CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CRM)

Here is an interesting question to ponder: if we all make mistakes, then what is

the advantage of having two pilots over one pilot on the flight deck of a
commercial airliner? After all, will two pilots not make twice as many mistakes
during a flight as a single pilot? Let us see if the reader can answer the question
by the end of this chapter.

While the past chapter shared some of the seemingly countless ways in which humans
fall prey to errors and biases, this chapter focuses on how the human spirit can
combine with science and ingenuity to build better ways of managing our tendency to
err and be biased. One major accomplishment toward that goal in aviation safety has
been the development of Crew Resource Management (CRM). Stated succinctly, CRM is a
philosophy for mitigating error and maximizing efficiency when operating an
aircraft that leverages the presence of more than one individual.

The concepts of CRM have wide applications to many facets of life and are used in
many industries. In aviation, the people involved in CRM are primarily pilots, but
also must involve flight attendants, external crewmembers, even passengers.
Essentially we are referring to any people or material that can have an impact on
the outcome of flight. All such people and material are considered resources, and
how we coordinate the use of such resources is the practice of CRM. The U.S. Air
Force offers a very useful explanation by stating, �CRM training is a key component
of a combined effort to identify and manage the conditions that lead to error�
(USAF, 2008, p. 5). Notice how the Air Force mentions CRM as a key, but not the
only, component in addressing the conditions that lead to error. We previously
mentioned individual accountability for our own performance as another important
means, but now we are discussing the team aspects of safety.

To reduce error, researchers have focused efforts on understanding the human

factors endemic to aircraft operations. Specifically, psychology has made major
inroads in detecting how errors are formed at the individual cognitive level.
However, such efforts do not address errors that arise due to crewmembers
interacting with each other, be it through verbal exchange, nonverbal
communication, or assumptions of what a fellow crewmember knows or actions being
undertaken. CRM was developed precisely to address such needs. Other advances have
been made in areas related to CRM processes and in how we train such processes
during initial and recurrent flight training. Yet, the amazing fact remains that
CRM is not universally embraced by pilots throughout the world. The world is a
large place and only a segment of the pilot population work for commercial air
carriers. Even within commercial aviation there are some pockets around the globe
where CRM principles are not followed. However, those pilots who embrace CRM can
significantly increase the safety of a flight, as will be depicted in this chapter.
Most commercial aviation operations throughout the world have, to some extent,
incorporated CRM training into the pilot curricula and even into how they train
other employees.

Fundamental CRM skill sets include leadership, communication, crew coordination,

judgment, and decision making. Each skill set presents a seemingly bottomless ocean
of knowledge for use in both routine and abnormal flight conditions. CRM can be
seen as a human victory over the potential errors that can surface in the complex
aviation system. The ingenuity and creativity of talented minds in the accident
prevention movement created CRM as a means for preventing, minimizing, and
correcting the natural human tendency to commit errors before such errors result in
disaster.

4.4.1. Evolution of CRM Principles

CRM is so embedded in the minds of most commercial aviation professionals today
that it is hard to imagine a world without it, but such a world did exist, and we
are by no means finished with the evolution of CRM development. We must remember
the roots of aviation to help visualize what flight operations looked like before
CRM. In October 1927, Pam American Airways flew a Fokker F-7 Trimotor from Key West
to Havana in what became the first U.S. commercial flight. Since then, individuals
and certain crews have used the principles of CRM, although they may not have
called it CRM, but it has not been until the last 30 or so years that the
principles have been lumped together and taught as part of CRM programs.

In the 1920s and 1930s, most aviators were associated with barnstorming and airmail
runs and, thus, were considered brave, even daring. The fatality rate was quite
high in those early days and it took a special kind of person, often male, to
undertake the profession. Although women aviators existed as the era of commercial
aviation began, most women in the aviation profession were associated with flight
attendant positions and were called �Skygirls.� The 1930 Boeing Air Transport
Manual provided the following guidance that today sounds humorous: �Skygirls should
render a rigid military salute to the captain as they go aboard and deplane � there
is no real need for conversation or contact.� Such was the perspective of pilots as
being significantly higher in social status from other airline employees, such as
flight attendants or ramp support personnel. The opinions of employees were neither
expected nor particularly welcome by many pilots, although exceptions undoubtedly
existed.

