Term Paper Towards Fulfillment of the Assessment in the Subject of Constitutional Law

INTEGRATION OF PRINCELY STATES

IN INDIA: ROLE OF STATES
COMMITTEE OF CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY

Submitted To:
Asst. Prof. Milind Gawai

Anoushka Singh (2017 009)

MAHARASHTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, MUMBAI
 Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 2

2. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY............................................................................. 4

3. THE STATES COMMITTEE ...................................................................................... 7

4. ACCESSION OF STATES........................................................................................... 9

i) Junagadh ........................................................................................................................... 10

ii) Kashmir ............................................................................................................................. 10

iii) Hyderabad ......................................................................................................................... 11

5. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................... 12

6. BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 13

1
 1. INTRODUCTION

When the British declared that they would leave India by June 1948, they gave nearly 500-plus
Indian Princely States the tacit option of either joining India or Pakistan or remaining
Independent. On the political map of India, these States collectively had occupied a territory
admeasuring approximately 7.16,000 square miles (18,54,440 square kilometres - about 45%
of the total Indian territory) and containing a population of about 93 million people (about 25%
of India’s then total population.
The Indian States Committee of 1928-29 had put the number of the then extant Princely States
at 526. Subsequently, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitution Reforms in
1933-34 raised their number to 6001. Later, their actual number was found to be 573.

Figure 1: Princely States in India2

1
Kulkami, V.B. (1998): “Integration of Princely States”, in: Grover, Verinder (1998): “Vallabhbhai
Patel: A Biography of His Vision and Ideas”, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, p.490.
2
Partition of India and similarities with BREXIT Pakistan Academy of Competitive Exam,
https://pace.pk/brexit-and-partition-of-india/ (Accessed Aug 22, 2018)
2
Sir William Lee-Wamer, regarded in those days as an authority on the Princely States in India,
had observed, “the preservation of the numerous country principalities has exceeded the
expectations, and even the designs, of those who built up the British Dominion in the East”3.
Before the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, many principalities were annexed by the English Company
Government on the charges of gross misrule. If the same corrective measure was applied by
the succeeding British Crown Governments in later years, the British India’s political map
would have presented a much tidier appearance.
The basic policy of the British Government in India in relation to the Indian States was laid
down in the Queen’s Proclamation (1860)4:
“We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions, and while we will permit no
aggression upon our Dominions or our right to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction
no encroachments on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity and honour of native
Princes as our own; and we desire that they as well as our own subjects should enjoy that
prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good
government.”
This Proclamation clearly brought out the dualism in the composition of political India. That
part of India which was under the direct rule of the British Government was governed by laws,
rules and regulations made from time to time by the British Government, whereas that part of
India, which was covered by the Indian Native States was left to be governed by the respective
States without any encroachment being made on their power to carry on their governments.
Furthermore, the Indian States ceased to be allies of the British Government as such; they were
substantially transformed into the protected ‘feudatories’ of the Crown of England, “whose
sovereignty over them was boldly and frankly announced and pressed with the unquestioned
authority of irresistible military power.”5
In reality, many of these so-called ‘States’ were minuscule land-grant Jagirs of the pre-English
Mughal and other native rulers. But a few of them like Hyderabad, Kashmir, Mysore,
Travancore, Gwalior and Baroda indeed were very large self-proclaimed States. The
continuance of these States governed by autocratic rulers, however, served a basic imperial
purpose of the British Government. Sir John Macdonald, as early as 1825, had articulated this

