History of Political Economy

Plato’s Supposed Defense

of the Division of Labor:
A Reexamination of the Role of Job
Specialization in the Republic
Daniel Silvermintz

Historians of economic thought credit Plato, primarily on account of argu-

ments advanced in his Republic, as an early proponent of the division of
labor.1 Notwithstanding how often this claim has been made, I argue
that it constitutes a serious misreading of Plato’s philosophy that fails to
consider the dramatic form in which his work is written, and more spe-
cifically, fails to contextualize the relevant passages within the Republic’s
overall argument. The persistence of this misreading has, moreover, pre-
vented significant exploration of Plato’s genuine contributions to the field
of economic thought. I contend that the Republic offers a radical critique—
rather than an endorsement—of job specialization and its accompanying
psychological orientation toward acquisitiveness.2 I will begin by pro-
posing an interpretive strategy for reading Plato that attempts to situate

Correspondence may be addressed to Daniel Silvermintz, University of Houston–Clear Lake,

2700 Bay Area Boulevard, Box 371, Houston, TX 77058; e-mail: silvermintz@uhcl.edu. I
would like to acknowledge J. Parens, R. Wood, M. Harrington, D. Sweet, and R. Barney for
commenting on earlier versions of this article.
1. See Blanqui 1880, 29; Trever 1916, 33–37; Haney 1922, 52; Roll 1942, 19; Schumpeter
1954, 56; Foley 1974; Lowry 1987, 72; Karayiannis 1990; Spiegel 1991, 246; Karasmanis 1997,
83–93; and Sun 2005, 4–5. But note the caution of several scholars against attributing modern
economic concepts to the ancient Greeks: Schumpeter 1954, 53–54; Finley 1970, 3–4, and
1973; and Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, 3–17. The sole scholar to my knowledge to argue that
Plato does not support the division of labor is C. D. C. Reeve (1988, 171–72).
2. For greed as the central political and social problem dealt with in the Republic, see
Balot 2001.
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arguments in their dramatic and dialogic context. This is followed by a

discussion of the Republic’s dramatic setting in the home of the industri-
alist Cephalus. Having established this methodological and dramatic
background, I offer an analysis of the Republic’s shifting sense of the divi-
sion of labor that culminates in the idea that those who perform a special-
ized job in the city are hindered from performing their common job as a
human being.

1.  Interpreting Plato’s Works

Before proceeding to a discussion of the relevant passage from the Repub-
lic concerning the division of labor, it will be useful to make some com-
ments regarding the source of the aforementioned misreading and to pro-
pose a strategy for uncovering Plato’s genuine contributions to intellectual
thought. The interpretation of Plato’s works poses a unique challenge in
the intellectual tradition, given their dramatic form. Rather than dogmati-
cally spelling out his thought in philosophic treatises, Plato presents his
ideas amid the conflicting arguments advanced by the various characters
in his dialogues. Aristotle (Poetics 1447b) categorizes these writings as a
type of mime whose literary style is to be analyzed along with other forms
of poetry (see Kahn 1996 for a complete discussion of the Sokratikoi logoi
as a literary genre). Although Aristotle goes on to argue that medical and
scientific works should not be read as poetry even if they should present
their ideas in poetic meter, one cannot so easily dismiss the literary form
of the Platonic dialogues. The ancient biographer Diogenes Laertius (1925,
3.5) recounts that before Plato devoted himself to philosophy, he had stud-
ied painting and poetry and had aspired to enter a tragedy in a public com-
petition. Although Diogenes reports that Plato had destroyed his poetic
works once he was under Socrates’ spell, the dialogues clearly demon-
strate that he made use of his literary training when composing his philo-
sophic dramas. In spite of the critique of poetry offered in the Republic
(376e–398b, 595a–607a), the work is itself a rich literary tapestry replete
with allusion, symbolism, myths, metaphors, analogies, rhetoric, and irony
(see Rutherford 2000 for a complete discussion of the literary elements of
the dialogues). Previous scholarship had treated the literary character
of the dialogues as mere window dressing by which Plato might present
his more obtuse ideas in a palatable manner. Older Plato scholarship had
thus attempted to strip away the literary aspect of the dialogues in order
to unearth their unadulterated teaching, which was, most commonly,
assumed to be found in the arguments proffered by Socrates.

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Plato may ultimately be a philosopher seeking a scientific explanation

of the world; nonetheless, he presents his ideas with all of the literary
devices of a poet. In light of the literary form of the Platonic dialogues,
one must initially interpret their significance in a similar manner as other
dramatic works (see Klein 1965 and Rutherford 2000 for a full account
of what is entailed in interpreting Plato dramatically). Shakespeare cer-
tainly had ideas about history, psychology, and politics, yet these cannot
be determined by the same means as an author that presents his thought in
a treatise. The significance of a speech delivered in one of Shakespeare’s
plays can only be determined by contextualizing it within the overall action
of the drama. In similar fashion, we should not simply equate the views
expressed by Socrates or any other character within the dialogues with
Plato’s own views.3
Plato himself warns us not to expect to find his actual philosophic beliefs
in the dialogues. We should, however, note the irony even in this statement.
In a rare example in which Plato speaks in his own voice, he disassociates
himself from the ideas expressed in the dialogues while subtly suggesting
his influence: “No treatise by Plato exists or will exist, but those which now
bear his name belong to a Socrates become fair and young” (Epistles
2.314c). Although Plato attempts to distance himself from the ideas
expressed by Socrates as if he is merely reporting conversations that he had
overheard, he fully admits to having cleaned up the historical Socrates by
making him “young and beautiful.” Given that Plato depicts Socrates as an
old man in all of the dialogues except the Parmenides and at least several
times has characters refer to his ugly appearance (e.g., Theaetetus 143e and
Meno 80a), the cleaned-up version of Socrates would seem to refer to his
ideas rather than his physical appearance.
How are we then to identify Plato’s influence when appropriating actual
historical figures as characters in his dialogues? One presumes that there
is a strong relationship between ideas expressed by Plato’s fictional char-
acters and the actual people on which the characters are based. Moreover,
some of the meetings between Socrates and the other characters depicted
in the dialogues could actually have taken place. That said, Plato is by
no means simply writing down what he heard in the manner of a court
reporter.
As suggested by Plato’s own testimony, we cannot ultimately untangle
which ideas in the dialogues represent the authentic views of the historical

3. Several scholars note that Plato never says anything directly: Bloom 1991b, xxi; Sallis
1996, 2; Beversluis 2000, 19; Rosen 2008, 2.

