( G C F ~i c l d S c r v i c o Regulations)

Horcwith i s a t r a n s l a t i o n of P a r t I of t h o r c o o n t Gorman t c x t -
roo^ Lead.ing )
"TRUP~~TNF~~IIRI~NG' .
" T R T J I ' I ~ N F ~ ~ Ut h ~ e~ G
most
' ' , important manual o f t h e Geman Army,
i s t h e German F i e l d S e r v i c e Regulations. The p r e s e n t e d i t i o n was
p u b l i s h e d on October 17, 1933. This document was " s e c r e t " u n t i l iVovem.ber
1, 1935, when P a r t I ras r e l e a s e d , P a r t 11, c o n t a i n i n g t h e d e t a i l e d '
t a b l e s of. .o r. g. a.n-i-z. a t i o n and r o a d spaces, i s s t i l l ,a ~"...s, e c r e t " , . document.
~. . . .. ~ .- .

/
Pa11-t.1 i s now o f f e r e d i n tKe b e l i e f t h a t it 1611be found i n -
s t r u c t i v e and of t i m e l y i n t e r e s t .

By D i r e c t i o n o f t h e A s s i s t m t Commandant:

F. 1fiL IvVIILBURlJ,
Lieut. Colonel, I n f a r t r y ,
Assi:;'tant S e c r e t a r y .
 Part I

Sections I - XI11
Pars. 1 - 724 (inclusive)

Introduction ............................. Par. 1 - 15 incl.

I vrar Organization ......................... " 16 - 26

11

I1 Loadorship ............................ " 27-119 I'

111 Roconnaissancc ........................... " 120-194 "

IV Security ................................. I' 195 - 267 "

VI Attaclc ................................... - 409 " 314

V II Pursuit .................................. 410 - 426 " "

VIII Defonso .................................. " 427 - 502 "

1X

X Dolaying Action c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 531 - 538 "

XI S p e c i a l Typos o f warfare ................ ; " 539 - 649 "

::I I Billeting - Quartering ................... " 650 - 698 I'

XI11 Army Cavalry ............................. fit 699 - 724 "

 Introduction

1. The c0nduc.t of T a r i s an a r t , depending upon free, creative a c t i v i t y ,

s c i w t i f i c a l l y grounded. I t makes t h e highest demands on t h e personality.

2 . The conduct of war i s ba sod on cont inuous development .

warfare c a l l f o r t h ever changing employment. Their use must be anticipated,
New means of

t h e i r influence must be c o r r e c t l y estimated and quickly u t i l i z e d .

3. Situations i n mar a r e of unlimited variety. They change often and

suddenly and only r a r e l y a r e from the f i r s t discernible. Incalculable elemcnts
a r e often of g r e a t i&luence. The independent w i l l of t h e enemy i s p i t t e d
against ours, W i c t i o n and mistakes a r e of every day occui-rence,

4. T ~ Bteaching of the cbhduct of war cannot be concentrated exhausti~re-

l y i n regulationsb Tho p r i n c i p l e s so enunciated must be employed dependent
upon t h e s i t u a t i o n &

Simplicity of oonduct, l a g i c a l l y carried through, w i l l most surely

a t t a i n the objective.

5. War i s the severest t e s t of s p i r i t u a l and bodily strength. I n war,

character outweighs i n t e l l e c t * Many stand f o r t h on the f i e l d of b a t t l e who
i n peace would ranain unnoticed.

6. Armies a s well a s l e s s e r u n i t s dm-and leaders of good judgment, c l e a r

thinking and f a r seeing, leaders with independence and decisive resolution,
leaders with perseverance and energy, leaders n o t emotionally moved by the
varying fortunes of war, leaders w i t h a high sense of r e d p o n s i b i l i t y r

7. The o f f i o e r i s a leader and a teaoherr Besides h i s knowledge of men

end h i s sense of j u s t i c e he must be distinguished by h i s supericr .knowledge
and experienoe, his earmstness, his self-control and high courage.

8. The example and personal con%uot of p f f i e e r s and n o n - c n ~ i s s i o n o d

o f f i c e r s a r e of decisive influence on the troops. The o f f i c e r who i n the face
of t h e enany i s cold-blooded, decisive and courageous inspire8 h i s troops on-
ward. The o f f i c e r must likewise find the way t o the hearts of h i s subordi-
nates end gain t h e i r t r u s t through a n understanding of t h e i r f e e l i n g s and
thoughts and through never ceasing care of t h e i r needs.

Mutual t r u s t i s t h e surest b a s i s of d i s c i p l i n e i n necessity and

danger.

9. I n a l l s i t u a t i o n s every leader must e x e r t , without evasion of re-

sponsibility, h i s wholo p3rsonality. Willing and joyful acceptMce of re-
s p o n s i b i l i t y i s the distinguishing c h a r a o t e r i s t i c o f leadership. This does
not man t l a t t h e subordinate should seek an a r b i t r a r y decision without
proper consideration of the whole o r t h a t he s h o d $ n o t obey orders p r e c i s e l y
or t h a t he should l e t h i s f e e l i n g of g r e a t e r knowledge t a l e precedence over
obedience. Inde~endenceof a c t i o n should never be based upon oontrariness.
Independence of action, properly used, i s o f t e n tho b a s i s of great suoceas,

1 I n s p i t e of technique, the worth of man i s t h e decisive factor. Its

s i g n i f i c m c e i s increased i n group combat.

The emptiness of the b a t t l e f i e l d demands independently thinking and

aating fighters, vho, congidering sach s i t i n t i o n , a r e dominated by the convfc-
t i o n , boldly and dcoisivcly t o aot, and dotomined t o a r r i v e a t success.

Being accustcmd i;o physical ~ccomplishments, laok c f consideration

of s e l f , w i l l power, s e l f confidence, a d courage qualify a man t o master the
most d i f f h u l t situdtions.

Report No. 14,507.

-1.-
 11. The vrorth of leaders and men determined t h e b a t t l e worth of t h e

troops, which i s supplemented by the possession, care and maintenance of arms

and equipment

Superior b a t t l e worth can equalize numerical i n f e r i o r i t y . The higher

t h e b a t t l e worth, the more vigorous and v e r s a t i l e can war be executed.

Superior leadership and superior troop b a t t l e readiness a r e r e l i a b l e

portents of victory.

12. The leaders must l i v e with t h e i r troops, p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e i r dangers,

t h e i r wants, t h e i r joys, t h e i r sorrows. Only i n t h i s way can they estimate
the b a t t l e worth and the requirements of the troops,

hlan i s not responsible f o r himself alone, but also f o r h i s comrades.

Xe &o can do more, who has g r e a t e r capacity of accomplishment must i n s t r u c t

the inexperienced and weaker.

Frem suah conduct the feeling of r e a l comradeship develops, which i s

j u s t a s important between the leaders and t h e men as between t h e men tliemselves.

13. Tmops only superficially, and
ience, welded together, more e a s i l y f a i l
unexpected crises. Therefore before the
maintenance of steadiness and d i s c i p l i n e
.ing, i s of decisive importance.
not through long t r a i n i n g and exper-
under severe conditions and under
outbreak of war the development and
i n the troops, a s well a s t h e i r t r a i n ?

%cry commander i s enjoined immediately t o intervene vritn a l l powers

a t his disposal agninst any relaxation of d i s c i p l i n e , against excegses, plund-

ering, panic and other damaging influence.

Discipline i s fundarnontal i n an army, i t s s t r i c t mintenance a bene-

fit to all,

14. The strength of the t r o o p s must be able to meet the highest demands

i n decisive moments. He who unnecessarily f a t i g u e s the troops jeopardizes

SUCCCSB.

The strength ellp?lo$d i n b a t t l e must stand i n preportion t o t h e ob-

jective desired. Unrealizable demands prejudice the t r u s t i n the leaders and

shako t h e s p i r i t nf the troops.

15. From the youngest s o l d i e r on q?the omploymont o f every s p i r i t u a l

and bodily power i s demanded t o t h e utmost. Only i n sueh conduct i s the f u l l
power of accompliahmcnt of the troops achieved. So do men develop and maintain
t h e i r courage and pwrers of decision i n hours of s t r e s s and c a r r y fofmurd with
them t o greater deeds t h e i r weaker comrades.

Tfio f i r s t demand i n w a r i s decisive action. Everyone, the highest

comaader end the nost junior soldior, must be avraro t h a t o m i s s i 9 ~ sand neg-

l e c t s i n c r i a m t e himmore severely than the mistake of choice of mans.

Report No. 14,507.

..
-

 I. War Organization -- Troop D i s t r i b ~ t t i o n r

16. The o r g a n i z a t i o n of war e s t a b l i s h e s tho r c g u l a r command and ndmin-
i s t r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s of t h e army i n t h o i l c l d . It i s ordered b y t h e IIigh
Command (War ~ c p a r t m o n t )and b y it only can be cbaged.

17. T h e F i e l d h y c o n s i s t s of armies, u n i t s of army cavalry, a i r u n i t s

and army troops.

18, An Amp c o n s i s t s o f I n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s ( a l l r e g u l a t i o n s enunciated

f o r I n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s a p p l y f o r t h e other arms, i n so f a r a s t h e y a r e con-
ducted a s Idant&, &d o t h e r r e g u l a t i o n s t h e r e f o r a r e not e x p r e s s l y p b l i s h -
ed), which a s a r u l e a r e grouped .under corps commanders a s Army Corps. Corps
have corps troops, armies, army troops.

Several armies m q be formed i n t o an Amy Group.

19. The u n i t s of Field Army Cavalry a r e g e n e r a l l y Cavalry d i v i s i o n s .

Several Cavalry d i v i s i o n s may be grouped under a Corps commander as

a Cuvalry Corps, t o which a r e added corps troops.

The a t t a c h m n t of Field Army Cavalry u n i t s i n general i s l i m i t e d t o

Army Groups m d armies.

20. Units of t h e a i r arm a r e t h e a i r u n i t s (reconnaissance echelons,

a t t a c k ( p r s u i t ) squadrons nnd bomb% squadrons) and t h o a i r defonse troops.

Units of t h e a i r arm can b e a t t a c h e d t o army groups, armies, army

or Cavnlry corps, arvl oxceptionnlly t o I n f a n t r y and Cavalry clivisicns.

21. The following belong t o t h e F i e l d Army t r o o p s : s t a f f f o r s p e c i a l

q l o y m e n t , bicycle-, motorcycle-, machine gun-, minenlvcrfer-, nnd t a n k defense
u n i t s , motorized recopnaissance b a t t a l i o n s , a r t i l l e r y , including observation
b a t t a l i o n o and b a l l o o n platoons, t a n k u n i t s , chemical troops, onginecr m d
s i g n a l units, s p e c i a l t r o o p s end u n i t s of t h e s e r v i c e s of supply.

22. The I n f a n t r y and Cavalry d i v i s i o n s a r e t h e s m a l l e s t u n i t s which organ-

i c a l l y a r e capable of independent operations. They have a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l t h e
m a n s f a r independent cambat missions and sustenanoe.

23. Amy and Corps t r o o p s a r a organized s i m i l a r l y t o F i e l d Army troops.

The supply s e r v i c e s of Corps troops a r e o n l y so l a r g e a s a c t u a l l y n e c e s s a r y t o
supply t h e Corps troops.

24. The troops a r e distributed i n nccord,mce with t h c needs for s t r a t e g i -

c a l and t o c t i c a l emploporit (advance gucrd, r e a r guard, f l a n k guard, march col-
umns, b a t t l e groups). The u n i t s a s organized a r c m a i n t l i n e d i n t h e i r i n t e g r i t y
a s f a r a s possible.

25. Laadors a r e senior end subordinate. T h e higher 1es.dership ombraces

commaIulers of a1 1 u n i t s dolnn to i n c l u d e I n f a n t r y 'and C a v n l r j d i v i s i o n s , t h o
l a v e r a l l s?nr,ller c o m d s .
11
26. ( ~ r u ~ ~ o r i l " u h r eThe
r ) t r o o p comr~wderi s one pcrmmently o r tcmporcrily
indopendently i n oomand of e. u n i t of a l l ttrms (combined arms).

Xcport No. 14,507.

--
 ----- ----
11.
Leadership.

27. Great. successes presume boldness d a r i n ~preceded by

;ocd juQmnent.

28. !'le never have a t our d i s p o s a l a l l t h e d e s i r e d f o r c e s f o r

tlie d e c i s i v e a c t i 0 3 . Be :'rho w i l l b e s c c w e everyi~hereor vho f i x e s
f o r c e s i n secondary t a s k s a c t s c o n t r a r y t o tile i"uidm.cntal+

Thm wczitcr f o r c e , t h r o u ~ hspeed, !nobility, & r e a t march

accomplishmnents, utilization of d a r h s s and t h e t e r r a i n t o t h e A r l l e s t ,
s u r p r i s e and d e c e p t i o n , can b e t h e s t r o n c n r a t t h e d e c i s i v e a r e a ,

29. Time ar:3 space must be c o r r e c t i y e s t i m a t e d , f a v o r a b l e s i t u a -

.-.
t i o n s q u i c l r l : ~recor,nized acd d e c i s i v e l y e x s l o i t c d . hvery advantagi- over
the eneiny i n e l e a s e s OLW oi-m ficcdom o Y a o t i o n .

30. RZpidi t:r of a c l i o n i n t h e diSplacs!x?i?nt of troops ca be

a s s i s t e d g r e a t l y o r retardi:d t y t h e roeds a d s t r e e t n e t s alld by t h e
t e r r a i n conditions. The season, t h e n e a t h e r , t h e c o n d i t i o n of t h e t r o o p s ,
a r e a l s o of irlfluence.

3 . The d u r a t i o n of s 4 ~ r a t e f ; i c a la nd t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s cannot
always be foreseen. Successful engagements of t e n proceed slovlly. Often
t h e s u c c e s s of t o d a y ' s b a s t l e is f i r s t r e c o ~ l j zad -tomorror;.

2 . S u r p r i s e of t h e a ~ e ~ i zisi a d e c i :live i'actcr iii a success.

Actions based on su:?rise a r e only of isreat succes~?.:ihe:i we do not permit
t h e enemy t o t a k e adequate countcr izea:ura-s.

The ene.:iy ~ ~ i j . 11,ilrev'is

1 e endeavor to make u s e of s u r p r i s e . Our
conduct must ta& t h j s i n t o consideration.

5 . The kno:?led;;e of the h o s t i l e l e a d e r s h i p and Tire;- p r i n c i p h s can

i n f l u e n c e t h e d e c i s i o n arid a i d our h a t t l e condv-ct, bu-? i t m o t n e v e r load
t o preconceptions.

34. Those condi:i.ons :;hich f a c i l i t a t e t h e conduct of -;Jar i n our

l a n d , make i t more difi'ic:llt i n f o m i ~ nland.?, r e q l l i r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

35. I n s t r e n u o u s col?lbat,troopa are soonx!orn out and a u i c k l y u s e d

up. The f o r c e s m u s t r e c e i v e t i m e l y r e i n f c r cu51e1:t s i n l e i d e r s , men,
nnimale , b a t t l e ;leecis and vrnr m a t c r h l f i of a l l lcinds.

36. Tho mission and t h e s i t u a t i o n form xhe basis of t h e fiction.

The mission desi(y-att.s t k c objt c t i v e t o be at1;ained. The

l e a d e r m u s t never ;"or;et h i s micsion. A :nission 7:bi.ch iridicatos s e v e ~ a l
-tcnk,s e a s i l y divi:riz from ttic . x i n objcctivo.

Obscurity of t h a s i t u a t i o n i s t h a r u l e . Seldon c i l l one have

exact i n f o r m t i o n of t h e a a ~ y . Clarif'ication of the h o a t i l e s i t u a t i o n
Is a self-evirtent; demand. :icv;ever, t o wait. i n t e n s e s i t c a t i o n s for in-
f a r m t i o n , is seldom a token of s t r o n s lcadersb.%p, cfbm of weakness.

37. The clecisior, a r i s e s froin t h e mission and .tile s i t c a t i o n .

Should t h e mi@s io n no l o n g e r o?.rffi ce a s t h e 2.1ndamental of' conduct o r
I s it changed by event.9, t h e d e c i s i o n -t t a k e t h e s e ccnisiderations i n t o
account. Ire 7.7bo chm,es h j s m i s s i o n o r iice s not execute t'ie one g i v e n
!iiust r e p o r t h i s a c t i o n s a t or~ceand assulEs a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e
consequences. Re mst al.rq.rs ke q~ i n mind -the whole s i t u e t i o n .

The d e c i s i o n n q s t d e p i c t a c l e a r o b j e c t i v e aimed a t m i t h t h e
,::hole f o r c e . The s t r o n g 7 1 i l l of t h e c m a a n d e r rflust s u p p o r t it. Often
t h e s t r o n g e r r-rill g a i n s t h e success.
 ' : r i M o r ~ t -$er;; ~ o o dr:;asons a d e c i s i o n occe ziade should not be
abandoned. I f x s v c r , i n t h2 vicissi.';udcs of liar an irif!.exi b l e mainte-
.;ar:ce o? tilo ori:,inal. d c c i s i o ~ :map l e a d t o p e s t raint5Kes. Timely
reco:;nition o-r Lhi cor:di tici::; and the t i m 3;h i c h c a l l f o r ' a :le*;/ d e c i s i o n
i s a11 a a . $ t r i h u t r .of .iflie a r t or leafi*.r-.hip.

%a c ,~~ma::.?cr
i n s o t a r % h a t t h i s 6% s not e!n$ail;;er -tl::e ~ d01s
: .sche;~~e Iie mw t n o t
suz?.cnder t o tl-im t'losc d o c i s i o n s f o r irhich ic alone in ~,nsponsi.bl.c.
.
!!?us t p e r n i t freedoxx of a c tio:l t o h i s s1.k o r d i ~ . a t e s

Z?. -
Tho combs-t ( d m ~ e f e c h)t by lm$;e arr0.y v n ' i t s t h e b a t t l e ( d i e
Rchlac:-~t) - is the armed c o n f l i c t v h i c h e n s u e s -idlcn t:.ro opponoxts come
taf;otknr.

39. Thh- attack; is launchod i n ordor t o d o f c a t t h o oneniy. Tho

a t t a c k e r h a s t h e i n i t i a t i v e . S u p e r i o r i t y of l c a d c r s h i p and of t r o o p s
sl!o:-I t o t h e b e s t a 3 v a n t a ~ ei n t h o a t t a c k . Success does not il?.;ays c01!1e
t o s u g e r i o r i ty oi' nm;te?s.

I n s y c i a l i n s t a n c e s t k e o b j e c t i v e o f an a t t a c k may he
l i m i b ed.

?'he p o s s i b i 1 f . t y t hzt m a t t a c k clay m i s c a r r y siiould n e v e r

gemlit t h e f e t t e r i n & :of e n e r f ; e t i c l e a d e r s h i p from t h e f i r s % .

40. p ~ r s u i t-ec:-s t:?e f r u i t s oi' v i c t o r , . It . s t r i v e s t o d e s t r o y

the enemy, x h i c h 66::; tr::.ction was not possi.ble i n t h e l)i.eceding engage-
' . Only a t h o r 0 ~ ~ . ! 1 - ~ .:j0 ir~e.l e n t l e s s p u r s u i t , vriiich ;ci-'eiients t!le
enemy f r o n gaiv.ini. t i to r e s t and r e c i l p e r a t e , ea.ies w r s e l v e s s a c r i -
f i c e s n e c e s s i t a t e : i: -:-le pps?r.~it +he enemy t o f o r c e a n o t h e r d e c i ~ i ~ , e
art;q;ement.

41. The defeasa -;!&its f o r t h e opponent. Tho dcl'cnder s e e k s t o

prescribe t h e battle terrain.

The d e f e n s e is chostzl when our o m i ; l f e r i o r i t y p e r n i t s r,o

o t h e r choice, o r i f :'or o-the r r e a s o n s it ap2ears adv&tajeous.

The d n f s i SF: has t h e laission of s i m t t e ~ i i ? i ;t h e enemy at-tack.

FoY t h i s purpose, t h e a t t a c k is r e c e i v e d i n n ci-re11 t e r r a i n , 1-rliicll is
held t o t h e l a s t .

The comrm-der ( l e a d e r s h i p ) m y lini-i; the t i n e of t h e d e f e w e .

A d e c i siv e v i c i;oly ca be aclliuved only by an o i i a l s i Y e r e t u r n .

The d e l a y i ~ l t :a c t i o n h a s t h e m i s s i o n of i n f l i c t i q ; h i c h l o s s e s
on t h e enemy w i t h o u t p e c l i t t i n : ~ a decisi-ie a c t i o n t o r e s u - l t . Fm t h i s
pur?,ooe .;re m u s t .;iitildri?-:! in ti!= f ~ o r nt h o hoati2.c a t t a c k a&d @ v e t e r -
r a i n f o r timc.

42. RreaLin, W f .in en(;ageiI:.ent has t h e pur20so o f t e m i n a t i n z .

the b a t t l e o r ,jvi?;i UP tP.e .former p o s i t i o n i n order t o c o n t i i l l s t h e
en~;+;;.ai:unt a t a moro fa-;o:-able p o s i t i o n . 1x1 t h e l a t t e r i n s t a n c e d e l a y -
ing a c t i o n i s oTton e??gloyc?d.

43. Tho r e t r e a t i n t e n d s t o avoid t ~t hr e r combat. The engage-wnt

lliust for t h i s purpo;.e b:, tcn:xinated and tho oithd~.arral of' the t r o o p s be
.protected.

44. The chacgir?: f o r t u w s of b a t t l e du.;.:mh o f t e n t h e p a s s i n g

ihrn one t y p e of a~&a&clzion.tto another.

!:?port No. 14,556.

bmb
- -
 The pacsage fmr:? a t t a c k t o defense i s mcconiplished by holdin:;

t!?e t e r r a i n -.iliich hai; b curl $&en, or ,' if SEc c s s u r y , unitur hos l i l c

c u . i . x -
s ~ l x o . T!!e t l o op; a r c r ~oi1r!cd,
f dio pcnsablc Tor cos :-ri thdra,;m from t!1c

line.

I n t h e gar:;a.-;c fro.;? t h e dcfonzc t o t:ic a t t a c k t h c tiincly

c o n c o n t r a t i o n of stro?:> fwco:; a t dccici-yo area:: i c of dcciciv;, iin-

pcrtmcc.

45. Dc:aying a c t i o n aqmids a d o c i s i o n . It \-rill g a i n t i m c , keep

tlic mcmy hurjy ars! dcccivcd.

Fui1:t a t t a c k t j ,pmvido dcccption.

,o.
,v' Thc ;;i&th of battle: zoncs and s c c t o r s is dcpcndcnt u ~ o ntho
i n t m t i e n s , the istin tin{ aCJaccnt s u p p o r t and t h c t e r r a i n . I t is in-
f l u c n c c d by t h c conduct an? breadth. of t h u c n c ~ a r s 1-10ll a s hy o m o r
bqtB opcri f1an::s. %?c b r c a d t h of zonos and. s c c t o r s is d i f f c r m t .
G r o a t c r brr~adthc,n r s pcrrfie s i b l c i n fa701,ablc t o r r a i n , i;spc c i a l l l ; if i t
is a r t i f i c i a l l y r c i n f m c i d . Grcatrir b r c a d t h s can uc u c d i f no a m ~ l o y
b a t t l e Lroups. Great bre*O.ths can b r i n ~t o e a r l y frui.tio!i t h e c n t i r e
e f f e c t of t h e am.?, bu'i. thoy can prematurely b r i . n ~ow t r o o p to a s t a n d -
s t i l l . Too ;;reat b r e a d t h c r e c t e s t h e d m g e r of a p e n e t r a t i o n , t o o riarrov,
e c p c c i a l l y inthou",eep or;anim,Lion, the clon;er of envelopme~~t or im
e ~ a s i o nof t h o p o s i t i o n by t h e enemy. I n an at-Lrc!; an i n i t i ~ bre?.dth l
g r e a t e r t h n -th?.t of t h e ene;;l:; ri1r.y be t h e forerutmer of g r e c t e r s u c c e s s .

I n unc:.rxified s i t u c . t i o n c , or;;nniz?.tion i n de;?th p r e s e r v e s

freedoin of c c t i o n f o r t h e com:i,".mler. & p i n s t -.more r.-.pidlg moving eneiny
or one ;:rith p o n t e r m o b i l i t y i s such o r ~ m i z n t i o nr.l:i?.y^.y:; proper i n i t i C n . l l p .
At t h e d e c i s i - e ? r e ? t h e r e ir, norm".lly t h e dcr?;..~id f o r or;;:niz.?tion in
depth.

The c m t " . n d e r must d i o t r i b u t e h i s f o r c e s i n d e p t h ?nd breq.dth

b e f o r e c o n t z c t ?.nd during, t h e b ? t t l c , -.ccordin{, t o t h e n i t u l t i o n .

47. Durin:.: t?e course of the b , - t t l e t h e c o m ? n d e r i n f l u e n c e s t h e

-.ction t ~ o s~t rt o n ~ l yby t h e concentr.?.tion ?ad i n c r e c s e of f i r e ?ad tkrou,h
t h e a n p l o p ~ ~ e notr h i s r e s e r v e s .

Ammunition o u p p l i c s hcld ::lobile, m - b l c him t o i n c r e c s o t h e

i'ire e f f e c t i v c n e a s r.t tho d c c i s i v o r.rc,:. z t t h e d e c i c i v c t i m e ,".11d t o in-
,
f l u e n c e t h e en~?gcmcnt cvcn ? . f t e r h i s roscrvLs hcvc becrl coimiit ted.

D i s t r i b u t i o n , loc?.tion .-ad eiap1oyf1or.t oof thc r e s e r v o s r c q u i r c

c.?rcftil considcr?.tion. M o b i l i t y i n c r o z s c s tilo p o n s i b i l i t i o s f o r t h e i r
urployinent.

2'0 m?2:c tho foir coy c i ~ ~ p l o y511~ dt h e f r o n t l i n e t o o wc:lk i n

o r d o r t o f l v o r r. l z r g c r ~ o s c r v c ,oi'+on i1c.-11s t h o l o s s of t h s succsss
n.:y lo-.& to 4ofw.t ii; d c t n i l . TI1cr1; ?.re ir~st.-.nccsi n \-&ich it 4s b o t t o r
t o b o l d no r c s c r v z a .

U n i t s uf conbincd ?.r.r,.x".re p ? r t i c u l o . r l y ' s u i t z b l o .-.s r o s o r v c s

s+i?$?nt l l c s ~t-20 c.-.p?blc of indcpondcnt c c t i o n . The d i e n l p t l o n of s u c h
.mits "a ;.rill n s t h o f r i t t w i r i a :??a: of r o s u r v c s i s t o b c ?Void~d.
Tho l o a n t i o r . of t h o r c s c r v o dcponds upon its p r o b ~ , h b ploy-
InmC ;md tho tor,Yr.i]l. I t o t b i o l y c?mployacnt must bc caaurod. Wnomlly
it $8 t o b c o c h o l o 1 ~ 3hohind t+tc f l n r k . ~ i s t - = c ox d iatcrvp.1 from t h c
fl?n!; iricrczsos i r i t h t h o s i z o af t h o ?csc?vc.

Rcport No. 14,556.

-6-
 A i-eserva h:??d xiell seek is p m t e,cteil z~d i t s a.l_olop,io;?t i n

d i f f e r e n t d h o c t i o i x ; i.3 ;:;icilitated. i~ reserTJo f ~ u ~ t l ~Tor-:lard o r

accolcr-

a t e 6 i t s i n t c r s c n t i c i - i j.11 tlte b a t t l e . The s u r e r t h o coim~liuzd~r is of t h o

n0ari.r tlir: f r a n t ,::ill, i.

011i a
.
oi:~pls:{mc~?tof thu r,.:scr-vc G:?. - t k i n r s ir.riiinont t h i s ci.:plo3lllcnt i s , tho

-5 !I<; liroii:ht A. s t r a - t c ~cia l r c s c r y c 1:ius t bc hold

, s o l o . a s i t s r l o i is ilot i1:-tondcd.

:;iith t h e e;~lo:n-.cn:i. of h i s i?cscrv;, th:! c o i n ~ a ~ i d cr ro l

o a s c s
frori h i s bar~d-;tile :act s:loclr elei:.eiit a t iiis d i s p o s a l . :-ie i x m t n o t l e t

hiraself' a,11;lo;r h i s reser-ie -too e a r l y . everthe he less h e i:~i.lr,tn o t d e l a y ,

i f tile ertplc~iiiex-k of r e s o l - e can brill:: about t h e decisiori o r if the

sit'ust,iori iizke:: i'ks i ~ ! t ~ l r i e i ~ t : inc(:emar;.

on

'-fim tlie r.e:jc;rlTe it; aiplo\~oc?,Lhe t:arly fom~.lationof a n o t h e r

is o? ;;reat i;lyortiince.