3
Kulkami, V.B., ibid.
4
Gajendragadkar, P.B. (1966): “Kashmir - Retrospect and Prospect”, in: ‘Patel Memorial
Lectures: (Combined) - 1955-85’ (1990), New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, p.517.
5
Panikkar, K.M. (1927): “The Relations of lndian States with the Government of India”,
London: Martin Hopkinson, pp.34-35.
3
purpose, “I am decidedly of the opinion that the tranquillity, not to say security, of our vast
oriental possession is involved in the preservation of native principalities which are dependent
on us for protection. These are also so obviously at our mercy, so entirely within our grasp,
that besides other and great benefits we derive from their alliance, their coexistence with our
rule is itself a source of political strength, the value of which will never be known till it is lost.”6
Again, majority of the rulers of these States were indeed Hindus and were associated with the
Indian milieu for generations. But an extremely coercive, corrupt and uncontrolled reign of
these rulers prevailed in many of these States. As Pandit Nehru had observed,
“The Indian States represent today the extremist type of autocracy existing in the world. They
are, of course, subject to British suzerainty, but the British Government interferes only for the
protection and advancement of British interests.”7

2. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The reason why the years leading up to India’s independence, and their content in terms of
attempts to actuate a federation, are significant is that they point us to important challenges that
state-building in India faced in the post-transition phase. Still, they do not necessarily exhaust
the problems identified by the members of the Constituent Assembly Debates during the course
of elaborating on the Constitution.
The Constituent Assembly of India - created and constrained by the Cabinet Mission Plan - sat
for the first time on 9th December 1946. Representatives of the princely states did not
participate in the initial sittings of the Constituent Assembly.8
During colonial rule, princely states had a direct relationship with the Crown, different from
that of the regular British Indian provinces; they were, to a large extent, independently
governed by their respective monarchs. The position of the princely states became uncertain
when the British decided to leave India: they could remain independent or join the Indian
Union. Some of them considered joining and taking part in the constitution-making process but
the question of how remained.

6
Gupta, Sisir (1966): “Kashmir - A Study in India-Pakistan Relations”, New Delhi: Asia Publishing
House, p. 18.
7
Nehru, Jawaharlal (1962): “Autobiography”, Bombay: Allied Publishers, pp.530-31
8
CADIndia, CAD,
https://cadindia.clpr.org.in/blogs/the_constituent_assembly_sets_up_committee_to_negotiate_with_th
e_princely_states (Accessed Aug 30, 2018)
4
The Cabinet Mission Plan contained a proposal for the setting up of a Negotiating Committee
to facilitate the participation of the representatives of the princely states in the framing of
India’s Constitution. On 21st December 1946, K.M. Munshi moved an amendment in the
Constituent Assembly to set up this committee. This newly set up committee would engage
with a committee that had already been set up by the Chamber of Princes, and with other
representatives of the princely states to determine the distribution of seats in the Constituent
Assembly reserved for the princely states and decide on how the representatives of the princely
states would be returned to the Assembly. Munshi’s resolution proposed to appoint the
following to the Negotiating Committee: Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, Jawaharlal
Nehru, Sardar Patel, Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Shankarrao Deo and Gopalaswami Ayyangar and
provided for the addition of a maximum of three more members.

The Constituent Assembly while broadly agreeing with Munshi’s resolution, moved some
amendments and a debate followed. P.R Thakkur, Jaipal Singh and Munniswami Pillai wanted
members of the depressed classes (Dalits/lower castes) to be represented on the Constituent
Assembly’s negotiating committee. They believed that the depressed classes were worse off in
the princely states than in the British Indian provinces and their interests had to be protected
during negotiations. B.G. Kher, Nehru and Munshi opposed these proposals. They argued that
the negotiating committee’s brief was limited and communal representation was neither
desirable nor as Nehru reasoned, would be practical: numerous groups could be identified on a
communal basis and providing for representation for all on the small committee was not
possible.

Another concern – first expressed by Somanath Lahiri – was that the negotiating committee
might make decisions unilaterally, without the approval or ratification of the Constituent
Assembly. Diwan Chaman Lall moved an amendment to Munshi’s resolution: it called for the
negotiating committee ‘to report to the Constituent Assembly the result of such negotiation.’
Nehru gave an assurance that no final decisions would be taken by the negotiating committee
without taking the Constituent Assembly on board. Munshi accepted Diwan Lall’s amendment
and urged the Assembly to do the same. The Constituent Assembly adopted the amended
Resolution as per Diwan Lall’s proposal and all other amendments were withdrawn.