The high regard and even awe that employees used to have of captains were partly a
product of the heritage of aviators and also partly due to the nautical equivalent,
the ship captain, where the captain�s word was considered law. The situation
remained for several decades. Although group dynamics had been studied as an
offshoot of crew performance and accident investigation in the 1940s and 1950s, it
was not until the Apollo era of spaceflight in the 1960s that the topic came under
serious consideration when NASA studied the group dynamics of astronauts.

As the Apollo program was winding down, awareness that something was wrong in
commercial aviation started to grow slowly at first, and would eventually lead to
the CRM movement. In 1972 a Lockheed L-1011 operating as Eastern Airlines Flight
401 flew into the Everglades in Florida as all members of the flight deck crew were
focused on a burned-out light bulb. During the troubleshooting, no pilot had been
assigned the task of flying the aircraft and, although an altitude discrepancy was
noticed by air traffic control, the flight gently descended without the crew
noticing the critical controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) problem.

That same year in Europe, a Hawker Siddeley Trident operating as British European
Airways Flight 548 entered a deep stall 3 minutes after departing from London and
crashed, killing 118. The accident was a result of dysfunction in crew coordination
and, together with the Eastern 401 accident, served to catch the attention of
aviation safety professionals that something was seriously wrong with the human
element in commercial aviation safety.

In response to those and other serious accidents, the Flight Safety Foundation
(FSF) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) convened conferences
in 1974 and 1975 in Virginia and Turkey to address the concern of human causes to
commercial aviation accidents. The concern was growing within the awareness of
aviation safety professionals but was not necessarily high on the consciousness of
the public, but that would soon change.

Just 2 years after the IATA conference, two Boeing 747 aircraft collided in foggy
conditions on the island of Tenerife, Spain, causing the worst loss of life in any
single accident in the history of commercial aviation. That terrible record stands
to this day. The collision was a result of coordination breakdown, the false
expectancy of a takeoff clearance in the mind of one of the captains, and the lack
of assertiveness on behalf of crewmembers who did not question the captain�s
decision to takeoff without a clearance. A total of 583 people lost their lives in
that tragic accident.

One year later, in 1978, one more accident occurred that would be the final straw
that broke the camel�s back. A Douglas DC-8 operating as United Airlines Flight 173
crashed near Portland, Oregon, after running out of fuel, killing 10 occupants. The
accident resulted from the captain focusing too heavily on preparing the cabin for
an emergency landing due to a gear malfunction, while neglecting both the fuel
state and the increasing concerns of the other flight crewmembers who were
rightfully worried about running out of gas.

The string of accidents all occurred due to poor
the humans operating the flights so, building on
conferences in Virginia and Turkey, NASA decided
1979 out of which the CRM concept was officially
for Cockpit Resource Management and was narrowly
crewmembers, often comprised of two pilots and a
hindsight we consider the CRM principle that was
generation of CRM, since much was to happen over
shape the evolution of the modern CRM of today.
communication and coordination by
the momentum of the safety
to host a series of conferences in
born. At that time the term stood
focused on flight deck
flight engineer in those days. In
born in 1979 as the first
the next few decades that would

Crew Resource Management has evolved considerably since then. Many experts claim
that we are now living in the sixth generation of CRM, although several purport
that we are already in the seventh generation, although we do not yet realize the
shape that the seventh generation is taking. The first generation of CRM in 1979
focused on changing individual behavior, primarily that of the captain, so that
input would be incorporated from other flight deck crewmembers when making
decisions. Many of the captains of that era were born in the 1920s and were veteran
combat aviators from World War II. The first generation of CRM has since been
humorously referred to as �charm school� in that by trying to change the behavior
of captains it was often perceived as trying to turn gruffness into charm.

Around 1980 and 1981 two airlines lead the CRM movement globally, United Airlines
and KLM Airlines. Both programs stressed management and personality styles. As one
might imagine, many captains felt personally insulted by such initiatives and were
very defensive when told that they were exhibiting accident-prone behavior and
therefore had to change. Can you imagine a captain of that era, who may have shot
down enemy aircraft and been labeled a hero, suddenly told that he was a problem?