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Socrates and which ideas are to be credited to Plato. In light of this, we

must follow the most cautious path by identifying these ideas as belonging
to the Platonic Socrates, who must be treated as distinct from other Pla-
tonic characters, as well as from the Socrates that appears as a character in
works by other writers of the period, such as Xenophon and Aristophanes.
Although the previously quoted epistle suggests that in the absence of a
Platonic philosophy, we are to pay particular attention to the arguments
expressed by Socrates, one should keep in mind that Plato also presents
competing philosophic positions, namely those advanced by the charac-
ters other than Socrates. In most of the dialogues, Socrates successfully
refutes the interlocutors’ arguments and thus represents the most logically
sound position; nonetheless, we must still give serious consideration to the
opposing positions. In this regard, it should be noted that in at least one
dialogue, namely the Parmenides, Socrates’ logic is shown to be faulty
and he does not emerge as having won the argument. Moreover, there are
several dialogues (Sophist, Statesmen, and Laws) in which Socrates is
either absent or nearly completely silent.
The reader is thus ultimately saddled with the task of comparing con-
tending views advanced in the dialogues in order to assess which is more
philosophically sound. Given what Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 1096a)
is famous for saying regarding his relationship to Plato (the phrase is most
commonly known in its Latin translation, “Amicus Plato, sed magis amica
Veritas”), we might similarly assert that Plato considers Socrates to be a
treasured friend and teacher; nonetheless, he values truth more than his
dearest friend. This is not to imply that Plato does not portray Socrates in
a sympathetic manner. Clearly, Plato intends for the reader to be persuaded
by Socrates as his arguments are, for the most part, more philosophically
rigorous than the interlocutors’. That said, there is something to be gained
in the dialectical exchange between Socrates and the other characters in
the dialogue (compare Meno 75d). If, contrary to his claim against such an
attempt, Plato’s teaching is to be unearthed, then it must be found in the
dialectical argument woven into the tapestry of the dramatic terrain of the
dialogues.
Let us then set forth the following interpretive principles by which we
can attempt to identify what is genuinely Plato’s contribution to philoso-
phy and more specifically to the area of political economy.
1. Plato does not appear as a character in the dialogues and thus does
not say anything directly. In light of this, one should take care to attri-
bute specific arguments proffered in the dialogues to the character that

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forwards them. As in literary works, the characters in the Platonic dia-

logues are symbolic of certain dispositions and types (e.g., the sensual-
ist, the money lover, the honor lover, the wisdom lover). Biographical
information and dramatic clues regarding a character’s disposition help
explain the argument that is attributed to him in the dialogue.
2. The conversation reported in the dialogue, which may be under-
stood as its surface layer, is an inquiry in progress rather than a series of
conclusive findings. Various arguments may be provisionally accepted
only to be rejected after further examination. All arguments must there-
fore be contextualized within the overall argument.
3. The dialogues present several layers of meaning. The surface level
describes the linear argument that is explicitly revealed in the course
of the conversation (principle no. 2). This initial understanding must,
however, be rethought in light of the dialectical character of the argument.
Deeper layers of meaning are suggested by clues that challenge the reader
to reassess arguments that were either affirmed or rejected in the surface
reading. Thus while the surface level is explicitly revealed, other layers of
the text are only intimated.4 In spite of the necessarily speculative nature
of this level of interpretation, it may best represent Plato’s thought since it
emerges from a dialectical reading of the work as a whole.

2.  The Dramatic Setting of the Republic

in the House of Cephalus
With these hermeneutic principles in mind, let us turn our attention to
an examination of the dramatic context in which the division of labor is
proposed in the Republic. Although historians of economic thought tend
to focus on the brief passage in book 2 of the Republic where the idea is
explicitly discussed, relevant economic ideas pervade the entire dialogue.
In fact, a discussion about the Republic’s understanding of the division
of labor might begin by a consideration of the dramatic setting of the
dialogue in the house of Cephalus.
No individual from the ancient world would be more qualified than
Cephalus to appreciate the value of producing goods by means of a divi-
sion of labor. Originally a citizen of Syracuse, Cephalus was encouraged
by Pericles to emigrate to Athens (circa 460 BCE), presumably for the

4. For internal validation of exoteric and esoteric readings of Socrates’ speeches, see Plato’s
Symposium 221e–222a.

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sake of the business opportunities that would be available to him (Lysias

1930, 12.4; Plutarch 1936, 835c; Gifford 2001, 55–58). Pericles’ invitation
indeed turned out to be a mutually beneficial relationship. After emigrat-
ing to Athens, Cephalus founded an armaments factory, which is consid-
ered to be the only mass production operation of its kind in the ancient
world (Glotz 1926, 163, 166, 182, 185, 205–6, 266–67; Calhaun 1968, 37;
Mossé 1969, 89; Finley 1973, 48, 72, 137). This proved to be a particularly
lucrative business during Athens’ protracted engagement with Sparta in
the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE).
Although Cephalus’s family ultimately lost everything when the thirty
oligarchs seized power in 404, they remained, as Plato confirms, an iconic
representative of business and industry. At Republic 329e, Socrates notes
Cephalus’s widespread reputation as a man of great means who is, evi-
dently, able to enjoy a comfortable lifestyle in his elder years: “I fancy,
Cephalus, that most people, when they hear you talk in this way, are not
convinced but think that you bear old age lightly not because of your char-
acter but because of your wealth.” Attempting to downplay his holdings,
Cephalus retorts with the modest claim, “As a moneymaker, I hold a place
somewhere halfway between my grandfather and my father. For my
grandfather and namesake inherited about as much property as I now pos-
sess and multiplied it many times, my father Lysanias reduced it below the
present amount, and I am content if I shall leave the estate to these boys
not less but by some slight measure more than my inheritance” (330b).
Despite Cephalus’s modest claims regarding his financial holdings, his-
torical accounts outside of the Republic substantiate that he was in fact
one of the wealthiest men in the ancient world (for a discussion of Cepha-
lus’s sham modesty, see Steinberger 1996, 187; and Gifford 2001, 67).
In a speech delivered in court proceedings, Cephalus’s son, Lysias,
provides an accounting of the family’s property that was seized during
the oligarchic takeover, “seven hundred shields belonging to us, together
with gold, silver, brass, ornaments, furniture and women’s clothing to an
amount far beyond their expectations, besides a hundred and twenty
slaves” (Lysias 1930, 12.19).
Beyond documenting the family’s considerable financial holdings, the
passage is significant in suggesting Cephalus’s innovative business prac-
tices. Historians of business appeal to the unusually large number of slaves
owned by the family as an indication that these individuals were not domes-
tic servants, but rather were workers in a mass production operation pred-
icated upon job specialization.

