Enrile vs Salazar Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the

G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by
law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103,
in Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors
composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and
Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without
bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The
following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he
was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo
Dula Torres.
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the
appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the
respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty
pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent.
The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail,
claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and
even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available
there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must
be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he
was deprived of his constitutional rights.

Issue:

(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an offense
being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code?

Held:

There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor,
in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding
12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article
48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would
be unfavorable to the movant.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime
defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of
G.R. No. 175013, June 1, 2007
Beltran vs People
Facts: These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin
petitioners’ prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and
prosecution of petitioners’ cases. Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran),
and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, are members of the House of Representatives
representing various party-list groups. Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under Article
134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases pending with the
RTC Makati.
Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform
Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an
inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on
24 February 2006, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest
was based on the joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been
present at the rally.
The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where he was subjected to a
second inquest, this time for Rebellion. The letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action
the results of the CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-
76, San Juan, and several others as “leaders and promoters” of an alleged foiled plot to
overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng
Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a “tactical alliance.”
The DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict
Beltran and San Juan as “leaders/promoters” of Rebellion. The Information alleged that
Beltran, San Juan, and other individuals “conspiring and confederating with each other, x x x,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously form a tactical alliance between the
CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members
as Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan (KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and
thereby rise publicly and take up arms against the duly constituted government.
In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that Beltran’s inquest for
Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for
such felony.
Issue: whether there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion.
Held:
There is No Probable Cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion. Probable cause is the “existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted.
The elements of Rebellion are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government;
and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either –
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of
their powers and prerogatives
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action
done in furtherance of a political end.
We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are
insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. The allegations in these
affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public
uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in
Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present
during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts
of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February
2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran’s alleged
presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere
membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.29[29] As for the alleged funding of the CPP’s
military equipment from Beltran’s congressional funds, Cachuela’s affidavit merely contained
a general conclusion without any specific act showing such funding. Such a general
conclusion does not establish probable cause.
In his Comment to Beltran’s petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes’
affidavit, dated 25 February 2006,] as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as
Fuentes provided details in his statement regarding meetings Beltran and the other petitioners
attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were
allegedly discussed, among others. The claim is untenable. Fuentes’ affidavit was not part of
the attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ on 27 February 2006. Thus, the panel of inquest
prosecutors did not have Fuentes’ affidavit in their possession when they conducted the
Rebellion inquest against Beltran on that day. Such belated submission, a tacit admission of
the dearth of evidence against Beltran during the inquest, does not improve the prosecution’s
case. Assuming them to be true, what the allegations in Fuentes’ affidavit make out is a case
for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code,
not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to
bring down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion
under Article 134. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to
try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.
To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting, maintaining, or
heading a Rebellion. The Information in Criminal Case No. 06-452 itself does not make such
allegation. Thus, even assuming that the Information validly charges Beltran for taking part in
a Rebellion, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right since there is no allegation in the
Information that he is a leader or promoter of the Rebellion. However, the Information in fact
merely charges Beltran for “conspiring and confederating” with others in forming a “tactical
alliance” to commit rebellion. As worded, the Information does not charge Beltran with
Rebellion but with Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, a bailable offense
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor vs CA
OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ATICO ABORDO, JUDY CATUBIG, PETER MOLATO, and FLORENCIO
CANDIA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 125796,
December 27, 2000
Ponente: Mendoza
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
Petition brought by the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte for a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals founding the prosecutor to have gravely abused his discretion
in charging murder with frustrated murder on the ground that the evidence adduced at the
preliminary investigation shows that the crime committed was rebellion and as such, ordered
the prosecutor to substitute the information filed by him.
FACTS
On May 1, 1988, in the Municipality of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with the high caliber firearms,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another and with intent to kill by
means of treachery and evident premeditation did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and fire several shots to one Cpl. ALFREDO DELA
CRUZ PA, which accused his instantaneous death and causing injuries to the following victims
namely: SGT. RODRIGO ALVIAR PA, SGT. RODRIGO BARADI, SGT. LINOGAMAN PIATOS and SGT.
BELLIZAR PA, which injuries would ordinarily cause their death; thus performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of MURDER, as a consequence, but which
nevertheless did not produce it for reason of causes independent of the will of the herein
accused, that is the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the said victims which
prevented their death.
On August 3, 1993, the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Dipolog City, an information (docketed as Criminal Case No, 6427)
charging private respondents and 10 other individuals with murder and multiple frustrated
murder.
in murder and multiple frustrated murder, they can be denied to bail only if it can be shown
that the evidence against them is not strong, whereas if the charge is rebellion, private
respondents would have an absolute right to bail.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether or not the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor erred in filing the information against
the accused as Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder instead of the crime of rebellion as
defined in Art. 134 of the RPC.
DECISIONS/ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Denied private respondents’ motion for the correction or amendment of the
information. The court recognized and respected the prerogative of the fiscal to determine
whether or not a prima facie case exists in a given case against the accused and that the power
vested in the fiscal cannot be interfered with even by the courts.
CA: Holding the office of Provincial Prosecutor gravely abused its discretion in charging private
respondents with murder and multiple frustrated murder and ordered respondent to file a
substitute Information in Criminal Case No. 6472 charging the petitioners with rebellion only.
SC: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 24, 1996,
is REVERSED insofar as it orders petitioner to file a substitute information for rebellion in
Criminal Case No. 6427. In other respects, it is AFFIRMED.
The court did not resolve whether the crime committed was murder and frustrated murder or
rebellion. It ruled that what the real crime is must await the presentation of evidence at the
trial or at the hearing on the application for bail. Those accused of common crimes can then
show proof that the crime with which they were charged is really rebellion.
SUPREME COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
Mere allegation that the private respondents were members of the CCP/NPA who engaged
government troops in a firefight resulting in the death of a government trooper and the
wounding of four others does not necessarily mean that the killing and wounding of the
victims was made in furtherance of a rebellion. The political motivation for the crime must be
shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion.
Given the Joint affidavit of the prosecution witnesses alone, it is not possible to determine at
this stage of the criminal proceeding that in engaging the government troops in a "firefight,"
private respondents were acting in pursuance of rebellion. It could be that the "firefight" was
more of an ambush staged by the NPA, as shown by the fact that while the government troop
suffered one dead and four wounded, the CPP/NPA suffered only one wounded.

