32 (IJCNS) International Journal of Computer and Network Security,
Vol. 2, No. 9, September 2010
Detection of Selective Forward Attack in Mobile
Wireless Sensor Networks
S.Sharmila1, and G.Umamaheswari2
1
Research Scholor, Anna University, Coimbatore
hod@dit.psgtech.ac.in
2
Assistant Professor, Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering,
PSG College of Technology
Abstract: Mobile Wireless sensor networks are composed of
a large number of wireless sensors and they require a careful
consumption of available to prolong the life time of the network.
From the security point of view, detecting schemes must be very
light to increase the life time of the network. In this paper,
defensive mechanism is proposed to detect selective forward
attack in mobile wireless sensor networks. The proposed
mechanism is simulated with Berkeley Mica 2 Motes
configuration in Network Simulator Version 2. The scheme is
evaluated in terms of packet delivery ratio and throughput. The
simulation results show that the scheme achieves high detection
rate.
Keywords: Selective Forward attack, Dynamic Window,
Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks.
1. Introduction
Recent advances in wireless communications and micro
electro-mechanical system (MEMS) technologies have
enabled the development of low-cost, low power and small
size wireless sensor nodes. Wireless sensor nodes perform
significant signal processing, computation and network self
configuration to achieve scalable, robust and long-life
networks. Many sensor nodes are capable of local processing
to reduce communications and energy costs consequently.
Wireless sensors have been used in hazard alarms,
monitoring and tracking wild life, heartbeat monitoring for
patients, habitat monitoring, and many more applications.
In Wild life applications, sensors are cast in the field as well
as equipped on animals to monitor. The self organized
nodes are mobile as animals move. In telemedicine
applications and human tracking applications, sensors are
attached to patients and thus constitutes mobile wireless
sensor network. Certain applications such as rescue
management, emergency care and military applications
require secure information transfer between the source and
destination [1]. Considering an example where sensors are
used to sense the blood pressure and temperature of patients
and reports to the intensive care unit of the hospital. The
patients are monitored remotely. In this case, if any data is
hacked by malicious node lead a chaos .It is necessary to
detect the malicious node in the network.
In Selective forward attack malicious node selectively
drops the packet and degrades the performance of the
network. This paper focuses on detection mechanism against
selective forward attack based on Dynamic Source Routing
Protocol for mobile wireless sensor networks.
1.1 Motivation
Wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to many routing
attacks such as Selective forward attack , HELLO flood
attack , sinkhole attack, Wormhole attack ,etc because of
broadcast nature of transmission medium, resource
limitation on sensor nodes and uncontrolled environments
where they are left unattended [7]. The existing security
mechanisms are inadequate and new approaches are
required for each routing attack since each attack has its
own nature and characteristics. The major aim of this work
is to detect the selective forward attack which also meets the
security goals such as data authenticity, integrity, and
availability.
The major security objectives are as follows:
• To design defensive mechanisms against
selective forward attack considering the resource
constraints of mobile nodes.
• To identify the malicious node on forward
routing path.
• To provide data authenticity and data
integrity.
• To improve the detection accuracy and data
availability.
1.2 Our Contribution
Selective forwarding is one of the routing methods. The
packet is forwarded to the destination node/base station
based on routing table and network conditions. The
defensive mechanism against selective forward attack based
on Dynamic Window based concept is formulated. Window
refers the session between the complete transmission of
message from the source and destination node/base station.
The message transmission timings of the sessions are
different. With the particular window malicious node is
identified based on the cumulative acknowledgement packet
and drop ratio of the node which lies in the forward routing
path. It is detected by checkpoint, source node, ordinary
node, and node id. Once the node is identified, it is removed
from the network and the packet is routed through the
alternate path. Detection accuracy also depends upon the
transmission and reception range since the nodes are
mobile. Simulation results show that the communication
overhead is slightly high but the detection accuracy is 90%
when the drop ratio is less.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section II represents the Back ground, reviews the existing
works, and proposes the detection scheme. Sections III
 (IJCNS) International Journal of Computer and Network Security, 33
discuss the performance evaluation. Section IV concludes
with the scope of the scheme in future.
