CRIMINAL LAW 1

#25 ORIEL MAGNO vs HONORABLE CA and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 96132 (June 26, 1992)
In relation to Malum prohibitum as exception to the requirement of mens rea

PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
The case at bar is due to an appeal of certiorari from a decision by the Court of Appeals
(respondent) affirming the RTC ruling that MAGNO was guilty of violating Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22.
In April 1983, Magno was in the process of putting up a car repair shop, but lacked funds to
purchase the necessary equipment as to operate the business. The Vice President of Mancor
Industries, distributor of car equipment, Corazon Teng was then approached by Magno telling
Teng his lack of fund in running a business. Consequently, Teng recommended LS Finance and
Management Corporation (LS for short) to Magno. Teng, also, advised the Vice President of LS,
Joey Gomez, that Mancor would be willing to supply Magno the equipment if they could provide
Magno credit facilities.
LS proposed an arrangement with Magno regarding a warranty deposit amounting to P29, 790.00
(30% of the total value of the said equipment). Due to lack of fund, Magno asked LS to search
for a third party that would lend him such amount. Unknown by Magno, the third party paid the
warranty deposit that the amount borrowed will be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest rate.
(Teng also instructed LS not to disclose it to Magno). Magno then had a leasing agreement
whereby he shall lease the equipment and pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the
same. The equipment was then delivered to Magno and a post-dated check was issued to LS
which was subsequently forwarded to Teng. When the check matured, Magno asked LS to not
deposit it, as he is no longer banking in Pacific Bank.
In exchange of the first check, he issued six (6) postdated checks. Two of which were deposited
and cleared, while the four (4) others (which was the subject used against Magno) were held
momentarily by Teng, on the request of Magno due to insufficient funds. It was only when
Magno couldn’t pay LS the monthly rentals, did he come to know that Teng was the one who
paid for the warranty deposit. They sought to Teng the payment would be made but failed.
Teng then sued Magno for failing to pay. After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104, decided that Magno was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the
four (4) cases.
ISSUE: WON Magno was guilty of violating BP Blg 22
HELD: NO.
The decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
RATIONALE:
As the arrangement was merely for rental, the equipment was also pulled out when Petitioner
couldn’t pay. Not paying the remaining checks was lawful and just. Moreover, since petitioner
did not receive the amount borrowed, charging him for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which
he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to
even make him pay an unjust "debt. Petitioner was not even aware that the checks made were
turned over by Joey Gomez to Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her
instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an
accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was
absent, therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question.
The Court of Appeals even ignored the cardinal rule that the accused is presumed innocent until
proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. They even expected the petitioner-appellant to present
evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime charged, which he could not as the warranty
deposit has already been taken back by Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest
in the transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Whereby even
when she may have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue
collecting from the petitioner since she had in her possession the checks that "bounced".
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the
petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required
under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22.
POINTERS:
RULING OF RTC: Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of
the checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued, would have resulted in
placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no
satisfactory proof that there was such an extinguishment in the present case. Appellee (CA) aptly points
out that appellant (MAGNO) had not adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by
the complainant to cover the warranty deposit must already have been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)

BP Blg 22 is a special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on
the rule that in cases ofmala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been
violated, proof of criminal intent not being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts
being prohibited for reasons of public policy and the defenses of good faith and absence of
criminal intent being unavailing in prosecutions for said offenses.