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Although we do not know much more about Cephalus’s factory than

the number of workers it had utilized at the time of Lysias’s reckoning in
404, we know that the principle of specialization was employed by other
workshops during this period. In an often-quoted passage, Xenophon
reports the practice, which is clearly innovative for the time period as its
use is restricted to larger urban areas:
For in small towns the same workman makes chairs and doors and
plows and tables, and often this same artisan builds houses, and even so
he is thankful if he can only find employment enough to support him.
And it is, of course, impossible for a man of many trades to be proficient
in all of them. In large cities, on the other hand, inasmuch as many
people have demands to make upon each branch of industry, one trade
alone, and very often even less than a whole trade, is enough to sup-
port a man: one man, for instance, makes shoes for men, and another
for women; and there are places even where one man earns a living by
only stitching shoes, another by cutting them out, another by sewing
the uppers together, while there is another who performs none of these
operations but only assembles the parts. It follows, therefore, as a matter
of course, that he who devotes himself to a very highly specialized line
of work is bound to do it in the best possible manner. (Cyropedia 8.2.5)
Xenophon’s account is most helpful in understanding how Cephalus might
have employed his large labor force. Although several scholars argue that
Xenophon and the Greeks in general only considered the qualitative ben-
efits of job specialization (Trever 1916, 71; Finley 1970, 3–4; Vernant
1983, 259), the great number of shields that were held in ready supply
in Cephalus’s warehouse seems to support the idea that the factory was
organized for the sake of maximum productivity. S. Todd Lowry (1987,
68–72) challenges Finley’s interpretation of the passage from Xenophon
in light of Protagoras’s introduction of calculative notions into intellec-
tual thought. Furthermore, Socrates explicitly acknowledges the greater
productivity afforded by job specialization in the key passage involving
the division of labor in the Republic (370c; Benardete 1989, 50; Lowry
1987, 104).
Although Cephalus’s armaments factory is not explicitly mentioned in
the Republic, Mark Gifford (2001) has argued that Plato is intentionally
playing upon the industrialist’s notoriety. This begins with Socrates prod-
ding Cephalus to boast about his prowess as a moneymaker, which leads
Socrates to press him further about the greatest benefit he derives from his

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wealth. Cephalus’s answer, which will turn out to determine the principal
focus for the long discussion that follows, is surprising. Rather than boast-
ing about the material comforts enjoyed by the wealthy, Cephalus asserts
that the rich have a greater ability to act with justice since they have the
means to pay their debts: “It is for this, then, that I affirm that the posses-
sion of wealth is of most value, not it may be to every man but to the good
man. Not to cheat any man even unintentionally or play him false, not
remaining in debt to a god for some sacrifice or to a man for money, so to
depart in fear to that other world—to this result the possession of property
contributes not a little” (331a–b). Cephalus’s response seems to cast him in
a noble light, leading C. D. C. Reeve (1988, 6) to conclude that he exhib-
its all of the virtues (most notably moderation, piety, and justice) with-
out needing philosophy; Plato, however, also includes in his portrayal a
number of what Julia Annas (1981, 18) identifies as “malicious touches”
that suggest the need for greater scrutiny of Cephalus’s character (see
Steinberger 1996, 172–73, for a discussion of the contrasting scholarly
views of Cephalus). Noticing the dramatic cues observed by Annas, we can
understand that Cephalus has good reason for worrying if he has indeed
defrauded someone.
Many readers of the Republic naively believe that Cephalus maintains
his good reputation even after Socrates has refuted him (Jowett 1936, iii–
iv; Nettleship 1906, 15; Cross and Woozley 1964, 2; Guthrie 1975, 439).
A very different picture emerges, however, if one considers the dramatic
irony of Socrates’ refutation. Socrates challenges Cephalus’s conception
of justice by noting, with the following hypothetical, that fulfilling a debt
does not always result in just consequences: “I mean, for example, as
everyone I presume would admit, if one took over weapons from a friend
who was in his right mind and then the lender should go mad and demand
them back, that we ought not to return them in that case and that he who
did so return them would not be acting justly” (331c). Without some
knowledge of Cephalus’s business dealings, one might easily dismiss the
extraordinary circumstances involved in Socrates’ hypothetical as posing
no serious threat to Cephalus’s definition of justice. After all, how often
is one handling something as dangerous as a weapon and dealing with
someone with the rationality of a madman? In light of our knowledge
of Cephalus’s dealings in the armaments industry, this critical exchange
at the beginning of the dialogue may be intended to make a much larger
point when interpreted with consideration of the dramatic and dialogical
context.

