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Background
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the Petition for Quo Warranto
It is the opinion of the commentator that the Petition for Quo Warranto
violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
While it is true that the Supreme Court does have jurisdiction over the
petition, the action may be premature for violating the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. As stated in the case of Ernesto Dy v Hon. Bibat-Palamos:
“In the absence of special reasons, the SC will decline to exercise original
jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus since it is not a trier of
facts and, that is a function which can be better done by the trial courts.
The same rule applies for quo warranto wherein the SC has
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC.”
Recourse may however be made directly to the SC. The exceptions to the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts are the following as stated in the case of
Republic v. Caguioa:
1.) Where there are special and important reasons clearly stated in the
petition;
2.) When dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
3.) When demanded by the broader interest of justice;
4.) When the challenged orders are patent nullities;
5.) When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances call for
and justify the immediate and direct handling by the Court 2
Not squarely fitting any of the exceptions above, the Ponente invoked that
the case against Sereno was one of transcendental importance to justify the
Court’s instant jurisdiction. However, such doctrine applies to the legal
standing or locus standi of a petitioner or plaintiff. The Court invoked the
doctrine of transcendal importance in the manner of a magic wand to fit the
petition for quo warranto to the exceptions of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts.
1
Ernesto Dy v. Hon. Bibat-Palamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013
2
Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 174385, February 20, 2013
Propriety of a Quo Warranto proceeding against an impeachable officer
The use of the word “may” does make it seem that the Constitution itself
does not prohibit a petition for quo warranto to oust the enumerated officers
therein.
Thus it cannot be simply gainsaid that since the word “may” is used then
the possible mode of ouster can be a petition for quo warranto.
3
David v. SET, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016
The power of impeachment is lodged in the Congress. It is the power of
Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as
provided in the Constitution.4 It is a safeguard to the separation of powers of
the state and acts as a check and balance. Such great power cannot simply
be diminished by the use of the permissive word “may” which makes it
possible for a special civil action of quo warranto to step into its shoes.
A dangerous precedent is now nonetheless part of the law of the land for
Article 8 of the Civil Code provides: “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.”
The commentator opines that the action of a petition for quo warranto has
prescribed.
The language of the law is thus clear that the action should have been
commenced one (1) year after the alleged cause for Sereno’s ouster. In a nifty
and convenient move, the majority decision in the case heavily relied that
“prescription does not run against the State” based on the Civil Code
provision:
If the legislative intent is to provide that the action does not prescribe
against the State then such should have been written unto the Rules of Court.
Usually, it is the Solicitor General who initiates the action for quo warranto,
therefore the State is always involved. Should the idea of “prescription does
not run against the State” is to be recognized under Section 11 of Rule 66 of
the 1997 Rules of Court, it should have been inculcated in the language for
the State, again because the State is involved in actions for quo warranto
because a quo warranto is as provided:
5
Unabia v City Mayor, G.R. No. L-8759, May 25, 1956
“However, we note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an
office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This has
been the law in the island since 1901, the period having been originally
fixed in section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find
this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that
persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally
dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and
that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be
considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment.”
Sereno’s consistent failure to file her SALNs during her tenure as a law
professor in the University of the Philippines and failure to submit the required
SALNs upon the request of the Judicial and Bar Council for her nomination for
Chief Justice is proof that Sereno lacks integrity.
RULE 5.08 A judge shall make full financial disclosure as required by law.
Conclusion
With the foregoing, the commentator opines that the case of Republic v
Sereno is one that diminishes the independence of the Judiciary and impairs
the impeachment power of Congress. The application of the rules on Statutory
Construction is somehow stretched to accommodate the decision of the
majority. A dangerous precedent is created that would one day haunt the
Judiciary itself. It could be said that the floodgates have been opened and the
Court may be flooded with similar actions.
It could be said that the case was politically motivated by the current
administration but such inference is already moot and academic. What now
lies ahead is the future application of the jurisprudence created by this
unprecedented and historic case.