As airline accidents with CRM components continued to happen, such as the very
dramatic crash of a Boeing 737 operated as Air Florida flight 90 during a winter
storm in Washington, D.C. in 1982, the industry and government continued to
cooperate to shape and evolve CRM. In 1984, heavily influenced by the leadership of
Dr. John Lauber, CRM was defined in such a way that was accepted by stakeholders as
�the effective utilization of all available resources�hardware, software, and
liveware�to achieve safe, efficient flight operation.� Liveware, in this context,
alluded to humans.

As a result of these efforts, around 1984 the second generation of CRM took shape.
Instead of focusing on changing individual behaviors, CRM now went deeper in an
attempt to change attitudes and focus more on decision making as a group. This
generation also recognized that CRM should involve more than just flight deck
crewmembers and that others, such as flight attendants, often possessed key
information that should be communicated to the flight deck to prevent accidents.
Special emphasis was placed on briefing strategies and the development of realistic
simulator training profiles known as Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT). Figure
4-2 shows an airline flight crew operating a sophisticated modern Fokker 70/100
simulator to fly an approach. When combined with realistic situational scenarios,
such simulators host LOFT sessions that are grueling but extremely important for
pilots to learn both technical and CRM skills, and how both skills need to work
together to assure a safe outcome to the flight.

Figure 4-2. Modern flight simulator capable of performing a LOFT. (Source:

Wikimedia Commons)
By 1985 only four air carriers in the United States had full CRM programs: United,
Continental, Pan Am, and People�s Express. American and the U.S. Air Force Military
Airlift Command soon introduced CRM programs, and the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
were on the verge of starting CRM programs. In 1989, a very serious accident
happened that provided irrefutable proof that CRM principles worked. A DC-10
operating as United Airlines Flight 232 experienced the uncontained failure of its
#2 engine, resulting in a loss of normal flight controls. The captain ably
coordinated flight deck and cabin resources to perform a controlled crash of the
aircraft at Sioux City, Iowa. The resulting crash killed 111, but there were 185
survivors who likely would not have survived at all had it not been for the CRM
prowess of the crew.

In the early 1990s the third generation of CRM took hold, which deepened the notion
that CRM extended beyond the flight deck door. That generation saw the start of
joint training for flight deck and cabin crewmembers, such as for emergency
evacuations, placed emphasis on the role of organizational culture, and also
started exploring how flight deck automation was increasingly a key component of
communication and coordination protocols for pilots. Some vocal pilots voiced
concern that CRM was becoming too diluted by extending it past the flight deck with
all the increased emphasis on using external resources. Around 1992 CRM also saw
itself being exported to the medical community to address similar group dynamics
events associated with medical error in both routine and emergency care at
hospitals.

Around the mid-1990s the fourth generation of CRM was introduced, which promoted
the FAA�s voluntary Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) as a means for �custom
tailoring� CRM to the specific needs of each airline and stressed the use of Line
Oriented Evaluations (LOEs). This generation also fostered the pairing of crew
behaviors to checklists and advocated the integration of CRM training directly into
technical training versus as a stand-alone initiative. In 1998 the FAA made CRM
training mandatory for U.S. Airlines through FAR 121.404. It should be noted that
this was 19 years after NASA�s effort to start what became CRM, which shows the not
uncommon delay in implementing new regulations that promote safety.

Around 1999 the fifth generation of CRM took hold, which reframed the safety effort
under the umbrella of �error management,� modified the initiatives so as to be more
readily accepted by non-Western national cultures, and placed even more emphasis on
automation and, specifically, automation monitoring. Three lines of defense were
promoted against error: the avoidance of error in the first place, the trapping of
errors that occur so that they are limited in the damage they create, and the
mitigation of consequences when the errors cannot be trapped. This generation also
promoted the use of incident data in addition to accident data. This generation was
influenced by the now NTSB Member Robert Sumwalt and two co-authors who studied the
ASRS database and in 1997 published �What ASRS Data Tell about Inadequate Flight
Crew Monitoring.� In the paper they were quoted as stating, �One pilot must monitor
automated flight systems 100% of the time� and mentioned that �Monitoring � is the
lifeblood of safe flight operations.�

At the start of the 21st century, the sixth generation of CRM was formed, which
introduced the Threat and Error Management (TEM) framework as a formalized approach
for identifying sources of threats and preventing them from impacting safety at the
earliest possible time. Sophisticated and elaborate TEM models were introduced for
intervention and rely heavily on human factors knowledge for improving safety in
aviation.
Threats can be any condition that makes a task more complicated, such as rain
during ramp operations or fatigue during overnight maintenance. They can be
external or internal. External threats are outside the aviation professional�s
control and could include weather, a late gate change, or not having the correct
tool for a job. Internal threats are something that is within the worker�s control,
such as stress, time pressure, or loss of situational awareness. If the threats are
not managed properly they can impact safety margins and cause errors, which are
mistakes that are made when threats are mismanaged. Errors come in the form of
noncompliance, procedural, communication, proficiency, or operational decisions.