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Cephalus departs the discussion when confronted by Socrates under the

pious pretense of returning to his sacrificial duties; however, rather than
testifying to his genuine moral and religious commitment, his entrance
and return to the religious sacrifices might better be understood as an
attempt to buy off the gods for a life of wrongdoing in the final hours
before his death. In what seems like a personal confession, the wealthy
businessman shares his fears regarding his possible wrongdoing: “Now he
to whom the ledger of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts
up even from his dreams like children again and again in affright and his
days are haunted by anticipations of worse to come” (330e). Cephalus
insists that the just man needs a store of riches; however, this turns out to
be for the sake of making restitution on his previous acts of injustice from
which he made his money in the first place (for a critique of how the unjust
man is able to use his wealth, see 362c, 550e, and Shell 1978, 21–27; and
Steinberger 1996, 189–90). Gifford (2001, 79) offers a harsh judgment of
Cephalus’s character based upon what we know about his business
affairs:
Instead of doing what justice really required, Cephalus kept himself
and his household in the Piraeus in order to garner huge profits from
the warmongering of the Athenian democrats. And it was his limited
and unexamined standard of justice that allowed him to enrich him-
self and his household without moral qualms and to devote his life to
indulging his lust for wealth while all along remaining blissfully blind
to the ethical costs of his activities as a decent businessman.
Cephalus obviously recognizes that Socrates is condemning him with his
carefully chosen hypothetical that just so happens to involve the exchange
of the very product that Cephalus had manufactured and sold (for the irony
of Socrates’ hypothetical, see Gifford 2001, 74–77; and Rudebusch 2002,
76). The moneymaking foreigner represents a newly emerging merchant
class that attempts to wield power in Athenian society on account of its
wealth rather than lineage. Socrates’ scrutiny of Cephalus’s business prac-
tices undermines his authority and deposes his commanding role within
the dialogic community. As many commentators have noted, the ousting
of Cephalus from the dialogue results in Socrates usurping his control over
the conversation (Strauss 1953, 84; 1964, 65; Bloom 1991a, 312–13; Benar-
dete 1989, 20). This symbolic transfer of power foreshadows the transition
(treated in the next section of the present article) that occurs in the course
of the next six books of the Republic as a class of philosopher-kings

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supplant the rule of the moneymakers while the feverish city is trans-
formed into the beautiful city.

3.  Adeimantus’s Role in Founding the First City

Cephalus had argued that money buys justice; the irony of this formu-
lation is, however, quickly made evident in Thrasymachus’s contention
that injustice is more profitable than justice (345a, 354a, 362a–b). Thrasy­
machus’s defense of the profitability of immorality is further defended
by Glaucon (360d, 362a–b) and Adeimantus (365b–c). The collective
argument mounted by Cephalus’s defense of the merits of wealth, along
with the arguments for the profitability of injustice advanced by these
three characters, turns out to be so persuasive that Socrates will devote
the remainder of the dialogue to an attempt to overthrow this position.
Socrates’ initial inability to refute the sophistic defense of injustice
leads him to propose an alternative method that will result in the explicit
discussion of political theory. Since the interlocutors cannot accept that
the soul has a natural order that directs it to act with justice (357b), Socrates
suggests that they view justice on a larger scale as may be found in the
order of a city: “There is a justice of one man, we say, and, I suppose, also
of an entire city. . . . Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the
larger object and more easy to apprehend. If it please you, then, let us first
look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the indi-
vidual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less”
(368e–9a). One should then keep in mind when evaluating any of the
Republic’s political proposals that the exercise of constructing a city in
speech was introduced as a pedagogical means of uncovering the role of
justice in the individual and not as an attempt to outline an ideal regime.
Moreover, the process of founding a city in speech actually results in the
construction of three distinct cities: the city of necessity, the luxurious
city, and the purged/beautiful city (kalipolis). We must initially be careful
to contextualize any individual political proposal within the respective
city that is being described and then evaluate the city as a whole against
later formulations. Socrates will further suggest in the cave allegory how
even the beautiful city, which would seem to represent the Republic’s most
sophisticated political association, is ultimately no better than a prison.
Many readers of the Republic have, in fact, come to the conclusion that the
beautiful city is meant to be a description of an anti-utopia on account of
proposals that end up restraining individual virtue rather than fostering it.

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In light of Socrates’ use of politics as an analogy for ethics, readers are

justified in being suspicious of the ultimate viability of any of these
regimes or any of the specific proposals described.
Socrates initiates the construction of the first city by having his discus-
sion partners consider what would be necessary to satisfy the citizens’
biological needs and so designates this as a city of necessity. The almost
immediate descent of this regime, described by Socrates as healthy and
true, into the feverish city of overindulgence leads some commentators
to suggest that this is an unobtainable ideal (Devereux 1979; Annas 1981,
77; McKeen 2004). In contrast, Straussian scholars have noted the unde-
sirableness of the first city on account of the limited virtues that its citi-
zens are able to express (Strauss 1964, 95; Bloom 1991a, 346). Paying
attention to the dramatic context, Straussian scholars have, moreover,
drawn attention to Adeimantus as the interlocutor who acts along with
Socrates in founding this city (Strauss 1964, 95; Bloom 1991a, 344, 413;
Nichols 1987, 69; Rosen 2008, 75, 80). This will prove to be an important
point in assessing whether or not Plato endorses the division of labor. Pur-
suing Adeimantus’s role in founding the first city beyond the argument
advanced by Straussian scholars, I argue that a careful reading of the key
section of the dialogue reveals that Adeimantus is responsible for all of the
significant political and economic proposals. Analysis of Adeimantus’s
acquisitive disposition further supports his decisions to implement eco-
nomic mechanisms and institutions that maximize the city’s economic
efficiency and productivity.
We do not know much about Adeimantus beyond the fact that he (along
with another of the dialogue’s interlocutors, Glaucon) was one of Plato’s
older brothers. Drawing on cues within the dialogue, Straussian scholars
have pieced together a picture of Adeimantus’s character as moderate
to the point of austerity (Strauss 1964, 60, 95; Bloom 1991a, 413; Nichols
1987, 205; Rosen 2008, 7, 67, 75). In contrast, I contend that Adeimantus’s
appearance of moderation follows from his acquisitive motives rather than
from a genuine commitment to virtue. He acts, in effect, as a proxy for the
departed Cephalus by promoting political proposals that are conducive to
doing business. Plato makes Adeimantus’s association with Cephalus and
his industrialist family quite explicit in the beginning of the dialogue
by introducing him as an associate of Cephalus’s son, Polemarchus, and a
member of his gang that threatens Socrates with violence (327c; Ferrari
2005, 11). His allegiance to Polemarchus, especially with regard to finan-
cial matters, is again affirmed much later in the dialogue where they