The private respondents, who are claimed as members of the NPA at the time of encounter,
appealed the resolution of the provincial prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice on the ground
that, in accusing them of murder and multiple frustrated murder, the provincial prosecutor
disregarded the political motivation which made the crime committed rebellion. When the
case was filed in court, private respondents reiterated their contention and prayed that the
provincial prosecutor be ordered to change the charge from murder with multiple frustrated
murder to rebellion. And that the alleged purpose of not filing the information as rebellion is
People vs Dasig
G.R. No. 100231
April 28, 1993
Facts:
Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nuñez and 6 others were charged together of shooting
Redempto Manatad, a police officer, as he died while performing duties. Upon arraignment,
appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the prosecution
had presented its first witness, accused Nuñes changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty."
Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said
accused until the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still
ongoing, Nuñez died on March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to
persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor
General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.
However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the
crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as
the person giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an
unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight
(8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the
heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom
he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions
to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. On August 16, 1987, two teams of police
officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the
sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw
Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñes trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured
Nuñes and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while the
group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was
shot on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended while a .38 caliber revolver with
17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him. Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the
hospital for treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation.
Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise
admitted that he and Nuñes were members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were
"Armand" and "Mabi," respectively.

The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every page thereof with the
first page containing a certification likewise signed by him. However, Dasig contends that the
procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and
contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming he conspired in the
killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and not murder
with direct assault. Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he
was still very sick and consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of
admitting such a serious offense.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of the deceased and
participated in the act of rebellion?