2. Background and proposed Scheme
This section describes the selective forward attack and
reviews the existing works.
2.1 Selective Forward Attack
Figure 1 shows an example of selective forward attack. It
drops packet and refuses to forward the message to neighbor
node. If the malicious nodes drop the entire message, the
node is called black hole. Malicious node can forward the
message in a wrong path and gives unfaithful routing
information in the network. It creates unnecessary packet
delay and it leads to confusion in forwarding the message. It
also creates false information and transmission in the
network. It is difficult to detect the malicious node when
there is collision, packet drop due to timer expiry and link
failure, since the nodes are mobile nodes. Selective forward
attack affects the exsisting routing protocols such as DSR,
GPSR, GEAR and Tinos beaconing.
2.2 Review
Selective forward attack may corrupt some mission-
critical applications such as military surveillance and forest
fire monitoring in wireless sensor networks. BinXiao[3][4]
proposed a lightweight security scheme and detected the
selective forward attack using multi-hop
acknowledgements. It has limitations as it requires nodes to
be loosely time synchronized and keep one-way key chains
for authentication. Kim[5] suggested cumulative
acknowledgement based detection. The limitations, data-
reply packets are transmitted through multiple paths. But,
the communication overhead will be high because of
cumulative acknowledgement and there by reducing the
node energy. Y.B.Reddy[7] proposed a new framework to
detect the selective forward attack using game theory model,
the detection of a malicious node is found between the
selective acknowledgement points irrespective of the
dropping rate. J.Brown[8] proposed a sequential
probability ratio test for detecting the attacks in
heterogeneous sensor networks. Mathematical foundations
are also be helpful in detecting the attack. The major
concept of the existing works adopted a scheme in routing
protocols and analyzed its performance in terms of
communication overhead, network throughput, and energy
consumption. In this paper, the light weight scheme based
on dynamic source routing protocol for detecting the attack
Vol. 2, No. 9, September 2010
is used. The limitation of the scheme is high communication
overhead and high energy consumption is high.
2.3 Assumptions
Seven assumptions are proposed in detection mechanism.
First, the Nodes are mobile and transmit the messages
during different sessions. Second, the size of the window is
constant i.e. the total time duration for transmission of
messages per session is kept constant. Third, the Dynamic
Source Routing protocol is implemented in nodes. Fourth,
during a particular session topology is static .Fifth; the node
id is different per session. Sixth, the malicious node only
drops maximum number of packets. And finally, the
messages are authenticated using one-way hash chains.
2.4 Detection Scheme
The existing detection scheme consists of inclusion of
packets such as cumulative acknowledgement of each node,
event packet, acknowledgement packet, control packets and
alert packet. With the inclusion of packets for detections,
communication overhead will be more. The proposed
detection schemes consist of cumulative acknowledgement
packet between the check points of the forward path and the
check point generates the trap message and is sent to the
next node of the forwarding path.
The different phases of the proposed mechanism are as
follows:
1. Node id assignment phase and location
phase
2. Topology identification
3. Forward route selection path
4. Check Point assignment
5. Data transmission
6. Malicious node detection
2.4.1 Node id and Location Phase
Node id is activated only when the transmission is
required. Node id is configured dynamically per session by
the sink node/base station. Whenever the sink node/base
station needs any information it broadcasts the set of node
ids and activates the timer. Node id is valid until timer
expires. Base station stores the allotted node id temporarily
for each session temporarily.
2.4.2 Topology identification phase
After receiving the node id, the node identifies its
neighbor node and stores the next hop neighbor id to dentify
the topology of the network.
2.4.3Forward route selection path
The source node sends the route_ request packet to the
destination node/base station. It responds the route_reply
packet with the selected forward path through which data is
transmitted. Forward path is selected based on the Dynamic
source routing protocol.
2.4.4Check point selection phase
Base station/Destination node assigns the nodes to be
the check point in the forward path randonly. In the
downstream link, check point generates a trap message after
the successful reception of the packet.
2.4.5Data transmission phase
Once the forward path is selected, data is transmitted
from the source to the base station/destination node. Upon
successful reception of data, each node sends an
acknowledgement packet to its next node which lies in the
forward path. The acknowledgement packet of next node
34 (IJCNS) International Journal of Computer and Network Security,
Vol. 2, No. 9, September 2010