The TEM framework recognizes the relationship between threats and errors. In fact,
many airlines are moving away from CRM training and putting more emphasis on TEM
instead. They feel that CRM is too broad and open to too much interpretation. If
aviation professionals can identify the threats and manage them, then they can
directly mitigate human errors. Safety procedures are in place to resist some risks
from having harmful outcomes, such as inspections and operational checklists, but
some errors do not have a buffer. However, we as workers also have the opportunity
to resolve the error before it leads to a negative impact.

To assess the Threat and Error Management aspects of a situation, aviation

processionals should:

Identify threats, errors, and error outcomes.

Identify �Resolve and Resist� strategies and counter measures already in place.

Recognize human factors aspects that affect behavior choices and decision making.

Recommend solutions for changes that lead to a higher level of safety awareness.

4.4.2. Central Theme of CRM

The evolution of CRM has been long and productive, and will undoubtedly continue
into the future. Throughout it all, a central theme has emerged where leaders and
subordinates work together in a way that maximizes efficiency and safety. Although
many important concepts are covered in CRM training, the one most overriding idea
is that of creating an environment that is most suited for the proper types of
communication and coordination.

The importance of a supervisor or senior employee setting the proper tone for his
or her coworkers cannot be overstated in order to achieve the proper safety
environment. This is particularly true if the supervisor or senior employee
promotes inquiry and assertion by working to open the lines of communication. Of
course, the concept of assertion not only depends on the supervisor or senior
employee setting the proper tone for a flight. Other employees must also be
encouraged to inquire when someone feels that something is wrong and to advocate
their concerns in such a fashion that does not diminish the supervisor or senior
employee�s authority, but that instead uses the supervisor or senior employee as a
catalyst for solving problems.

Henceforth in our discussion we will refer to the supervisor or senior employee as

the captain, given that so much of CRM development has focused on the captain of an
aircraft as the leader of the airborne team. However, the reader is urged to
remember that the concepts being discussed transcend the flight deck and apply
throughout commercial aviation employee ranks.

This central theme of CRM of which we speak is best expressed in two elements:

Authority with participation

Assertiveness with respect

4.4.2.1. Participation.
Authority is defined for purposes of this text as the ability to influence others
as a result of the office or rank that one occupies. The captain cannot be
everywhere at once, nor aware of all processes that affect the aircraft at any
given time. Furthermore, numerous tasks sometimes need to be accomplished
simultaneously. Thus, the captain must be able to effectively delegate authority to
different crewmembers at different times, while retaining overall responsibility
for the safety of the aircraft and its occupants. This process requires that the
captain place trust in the training and the capabilities of the crewmembers that
are being delegated tasks.

In the context of CRM, the captain should attempt to perform participative

leadership, which is a leadership style in which crewmembers are encouraged to be
part of the decision-making process while being given full autonomy to accomplish
specifically assigned tasks. One of the many challenges faced during the
introduction of CRM was that changing someone�s leadership style, much like
attempting to change personality, is an extremely difficult undertaking once the
style has been firmly in place for some time. The element of participation in
leadership decisions carries the potential risk of influencing how people perceive
the authority of the leader. Flying an aircraft does not employ democracy for
decision making! It is highly desirable that a captain be a strong leader, which in
the CRM context is defined as fostering crew participation without diminishing
one�s perceived authority.

Captains are vested by their company and by aviation regulations with the authority
to influence others as the designated leaders of their crews. Discussions on the
concept of captain�s authority are prevalent on professional flight decks across
the world. It is quite common these days to hear flight crews bemoaning the
perceived erosion of captain�s authority, as is illustrated in the first ASRS
example later in this chapter.