Held:

Yes. Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8)
years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
(DIRECT ASSAULT) These facts should have sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant
Nature of the Case: conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an
Petition for Review (Appeal ) agent of the Law.
People of the Philippines Plaintiff – Appellee When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter,
Vs. there arises the complex crime of direct assault with homicide or murder. The killing in the
Tiburcio Abalos Accused-appellant instant case constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia throught treacherous
G. R. No. 88189 means deliberately adopted by the vistim struck from behind while he was confronted at the
July 9, 1996 same time by appellant’s father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind
REGALADO, J: the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which he deliberately got for the purpose.
BRIEF:
In this case accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution from the judgment of
conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 27, of Catbalogan, Samar which
pronounced him guilty of the complex crime of direct assault with murder iin Criminal case No.
2302.
FACTS:
The Incident transpired during the barangay fiesta near the house of appellant at the said
barangay. On that night while accused Tiburcio Abalos and his father, Police Major Cecilio
Abalos, were having heated argument a woman shouted for help. The victim Police Officer
Sofronio Labine then appeared at the scene and asks Major Abalos about what happen. The
victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his
carbine ar Labine, accused harriedly left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick,
three inches wide, and three feet long from a nearby ford Fiera Vehicle. He then swiftlt
returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooded piece at Labine from behind, hitting
the policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconciously in a heap
and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from the blow. The trial court
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Direct Assault with
Murder.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of direct assault with murder.

Held:
No.
There are two modes of committing atendados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under art.
148 of the RPC. The first is not true atendado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition,
except that there is no public uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more
common way of committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in
the attack or the offender is a public officer , or the offender lays hand upon a person in
authority .
Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must
be an attack, use of force, or serious intimadation or resistance upon a person in authority or
his Agent., that is, that the accused has the attention to offend, injure or assault the offended
party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.
Labine is a Police officer in Catbalogan Samar, an thus was an agent of a person in authority
pursuant to article 152 of the RPC. There is no dispute that he was in the actual performance
of his duties when he was assaulted by the appellant that is he was maintaining the peace and
order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant Himself testified that he personally
knew that Labine as a policeman, and in Fact Labine was then wearing his police uniform.
Art. 148-Direct Assault
GR. No. 173150 | July 28, 2010
Lydia Gelig, petitioner vs.
People of the Philippines, respondent
Nature of Case:
Appeal from the judgement of the Court of Appeals
Brief:
Petitioner Lydia Gelig impugns the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals
that vacated and set aside the Decision of the RTC, Cebu City, Branch 23, RTC
Decision convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty only of the crime of slight
physical injuries.
Dispositive: The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts
 Lydia and Gemma B. Micarsos, were public school teachers. Lydia’s son, Roseller
was a student of Gemma at the time material to this case.
 On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma
after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a “sissy” while in class. Lydia
slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a
wall divider.
 As a result of Lydia’s violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her “maxillary
area”, as shown by a medical certificate issued by a doctor in the Bago General
Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and started
bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in the
Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered
incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a medical certificate was issued.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
(a) Whether or not Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner
is liable for Slight Physical Injuries pursuant to Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal.
(b) Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
petitioner can be convicted of Slight Physical Injuries under the information
charging her for Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion.
SUPREME COURT RULING
Direct Assault
It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public
order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority
expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The pertinent
portion of the provision reads as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority Who shall be
deemed as such.
xxxx
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors,
and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their
professional duties or on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed persons
in authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June 12, 1985).
Unintentional Abortion
The prosecutions success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct assault
does not necessarily mean that the same physical force she employed on Gemma also resulted
in the crime of unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove that the
slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate
cause of the abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemma’s attending physician, Dr. Susan
Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented to the court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no
data in the document to prove that her medical condition was a direct consequence of the July
17, 1981incident. It was therefore vital for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was
competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydia’s assault and Gemma’s abortion. Without
her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemma’s
abortion.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner Lydia Gelig
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered finding Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of direct assault and is ordered to suffer an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year
and one (1) day to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional. She is also ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00.