The gist of the States Reorganisation Committee’s labour, which was finalised in 1955 laid the
foundation for the redrawing of subunit boundaries in 1956. It was a redrawing that meant that
the, out of convenience, accepted formula for India’s federation in the immediate aftermath of

5
independence was abandoned, namely the threefold distinction between states—i.e. between
those that consisted of former provinces coalesced with adjacent Princely States, those
constituted either through the grouping of former Princely States or through keeping the
territory of a former Princely State intact, and territories that were placed under the direct
control of the centre.
There is a paucity of accurate information about the role of the States Assembly, as recounted
by European scholars. For instance, the confounding book on India as a ‘state-nation’ rather
than a ‘nation-state’9, offers a tellingly misconceived depiction of the Constituent Assembly.
It is written that, “there was little doubt about the provisions for protection of linguistic,
cultural, and religious diversity”, thus entirely disregarding the intractable conflict between the
Congress and the Muslim League on the issue of communal representation, the concurrent
boycott of the assembly by Muslim League representatives and the Princely States alike, and
the many concerns that were raised inside and outside the assembly regarding how to protect
low-caste and tribal communities as well as other socio-economically ‘backward’ groups.
Much of the information in this paper has been borrowed from V. P. Menon’s recount of the
work of the States Ministry10.
There was tension between those who wanted to enshrine a broad spectrum of fundamental
rights in the Constitution and those that were sceptical towards the possibility of realising the
universal protection of these. As is well-known, there was also a clear divide between those
who wished for the Congress to refrain from becoming a conventional political party, and
instead remain committed to its Gandhian-inspired social work, and those who—like Nehru
and Patel—saw it as the Congress’ responsibility to govern.
First, the continued uncertainty about the future of the Princely States is evident in B.R.
Ambedkar’s concerns in November 1948 when the Draft Constitution was introduced in the
Constituent Assembly. While commenting on disparities in the proposed ‘constitutional
relations between the Centre and the Provinces’ and ‘the Centre and the Indian States’, he
objected to the legally sanctioned possibilities for the Princely States ‘to create their own
Constituent Assemblies and to frame their own constitutions’ and to the fact that ‘the Indian
States under the Draft Constitution are permitted to maintain their own armies’11. Of this,
nothing of course remained in the end of 1949. Even when Ambedkar raised these concerns,

9
Stepan, Alfred, Linz, Juan J. and Yadav, Yogendra, 2011. Crafting State-Nations: India and Other
Multinational Democracies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
10
V. P. Menon, Integration of the Indian states (Orient Blackswan) (2014)
11
Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings), 4 November 1948.
6
he himself noted that only a maximum of 30 states existed as ‘viable states’ and that the others
had fully acceded to the Union
A second ambiguity is contained in the worries of CA members regarding the vagueness of the
word ‘states’ as it was being used in the Draft Constitution12. On the one hand, it was seen as
overly mutable and as applied to a diverse set of entities and, on the other, it entailed the risk
of affording the Princely States with a sense of legitimate claims to sovereignty. It is interesting
to note that Ambedkar acknowledged a continued divergence between provinces and Princely
States when he maintained that the latter ‘are sovereign States’ and that any initiative to ‘change
their boundaries’ ought to be based on ‘consent’13. On 18 November 1948, while challenged
on his position on the Princely States’ sovereignty, he argued that ‘nothing in the Negotiating
Committee report (of the two committees representing former British India and the Princely
States respectively) will be understood to permit the Indian Union to encroach upon the
territories of the Indian States’14.
A third dilemma concerned India’s unity per se—a problem that the Princely States acted as a
reminder of. While detailing the Draft Constitution, Ambedkar insisted that ‘the Federation
was not’, in the eyes of the Drafting Committee, ‘an agreement by the States to join in a
Federation’. Rather, ‘[t]he Federation is a Union because it is indestructible’ and despite the
decision to establish a federal form of government out of a ‘convenience of administration’,
India should be thought of as ‘one integral whole, [and] its people a single people living under
a single imperium derived from a single source’15.