Much of the early culture and processes in aviation were modeled from maritime
history. As such, the concept of deference to a captain�s authority originated in
the maritime world, where it was discovered long ago that ships could not be
governed democratically without catastrophic consequences. Not too long ago,
maritime law actually expressed the matter succinctly by stating, �The captain�s
word is law.� Further increasing the sense of an airline captain�s authority was
the tremendous respect, if not awe, that most people had toward the early pioneers
of aviation.

As air travel became increasingly safe in the 20th century, the public started
losing some of its awe for pilots. As the number of aviators swelled into the tens
of thousands and the accident rate dropped dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, the
public sentiment toward pilots shifted. Aviators were no longer seen as minor gods
by the general public and, more to the point, by fellow aviation professionals such
as ground support personnel and cabin crewmembers. The increasing accessibility of
air travel following the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act in the United States caused
a further reduction in the perceived prestige of the airline pilot profession.

Pilot acceptance of CRM during the 1980s was hampered, partly, by captains who
viewed the movement as an attack on their authority. In the years since the
September 2001 terrorist attacks, pilot unions have voiced concern that security
measures have further diminished the captain�s authority. Security decisions are
often made for a flight by government officials without consulting the captain,
thus effectively usurping the captain�s authority in such matters. Furthermore, the
terrorist attacks of the past 15 years have resulted in the continuing requirement
for pilots to undergo security screenings, further reducing the appearance that
they were special in the eyes of the traveling public. In fact, these days, flight
crewmembers are occasionally rebuked by passengers for cutting ahead of security
screening lines. Such passengers have even been heard to complain that crewmembers
should not receive preferential treatment.

Captains approaching retirement or those who have retired often reminisce about the
esteem that they were afforded and about how the few disagreements that occurred in
the bygone era were handled, back in the days when �the captain was king.� Any
disagreements with ground personnel or flight attendants were dealt with quickly
and efficiently, often quite harshly. In many cultures, such respect (or fear) for
captain�s authority persists to some degree while in others, it is perceived as
quickly receding into the annals of history.

Regulations are in place to protect captain�s authority. In the United States,

Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.3 (a) states that �the pilot-in-command (PIC)
of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority to, the
operation of that aircraft.� 14 CFR 121.535 (d) states that each PIC is, during
flight operations, �in command of the aircraft and crew and is responsible for the
safety of the passengers, crewmembers, cargo, and airplane.� FAR 121.557 allows the
PIC to take any action considered necessary during emergency situations that
require immediate decisions. 14 CFR 91, 125, and 135, all have similar language
empowering captains with command authority. Challenges to captain�s authority must
be met head on, but with respect and politely. The authority provided to leaders
must be used with great judgment by soliciting participation from subordinates.
Leaders must also remember to never assume malice as someone�s motivation for
challenging authority when simple ignorance may be involved.

4.4.2.2. Assertiveness.
Continuing with our discussion of the central theme of CRM, let us turn our
attention to looking at the second component: assertiveness with respect.
Assertiveness is defined as �a style of communication in which individuals express
their feelings and needs directly� (VandenBos, 2007). In CRM, assertiveness means
that a crewmember should know what questions to ask and not be hesitant to ask
them. Assertiveness also requires that crewmembers candidly state opinions about a
course of action or planning item and voice concerns immediately. A five-step
assertiveness process is often taught to subordinates in order to encourage the
captain to act on the crewmember�s input. The advocacy of an opinion or of a
desired course of action is imperative in the decision-making process, particularly
in the highly time-sensitive environment of aviation (Kern, 2001).

A climate of mutual respect is the key to the success of interpersonal

relationships in life and to completing tasks in any working environment. Given
that professional pilots are, by virtue of their office, the end-result of many
years of training, that notion alone should warrant a certain level of respect.
However in CRM, the reasons for exhibiting respect when interacting with fellow
crewmembers are not only an appropriate deference to one�s commitment to aviation,
it also has direct ramifications for safety. It is only by respecting the input of
a crewmember that one can expect future input to be provided. For example, a pilot
who dismisses the concern of a flight attendant because it seems unfounded may not
only be disregarding a key piece of information that affects the flight, but by
virtue of the dismissal, may also have made the flight attendant reluctant to voice
concerns in the future. Likewise, a crewmember who shows disrespect toward a person
in a position of authority can also negatively impact the CRM process by making the
senior member more hesitant to solicit input.