and previous node is forwarded to next neighbor node in the

forward path. In this way ,acknowledgement packets are 1
32
31
cumulated. Once the check point receives the cumulative 2 41
35
6
acknowledgement packet, it generates the trap message and 46
36
30 47
sends to its next node in the forward path. If the destination 14
20
13 45 37
receives the trap message generated by the last check point, 17
21 38
it shows that the data has been successfully transmitted from 28
5

44
the source and the destination. 48
9
7
43
16
22 39
2.4.6Detection process 49
15
12

8
23
10 24
Step: 1 Base station issues the node id and it is dynamic 50
42
40
18
and unique for a window. 11 25
26
Step 2: Base station sends the data request to all the 33
19
nodes. 3
4
27
Step 3: Source nodes send a route request packet to the 34
B
base station. S

Step 4 : Base station sends a route reply packet to the Window-A

source station . 46 11 44
99 19
Step 5: Base station selects the node in the forward path 14
9
as check points. 45 18 77
14 27 43
Step 6. : Source node sends the data packet to the next 26
78 88
node which lies in the forward path. Upon receiving the data 13
91 66 23
the node sends the acknowledgement packet and the 44
21
5

receiving node sends its acknowledgement packet along 22 6 48

54
15
with the data packet and thus frames the cumulative 52 17
62
43
acknowledgement. 26 4
3 36
Step 7: Once the check point receives the cumulative 83
17
44
acknowledgement, it generates the trap message and it is 81 80 B
5
forwarded along with the data to the next check point. 2
S
7 8
Step 8: Upon receiving the cumulative acknowledgement 1
10 72
packet and the trap message, the base station detects the 98 54

exact malicious node in the forward path based on the Window B

negative acknowledgement. If any node holds its id after a Figure 2. Node-id Detection
predetermined time interval of the window that node is also
suspected as a malicious node and is illustrated in 2.5 Detection Analysis
Algorithm. The proposed detection mechanism has been analyzed
Step 9: Once the malicious node is detected it is removed based on following background:
from the network and the packet is forwarded through the Scenario 1: Based on node id
alternate path. If any node holds the id after the timer expires, that node
Algorithm: Determining malicious node is suspected to be a malicious node. The value of the timer
Input:
CAKP : A cumulative packet received
depends on the number of hops in the forward routing path
{Datan,ACKo,ACK1,…….ACKn} and maximum transmission delay. Packet delivery ratio,
Trap :{check point id, rds, node id of NACK} throughput are further analyzed to confirm the node to be a
n: Total # of ACKs in CAKP
m: Total # of nodes in the forwarding path
compromised node. In Fig 2. the node id’s of Window A
1. create a list of responses [] and traps[] and Window B are different except the node ids such as
of length m 45,15 and 21 and such nodes are treated as malicious nodes.
2. for i=0,….n-1 Scenario 2: Check-point detection
responses [n-1]<- ack n-i 46 11 44
99 19
remove ack n-i from CAKP 14
9
if ack n-I == n then 45 18 77
return {rds=1 } 14 27 43
88
67 78
else {rds=0} 13
91 66 23
retrun ckpid
44 51
endif 22 6 16
21
3. for i=0,……., n-1 54
15
52 17
traps [n-i] <- nids(nack) 62
43
remove and ckpid and rds from 26
3
4
36
trap[] 83
17
4. for i=0,……., n-1 44
81 80 B
5
if ckpidi [trap] != ckpidi+1 then 2
S
if (rdstrap[]==1) then 1
7 8
return ckpids 10 72
98 54
else
return the nids(nack) Figure 3. Check-point detection
end if
 (IJCNS) International Journal of Computer and Network Security, 35
Vol. 2, No. 9, September 2010