Col.L-:unications, I n f o r ? . a t i o n , ROpOStS.
" . - .- -"- ...-S-+
i t u a t i o n--.*+
$laps.
-.+-.------ ~--
48. Tho re:ior-ts and iili'or!:iaticn of t h e e n m y f o r n one of t n e

r.1ost i n p o r t a n t fot~.ildations ?a-t h e e s t j r l a t e of t h e s i t u a t i o n , t h e de-

c i s i o n a c d i t s exocuti on.

m e I'irst deciu.cti.;'ils concern?.!l;' t k e enei:ly a r e i>nuall:r d e r i v e d

froii t h o :;ener&l im~x~ls&::eel" h i s r~ethccia 01- a r e pi.@cuved from s p e c i a l
sources cf i n ;or:!ation. A i r and. c r o ~ ' a droconr.ai ssar.ce , he s e a r c h i n g f o r
mid c c n t i n u a l o b s o ~ - ~ o t i oof'n thc: a:cr;y, and i i i i . ~ l . ~ ; : t i o rs~e c w e d t!lrou;;h
s ~ ~ c i r?eans
a l prot'i;ii? a uo;-c d o f i n i t e p i c t u r u 0:' tho hosti2.e r w c c . , i l o n ~
;?ith a c c u r a t e i n f c r l i ~ t i o nw.d r e p o r t s .;IO i.m.st roclton on inco1:i~lote%id

c c r r c c t co!?cli?si.,ns .
inaccurate i n f m i a t i c n . >YC,:,I t h e ~ i i l o l tho

,;.ith othc r r c p o r t s , hni-c c a-mid crcblr: ;lor th.

~ cm.i~mcicrj.s able to d r m
. i p p o r ~ n t l 7 mir.ipm t m t d e t a i l s n a y , i n connection

Zvcry r c ] ~ o r - tad Yio hc:;"si:li'~r~:iatioil oro of l i t t l c or 110

volur! ;ihf;n t h e y r n a c h t c n l c t c : t:ic corilia.n!: fir - : h i c h thcy nrn j.ntzn$od.

49. 7 i t h i n h i s a r e a oT o p e r a t i o n s , e v e r y co.manfier is respoiisible

f o r t h e contir;u.al recoi:naiissan.ce of t h e h o s t i l e s i t u a t i o n and % r t e r r a i n
Imot:iledi,e both da:? and ni;,ht. Contact once zained u i t h t h e enemy n l ~ l s . i ; be
rflaint ained.

A l l conlulmders arc: en joincci, a s e a r l y arid t o t h e ,&reatesT

e x t e n t p o s s i b l e , to in.:orc~ tt)lt: hj-h+- 7 comncns?e r of -the s i i , ~ ~ aon
t i and t o
t r a m m i t a l l importar t inforlna t i o n .

50. I n hi:;iier co:~mmds, if' n e c e s s a r y a l s o by l o r - I C ~commands, an

o r f i c e r i s char::ed ?d.th t h e e'valua'bion of reconnzissarice r e s u l t s
s p e c i a l reports.

I n f m i a t i o n a d raporbs i~iustb e d i s c ~ i n ~ i n a t e leyv a l u a t e d ,

Any a t t m p t t o deeuce ~~1ia.t is d e s i r e d by us or is-810s t f a v o r a b l e t o u s ,
;nus t be avoided,

51. The one ;.!al:ix a r e p o ~ tr nust e q r e s s hirilse7.f clear-ly end

p ~ ~ i t i ~ e l Hey . ms-i; d L f f e r e n t i a t e bewe,-n ,,>:!at he lias s e e n , v ~ h a tar.o'iher
!:as n o t e d o r s t a t e d , arid :-t>at is preswied. he s o u r c e of the i n f orrmtion
lmst b e s t a t e d . 5;u?picions must have bases.

mom in:: .
52. Exact stotei,lonts as t o numbers,
- t i m e and p l a c e have ~ e o t

I t i s o f t e n of g . r e c t v s l u e t o l o a m . I-here t h e enemy hos n o t

been rne t ~ r i t h , ,?he ~ o n f j ~ r m a tni oof' previous inf'onnnt ion a d t h e proof
of unchanged condi.tion; i n a s p e c i f i e d t,imo W e also of g e o t v a l u e ,

n c p o r t No. 14,556.
 Important i n f o i ~ u a t i o na s t o t e r r a i n is to be addod ? o t h e
r e p c r ts c oncemiin[, thii oner,?y.

53. The c o n t e n t s and r e l i a b i l i t y of & p o r t s , not t h e i r numbers,

ai-e the 5:mportan-i ~ a t t c ? . R ~ p o r t smust cal;nly d e p i c t thc events. Ex-
ag&;orated rscports ace dctrairliontrd., soino t h e s d i s a s t r o u s . Colored r e p o r t s
lEIdcr1~net r u s t and ma!rc t h ~conniland o r u n c e r t a i n .

F i r s t c o n t a c t nit:? t h e cllc:~ny is aL\'~a:is t o he r c p o r t c d , w l c s s

o t h c r c ~ i s oordered. I n o t h e r ciFcu.m<tancos each observed hos t i l e a c t must
h c ?x;i;horl a,? t o n!lithc;r 5 i shoulA he rcgci? tnd a t onco ar. nut at a l l .
U s e l c s s r o p o r t s TIC~?:C!I tile o f f c c t i v c n c s s of t h c rc:>ortin; agoncy, l o a d thc
c n r m l i c a L i o 11s sys texi wid r,al:t: more d i l f i c u l t tile corm,iailder's conaim t.

I~lportan';:i n f o m a t i o n of tile ene;ny inay demand v e r i f i c a t i o n .

54. B a t t l e i t s e l f m a - i d e s t h e o!ost r o l i c . b l e meam of e s t i l ; a t i n &

t h e memy.

Reports dui-lnc, b a t t l e a r e i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r ihe co~cluct of

t h ~e n ~ a g c r ~ i c n t

During t h e combat, r o p o r t s nlust be c o n t i n u a l l y made about t h e

enemy and our cml s i t u a t i o n , t h e t e r r a i n and t h e armunition supply. Cam-
rnuicatin;; i m y r e s s i o n s , su[;[>estions f o r exp1oi.ti.n; f a v o r a b l e o p p o r t u n i t i e s
and t h e t e r r a i n f a c i l i t a t e t h e f o r x u l a t i i q of d e c i s i o n s . Pauses i n the
b a t t l e a r e t o be, u t i l i z e d -to - ~ d dt o t,he informatio!: reported. At t h e
approach of darlniess, h a s t y b a t t l e r c p o r t s a r e of p r t i c u l a r value t o t h e
11j~gllerc omand.

At .Lt~cclout: of a b a t t l e . Lhe f o l l o r , i l i ~clessages s i i o ~ l dbe s e n t

7-!ithout delay: '7liici1. h o s t i l e t r o o p s a r e o p p o s i t e , h m tho en.em:r coiidl>Cts
l ~ i r n s e l f , i n -!hat coridj.tion he i s , our owl situatio!?, o w muniticn3, e t c .

55. I n pressin;. s i t m t i o n r ; , r e p o r t s r m t he made ilct o n l y t o t h e

n e s t s e n i o r c o m a 2 o r but io t h e s e n i o r coml-amder ( ~ r u p p e 1 1 f ~ r e . i )Troops.
threateneri by t h o e n e m y , r e p r t t h i s i r m e d i a t e l y viithont ro;;ard t o o t h e r
n c c c s s a r y pressa(;es. -A. m e s s u ~ os e n t siniultctneoi~sl;r t o s e v e r a l co.w:ia!ldnrs
c o n t a i n s t h i s i n f o r m t i o n of thi? enbilly.

56. Mcid;l?ori dctnchmcrts muo t comunicatc imnpmtmt okserua-

t i o n s concornitv; thc ci-my ail& cb,anfps i n t h e i r o-m s i t l ~ n t i o n .

57. Tho l!lo:rc dcb?j. li? rcpori; f r c q u c n t l y r ounds out tlm p i c t u r e

p-.intec? by t h e :nesszLcs. Tt~cs h o r t iness,?.;,os sorli imi'1cdi?.telq' a f t c r tho
b a t t l e do not e l i ~ i i i n ? . t ct3.c n c c c s s i t y f u r b?.ttle re;:% ls. T l ~ c s ca r c t o
b i m?.;?o ,-.s soon 2 s ;.cssiblo M t ~ trho b n t t l c . Tkcreforc d u r i n ~ ;thc b,?.ttl.o
i t i s nccr;ss?ry t o i-71 t c dw;!n tcmpor?.?:ilg- ?.i~d t o orr:>nza c:?il?.t is l a t o r t o
kc r ~ p c r t c d .

Orders and nessa;;es 1-hich have been issuet? dirrily; aud have
i n f u e n c ed %lie er?;a;;er,~en.c , .,ri 11 be inclu-ied i n t h e report or added a s
inclosures.

58. I?Ie v e r y hi.:;he r :leadquarters, silxla t ion ]raps o r e t o be k e g t

and the s i t u a t i o n thereon posted. Ace ~ r f i i n - ;to t h e needs thoy must
d e p i c t t h e h o s t i l e e i ' ; ~ ~ a t ino, our 01-m si'uatio n and inforrna t i o n Of
n e i g h b o r i r ~u n i t s . T i a s e f a c i l i t a ' t e <;he task of t h e c a m d e r and aake
e a d e r h i s d e c i s i o n . La-rer comnanders may a c t oorrespol:dinCLy.

Report No. 14,55(i.

"&
 Es iimate of s--i t u a i j -
o I;.-. - ---
Decision.

59. iin e s t i i . B t e of t h e s i t c a t i o n precedes each d e c i s i o n . It

demands r a ~ i dthou.,i.t, s iniple , ly;i c a l coiisidnration of t h e e s s e n t i a l
d e t a i l~ , 0111 y.

60. Our mission i s tlie b a s i s . 7 e proceed from i t and d e t e r n i n e

:rhat it p r e s c r i b e s and h m ~-;re car, b e s t accomplish i t .

Itn@:?len;-;e ana c o r r e c t a s t i l m t i o n of tile t e r r a i n i n f l u e n c e t o

a [;reat e x t e n t the t a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s an6 tile meaouren ; h i c h a r e t o
be employed.

6li c o n s i d e r a t i o n of our ovm s i t u a t i o n detertninec :-rhere tho

m i - t s ef t h e a t t a c h e d f o r c e s a r e , :;.ich i m n e d i a t e l y , Or l a t e r are
a v a i l a b l e $o'r thi. ercccution of t h e ,nission, if aldi. t i 0 n a l f o r c e s are to
be e x p e c t e d , and T r h u t h c we ~ sl-1aU. be supported by a d j a c e n t u n i t 8 or
:jhether t h c s c unj.';o a r e i n need of our support.

The previous a c t i v i t i e s and t h e c o n d i t i o n of the t r o o p a s

veil a s t h o a n x ~ u n i t i o no i t u a t i o n ~ u s be
t considered.

6 The h o s t i l e s i k a t i o n riiust be estinrited s i m i l a r l y . Based on

t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a t ! ~ ~ Z l d , ' ~ must
6 consit: o r to v ~ h a textent t h e eneniy can
h i n d e r our i n t e n t i o n s and ho;~:le i ~ t ~ al cdt , ,vere v e t h e h o s t i l e ,
f c r c c . Such c o n z i d e r a f i o n s m u s t n o t l e a d to b i a s e d preconceptions. 'ye
must corisid e r tine e;:em.;.'s conduct to be t h a t rfior t disadvar, t a ~ e o u st o '-1s
u n l e s s .ire have a'i hand s.u' f "i ent in;'ormc-tio:! t o t h e c o n t r a r y , which is-
formation i n d i c h i e s a moat probkhle enemy a c t i v i t y .

O r d i n a r i l y ~ t e!imi~1t c o n s i d e r i n d e t a i l l-rhicil a r e a o r ~hic1-1l i n e

t h e enemy can have ;-eathe&, \:hat evidences of h i s s t r m g ti: and 0 r ; m i z a -
t i o n ne have, an6 rihetl-icr 1.e can contifiuc h i s movement.

I n l a r c e r . conx~~artds :-x? mu? t tonsid e r the h o s t i l e s t r e e t and

.
r a i l n e t s , t h e a c t i : i t y of h l s air f o r c e , h i s A.L. z r t i l l e r y a,ld h i s
comr!iimic a t ions t r o o p s

The c h a r a c t e r of t h e h o s t i l e l e a d e r and the hos ti l e t r o o p

may be 11sei1 i n estirra ti:-:< the co~:.d.t~c t of t h e enemy, especial.1. y if 1-~e
have bad previous b a t t l e e;:perience lrith the se.

63. A r?i:tcrrcincd d o c i s i o n must be t h o l o [ ; i c a l r e s u l t of c a r s f u l

consid e r a t i o n of a l l f a c t o r s .

Tile d o c i s i o i i s i~iade: k l l riot a k ~ a y scorrcsportd t o t h e a c t u a l

c o n d i t i o n s prcsonted. -;l:en t h e s i t u a t i o n devolops o t l i e r than t h e de-
c i s i o n coritea~plated, ho bas tl:c G r e a t e s t p r o s p e c t o-E succc.ss y:;ho q u i c $ l y
and :;!:illfully e r , q l o i t s f w t h e r reconnaissance but does not diange the
c'ocisi on except -iri-bli ~ o r a r e l l i n ; r~easons.

Orders.
-.---
64. Tho O r d ~ rp u t s t b e d e c i s i o n i 2 t o e f f e c t .

65. Clear o r d e r s a r e ari e s s e n t ? . a l for the f r i c - t i o i i l e s s cooperation

o f a l l conlmard e r s .

66. For t?ie h..i;,ller c m a d . e r , t h e n r i t t e n o r d e r p r c v i d e s %he founda-

t i o n f o r the l e a d e r s h i p . I t is co;mui~icated t o the l & e r u l i t s , p r i n t e d , a s
a carbon copy, typi:~.:rl.t t e n or *:=itt e n by hairi or by t e c h n i c a l i!onmmica-
'tions m a a s . Frequeiltly i t i s d i c t a t e d a - e r t h e telephone. I n e v e r y i n -
staxice t h e most FUIC & s u i t a b l e m e t h a of t r a n s n i s s i o n is to be chosen.

bmb
 Sl~ovJd t h e o r d e r be; sim~7le o r dl or t , it may be o r a l l y corn-

nmnicated. I t must l a t e r , hm;evar, bc camg~iitod t o paper.

67. O r d i n a r i l y , l w e r cca!maiidel.s u s e t h e o r a l o r d e r . T h e i r

o r d e r s a r e v r i t . l e n i f .the wal. o r t h e t e l e p h o n i c o r d e r is not pos:?ible

o r i f t k e o r a l o r d e r is i n s u f f i c i e n t or t h e r a e x i s t s t h e d a n c ~ r0;" i t s

i l ~ t e r c pe t i on.

68. The mcre prossin. t h e s i t u a t i o l ' , t h e s h o r t e r the ordsr.

..h e r e cir.cuinstances p e r n i t , o r a l o r d e r s a1.e :i ven i n accordance r;ii ti1 t h e

terrai!], not tlie map. I n t h e f r o n t l i n e s a d ~ i i t i nt h e 1m1er command::rs

i e t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y so.

6s. Orders t r a i l s m i i t e ? ttro!ljh t e c ' h n i c a l c o m u n i c a t i o n means re-

o~ij.re&a v n r i ? i c u t i o n a:ri a i i t h e i i t i c a t i o n . I t i,? recmme1:1,8ed t h a t Llir!

srdi?r s o ;iveii be ?:of@ated t o t h e scndor.

.. .
,.ilth important o r d e r s it i3 ofte>l ac?~iisaljlct o u s e i7m or
more means of trnnsmis s ion.

70.
throucl~ .
It is e a s y t o m d e r e s t i ~ ~ B tthe
e time r e ~ u i r e dt o g o t a n 01-der

I n indil:idual :~istaiices i t may be ;locossary f o r Ll-e coimaxider

t o 'convince himsolf of the d i s t r i b u t i o n &?d .(:>::scution of h i s or-rtor.

71. 3'00 o r d e r s , cs?cciall:i i n S d t t l c , c'urini; vih,icil t h e con-

municatio n moans c a y m i s c a r r y , -prod.uccs the ?.anger of causin;; i n J u r y t o
ind~pendc:icc of a c t i o n of la.!c;r co.~iian?,c-:s.

72. ;Lccordi!i:, t o s;;ccial r c ( ; u l a t i o n s (;:::TI) ( s c c r o t ) o r d e r s corn-

mflcnicatcd b y r a d i o , v i t h t h e oxccpLi on of tlloso ca1~lir.f;for t h e i.m;~e?iato
cooacratio n oi' t l ~ c mar, a r c t o be cncodc2; a l s o thos c sent by t clep!lmc
di' t h r o is Gian:;cr of h.ostilc i n t c r c c p t i on.

I n ::Xc c,ptional Cii"cw-lst.lr~c;?s-r,'rit-i;cri Orders a r c g o r t l y o r

cr.t i r c l g oricodcd.

73. An c r d c r s i ~ 1 a 1 c o n t z i n r:ll t i l o t is ; ~ c c ~ s s a fr oy r thi! lot-lor

corrnlmd o d r t o !ma-! i n o r d s r for h i m to c x c c u t ~indcpcndontly h i s t a s k .
le
I t should c o n t a i n no more. Corrospon~.iny;ly tl-c; o r d c r ~ n ~ bo s t brio f and
c l e a r , d e c i s i v e i n tone and c o r n ~ l e b e , adopted to t h e understanding of t h e
r e c e i v e r a n d , a c c o r d i n , t o Conditions, t o h i s p e e - d i a r i t y . The conmender
must never f a i l t o p k c o h i i s e l f i n t!le p c s i t i o n of t h e r e c e i v e r .

74. T:le 1an:;~ra;e of o r d e r s must be sir;iple and unders-tandable

,
C l a r i % rill icli elininat0n,,?P3. ..doubts, is more il;?portar.t than c o r r e c t
.
technique. C l a r i t y :vi~;st n c t be s a c r i :iced for h r e v i t y .

iie~::aa;tive expressloris and cl1tn:;es l e a d t o iml? m e s s m e s anC

a r e objectionable .
Z < a @ i ; e r a t i o n sa r e e m a l l y had.

75. Orders !;my b i n d oiily i n s o i'sr a s t'e:. correspond t o t h e

s i t u a t i o n and i t s c n ~ d i t i o n s . S t i U . i t i s o f t e r :leccssar:i t o i s s u e
orders i n uncertai? situations.

76. If c;lan.gs i n t h e s i t ~ s t i o l ;a r e t o b e c;;pected b e f o r e t h e

o r d e r is put i n t o e x & c u t i o n , t h e m d e r should ?lot ~o i n t o d e t a i l s . In
T r e a t stra'te(;ical o;erations, e s p e c i a l l y when o r d e r s m u s t be i s s u e d f o r
several. dxvs i n a d r a ~ c c ,t h i s a b s e n t i o n from d e t a i l s is t o Fe s p c i a l l y
observed. The g a i e r a l i n t e ; l t i o n is e x p r e s s e d , t h e end to be achieved. i s
eegeci a l l y s t r e s s e d . I n t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e impending a c t i o n , t h e main
icsia-uc t i ons are g i \ m ~ ,tlie jmnedi a t e conduc t of t h e en;,a&um;~t is l e f t
t o subordiriate cox..w,ders. Iii such a v ay i s ti:c o r d c r f u l l y executed.

Report No. 14,556

t)inh
-10-

 77. E'or t h e :mint enailce of s e c r e c y , t o r-!hat e x t e n t and to rrborn

the i n t e n t i o n s ma:? be ~ a d eh a m cleii~zllds c a r e f l ? l c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

I11 s i ~ c
e i a 1 oi:era Lio :iii coX~~nu~.rl
er:j a r e occasi or all:: i a s t r u c t e d
by means of s~ ciall:? ?n-i'i te-!! i n s t r u c t i o n s or bj- o f f i c e r s e q e c i a l l y s e n t
t o t)r, v a r i o u s comr,!ali;iers.

For b a t t l e on a 1m;e s c a l e , h m e r e r , the r e map be no vitil-

,
5.alili 11; of t?~.oro?&:h i r i i c i r 1 : a t i o n aud adequate a s s i;:p.mer;c or m i s s i o m i n
o r d e r t o s e c u r e t h e coopergtion of a l l for the attain!ileni of tile coinnon
z e a l . *is t h e t t r o i p e n t e r b a t t l e t h e r e must be no doubt i n any cu~~zriarirler's
!!iind a s t o t h e i i ~mti t 011 of tlle hi;;li cornmmtl.

I n so f a r as t h e c o n d i t i o n s p e r m i t , i t ja of Len b e s t f o r t h e
comimd. e r t o c l a r i f y hi:: i n t e n t i o n s t o h i s sirbardilia t e s by ::or<: ol: mouth
and dj.scu:;ski n. ::st he mus t n o t m& :iirw ell' dependeiit on h i s .mbor-
'

,dl n a t e s . Tile d e c i s i o n ald o r d e r s tilei-efor e a r e s o l e l y !?-is.

7F. I t is recor;~.ienJ.edt h a t t:?e r i t ton o r d e r ~ i h i li

c directs the
a c t i v i t i e s of dii'f a r o n t elercionts to a coin-?on ~ , o &h e para:-ral~hod a n d thc
Darucraphs numbarcd.

l'lial; ~ I n i c hj s iniportant s:-auld be pl.occG fir s t ; m t t c r gcr-

t a i n i n i ; t o each c:la-.cnt ox unit :;hould be !:laccC iil a s c p c r a t s p a r f i p a p h ,
under a sc;iarato nuiilbir.

79. O>i:roti5nr: orcic;rc jovcrn t!~c n c t i - i @ of t h e - I r o o p and i n c l u d e

Tor con1ba.t 213~si:r;i.cc tr??iil:: t ! ! ~ :? instrnctioi::; ';!hicli t h e t r 0 0 ~n ~
ust
Imor-J; TLC o r d e r s nro fits ii;n;:.tcd o c c o r ; i i x t o t h c lssuln; connlond (mzr":y,
,
c o r p s , d i v i s i o n , ro:;jrent, o r d e r c t c . ) o r , if ~uii;~-.l;l;: according t o t h o
t r o o p d i s t r i b u t i o n c?.?v,cnco gucrd, outp0s.t o r d o r ) or ?.ccOrdiW; t o t h e
s c p ~ r c t c,?.rm ( n r t i l l a r y m 3 o r ) .

SO. T:lc !?ollorrin(. r,eqv<:nce is -econmendrd f o r o p e r a t i o n s o r d e r s :

I x l ' ~ r ~ i ' a t i o noI' t h e enem:: ancl neii$boriil:: unit:: i n so f a r a s

t h i s is of importance io L:?c r e c e i v e r .

The i n t e n t i c n of the coinrnm.der, i n , G O f a r as i t s communication

i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e acco;nglisl?m~ni; of ti-e end :;on: . h i .

??lisfiio n s for t h e eleiilent s of the ~\-ilolecom:lanr!.

Orders for the Li(:h~l motor; i zed colu!mns, t h e f i e i d trailis and

b 3 3 '[;et r a i i i s , t h e b a t t l e i?cl;.e.ion aryJ t h e r e p i n i n ; ; 17esn:srd nlrment s,
i n s o far ar: Pi i c ic of ir;ipor,taice f o r the t r o o p .

Cc.nmr~rcr:d !IOR L and c o,v.iw,~ca t io na Lo a d froin.

order . x a c ? ~sit!!atlon d i e - t a t e s ::1?3.t chould. be incliiaed i n t h e

,in*..
~ einIom3.a t l o n of the ec:;ciz shoulcl r l s o i c c l n d e t h e
conl;i;:anderls c c t i ~ i ~ l : i o rof: ik ;IOSi i l c ilitcx~tioil.

S u p p o s i t i o n s on? i x p e c t a t i o n s a r e to be so iiidic ated. Reason3

f o r the rneasurga ordi:rcd bi:lon;; 0o.j.j; cxcoptio na1r.y i n tilo ardor. D e t a i l e d
i n s t r u c t i o n s covci-i xi< a l l -pas oi blc; con-tirgcnd e s, 1-!!lil?ich o r e m a t t a r s cf
t r a i n i r ! ~ , do not bcloc;; i n an i n d c r .

Repurt No. li,55E.

-11-
 81. I t i s of ts%? s?zita'~oleto isi;:ie :'ar?!ini a r d e r s . Tl!e mrnin;:
o r d e r ir!farm; a
t' t!ie l a t - s t develo~?men+sof the si'ua tf.011; i t is llsed t o
e f f e c t the moct L P ; ; ~ ~ ; > r e p r a t i o i i s ; l i l ~ b r i s ei-l i:;used t o peJr?it +die
t r o o p to conk t o rsfbt e a r l i e r ard also t o p-e-r:~t *,ern t o r e r t Lonf;or.

"ramin; orrli;rs (Vorhofeille ) a r c e c ~ j e c i all y ?lor tl~-;hil.e .;11-ien

they can 'de t r a r ~ s k i t t e d o r a l l y , b y t e l e p h o n e or ratlio.

82. O Z t m tilo u ~ g e n c yof Mle s i t u s t i o n den?n?ands,f r e q u e n t l y in i t

simp:.er to isste, i n d i b i d u a l orders. These a r e e x t r a c t s o f t t e ??hole
o r d e r &d nlvs -:c o n t a i n everg-Uiing t h a t t l ~ r e c e i v i r i ; comr:aiidnr 1i;;ls t ltnosi
i n w e e r t o e x e c u t e pro:;:erly h i s mission.

_
1.n...
n. a-ir:!! t k i n c i v i d u a l o r d e r s a l l the t r o o p a r e not g i v e n t n e
g e n e r a l p i c t u r e . In l a r & : r opc,-at$J n s , t h e r::-.ols o r d e r ( o p r a - t i o n s o r d e r )
must ;;e?Lerall:.~r o l l e ~ , ;i n ntlicr i n c t m c c s it is ~ o c o i ~ ~ e l tlhi a~t d t h e in-
divi6.xc 1 eomm.? cr:; be i i l s t r u c t e d c o n c c r n i w tho most impor-lant f a c t o r s of
tile I-tiole s i t u a t i o n . "

83. I n t i c " t r o oi, d i s tribl1,tion" ~;;!iich {.;mer a l l y i

: ;iv on s c ; ~ r a t o
fl-om ttiu .;ordin,:, of i i l ~o r d e r , t h o t r o o w n r o s!yccificd n c c o r d i r s t o arm
i n tllc follo*riiw ocqiri.,ncc:

?;ifantry, cavallr;~, ho~nso and motor. i-;connaissance

batta!.io-.s, l o , tan::?, chs::uca~..troop, cn-
;;iilee;.n, 8 a ,
;?iot01. o r - n i c s ridi- ,
c a l and scturi.;iar,i troops, o t l ~ o rt r o o p s ( a i f~o r co
and a n t i - a i r c r a f t ) .

I f t h c iiarc'.~. scqu-cnce i? a l r e a d y n r i t t o n i n t i ~ co r d e r , t h o
t r o o p s a r c s o dcsi;;r~atcd i n tho "t2oo;i d i s i r r o - d t i o n W ;t h e corrospolld-g
t r o o p 0r;anization (main bod:;, advanco ;;uard, r o a r ~ u a r d )c o n t a i n s t h e
adai t i o n ttaccordin;: t o ma~c!l soq!ionccv. Liii~x-ri s o i n a r c t i r anent t 5 c
i;rUo]??:a r:> sir: cii'io d is1 i;mrc!l n oqui~nco.

84. A t tile mid sf t h e order t h e r e i s noted ho:; and by '<horn it i s

i.ssued and ho:! i t vil.1 be 6 - i n t r i b ~ ~ t e d .

T'le tim!? the crrler is coriplcted 0:. tl-e hour of t r a n s m i s s i o n

is t o be i n d i c a t e d .

Tile c a l l i n i : tocet!;ar of t:qe h i g h e r comlnanders o r t h e i r c h i e f

a s s i s t a r - t s f o r t h e is,$uance of o r d e r s is only p e m i s s i b l e x::hen % h e s i t i i a -
t i o n of t ; ~ e u n i t i n w e s t i o n so zduiits.

85. Seldom i s i:le o r d e r of t h e !:i;:Jier co:miander t r a n s m i t t e d , x:itll

a l l annexes, beyond the ?;s:ct lo.;cr commmd c r s . Tlleoe cornnand e r s tll&m-
s e l v e s iosce o r d c r s based on the o r d e r of t k hi;;:i*r c a m m d , iricocporatie
tile necessa;?: iil:?urmtior: and i n s t r c c t i c ns.

G e n e r a l i y t h e d i v i s i o n order foras tiie b a s i s for t h e o r d e r

t o tho troogo.

86. It may he s u i t & l . o t o co!!w?u~licate s e c r e t l y t o t h e n e x t

lo~.iorcomniailders oxily, ordo:-s f o r a r e t r e a t or rotirefizn->.

..-..-..---------
* See A2~enflix 1.

Re,prt No. 14,556.

