De Leon v.

Esguerra Case Digest

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera Issue:

Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal
in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise
known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum
antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor
Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino
G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other
respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of
February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election
Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall
commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall
have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with
the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC
Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate
their successors.
validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling:
Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC
Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force
and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987,
therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have
superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no
longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987
Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw,
therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of

elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners
continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution
and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the
provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay
officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being
inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
DECISION
(En Banc)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in Manila
Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as
its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the
GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked
the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”
II. THE ISSUES
1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is
a self-executing provision and does not need implementing
legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing,
whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form
part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence,
mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give
preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision and does not need implementing legislation
to carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes
of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from
enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long
as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor
details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing
nature of constitutional provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec.
10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and
third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not
self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State
still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third
paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph
can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing
in one part and non-self-executing in another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when
our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce
such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
form part of our patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources,
but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness
to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos;
its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management
of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim
that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is
being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation,
not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is
mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be
carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through
respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes
the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state
action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
distinct from the government are considered “state action” covered
by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a “public
function;” (2) when the government is so significantly involved with
the private actor as to make the government responsible for his
action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized
the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling
51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and
third categories of “state action.” Without doubt therefore the
transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the
people but also to the government as elements of the State. After
all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power -
legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the
three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case
the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to
the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale
of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the
higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules
expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the
winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino
First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award
yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the
highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the
provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders
and other interested parties.
xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any
reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the
constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the
block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding
its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we
cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional
injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in
a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the
Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life
and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to
sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS,
petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was
referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the
same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House
Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with
the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of
which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.”
Issues:
Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5)
of Article XI of the Constitution.
Rulings:
This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope
of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy. Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.”
Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said
rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article
XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend
the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice,
the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.
Ramon Gonzales vs COMELEC
21 SCRA 774 – Political Law – Amendment to the Constitution –
Political Question vs Justiciable Question
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for
the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to
the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite
shall be held on the same day that the general national elections
shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon
Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was
unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to
the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in
the general election rather than in the issues involving the
plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by
Congress when they came up with their proposals to amend the
Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other
respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress
cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.
not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the
constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must
only be held on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in
this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the
election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The
circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had
been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections
merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to
submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite
should be scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate “Fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection”. They should be able
to compare the original proposition with the amended proposition

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a

political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a
general election.

HELD:

I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the

power to amend as well as the power to propose amendments to
the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to
Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people
as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when
Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not
actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as
a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is
Imbong v.COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970
Ponente: Makasiar, J.
FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both
interested in running as candidates for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a
Constitutional Convention which shall have two delegates from each
representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed
Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the
convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two
delegates from each representative district. On August 24, 1970,
the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132,
implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914
which previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the
validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law,
while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of
said R.A. 6132.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional
convention and set the parameters of such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?
HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention
as the constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to
enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A.
6132, since such details are within the competence of the Congress
in the exercise of its legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely
an application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does
not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the
law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res.
Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The
challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for
any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable
and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested
by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction contained in the
section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain
substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid
infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by the
petitioners.
I
The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers
and employees, whether elective or appointive, including members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of
corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date
of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this
Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an application of
and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the
Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due process or of
the equal protection of the law. Likewise, the constitutionality of
paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was upheld.4
II
Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain
the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting
as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and
not as a Constituent Assembly, because —
1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art.
XV of the Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose
Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose.
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary
authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the
doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the
effective exercise of the principal power granted.
3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by
the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which
are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132,
does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly.
Such implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress
in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power
encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication
withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action.
4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
omits to provide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional
convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary
implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly
recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.
5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be
vetoed by the President is no argument against conceding such power in
Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not
irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress
can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution
prescribing the required implementing details.
III
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of
delegates is not in accordance with proportional representation and
therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without
pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution with which it collides.
protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from
running "for any public office in any election" or from assuming "any
appointive office or position in any branch of the government government
until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention."
That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public
office, is axiomatic under our constitutional system. The State through its
Constitution or legislative body, can create an office and define the
qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as impose inhibitions
on a public officer. Consequently, only those with qualifications and who
do not fall under any constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly
elected or appointed to a public office. The obvious reason for the
questioned inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the perverting
influence of self-interest, party interest or vested interest and to insure
that he dedicates all his time to performing solely in the interest of the
nation his high and well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme
law of the land, which may endure for generations and which cannot easily
be changed like an ordinary statute.

Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution

does not expressly or impliedly require such apportionment of delegates to
the convention on the basis of population in each congressional district.
Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate
one delegate for, each congressional district or for each province, for
reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention.

Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue

deprivation of liberty without due process of law and denies the equal
OCCENA VS. COMELEC
SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-34150
APRIL 2, 1981
FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a
prohibiting proceeding against the validity of three batasang
pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment
allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a
foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential
purposes were approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2
dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet,
and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention;
and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.)
The petitioners contend that such resolution is against the
constitutions in proposing amendments:
ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?
HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled
the following:
1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its
amendments and how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The
1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim
National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on
Amendments similar with the interim and regular national assembly.
15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call
of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a
constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence.
2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in
character as to amount to a revision rather than amendments. To
dispose this contention, the court held that whether the
Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and
propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign
to the democratic system, is of no moment, because the same will
be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the
sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the
new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be
revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the
validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or
total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the
Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally
changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified
by the sovereign people."
3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose
amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. The
language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above
questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent
body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority
vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert
that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative
body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a
requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned.
Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as
follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not later than three months after the approval
of such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were
approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa
Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus
within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.
Tolentino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018
FACTS:
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two
resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines by Resolutions No. 2 and 4
on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969, respectively.
On November 10, 1970, the delegates were elected. The Convention has
its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Three months later, the
Constitutional Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1.
Constitutional Convention OR No. 1 lowered the voting age to 18 years old
and made women qualified to vote.
President Diosdado Macapagal sent letter to Comelec calling upon it to
implement the resolution. A day later, Comelec resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite. Constitutional
Convention then passed a series of resolutions to continue with the
plebiscite. Plebiscite was scheduled on November 8, 1971, which is the
same day for the elections of other government officials.
Petitioner assailed COMELEC’s resolution and the holding of the plebscite,
arguing that:
the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by Constitution, a power
lodged exclusively in Congress.
the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people
for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments.
(Sec. 1, Art. XV – partly stated above)
The COMELEC argued that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay
down the details of the plebiscite is within the authority of the
Constitutional Convention and that this power includes that of submitting
such amendments either individually or jointly.
ISSUES:
Whether the Constitutional Convention is governed by the Constitution.
Whether the plebiscite initiated by the Constitutional Convention, and to
be held by the COMELEC is constitutional
RATIO:
The Constitutional Convention is governed by the Constitution.
As a creature of the Constitution, the Constitutional Convention is
governed by the same Constitution that created it. This Convention has not
been called by the people, that is, revolutionary convention).
Consequently, it is not completely without restrain and omnipotent all
wise. Therefore, it is subject to the constraints imposed upon it by the
Constitution.
The plebiscite initiated by the Constitutional Convention, and to be held by
the Comelec, is not constitutional.
The plebiscite is against Sec. 1, Article of the 1935 Constitution, which
provides that:
“SECTION 1. … Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution
when approved by a majority of votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.” (emphasis
supplied)
The phrase “an election” refers to a singular election. The rationale of
which is that, to allow the people to realize the wisdom and
appropriateness of the provision, they need to examine the amendments
proposed by the Constitutional Convention in harmony with the others, as
well as the rest of the Constitution.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION:
Fernando, J.
Such an approach (plebiscite) all the more commends itself to me
considering that what was sought to be done is to refer the matter to the
people. The Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the
people alone, in whom sovereignty resides. There is no repugnancy to the
fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention ascertains the
popular will.

Once the Constitutional Convention is convened, it cannot in any wise be

interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. Though not sovereign, it
is a body independent of legislation.