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aggressively confront Socrates about his proposal to institute communism

among the guardian class in the beautiful city (449b–c). In an earlier pro-
test against communism voiced by Adeimantus alone, he reveals his ori-
entation to the material world with his insistence that happiness is only
achieved by “owning lands and building fine big houses and providing
them with suitable furniture and winning the favor of the gods by private
sacrifices and enjoying too those possessions which you just now spoke of,
gold and silver” (419e). One should note Adeimantus’s obvious admiration
for Cephalus as having achieved all of the worldly success that he associ-
ates with the happy man—a large house, elaborate furnishings, and abun-
dant riches to use in buying off the gods.5 Adeimantus’s strong conviction
about the merits of material possessions certainly challenges us to rethink
the aforementioned characterization of him as austere.
Adeimantus’s admiration for Cephalus and his praise of wealth sug-
gest his own temptation to pursue the acquisitive life—even if this means
engaging in unfair business practices and going beyond what justice will
allow. Several scholars have noted Socrates’ attempt in the Republic to
redirect Glaucon’s political ambitions while the attempt to restrain his
brother Adeimantus from the acquisitive life has largely gone unnoticed
(see the literature devoted to Glaucon cited by Giovanni Ferrari [2005,
35]). Adeimantus rehearses the following justification for being decep-
tive when there is a financial gain at stake:
The consequences of my being just are, unless I likewise seem so, not
assets, they say, but liabilities, labor and total loss; but if I am unjust
and have procured myself a reputation for justice a godlike life is prom-
ised. . . . For a front and a show I must draw about myself a shadow-line
of virtue, but trail behind me the fox of most sage Archilochus, shifty
and bent on gain (kerdalean). (365b–c)
Although Adeimantus attempts to disavow his praise of injustice at 367a,
one wonders if he is not the “quick witted youth” that he describes at 365a
who actually holds these views (for support, see Blondell 2000, 132).
These glimpses into Adeimantus’s character justify a closer examination
of his role in founding the city of necessity, particularly in light of some of
the proposals that seem out of place in a city that was meant merely to
satisfy biological need.

5. Rachel Barney (2001, 217) further notes that there are resemblances between the mon-
eymaking Cephalus and the citizens of both the first city and the producing class in the beau-
tiful city.

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Despite Socrates’ characterization of this city as bound by the standard

of utmost necessity, one finds all of the instruments and mechanisms of a
modern market economy: cost-benefit rationality, division of labor, job
specialization, a monetary system, retail trade, imports and exports, and a
designated marketplace (for discussion, see Lowry 1987, 103–8; and Scho-
field 1999). Although the first city’s focus on maximizing its economic
efficiency should raise suspicions regarding this as Socrates’ ideal, most
readers take his judgment of it as “healthy and true” as an endorsement
(372e). In contrast, Straussian scholars have argued that the city cannot be
a Socratic ideal in light of the complete absence of philosophy. As sug-
gested, I argue that the city’s focus upon economic efficiency can be best
understood as the result of Adeimantus’s influence. It is important to keep
in mind the pedagogic character of the Platonic dialogues and to be cog-
nizant whether Socrates is advancing something or, alternatively, is allow-
ing an interlocutor to see the implications of an argument in order to show
him its deficiencies. He is, in fact, quite explicit about using this approach
with Glaucon in the founding of the second city. After describing the rus-
tic life in the city of necessity, Glaucon boldly breaks in and declares that
a city devoid of the luxuries to which refined men are accustomed is a city
“fit for pigs” and insists that the citizens “must recline on couches, I pre-
sume, if they are not to be uncomfortable, and dine from tables and have
made dishes and sweetmeats such as are now in use” (372d–e). In spite of
his disdain for such indulgences, Socrates appeases Glaucon by abandon-
ing the moderate and healthy city of necessity with a consideration of an
immoderate city based upon overconsumption:
The true state I believe to be the one we have described—the healthy
state, as it were. But if it is your pleasure that we contemplate also a
fevered state, there is nothing to hinder. For there are some, it appears,
who will not be contented with this sort of fare or with this way of life;
but couches will have to be added thereto and tables and other furni-
ture, yes, and relishes and myrrh and incense and girls and cakes—all
sorts of all of them. And the requirements we first mentioned, houses
and garments and shoes, will no longer be confined to necessities, but
we must set painting to work and embroidery, and procure gold and
ivory and similar adornments, must we not? (373a)
Readers readily associate the fevered city of luxuries with the erotically
inclined Glaucon rather than the sober Socrates despite the fact that his
contribution to the city is not much more than the request that Socrates

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provide the citizens with more indulgent consumables. In similar fash-

ion, we should be as eager to distance the poverty-stricken Socrates from
the city of necessity in light of Reeve’s (1988, 176) characterization of it
as one in which “money-lovers, and only money-lovers, are made as
happy as it is possible for them to be.”
Although Socrates is clearly directing the conversation throughout
the founding of the first city, one might note that he either asks Adeiman­
tus to decide or, at least, secures his consent regarding each of the sig-
nificant political proposals. As is quite clear throughout the dialogue,
Adeimantus will not allow himself to be intellectually pushed around by
Socrates and would certainly not give his consent to something unless
he absolutely agreed with it.6 On the contrary, he is seen on a number of
occasions objecting to Socrates and backing up his ideas with vigorous
argumentation.
The first of several notions suggested by Socrates that is affirmed by
Adeimantus concerns the conception of the individuals forging the city of
necessity. Rather than conceiving of the city as a solidarity between self-
sufficient households, Socrates has Adeimantus agree that individuals are
inherently incapable of providing for their own needs. Socrates offers the
following account of the city’s founding: “‘The origin of the city, then,’
said I, ‘in my opinion, is to be found in the fact that we do not severally
suffice for our own needs, but each of us lacks many things’” (369b). In
light of this conception of the individual, Socrates proceeds to formulate
that the community arises out of the need to form partnerships for the
sake of exchange: “Then, one man calling in another for one service and
another for another, we, being in need of many things, gather many into
one place of abode as associates and helpers, and to this dwelling together
we give the name city or state” (369c). Although individuals in this first
city provide for others as a result of their business dealings, Socrates notes
that this is merely an unintended consequence of their pursuit of self-
interest: “Between one man and another there is an interchange of giving,
if it so happens, and taking, because each supposes this to be better (amei-
non) for himself” (369c). Once again, Adeimantus concurs.
Adeimantus’s role as architect of the healthy city becomes even more
apparent when one examines his responsibility in determining the city’s
mode of production. At this point in the argument, Socrates presents Adei-
mantus with two rival economic systems and asks him to consider which
of the two he finds more advantageous:

6. See Adeimantus’s concern about Socrates’ undue influence in the Republic 487b–c.

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Shall the farmer, who is one, provide food for four and spend fourfold
time and toil on the production of food and share it with the others, or
shall he take no thought for them and provide a fourth portion of the
food for himself alone in a quarter of the time and employ the other
three-quarters, the one in the provision of a house, the other of a gar-
ment, the other of shoes, and not have the bother of associating with
other people, but, himself for himself, mind his own affairs (ta hautou
prattein)? (369e–70a).
Adeimantus responds with the contention that an economic system
based upon job specialization would be easier, and Socrates bolsters his
conviction with the following assessment of the economic benefits that
will be derived from this decision:
The result, then, is that more things are produced, and better and more
easily when one man performs one task according to his nature, at the
right moment, and at leisure from other occupations. (370c)
Clearly, Socrates recognizes the economic benefits of job specialization,
and yet his previous scrutiny of Cephalus’s business dealings raises seri-
ous doubts about his endorsement of this as a political proposal.
One should note that Socrates does not merely present Adeimantus with
a rhetorical question, but rather provides him with two viable modes of
production for his consideration. Although the modern reader may read-
ily agree with Adeimantus that having a division of labor is preferable to
doing everything yourself, one must realize that Plato’s contemporary
readers would find it quite disturbing to envision a society that is com-
prised solely of manual workers.7 As suggested in the earlier quote from
Xenophon, the Greeks at this time only employed job specialization in the
production of selected goods, and this only in larger urban areas. Even in
a city as developed as Athens, the self-sufficient farm—the alternate econ-
omy that Socrates had proposed to Adeimantus—remained the dominant
economic unit during this period (Hanson 1999, 66–67; Donovan 2003,
2). Adeimantus’s decision to implement an economy of specialized crafts-
men is even more remarkable given his aristocratic lineage (the family
traced their descent to Codrus on their father’s side and to Solon on their
mother’s side) and what we know about the typical sense of disdain felt by
most landed families toward manual workers. As surprising as Adeiman-
tus’s decision may be, the reader has been prepared for it by way of his

7. For example, see Aristotle’s Politics 1291a for a critique of the Republic’s first city
along these lines.

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close association with the foreign-born family of armaments manufactur-

ers living in the Piraeus (see Ferrari 2005, 11, on the oddity of this rela-
tionship). Interestingly, Adeimantus’s decision to produce goods by means
of a division of labor is the one proposal that remains constant throughout
the several regime changes—lending credence to the dominant claim that
Plato endorses this sort of economic arrangement. Let us then proceed
with a discussion of how the principle is applied in each of these proposed
cities and then to a consideration of the dialogue’s ultimate understanding
of this economic mode of production.

4.  The Evolving Role of the Division of Labor

in the Three Cities
Following Adeimantus’s directive, Socrates establishes the unwavering
principle in the first city that each man should labor at only one job. Many
scholars have noted that this first city lacks many of the traditional social
and political institutions that typically characterize civic life. In fact, the
division of labor, along with the other economic institutions (a designated
marketplace and a unit of currency), is the only means for forging social
solidarity. By isolating the economic institutions, Socrates illustrates a
significant sociological principle in which self-interested individuals forge
mutually beneficial social bonds for the sake of reciprocal exchange. The
citizens are thus bound to one another merely out of their self-interested
need for the products of another man’s labor. The irony of Adeimantus’s
decision is that the city restricts its consumption to only those goods that
are strictly necessary (basic food, clothing, and shelter) and thus there
would seem to be no need for specialized craftsmen when the goods pro-
duced are so utilitarian (cf. Rancière 2004, 269). In light of the Platonic
notion that most men are incapable of controlling their desires, Rachel
Barney (2001, 220) questions whether the city would ever be able to main-
tain this standard, and John R. Wallach (2001, 152), Jacques Rancière
(2004, 269), and Stanley Rosen (2008, 74) have suggested that notions
of excess leading to the feverish city of luxury might begin to enter the
city with the introduction of the monetary system. By allowing economic
institutions that typically support economies of surplus, Adeimantus has
sown the seeds for the citizens in the first city to violate the standard of
utmost necessity in favor of overconsumption. This is dramatically repre-
sented by Glaucon’s demand for luxury goods immediately after the con-
struction of the first city has been completed.

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Despite vastly different lifestyles, the luxurious city does not have much
more in the way of social and political institutions than the city of neces-
sity. Once again, the social arrangement of the luxurious city revolves
around strict adherence to the initial ruling that each man should only labor
at a single occupation. The main difference between the city of necessity
and the luxurious city is that the previously trained craftsmen (farmers,
weavers, and builders) will now be even more specialized so as to produce
higher-quality goods (savory food, fashionable clothing, and well-adorned
homes). Socrates further suggests that several new artisans will have to be
introduced in order to produce goods that did not exist in the city of neces-
sity: swineherds and cattleherds, butchers, chefs, beauticians, poets, rhap-
sodists, actors, chorus dancers, contractors, tutors, nurses, and physicians.
In addition to these newly established professions, Socrates suggests that
the luxurious city will have to introduce an entirely new class of citizens
into the city enlisted with the mission of conquering neighboring lands in
order to expand the city’s borders and to protect the city’s valuable posses-
sions from foreign attack.8 This proposal again runs contrary to the tradi-
tional Greek belief that a man expressed his nobility by serving his country
and fighting in war. Socrates defends his decision to have a distinct warrior
class rather than a civilian force by appealing to the original notion of job
specialization that was established for the artisans in the first city:
Can we suppose, then, that while we were at pains to prevent the cob-
bler from attempting to be at the same time a farmer, a weaver, or a
builder instead of just a cobbler, to the end that we might have the
cobbler’s business well done, and similarly assigned to each and every
one man one occupation, for which he was fit and naturally adapted
and at which he was to work all his days, at leisure from other pursuits
and not letting slip the right moments for doing the work well, and
that yet we are in doubt whether the right accomplishment of the busi-
ness of war is not of supreme moment? Is it so easy that a man who
is cultivating the soil will be at the same time a soldier and one who
is practising cobbling or any other trade, though no man in the world
could make himself a competent expert at draughts or the dice who did
not practise that and nothing else from childhood but treated it as an
occasional business? (374b–c)