 87. B a t t l e o r d e r s i!~i.si:not be s t e r e o t ~ e d . Under c e r t a i i : condi-
t i on6 a t'tro op d i r t r j . briti on r' r e y be 1;i.o re r ; h a-love-, t.1.e com,la?der upon
e n t r y i n t o b a t t l e , should ~ ~ i n t i l midf p o s s i b l e t h e s e u n i t s nornlal.ly wider
h i s conm~&!d a c c m d i z y t o the " t a b l e s oi' o r ~ ; a ! . z a t i o n ~ ~ .
3-
k_ethi?r. I.he h a t t l o m d n r be w - j t ten o r o r a l , 1rl:et1e r it be i n
t h e f o r m o i i n . i i - v i h l o r d e r s or a s a f i e l d crdi?r, the c o r ~ d i t i o n s& m . t

xen t s .
d e t e i r n i i ~ ~ .Tile order nrdst ::uarartcc t k c i?.eeir3~d. c o o ~ ~ u r a t i oof
n a11 c l e -

8 . S m c i n l o r d c r s (a~u!.exes ) complete t h e onera-tions o r d s r ;:itli

1-i:c;ard t o t h o s e cletclih ~:ri?ici; a r e iiot of i r ~ p o r t m c cto t h c vllolc cc~.nand.
They d e a l , a s f a r a s ilccessaq?, with tile conduc t aacbivity of' i n d i v i d -
u a l FrinIC:, t h e ronlacc-:~or,tof x m n i t i o n s , fiotcr vc;hiclr: c a r e mil s ~ ~ l l p l : i ,
; ~ o d i c a land veterir1ar.y s c r v i c c , tho food supply, th: sugply oC arins ,
,
!iraterial urld cqui~~cic?nta n d som. timcs \-nththo concluc t oT tine fi.216. a:;d
baggcge trsitls. C a i s i d c r a t i c n s of spccd and b r c v i t y ir: t h c ordor u i s -
t r i b u t i o n niay makrc it a d v i s a b l e to i n c l u i l : stlcli n i a t t c r s i n t h e o p c ~ a t i o a s
ordir.

Ot>Lci.:nsu, r i l l n e c e s s a r y o r d e r s iswsed by t1:e aomnlander on

tb.e supply s e r v i c e s a r c issued as . s , ~ Z i a l oi-dem.

311 s p c i a 1 o r d e r s {;o onlly t o t h e co::lmad. concerned. If

t h e s e comni!:: :lo not r e c e i v e t h e o c e r a t i o n s o r d z r , t h e s p e c i a l o r d e r
:mrst c o n t a i n t h e n e c e s s a r y i n f m i a t i o n ~ . I I ~ ~ - R S ~ O : , ~ .

. 8'3. D a i l y o r d e r s ( c o r i : ~ . ,d i .jisiori, e t c . , d a i l y mii.i:~*s):.elate

, ,
t o t h e i n t e r i . or ecoilo!-:~yoi.' t l ~ ecom1laix3 m a i o r i a l s p e r s o n a l 1ra tiiers ,
roccC;nitioils, e t c .

S t a f f ori?err, reilfi-atn t h e i n t e r i o r economy of '<he s t a f f .

 T~:aiismission of o r d c r s and reyol-ts.
Connectioil be t w e n t h e C o m m d e-r- -aid -$he Tm ops .
90. Orders ant1 :repor. ts, accoi-dii;: t o 2 is-Lance and condi tioiis,

a r e t r a n s m i t t e d by nnans of' t e c h n i c a l means, i n t l i v i d u a l s , d i s p a t c h

r i d e r s , p i ~ ; e o n so r inesselqor 60;:;~.

Techi:ical si{;rjn?.imcuis st!ould !le orciploged .:ilx?n more r a p i d

transr?issio n is a ~ s u r e d , an3 if s e c r e c y i s not jeo;:ardized. Yet, -Glie

t r a n s m i s s i o n ma;. r e q u i r e tlie m.plo:~xent 02' o t h e r means. Long o r d e r s

and r e p o r t s t r a n s n i t t e d by t e l e p h o n e a r e mme r a p i d l y and s e c u r e l y a c -

complished srllon t h e t r a n s n l s s i o n is from one o f f i c e r t o another.

91. I i i f h e r c o r ~ i ~ a n d o,r so c c a s i o n a l l y 1 0 ~ 1 e zcomrfianders, can

send
:OrT:r3rd, i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e g r c a t i ? s t coii~.~uil c a t i o n t r a f f i c , advanced

:nessai;e c e n t e r s . Tilese save t r o o p s and f a c i 1 i t a t . e $he transr;lissicn of

o r d o r s and re;,orts. The advanced nBss,xe c c n t c r mst be e a s i l y found,
s e c u r e d , if p o s s i b l e a;-.ins t hos t i l c a c t i o n , an? connected positivc1.y
w i t h t h e commander. I t s posi-tjon rnlint bc 1:no:m t o t h e troops.

I n l a r g e r con~~ficu~ds " r e p o r t nssanbly p l n c c s " ma:. be c s t r . b l i s h e d ,

rrhicli, 7.1hen -properly plccod, s c v e both ccn ?nd tiino. %csc ii~ustbe

cquippcd v i t h t h n~cccss,?r:! com;nunic,ztions ncims ?.rlmust bc s t r o n g cnou;;h

ll orrcxjr r,.rou:.x. Ecch '1-.sncmbly l;lr.ce"

i s 1u16ci: t!lc cammr.nd

t o r o p c l a;iGm.
of ".n cap::ri?Lly soli.ctc!d. c f f i c c r , 7.-ho s i f t s t h o incornin;, mc,ss?.,::os, end,

?.ccordin, to t h c i r ?.r.:port.r,cr;, ?o t o t i r r ~ -?ld k i n d , d o c i d c s 2s t o t h c i r

r . r i . I t .;;?y bc suit-.blc t o incorpor-.tc t!-L c o n t s n t s of scvcrs-.l

i;:coniiil;, r c 2 p o ~ t si n i o *tic 0:)-L;;oi,n:,.

9 Con~t?~ui?ic::tion'orit:;i?cn ?vi,-.tors and ; ; r o u ~ d t r o o p s i s accomplished

by Li&;l!t and si:;nnl r i e a ~ s ,dropped ;iiessaL:es, pick-up s t a i i ons , and by
radio.

93. On t hi: slafi' 0: 1;ii:her commneers a r e personnel r e q n i r e d f o r

t h e tTa;isWissio?l 9f ordcrs. I n a d d i t i o n i t ;lay be s u i t a b l e t o a t t a c h ,
!>ermanmtlg or t m q ? o r a r i l y , t o t h e hi;!ier co~:m.ar:ds o r t o s t a f f s of
mixed units ( d i v i s i o n , e t c . ) intiivifivals fro111lo\-:er commands as "order
receivers".

The co1~11an3, o r staff t o vrhic h t h e s e " r e c e i v e r s * a r e a t t a c h e d

p r o ~ r i d e s f o r t l ~ e i rr a t i o i l i i ~ g and q ~ a ~ t c r i n : ; .

94. Considera1;ion as to t h e froilt l i n e stren{;t:i demazds modcra-

-tion i n tile number of t h e s e " r e c e i v e r s " . U2on t k e c o l ~ ~ p l e t i oof
n their
d u t i e s t h e s e ettacl?c:l jndlvi~dim1.s D.1 s e n t back to t , i o i r coruniulds.

95. -:Tier;: ;;cod and aaecluatoly secilro i7cats and s t r c c t s a r e a v a i l -

:.b 10, automobile s , n ~ o t oc:rc
r l e s ard bicycl. t;s ars c!n~loycd.

On o i , n roacls, on t e r r a l . n sfi.t!;cuA6 ~ o a i and

~ , abovc all. on t h e
l > n t t l o f i o l d , horscr.lcn and m.nncrs a r c to be I-sod.
-l i t h 1.nr::cr
L C u f f o c t i v o i y usod . comiands and o v e r g r c a t c r distances, c i q l c n c s ccn

96. It i s on1.y durin.; t h e advance i n t o b a t t l g t h a t lrmer conmallders

nay be assembler? by t h e k i c h e r cw11,imd e r or to r e c e i v e o r d e r s , t h e r e b y
f a c i l i t atin& t h ~oriia-
~ transr,!ission. D u r i q - : batt?& such procedur e is
forbidden.

9'7. 'men m. o r d e r or r e p o r t is t r a c s i : i i t t e d o r a l l y , tk.e one b e a r i n g

t h e m d e r or re;>or-: rfii.~tr e 2 e a t i t t o tk ismlln; person. , ipnrsoll t r a n s -
rzittin;:: a r i r i t t e ~ r. e l p r t should be i n s t r u c t e d as t o i t s c o n t e n t s , i n s o f a r
a s c o n d i t i o n s pelmit. O f f i c e r * t r a n s r r i t ' b i i ~ordero s h o u l d , a o a m k , b e
i n s t r u c t e d as t o the t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n .
 98. If p m s i l ~ l e , j : ~ p o r t a ? t o r d e r s and, r e p o r t s shouIW be salt
by o f f i c e r s .
T:3~en t5.e o r d e r o r r e p o r t is e ~ ; ~ ? c i a l l iymportant o r ii?i!re is
a questioil of a s s m e d a r r i v a l , t r a n s n i s s i o n by .various r o u t e s i s ac-
v i s a h l e . IJndel- suck c o n d i t i o n s , o r if tl-e r o u t e is very lone;, i t way be
aclvisaole to send o f f i c e r s ~ r o t e c t e dby e s c o r t , nlounted t r o o z s o r armored
vehicles.

99. T:?C cocr2m.d e r mt c 0 P ~ i dc r \-?here h i s comunicatjon c a n r e a c h

t h e receiver, and. he ialst i n s t r u c t t h e b e a r e r a s t o ~:llom the m s s a ( e is t o
be d e l i v e r e d m d t h e r o u t e he should follovi. If n e c e s s a r y , a s l z t c h or i h t ,
r o u t e should be g i c en. A t t e n t i o n should be c a l l e d t o e s r e c i a l l y d a n ~ e r o u s
areas. So:::etinez it is n e c e s s a r y t o s::ecify u11en t h e x1essa:;e 'lust r e a c h
t h e r e c e i v e r , a t t!le l a t e s t . The b e a r o r ixust bo iiist;?uc&?das t o Tihat he
s h a l l do upon d c l i v e r i l ? ~ .of the comxunicatlon.

,
100. Ul'on meotir!g s a i o r s r.la:nted. ~ i e s s e n ~ , keep xs their g a i t ;
to h i ~ > . c ro f f i c o r s :;boy r c l o r t tb.e d e s t i i l a t i o n of t h e i r mssa;s. As thny
~ i d r ;by a r~iarchcolunil tl?ey l i k a - r i a o report to t h e c m m a ~ d e ra 3 riel1 as
t o the advanco ( - r o a r ) C:uiai.d conl.mmdor; a,? thr::! pass s c c u r j t y f a r c c s -t?.cy
r e p o r t to tile i l e a r e s t col-~!r:wd e r . I:i s e r i o u s or tllreatenin:; sitzl.at ions
t h e y c a l l o u t t h o contelits of '&LC inessai;e t o t h e coimardcrs and t h e
tloo:!s. They rnmt be inst_*ucted t o a;;!? f o r t h e l o c a t i o n of the corilr~alder
t o 7:ihon t3.e ordeer or m e s s q e is direc-bed. B i c y c l i s t s conduc t t h e n s e l v e s
s i n i l a r l y t o nooiu?tedr;essw.;;ers. >'roc. ~ i o t a r c y c l eriessengers t h e c o n t e n t s
of i.lessai;es cannot of ten. 3e denailded.

Hj.&her corma;ders and cormmders of r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o i l s

a r e a u t h o r i z e d t o reod riessa.;es yassi11;; -then, b i ~ t +,i~:i i m s t n o t unduly
d e l a y i t s t r a n s n i s s i o n . They r l w t n o t e on t h e i z s s a g e t h a t they have
l e a r n e d of i t s contellts.

A l l colxm~~d c r s a r e er: joined Lo ~ o i i l to?it -the ?lily t o

r.lesscilge rs , a l l t r o olx t o nalco i-lay f ol> r2Bssengors. Every element i-.ust
a s s i s t i n getti!lL t h e m s s a z e i,hroq;h, if n e c e s s a r y b:r ~ r o v i d i : q trans-
;;ortation facilities.

101. ;is a r u l e one o r more c r c s s e s pJLaceci 011 t h e nessage o r i t s

c o n t a i n e r i n d i c a t e s tile speed bo be xaiiitaiiled by counted ,mssen;ers:

x = one k i l o n e t e r i n 7 t o 8 rlinutes.

xx = one k i l o n e t e r i n 5 t o ninutes.

0 If n e c e s s a r y , t h e q e e d of b i c y c l e and 110torcycle i;lessen:;ers

i s indj.cated i n !:ilo!lecers per bour.

103. -:llxer. tile t r a n s n i s s i o i ; of messages and o r d e r s nust b e i:iade

over long d i s t a n c e aild t r a r i s r i i s s i o n b'r si&aal -,leans cannot be a s s u r e d ,
i t m y b e c o r ~n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h d i s p a t c h r i d e r p o s t s .

"Dispatch r i d e r s ' ! :?ay be ruumers, r.iounted nesselli;ers, b i c s -

c l i s t s or m t a r c y c l i s t s . i s o r i s t i . RUILI?~TSand mwntod
riesser.{;eTs a r e t o be used oriiy if b i c y c l i s t s and n o t o r c y c l i s t s a r e n o t
a v a i l a b l e or if t h e t e r r a i n does n o t p e n l i t t h e i r u s c .

1 The d i s t a n c e bet\-men "dj. s p a t & r i d e r " p o s t s depeads upon

t h e lenfitll of t!r? ilistance to be t r a v e r s e c , t h e purpose of t h e ' f d l s p t c h
l i n e w , and t!?e c o n d i t i o n of t h e roads aad t h e termain. The s t r e q t h of
t h e post,s is deton.linod bg t h e i r d u r a t i o n , t h o m o u n t of c o ~ ~ w . i c a t i o r .
t r a f f i c , and t h e n e c e s s a r y l o c a l s e c u r i t y .

105. C a r r i e r pifieons and riessenger do<;s a r e used f o r connection

ritl-. t h e n o s t advanced u n i t s , sihen o t h e r r,lears f a i l .
 106. Tlie l?i:.>he:: cor.Tand is res::onsible for c o r r m - ~ j c a t i o n-to *lie
lower, f o r t h e c o n s t r u c i i o n and r.i:~ntenance +hereor.

Co!lr 7.ullic aTia n be b:/een r?ei ;;:ibori i?; o i e i e n t s is t o be i n -

au:.;urated ax1d r m i i ~ t a i n ~ cjYor;
d t h e l e f t , ~ u ~ l e other'.!jse
ss ordered. liOr?-

e v e r , t h i s does not rele:ise t h - e l e r e n t of t h e ri,Jlt f r o n t!.e duty of

establishin:; co:.:nlujlication t o t h e l e f t , i f t~is cor.?;lwicatioi? is lackin;;.

107. I n 1.ar~:er c o r n ~ a ~ dt sh e hi;;heY c a x ~ a n d s r:lay n i sxa tcl- l j a i s o n

o f f i c e r s t o a t t a c h e d ~or.lnad.s a:ld to iiei;hbori:?: 'zits. These office?.^
i n f o r r i t h e wnits t o !-;;.:Tic!? s e n t of t h e i r t m t i o r i s o f t h e i r com.18nd-r and
acquai?!t t h e n riitl: t h e s i t u a t i o n . Iil a d d i t i o l l t o c l e a r perceptiol: a?ld
independent jud,.:.;!ei!t tlicae o f f i c e r s r e q ~ ~ l r(;reate jnilital3, t a c t . :~15?.boi~
f r i e t j o n , t h e y sczi: t o a s c e r t a i n t h e ?::t:?~?tions a?id sr'ders uf tlle
c s a l a n d e r s to {-$.or: they a r c s e n t , anti, b e f o r e sendin; their r q ? o r t s , t o
tori.' incc t l i a ~ o e l v c ovrha ihjr i??<:ir ~ tile s i tuaation a,cJoes
u r : ~ ? c r s i a n & iof
~.:iLt: Il;a t of thc. cor~::mdors t o \~ho!:~i!!cy a r e sunL a113 io c a l l a t t c n K on
to t h e cor.r:.ai-s?ers m y c i i f f ~ r c i i c c si n jntorprrutaiioll; L!icrcu!pon thuy
r c l o r t t.1cj.r iz~lll'ossio!ts. 'fien p e r s o n a l r y : o r t s a r c n e c e s s a r y d \??fin
t h e i r t a s k is coi-~;?lctod, i i ? c ~ -retm-n -to t h e i r : r t r a d q u z r t ~ r s , T!lo i?r~;scncc
of a liaioo:? o i ' f i c e r dm o not r e l i e v e t h e ccr~r~antiar,a t hose k e a d q u a r t e r s
t h e l ~ i a i s o noi'i'5cer r s i l a i n s , of irLi'cr;?ll-l; h i s s u ~ x r ' i mof t h e s i t i ~ a t i o n
i h r o y'i contl~:uous r r p o r 6s.

1-08. The ew.r;.uni.ca",o 1: lick-reen t h e arr!-.sis t r e a t e d i r ? S e c t i o l VI

(attack).

'.pie ...-
~
p l a c e of t h e COI 1~la116eyanrl h-- i s S t a f f .

!~U9. Ttie ::e?soi~el e f f e c t of t h e cor:x.~ar?dsr or! t h e troolx is Of

rea at iripor tarice. l-:e i:us ; b e ??ear t P s f i <:!~ti:x; troops.

110. Th.e choice of locatio:? i'or the cor2s c~?.~:;i?des~ ~ : o he ~ l d

based upon t h e r e q i i r e i - ~ i i tof t h e osta!,lis?!nent of rai>id aid. c o n t i n u o u s
corn:iixicatio ri to tlie d i v i s i o n s and t h e r e a r . Iie cannot r e l y alone on
tocl'inical corv:~unica'tior;s.

Great clj.strn ce, i n s p i t e of adeovaie c o r ~ v ~ ~ i c an t fi o acilities,

lengthens t h e cormand anti r s p o r t l i n c , endanLcrs t h e s y s t m : ~an6. r.xiy l e a d
t o l a t e r e p o r t s and o r d e r s o r even t o f a i l u r o of a r r i v a l . Lioreovl?r d o a t

of the ;jm ~ ; r c 3 oof tho 'I: a t t l e .

d i s t a l c e nalms d i f f i o l l t ;orcoilal -teri.ain study an6 a p r s o c a l imm11ed;;e

On the o t l u r ?,arxI, bocouse of tho < ; r e a t alount of concnnica-

t i o n to alri i r o i i d i v i s i o n s m i i o t h e r submclinate coi:~xi;u~rist!ic Cor'p~
Cor~iznd P o s t should bc col>.s.:.antly ir: o p c r a t i o it. I t s cliar!.;;~ of l o c a t i on
is uade quicX:ly, cvcii oqcr l o n g disto:;ccs.

Bcfarc c rlovo is nadc f r o x one l m n t i o n t o a n o t t ~ c r , t h e

c o m u n i c a t i o ~ lsjfiutm i h e r e t o :wst be establis?!ed.

'or t h e Cavalry Corps co.mlander, co:;r~u~-,icationt o !]is d i v i -

s i o n s is O f 63 c i a l il:ipriance. A8 a r u l e , ii' he d w s not accorllpaii:r o n e
of h i s d i v i s i o n s , he n u s t fo1lol-i c l o s e behind.

lll. The d i 7 ~ j . s i o nco!lrmnCi e r bel.on;;s :-ri-th his troops.

112. Duriw an advance t h e d i v i s i o n co!xl3nier with h i s ?daell

s t a f f , is 1.~11
forl:!ard.

I n an advmc e i n s e v e r a l c o l w i n s , t h e d i v i s i o n conr.lander, i f
he aces not r.iarcil be-h-reel? t h e march c o l u : ~ n s ,g e n e r a l l y i l a x h e s alon;; t h e

t i o n s ;leans can be ut;, li zeC .

s t r e e t u>on ';ihicS, tlie t r u n k l i n e is laic? or al.on:; ~ v h i c he x i s t i n g co?.wlu!ica-
The e a - ~ a l gd i v i s i o n corr.lw.dur, a c cordin;; t o
t h e s i t u a t i o n , i~iarches7.5 t l i the nos t i r ~ p x - t m t column or bctneon c o l v ~ u l s .
 T i e d i v i s i oil comrmd c r adv-m ceo by bounds
:;orse o r noto]? vd~ih;clea t h i s dis;!os a l
!
.
Tilero is almqrs a
. Tile rer.?air:di?r of the s taf f
fo1lff;is i n t h e march. colimm untl.1 it i s ordered f'srvlard. Reports m i i t b e
a b l e t o roach t h e d i v i s i o ~ lcommander quickl:r and a-t 62.1 t i m s .

113. Sho11l.d co:.ltact :ritil ti:^: enen:r be i-mminent, tile d i v i s j o n

cornnand e r r m a i n s t h e arlva ced (;ua?d. I t i s t h e r e t h e s i t ~ l a t i o n
\riel

f i r s t brealrs and tiiere c a r lie e x e r t more u c r i in?!.uczce.

ils contac-t i s <;ainsd i-rit.?~t h e eneiiy i t i s bt?:-ter t h a t tile

G i v i s i o n comrrianter b e vrhei-e he can observe. Thex'efore he b e l o x s ear1:i
on tlie fic;ld of b a t t l e at t h e ciecisive area. h i s l o c a t i o n mlmt be
~ a s i l yfound, e a s i l y reacked.

114. I n a t t a c k tilo d i v i s i o n cormand :lost s:-lonld be l c c a t e d a s f a r

fom-:ard as p o s s i b l e , ye-t s o selected. t h a t t h o coA~mmuiications n e t t o thu

s i d o ar,d r e a r is cflectively- s h i o l d e d f2om h o s t i l e f i r e . To bo d o s i r c d

a r c : o i s g ~ v a t i o nof tlic b a t t l e f i o l . d , e i t h e r from tlie c a r m n d post g r a
ucarbg o b s e r v a t i o n p o s t , a d thc. p o s s i b i l i t y of c s t a b l i s h i n ~a lcn.dii:.i:
ylnce nenrbf.

~ e c a u s o037 t h o ; , r e a t o r b r c a d t h of f r o n t t h c cornand 3 o s t i n

t h e dofenso is gonoroily fmt!:cr i n t h e r c s r .

Tlio divi:;i crl comnmc1~rmust coilsidur %l!c sigr!ai o f f i c e r l s

r c c ~ ~ r m o n d o t i o nfoi.

ijoi;t should bo rvoidci..

s
o f mwemcn.t of Cl1c coi~i:imd20s t
T ~ L
.
t h e l.oc?,tion, tho t i r r c of ost,?t!.ic:lmcnt, aiid tilo tiKc
li:riq~:ont c l ~ r r n g
s ~of tli c d i v i s i o n com:nd
cI-!~ui.;ci s mado o n l y 7;;i-c.n t h e r c v C.P. i s s o t
uli, cont~,iimi.c-,iii~;;tli::i~ctc>osJ6.-J>2ish,u?'. ZLIl i?iti;ildid c!>J-.~;c: nust i.c i n -
diccm.todto t17.o ~i~;i:~?..l o f f i c e r i n ?.n;>!c: timc.
Pro?~j.sionl a i s t bc iii?.uu f o r
tho for;:;rdin;:
c or~mi?.rrd]?osi .
t o t l : ~ r s r , of o r d c r s 2nd r c p o r t s rcccivcd a t tki: uld

115. I n t h e p i r s u i t t h o cornn?m~<
;:r inm t b e f?u'tk:er i'or1:ard. Isis
alipearailce ar-.on; t h e nioc t advanced air- .?ents srurs the troops t o the
p e a - t e st e x e r t i o n s .

116. Slio1iZ.d na-! oon~'cmt impend a f t e r t1i.c e a r l i e r cor;ibat has been

broken o f f , tlie d i v i s - i o n com;lander b e t a k e s himself Lo -the a r e a s of t h e ner:
l i n e of r e s i r , tance, a f t e r h e has c w i n c e d hinisoU t h a t h i s o r d e r s f o r -the
f i r t l i e r conr,uct of the t r o o p a r e beink c a r r i e d t1rou;;h. In difficul-t
s i t u a t i o n s he remains x i i t h t h e t r o o p . , Unless ordered otker7:risc, lo~?:m
c:>r~x~i&e r s always raisin v i t h the troops.
. .
117. The command p o s t of t h e hi;;& r corrimm~derand -tkc m y t i l e r e t o
m u s t a l v a y s be r e c o t p i z a b l e b y day and by ni:$~t. The C.P. fla: f a c i l i t a -
t ~ lso c a t i n g i t , b-dr it n1.s t be concealed from t b e cnec~y.

P l v t o c t i o n ar:ain:;t w
, ; > r i s e a i r o r ;,rmnC a t t a c k s fro?^ a i l
d i r e c t i o n s must be ;:reparc&. C o n s i d e r a t i o n s of s e c m i t g Gay f o r c e t h e
l o c a t i q ; of tilo C.P. v i t l l i n t h o p r o t e c t i o n oi' ib.c fi*g:tin& t r o o p s .

I . Tkr? c o r r e c t c o n i i i n a t i o c of tho s t a f f and t h o suitable d i s t r i b u -

t i o n of t a s k s a r c @ c%,:ccial impo;.taricc. Tb.e hii!icl. g t a f f s i n ~ ~ . fsut n c t i c n
. t h e prc:scrib cd stl-2n:;th.

A t t h e c@i~maad p o s t ,-recaut5.ons n.us t bo takmi and s t r i c t

r c i ; u l a t i o n or' the ::i>rl:: r!iust he cxercificd i n oriir:r to ~ ~ 1 a r a n t c a . o ~ u i c arid
t
s u r c l c a d c r n t i p a n d t.) a v o i d p i a c i n g the bur dell^ oi' d e t a i l s on t h e camlander.

119. If t h e c;ml;a.ndcr l o a o o s t h e comtland p o s t , t h e Chief of staff

b t cc>mus h i s r c p r o s m t a t i v c t h o r c .

Rcaort No, 14,576.

-17-

 120. ?c!conn&. ssarice ~?-.a 11 a:: quLo!tly, c onpie t e l y and r e l i a b l y a s

j?ossihle , provi:?e a pic i:.xe of the h o s t i l e s i t u a t i o n . The resul';s 0:f
r e c o n n a s :;ante f o r % t k jnos t important b a c i s f o r the ?.ecision and t h e
u t i l i z a t i o n of t1-e f o r c e .

121. The Secmiialssance i s de:;ifpaiea a s t a c t i c a l and s-trate:;ical

reCCllnais:;a~ce, ground and a i r . It i s aii~pli?iied by s ~ e c i a riea:?s
l as
i r i ~ i c a - t e di n oars. LC4 LO 189.

2 S : r a t e g i c a l rcconnaissa:ice p r o v i d e s the h a s i s f o r tl?e

ctra-tngi r a i d e c i s i on.

The t a c t i c a l recor.naj.ssm.ce pr w i 5 e s the b a s i s f u r -the

t a c t i c a l lniiders??ip an.?.coildiic t of t h e t r o o w . i t Lhe.- 'ace; i :ilurt t a c t i -
c a l recunnaisaar.ce 1)o~:n -::iLh c o n t a c t . I t forms t h e basin f o r tl;c conduct
of thc cni;ac;cmc;nt. I t i.s p n r t j . c i p t c ! d by a l l orl:?s.

1.2. S o %me -troors should b ~ :mployed f m rrcoiinnissancr; r , - ~ r p o s e s

than a r e r;ecer,sar:r.

The rcconnais sxce f m c e c o r e e a r l y c onccn i i a l e d i r l t h e nics t

i m p o r t m t d i r e c t i o n , e s p e c i 2 l l - j if IN: !mst rocicon v i t h s u p r i o r l l ~ ~ ~ i l t :
rccon:lcissn:lcl:. I n oill,:.~ d i r e c t i o n s only i h c most oflflcntial a r c c::lploy~d.

,"m 2ndcr.vrr c,l-ould he 1;:iidc to h.:.vc r c s c r r c . rcconn?.issnnce

~1.cmcrits ;:.hich c -11 hc c~;ployed t o r c j n i c r CC? oc i;id cn t l ; c: ri;c!c!nr!-.?c s?ncu
i n o f f o c t , o?, i c s s r t o h c s m t i n 2 ?;cra i r ~ c t i u n .

1.24. 313c?rio rit:; iil: a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a r e a lig!! Lens ozr t a s k ,

makes more &rficr,li t h a t of t h e er:w,j.

TIE .:linninf; of reconnair; oance s u p e r i o r i t y 011 t h e yround i s

m a t e r i a l l y ai6ed by a ~ f : r e s s i v econd.us:t a;;ainst t h e hcsti.!.e r e c o n n a i s -
: ; a c e mi;:;. 2kcoi.dil;~ t o tk,is, a l l recon;ialnsaxce units dffm t o t h e
p a t r o l s so con61.lc t t?.eh!selveo, i n s o far as t h e r:~:ll.ssionand s i i u a t i o f i
permit.

If reconnais aance batta!.icn.s a r e f o r c e d , i n o r d e r t o e f f e c t

t h a i r m i s s i o n s , t o broak throuy;l~, t h c 1imtil.c reco::naissance o r s e m r i t y
f o r c e s , they q u i c k l y c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i r for cos and d r i v e through. Should
t h e enemy be s u o e r i r ) r , our mission c a n ofte;! he:;t be f uli'i l l e d by d e l a y i n g
a c t i o n b e f o r e tlie m.eny and e n c i r c l i n g him.