3. THE STATES COMMITTEE

The States Committee was appointed by the Constituent Assembly on December 21, 1946 to
confer with the corresponding Negotiating Committee set up by the Chamber of Princes and
other representatives of the princely states. It held its first meeting on January 16, 1947 and
elected Jawaharlal Nehru as its Chairman. At this and subsequent meetings of the two
committees a number of agendas setting out the respective viewpoints of the two committees
and various proposals formulated by them or their secretariats in regard to the scope of
negotiations, the distribution of the 93 seats in the Constituent Assembly allotted to the princely

12
Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings), 5 November 1948.
13
Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings), 17 November 1948.
14
Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings), 18 November 1948
15
Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings), 4 November 1948
7
states under the Cabinet Mission’s Plan, the method of selection of the States’ representatives,
etc. were discussed.
During January- February, 1947 the Committee had five sittings. The discussions were mainly
based on several notes and memoranda submitted to the Committee by the Constitutional
Advisor and Constituent Assembly Secretariat, and by the princely States’ representatives such
as Dewan of Baroda, B. L. Mitter. Amongst the important points discussed at these meetings
were: the scope and functions of the Committee, negotiations with the appropriate authorities
in Bhutan and Sikkim, the representative character of the States Negotiating Committee and
the representation of Baroda in the Assembly.
The first series of joint meetings between the States Committee of the Constituent Assembly
and the States Negotiating Committee were held on February 8 and 9, 1947. The discussion
largely centred on the scope of subjects to be negotiated between the two Committees. The
States Negotiating Committee urged that it would be difficult for the States to take a decision
in regard to entering the Constituent Assembly unless certain assurances desired by the the
Princes were forthcoming. The members of the States Committee of the Constituent Assembly
held that although these points could properly be discussed only by the Constituent Assembly
itself, they had no objection to their being discussed in a friendly and informal manner. During
the course of the discussions Jawaharlal Nehru clarified a number of points and attempted to
remove certain misapprehensions which seemed to be causing concern to the Princes.
The second series of joint meetings between the two Committees held on March 1 and 2, 1947
considered the question of distribution of the 93 seats on the basis of the recommendations
made by the Secretariats of the Constituent Assembly and the Chamber of Princes. It was
pointed out by the members of the States Committee of Constituent Assembly that His
Majesty’s Government’s declaration of February 20 to bring an end to the Paramountcy of the
Crown had introduced an additional element of urgency in the task of the two Committees and
that it would be greatly to the advantage of the States themselves to send their representatives
to join the next session of the Constituent Assembly and participate in the various committees
set up by the Assembly. Though the suggestion was not immediately accepted by the States
Negotiating Committee, the distribution of the 93 seats as proposed by the two Secretariats was
approved by the two Committees. They also agreed that not less than 50% of the States’
representatives would be popularly elected of the joint meetings of the two Committees
On suggestion made by Jawaharlal Nehru at the joint meeting on March 1, 1947 the two
Committees appointed a Joint Sub-Committee to work out the details of the proposals discussed
at the joint meetings of the Committees and also to examine any alternative proposals that
8
might strike them. The Sub-Committee met the same afternoon. The March 2 joint meeting of
the two Committees decided to continue the Sub-Committee “to go into various small matters”
and wherever necessary consult the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes on the one hand and
President of the Constituent Assembly on the other “for such details as it might be necessary
to consider”. The Sub-Committee met on March 6 and 23, April 24 and June 5, 1947.
At the last joint meeting of the States Committee of the Constituent Assembly and the
Negotiating Committee of the Chamber of Princes held on March 2, 1947, it was agreed that
the latter would place the conclusions reached at the joint meeting of the two Committees
before a general conference of Rules and representatives of States for ratification at an early
date. A meeting of the Ministers of the Chamber of Princes was held at Bombay on March 30.
It was followed by a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Chamber of Princes and a
conference of the Rulers on April 1 and 2 respectively.
The States Committee submitted its report to the President of the Constituent Assembly on
April 24, 1947 after it had succeeded in securing agreement on the method of distribution of
the 93 seats in the Assembly allotted to the States under the Cabinet Mission’s plan and on the
manner of selecting the States’ representatives to fill these seats. The report was presented to
the House on April 28, 1947. While moving it for adoption, Jawaharlal Nehru explained the
scope and the nature of negotiations held and agreement reached with the representatives of
the States and States Negotiating Committee.16