The justification that the use of word “election” in the singular is not
decisive. The words used in the Constitution are not inert; they derive
vitality from the obvious purpose at which they are aimed.
Sanidad v. COMELEC
73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976
Ponente: Martin, J

FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding
and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare
without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031.
Petitioners contend that the president has no power to propose
amendments to the new constitution, as such, the referendum-plebiscite
has no legal basis.

ISSUE:
1. Is the case at bar justiciable?
2. Does the president have the authority to propose amendments to the
Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within
the time frame allowed sufficient and proper submission?

HELD:
The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent
assembly is a justiciable question since it is not the wisdom but the
constitutional authority of the president to perform such act is in question.
The president has the authority to propose amendments as the
governmental powers are generally concentrated to the president in times
of crisis. The time for deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions,
3 weeks, is not too short especially since the questions are issues of the
day and the people have been living with them since the proclamation of
martial law.
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the
Philippines
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the
petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them
the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the
slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation
thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from
signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA
is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a
state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as
a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision
not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform
to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act
No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the
respondents to consult the local government units or communities
affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their
authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any
branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the
Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with
the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act
. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the
dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate
ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the
Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under
RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure
derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public
concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring
that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds
no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character
of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing
consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal
forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular
dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of
society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as
a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision
not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that
the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated
state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized
under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the
national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the
associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version
of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the
ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria
of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily
sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it –
which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association –
runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the
national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the
present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE
are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more
of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is
covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform
to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring
amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force
upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting
the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an
amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOAAD.
This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the
amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her
oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such
presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to
change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure
for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the
above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose
constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third
party that the required amendments will eventually be put in
place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do
is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or
the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act
No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all
Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves
and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro
people” as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its
adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the
time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether
mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the
MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally understood even
by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous
peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in
has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to
the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested
exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights
of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that
ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation
of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does
not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by
mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991
requires all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany
project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group
of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The
MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally
vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which
could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed
grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No.
7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the
MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of
the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that
the same is on its way to independence.
Santiago et al vs COMELEC
March/June 1997
Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition
to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials
by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set
the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country, b.)caused the necessary publication of the said petition in
papers of general circulation, and c.)instructed local election
registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil
action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues
that 1.) the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend
the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA
6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local
legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically
provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were
specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission
indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law – as pointed out by former
Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on
amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as
worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on
amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to
cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides:
“Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least there per
centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right” This
provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law
to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Con-Con stated “without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17
cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional
action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional
action.” Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot
exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress
for whatever reason does not provide for its implementation.
***Note that this ruling has been “reversed” on November 20, 2006
when ten justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough
to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute
resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by
their various opinions already given when the Decision herein was
promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate
to amend the Constitution thru a people’s initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become
stare decisis. See discussion here
See also Lambino vs COMELEC.
Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018
FACTS:
On August 25, 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC
to hold plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b)
and (c) and Section 7 of RA 6735.
The Lambino Group claims that their petition has the support of 6,327,952
individuals satisfying the requirement that the signatories of the petition
constitute 12% of all registered voters with each legislative district
represented by at least 3% of its registered voters.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition modifies Sections 1-7 of Article VI
and Sections 1-4 of Article VII of the Constitution and adds Article XVIII
entitled ‘Transitory Provisions” to it shifting the country’s form of
government from Bicameral-Presidential to Unicameral-Parliamentary.
Days later, the Lambino Group filed an amended petition with the
COMELEC. However, the COMELEC issued its resolution denying due
course to the Lambino Groups’s petition invoking Santiago v. Commission
on Elections, which found RA 6735 as inadequate, in stating that there is
no enabling law governing initiative petitions such as that of the Lambino
Group to amend the Constitution.
The Lambino Group is petitioning for the issuance of writs of certiorari and
mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of August 31, 2006 and to
compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The
petitioners and supporting intervenors hold the view that COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago.
Opposing intervenors maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent and
they also challenge:
The Lambino Group’s standing to file the petition
The validity of the signature gathering and verification process
The Lambino Group’s compliance with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution The nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not
mere amendments.
The Lambino Group’s compliance with RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions
to only one subject.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complied with Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution – NO.
2. Whether the Court should revisit its ruling on Santiago v. COMELEC
which declared RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause proposals to
amend the Constitution – NO
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
due course to the Lambino Group’s petition – NO.
RATIO:
1. The Lambino Group failed to comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
a. The petition is not directly proposed by the people.
The Lambino Group’s Initiative does comply with the requirement that the
amendment be “directly proposed by the people upon a petition” because
the Lambino group failed to present the full text of the proposed changes
to the Constitution to the signatories and thus it cannot be assumed that
the signatories had knowledge of the full nature and effect of the changes
they were supporting. Given that the Initiative first gathered signatures
without showing the full text of the proposed amendments, it can be seen
as a “gigantic fraud on the people.”
While Section 2, Article XVII does not explicitly state that the full text of
proposed amendments to the constitution should be presented to the
people before they sign the petition, as shown on the record of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it was the intent of the
framers that an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments.
A signature requirement would be meaningless if the signatories have not
first been informed of the full extent of the proposal he/she is signing, and
that the attachment of the full text proposal would provide the
assumption that people would be informed in their decision whether to
sign or not.
Moreover, the signature sheet submitted by the Lambino Group to the
Court does not contain the full text of the proposed changes to the
Constitution; instead, the signature sheet merely asks whether the people
approve a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government.
The petitioners alleged that they circulated the draft of their 30 August
2006 amended petition during the signature gathering from February to
August 2006, having the Court believe that they prepared their amended
petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 and even before
they filed their 25 August 2006 petition. While Aumentado gives as
evidence ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, as proof that the amended
petition was circulated six months before the petitions were filed, ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to
prepare the petitions, rather, it only states that ULAP “supports the
proposals of the Consultative Commission on Charter Change” which are
vastly different from the proposals of the Lambino Group, thus the ULAP
Resolution does not establish that the Lambino Group circulated the draft
of the petition.
There is inconsistency in the story of the Lambino Group as it was first
stated that they circulated both the 25 August 2006 petion and the 30
August 2006 amended petion; however, Atty. Lambino later changed the
story stating that only the amended petition was circulated.
Even with the assumption that the amended petition was indeed
circulated while the signatures were being gathered it could still be
concluded that there would not be enough copies of the petition for all the
signatories to see. As per Atty. Lambino’s own admission only 100,000
copies could be confirmed to have been printed as these were printed by
Lambino himself. Assuming that each signature sheet, which had space for