:,my cauairy mj- bo eirployed e f f c c t l v e l y for ti1 i.s e~.cir.cle-

Inen 1. Should ai iiiido~ser:der:i moLorizeil r.eci)ni:?ii.s nal.ce b a t t a l i o n he eid-
ployed f o r t h i s I .,
ir; m o t h a t i ~ n e l yxi~!?'cr cod by o t h o r rwtorizcd
elel-,ent s .
CIirFIti0
S o r ~ ~ d t i ? D Y;G
r. of i n p c r tar.t t e r r a i n poini;s .
s , can gain. suc?riori:y by e a r l y s u r p r i s c oc-
Accalls o r,f l;h G j P r spesd, motorized
f o r c e s a r c mi% t ,mi2(,ah].<? f o r t h i s l>~~r;lr,r,c.

125. Goo6 ~ ~ o u ! i di?oconnaiesanco aa,sulros s i i , ? ~ ~ l t a n c t ) u sal y c e r t a i n

s o c m i t y . On t h e :;thur !land, t h e nt:Li';ity of a counter recomlaissoncc
bo t t a l i c n providos a c c r t z i n m,?unt of rc:connoiss;mcc. RcconnoiosancQ
anc? c c u n . t c r - r c i c o 1 l r ~ a i 3 ~cli h o~ CXOUIIC! c o n p l c i e n t or:c anOSI':Cr orld
: ~ ~t ~
cmincvt nlnaxp bc s h ~ - ~ p sl epnm2;od. y licconnais n mco bottc.lions E r o c t
thcrnscl~ros?.gains t t h e cr,cn.y and morc f r o c l y o-alXtlic: t o r r c j n. C o m t e r
r e c a n n a i s s a n c e (securit,::) :'brces a r e t i e d t o riefinjLe a r e a s .
 Should it be r\ecessar:y Y ' o assim t o a z e c s r ~ n a i s c a n c eb a t t a l i o n
sin:ulta?~olisl:~rt h e !-aissicn of a i:econnais s a m e and c s u n t e r rrc.il;na>~ssancn
( s e c u r i t y ) , tile:^ t h a r d e r should c!rpli.citly s t a t e .i?lich. ] ; a s prece:lence.
In for ccs of sufi'icien4t s i z e , a ;~?r+,i~on ~ 2 a yhe a ~ s i m e deach t a s k .

1 2 . The reco?!n.aisnance of $.he terrain, its neiotiability, t h e

CCn& t i o n d tl~!e roads, r a i l y o a d s ;ir:d o r i d yen, o:,? ~ a c l op r s s i b i l i tie o ,
:)'i:sei.vai;io :I p a i n t s a d c w e r , ao 1- ell a s e x i r t i n & comaunic a t i n n i ' a c i l i -
t i e n o.se f r c q u e n l l y a s s i , T e d a s tasks f o r t:le roci.nriai ssari ce elc;mo;its.

-.!ith;>ut :;,recia1 o r d e r s , and iil s o f a r nc: t h e ::ituatj.on c:ld

,. r?issb:! porn%.;;, a l l rocc>maissanco aser.cios a r c c i ~ n : c ~,:fit11
LL.~
A ~ d t:~;.rai.i?
rcCo:llalssC.'~11C~

A i r !j?:r,trjgrapki:: ai 6. ail< cl;-.b erci;,; ;'cr,c,nncis:-jr::co.

2 Tho !:'.:rii;s of r i r rcccl;~::.-.iss,?.? cc t h o s r c cd si' t:!r 1 ~ 1 - ~ i c s ,

-
?>: c!ir p,'l, ili .!-T,
, t,. a . y i-v<,r !IOS
t i l a S C C L ~ -@
P.r.2
~ . :for COS, o't~s
t,?.clr;s -:nd pc!c:i-
tj.ctns, ?.nd I
.
s i t u r t i ::n
. t o ?7u r.;1li: t o s c c ~ r r or: fcq.rror.ci!ir,~vi:?:-: of tho l l o s l i l u
:r:;i-
, pl?;?:,e n r c i n C;LCI.I ::r?.l r.1;l.c t o dir;rc~F.rd cround forms
f,JorcL>
The f l . i c r , under fa:-ra'nla CailditiZ~lr.,earl secure w.d ;ep!)rt ~ n i c k l yan
.
rxi;ensiv c! p i c tlr e f % t h ee:lemg.

FT:s.:ercr, a i r reconcaissance can d e l i v e r ~ ' 1 1 1te81porary

~ pi c-

t~.~i-esof 3 e :~c?:.:til.esitl~atj::?n. Cijjliinuous oljservatioil of t!he came a r s a

u s u a l l y i s n c t po:;siblc. j?Lril:er lin!itati:!ns on a i r r e c c x n e i s s a n c e a r e

l l i l i ' W ~ . ~ ' r < ~ i i ?..ma-liinr,

lr c.>~;f~;re?~

t e r r a i . , ? and 5-s4;.ile a i ? a t t a c k .

12s. T!le ;3inl:jLe:si k.ind of ai:;. rocc,-1;luiszaxlce i s : l s u a l recomlais-

sa!cc. I t s r ' j s ~ ~ ldepend

i:~ rn tlie e l c l . a t i o n , 7:1kicl; is rletw~fliiiedby tile

i:aisi.ion aEd -M:e h o s t i l e defa~nsc, on eneny cm.~-,uSap;~ and tile ohsel-ration

c;,:-.d%t j c,.?,~.

Daj21i:>i~t f l i t sa frcqui:'lt, Ti'csc a r c r i . L liriihed t o

ar,y p a r t i c u l a r !:zur+s.

Thc iW.;c ?:?a.tilc m ~ ~ i . i e : ? . larc?

, s n a i c a t niglkt and t h e g r e a t e r
d.ofcnsc r:ma;:ur st: tr:c ~:~or,cy . .
t a k c s corlz~-, t!:~ da:: , tPjc n;.Tc r,ose nsary
bi:ciirs1is 1:it:li; air :cccc~r.naissanc c , i$i~?,.t r ~ c , ? i ~ : l asi sa c is viu21i*l ro-
coniiaissaccc o t 1::) cl.ovati?ns, as:;istcd by v a r i o u s i-:loas dr' i l l u n ~ i n a t i o n .
I t ccmnat c:m!pr:!sa?'o f?r dayli~:!>t rcconnaiscancc. I t i s l i m i t e d t c , !-!ell
dcf iilod a116 i>cloily roco.3-:i.zod lanSnn:;-l:s , ol:c h nc oti:oo-to, r a i l x ~ o a d sC~ld
n a t c r ci!zirsct; ,%:d i-!rrofc:ri: i s r c s t r i c t c d t o l i i n i t c d t m l t s .

Recon;ai:;oance S l i c h t c made i!i t h e ea::l.r morninr; o r l a t e

evening l ~ z yi3entij':., t h e co!a.ple t i o n or 3' eginnii-.c of a iliglit mov =tent.

IZO. ..ir phot o j r a p h s c u,iplm.e.ont and coilfirm t h e v i s u a l roconnais-

sacce. The hi:;her the p l a n e must f l y , t h e more n e c e s s a r y i s t h e photo-
:;ragh. T h e a i r p h o t o ~ ~ a pphr o v i f i e s i n f a r n a t i c n i;f E
' :e ere?,ly, o r our ai:,n
0'
~ z r ee f f e c t a?d ? ~cm.od:?i.ace.
f T'ie photograph i s of l i t t l e i1:lportauce
','her, 'the nee2 i s im:;ediais and t h e b a t t l e o b j e c t i v e photogral,h i s of tenl-
pora1.y inpor t m c e .
 P!>~io~ r a ~ l prc-c
.

l s i d e i n f .-:rrna t i o r af
t h e t e r r a i n and a s s i s t
i n neaswer~lents ( a r t i l 1 . e ~ : ~f .i r e )

,iir phc'cocraphs a r e talren i n s e r i e s o r a s i n d i v i d u a l p i c t u r e s .

Gocd p i c t u r e s r e q u i r e 'ori~l.?; d a y l i @ t , t h c i r develcpmnt dexlards time.
"or h a t t l d recc;i!?rAs sm cc pm:>ao e s resqult s from a s m a l l numhor cf pic c u r e s
can i.c r c g - : rtcd iri one t o t\;o baurc. The p r c y a r a t i c n of cxtc?:sive p i c -
t u r e ~.:T tho t a c t i c a l rcconn-3s 3ancc r c q u i r c s k~ti. f i v e haurt;. Fcr
stratc;;icnl. purp:'scs, r e q u i r i n g i: g r e a t n b c r af pictures, r c m l t s can
he c::~cctcd iir a b c u t t o n c r i w r o hou.rs. The dmcl:!l;l:~cnt is r.ncic a t tile

.
a i r p o r t or a "development" c a r a a y be advanced t o t h e lariding f i e l d o r i n
proximity t o t h e col:.r!land :post of t h e com~ander

1314 ;LS a m l e , g r a n d reconilaissanco cannot s c c u r c a pic t i r e deep

i n t h e hcs t i l e a r e a , Tlie air recoim.aissaRce often d i r e c t s ttL'e ground
Teconnaissalz e t o tile n o s t d e c i s i v e a r e a for i t s a c t i v i t y . Only jiro-md
reconnais s a m e can d e t e n l i n s if a g i v e n t e r r a i n a r e a i s a l ? s o l u t e l y zmoc-
cupind by t h e ent?r.ly. Groulld reconnaissance f o r c e s can, by ,pisonern
t a k e n , throw:h v?o~;~id.eda13 d s a d , by o t h e r id6nti.f i c a t i o n s , deterinine t h e
h o s t i l e t r o o p c o ~ l p o s i t i o n . Only grcund for ccs can ;'laintoin continu.ous
c o a t a c t , detelrxine the d e t a i l e of tim hostile activit:,, l e a r n t h e s t r e n g t h
and corlpositioo ard perl;a,ps t h e b a t t l e vror t h of t!lc er:cng, and e a r l y
l c a r n of gassed arcc.s. Likevnse ground f o r c s s caa opc:ratc mdcr rrcaiher
c o n d i t i o n s v!hich ;a&c i r q ~ o s s i b l i . o r v e r y i l i f f j c l i l t Wc o y ~ r a t i o n sof c i r
rcconnaissancc.

3.32. ?dfo.torizod rcconnoissiu-.cc brittz.?.:i.ionsp m c u r o q u i c k l y c::d a t

&rcr.t i l i s t ? n c c s , rccon:1,".ir,s?.ncc results. % l ~ e y s ? i lnot
l be a b l e alv~ays
'GO i d e n t i f q d e t a i l s . Tlieir a c t i v i t y is norr.~all:; l i r l i t e d t o d a y l i g h t
hours; advanccs can be r%laadoat n i g h t . Th.e use of s t r e e t s t a k e s advantage
of' t h e i r si2ee8. Tlley shoulCL be ;lade independent of m r e s l m ? l y r.larc!ling
reconna-issan ce fur ceii .
The accor.plisl.r;ent s of noi:erized reconilaissance b a t t a i i o n s
a r e depencent upon t h e ca;!abilitie s of t h e vei-.ides, upon t h e r e p l e n i s h -
ment o!' IUc 1, ugon z t r c e t and road conCitions, t e r r a i n , .leather, d a y l i g h t
and esne c i a l l y uyon t h e y o s s i b i l i t y of u.tili:iia:,i: t h e i r o.m and e x i s tiw;
?:]ear,s of co!:r.~uni ca-tioils.

133. 1 ieun t e a reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n s Lave tho advan tq;e of

@ e a t e r n o b i l i t y a c r o s s t c r r a i n and t h e a b i l i t y of t r a v e l l i n ( : i n a l l
d - i r c c t i e ns and t o considerable di., t w c c s . They a r c l o s s de;-endcnt on
'-!cathcr, t e r r a i i i and sup11ly tkar. not o r i z e d u n i t o . T h e i r speed am? i~larc:?
capacity a r c linitcd. They a r c Oblc; t o oLservo t!lc eller.ly f roc1 covered
,
p o s i t i o n s , t o L'orci a c l o s o r.?esiicd reconnaissct7.cc n e t acd wl,a i: is of
g r e a t e r v a l u e , t o d c t c n ~ i n cd e t a i l s to n g r c a t c r e x t e n t .

134. The :;reatest d e r i n d s a r e placed sn t h e leaS.ers of all e f i q l q e d

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a:jeEcies, dmrn t o i n c l u d e ],at??o:i. l e a d e r s . The p e r s o n a l i t y
0" t h e l e a d e r is u!? d e c i s i v e i r q o r taxce. C r a f t i n e s s , B e x t e r i t y , under-
s t a n d i n g of t h e s i t u a t i o n , deterilined m a - m n t i n e v e r y t e r r a i n , t e r r a i n
resourcefulrioss by day and n i z h t , cold blooded;leso, q ~ i c l sand independent
conduct mlst be doi:~anded.

A l l co;.ria?ders a r e r e s p o n s i b l e t h a t c o x t a c t once g a i n e d i s
n o t l o s t , i n s o f a r as t h e n i s s i o n does not otherl-rise p e s c r i b e . Contact
i-lhich is l c s t should be r e g a i n e d i r ~ l e d i a t e l y .

135. The di::positio~? of t h o recollnaissance iyoacie s is de$:tdmt

upon t h e s i h m t i u n , t h e coI.uPiander's i n t e n t i o l l , t h e killd and nur.&er of
a g c n c i c s , and t h e l ~ c s t i l cc o u n t e r reconnaissance ':nth v h i c h n c r u t
ruclron, u.pon t h e t e r r a i n , upon t h e road and s t r u e t n e t , upon t h e td.10 o f
t h e y u a r and of t h c d a y as : / e l l a s upon t h o I-ioathur. So r.m:y p o s i i b i l i -
t i c s cxis t f o r c x c c ~ ~ t i oofn reconnaissance r?As oions t:a t no p r e s c r i b e d
conduct c m bo l a i d d0v.m.

Hcport No. 14,570.

- 20-
 81.1 reconnaissance aGenc i e s !lus t be u n i T o r a y ( f r o ~ one l head)

er~plojrod.; 0nL:r i n t h i s i-;arlner can t hey e f f i c i e ~ i t l yrrorlc t o g e t h e r and

d e l i v e r a co~:r;ilete 13icLure of t h e ene;::!.

A l l reconnaissance r e s u l t s a t hand r?us t b e u t i l i z e d f o r t h e

firthe r e!ly,lo:rr~.eut of t h e agencies. Only i n t h i s r-lanwr is the? unnecess-

a r y el-lploynent of r e c o ~ m a i s s a n c eileans aTrciided.

The qu.%ti t:' of reconnaiosnnce ina;>s e.lployed i s not the

r1ecisi~-cf a c t a r i n t h e pmcurenent of v a l u a b l ~ .i n f a : i a t i o n . I t is of

u t i l o s t ir:ii>ortance, oir t h e o t h e r hand t h a t e . v e p a j e n c y kncu ud.iere t o

sen6 i t s rel;or'ts and tha-la.t it be i n s t r u c t e c l tl~a*oil@ilga s t o t h e s i t u a t i o n ,

t h e c o~:u:i.ando r ?s i n t e n t i c n and ab mi; & e n d i e s p ~ e v i o u 1

s :; s e n t out and t h o s e

adjacent +

137, i.:!issions ;iven r c c b n n a i s s a n c o agencr.corii:iandors riust be s:iar:>ly

d e f i n t d arld ti!!?:r r ~ i i c t s t a t e t h o s c p o i n t s ~ l h o s eestab1ishi:ients o r i c i c z t i f i c a -
t i o n i s t o bc: i n d o m d t i i c soqucncc of t h e i r i;lportancoi

138. Thc h i ~ i ~ oc or ~ x ~ a n d c rwho , orders an2 s p e c i f i c s t h e en-.lploy:~ont

of a i r and cround rccorin:iissancc a l s o r o g u l a t o s co:x:unication bctvocn t h c
txm. Hc ::ia:i a l s o or.<-i- s y ~ c i a l si[<ns. or sigriols. I n :;cnerji cor?;w.nico-
t i o n bc4u7- eon t h o t.x i s c s t c b l i o h c i l by nay of t h e hi-,her corrrczidcr. In-
!;c;dintc t r z n s n i s s io:: ol' co~i:unicationo b,,tT.joen tilo trio is an o x c c p t i o n
bcc.auso it i s d . i i ' f i a 1 . l i t o i s t c b l . i s h z.hcod of ti in^. t h o l~lC.cc, tho tint
2nd t h e k i n d of coiii,n:nication. As a ar;,:~i: agree:rielits a s t o d i r e c t com-
i:lunicatiox m u % bs 5mde b e f c r e t h e en:plo)~.~ento,^the agencies.

If t i ~ c r eis no a i r comma~ider on t h e s t a x , t h e cor!uamication

be b:e en t h e hhighe r comiiiXqd c r and tho a i r reconiiaisnance i s secured
tlrou,ch an a i r l i a i s o n c-i'f'icer. -Such l i a i s o n is e s p e c i a l l y important
-:~ben, because of t h e c ~ e a dt i s t a r ? c e oi' t l i e a i r p o r t , a lar~clingplace n e a r
t h e C.P. r n u s t be e s t k b l i s h e d . Such a landin;; placr: n ~ bet s u p p l i e d w i t h
t h e necessary personnel and means.

To t h e conlillander of t h e a i r reconnaissa.nce u n i t must be

given: (1)t i l e probable r o u t e s or t h e :;ro?~ndr e c o n a a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o r n s
o r w i t s , ( 2 ) tho mutt: 03: march of thc main fo-CCF,(0)and j)lanni?il
landirdi: p l a c e s , s o t h a t hc may inform the indivj.dual f l i e r s vihere our o;m
t--00.p~a y be found. 7 l i o r s and t r o o p s a r o bc instructed t o r e c q n i z e
zach o t h o r .

Occasioriallgr h i g h e r co.mandors may hold i n d i v i d u c l p l a n c s

a t t h u r inu;~cdiati.d i s p o s a i .

139. F l i e r s and r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o n s s e c u r e communication

t h o u g h l i g h t s ailti s i g n a l s , b:~ means or drop.pd message and p i c k up
s t a t i o n s . Radio n a y be used ii' it i s a t hanri a n d the r a i l i o s have the
s a m sending and r e c e i v i n g gossj b i l i t i c s .

As a m l e f l i e r s cannot i n s t - u c t reconnaissarice b a t t a l i o n s
concernin:: t!ie for e m s t ene:ly element s l:,hicl~ from t h e air a r e d i f f i c u l t
or' d e t e r m i n a t i o n .

1 0 . l'he h i g h e r conmlander deter:-nines the kind of co~niiluriications

t o be w e d b e t m e n r1otoi.ized and rrounted reconnaissancc battal.ions.
Moreover, connections ore t o b e e s t a b l i s h e d i ~ d e p e n 6 e n t l . ya n 2 a t every
o p p o r t u n i t y ; in i;he foyemoct l i n e by r a d i o . Upon meeting a l l rocoxmais-
sance a g e n c i e s should exchange 1 : i c r t h v~hilc:, i n f o r n a t i o n . A s t o i n s p e c t i o n
of r e p o r t s , s e e p a r . 100.

141. The quick and s u r e t r a n s m i s s i o n of roconnaissanco r e s u l t s up

t o t h e h k h e r c o m a i d e r r u q u i r e s tilorotgh r o p l a t i o n .

Report No. 14,578 '

kr~b
-21-

 Reports or f l i e r s n 0 r m a l . l ~a r e sltbmittod a f t e r t h e r c t u r n
t o tlic a i ~ d r o m cor iandinf; pla co. Ths:? a r c trar!sri&t26cd by phonc ,
~ , i o t o r i i c drcssm::crs, or c x c q t i o n a l l y by r a d i o . Undcr s p c i a 1 cirnlrn-
s t a i c o n tilo ohacrvo? milk3e a pcruonnl v i p o r t . Im?oratcnt olm.c:i-ts of t h o
r c c o n ~ o i s s ? a l c cs:io?lld be rcpor tod q u i c k l y ox3 bofor c: the o n t i r o rol:or C is
,
rcbAmittcd4 .is f o r t h c r o p o r t , it should h c writ t m i n c l e a r , concisc,
but compli:-to .i'omii Eo$)or.ts from thr: 131:lnc z?c> ncdo by r a d i o or droppcd
r,lesiicgos.

R e c o ~ n a i s ance b a t t a l i o n s , lack in^: an e x i s t i n ~ ;c o m u n i c a t ion

l i n e , employ t h e r a t i o o r m t o r i z e d r e s s e n g e r s . 1Iounted b a t t a l i o n s , i n
c a s e 4i' n e c e s s i t y , use mowted messengers. llo~lntedpatro1.s r e ? o r t , a s a
.?ule, Sy sea.= of mounted rc~essengers. iiotor
attached o a .
."
-
or L i c y c l i s t s may 50
r ~ i s t i n g .cornmunication f a c i 1 i t i . e ~shou1.d be u t i l i z e d .
Zspe cia1.ly Lmpor'tant mounted p a t r o l s may have r a d i o o r "Blinl;erl' equip-
men t a s s icgned.

B a t t l e reconnaissance r e p o r t s o f t e n a r e 0.f vallre only if t h e y

employer! .
can be employed i i ~ i i ~ e i r i a ~ t eLo
l y t h e g e a t e r e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e vmapons

1'5. Rccause? of t h e danger of i r ~ t e r c a p i ~ i otho

n unlimitei", o r very
extensive enp1o:mont d' tile r a d i o i n t k e reconnaissancu a r e a m.lst be
;:ovcrncd S y t h e hi:;,ier command. Should " r a d i o s i l e n c o " be orrlured, o Lhcr
;:leans of corm;ll.mication m a t 5e maintained t o g u a r a i t c c tile t r a ~ s m i s s i o n
f ti m.
of i ~ orina

3 Tho s t - a t c f ; i c a l rcconnaissanco crhibraccs t?13 olisorvation of

t k e h o s t i l c c o n c o n t r a t i o n , p r t i c u l a r l p h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o i ~by r a i l , h i s
ad~rancoo r roan-lard march, t h o l a d i n g or m l c c d i n @ of army c1cii:ont s ,
t h o c o n s t r u c t i o n of f i c l d or pormmlcnt f o r t i f i c e t i o r i s and t h c h o s t i l c a i r
u n i t c o n c c n t r a t i o n. 'Tho carl:! i d o n t i f ' i c a t i o n of l c r g o hoa t i l e mot o r i zcd
c l c ~ ~ si i, t cs:~oc i c l l y t h o s c on an open :'lank, i s impor-Lnnt.

Generally, t h e s t r a t e g i c a i a i r r e c o r n a i s s a n c e i s one of
photographs talcen a t a l t i t u c l e s betveen 5,000 and 8,000 mators. The depth
o f t h i s r e c onnaissanco may exter.d t o t h e l i m i t of the fli2:k.t range.

Slloilld !re n o t ex$ect an earl;. meeting rriTi-ih t h e eneiry o n t h e

ErOlmd, it n$y be s u i t a b l e t o draw upon t h e 3 z l y r e c o n n a i s s a n c e echelons
( a i r ) f o r s t r a t e g i c a l reconnaissance, t h e s e i n a d d i t i o n t o the s p e c i a l a i r
f o r c e echeloas. 'Tile a m > - ecke1c)ns have p l a n e s of l e s t range, l e s s speed,
l e s s r a p i d asccn t c a p a b i l i t y .

145. Independent mcto*.izeri r e c o r ~ l a i s s a n c eb a t , t a l i o n s and arrny

c a v a l r y a x employod for s t - a t e g i c a l ground j?ecm~nsissance. h q v c a v a l r y
i s w e d p r e f e r a b l y f o i open f l a n k 3 and i n d i r e c t i o n s 1-1hel.e i t s l a t e r
b a t t l e employment is probable.

146. The ~ r i i ~ c i psl eof s t r a t e g i c a l reconnaissance a r e iil general

tllcs c of t a c t i c a l ~ e c o n n a i s s a n c e .

Since? t h e missio rs ass ifpiid s t r a t e ~ i c a la i r recomtlissallce

a r e g e n e r a l l y l i c l i t o d t o t b e obaervation of important r o a d s and r a i l r o a d s ,
the. assi,pment of r o c o r a a i s s a n c o a r e a 6 s c l d o m . comes i n t o qucstj.011.

Rcp0i-t NO. 14,578.

brnb -22-
 As a r u l e , independent motorizei: t . l ~ c t a l i o i l oand army c a ~ i a l r u ~
a r e a s s i g g e d o n l y a diyec-tion and an o b j e c t i v e . If neceosar;, the!. :nag-
he assic.ned b m n d a - i e s on one o r b o t h flanlcs.

147. he t a c t i c a l reconnaissance er,l.braces t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n or

f i x i n g of the a c c e z b l y of t h e ~eneuyo r h i s ad-;axe as i t approaches near-
e r u s , h i s or;;anizatio~i, e i s t r i b u t i o n , e x t e n s i o n i n b-tadth and de:.th,
liio s u p p l y , h i s p o s o j b i l i t y of r c i n f o r c c m c n t , hi.n a i r s i t x i a t i o n , os-
.pcciaLiy as t o n(il:: aoi.rdrorncs, an6 hj.s nix dcfi:nse.

irnpor t a n t .
Timely r e p o r t s of h o s t i l e mo.tor.izod olcnLnis a r c very

Thc d(.,gth of tho t a c t i c a l r e c o n n ~ i s s a n c ed ~ p c n d supon t h o

s i t u a t i o n and t h o c a p b i l i - t i c s of t h c a g c i c i 3 s .

For t h e w2loymcnt of t i c t a c t i c a l rcconnaissancc a c e n c i e s ,

o s p c c i a l l y a s t o t h c i r d i r e c t i o n , t h e r e s u l t s o r t h e s t r a t o g i c a l rocon-

. ,
n a i s s a n c e should l.c u t i l i z e d providcd d e l a y s a r c not occasioriccd tt1.c roby.
Should t h i r i be no s t r o t c g i c a l r c c o n n a i s s a n c c , 'the t a c t i c a l rcconnais-
sancc agcncics rust kc s u n t fulrthcr t o ~ r a r d sand around t h e cncqf.

'The n c a r i r nr, apgroach t h e cnnily, tbi: .?lore is d o t a i l e d

rcconnaissan cc nu cc;srary.

14C. A i r t a c t i c a l reconnaiosance is executed by t h e reconnaie-

sance e c h e l o n s o f h e arm:..

T a c t i c a l round recom~aissa:r:ce is c';;ccuied by m.otorized

seconnaissar,ce bat tali or:.^ and by ~~ooimted

Arniy, Cavalry and. hi'an+;ry Uivi s i o n;; ) .

reconnaissar?ce b a t t a l i o n s ( o f

Note: Tile I r f a x t r y Division reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n as s e t

up a t p r e s e n t c o n s i s t s of: onc Cavalry Squadron. ( 4 n e r i c a n t r o o p ) , one

b i c y c l e cori~pail:r, one heavy r a c h i n e [,un p l a t o o n , oitl:.er pack o r f o u r horse

drat;nl., and periiaps a tau!: dei'ense p l a t o o n ( 3 tan!: d e f e n s e g u n s ) . The

mounted r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o n i s o r g a n i z e 3 t o provide t h e utinos t

t a c t i c a l mobility.

14.9. The &my commander and t h e Corps or Cwalr Gorp commander

einploy ilre reconiiaiuuance b a t t a l i o n s Lmnediatcl;~ under t h e i r coi~mand

;.
a a = , t h e cooperation of t h e s e -;rit11 reconl-,aissance f o r c e s of sub-

ordinate units.

The cava1r:r d i v i s i o n c m l a n d e r may exploy h i s motorized and

h i s lllounted reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n one behind t h e o t h e r , o r finploy h i s

mounted b a t t a l i o n t o t h e f r o n t and t h e motorize3 from one ring a g a i n s t

t h e 'flanl: of the enex-g. Arsy c a v a l r y 1iwtori::ed b a t t a l i o n s should be

uoed to t h e utmost so t h a t t,he mounted Fati-ali.ons ;nay be held t o g e t h e r

for battle.

150. The t a c t i c a l a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e is u s u a l l y Fade a t h e i g h t s

froin 2,000 t o 5,000 r ~ e t e r s .

.'is a r u l e , r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a r e a s a r e assi&ned t o t h e recon-

n & i s s a n c e echelons. For t h i s purpose i n d i c a t c a p l a c e s and l i n e s a r e

i n c l r ~ d e di n t h e bouildaries of both n u t u a l l y a d j a c e n t elenients, o r over-

lappire a r e a a a r e asci6;ned. Air boundaries a r e n o t dependent upcn t h e

boundaries a s s i g n e d ground troops. Echelons on t h e flard: a t t h e sme

time e x e c u t e recorulais sance a g a i n s t tile hos ti i e flank.