4. ACCESSION OF STATES

From June to August 15, 1947, 562 of the 565 India-linked states signed the instrument of
accession. Despite dramatic political exchanges, Travancore, Jodhpur and Indore signed on
time. Patel was also willing to take on other Indian leaders for the sake of accomplishing the
job. The privy purse pledge was offensive to many socialists, and Prime Minister Nehru had
complained of Patel by-passing the Cabinet to make the pledge to the Princes. Patel described
the pledge as an essential guarantee of the Government's intentions, and it was duly
incorporated into the Constitution. (In 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Congress Party
would repeal the clause through a constitutional amendment.17) Patel defended their right to
retain property and contest elections for public office, and today, especially in states like

16
B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution, vol. 1 (Universal Law Publishing) (2015)
17
The Constitution (26th Amendment) Act, 1971. National Informatics Centre.
9
Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, descendants of the formerly royal families play an important
role in politics.
However, in the strenuous process of integration three major conflicts arose that posed a major
threat to the Union:
i) Junagadh
Junagadh was a state on the southwestern end of Gujarat, with the principalities of Manavadar,
Mangrol and Babriawad. The Arabian Sea stood between it and Pakistan, and over 80% of its
population was Hindu. Possibly on the advice of his Dewan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who was
prominent in the Muslim League, the Nawab of Junagadh Mahabhat Khan acceded to Pakistan.
The accession was announced on August 15, 1947, when Pakistan had come into being. When
Pakistan confirmed the acceptance of the accession in September, the Government of India was
outraged that Muhammad Ali Jinnah would accept the accession of Junagadh despite his
argument that Hindus and Muslims could not live as one nation18. Patel believed that if
Junagadh was permitted to go to Pakistan, it would exacerbate the communal tension already
simmering in Gujarat.
Patel gave Pakistan time to void the accession and hold a plebiscite in Junagadh. Samaldas
Gandhi formed a democratic government-in-exile, the Arzi Hukumat of the people of
Junagadh. Eventually, Patel ordered the forcible annexation of Junagadh's three principalities.
Junagadh's court, facing financial collapse and no possibility of resisting Indian forces, first
invited the Arzi Hukumat, and later the Government of India to accept the reins. A plebiscite
was conducted in December, in which approximately 99% of the people chose India over
Pakistan19.
ii) Kashmir
Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu, was equally hesitant about acceding to either India — he felt
his mostly Muslim subjects would not like joining a Hindu-majority nation — or Pakistan —
an eventuality which he would personally prefer to avoid. He personally believed that Kashmir
could exercise its right to stay independent; a belief in which he was backed by Sheikh
Abdullah, the leader of Kashmir's largest political party, the National Conference. However,
Pakistan coveted the Himalayan kingdom, while Indian leaders including Gandhi and Nehru
hoped that the kingdom would join India. Hari Singh signed a Standstill Agreement (preserving
status quo) with Pakistan, but did not make his decision by August 15.