The Check-points are randomly selected, if the base mobile nodes. Overlap of window causes the packet drop in
station/destination selects the malicious node as check- the network. Check point should not misjudge an ordinary
points that generate acknowledgement and trap message on node to be a compromised node. In Fig. 5 Node 4 drops the
its own and forward the packet to its neighbor node. In that cumulative acknowledgement packet and it is treated as
case, detection of malicious node may be suspected based on compromised node. Based on the Negative
the node id and packet delivery ratio. Check point id is valid acknowledgement, the compromised node is identified.
until window expires. In Fig. 3 Node 26 and 67 are source
Destina
nodes whereas BS is the base station and it is treated as Source 1 5 8
tion
destination node and forward paths are 26-54-22-6-52-36
and 67-13-44-78-21-88-17-62 respectively. Check points are
22, 16 and 21.The forward path from the source 26 to base Figure 5. Node as Compromised Node
station does not contain any malicious node. But the forward
path from 67 to the Base station contains 21 as check point Format of the Cumulative Acknowledgement packet
but it is also a malicious node. In this case, check point is a Dat Ac Ac … Ack NACK
malicious node and it is detected based on node id and a k0 k1 N
packet drop ratio. Format of the Trap message
Scenario 3: Source node detection Check point RDS Node ids of NACK
The base station broadcasts the request to nodes, and the Node id
malicious node responds to the base station with route
request packet station to gather the routing information and If NACK is set to 0, it denotes that it is a negative
misguide the route in the network. Fig. 4 shows that acknowledgement of data packet and if itis set to 1, it
malicious node 67 voluntarily responds to the base station denotes that it is a negative acknowledgement of route, if the
after receiving the route request and misguides the route. node has not seen the route packet sent by the base
The actual forward path is 67-6-16-52-3 instead of 67-13- station/destination.
44-78-21-88-17-62. The node is detected based on the Received data successfully (RDS=1) denotes that data is
packet drop ratio and based on cumulative received upto the particular check point indicated by its
acknowledgement packet. node id.Once the destination/base station identifies the
46 11 44
99
14
19 malicious nodes, the destination broadcasts the node id of
9
NACK packet .Source requests the destination to send the
45 18 77
14 27
88
43 alternate forward path.
67 78
91 66
13
23 3. Performance Evaluation
44
21
51 The proposed algorithm is implemented in ns2 [6] and
22 6 16
54 the performance is evaluated in terms of network throughput
15
52 17
62 and packet delivery ratio
43
26
3
4
36
Evaluation Metrics:
83
17 The following metrics [6][8] evaluate the effectiveness of
44
81
5
80 B the proposed detection Scheme.
S
2
7 8
Packet delivery ratio: It is the ratio of number of packets
1
10 72 received and the number of packets sent.
98 54
Throughput: This gives the fraction of channel capacity
Figure 4. Source Node Detection. used for data transmission.
Communication Overhead: It is the ratio of overheads
Scenario 4: Node can be a compromised node with and without the detection scheme.
The existing methods such as CHEMAS, CADE, Average Latency: Mean time in seconds taken by the
[2][3][4][5] detect any two nodes in the selective forward packets to reach their respective destination.
path as malicious node . In CHEMAS, authors suggest that Undetected ratio: It is the ratio of number of undetected
malicious node lies within the rang of check points. In maliciously dropped packets to the total number of
CADE, authors present the detection mechanism to identify maliciously dropped packets.
the two malicious nodes in the forward path. The proposed 3.1 Simulation parameters
mechanism detects the exact compromised nodes. Check The parameters used in our simulations are shown in
point generates a trap message and forwards it to the next Table 1. Window is static and malicious nodes are randomly
check point stating that there is no packet drop exists upto located on the forward paths of source and base station.
that check point. Between the two check points, Node ids, check points, source and destination are assigned
acknowledgements of each node are cumulated if the data before the transmission starts.
has been transmitted successfully. Once the check point
receives the cumulative acknowledgement successfully then
it generates the trap message. If any node between the
check points fail to forward the data packet, Cumulative
acknowledgment and trap message, that node is suspected to
be compromised node. Cumulative Acknowledgment packet
can also drop by collision and timer expiry since nodes are
36 (IJCNS) International Journal of Computer and Network Security,
Vol. 2, No. 9, September 2010

Table 1: Parameters used in simulations During the data transmission, malicious nodes are
Area 2000mX2000m detected, and the authors have detected that node 2 is a
Nodes 50 check point node and also malicious node and other
Packet size 512 bytes malicious nodes are 7, 14 and 41 as shown in Fig. 8.
Transmission protocol UDP
Application Traffic CBR
Transmission rate 10 Mbits/sec
Pause time 24.73 sec
Maximum speed 31sec
Simulation time 100 sec
Propagation model Radio Propagation
Maximum Malicious node 50
Type of attack Selective forward attack
Examined DSR

3.2 Performance Results

In this section, the performance of the proposed
detection mechanisum is evaluated in terms of packet
delivery ratio and network throughput. The check points,
source node and destination nodes with its id are depicted
in the Fig. 6.