Roport KO. 14,578

 11. The o r d , . : ~z i v c n tlio c o m , ~ ~ ~ iof i o ~a - rcco:maissance a i r ,
cchelon 1;.1:? c o n t ~ i ni~ ildditio n to thc r!i.c;sic\rl: I n s t r u ~ c t i o n sa s t o :
(1) c o r n m ~ ~ i c a - nt i oan& iri'or:mtio n t r a n s n ~ i s s i o n t o t h o P:i@ii r casiia::der
r;na t o rccor!ilnissailcc b c t t o l i o n s , ( 2 ) s p a c i a l i-,:.;ssn~ed e l i v e r i e s , ( 3 )
t!u rout ? ( s ) of t h e naii-I. f o r c e and r o c o n ~ i o i s s a i ~ cbea t t - l i o n s titics
of a r r i ~ a lo r d 6 ; ~ m t u r c of t l l e s e e l e ~ c n t s ,cind ( 4 ) 1.ondi.l~pl.2cssi 'l'hc
ooijoion coammiai- o s s i ~ 3 st2si:s t6 Lhe v::rioiii: ,I':.ici-s : x d exlrl:$ns tkn
situation, ctc. s p c i f i o s tllc fl i i r s ) c : - l i a l z r &tii:s, dcciclcB
ux!or- tilo p1c;nc.s t o b~ cr:p:Loyci'~ 2nd t h o tlinos of i'li[,i!t. icorr!l.lly, t h e
riio-!- c'looscs t h e r o u t c r

1 5 . The r n c o n n a i a s a r c a i':Liers aa a r u l e are ai;>l~:~nflj5ili',iii~li,l:r

and a t t h o s e t i n e s d ~ ~ r i r i c.:hie!:
; tho n3n: favo;.able i . e s u ? ~ t sa r e t o ;:o
expected. T:?e-, i a.;oid a i r c o i n ~ ~ a t .;:e!co!inals :;ante arid a l laclr ( p u r s u i t )
p l a n e s r;ay b e des !%tclicd s i r ~ u l t a n c o u s l q .

153. C e ~ e r a l i y ,reco:;i~.aissance f l i e r s :::!oul.d be a s s i c l e d on17 one

l o n g , s t r e n u o u s ;'li:i;t ? o r r?ag-. A pl anc nag h e a!:lyloyed on a h w t ti-ips a
nuriber of ti;:les <all:-, i f %.ereb:r <:;?eater r e s t i s provided for o-Lker
crevis. Lecausc o; 2 . e l i m i t e d nimber. of ~ e c o ~ l i a i s s ~p lca en e s and Lecause
o t their manifolj iifi'icillt tas!:s, it is e s s e n t i a l t o enploy thsm
o n l y i n t h e r m n t iri:portant 6.irectio 11s , e!:lployin;, other a g e n c i e s ir. o t h e r
air ec t i o rs .
154. ?or gi-ouilc! reconnaissar;ce, ::u:let: o: i e s p o n s i b i l i t : . a r e
n o r n a l l j . a s s i ~ q e dtlie r:?conuaissmc o ):a t t a l i oils. I n or6 e r t o n&;e t,l!:le;:l
indcperidont o r t o T a c i l i t a t e t b i i r c:!ai~[;e of d i ~ c c t i o n ,the:: i . ~ gbe a s -
s i f W d l:lereljr a :ca~:orriaissance o b j e c t i v e . I n s:~::??ins.i;ances l i n e s of
s e p a r a t i o n nag- be [;iven betyiseil a d j a c e n t recoil: a:.ssmce u n i t s .

T h e b::eaCi,h of a 1-econnaissance zol'e is d e t c r r u n e d b y -the

L
i iua .'..ion,
.'
tl;e kiad and strc11stfi of the batta!.io:i, 1:3 t h e road n e t and
t s r r a i n . I n a t r o n ? zone vie aftei?
i:i>.~st 11-e ,:;aps betrrcen adjaceilt
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e -uni<is.

Si;:ests :.:ay not be used a r "di- isi ion l i r - e s '' o r ao boun?ary

l i i l c s . iiizil! s t r e ~ t 3o r roads :;hou.ld l i e i n tlic c c n t c r of a roconnais-
eance zonc,.

155. Cor~.bat vhic:? i s not n e c e s s a r y t o d r i v i r off of i i o s t i l e

reconnaiosance o r t h c gainir,.j of i n f o r i . ~ a t i o n , ~ i l o u l db e avoidca. Should
reconn?iusat;ce battall.o;is b c cr.~ployccl,cxca1:-bicnally, oil sccurit:.
15::s i o m , t11c:. silo:;ld b e , 9f n e c e s s a r y , adcquato:i:: and t i r ~ e l gr o i n f o r c e d .
A l l co1;-~.landi!rsa i c ~ e ! ; p 0 1 1 s i b l ~t h a t Che reco:l.-!uissaic n i s s i o n s do n o t
s u f f s r a s a ;.i.mlt of the? s i c u r i t > - n i s s i o n s .

1.56, TLi- order i s ~ u o 2 .u roconr~a%ssancs1 :attalion c o z t a i n s a s n

r u l e , i n add-ition .io -tho n i s s i o n , ( I ) - i ; ~ : ~of
e cle-nart~r::, ( 2 ) i n s t r u c t i o n s
conccm.ins a d j a c ~ n treconnaissance u~iit:j, ( 3 ) zo:~e o r direction, ( 4 )
o b j e c i ; i 7 ~ e , ( k ) :?c l l i i e t o be reached durinp; %!> day by p a t r o l s , ( 6 ) i n -
a t r u c t i o n s ? m ti~.:! tzanm.?ission of r o p o r t s iiic!.udi.ng t i c ; l o c a t i o n of
i!-mcdiatc. ob je-ti:es iiiiosc a t t a i m l t l t is %o hi: r c p o r t o d , ( 7 ) r x ~ d o rsor2@.i:
circiiix t u n c z s ti::!z~ r q o x . 1 ~aru tO b e u r l h n i t tud, ( 2 ) i n ~ t r u tci o n s al:oul
c v m tun1 c o i - i u n i c a t i o c i n ti1 f l i e r s , and ( 9 ) tirio oj' d c p r t u r c , r o u t s and
oL jcctivc: of tht? :-ia.i??fozci;.

Xnstructicjns a i to c o n d ~ ~
t cupon h o s t i l e c o n t a c t w:r? urith
t h o c i v i l i o l ~p o p u l a t i o n ao;i bc neccssar:r,

S i n i l a r l : ~c r 6 c r s a r c is slied t o patx,ols.
 157. When c o n t a c t with t h e enemy i s t o be expected, motorized recon-
n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o r i s advance nWmally by bounds. The l e n g t h of bounds i s
influenced by t h e form and cover of t h e t e r r a i n a s w e l l a s by t h e road n e t .
A s t h e d i s t a n c e t o t h e enemy d e c r e a s e s , t h e bounds a r e shortened. I f and how
t h e advance by bounds i s t o be p r o t e c t e d , depends on t h e s i t u a t i o n .

A l l elements of a motorized reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n u t i l i ~ er o a d s

and s t r e e t s a s l o n g a s possible. I n a h o s t i l e l a n d t h e r e t u r n must o f t e n be
made o v e r d i f f e r e n t s t r e e t s . P o i n t s a l o r g t h e r o a d s and towns which a r e im-
p o r t a n t f o r t h e movement must, i n c a s e of n e c e s s i t y , be secured.

I n o r d e r t o s e c u r e r e s t d u r i ~ i et h e ni;:hts, patrol:; may be s e n t

o u t a s s e c u r i t y f o r c e s . V i l l a g e s o r t o - m s on main highways a r e n o t recom-
merlded a s riormally s u i t a b l e f o r b i l l e t s o r bivouac.

158. I n g e n e r a l t h e b r e a d t h of zone f o r a lnotorized reconnaissance

b a t t a l i o n shoilld not exceed 50 k i l o m e t e r s (about 30 m i l e s ) .

The depth t o which t h e b a t t a l i o n i s employed must t a k e i n t o con-

s i d e r a t i o n t h e adequute supply of g a s o l i n e and o i l . I n o r d e r t o provide f o r
u n f o r e s e e n c i r c u m t a n c e s , a s u r p l u s of g a s and o i l should be reckoned.

The t o t a l c r u i s i n g range of armored motor v e h i c l e s i s between

200 and 260 k i l o m e t e r s (125 t o 150 m i l e s ) , without resupply..

159. P a t r o l s f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f reconnaissance a r e , according t o the

mission, t h e conduct of t h e enemy and the. a i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n , t h e roads and
t h e grobable message r e t u r n , c o n s t i t u t e d of armored c a r s , machine &wn motor
v e h i c l e s , and according t o negd, u o t o r c y c l e s . S t r o u g e r p a t r o l s a r e employed
a l o n g t h e more important r o a d s and a g a i n s t more important a r e a s . The com-
mander of t h e b a t t a l i o n normally sends o u t t h e p a t r o l s .

160. Routes and o b j e c t i v e s a r e g i v e n t h e p a t r o l s i n o r d e r s . Norinally

they cannot be u t i l i z e d f o r t h e c l o s e - i n s e c u r i t y o f t h e b a t t a l i o n o r t h e
u n i t from which s e n t . They advance by bounds from O.P. t o O.P.. Their
d i s t a n c e i n Pront of t h e b a t t a l i o n i s determined by t h 6 s i t u a t i o n , the t e r r a i n ,
and the range of t h e s i g n a l means. A s a ruln, t h e y precede by not more than
an h o u r ' s t r a v e l i n g d i s t a n c e .

161. The motorized r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o n s e r v e s a s a reconnaissance

r e s e r v e f o r t!ie > a t r o l s , a message assen15ly group and a s t h e g e n e r a l r e s e r v e
o f t h e reconnaissance element. When t h e g a t r o l s a r e a t a g r e a t d i s t a n c e i n
f r o n t of t h e b a t t a l i o n , t h e i r commnication t o t h e r e a r must be a s s u r e d ,
under c o n d i t i o n s through t h e advancing o f elements between t h e p a t r o l s and
the battalion.

Contact once gained r & t h t h e enemy i s maintained, i f necessary, by

t h e f u r t h e r emplojment of reconnaissance v e h i c l e s . hfotorcycles lnay ‘mil b e
employed t o thicken the reconnaissanee n e t .

162. When t h e n e a r approach of t h e enemy does not p e n n i t t h e f u r t h e r

p r o f i t a b l e employment of t h e motorized b a t t a l i o n it i s oiithdrann,and t h e
c l o s e r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e i s t a k e n o v e r by t h e mounted reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n .
The commander s o g o v e r n s t h i s t h a t t h e reconnaissaLce i s not i n t e r r u p t e d and
t h e h o s t i l e c o n t a c t i s not l o s t . Elements of t h e m t o r i z e d b a t t a l ' i o n may be
t e m p o r a r i l y a t t a c h e d t o t h e mounted b a t t a l i o n t o a s s i s t i t s a c t i v i t y .

Motorized r e c o n n a i s s ~ i n c eb c t t a l i o n s w i t h d r a w froni t h e f r o n t s h o u l t
be emJloyed t o r e c o n n o i t e r t h e f l a n k s and r e a r of t h e enemy o r t o s c r e e n a
ga) betwee>n elements of *he army o r h o l d behind t h e Pront a s a r e s e r v e .
 163. Mounted reconneissaiice b a t t a l i o n s must be sent out s u f f i c i e n t l y

e a r l y t o g a i n t h e i r d i s t a n c e i n f r o n t of t h e main f o r c e without h a s t e and

t o have a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l t h e time necessary f o r reconnaissance.

For t h e i r p a t r o l 8 t h e y form a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e ( p a t r o l ) r e s e r v e .
They advance by bounds, i n g e n e r a l avoiding t h e main r o a d s ; e s p e c i a l l y i f
they l a c k Vank o r armored c a r defense weapons they o n l y observe t h o s e main
roads. The less can t h e t e r r a i n be observed a t a d i s t a n c e , and t h e n e a r e r
t h e enemy i s presumed, t h e s h o r t e r mst t h e bounds be made.

164. m u n t e d reconnaissance detachments a r e formed by t h e hr;ay Cavalry

t o conform t o t h e m i s s i o n , t h e s i t u a t i o n and t h e t e r r a i n . The s t r e n g t h v a r i e s

between a p l a t o o n and tvm squadrons (U.S. t r o o p a ? ? r o x i m a t e i y ) ; i n s p e c i a l

c a s e s a c a v a l r y regiment ( 5 o r 6 squadrons) can be employed f o r r e c o ~ m a i s s a n c e ,

As ti r u l e b i c y c l i s t s provide t h e r a d i o means. Heavy machine Dins, moiior-
c y c l i s t s and t a n k defense weapons a r e a t t a c h e d according t o need. l r t i l l o r y
mag sometimes b e a t t a c h e d . But a s a r u l e it i s n o t s u i t a b l e t o d e c r e a ~ et h e
mobi.lity of mountsd reconnaissance detachments by adding l e s s mobile

alements. For t h i s r e a s o n i t may be recommended t o l e a v e t h e baggage

v e h i c l e s behind t e m p o r a r i l y and, if n e c e s s a r y , t o compensate f o r t h i s by

r e q u i s i t i o n e d v u h i c l e s &ich may b e abandoned i f necessary.

165. The zone assi,gned a o a v a l r y d i v i s i o n f o r reconnaissanc* Should n o t

exceed 50 k i l o m e t e r s i n breadtll if it i s t o be observed %horoughly and with-

out gaps. The numBer of mounted reconnaissance detachlnents employed i s

d e t e m i n e d by t h e breadth of tho d i v i s i o n zone. Should t h e eone excecd 50

k i l o m d t e r s , a n e f f o r t should be made t o gocure reconnaiasance i n t h e most im-

p o r t a n t d i r e c t i o n without gaps.

166. Zones a r e a s s i g n e d t o mounted rsconnaissanoe detachments c o r r e s -

ponding t o the m a d n e t . Tho zone assigi:ad a squadron (U.S. t r o o p ) should

i n g e n e r a l not exceed 1 0 k i l o m e t e r s . Squadrons s e n t out on independent

m i s s i o n s , l i k e w i s e p l a t o o n s and o f f i c e r p a t m l a s e n t out i n our. ovm l a n d , a r e

o r d i n a r i l y given o n l y a d i r e c t i o n and reconnaiasa'nce o b j e c t i v e . On such

m i s s i o n s can we seldom hope f o r r e c o n n a i ~ e a n c e without gaps.

167. The c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n commander must have t h e mounted d i v i s i o n

reconnairmdnne b a t t a l i o n f i r m l y i n h i s hand. I t s d i s t a n c e i n f r o n t of t h e

main bo4y of t h e d i v i s i o n i s dependent upon t h e conrmander's i n t e n t i o n s and

t h e a i t u a t i o n ; seldom w i l l it be more than 30 o r 40 k i l o m e t e r s i n f r o n t .

I n the employment of p l a t o o n s and independent o f f i c e r ' s p a t r o l s , consider-

a t i o n must be g i v e n t o t h e sending c a p a o i t y of t h e a t t a c h e d r a d i o s .

Generally mounted reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n s r e c e i v o d a i l y missions.

Should i t be p o s s i b l e t o a s s i g n a t one time t a s k s f o r s e v e r a l days, i t may be

a d v i s a b l e t o d i r e n t t h a t t h e b a t t a l i o n proceed on t h o f o l l o v ~ i n gday's t a s k

o n l y if no o t h e r o r d e r h a s been r e c e i v e d by a c e r t a i n t i m .

Mounted reconnaiasance b a t t a l i o n s r e s t d u r i n g t h e night away from

t h e main r o a d s , which, howevar, t h e y observe and block, so f a r a s necessary.

1 8 A message assembly c e n t e r may b e advanced mhen s e v e r a l mounted re-

connaiasance b a t t a l i o n s a r e employed. If t h e c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n changes i t s
march d i r e c t i o n , a message assembly c e n t e r i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e .

169. The d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n of t h e i n f a n t r y

d i v i s i o n depends upon t h e mission, t h e s i t u a t i o n , t h e commander's i n t e n t i o n ,
a a m l L au upon t h e b r e a d t h and depth of t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e area.

The d i v i s i o n noinmander a s s i g n s , i n g e n e r a l based on t h e Corps

o r d e r , t h e m i s s i o n s and d i r e c t i o n s Tor t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e . He determines i t s
d i s t a n c e i n f r o n t O f t h e d i v i s i o n , which i n g e n e r a l can he l e s s t h a n t h a t
Of t h e mounted reeonna.issance b a t t a l i o n of t h e c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n . (An in-
f a n t r y d i v i s i o n reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n i s composed o f : a squadron of
c a v a l r y , a b i c y c l e Company, a heavy machine gun p l a t o o n , and perhkps A
 p l a t o o n of tank defense guns) and p r e s c r i b e s any s p e c i a l t a s k . Should the
reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n of a d i v i s i o n marching i n one column be - a t t a c h e d t o
t h e advanced guard (which i s e x c e p t i o n a l ) t h e advance guard commander
a s s i g n s t a s k s and p r e s c r i b e s t h e d i s t a n c e i n f r o n t of t h e advance-guard.
These t a s k s a r e based upon t h e i n t e n t i o n s of t h e d i v i s i o n commander. The
s u b d i v i d i o n o f t h e d i v i s i o n reconnaissance bat"ta1ion and a l l o t m e n t thereof
t o v a r i o u s march columns i s t o be avoided. The fant t h a t ' o t h e r reconnaissance
a g e n c i e s may be o p e r a t i n g i n f r o n t of t h e d i v i s i o n does n o t r e l e a s e t h e d i v i -
s i o n connuandor f r o m r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s own reconnaissance. Should t h e r e
be no reconnaissance agency ( f o r example, motorized .reconnaissanFe b a t t a l i o n )
i n f r o n t . of t h e d i v i s i o n b a t t a l i o n , t h e o b j e c t i v e of t h e l a t t e r may b i
p l a c e d f a r t h e r forward. Yet, t h e connection w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n and t h e
message and o r d e r t r a h s m i s s i o n must be fissured.

Should t h e march b e execute4 on a broad f r o n t , p r e c a u t i o n s must

be taken t o a s s u r e the t i m e l y r e c e i p t of i n f o r m a t i o n by a l l column com-

manders.

Should t h e d i v i s i o n be i n c l o s e proximity t o t h e enemy it may be

r e c o w n d e d t o hold t h e reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n back and t o send out p a t r o l s
only.

170. The commander of t h e d i v i s i o n reconnaissanee b a t t a l i o n d i r e c t s

t h e execution of t h e reconnaissance and sends out t h e p a t r o l s . Should t h e

d i v i s i o n commander send o u t p a t r o l s , h e must inform th,e reconnaissanee

b a t t a l i o n commander of these' p a t r o l s and t h e i r missions.

Should t h e reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n commander r e c e i v e no in-

s t r u c t i o n s o r should he f i n d himself i n an unexpectedly changed s i t u a t i o n ,

he must execute t h e reconnaissance i n t h e manner he b e l i e v e s t h e d i v i s i o n

commander would d e s i r e .

171. The commanders o f mounted reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n s must have

t h e i r p a t r o l s w e l l i n hand; Close O b j e c t i v e s (10 t o 1 6 k i l o m e t e r s ) , well

d e f i n e d and l i m i t e d missioGs, and r a p i d advances from a r e a t o a r e a a r e

p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s f o r s u c c e s s f u l p g t r o l m r k . Through p a t r o l s a l r e a d y i n

c o n t a c t , as w e l l a s through t h e t i m e l y employment of new p a t r o l s , c o n t a c t

gained w i t h t h e enemy must be maintained.

I n o r d e r t o conserve t h e s t r e n g t h of p a t r o l s , it may sometimes be

a p p r o p r i a z e t o t r a n s p o r t them on t r u c k s while t h e y remain a p a r t of t h e

b a t t a l i o n and b e f o r e t h e i r employment as p a t r o l s .

7 The s t r e n g t h o f p a t r o l s i s determined by t h e i r m i s s i o n , t h e

conduct on t h e p a r t of t h e enemy.and t h e c i v i l p o p u l a t i o n . The number of

messages probably t o be s e n t back must a l s o be c o n s i d e r e d . We must always

remember t h a t t h e l a r g e r t h e p a t r o l , t h e l e s s e a s i l y c a n ~ i to p e r a t e

unobserved by t h e enemy. A second i n command should normally be desig-

nated.

The p a t r o l s may be u t i l i z e d t o s e c u r e t h e b a t t a l i o n . P a t r o l s
u s e a s l o n g a s p o s s i b l e t h e e x i s t i n g r o a d s and advance by bounds from O.P.
t o O.P.

1 7 3 . Under t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e mounted reconnaissanae b a t t a l i o n

t h e i n d i v i d u a l arms send forward such reconnaissance elements a s may be
n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e l a t e r and t i m e l y employment of t h e s e arms. The com-
mander o f t h e reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n should be g i v e n i n s t r u c t i o n s
concerning t h e s e reconnaissance p a r t i e s , which may be t e m p o r a r i l y a t t a c h e d
t o the battalion.

174. B a t t l e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a s a r u l e i s begun when t h e t r o o p s begin

t o develop.

.Often i s i t f e l t a s one draws n e a r t h e enemy t h a t t h e n e c e s a i t y

for s e c u r i t y is g r e a t e r t h a n t h e need f o r reconnaissance. Every commander
must be watahfbl t h a t t h e reconnaissance i s not n e g l e c t e d i n o r d e r t o a r r i v e
a t greater security.
 1 7 5 . With t h e beginning of t h e b a t t l e reconnaissance t h e mounted recon-
n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o n s which a r e i n f r o n t must be i n s t r u c t e d whether they
s h a l l evacuate t h e f r o n t and r e c o n n o i t e r the h o s t i l e f l a n k s o z whet'ner they
s h a l l c o n t i n u e i n t h e i r zone, occupy important t e r r a i n p o i n t s and be
absorbed by t h e main f o r c e o r whether they s h a l l withdraw on t h i s f o r c e .

Should t h e reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n r e c e i v e no o r d e r s it remains

b e f o r e t h e f r o n t , f u r t h e r executes r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , s c r e e n s t h e advancing
main f o r c e and r e t i r e s only when f o r c e d by t h e enemy. Mounted recon-
naissance b a t t a l i o n s z a t u r n normally t o t h e u n i t s from which t h e y were s e n t .
D i v i s i o n reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n s of i n t e r i o r d i v i s i o n s a r e wi-thdrawn
behind t h e f r o n t a f t e P t h e i r t a s k s a r e f i i l f i l l e d .

If a mourited reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n i s employed On an open

f l a n k , if p o d s i b l e , it should b e echeloned forward.

176, The b a t t l e Peconnaissam2e by..avfa*toPs s h a l l pyovide i n f o r i m t i o n

about t h e h o s t i l e f o r c e d i s t r i b u t i o n , namely h i s a r t i l l e r y , h i s bivouecs

and movements, of r e s e r v e s , of t a n k s and of s p e c i a l occurrences behind

the front. They observe t h e course of t h e b a t t l e .

I n g e n e r a l b a t t l e reconnaissance i s executed under 2,000 meters.

Reconnaissance a t low a l t i t u d e s i s n e c e s s a r y if d e t a i l s a r e t o he i d e n t i f i e d
and t h e advance of our own and t h e h o s t i l e i n f a n t r y i s t o b e observed.
The t r o o p s must on r e q u e s t i d e n t i f y themselves t o our a v i a t o r s by p a n e l s ,
signals o r lights.

The execution of our a i r b a t t l e reconnaiasanoe i s t o a g r e a t

e x t e n t dependent upon t h e a i r s i t u a t i o n . Not o n l y must it be s u p p o r t e d

by our a n t i - a i r c r a f t , but o f t e n by p u r s u i t p l a n e s .

lV7, Observation from c a p t i v e b a l l o o n s complements t h e b a t t L e recon-

n a i s s a n c e . The employment of c a p t i v e b a l l o o n s may be l i m i t e d by h o s t i l e

a i r a c t i v i t y and t h e range of t h e h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y . I n q u i e t and c l e a r

weather it i s p o s s i b l e t o i n v e s t i g a t e the b a t t l e f i e l d tiioroughly and t o

s e c u r a , by means of photographs, .an e x c e l l e n t p i c t u r e of c o n d i t i o n s .

Captive b a l i o o n s provide an e x c e l l e n t means of watching t h e f r o n t .

c o n t i n u o u s l y , of o b s e r v i n g h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y f i r e , i t s s t r e n g t h and e x t e n t ,

and of o b s e r v i n g our o m forward e l e ~ n e n t s . T h e i r moat. important employment

i s i n the s e r v i c e of our o m a r t i l l e r y .

17% The commander (Truppenfuhrer) can o r d e r t h e boundaries and o f t e n

t h e o b j e c t i v e s of t h e ground reconnaissanea of h i s s u b o r d i n a t e u n i t s . Xvery
u n i t , without speoj.al o r d e r , i s r e s p o n s i b l * f o r t h e b a t t l e reeonnaisnance
w i t h i n t h e zone a s s i g n e d f o r i - t s march, i t s davelopment and b a t t l e . Every
u n i t w i t h a n open f l a n k is l i k e w i s e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r f l a n k reconnaissanne.

Should t h e reconnaissansa elenients s t r i k e h o s t i l e r e s i s t a n c e

through which t h e y cannot br,ak through o r envelop, they must e i t h e r he
r e i n f o r e e d s u f f i c i o n t l y t o push t h i s f o r c e a s i d e o r t h e main f o r c e must
t a k e over tile reconnaissance. O r d i n a r i l y b a t t i a reconnaissance dttmilds
a c o n c e n t r a t i o n of f o r c e and a u n i f i a d employrnent of t b f o r c e s , whinh
a t t a c k tKith a l i m i t e d o b j e o t i v a a t t h e a r e a most important t o t h e e x e c u t i o n
of t h e ground reconnaissance.

Sometimes .small mountel3 o r i n f a n t r y p a t r o l s h e l d i n r e a d i n e s n

by t h e commander and employed suddenly can q u i c k l y s e c u r e d e t a i l s of enemy
d i s p o s i t i o n and conduct.

Should p a t r o l s be employed a t n i g h t , t h e y must he i n s t r u c t e d

s u f f i c i o n t l y e a r l y t o b e a b l e t o make r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s and p l a n s d u r i n g day-
light.
 179. B a t t l e reconnaissance r e q u i r e s time. Therefore f o r e s i g h t i s
e s s e h t i a l i n o r d e r t o s e c u r e t h e advantage of e a r l y employment. and informa-
tion. Thorough c o n s i d e r a t i o n must be given t h i s need of time f o r b a t t l e
r e c o m a i s sance.

180. The b j t t l e reconnaissance of t h e i n d i v i d u a l neapons m r v e s t h e i r

p a r t i c u l a r needs. Often it can b e executed during t h o t a c t i c a l rcconnaissnnc

The r a p i d exchange of informution and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n botween

clements and w i t h neighboring u n i t s , a c c e l e r a t e d r o p o r t s o f important i n f o r -
mation s e n t t o t h c h i g h e r commanders who f o r t h e i r p a r t must provide f o r
t h e d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n f u r n i s h e d them, m c u r c s ' a r a p i d e v a l u a t i o n
o f t h o reconnaissance r c s u l t s and u s a b i l i t y f o r a l l arms.

The b a t t l e reconnaissance oxtonded by t h e i n d i v i d u a l a r o a i s of

g r e a t e r meaning i f t h e a i r reconnaissance i s i n s u f f i c i e n t o r i s not p o s s i b l e
and t h o s p e c i a l reconnaissance means f o r ground reconnaissance a r c exhausted.

781. The b a t t l c rcconnaissancc must of(;cn simultaneously scrvc as c l o s e

s o o u r i t y and t o r e c o n n o i t o r t h o t e r r a i n ( f o r oxampLo: approach avonuos and
possibilities, a r c a s covorcd' a g a i n s t cnemy o b s c r v a t i o n and f i r c , o b s c r v a t i o n
p o i n t s and f i r i n g ' p o s i t i o n s ) . If possiblo, o t h c r f o r c e s should bo omployed
f o r t h e s o purposcs.

B a t t l o r e c o n n a i s s m c o can a l s o i d o n t i f y our ovm f r o n t l i n o s .

182. ~bs*cr&ion of t h c b a t t l c f i o l d b y commmdcrs of a l l grades o r by

o s p o c i a l l y designated o f f i c c r s i s an c s s o n t i a l cloment of b a t t l o rcconnais-
sanco.

183. O f g r o a t valub 'is t h e 'observation of t h o b a t t l o f i o l d by t h o

o b s c r v a t i o n b a t t a l i o n (F.A. ). I t s obscrvors a r c o f t o n i n p o s i t i o n t o givo
o a r l y important information t o t h o oommander. Likowiso during t h c course
o f t h o b a t t l c a r o t h c y a b l o t o securo important i n f o r m a t i o n through t h e
a c t i v i t y of t h c f l a s h ranging battory.

-
~ n t c l l ~ g e n ct he r o u g h s p e c i a l 1,feans

184. The a i r r c p c r t s e r v i c c obscrvcs t h e h o s t i l e a i r a c t i v i t y and

t h e r c b y s c c u r e s important information f o r t h e estimation o f t h e a i r s i t u a t i o n
It can d c l i v o r worthwhile observations vrhich sorvc a s an i n d i c a t i o n of
h o s t i l c i n t e n t i o n s , cvcn bcforc hostilities a r o bogun on t h o ground.

. 185. Tho i n t c l l i g o n c c reconnaissanco of t h o s i g n a l t r o o p s i s a s s u r c d

by o b s ' o r m t i o n o f t h e h o s t i l o s i g n a 1 , t r a f f i o b o t h i n t h e a i r and on t h o
ground. For. t h i s purposo listening posts, t r o o p s t o sock out' h o s t i l c
"BJillkcr len~p"use, and t h e t a p p i n g o f h o s t i l c ifsircs a r c uscd. This -work
r c q u i r c s u n i f i e d l c a d c r s h i p , c s p o c i a l l y t r a i n e d o p e r a t o r s and secrccy.