18
Rajmohan Gandhi. “Patel: A Life” p. 292
19
Rajmohan Gandhi. “Patel: A Life” p. 438
10
Pakistan, concerned about the lack of movement on the front, attempted to force the issue by
permitting the incursions of tribal people from the North-West Frontier, followed in September
1947 by regular forces. India offered military assistance to the Kashmiri Government, which
was totally without an organised military; such assistance, however, was conditional on the
Maharaja signing the Instrument of Accession, which he then did20. By this time the raiders
were close to the capital of Srinagar. Indian troops secured Jammu, Srinagar and the valley
itself during the First Kashmir War, but the intense fighting flagged with the onset of winter,
which made much of the state impassable. Prime Minister Nehru, recognising the degree of
international attention brought to bear on the dispute, declared a ceasefire and sought U.N.
arbitration with the promise of a plebiscite. Patel had argued against both, describing Kashmir
as a bilateral dispute and its accession as justified by international law. Patel had feared that
the U.N.'s involvement would stall the process and allow Pakistan to reinforce its presence in
Kashmir; in addition, it was far from clear, which way a plebiscite would go. In 1957, Kashmir
was officially integrated into the Union, but with special provisions made for it in the
Constitution's Article 370. The north-western portion that remained under control of the
Pakistan army is today Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In 1962, China occupied Aksai Chin,
the north-eastern region bordering Ladakh.
iii) Hyderabad
Hyderabad was a state that stretched over 82,000 square miles (over 212,000 square kilometres)
in the centre of India and with a population of 16 million, 85% of whom were Hindus. Its ruler
was Nizam Usman Ali Khan who had always enjoyed a special relationship with the British
Raj. When the British ruled out dominion status, the Nizam set his mind upon independence,
under the influence of Muslim radical Qasim Razvi. Without Hyderabad, a large gap would
exist in the centre of the united nation envisioned by Indian nationalists and the Indian public.
Patel believed that Hyderabad was looking to Pakistan for support and could pose a constant
threat to India's security in the future. Patel argued that Hyderabad was essential for India's
unity, but he agreed with Lord Mountbatten that force should not be used immediately. A
Standstill Agreement was signed — an agreement made with no other princely state without
an explicit assurance of eventual accession. However, Patel required Hyderabad promise it
would not join Pakistan. Mountbatten and India's agent K.M. Munshi engaged the Nizam's
envoys into negotiations. However, no deal was reached that both sides found acceptable, and
the Nizam alleged that India had created a blockade. India, on the other hand, charged that

20
Hindustan Times, “Instrument of Accession”. 08 Aug 2006. Accessed 30 Aug 2018
11
Hyderabad was receiving arms from Pakistan, and that the Nizam was allowing Razvi's
Razakar militants to intimidate Hindus and attack villages in India.
Lord Mountbatten crafted a proposal called the Heads of Agreement, which called for the
disbandment of the Razakars and restriction of the Hyderabad army, for the Nizam to hold a
plebiscite and elections for a constituent assembly, and for eventual accession. While India
would control Hyderabad's foreign affairs, the deal allowed Hyderabad to set up a parallel
government and delay accession. Hyderabad's envoys assured Mountbatten that the Nizam
would sign the agreement, and he lobbied Patel hard to sign for India. Patel signed the deal but
retained his belief that the Nizam would not accept it21. The Nizam, taking Razvi's advice
dismissed the plan. In September 1948, Patel made it clear in Cabinet meetings that he intended
to use force against the Nizam. He obtained the agreement of the new Governor-General
Chakravarthi Rajagopalachari and Prime Minister Nehru after some contentious debate, and
under Operation Polo, sent the Army to invade Hyderabad. Between September 13 and 18th,
Indian troops fought Hyderabadi troops and Razakars and defeated them. Patel retained the
Nizam as the head of state as a conciliatory gesture. The main aim of Mountbatten and Nehru
in attempting to achieve integration through diplomacy had been to avoid an outbreak of
Hindu-Muslim violence. Patel insisted that if Hyderabad was allowed to continue its
independence, the prestige of the Government would be tarnished and then neither Hindus nor
Muslims would feel secure in its realm. The successful annexation of Hyderabad was praised
by many Indian Muslim leaders, as there were no episodes of civil violence.