8. The assumption is that warriors are not necessary in the city of necessity since they
would not have the desire for expansion and do not possess the sort of valuables that would
open themselves up to foreign attack.

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Although the warriors’ mission to conquer and plunder in order to satisfy

the inflamed passions of the rest of the city indicates that they are subject to
the irrational rule of the producing class, this power relationship will ulti-
mately be inverted as the warriors undergo an educational regimen meant
to cultivate prudence. With this training, the warrior class will begin to
assume a governing role responsible for purging excesses from the inflamed
city of luxuries and thereby transforming it into the beautiful city (399e).
The beautiful city will build on the notion of job specialization that
emerged in the class structure of the luxurious city. The education of the
warriors ultimately resulted in the formation of a class of rulers that estab-
lishes laws for the city and an auxiliary class responsible for enforcing the
laws set down by the rulers. Whereas the inflamed passions of the produc-
ing class dictated the political agenda of the luxurious city, the emergence
of a specialized class of rulers now directs and restrains the excesses of
the citizenry. Having perfected the city with the establishment of the har-
monious class structure (rulers, auxiliaries, and producers), Socrates
returns to the question of motivating the dialogue’s discussion of politi-
cal economy and attempts to identify how the city upholds justice. After
observing the city of necessity undergo several regime changes, Socrates
declares that the principle for which they have been seeking was actually
present at the first city’s inception: “For what we laid down in the begin-
ning as a universal requirement when we were founding our city, this
I think, or some form of this, is justice. And what we did lay down, and
often said, you recall, was that each one man must perform one social
service in the state for which his nature is best adapted” (433a). Not only
has the division of labor persisted through the several regime changes; it
has also turned out to be the primary principle in which civic justice is
revealed. This would seem to provide strong support that Plato is indeed
endorsing the division of labor, as much for its economic value as for
its social and political benefits. Let us proceed to see how this argument
(what we have previously termed the dialogue’s surface) is ultimately
undermined by a dialectical reading.
When helping Adeimantus to rationalize his decision to produce goods
through a nexus of specialized craftsmen, Socrates makes the claim that
men have different natures making them more suitable for different tasks
(370b).9 He again affirms this claim in the previously quoted passage from

9. See in particular McNulty 1975 for the view that Plato is assuming natural differences
when proposing the division of labor.

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433a. If the idea that individuals have different natures can be supported
by other places in the Platonic corpus, then one might have a good case for
using this to support the natural basis of the division of labor. In contrast,
I contend that Socrates consistently argues throughout the Platonic dia-
logues for a universal human nature. The universality of human nature is,
perhaps, most explicitly stated in the Meno, where Socrates, after refuting
Meno’s claim that human virtue is different for different people, affirms
that “all mankind are good in the same way; for they become good when
they acquire the same qualities” (Meno 73c). In light of Socrates’ affirma-
tion of the universality of human nature in the Meno and other places, I
would argue that the notion of different human natures in the Republic be
contextualized within the pedagogic exercise to envision a just society.
There is obviously political efficacy in having a society that is organized
for maximum efficiency, yet (as Socrates notes at 420b) this may not be in
the best interest of the individual.
The decision to implement job specialization can thus be defended
within the exercise as this mode of production will ensure that the first
city is provided with the most utilitarian goods and the second city is pro-
vided with the most luxurious goods. Socrates ultimately reveals this
application of the division of labor as superficial when explaining how the
principle will be applied in the beautiful city: “A carpenter undertaking to
do the work of a cobbler or a cobbler of a carpenter or their interchange of
one another’s tools or honors or even the attempt of the same man to do
both—the confounding of all other functions would not, think you, greatly
injure a state, would it?” (434a). Although Socrates had initially suggested
that there was some great significance to maintaining a strict adherence to
the principle of job specialization as if each of the arts corresponded to
a distinct human nature, it now seems that there was nothing at stake in
maintaining the rule within the artisan class. Specialized carpenters and
cobblers may be better equipped to produce finely crafted furniture and
shoes than a jack-of-all-trades, but this obviously does not mean that these
tasks constitute their respective natures. Socrates attempts to reveal man’s
true nature to Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Republic by allowing them
to conceive of imaginary cities that are each defective on account of their
respective use of job specialization: the first city was restrictive to the
point of being subhuman while the second city was overindulgent to sick-
ening consequences.
Socrates ultimately gets Glaucon to agree that the city does not reach
its ideal by having finely crafted consumables, but rather by harmonizing