186. I n our o m l a n d r-m c a o q o n sc.cure vmrth~vfiilei n f o m t i o n by

my of tolcphonc o f f i o c s l o c a t o d i n t h o d i r o c t i o n of t h c cnomy, oven though
i n a rouhd about m y . T h i s may o f t e n s a ~ cth o omploymcnt of roconnaissancc
agoncio s.

In our own l a n d we may o c c a s i b n a l l y omploy agrccd upon v i s u a l

and a u d i b l c t o k c n s t o sccuro i n f o m t i o n .

In a f o r c i g n c o u n t r y roconnaissanco agoncibs can o f t o n sccuro

i n f o r m a t i o n by c u t t i n g i n on p u b l i c tolcphonc t r a f f i c ,

187. Tho h o s t i l o p r c s s i s t o bo obscrvod. Tho h i g h e r commaador i s s u c s

s p e c i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s concorning t h i s .
 138. ITnif'ir?il re&,xlai,+c~;?sa r e requ3,rod f o r t h o Exnmi:..mation of priaonern
and t h e ovriluation. of cq7turcd ytipnrs ( o r d e r s , n:aps, pay and mcncrnnclm
bon:;s, l e t t e r s , newspa:ors, yic-!;ur<!s, r o l l s of f i l x l s e t c . , - # ~ h i c h
a r o found
on p r i s o n e r s , on woundod, on pi;;eo::r., on nie;;sci~~;er docs, i n villages, i n
7osi:t;iorm , i n c ~ y t u r e dv s h i o l e s , plaxds, hal.lcons, c b c , u11d these rxnst h e
protected z p i n s t d c s t r u c t i s n ) . Sp':ciall.y $t?locted c i ' f i c c r s must bu prc-
a c n t f o r -the cxami.imtion elf prisonor;;.

BE-tcr n s k o r t cxam?n:~+:io!z,'rhich l i m i t s i t : : o l f t o t h o friu,!odia-La

co;nbu.t s i t u a t i o n , and c a n t u r ~ dpapcrs a f t e r a b r i e f i n s p o e t i o n a r c t o . bo
d a l i v c r c d v i a t h e s k o r t c s - t r o u t e t o tile licaclqur~rtars:of t h c coiil~~iu~tdcr.

Capablc and quiolc i n d i v i d u a l oxninination of prisoners i.u o f

gro:lt W&uo. This cxaminc.tion cndc a v o r s t o i d r n t i.f y 'thcir orcan j.eatic.n,
neighboring t r o o p s , whzit t h c y lm-cnq of l a r g e r u ? l i t s , <;ha :lam> of L l ~ c i r
concundc:, +hc l a s t b i v o ~ a i c , t h marcil ~ o r mcans of t r r ~ n . i p o r t , h e c o n d i t -
i o n oi' t h e i r u n i t s , t l l c i r !20rale, t h e i r ~ a i s s i o na s ~ v c l l .a s any s p c c i n l
ivcapn; or m:nni; Y:xlc:y E~ail. 'The cq1o:m.on.t of f o r c e is nY:t i c ~ ; n l l . ypor-
mi.ttcd. P ~ p i ? r s ,% rii;h t h o r:::co;,tion of t l i O s ~c o n t n i n i n g ~:~$xttr:r::of mi1:itnyj
o r , % r e r c t u r n c d t o t h e :>ri::on-rs a f t o r t h n y iz:ivc b w n scruti.i:ii.zod,

Thc uanics of k.illi:;ij ::.s w c l l an tllo nr?n>cr of t h a uui.L and Lhc

i n s i g r d a -::urn uru t o ?lo i c l ~ n t i f l c d .

109. Thc u t t c r u n c e s of i : t a n t nrovidc ~ v o r t l v ~ h i li!lf c ormction.

r,.
i n c sc::.rc:x of r!:ilrocd st,.tion:i, p s t ofr'icc;~ ?ifid si$?.:~r o;'ficcs 3n:iy
produco .tcl..;gr.a;ns w i t h m.ilit2.ry coi-xt:ii:ts, codo::, 2nd c!:all. sif:::i::ls c t c .
O f f i c i c l co:miunl.cai;iens rn-21 t;ivi; i i : l r ~ o r t ~ ~
i nl ft o r x . t i c n . P:.:r+i~e~xl~:rlyin
G p~~.r:i!:it cnzi w3rthwhij~c i.nf or-n:~ti.i ;m bc sr!cu~,sd.ns inc!icr.tod iii t h i s
p:~~lj;rc.ph.

190. T'nc enemy w i . l l -LC;< t o ~ . ~ jnfori:izti.on

i)i i n : rr::,ni:cr oimi.l.r t o
.ti-3r.t cinploycd 527 us. Tho s t r i c t c s i ; sup!?ri.i-iicndrncc i s ncccss:.~ry b o t h i:l
t h c hoincl~ild;?n,! n t tho frc>zi;. 7;-TcIDUS?; ?Ll,?oc?.~-~A?~lj.y vr:~.tci~.t;hc .v:~r?o~xs
inc:'.as of hosti.l<; prop:!.~,;l?.?. :?..nd t h e c~xl;.lirric,c.iri.;:nl i i t ' i l f i b ? pcqx,l,l:%.';,in~~
of
'Lhc hostile- l z n d i n %!: cr~dc:,~rort o inf'j.!~r.nc(:n7.w t r o o p s .
h cr.rcft~::lj plcnncd dcf;;~:sr; :1s:rinst csu'.ut~::,yc ;?u3.f: iic in.6titi1tod
by t h e h i g h cco;i."?c.nd. For t h i n purpose t h e sc::!:<;t, fic1.d p o l j c c arc! ct Lhc
cormiiimdcr's disposr.1. Idor .os-or it %s the d u t y of t h o -I;roopS Lo proL;:ct
t,hornsclvcs, ~ ~ p c : c i : . l l ?ii ; ~ b ivouac o r h i l . l c i ' , 57 t h o ccntin~~.ou::o h s w v a t i o f i
of susplc-ioz6 pi,rsonk;, bg 0-ut'ion i n cor~r~0r~::ti:;rland tolc:s*loi?c J ' communj.cat-
ion, by sccuri-by of tho rcij3ilc>.tions:.nd u r i t t c i : nritt,::r Ln t k ~ r > ~ , ? ~ r i c , x :
" c c d q u t r t c r s e t c . i i l l 01,sc;:rvi:;klons nirdc shoul.6 b i r c p o r t c d imoBi:.;i;cly t o
a." coc,rct p o i i c c -nd, r , l ? p!:rso:is surr;cctcd 0.f cspio:?::gi: soi.zod nr,d I;:~kc!n
t o t h e policc.

1.92. Disdro-tioh i o iriili:;ponsi%lo o;x 'th: p n r t of b o t h cc:aumndcrs ~.n&

troops. I n thiic rcs;oct urn.%iguQgs i g n c l com:mnicx'iions roq..z!.r:: ~ugcr.~?iioi.ori

Unilor c u r t c i r , conditlc-ns loti;t:rS r.7j.lst 'k cirns0r~:8. h ? ; t o r s mriay

cor.ta4n no aht.konionta :is t o t h o situ-.tion, t r o q d i . . ; t r i b u t i c i l c r c,i13f s p o c i a l
p a i n t s of vnl:a- t~ tiic o,qoiay. Rcgulatinns g o ~ o r n i ~thi; g f i c l d nont o f f i c e
s ~ r v i c e;)rsv!.d~ f.ir ~ u p c i v i ; i o r ~of thr: l c t t c r tr:.f Sic.

193. P o s t s r n and d:r,i::iVL*"io:1s: n r c b ~ s toi:Af:ted rroin k i i l l c t s , s11oul.d

.they bc uscd, t h c y ::hould bcr.ccmovcti b s f o r c d c p u r t u r c thcrcfrcm. n l ~ r k c r s
on vchj.clcs :ir.d t r a h ~ s:>.ro n l s o t r o a c h c r o u s . Th-csc mcrkor:; n c y bc tcmpor-
c r i l g covcrc:d.
 T i r i t i ~ g swhich a r c no moro of usc should hc: burnod. 1!!fhcn t h o
b i l l e t i s .cv:~cu::tcd. cvcrytlling, cvcn clocumcnts o f t h c ~ L i g n t c s t.~r.luc,
khi~v:ld bc tukcn. Supcrvisior, of th'is work i s nccpssary.

194. Rocenrlaiscancc and s c c u r i t y f o r c c c u n d ' t h c advanccd clcmcnts i n

conbat s h a l l h ~ ~ nr oc kiiid of c r d c r , w r i t i n g o r r c g u l n t i c n which >nay bc of
-..luc t o t h c cncny. I n s o f a r a s it i s :tbsclutcly ncccss::~ry For r c c o n n a i s -
suncc agcncico t o 5.avc w r i t t c n a r d o r s o r mzps w5.th n c t n t i o n s . t h c r c o n and
t h c s c cannot bc k e p t s o a s t o be v a l u c l ~ . s st o th;: cncmy, it i s t h e i r d u t y
t o u c s t r o y t h c s c o r d c r s o r maps whcil danger of c a p t u r c n r i s c s .

IV. S c c u r i t y

195. S c c u r i t y mc:surcs c r c cmplcycd t o providc a g a i n s t s u r p r i s c c t t a c k

a s ~ 6 0 1 1 2s t o l i m i t h o s t i l o o b s c r v n t i o n . b o t h on t h e ground and froin t h e
a i r . lElhcrc t h c s c mc::~surcs a r c c m ~ l o y c dp r i n a r i l y agr.inst cbscrvc.tion, t h c y
s c r v c a l s o t o scrcon.

S c c u r i t y i s noccssary d u r i n g r o s t s , d u r i n g mcvcjncnt and t o a

l c s s c r dcgrco d u r i n g b a t t l c . lis t h o dist-nco froin t h o cncmy dccrc~ascs
s c o u r i t y i n g c u a r a l i s d i r c c t o d primr!.rily a g z i n s t t h e cncinv on t h c ,ground.
I n b a t t l c t h e Bird and 2mou:nt of s c c u r i t y mt:asurcs a r c dctcrminod by t h o
s i t u a t i o n . Undcr no c c n d i t i o n s s h a l l t o o g r c a t c t t c r i t i o n t o sccurit:r
mc:tsurcs mnkc l o s s l i k e l y thc. f u l i ' i l lmcnt of t h c ~ n i s s i a n .

For t h c r c l s t i o n bckccn s c c u r i t y znd rcconnzissancc s c c nnra-

gr.:ph 125.

197. Sccuriicy a g n i n s t cir a t t a c k i.s ?.ccumplishod b y mc::>.ns of p u r s u i t

( 3 L Lack) z.vii:L1011 iir~d~ r i t l - : : i r c r a f t wx.pons,
by ordvrs of t h c h i g h e r
oom~nandcr s p e c i f y i n g incasurc:s t o 50 t c k c n :is - t o d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h c t r o o p s
and c!imcuflngc, by u t i l i z i n g d:!.ricnoco f o r t h o march and o t h c r novcmonts
and by t h c cmplo)y~cnt of a l l a i r dcfonsc ncnsurcs on t h c p a r t of a l l troops.

158. S c c u r i t y :>g:inst t h c ground cneixy i s i n goncr?.l procurcd by sond-

i n g c u t +:I f r o n t of t h c t r o o p s t o be sccurcd sr;i;-.ll u n i t s whj.ch mtlintain a n
i n c r c a s o d st:,.tc of ro::dincss. Undcr ccrt:;in c o c d i t i c n s t h o majn t r o c p s
t h c r ~ s c l v c sm.y assurmc n grc?.tcr st::.tc of rcc.d;incss.

Thc s t r e n g t h , coilposition 2nd c r g c n i e c t i o n of t h o , s o o u r i t y f o r c c s

dopond upon the s i t u c t i o n , t h c intention, t h o t o t c l strength., t h e d i s t a n o o
f r o n t h c cncliy, t h c t c r r n i n 2nd t h e dcgrcc of v i s i b i l i t y . So f a r n s
p o s s i b l e , t a c t i c a l u n i t y should bc prcscrvcd i n t h c s c fcrcctl uscd f o r
security.

During rcst p c r i e d s , l z r g c r u n i t s s c c u r c tliensclvcs, i n s o f a r ns

locc.? s c c u r i t y i s inadcq.!n-to b y o u t ~ o s t sor b a t t l e o u t p o s t s ; during c.
rx?.rc!i, by adTi,?.ccc guards; i t ? . r~:tircmcrrt o r rotrc:si: by r0F.r g d s r d u : ir.
f l a r ; k , vthcn ::cccss:-.ry, by fl?.nlc guards.

Morcovcr, c r c r y mit r o q u i r c s c l c c c - i n s c c i i r i t y . This may bc

ordcrod Ln curnmn f o r s c v c r t l ur.i.ts.

199. S o c u r i t y s c r v i c o ir!crcascs t h o dcmnds upon t h o t r o o p s . Thcrcfor

no morc f o r c o should bo uscd f o r t h i s purposc t h - n i s absolutely r c q u i r c d .
 202. R c s t i n g - t r o ~ p scs';?blj.sh o.1 t h e greu.n.d ouipos-ts nr ba%tli; out-
D G S ~ O , dcpciidin.g upon tile diiercc of t h e 2silgcr.

Outposts r c p c l ;:t:invr z t t - c l r s , prs.lco-!; t h o x.i;>~

body f r x d i s -
.%Pa",r~ccs cnd s r c u ~ - ct o it tlic tiixc nccoss-ry t o nrcpcrs f o r b z t t l c o r
c h Tlicydc~ljrh a s t i l o i.nsigb.t i n t o t:lc disposiLi.oiir: <!kc., of t h o ].inin
body,

B a t t l o o u t p o s t s a r c c s t ? b l i s l ~ c dwhen p ' t i c l o r con?>lo.i:c:l?.ttlc

r e a d i n e s s o n t h o p a r t of t h o r c s t l i l g t r o o p s j.s . r i t i c i p ? t c d . Thcy p r o t o c t
t h c i m c d l a t c ndv-i;cc i n t o b - t t l o of t h c clcr:icr~ls prcy::rccl f o r b n t t l c ;
othcrvrl.sc t h c i r t n s k i s t h 3 s f oubposts.

Ou-tposts and bs.tt1.c out.nost.: r c c i x ~ n o ~ . t o io!ily

" n o kil- as t h o
8ccuri.ty of tho r c s t i n g t r s n p s rcquii*c;s. F u r t l ~ o rroeei?;iaissn~?.cci s u
x ~ z t t c rt o bo c c ~ o ~ n p l i ~ iby
i ~ ro?t h c r I;i-oaps n1id crdirc11 b y tho cc~t..mndcr.

201: Ilon t h o vnriour, t r s k s 2 r e t o bc 2.cconpl.ishcd cz.oh s i t u z t i o ~n u s t

dotchino. It i s fcn:;ibln .to s t z t c onljr g c n c r n l pri::ciplc$.. Outposts nnd
b a t t l o o ; ~ t p o s t scxccutc t h c i r ~?issFnilr i'? zccords:lcc w i t h cnc!i i n d i v i d n a l
s i t u a t i c n . Thc narc unclcrifi.cZ t h e oiic.-!y s i t u u l i o u , tlic ;icrc c::.rcfully
rLust -the so c u r i t y prcporc i.tsc1.i' t o cou;::;or h i s v:.ricus poss i:)l.c ackious .
202. P r o t e c t e d s e c t o r s make t h e s e c u r i t y eas i c r and eria'~lc y o t c c t ' l o n
t o be secured w i t h wsalrer f o r c e s , ' ~ v h c r cc d i n i s s i h l c , t h e t r a i n s and n c r v i c e
clemc!l'ts should bo bivcuacliod h c h i r ~ dshc1.tercd (by na,t?tural f i ; n i u r o s )
terrain.

Unguarded aud,ope31 f lnnks m l s t bc protr,ctcd. Accord: ng t o t h o

oircCmsta~iocsthe fl a r k m y be curvoc! bacbrard, mpy b c ocl~cloncd.t o t h e
r c n r , o r :;icy be p r o t c c t o d b y specially dcs ignatcd u n i t s . ? r o t c o t Lon of
t h o rc2.r m.y a l s o bc ncciissary.

Obstsclcs ind f i e l d f o r t i f ic-tionr -re ruitc.blc ?:ncm.~sof r o i n -

f c r c i ~ l gt h e scc:lrity.

'on ~ixustbc paid t o dcf c n r c i

Spcci:rl .:i-t~kcnt t urmorcd
v c ! ~ i c l c sand -tai?.ks.

203. Dur'~ng t h e d-t:f zarl ovci. norL s o 23; ,.light : ~ r ct r o o p !novornciits,

np:irt from thcs:. i n 5ci.:Ic, o o s c n t i a l l y t;.cd t o tiic s t r c c t s .

It comcs as 3 !xt , C Y of pr,;fori:ncc ';a occupy and block t h o s i

s t r c c t s 1 o z d i . n ~from t h o dj.rcc-tion of tlic cncmy 2nd t h o s e 1c:adirrg from t h e
opcn fla,lks. During t h o 2z;r and. w i t h good obscrm:tioil i.t g l l i nornmlly bc
s u f f i c i c z t 'lo occupy coaxc,jirl:a: t o r m i n ~ i i t ' i rgcod f i c l d s of f i r o . Thcso
p o i n t s from which t h o onolnji can scourc obsorv?.:.ion ovcr our avn .troops
s h o ~ l da l s o h c occupied.

In t o r r a i r . i n wbticki v i s i b i l i t y i s cot; good, during inclc:nont

wcctthcr !znd dur+.ng dcrk~e:;, s t r o n g o r s a c u r i t y f o r c c s a r c rioccsscry. Loss
d e p t h t o t h o s c c u r i k y u n i t s c,lzd c l o s o r p r o x f n i t y t o t h c m5.n body my bc
r,cccssory.

ah. A l l s u c ? j r i t y clc'!~cn.t;; m ~ s tsock c c n c c a l ~ ~ . e nfrom

t bo+!i a i r und
ground ' . ~ o s t i l oo b s o r v a t l c n .
 205, Every c f f o r t i s t o be m-tic t o s o c u r c r a p i d rind rol-iab1.c cmmun-

i e a t l o n bct~r?cc!nolcx(:nts or" our c m scjcurity f o r c o s , t o t h e ~ . e ~ g h i i o r i n g

s c c u r i t y c1urncni;s ciid t o t h e rrcstiug i;roopo.

206. Zccli sc;curity conurin~idprotects. l . t s c l f by qcizns of s e n t r i e s , t h c

~ u n i b e r of which, var,i.cs :'.cco?di.ng t o need.

207. S c n t r i c s , cossack p o s t s , s e n t r y squa&s, p n t r o l u of c v c r y kind

r c n d c r ilo for?nal c o u r t c s i : ? s i n s ~ c u r i t ys u r v i c o i Thcy r c p o r t t o t h c i r
s c n i o r s w i t h o u t i n t e r r u p t i n g t h c i . r observation.

208. R c l i c f of c l i s c c a r i t y c l r ~ n c n t si s nnclc simply a.nd q l ~ i c t l y . A l l

inform.*i;icn or' x l u c i s tr::nstni.tted t o t h e now coz:inndc;r, who i s t o b c
i n s t ' r ~ i c t c da s t o t h c t i - r m i n . During t h c r c l i c f , t h o s e c u r i t y n u s t be
grzntcd.

209. An nttt?ck ?nust i ) i r d a l l clc!ncr~tsof t h e s c c : ~ r i . t yf o r c o s i n f u l l

r c a d i n c s s . Thcy must bc prcpcrcd f o r ovcry sacrifice .in o r d e r .to accomp-

l i s t t h c i r mission, t h e s o c u r i t g of t h c r c s t i n g troop^.

210. iiir dcfcnsc f o r t h o r.:sti:lg t r o o p s i s i n ilccordancr w i t h pnra-

graphs 662 iind 696. Tho security forccjs racy be j.ncludcd i n t-hc gc1:crc.l
a i r 6cfcnsc s c c u r i t y :nc?.surcs. But t h c y cirs r c s p o g s i b i i . f o r t h c i r ovm
s c c u r i t y ix?asuro.s n g - i n s t h o s t i l e a i r u n i t s , t11c inost import;inl; xfii;nsu.ra
b c i n g c - ~ m u lngc
f .
Outposts

211. Tho d c c i s i c n of t h e ocnmandcr ss t o t h c c~rc:: i n ii!zSch t h e t r o o p s

w i l l r c s t provido; t h o i n i t i u l co~-~s5.dcrc.tion f o r t h c locc.ti<>l.iof t h c out-
p o s t , fibrthcr, Ghc l c n g t h of tiin,> t h o o u t p o s t r.itnst rcn;.in i n . p o c i t i u n ?ad
tl?c furtlir:r i n t c i l t i o n s must b>: c c n s i d o ~ ~ c d .

Tho s t r e n g t h :ind co:npositl.on of t h e outpost i s dctc:rmincd by:

( 1 ) t h o cncmy t h r c n t , 42) thc s s t c n g t h , cor;iposition and kind of treo.ps t o
bc sccurcd, (3) t c r r c i n , (4) t i i , ~ cof d y , '(5) n;sd s p c c i i ~ lc n n d I . t o n s .
Should t r o o p s i i c bctvrc;:n t h c ciltpost znd t h z cncqy, t h c outpost ?nr:y bc
c o r r c s p c n d i n g l y wcnkcr.

212. A t it coonsidcrzblc d i s t n n c c f r o ~ nt h c cncay (150 200 kn) v?c nccd -

n o r : . ~ly~ l c i ~ p l o yonly t h o i . ~ o s ts i ~ n p l oof s c c u r i t y :.icnsuros. Tho~;c c o n s i s t
i n s e c u r i t y of t h e irr:lcdi:ltc ?~ivou:~.cn r c a , wit:? s ; ~ n l l .groups s c n t out 2.s
t h e nscd a r i s c s . t o s e c u r i t y of 'ihc, r ~ s at rci:. by mczs of o u t l y i n g
p i c k e t s sco pzr:xgrnph 6'77.

Should t h i s k i n d of s c o u r i t y apecnr j.ns!~fficiont, t h o hi.ghc.r

coiwcmdi:r o r 'ihc corm".ndcr of t h o b i v c ~ w .groups ~ w i l l direct, tkt tllc
t r o o p s r!onrcs.t tilo cneiny p r o v i d e s c o u r i t y f o r t l ~ cn - i n groups $vil.l Be-
ni&:~ixtc:A lo:?.dcr e f thosr: s c c u r i t y v n i t s . Should scw:ral scot<>?,rebo
dcsign%tcd, n comnander shot~lc?bc no3igncd onch s a c t o r , Thc c m i p h r s
~ c s i ~ ~ m l fbo lr et h o s c o u r i t y me. bc, EL? Ilho scnc. tliqc, q r c n o r b i v r a a c
eoim.ulhdcro, Thcy d e t c r n i n o u p o h t h o conduck i n o a w of n t t c o k , t h o r.lcgrcc
of rswlidincas o f t h o imin f o r c c i n bS.vonao, and t h e s c o u r i t y f o r c e s ,#hioh
n r a c s t i ~ b l i s h o d . Tho $ccurkky of t h e vrholc call bc incrco.su& t h r o u g h
oorrcspcnding d i s t r i b u t i o n of -khc t r o o p s w i t h i n t h e ~ ~ V Q U R~C ~ 0 4 .

A r n e cz\~.:*lrya n d . a u t o r i z c d iltiits s c q n r e thwsalvnsr 'p~iiw.r.rllyby

f ~ ~rc n c h i n gr o c c n u ~ , i s s a n o cand g r o a t c r depth 3T @.$8~08ii2j,bl\ tilo b i ~ o u a c
nrca.
213. B g r c n t c r d c e r c ~of s c c u r i t y i s nscurod thrcugti t h o r : s t ~ ~ b l i s h n c n t
of a n outpost systci? boyond t h o r c s t i n g t r o o p s ,

BA12^3h-hck -35-
 vilic csi?.hiish;crit of such -.!I o11tpo8t syatc;? docs n o t , lls a ~ u I c ,
r c l i c v > t h o rc;stir.g t r o o p s of ;lrciiiding l o c i l i s c c u r i t y ,

214. I n f c n t r y i s 3 o s t s u i t - b l o f o r c u t p s t s c r v i c c . As r c q u i r c d it

i s r c i i i f o r c c d by c t k c r ar7.s.

lvfountcd :?on should be uscd s;:nringly cad rrhcri nscd i-~;?r,.la.lly:arc

knlcon f r u x ~t h c c?.v~).lrjry1:~tuo:w of t h e i n f ~ . n t r yregi.mznt:j. On good s t r c c t s
r,nd :it n i g h t b i c y c l i s t s s c m o i'icll on outpost duty. i i r t i l l c r y j.s scldoll
c c l ~ l c y c dw i t h i n t h e o u t p o s t . When c~xployodpcrpr.r:y.tions rzus-t be .~occlcf o r
n i g h t or:ploflcrit.

The dcfcnsc by a m o r c d v h i c c l c s m y bo r e i n f o r c e d b y clomonts of

t h c d i v i s i o n tank dcfcnsc b a t t a l i o n .

E n g i n c i r s may b,c c n p l c ~ j c dt o crcc'i c b s t z c l c s ai?d 1li.ndranccs.

Thc e s t ~ . b i i s h i ? c n ~of
t a cc~n?iunicztiorin c t i s i n g c t ~ c r a lt l ~ ct a s k

of thc s i e n c l i m i t s .

215. Whcu t r o o p s r c s t on t h o nzrch, t h o advzncc o r r e a r is

normally zesigncd t h o ' t z s k of s c o u r i n g t h o l a i n bady, u t i l i ~ i n ~f a; r

t l i i s

purposc a l l o r p z r t of t h c advnacc ( r u a r ) guard.

Tho o s t a b l i s h i u g of t h o out;post mdst i t s o l f bo pro,Lcctod.

Shciiid t h ; r c bo :I d i v i s i o n - r c c o s n a i s s a n c a b n t t u l i o n , it nay bc
d c t : ~ i l c dunder c x c o p t i o n a l cj.rcil;ls-t~nccst o p r o t c o t t h c c s t c . b l i s h m n t of
t h e o u t p o s t . The d u t p o s t m~l.:t bc i n s t r u c t e d concerning t h ; 6 i s ~ o s : t i c n s
of t h e rcconiynissnncc b:Lttr.lion. During tl-ic n i g h t it ?.zY be s u f t ? b l o t o
*vithdr:lrr t h c rcco~:!~?.c~;ss.sncc k t - L s l i o i l w i t h i n t h o o u t p o s t , h,?v'ing, ho~,xcvcr,
t h e p a e p b l i ~i n coutc.ct vri-tk th; c:lcn:q,

216. Whcn t h e com-.&nd rcs'cs , t h e comnc.:?dcr dcsi,-!l?tcs t h c r c s t a r c a s

of t h e t r o o p s t o bo p r o t e c t e d . Insef?.r ns ;1c has n o t $cli:;ctcd such
n a t t c r s t o t h e co:m-odcrs of t h e s c v c r a l n a r c h oblunils, tic d i r e c t s ( 1 ) t h c
t r o o p s f o r o r ~ t p s tduty, ( 2 ) t h e o u t p o s t scoterr., (3) t h o c o a t c r coim:ndcrs
and t h c sector Souil&.rics, (4)
t h e ~ o s advancod
t z'>curity l i n e , (5) .tho
c x t c n t and o b j c c t i v c s of t'nc outpost rc:aonnaisshncos, ( 6 ) t h o cc~nri~>ct of
t h o outpont i f t h e cnc3y atttnclcs ?.id ( 7 ) t h o cor:munict;.tj.cn t-uj.t;i a d j a c c n t
outpo5ts.

Thc k i n d of d c f c r s o , a c t i v e r r ;rassivo dcfonse o r dc1a:~ing

n o t i o n d i c t a t e s v?hcth?r t h c o u t p o s t w i l l be rcinforccc? f r o n t h e n::in !:ody
o r vihcthcr t:ls ovttpus.: x i 1 1 r c t i r u on ,the main bofly.

'8R~ctlir:r a c o : l t i ? i ~ ~ i ! :sI ! Q U S L . l i m of .-dj:~cont i t l c ~ ~ o nis~ st o bc

o s t f i n l i s h c d dcpcnds up'n t h o s i t u a t i c a . , t h e ?br~::di;h of tkic t r o o p s t o bo
protcc$cd :rnd t h c tcirrc.i:?..

L%@rtnr.t ~ % r c ~, rt ns i l.r:)fids ~L!I(! tcrraj.li pr1ii1-L~~ ~ 1 sbot wi.thin

bh.e o u t p o s t . 5lhcrc gaps ccol?r, ri;sI~o:>si3if!.tg f n r i;hcir obscr\?.tj.cn cmst
.
L

bc crdcrcd.

21.7. Bn o u t p o z t s r j h o r i s !~,)r?s.llyi:lc.nnod by a b : ~ t t n l i o n , r c i n f o r c c d
5.f nocd b c by c t h i r arms.