5. CONCLUSION

The integration of princely states into the new postcolonial union of India was one of the most
remarkable and complex achievements of the transfer of power that occurred in the mid-
twentieth century. Yet this event, involving the political dissolution of hundreds of semi-
sovereign territories and their subsequent realignment with the new centre in Delhi, has
received the scantest of scholarly attention
This paper attempted to revisit the process of integration, to look a new at the series of events
that remain foundational to the creation of the postcolonial Indian state. Given that
approximately 600 principalities were jointly involved, intertwined with a series of national
and British imperial organisations, the potential scope of this subject is vast. The focus of this

21
Rajmohan Gandhi. “Patel: A Life” p. 480
12
paper was one element of the integration: The Constituent Assembly’s role. At the beginning
of the States’ metamorphosis in 1946-47, the Assembly conducted the negotiations with the
rulers, for these were beyond the competence of the Interim Government. However, after its
establishment in July 1947, the States Ministry under Sardar Patel assumed the primary
responsibility for bringing the Princes into the Union. The Assembly, however, continued to
be closely involved with what Patel called the ‘unionization’ of the States, although largely as
a ratifying body, drafting the provisions to implement the agreements reached between the
States Ministry and the Princes.
So far as the Assembly was concerned, the States issue came to its triumphant ending on 26
November 1949, the day the membered signed the completed Constitution. On that day, Patel
announced22 that the Constitution had been accepted by “all nine States specified in Part B of
the First Schedule of the Constitution, including the State of Hyderabad”. Just over six years
late, the States Reorganisation Act came into effect. All references to these Part B States were
removed from the Constitution and the Princely States issue breathed its last. On that occasion,
Indians might well have remembered Patel’s words to the Constituent Assembly23: Unlike the
scheme of 1935, our new Constitution is not an alliance between democracies and dynasties,
but a real Union of the Indian people based on the basic concept of the sovereignty of the
people.
India had finally united India24.

6. BIBLIOGRAPHY

• B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution, vol. 1 (Universal Law

Publishing) (2015)
• CADIndia CAD,
https://cadindia.clpr.org.in/blogs/the_constituent_assembly_sets_up_committe
e_to_negotiate_with_the_princely_states (Accessed Aug 30, 2018)
• Constituent Assembly of India Debates.

22
CAD XI, 12, 983
23
CAD X, 5, 164
24
Granville Austin, The Indian constitution: cornerstone of a nation (Oxford Univ. Press) (2012)

13
• Gajendragadkar, P.B. (1966): “Kashmir - Retrospect and Prospect”, in: ‘Patel
Memorial Lectures: (Combined) - 1955-85’ (1990), New Delhi: Government of
India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, p.517.
• Granville Austin, The Indian constitution: cornerstone of a nation (Oxford Univ.
Press) (2012)
• Gupta, Sisir (1966): “Kashmir - A Study in India-Pakistan Relations”, New
Delhi: Asia Publishing House, p. 18.
• Hindustan Times, “Instrument of Accession”. 08 Aug 2006. Accessed 30 Aug
2018
• Kulkami, V.B. (1998): “Integration of Princely States”, in: Grover, Verinder
(1998): “Vallabhbhai Patel: A Biography of His Vision and Ideas”, New Delhi:
Deep & Deep Publications, p.490.
• Nehru, Jawaharlal (1962): “Autobiography”, Bombay: Allied Publishers,
pp.530-31
• Panikkar, K.M. (1927): “The Relations of lndian States with the Government of
India”, London: Martin Hopkinson, pp.34-35.
• Partition of India and similarities with BREXIT Pakistan Academy of
Competitive Exam, https://pace.pk/brexit-and-partition-of-india/ (Accessed
Aug 22, 2018)
• Rajmohan Gandhi. “Patel: A Life”.
• Stepan, Alfred, Linz, Juan J. and Yadav, Yogendra, 2011. Crafting State-
Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
• The Constitution (26th Amendment) Act, 1971/. National Informatics Centre.
• V. P. Menon, Integration of the Indian states (Orient Blackswan) (2014)

14