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civic factions through having each of the classes maintain their role in
the social hierarchy:
But when I fancy one who is by nature an artisan or some kind of
money-maker tempted and incited by wealth or command of votes or
bodily strength or some similar advantage tries to enter into the class
of the soldiers or one of the soldiers into the class of counsellors and
guardians, for which he is not fitted, and these interchange their tools
and their honors or when the same man undertakes all these functions
at once, then, I take it, you too believe that this kind of substitution and
meddlesomeness is the ruin of a state? (434b)
One might conclude from this passage that while Socrates dismisses the
necessity for job specialization employed in the first two cities, he does
affirm the need for a stratified society in which each class maintains its
position in the hierarchy. I would contend, however, that this version of
the division of labor is also ultimately rejected by Socrates.
In an extremely provocative passage, Plato has Socrates intimate how
to read what lies beneath the surface layer of the argument. Prefacing
his attempt to discover justice in the beautiful city, Socrates reminds
his interlocutors of the original rationale for discussing political econ-
omy as a means for understanding the justice of an individual and insin-
uates that the analogy between city and soul might be fundamentally
flawed:
But now let us work out the inquiry in which we supposed that, if we
found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there,
we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man. And
we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the
best city in our power, well knowing that in the good city it would of
course be found. What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer
back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well. But if
something different manifests itself in the individual, we will return
again to the state and test it there and it may be that, by examining them
side by side and rubbing them against one another, as it were from the
fire-sticks we may cause the spark of justice to flash forth, and when it
is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds. (434d–e)
As many scholars have noted, there is a fundamental problem with Soc­
rates’ analogy: the beautiful city achieves harmony by having individuals
perform their job as members of one of the three classes, yet if an indi-

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Silvermintz / Plato and the Division of Labor  767

vidual is to achieve a comparable sense of harmony in his soul he must

perform the psychic labor of all three classes himself (see Sachs 1963).

5.  Conclusion
We might conclude that while Plato recognizes both the economic and
political benefits of the division of labor, he ultimately critiques this form
of economic arrangement insofar as it hinders the individual from order-
ing his own soul by cultivating acquisitive motives over prudence and
reason. Although the craftsmen in each of the three regimes were com-
manded that they must only labor at a single job, Socrates had earlier
established that all craftsmen must necessarily labor at a second occupa-
tion, namely the wage-earning art (mistharnêtikê), in addition to their spe-
cialized occupation (Strauss 1964, 24, 80–81; Bloom 1991a, 331–33;
Benardete 1989, 24; Reeve 1988, 19–20). It was, in fact, only by isolating
the craftsmen’s productive and acquisitive labors as two distinct occupa-
tions that allowed Socrates to uphold the crafts as a model of justice in the
first place. He here presses Thrasymachus to admit that moneymaking has
no role in the proper work of a physician: “But tell me, your physician in
the precise sense of whom you were just now speaking, is he a money-
maker, an earner of fees, or a healer of the sick?” (341c). Although this
allows Socrates to appeal to the crafts as a model of civic justice, he also
admits that no craftsman would labor at his particular craft if not for the
secondary art in which he is compensated for his labors: “But if we are to
consider it ‘precisely[,]’ medicine produces health but the fee-earning art
the pay, and architecture a house but the fee-earning art (mistharnêtikê)
accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others, each performs its own
task and benefits that over which it is set, but unless pay is added to it is
there any benefit which the craftsman receives from the craft?” (346d). It
now becomes clear that the appeal to the craftsmen’s justice is necessarily
compromised by the fact that the craftsmen must violate the strict prin-
ciple of job specialization when they labor at the self-serving secondary
occupation of moneymaking.
As previously noted, the first city’s economic institutions were its only
means for forging the political alliance. It now becomes clear that the
economic system provides the governing principle for the class of money­
making craftsmen in all of the proposed regimes. Just as the commu-
nity of philosopher-kings is able to share all goods in common through
their mutual perception of the imperishable world of forms, the craftsmen

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are able to exchange goods with one another by their participation in

the monetary system that by a common measure makes all goods com-
mensurate. The parallel world of ideas and goods that is inhabited by the
class of guardians and the class of craftsmen respectively results in a
radically different psychological formation within the two classes.10 While
the guardian’s contemplation of the good harmonizes his soul, the crafts-
man’s engagement in the economic system leads to a disordered soul that
places appetite over reason. Only much later in the dialogue does Soc­
ra­tes acknowledge the debilitating effects of training workers to do a
specialized task within the city: “And why do you suppose that ‘base
mechanic’ handicraft is a term of reproach? Shall we not say that it is
solely when the best part is naturally weak in a man so that it cannot gov-
ern and control the brood of beasts within him but can only serve them
and can learn nothing but the ways of flattering them?” (590c). While the
beautiful city may achieve a certain degree of civic justice, the major-
ity of citizens are rendered incapable of ordering their own souls, as was
evident in the irresponsible manner in which the luxurious city was gov-
erned and, in more poetic form, in the depiction of the prisoners in the
cave allegory.
When discussing the justice of the division of labor within the beautiful
city, Socrates had stated that each man, whether a craftsman or ruler, “did
his own work” (ta hautou prattein) when performing his specialized occu-
pation. This was the same phrase that Socrates had previously used with
the opposite meaning when describing to Adeimantus a city in which
everyone would be self-sufficient and thus be a jack-of-all-trades. This
seeming contradiction in Socrates’ locution can be reconciled once the
analogy between the city and the individual collapses.11 This sense of
the phrase is clarified in the opening question of Aristotle’s Ethics. Return-
ing to the Republic’s analogy between the crafts and psychic life, Aristotle
considers if there is some work proper to the human being: “Are we then
to suppose that, while the carpenter and the shoemaker have definite func-
tions or businesses belonging to them, man as such has none, and is not
designed by nature to fulfil any function?” (Nicomachean Ethics 1097b).
Plato’s answer to Aristotle both in the Republic and across all of the dia-
logues is that man’s proper job is to be a philosopher.

10. For discussion of the Republic’s conception of a parallel world of goods and ideas, see
Shell 1978 and Campbell 1985.
11. See Donovan 2003, 9, for a way to reconcile the two senses of the phrase using the
notion of ethical self-sufficiency.

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As we have noted, the entire Republic is motivated by an attempt to

refute the sophistic defense of unjust acquisition. At the height of the dia-
logue’s metaphysical argument, Socrates plays on the dual meaning of the
word ousia as both being and riches to declare that “the good is beyond
ousia” (509b). Socrates’ young interlocutors are seduced by the economic
advantages afforded by the division of labor, whether by generating greater
profits or by producing better consumables on which they can spend their
money, yet they will only find true happiness when they pursue the money
of the mind. We might thus contextualize the Republic’s economic themes
amid the work’s larger metaphysical argument through Socrates’ sustained
attempt to overthrow Cephalus’s influence over the boys and to redirect
their souls to the pursuit of wisdom instead of gain.

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