I n i t i a l - l y t h o o~.tst(,crst
s o c t o r commndcr ias;rcs t h c !lost urgcilt
o r d c r s f o r t h e s c c u r i t y . I n t h i s c a t e g o r y S c l o r g : ( 1 ) t h c occup-tion o f
co:.v-nrling t o r r u i n , ( 2 ) obst::cl.cs on ia?ort:;nt s t r c c t s and r o a d s , (3)
rccon'flaissancc 2.nd t c r r n i n i.!lforr~:~ti.:?nand (1,) t h e p r c p z m t i o u of t h e dc-
f c n s c by t11c r~~c;inoutpost S e r c c .

A f t o r p c r s o i ~ ~rccon:l?.isokn.cc.
l ho c l a b o r n t c s t h o i r ~ i t i a lo r d c r s ,
f o r cxaxplo: t h o l o c a t i o n of t h c dofcncivc positiol-1 o r l i c c of rc:lstnncc
t o i~:oludc t h c c(~i.duoti:l ca:;c cf o ~ i c i ~zttack,, y i n s t r u c t i o n s col-;cc;rning
oo~;l;cction w i t h c t h c r t r o o p s , fi'ld f o r t i f i c a t i c n c , s i g w i l co:.v.lnnicationa ?
t h o dogroo of roaditlcss, c1n.d a i r a116 g . s dcfcnsc i.lcasurcs. lueilg o t h e r
! ~ n t t c r shc d i r c c t s vrhcthcr or not t c n t s . ? r i l l bc p i t d h c d 2.1~3 if t h c r c r ~ z y
bc f i r c s . Hc p r c s c r i b c s t h e d r e s s , Unlcns cthcrur5so ordered, t h o ptck
is ts bo roncvcd du.rirs o u t p m t s o r v i c c .

Morcovcr, tlic outpost s c c t o r comaildcr dccidcs upon t h c l o c s t i o ~

of t h c r o s c r v c , t h c typo of i t s b i v c u a c o r b i l l c t , t h e dcgrco of i t s road-
i n c s s , i t s 13~31.s c c u r i t y cnd cvcntut.1 cxccutio!i of outpost d u t y m d h i s
m-rn. c01:miid p e s t .

Quiclc 2nd r c l i a b l c r.~c:.:~s 3f c o r l ~ i ~ i i i c ~ tfi o

r i~~ 311
n p a r t s of t h e '
eukpos-k ;?us-l; bc o s l , : ~ l j l i s h i d-to t h c ou:t:lcst s c c t o r com:l:,.ndcr'r, cc~,u:x~ndp ost.
Lilccwioc his O.P. is c ~ ? i - ~ c c t crdr i t h t!lr.t rif t h c i?i;;llcr connandcr. Oftcn
t h o d i v i . s i ? n trul?l: l i n e cr~m bb. uacd f o r t h i s co1.~.~1??ic~:~ti3n, o6pcci::lly if

it h t s ?.lrcc.dy b c ~ ; i1niG. alo~ngtiic; r c u t c of advzi?cc aud un t o t h e fon-r5rd

s c c u r i t y f:>rcos.

218. The r i f l c cc~::ipz::ii.cs c:~:>ligcd ill ::\no u t p o s t s c c t w :?,.rot h c~h i o f

s c c u r i t y f o r c o s . 111.cxccptJcj>!~.alciiscr, indopcndcnt plr.tr,ons ZIQ bo cr.lp1oycd
inst!::.:! cf ci>rlF:.nir:s. According ti: nt:cdr, t h c ci;m:,cnio.s i x y h a rniriforcod
by hca-qr i ~ r f r r ~ t rsic:.pons,
y cavatr'y t r o o p s o r b i c y c l i s t s . Thoy c.st:.blish
thonnclrrcs, uccc;r!ii:~r; t o t h c ~ r d c r srcccii-cd, i!i t h s i r s c c t o r s I n p o s i k i m
o r i n a dcfcnsi-JC l i n e . Tilc'co~1p3~1y c ~ ~ z - ~ ~ nbased
d c r , upzii t!ic c r d c r s of
t h c outpost S c a t o r com.v.rdor, dccidcr: what porti-11 of h i s cCr.ipnliy v r i l l
occupy -tho p o s i t i o n or l i n c 3f rosist?.ncc and which sh:ll r o s t . During t h c
day and w i t h good ?b:;cr-~.at?..:n "Foldrrachon" or "Fc1dpost cn" usu,?.lly suf f icc
a s t h c pijsiti-,:: o r l i n c r c s i s t a n c c g a r r i s m ( s c c par. 220
rcc;lni~x~issc;lc!.:,f o r sccur;:ly and f o r co.:~.l~rnfontia:iw i t h ncighluri:ig sco-
-221). For

t o r s t h c c:)rlpnny ccr.r?x,~~dcr soi-.rls o u t p a t r o l s . Urldor ocrtrrin conditi.:ils

hc sends out. s t n n c l i n ~p a t r o l s vrhich occupy s u i t r . h l c t c r r r . l n i n f r o n t of
t h e s c l ~ i t r i ~ s .Thcsc st::.ndin; p?.trols r c r n i n c u t u n t i l r c l i o v c d .

219. "Fcld~~rachcn"znrl "Fcld:-,ostcnn .:lay be pusl~crl fen-mrd 'G,? s u i t n b l c

p3inCs b y t h c r i f l c ox~pa:?ics. Tlw nur.ibcr, stri:iigt2i c11d a s ~ i g n ~ . i o n.af t
heavy -xcap:;ils (hcrlvy ~ ~ a c h i nguns c and ~ d i u c m r c r f o r s )t h c r o t o a r c dotorr.linod
by t h o n i s s i o n , t h e posj.ti,-'c of t h o r.:ost :idvnncoC l i u c of s o c u r 3 . t ~
(rosist;,i?cc f , tlic ir.ipxzk.t.Wimc! S t h c ~ d v ~ n cp o c i : ~ t s ~ i u dt h c prexi;:iit;y of t h c
cnc::::;. I;%c r d c r : l o t t 3 roducc utmcccs~ar?'.l; t h o cor.~bat c f f cctivcncs.? o f
t11c co:lpr:?y, tl-5c.s~ac:v?:t.; cod p:,sts shoulc? bc spi-i.n;;ly cnpl.oycd and oilly
?;rhcn :lost :1ccdcd. Thc cwipt:~ny cck.~,xindcr, t s z r u l c , s p e c i f i c s how *he
"Fcldvrachcn" nnd "Fcldpo~2i:ir:" shall. concluct -thcn:iclvcr 7;rhon n t t c s k c d .

220. Thc sstrc::gth of "Fcl&ir;i::choi?" v ~ r i c sf r o r ~a Group (16 non) Do a

p l & % x n ( 7 p a u p s ) . C ~ r r c s p ~ ! t:)
~ d a~ S.S. p i c k e t .

Thc "Fol&?acb+n" s l c u r c s i t s e l f by sentries, p a t r c l s nnd st?.nd-

9116p a t r u l o .
221. As n r u l c , c. "Fcldp~si;cnl' c m s i n t s of t h r c o ?:an (cos-aclr, p ~ k ) ,
of ~r112~1 i s t h e landor. 2iporti;nt p o i n t s should bo oocupiad by tPOap8
uri$k 1i;jh.t r . a ~ h i n oguns. i.s c r u l c , cossi~.clc'~ o : ~ tssh : ~ u l dn& fro :wl'c than
5CQ n o t o r s f r m their oupportiug u n i t .

ii "Poldpostci~" ::~usust havc a g ~ o dvia\-< o f t h o t c r r a i u and i:iusG it-

self br! o u t af cncny view. Thc occupati:>n of h i g h p o i n t s is c+<c.u:tagcous
f o r s i g h t aild hearing. Gcncrzlly t h c r c i s r. d i f f c r c n c c bctvrccn ally 2nd
 222.' "Vithin a p i c k e t (~cldinmche)t h e commander t h e r e o f , o r t h e company
c o m n d e r , r e g u l a t e s t h e r e l i e f s , The commander r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e
r e l i e f must a s s u r e himself t h a t t h e "Feldposten" i s thoroughly familiar
mith t h e . g e n e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s and t h a t t h e r e l i e v e d "Feldposten" t r a n s m i t s
a l l s p e c i a l instruc.tcons t o t h e ' r e l i e v i n g "Feldposteri" and t h awt t h e s e i n -
s t r u c t i o n s a r e f u l l y understood.

223, Commanders of a l l elements o f ' a n outpost, down t o i n c l u d e t h e

p i c k e t s (Felduvache) r e p o r t without delay, i n c l u d i n g a sketch, t h e measures
t h e y haw. i n s t i t u t e d f o r reco'maissance and s e c u r i t y and t h e comnunication
t h e y have with a d j a c e n t u n i t s .

224,. I n o r d e r t o spare horse f l e s h , army o a v a l r y i v i l l see!: t o a v o i d

t h e c s t a b l i s h m c n t of atrong o u t p o s t s . The g r a a t e s t r e s t w i t h p r o p o r t i o n n t e l :
small o u t p o s t s e r v i c e i s t o be found behind a p r o t e c t i v e s e c t o r o r b a r r i e r ,
The advantage o f such p r o t e o t i o n permits a s h o r t rearward rnovcment, u n l e s s
t h e s i t u a t i o n demands t h a t t h e t e r r a i n reached be o c w p i e d o r held. The
retirement behind t h e n a t u r a l s o & u r i t y must bc p r o t e c t e d by s c c u r i t y f o r c e s b
. .
A t n i g h t arm$ c a v a l r y vsill f r e q u e n t l y c a l l upon i t s b i c y c l c
u n i t s o r a t t a c h e d motorized i n f a n t r y f o r o u t p o s t duty.

The i n s t r u c t i o n ' s a p p l i c a b l e t o i n f a n t r y o u t p o s t s a r e e q u a l l y
f i t t e d t o c a v a l r y o u t p o s t s . Cavalry r o q u i r o s more time t o march o u t
prepared f o r b a t t l o t h m doe's i n f a n t r y . Cavalry o u t p o s t s a r e e s t a b l i s h e d
vrith o r vJithout t h e i r horses.

cavalry u n i t s i n o u t p o s t s e r v i c e vthich arc as l a r g e a s o r

l a r g e r t h a n a t r o o p n o m l l y havc t h c i r antmals vsith thcrn. 'Vcaker dotach-
mcnt's, ..unl,oss othdfrvsiso ordured, normally do not havc t h o i r .animals v h t h
thcrn. Should t h o animals bo present, a "Fcld~vncho" c o n s i s t s of a t l e a s t a
group, a !',Foldpostcn" a t l c h s t of a squad. Tho animals of "Fcldvachc" and
" F ~ l d p o ~ t o nrcmain
" snddlcd. If t h e t c r r a i n i s such a s t o permit s u r p r i s e ,
it mny be advisable t h a t t h e "Foldposton" romain mountcd.

225. Should t h o s i t u a t i o n not demand t h a t motorizcd u n i t s romain i n

t h c t o r r n i n t h c y havc rcnchod, t l i c i r spocd pormits them t o r e s t a t scmo
d i s t a n c c from t h o onomy o r t o vsithdra-2~behind o t h o r s f o r protection d u r i n g
thcir rcst.

Should s e p a r a t e motorizcd olemonts be c a l l c d upon t o establish

o u t p o s t s , i n a d d i t i o n t o mctorcyclc t r o o p s nnd a t t a c h o d motorizcd i n f i n t r y ,
armorcd ~ c h i c l c smay bo u t i l i z e d f o r t h i s s o r v i c c ( f o r c x m p l c behind
d c f i l c s and o b s t a c l c s ) . A l l v e h i c l c s belonging t o t h o r o s t i n g u n i t s must
bo s o r v i c o d and rnadc r c a d y f o r t r a v c l bcforc darlcncss s c t s i n . Tho
l o c a t i o n musk pcrmit quick d c p a r t u r c . Too c l c s c assombling l c s s o n s t h o
mnneuvcrability and c c l e r i t y of dcparturo.

-----
B a t t l o Outposts

226. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h o g c n c r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s npplicablc, a s s t n t c d
i n paragrnph 198, t h o strength, composition, a d o r g n n i z a t i o n of b a t t l c
o u t p o & s a r c i n t h c main dotorminod by t h c dogrcc and c x t o n t of b a t t l o
r c a d i ~ . o s s of t h e main f o r c e , t h c intondod conduct of t h o t r o o p s a g a i n s t
a s u r p r i s c h o s t i l c a t t a c k and my s p c c i a l omploymcnt contcmplntcd.

Thc primary mission of b a t t l o o u t p o s t t r o o p s i s n o t t h a t of

s p a r i n g thomsolvcs strone; s c c t o r s , b f f c c t i v c o b s t a c l o s and hindcrnncos
j u s t i f y l c s s strong b a t t l c outposts.
n i g h t occ?iPtinn of t h o t c r r c i n by cossack posts. Tho p o s t s shf:uld bc
cqui.ppcc! w i t h f . o l d g l a s s e s an?. s i g r . a l norms.

Two aenbers of t h e cos~sat;kpost. o?>serve j o i n t l y , t h e y n u s t a g r e e

among themselves a s t o t h c time of a c t u a l o ? ~ s e r v a t i o n .

h s a r u l e cossack p o s t s d i g thoinselves i n , Whether t h c incmb'crs

may si"; d.own, l i e dowm,.,removc t h e pack, o r smoke i s s t a t e d i n order::.

Tho oonsack post obscrvos i n t h c d l r c c t i o n of t h o oncmy, iis

soon as it ohscrvcs anything, suspi.ci?ns on t h o h e a r t of t h e cilcm;,r, it;
inmodiately r e p o r t s i t s obsorvatiou.

Should t h o r o bo drngcr i n dolay, o r should an a t t a c k irnpcnd, t h o

s o n t i n o l s give 'thc informa.tir?r; by f i r i n g . The p o s t s .i.nform pussing
puirrols of. t h e s i t u c t j . c n a s t h c y Bnorr it.

Pcrsens who a r c known, a r c pcrmittcd t o pass i n and out. A l l

o t h c r s must Show thr;i.r c,rcdcntial.s o r . p r o v c tho3.r i d o ? . t i t y o r tlloy a r c
conducted t o t h o m x t n i g h e r a u t h o r i t y . Ordcrs rcgul:ito " ~ c l d p o s t c n "
confiu.ct w i t h r c s ? c c t t o a l)loc'x.~dccind 51s t o our own. and h o s t j . 1 ~motor
vchiclos.

Upon tho cl-iailengo of u "l.'cldpcu (,on" t h o on,; appr,~ac!;.ir!g must

stoy?. Iic vrho docs not. cbcy t h o 0rcic.r~of t h c "Fcl~lpo<tcn".i s shot.

. During d:~rl;nr:ss evcryonc :iq)rnachcs t h c "FclripostenM i s

chc.llcngcd as follcvrs: "m!t, who i s thcrc?". Should t h o e x aappronc?.ing
hc c h a l . l c n ~ e 3t h r c c t i ~ n o sand should hc n o t h&-t, hc i s . s h o t .

i n d i v i d u a l cncmy of f i e ( ; rs, :iccorq:aniod by ;I s n ~ ~grou?, ll rutlo

i d c n t i f y t h c : x c l v c s a s e m i s s a r i e s o r ncgci;iatnrs, a:: 17cll a s c ~ c m yd o s c r t e r
c r s , w i l l not bo t r c a t c d a s 'ncrnics. Thcy : r i l l . bo r o q n i r c d t o 1:iy dm.m
t h e i r arms an<. w i l l be ccrtductcd t o t h e ncxt h i g h c r cornmandcr, dl?scrtc;rs
blindBoldcd nnd ~ ~ r j . t h o uhtc i n g p c r m i t ' i ~ (t~o converso.

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e above gcncm: i n s t r u c t i o n s :*I1 l t ~ c l d p o s t c n "

roaoivo spr:ci!~.l c r d c r s which co-?cr i n s t r u c t i o n s cr>rlcorciuig:,

(1) cnomy and l ~ c ~ ~ ~ l i . i ; i e s ,

(2)' l o c n t i o n and mi.r.sion of advancod and a6.juccnt u n i t s ,

( 3 ) Loc:ition of t h c " ~ c l d v r a c h . ~ " and t h c cc3mpn~iy:is W O U

3E t h o noarcst ri>utc thorcto,

(4) T o r r n i n n r c a s t o bc c s p c c i n l l y w:itchod (v?'.siblc r o a d s t r c t c h c s ,

d c f i l c s , b r i d ~ y svr!.!.io!? t h c c i ~ i n y , m u s tu s c d u r i n g his :ipproiich),

(5) c o n d ~ ~ cif
t t h o cucn:~a t t a c k s ,

(6) Kin6 of o o ~ m r ~ t l l . c a t ir. ioi~t h~ ~id,jaocrit

p o s t s :;a:\ triir:siiiissiiau of
mos:;n.?;cs, and

(7) O t h ~ n l r i s c!Ioccssary i n s t r u c t i o n s and tho dcsign.ation of our cwn

"Fcldpcstcnn (l,?,3, ctc.)

Thc "Fcldpustcn" shoul.d, i f posniblc, bo given n s k e t c h - o f tho

t o r r a i n , ~ r i t hs k e t c h t o i n c l u d e t h c v a r i o u s t m , r L s nnd i n p o r t a n t poj.n.ts.
 227. Gcncrally t!lc foroi! o Y r : (Tr?.!ppcnf'i!lrrw) st?iti; 4;lic: ;;lissic;n
of t h n o u t p o s t . Si~r:ult?.nr,ou::ly ho cui: d i r c c t w2ii.ch t c r r i i i i w i l l btc ocou-
p i c 6 by t t ~ coatpost,. oftcj: ~ l s oi t s foni,ard lint of r c s i s t : q . c e , tlio con-
i l c c t i o n w i t h i n tile o u t p o s t find vr:i.tn ailjnccnt outpo:.ts :ind .tho conrli:ct i n
cas:: of h ; ~ s t i l o attcc!c. Against cm n t t ~ c kt h e o u t p o c t oith<:r dcfi:r:ds, i n
p l a c c ~r oxocrit::s dolzying i c t i ~ n ,r c t i r j . r ~ gi n a p r c s c r i b c d d i r < c t i o n .

Undcr sunc c!?ndj.ti:~ns it m y bc suit::hlo t o l a y o u t A: pesitj.oiz

bc!;ind tho' outp.:st l i n o , ti:.~vc t h i s p o s i t i o n occuplr:d h y n p o r t ic,iz of t h c
-
&w,.i? f,?roc, This pusit!-on, i f n c c c s s a r y , i 3 ur;c;d i:s t?. s::llging zrc?. c r
...,.,,.-.
c5 ,. n b l y nrc?. f o r -the r c t i . r i n g o u t p o s t ( ~ ~ . f n l u n e s t c l l ~ i n ~ ) ,

22E. Ordi.n<t~-i.i~y t!:c b n t t l a ou!;pnst i s crt?Lblir;hcr! by tllc Inr'ritry or.:,.;

u n i t s n s n r c s t t h c oncmyi Thc; tilitpost t r o o p s rcn.?.ir? :-~i.;lnchcd,riorr;i::.lly t o
t l i c i r own u n i t .

Outposts which i r o :st Concidcra!)lc d i c t j n c o f r w -th.- ; ~ z i njrc;:t-

ini;) fo,rcc 2nd which cc~ncfrom oovorn? u n i t s i?"y bc p1:ioed under ?;PC
cc::c~.nds.

Outposts i x ~ yho r o i n f o r c o d by s u p p o r t i n g a r t i l l e r y o r i n s~;aci:j.

inntrinccs by atf,.L:!.c>hcd a r t i l l a r y . Tha r c i c f o r c c n c u t a ;f o u t : j n ~ t s by 0. ,
p o r t i o n of t h o divi:jicn -t::nk il!:.fcn.sc b n t ? ; r . l i o n ' i s t ~ l s i ,t o be rcco;;u?c.!;dcd.

Elr~cci::li~;->!hen t:a 9 :r~cili.?.to C C I C ~co!'t:?r;t

~ . OXPC etix?, gir:?cr:il.I.y
'khc i.n:;truct%iiii:; c;)ncorning orricrs, or~il:riz::+i.on q t c . , -r!:c? ccniluct cf tilc
O!ri;pc8<; n . r c :;I-pl!cc.til:: t o b [ ~ t t l co u t p o s t s .

229, i3ni;tlc S:~.GT;,;::~:: prcvj.d!? c l . ~ s: ;courity nu; r.rc ro~;:!:~s.ilrlr: f o r

t h a n?k!~r~tc'r;:\nccof. cs>%:icJi Tiice g?inc;i w i t h t h o cn::.riy. Thcy o:cc?~t;e1>cLt,;ttlc
rcc:innaissnnoc i n ac~orC~2i1co w i t h t h c orders ~ i v o i lt nvri.

Sh:.ul:i i.ro hc~xrc f'oraozi i n f r o n t of i;hr: a-&post,. s r ? , r r s ~ii!s.t

fipeoify .?rhct!icr :ir ?oi: t h c y s11::lJ. bc r.tt?.rhsd t o tlir ou-tpo;j-k ::n< ~ l s n oust
Inilj.cr:tc t h o i r p r o c ~ fcctivigJy " I t h ri;spoct t o tks o u t p o s t .

250,. Shoulrl t!?c ;ut;,cjst bc csto.hiisi.~cd~111ri n[; ci?.rk?icss it r;!c$ bs

;:.ri.v.j.s..?,lo t o (jcolpy i i ~ . i t i ~ . l l : y !,nly c?::ily ro&clicd p.~3.1:.t:: nnc? durfrig <k~a?r-
1:ii;lit t o oxtsnd :>.at'f;u l l y d::-~ol.o;: t h o oittpost systcr!.

271. Should p:ueo i:r l:rt:.rrupticn i n t h - b::ttlc ; G P ~ L p l f . ~ ~ 1;roopc

r, ;,
i:ci:r,3;:t -thc 1:tia~ys h o u l d cndc::r~i.r t o cccur- t h e i r jncit;.i.ri;i b;y n;:,iis of
ou-tl:r:its. Theso o ~ n o l f i t.i.l:G. r i l g of c s s r ~ . c %j>Ost;, ;>-iI;,. :'I r: , :..n'I s.k:.:>.,!ii~g
patrol:: x~li.clr:).re pliiis!~r;r? 35 o ~ > : ; c. ta t!i:: ci?~ix:r :!.s p~s::i.bl!: e r n.1-r 1.ci'-t i n
cc~n4;rrct;w i t h l?:i;o.

Sc c\r::.i.t:: i n iviovcm:?t
Sr cur it--:ioi-, t h c ;.I:lrch.

m v
.
i i s . . c
, R O V ~ ~ ;d!iri?i$
253 b?.rgi: r;,rtrah c,:~l:!!~~ns
. .
<
t t
d.~yli;;].it, :*1:(1 w!iict;
: u s ; i,f :7:7:ici;2.c
i ~ u s trock.-
50 :yo-
tec.;koO. by n:~+i-z.ircr;i:::. trui:i:s nnd i:? woc-~:..ry by ;;~$r$:;i~ik ((t;t+:>,clr) :-ri!:.t-
2:rn. Tho f'ir8j.i; a?:.:siccrt:!:j.:,n ~:g.st Li: ;:.VC?~ i30 :.)r~tlro!;S..il f i ) ~.:jll~.f;,nm.t-
i:i!z o f .t!:c ? i ~ : ~ r ro: c~l ~ m n s ,ti:c b c g i n r ~ i n gand ci~r.ipl<:ti:!n.c f the rr..rc!i, t'sc
; ~fs.tf;;:r
c r c s c i n ~uf s - k r c ; ~ ? ~anc! c c u r s o s , t11c yaat;:::<i of i!:>filcn nn(l ri,s.ks.
 'Rtcn t h e rond n c t pormito, t h c ii.6. u n i t s nllould bc a:jrigrcd
s p e c i a l r o u t e s (unused by o t h o r t r ~ o : . ) ~ ) .Frcqucn+;ly I;. 1:. bxt::crics cover
two r x d s from onc f i r i a g p o s i t j o n . f;iachinc gun &.A. coi?.pcnics and riotor-
7 ,

i z c d !L..!L. b a t t o r i c s * r;zy bc 6 e ~ ftorVrxr< t i : p r o t c c t pci.nts vihi.ch :ire

thro.tc:lcd b y l c v f l y i n g a i r p l z n c att:tcl<. Shonlrl t h c 6.A. u n i t s %at hnvc
cpccirrl r ~ ) u t c s ,t h o rcgulatinc; o f t h e i r rsot.cmcr.t ovcr t h c rou.tc comnon t o
a l l tr'iop:; nc.y EC T I C C C S E & ~ Y I !'LC a r u l c ;,.Ar u n i t t : k ~ v a prccc6cncc a t Fond
c r o s s i n g s and a t d c f i l c s .

Air' dcfci.:sc trc;cps s u p p c r t t h c p i ~ t r c land 'rarniuf; service of t h e

cemanfi,; L.L. b a t t o r i 0 8 warn by 1nca:ls :)f t h e i r f ~ r iind
c s h e l l hurstv,

231~. Should t h c a i r s i t u a t i o n bo tc:nso b u t lJztl:ic c o n t a c t ~6t h t h e

h o s t i l o f urcc not' oxi)cctod, t h c t r : ~ o p sa r c d i s t r i h u t c d upon 213. !.i.rirailal)lc
ronr?s an? streets., Sl:,,uld ti:nc nr,t bc important, t h o m r c h 1 2 %b~c cxtcnd-
cd over a g r c n t c s l c n g t h of t i r t c and. t h a t r o o p s ad~?.r?ccrli n s n c l l Groups,
vtith a spcaii'j.06 tinic interv::l bc.twccn cnc?~.

2-35. Shoulri t h e Pcrcc :.tccr,xt~lisha cllyts n a r c h 2.s a u n i t , t h o o f f o q t

of h o s t i l e a i r at.~:rck cun be lcr,scncci by c x t c n d i n g t h e co1w.n (Fl!.oger-
m a r a c h t i c f c ) ( i . c . allv:? nn oloincnt t h a t n ! > r m l l y c;ccu?ics 200G lncters

o t h h r fnctor::
I
.
road spnco, Il00C! n c t e r s ) , proYii!efi. S S I : C ~o x t c n s i o n i c n::t prohj.1-;itcd b y
"~1is~;ormrshhtidf~"~mnni:ks orirh e i m i : x t d?ublc tllo n o r n a l
s c . 1. decreasc i n t h c c!c;ith of t h c " F l i c G c r ~ a r s c h . t i c E o "rmst h c
ordorad.

Each u n i t 2istri.buto:: i t s c ~ l fw i t h i n i t s " a i r dcfonsc ionrch depth"

3.n accort?c.??cc w i t h t h e ordnrr, of i t s comx%r:dcr and '.XL~<SS:C~ITUI, it? beginn"
i n g and i t 3 end. E o r : ~ dr:w;n tro:.)ps t r c i i n s ancl hooscdrnvj;t cl~!mc~?ks of t h o
s c r v i c c tr:.il:s c.?ndi~cl;thcar,lsclvos s i . ~ : : ) . l a r l yi f t h c i r r a r c h i s rndo r?uring'
r!qlii;ht.

Thc highor coi;m~arrd.cr( cliv?si,n) orrlcrs t h c %::si~r$ptiuno r abnntlon-

in.?; 1:hc " a i r clef cnsc ::nroh i?.coth". k t t h o s a w tin.. I-.* c!iros%r: ~rhetl.icr
,iif
-the s c c u r i t d ~:l:~:;tai:co:; shn:Ll bc ;n:iintain.cd, lcs.~onoc'l o r gi:icri u ~ .

Tho " n i r dcfci?sc 1:ts.rch cclur;it' i s tt..kou u.t t h d Fcgilming of t h e

a r c . In ;her-t column:: i-k can bc. n:;~artcd i r u r i n ~ t, h o m r c h . Wl11on t n c t i c a l
r c a s o n s dm.anrl, it EC f o r c ~ o n c . H a l t s %rid rcst:: a r c : ~ t i l i z o dt o f a o i l -
$*:,to t h e c l i s t r i b u t i ;r: or scp?.rnl;inn of t h o troops.

276, "Flioaorciarsc?~l)rc~-tc" ( a i r clcfcnso i.x~rcErbr;:nr!.th) i': :i;lethcr

ncnno of pr<~tcotti.ng
t r o c y s d u r i ~ gn claylight z;:.rch.