4.4.3. Proof of CRM Effectiveness

Although CRM has evolved through numerous stages since its inception, the basic
premise is the notion that very often someone in the sequence of events has the
power to intervene and prevent an accident. The external and internal factors that
prevent key individuals from taking action to prevent an accident have been the
subject of countless studies.

We now have a better understanding of some of the key issues that form part of what
the aviation industry calls CRM. However, we would be remiss if we did not ask the
most fundamental of all questions: does CRM really work? Some questions can only be
answered with time. Now that the CRM movement has several successful decades behind
it, data can be depicted showing the tangible impact that CRM training has had on
the safety of aviation.

In most airlines of the Western world today, CRM skill sets are a core component of
initial and recurrent training curricula. Nevertheless, pilots and the personnel
who support them continue to make significant human errors that make it very
challenging to further reduce the rate at which accidents happen. It should be
noted that no one has proposed that CRM is a means for eliminating all errors. CRM
is a way to address error, but do we have proof that CRM actually has increased the
level of safety with which we operate aircraft? From the very beginning of the CRM
movement, flight training instructors, curriculum designers, and aviation
researchers have sought to find out whether the methodologies they were designing
actually were producing a benefit. The desire to quantify whether error management
methodologies are effective predate the CRM movement. Such efforts emerged out of
general research in the field of psychology and out of customized studies in
aviation human factors. As illustrated in Figure 4-3, NASA has used human test
subjects who are often active airline pilots for simulator studies about CRM.
Additional literature materials and citations regarding CRM theory and practice can
be found in the online supplement to this chapter.

Figure 4-3. Simulation studying CRM and use of advanced technology. (Source:
NASA)magnify-glass
4.4.4. CRM Pyramid Model
Given the many components of CRM and the various ways that each component affects
each other, it proves convenient to produce a model of how everything works
together. The reader may recall the discussion in Chapter 2 of why such models are
helpful. As concepts become increasingly complex it is common to resort to models
as a way of helping to understand how the concepts interrelate. They help us grasp
�the big picture� so we can try to make sense of it all. Also remember the
previously mentioned caveat that since models are inherently attempts to simplify,
they can sacrifice knowledge of the nuances that are sometimes critical to getting
the full picture of all the types of factors involved in an accident.

Bearing in mind such limitations of conceptual modeling, a depiction called the CRM
Pyramid model, shown as Figure 4-4, has been created to help the reader interpret
and contextualize the contents that are to follow about CRM. The model is in
pyramid form as a way to facilitate understanding and illustrate how certain
components of CRM are fundamental building blocks, or prerequisites, for subsequent
models.

Figure 4-4. The CRM Pyramid model. (Source: Authors)

Let us read the pyramid model from the top-down. Hovering above the model are the
two reasons why CRM is such an important part of commercial aviation. When properly
performed CRM directly leads to the creation and sustainment of safety and
efficiency. The terms safety and efficiency are intimately related, in that an
accident is the ultimate expression of an inefficient system. Grouping both terms
together is also meant to imply that the processes that promote safety can also
promote the efficiency of aircraft operation.
So, going back to the model, notice that both safety and efficiency are the direct
products of Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM), which is the top-most component of
the pyramid. ADM refers to how pilots use mental processes to consistently
determine how best to respond to a given set of circumstances. ADM is only as good
as the Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) of the team members who are involved in
making the decision. SSA refers to the common perceptions and comprehension of an
environment and how they impact the future, as held by two or more people. The
accuracy of SSA creates the reality and the common mental model of the team
members, and therefore, directs their decision making. The SSA is a product of how
well a team coordinates its actions, which depends intimately on the verbal and
nonverbal communication of members, which explains why the coordination component
underlies SSA and why the communication component underlies coordination in the
model.

The foundation of the model is leadership and followership, since the effectiveness
of the interplay between leaders and followers directly impacts the quality of
communication that is used to coordinate actions that build SSA for peak ADM. That
is how the CRM Pyramid model works to depict the interrelation of the key
components of CRM. Affecting every component of the model is culture, which means
the shared values and beliefs of a group of people, often impacted by behavioral
norms shaped by a nation, profession, and organization.

Although the CRM Pyramid model was just described from top to bottom, the ideal way
to study each component is to start with the foundation, leadership, and
followership, since the interplay of both set the stage for everything that follows
inside of the pyramid, except for culture. The next parts of the chapter cover each
component of the model and finish the chapter by describing how culture impacts the
overall conduct of CRM.