10 signatures, was attached with a copy of the petition, there would be
enough copies for only 1 million people, far from the 6,327,952 signatures
gathered by the Lambino Group.
Having proved that majority of the signatories were not able to see the full
text of the of the proposed changes proposed signing, they could not have
known the full nature and effect of the proposed changes which include
three controversial amendments:
The lifting of term limits on the members of the legislature.
The interim Parliament will continue to function indefinitely until it decides
to call for parliamentary elections thus enabling its members to determine
when they will end their term.
Within 45 days after the proposed changes, the interim Parliament will
convene to propose further amendments to the constitution.
This provision is determined by the Court to be totally unrelated to the
stated objective of the initiative and is considered logrolling.
Logrolling refers to the incorporation of an unrelated subject matter in the
same petition thus creating two propositions within one petition thus
putting the people in a dilemma where since they can only say yes or no to
the whole petition they cannot agree to one proposition without also
agreeing to the other.
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people.
While Atty. Lambino states that this provision is not necessary and should
thus be ignored, the Court does not agree since this provision could
effectively invalidate the whole exercise of the people’s initiative as
through this provision the interim Parliament could, in theory, propose
amendments not agreed upon by the signatories of the initial petition.
b. People’s initiative can only be done for constitutional amendments and
not revisions.
Based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the framers
intentionally made a distinction between amendments and revisions. It
was the intent, as is written, that only Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose revisions while a people’s initiative is limited only
to the proposal of amendments.
A revision implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution
while amendment refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes,
without altering the basic principle of the constitution. A change in a single
word could already be considered a revision as long as it overhauls the
structure of government and the ideological basis of the Constitution.
There are two tests to determine whether a change is an amendment or a
revision:
Quantitative test – examines the number of provisions, not the degree of
change, in order to test how extensive the proposed changes are.
Qualitative test – based on qualitative effects, asks whether the proposed
changes create far reaching changes in the nature of the basic
governmental plan thus amounting to a revision.
The prosed changes by the Lambino Group significantly alter the basic plan
of government as it would effectively alter the separation of powers
through the abolition of the Office of the President and merging of the
legislative and executive, and alter the system of checks and balances
within the legislature through the abolition of one chamber of Congress.
Under both quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s
proposed changes constitute a revision and not simply an amendment as it
“radically alters the framework of government set forth in the
Constitution.
The Court states that since the proposed changes constitute a revision and
would require far-reaching amendments in not just the specified articles
and provisions but also in several others, a deliberative body with recorded
proceedings would be the best vehicle to undertake them, as was intended
by the framers and is stated in the constitution, and not a people’s
initiative.
2. There is no need to revisit the Court’s ruling in Santiago since an
affirmation or reversal of the said ruling would not change the outcome of
this petition.
Even if it is assumed RA 6735 is valid, contrary to the ruling in Santiago, the
outcome of the Lambino Group’s petition would not change since before
referring to RA 6735 a petition must first comply with Section 2, Article
XVII, and as was previously established, it does not.
The Lambino Group’s petition also does not comply with RA 6735. Indeed,
It violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requiring that the signatories,
consistitng of 12% of the total number of registered voters, sign the
petition since it has already been established that the 6 million signatories
only signed a signature sheet and not the petition itself.
It also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735, which states that no more than 1
subject can be embraced by a petition, through its provision which
mandates the interim Parliament to propose further amendments which as
determined earlier is unrelated to the subject of a shift from presidential
to parliamentary form of government.
3. The COMELEC did not commit a grave of abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Lambino Group’s Initiative petition.
Since the COMELEC merely followed the Court’s ruling in Santiago, the
Commission did not gravely abuse its discretion.
DISSENTING OPINION:
Puno, J.
The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the examination of Santiago on
the following grounds:
In the Santiago ruling, the court ruled RA 6735 as insufficient but if did not
strike it down as unconstitutional, by doing so the Court “usurped the
exclusive right of legislators to determine how far laws implementing the people. Every step of the way it is the people who should decide, the
constitutional mandates should be crafted,” defying the principle that court should not prohibit them from doing so.
courts cannot dictate on Congress the style on writing laws and in doing so
rendered an intolerable ruling.
The ruling in Santiago involves the sovereignty of the people.
The ruling should not impede the will of the 6.3 million signatories.
RA 6735 is sufficient to implement the people’s initiative.

The intent of the legislators in enacting RA 6735 was the implementation

of the right of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution
through direct action.
The court has the duty to give effect to the intent.
Only implementing details were omitted from RA 6735 and not
fundamental principles. The implementing details of a law can be
delegated to the COMELEC.
The proposed changes are amendments and can be undertaken through
people’s initiative
Using the same quantitative test it could be argued that since only 2 out of
the 18 articles of the 1987 constitution will be changed and thus the big
bulk of the 1987 Constitution would remain unaffected.

Based on the work of Garner, who says that a good constitution is

composed of the constitution of liberty, constitution of government, and
constitution of sovereignty, the proposed changes only affect the
constitution of government and even then the changes do not change the
fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican state.
According to Dean Vicente G. Sincon, revision refers to a consideration of
the entire constitution while amendment refers only to particular
provisions to be added to or altered in a constitution. This traditional
distinction guided our people when they effected changes in the 1935 and
1975 Constitutions.
The court should let the voice of the people be heard.

The petition for people’s initiative is but the first step towards the
amendment of the constitution. The petition, if approved, does not
constitute already the amendment of the constitution. It will still require
debate and deliberation of the people, as well as ratification by majority of