Figure 8. Detection of Compromised Nodes

In the simulation, the authors used different types of field

Figure 6. Node Deployment Phase
Few packet drops are occurred during the data
transmission Phase and are indicated in Fig. 7.
Figure 7. Data transmission Phase
configurations including the forward path nodes which are
moving randomly, pausing for a fixed time of 25 seconds
and moving randomly in a 2000m X 2000m area. The
simulation time is 100 seconds and results are taken after 50
simulation runs. The same trends are observed in the results.
The Constant Bit Rate (CBR) traffic is introduced while
data transmission to check the detection accuracy. It is
observed that Node 15 has dropped the packets due to CBR
traffic and the proposed mechanism does not suspect the
node to be a compromised node. The undetected ratio is 20
% which proves that detection accuracy is 80%. Further, it
is observed that though the packet drop occurs with the
overlap of different windows. The proposed mechanism does
not suspect the nodes as compromised node because of
different time interval and dynamic node id configuration. It
is observed that the packet drop due to traffic exists due to
overlap of the window. During the time interval from 30
seconds to 40 seconds and from 95 seconds to 96 seconds,
the packet is dropped only due to CBR traffic window
overlap. Few nodes hold the node id after the expiry of
timer. Its packet delivery ratio is 30% where as packet
delivery of normal nodes is 100% and it has been detected
as compromised node. This is depicted in Fig. 9. It is also
shown that packet delivery rate of normal nodes are from
70% to 100% and compromised node is only 30%.
It is observed that Node2 is a check point and is detected
as compromised node. The packet delivery ratio is 80% like
normal nodes. The proposed scheme detects the check point
based on node id. The timer of that particular node holds
above the maximum time delay. The authors observed that
timer of normal node id is 40 seconds but the timer of check
point is 120 seconds for a specific window. Fig. 10 depicts
the packet delivery ratio of check point node, normal node,
and malicious node. Further, the authors observed that
malicious node in the forward path drops 270 packets /100
 (IJCNS) International Journal of Computer and Network Security, 37
Vol. 2, No. 9, September 2010

seconds and throughput is 47 packets /second .The average

latency is 38.26 seconds after the detection of malicious
node and 50 seconds before the detection of malicious node.

Figure 11. Packet drop ratio

Figure 9. Packet Delivery Rate of normal nodes are from

70 % to 100% and compromised node is only 30 %.

Figure 12.Throughput
The researcher observes that the number of packets sent
and throughput vary due to the presence of malicious nodes.
In Fig. 11 and Fig. 12, the malicious nodes increase the
packet drop ratio and decrease the throughput of the
network, the presence of malicious node affects the
performance of the network. A cumulative
acknowledgement is transmitted up to the check point and
thus reduces the communication overhead in the forward
path.
The packet drop rate of the normal nodes is significantly
different from that of the compromised node. The proposed
detection scheme can achieve 90% of detection rate when
drop rate is less.
The performance of the scheme is compared with the
other existing schemes and it is tabulated in Table 2. The
overall performance of the proposed scheme is better than
the existing schemes. Though the scheme consumes 60% of
node energy, it provides better accuracy than the existing
schemes.

Figure 10. Check point as compromised node

38 (IJCNS) International Journal of Computer and Network Security,
Vol. 2, No. 9, September 2010

Table 2: Comparision with the Exsiting Schemes

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 (IJCNS) International Journal of Computer and Network Security, 39
Vol. 2, No. 9, September 2010

Authors Profile
S.Sharmila received the B.E and M.E
degrees in Electronics and Communication
Engineering and Applied Electronics from
Bharathiyar University and Anna University,
India in 1999 and 2004 respectively. Her
research interest includes wireless sensor
networks,
computer networks and security.

G. Umamaheswari is Assistant professor in

Electronics and Communication Department,
PSG College of Technology, Coimbatore,
India. She completed her B.E. degree in
Electronics and Communication from Madras
University in 1989 and M.E. in Electronics
Engineering from Anna University, in 1992.
She is now supervising 5 Ph.D. candidates