Thc c s t u h l i s h n c . n t c c f " h f r c?cfonco ::inrnh brcni?thl' I)rc::x::.y)Bcs t h k t

s a f f i c i c n t pnrni?.cl r;:uJ;cs c x i s t or ';hat 't!ic t r o o p s c:;.:? narc!: n u r r ~ s s csun-
try.
I1 .
;.ir di:fc!~sc r u r c h 11rc:i! t!i" if:s c c u r c: by bhn d i s t i - i b u t i c n of t h e
tr:.'orgs ':)n 1'?:1<18 .>r. ri:,utcs tid.jr,cent, cn one .cr botll s i.dos, Cc t h e nxir. 1:nrch
rout$. iiioi~ctrx: tro,rpr: c r c prr;for?bJ.y a:.'.-i[;no(: t:hc l:~:t!;cr rout;nc. V'chic3.cr
'.nd -vuhiclc k l c n c ~ l t se ~ r crtssigncd r c u t c s . Tile win z u r c h ronri c c n b c
u t i l l z c d b y v c h i c l o s ; 3 t h o r tro:>ps should r:~:rch d i i f i ~ ;< ithor routon. If
nocoocrrry, b ~ u ~ ? d u r i cLlrc s %r,.+ignodt o avuic? c ~ n f u s i u a . !Chc nw.rol!. scqucnco
of mi-ks rcmc~ins a s tli.>ugh tlic : ~ Z ~ C ! I .m r c raadc 1.2 .n~.cc l r . Sh : a i r ?
dangcr CIS tl-sops C . C C - L ~ T I I . ~a~tDa?i.y . ~ ~ Tp~i ~n t a r i s c , t h o tro!:~S fol.l.0~~3.ng
: $ h u ~ ~ hl dc ~?ctif'ic:dprcj?ll:tl,y.
 Thc m r c h coluim ccnx.ndcr ? r d c r s t h a s s u a p t i , ; e a ~ ? t. b c ?.b~nrlc;i-
in;; cf t h e " a i r c?cfcnoc m.rch hrcnclth", c r he rs-y au:;!lr;rizc t h e co:?ixinIlers
cf e l c n e n t s of t h c c n r c h colun? t . 3 us:: t h e i r d i s c r c t i r ' n i n t h i s ir?::tlcr.
Shoi:ld t i n c bc t h o rnas.k iniiq~:~ortc:~.t; ?I.cr.ler.t, ovcry cor.r?andcr i:: z i ~ t h o r i z c d
-to s r d c r "::ir c~.ofcnscn c r c h SrcnEtli."

The ostal:lis!mcl;.t . f z n " a i r dcfcrlso march brcaCt:h" i n g r e a t

c l ~ p t h.is o r 6 i n a r i l y n:1; p o s c i b l u . It l e a d s as a r l . ~ lt ~o congcst;i?n and
d c l z y s . E6::rch i n " a i r dofcnsc m r c h brenc!thl' d c c c l e r : l t c s t h . c fc.rw:~rd
novc;?cnts, nilr;cs it: irrcgulra-, i n c r t a s c s t h c s t r o n u ~ u s n o s sif t h c rwrch nni
1:l:ki:cs :;,?re c l i f f i c u l t t h c !.e+dcrshlp. Tllcrcfore i t s ansurlpt!.r.m i s o x c o p t i
ioilal nncl rrhcn ass~:eii sli~:ulrl'uc gi-rcn up a6 s::cil u s :.)ossiblc.
.

237. I f thc? t r i ; ~ p s m;:ircli i z n :2cfcnsc

~i~ :-!arch colur,n", sul!ior: i s t h p
: i i l t . e s a s ? ' ~ y t i o n of a:; "c.ir d.cfcnso breadth? t o be uxc!crtc.kc~, He
:?cfci?sc inarch $.oyi;h :%I:?. hrc:..c?t:.i" a r c niit a p p l i c a b l e tt: nztorizo!:: !mi.i;s.

238; Shriulc! n l a r g e t?ixcii c ~ z s a n c l , l n r p r t h a n a rcinforcoc' r c g i r ~ c n t ,

h c n?.rch.~i':;li-u[: ?no rcac!. 8118.ho thrcr.tonoc1 by u i r a t t c ~ l : it ~ nc:ji bo oopnr-
z t c d i n t o se+cr::;l ini:rch grou)?s ~;lil?ichf c l l a v cnc! m..:,.tili:r r.t ( l i s t a n c o s c;f i n c
!;o t h r c c !ril.jnlctc:r:;. The sc;ijir col?n:irir!cr rcgu1::-ti::: t!icir i':~rI'~rarr1. movc-
racnt. Hc n.c.:y c1j.rcct " a i r ri:31?!,izsc rac.rch i.c?tlit1 f a r :is(; o r '!:-rc - i ~ l r c hc r x i p s
ixmiilr;d .tho orcbirc: c;.:l.u:?.ri 1c;lgtl~.re:.izl.ns %~.iitbin nil.ovi:..i,lc ] . i n i t s . Shou1.d
t h o cntirc! march i?.j;::.l;h exce;:c! $1 ?.h;~fs riarch, i"; i s [:rc;for:.hlc, vrhon x l l
c,,nrliti. :ti-rs p r ~ ~ it to ,'nli.,:w 'th;; inrlivi2i.i::l r.p.rch ;;r,.'ups t o rl?.rch a t cliff o r -
CILG'ti!ms.

Thr. :i:;su?.pti.on of " z i r 3.ofcnst; n:.rch brc:..d:t:!" r:?.t!li!: tht? mrrch

&r<,u]?3
dsponl:s :~j~o:it h ~ :n:rth:?rity t h c r c f s r sr?.nkc!! ?jy t h o ccmiariclcr.
. ,

11..
..lr rlefar:.s<; 'z:irch r7.o~1;h2nd brcac?th" as 2. r u l c n r c c o t e:~.1~I,u~~o2
3t i?i~:it.

...-.
. .

240. 1, y o t c c t i : ? n ?f :i ~ i i . r ~t?~rd!lpii
h dcf j.1~::: ijvcr bridge;: c)r rin '
f'ci-r.ic,e sh!iulc? bc ,?st-blishod b o f , i r c t h o arriv:rl. ::'f!;l?c r:luzs of t1.c tri;,)ps.
,
.
.simil?.r .
;.rc:;nc-l;lvo ncinsurco a t <Lcfilcc dcycl:d upon t h o !;irr.! :>f f!o-
Tho nc,:~surc:; at; sil,?rt ?.cfilos, briclgns an6 :L+ f f r r y i n g :;rous n r e

Ln a i r nf;taclc nt;i.i. ;;n": b l . i c ? . C I - ~ ~ :i :s CQ-L':~~:,.?.~.:. l y :~l.!:o

c..r.cvruc~? w iSh t h e ~-~o::rbyl c r r c l n . !t'hcrufr.rc:, r:h:)iilcl. I;bo ti":iiip& :.i~prou!:h-
ini; a Sri.!;:? hc u . 5 i r ; "air ~1,cfcn:;c ::y.rih dnFt?l", 2 1 ~ ~ 1 1uni-ts . shiiulc! be
a I . o a .Q ~ s)-i;.?~l.d
! hc !-.fii~ta?ao? f.,r 2. c o r t - i n ti!:c a i T c r

. ..i . . .
c r . ) : : 8 ~ . g . The iir.?ors t.Xc~-ef.:rc;z;it.k 'br: ,;ixon zuffic'ici;.i;ly i:?rl~yFIT ,;rt?~r
to ..,- 6 . F c r ~ y i i , ~igs bcsi; c:icc;.r:;e3: by cri?s:s:i]:ig sip~l?;:'.no-
::~i::?y ::!; ro'~~:l'al:tlrcas. 'i'ro;,p :ica;lr:?;b,?.?;:nn !.r r$.:>.,.n-i]:i?* ~ , !iclc.r.r t i i c l!,:,tllr:: i:; t.,!
c - . r,.,.., t r -c;.i;s 811 : i ~ l ~bc:
Z n::,jilo:rc::i i;n .bqt'li i:nnka, It :?-y hi:
I ~ O C ~ L ~ I : : : Yt
:cY ss.L~.blisi:u s j g ~ l . : cor.~i;rlnj.ct:.i;ioti n o t fg*. tllr; i':ii;rcl :LI:". w!:rn-

l'orwcr d .
il-$; s~:;::Yi.se, Fcx .!;ki,i.s b:-dry.)<,;:ct h c r:i\-j.slq;~ s.L[;niil. l > : ~ ? t & l i ~j.8
~ j x?::II,$~P.?(~.
i
 241. Ls a r v l c :i nr.rch by r:ay i;: continuer.'. i f h , ~ s t i l urcccnnnissanco
p l 6 n c s nppcnr. I l,i ~ . i ir;u:..rr's" warn of tpnroaohing lcw f l - j i n g h r i s t i l c plr.nos
i,r of a probablc att?rck. ' Thc sigric.1 "Flj.cgcrzlnrn" ( f i v e c h ; x t b l n a t s ) i s
c i v c n on o r d e r s o f c8:Jt%;janyarid &her r c m ~ ~ n i l . c r s .

Upc;n t h e s o o n d j n ~ " o fth.2 "~1ic;:cralsrm" f o o t trucj~:s scck cover

i n rlitches :in6 rl.cprc!ssio:is nloclg Chc rauci. Vchiclcs and c?v:~.lry h z l t on
t h c rond, r i f i c r s c:isjlount, brnkcs ::.rc s o t . Only when t h c wurniug i s
s u f f i c i e n t l y c:.rly ani! i n fnvorzs.blo t c r r z i n 60 t h o s c s c c k conccnlircnt sl'f
t h c roo.d, R i d c r s and cav:,lry rlc n o t b l o c k t h o c o i t o r of t h o rond. U t i l i z -
i n g c o n c c n l r c n t , c,?.vnlry, incl:~c!i6i: i . t s v c h i c l c s , c m t i r n ~ c s.tho i:l?rch 2,s
s9:)n ?.s possible. Thosc wcr.l?ons dcs3.gnntcrl f o r 2e.fcnse ngn?.n:;t; lovr f l y i n g
n.ttacIr3 i~:unx!inicly go i n t o p c i s i t i ,n ?+rid qpcn f ' i r c , Inclivic!uhl r i f lcmcn
do n s t p a r t i o i y c t c i n t h e f i r c . Gcis l!ofonse measures rr.l..y ?JC c n s c n t i t ~ h .

fiigh f l y i n g a.ttacks 'i;c.j.nst c z r c h colunns n r c n(-.rrr:1lly t,; h c

cx;'co-be6 only :it dci'ilcs. ";.ir' Ennrr!ell wnrn of t h c ;..p;rrnnch. Thc si;::nc.l
" ~ . ' l i e ~ c r r , l n r m i" s g i v e n b y c<:mp:iny i~ncl :,+her ca::m".ndo.rz,. T.113 trociys
cor1:luct thc~nsolvos si.c;il$r.rclfr :;s a : ~ ~ i n slow t f l y i n g att?.cks. i.s :i r u l e
on1.y A.L. b:!.ttorios f i r e n ~ a : i d ~.the k h o s + J i l f ~plnucsr

A t n i g h t h ~ x t i l cplanor, :il;tnck n s r. r u l c only w i t h t h o ci:?. of

f l n r c s : t h o s e w . r n t h o t r c o ~ s . T!lc si.gn:il "Flj.erp;orr*lnrm" i s ;-i-~cnb y
cemi;:rny and ;&her co!~-xm<brs. Foht t r ! : ; j ~ son!< conc(?:ilmcrit by t h r ~ v i n g
thcnisclvec down alcn(; +hi- sirlc cf t h u r.j?.d. Other t.r,j.;:!s hc.lt anii rcn-\in
m!>tio:~lcss. Any rno.~nncn'i hotrnys .khi? l o c n t i (cn of t h o trcrops. nr.fc:zsc i s
cxccutcd onLy by a i r 6.cfcnsc .trirons.

The m r c h , follv+ci;rg t h c n i r a t t a c k , i s rosumc.<. ui::.)!~or:!cr of t h o

com~n~'c~dcr
af t h c u n i t . con.c%rnod.

When t h o o r d c r f o r t;hc a r r c k i s gLvcn t h o comar~r'cr c%a r!cci".o

whathcr o r r i c h t h o s i g n a l 'l~l?ci.c~-i~l:imltnr.y h c i;ivcn.

242. Should. 2. n i g k t rr:'rch prcllong i t s s l f i r i t o . d ? y l i g h t , it miy l ~ c

nucas:jzry t o ::r!!cr c r e s t Soforc ( l a y l i g h t , j.n orclcr t o pro-:idc t h e iicccss-
m y ~ u c u r i t yni;ainst n i r nnr!. ground h::stilu f o r c e r ,

:?&5. F i r s t of a l l , t h c i r z a n t r y cLividion s c c u r c s i.bsclf n@:.i~ist ;,rounc!

110s-i;ilc f o r c e s b y izonns of iA?c d i v i s i o n rcconn?.isstu~co b n t t n l i m . Scc
1 . 1 169 cncl 170,

Thc d i v i s i - j n scr;;.nr;.ndc.r n?.y holC a t h i s d i s p e a n l clcmcn-t:: c:f t h c

roccnnr.is3cncc b n t t n l t a n . Yet hc shr?ul<: n..)t n r d u i y -<vc;kcn it.

Sh-iuld tharcl bc c n rcconnni.sst:nce bcttii1i:in i ~f r' f ~ n at r nn :n

G L 1 , rcco:~:~;:issr.ncc must bc norvo(: :~y ot;hcr mc?ns.

241,. 111 %?kc t<:rr?in bctwcen t l m d i ~ i 8 i ' ; r lr.oooi?r~r;isu:mooc 2;~ti,",19.:-incod

t'ric ?.(;v~ncc z!i.cri.', tile : ~ d v c n c egu::r?. n u s t ifrontnl.ly ?.u.l cn t h c flra1,cs
r o c i i m o i t ~ : ~ ,s e c u r e ant! s c r e e n t h o rrs:!v::ncc, Tho mountct! .!;r?.ips cinp1,iycd
:i moari'kcr! p,.jir?ts :IS wcl: cis t h o s o ilscd t o ex~c~,zl;e rcconr,.~Sss:lncc :,.n.cl.
si; c u r i t y miss i ?ns 21-o t;::kc:l from, t h c miuntod 1:lut-,:>xi ::r i n f i r r t r y rocir:: :i.k
inouts. Thc x!.rch co!.umr: c<,~m.ini:crs :,.ncl cormnnc'cr . ~ tfh o w):i?lo f (:rz"cc oqu--1-
i z c s , i f ncconsnry, t h c c!i;;tributi:,:i of t h e s o mo~mntcid trocys., 111orclar t o
occupy ici::ort.:nt pi:ints, to hol.~?opcr; i l c f i l c s , t o pl.ncc o ? ~ s t : : ~ l ~ "ar
f it o
rctn.cvc ~ i ~ s t ~ ~bli c yac l, i s t s , ~:~c.chj.ni:f i n .cct>~!p::riyin(; p l t : , , > i . i ; (fol1.r Horse)
~nlitiefcn:;~ p n s , raountcc! t r o c j x , i l l - y c:if;iii.ccrs ?.nd O.c;c,ssing u n i t s
rm,.y bc 8en.i; o u t i n ar!vancc. Iti ncc.,)rr!nncc w i t h th:: inp:>rt;:lncc ilf t h o t w k
 ,

-nil t h o t r o o p s rcquiroc!, t h o f o r c o s c n t nut r.h??xc! nnd i t s coqx:siti,;n n r c

i?.otonnincd by t h c advance ;u:rrc! ' c ~ ~ u n n n d ~ t hr c, mr.rch colurnn c~:nmadcr, o r

.tho.oonmrindcr of *he whole firroo, Sinoc t h c primr.ry m i s s i o n of t h c r c -
connnissnncc b a t t a l i o n is rcconnaiss:mco.; o n l y i n c x c c p t i ; n n l c i r a m s t n n c c s
w i l l it bc cmp1i;ycd on t h o r.bo~c n i s s i ? n % , ,

245: Thc ncl-z~ncc gucrd m l ~ s tprovidc f o r t h c nnhindcrcd nr'.vnncc of t h o

main bo6y. It pusiics a s i d c wo?.k r c s i s t n n c o , it [ ) r o t a c t s t h c marchii.:~
Gr,;ops from, s u r p r i s c attnclcs from t h c m:,.rch direction. Upon. mccbini: t h c
cnomy it n u s t provide t h o Innin bocly t i m c nnc? spacc f o r i t s B a t t l c pro-
p a r a t i , , n s nnd r e t a i n f o r t h o co!mnnr.cl.cr h i s frccSorn of docisior; nnt! noti:,n.

ITnclcr somc c o n d i t i o n s t h o :xc'.vancc ;:unrii must brc:~k tllrough prc-

u i : ~ u s l yunf orc.sccn r c s i s t a n c c nrld h o l d stuljt3:jrnl:y important 6 c r r l i n p o i n t s
5.t h%s sccurcd.

Shculd h o s t i l e cont?;,:c.t bc cxpcctcd, march coluim comnnCcro r c -

rimin w i t h t h e i r n+rnncc G ~ . I % ~ Lc
~ sAs t o th-c locnti:?n of tk.c tlj.vi.sici~.conum~ti-
c r 800 pnr. 113.

2!.iS. Tnc dis.t~r,ct: b c t - f ~ c ~ticlv?r~cc n gunrd rind mnic body r u s t bc ( 1 )

suf f i c i o n t l y g r o a t sa t'nct t h e main body i s r?.& iiuncdi::tuly involvcd i n rrri
r,r!vr:nco ;il~irr! o i ~ ~ b t l t(,2 ) n;it t o o ~ r c n t o i!rc-.~cr!t; t h o t i m e l y cmployincnt
of tll6 main bocly. I n t c n t i , - . n s , strength, t a r r a i n nnil v i c i h i . l i t y c o n d i t i o n s

.
r ~ u s ta l s o ! ) c ciinsic~orcc~. ID ~ c n c r ~ . lt h, o r!.istr:nc'c b n b ~ c c nrrdvnncc guard
and m~xinbocly vnry bobrfccrl t v ~ octnr.1 s i x k i l ~ ~ m c t o r s During c!nrknoss,
wccthor of lrm v i s i b i l i t y , t c r r z i n i n which o b s c r v n t i o n i s pair o r w i t h
,
smc,ll srIvr.ncc gu:~rr!s t h c d i s t n n c c !my bc !!ccronsod.

2Li7. Th:? str0n;;l:h and c n m p o s i t i > n o f t h o n 2 n n c c ,<uar,I nri- i3ctcrmincrl

by t h o s i t u n t i n n , tklc in-kcnti.on, t h o t c r r : i i n , opscrv:~.tir.n :;r,ci t h c s t r c n g t h
<if t h c whole c3lumn. . .
The oclvnncc ;u:x-d sh.)ul,! bo hclcl t t t h o miniaum stroni;l;li, t h o
Ini'nntry otren..;t;X ijf t h c nr!anncc i;ur:rd. v?,ryiisg b c t w ~ c r i:~nc-thirrl.::nc7, onc-
s i x t h vE l o s s of t h o ontirr: ini'nr-try strength. Elcmcrlts of t h c [Iivininri
Tnnk ?c;fcnsc b a t t i ~ l i ? n , li;ht, q r t i l l c r y cn". cncinccrs i:!~,ji ?IC ?.tt;:i.chcr!.
L l s a :'.rmorcii cr.rs, l i g h t ::rtil'lcry colim~ir:o r o1cr:mnts t h c r c o f , a n d c?c-
i',$:;si.i~gt r o o p s n(,rly bc uttr.chc!?, F i ~ rt h o m a r c h inc:i.i.idi~nl hcnvy b n t t c r i c s
( o s p c c i n l l y fl:.,t -trnj::ctliry) ancl horsc c!.rnrrn i:r mnt:lrizor! -tclcphonc, r::d.io
nn~! "nlinl.r(:r l i G h t l ' unit:: c f t h c Zivisj.?n si$:n?l b h t t d i a ~ zr.rr; s u i t n b l y
ci~roj.1t h c .:.?.vnncc ;u::~rl!. Tiic n d d i t i c n of :~\b r i d g e ccjlumn qr c! .lpr~rt:i?n ,
i.horo,;f i s ;?c'visablc if .!its use cr.11 hc c o r c s o c n or i s cxpcctc<,. S<;o p?.r.
289 3:: t o motor v o h i c l c e .
iis n r u l c ni? a * l v t ~ : c rgu:-.rtl
~
1nf::ntry ~ . r i t hi t s hen-,~y wcn;>:tns nnrl c n z i n c o r s
so-rcr-1 hui:rdrci: :~ctr;r:: bohind -tho nd.,r.acc c.u:irl unlcso
.
mnrc11i.ng :it t l i s h t w i l l c o n s i s t only n f
Hi~untctl-trs>i.pa f o l l i : ~ ~
i . t c
,
! jircf'c;r:lblo
..
to
4

c?istrjlh:i.tc tkiox ir: t h c i z i n b?c?.y (N?tc: cnrh rc-.;incnt has 1-. ni>un:tocl p1r;toi.n
i~tlhut48 m n ) , If n ni.;;lrt n ~ . r c h S.s i:xtci:(lcc', iindcr sccuri.ty :lf trn,?i:s which
k v o beon ;n.o.,ri,,u::ly s o n t :P?rvinrf:, aorm:tlly n s m l l inC::ntry f o r c c :infficcr:
;.
ns security, ' ;lmi7.r.ch unc!cr f o ~ ;o:)ncii:bi.rms i s cond.u:::;c:,i !:iizilrrrly t o onc
nc.:lc n t nii;ht.

?Lie. T'hc : ~ 2 v m a o&iu-.rc' cor:onnnilor erg? riizvc h i s .r.dirc;nco ,:liar6 5.r.

nocor~lauccw i t h t h o s i t u n t i a n , h i s r:issit,n, t h o tcr.r::iri, tkl;! ~ ? i ~ i . b i laidt G
~
i?Z?ccr-mti;:ii candi.tions, an~l.i t s s t r c n ~ t h . It i s orp:.nli.zar3. iizi:it a

r 1 v . %its .
~ u "Vvrtrrppl' be up pert) il11(?. pcrh:::?~ i7i'i;ti xttacf,cfi
" ~ ~ ~ ~ , ? t . t r n (~rpcps"e r - ~>tl(:

Tiic mass of t h c i ~ f n u t r yfin2 t h o okhcr n r n s of t h c ::cl.~.r:iizcc ~uinrci

? p~ o; r"t i. o n of t h c I n f a n t r y and En;,inncrs ciin-
irarch ns t h c " ~ a u ~ t t r ~ ~ ~i~
si;?.l-utc t h c "~ortru~,!:". Corrcsy;onrlinz t u t h c i r cm~loyilcn.1;h:!rso-~'~rnvm
olcmcnts of t h o divisi,::n :;i.i:z,cxl bn%-t:;li::n. 3.r~;incluilo8. i n t h o r.c~.vc.ncc guard.

Tho distrinco ( f o r socuri.ty) bctwscn " H a u p t t r u ~ ~and ~ " "~ortrujj?"

i s normnlly b c t v c c ! ~1300 and 2000 mctcrs. ; . s t r o n g " ~ o r t r u ~ ! pw
" i l l scnr!.

" ~ : ~ r t r u ~ , p( fsu??,ort
~?" ) .
o u t a p o i n t com;?ang; a t n d i s t a n c c of 1000 t o 1 y 0 m c t c r s i n ndv.c~nccof t h e

Ln i n f a n t r y p o i c t , c s n s i s t i n g of ijcrhc.ps a n o f f i c e r a n 6 @no o r
o r ; r s ( 1 6 mcn) n r c c c t s t h o " V o r t r ~ ~ >or~ ""point. con~p~lly" nnr! fonvard
v f t h c i n f a n t r y p i n t r~c.rchcs by bounds, from onc O.P. t o t h e ncx-k, a
nouctct! ji:,ink, norm:\lly o o n s i s t i n ~of 3nc group (16 r i d c r s ) . Thc n s s i ~ n -
mcnt of t a n k d c f c n s c i;uns anc: . ~ i r o l c s s;;x;c.ns of cr~mnunic:~tion,c s p o c i n l l y
"illinkor" t r o o p s , t o t h o n9st ncl.vanccd clemcnts i s inpcrt,-,.nt.

Thc scxiller clc!:lctlts r c ~ u l n t c'thoir rmrch o c tho l u r r m .

or connect ion s c c par. 302.

249. F l a k o c c u r i t y r'.uri.nz t h o ~ m r c hi s pcrf;,rmc2 prirz::rily by p . t r : i l s

Xarch columns on nn :);Jon f l a n k t n k c ovcr t h o fl:,.nk s e c u r i t y of rc'..jacc.c?t
colrm.ns. Should pa-Lrols n o t s u f f i o c , f l a n k guards a r c cmpl(,yc?. ,Crr?innr-
i l y f l a n k ~ u n r r l sa r o .dir:.:ctcC,whsn necassary, i n t h o rm:rch orcl.er~!. I n
dxccr;ti.:~nzl inst@.nccs, t h e y 1xc.y bo sent out clurin~; the. by e i t h e r . t h a
c.?.-r-ncc 5~iij.ritor t h o :inin SoCy. Vhon s u c h occv.1-s i n f a t r y s o n t Gn n f l a n k
[ : u ~ r r lmissi;il: sh.?ul!! Sc notifioc? cc.rly annd s c n t o u t c r t r l y s i n c e n::r?xo.l.ly
f1::nk c:ucri:o m u ~ ttr:,.v<:rsc a l o n g e r r o u t e .

'The thro:?.% and t h c t c r r a i n dctorminc t h e stren$h 2nd ori:r.niz?.t-

i.)n of f li?.nk ,:uunrc!s. Thoy must c*.jntinual;ly r c c o n n o i t c r fin(! hnvc ::t~~?.ys
rl:::iil :-?oms :1f oomr~ur?icc:;i.;n w i t h t h o w i n fi:rcr;. Flank p;uar$.!.c. must
i i r ? r i & c t h c i r iwa security, not oni:j f'r:,utally, b u t n l o i;r? t h o f l a n k nnci
:::ftoa t o t h e rc:,..r.

Flank ~uar;!s a?-thcr accom;~nnyt h o ! ~ ? ~ r c h i c:,lumns

n.~ wh;ich -they
~ r o t c c tor t & c . posi.ti::>n t o ccvcr t h c nrlv.v::nac nnr?, l.-.tcr rcj<i:.n t h c r e . *
v f t'nc c , ~ unn.
l

Should nn :>.i!v:,.noo i,ovi:l,:;:> i;!tn n f l.::rk ni:*..rcli it 1123' h c st.~it?blO

t. -.
.., umL?lijy t h o t+dvnncc -u,rr.i! ns Plnnlc guard an(! con'st).l;i.ii;i? a no*?: r.civ?.nco
.cuarc'; f r a : ~t h c r:zi:i!l* bo(!.y.

Sh>iul:l :I si-rc;:~; .ii;rcai: i?ovol.cp ni;niur;t a f l c n k -ire. c r n provi8.o a

i.ovoloyed f,?rco -;;?.inst t h i s thro:it by turnin; cf'f t , n j n r d t1ic Elcuk, c l c ;
~:~i>:it:;of t h o r ~ m c hcdlumnr Evcrg sucii clc!~cn:t provi:.os it:; cvrri scouriky.

2y!. Difonsc; 3;;zirrst ar!;z~ror' v c h i c l o e i c f ? c i l it:!tor! bg roco~n?.j.sz-.no0

::t)?.d orlrly wr.rnincr,. Mi;-torizcd . u n i t s c r c os;?cciblly cnJ%lililc of r,,;:ort?.u;;
c C y . W a r n i n ~ sor' thi: :i;c>prn?.cli. of ,:r:-asrcd vc'niclos i s ;j.iior. f i r s t t o t h o
".
tl.:r~:~{;onci,trooi;s -r *:,o- - %'no ni!:n?:ir.:z'cr 3f %he n n r c h colum~iby m:?.ns of
: j i ~ n c . l s ;n c s s c t q c r s , c r r?.<'.in. 1nj.s i:r.ttcr i s rc;;ul.::-LcG. 1jzf;:ro t h c m?.rch
ir, bc:;an.

T:& JcEccsc ,c.\as rrra t:,bc assij;ncd .tilo ~ r a r c hcolumns, ~.ntl

u?s;?cc.ic.lly t,.i ti\,sr; I?: fin o;xn i'lr:illr, :?.?i! abuvo a l l o l s c ,

aft;cr t h c flct;l!is
a r c prcrnii'?~;'!'fir, :;h.-.ulcl. t h o y hi: l.:!cxbcd n t t h o bcginuin-; anr! cni? cf t h e
?:~?.rch columns. Roac?s 1c?.r1.ir.it; i i 1 . t ~t h c fl.nnlc o f t h o a n r c h o r f r a n Chc r;:nr
on!: bc. bloclcci; by c n , ~ i n c o r sz r h t r w p o .themsclvcs by cli.t~coclr :>thcr
o s . Bucoif ir>$. c;:nn;rcr', vchi c l c s , ilosi!.;n-.tcd f o r r'.r~fcnsivo :,j!:r;>oscs,
r r. t r of mr.ch, o i t h c r i n front: fir bchi:iG tE!c nb-.rch

coli.innn:i, :ar <>n: > ? . r c . ~ . l ~r3c.cl.s.

l

 iLs s,: -n ns an ::rmnrz,: v e h i c l o ?.ttnclc is roc?[;riie::rj., 5.1 1 %kt-

tnfik won-.jns crr: !?,;?2c rc?.d~i f o r a c t i m , f f l o t t r o o p s t?J.!cc c.ivcr upt:ll
eorx>a.i.nd of t h c i r c,::nr.i::.n:icr, noun-tcx'~sri:;ro,ps ctn.1 trP..-.-, .,., :;n v c h i c l o s cnGcavcr
t o l c t ~ v ct h c r o 2 . d ~i n s n i i l l i:r.Jn;m, If t h i s i s not :?ossiblc, t h e y h a l t ,
6 i s n o u n t an(? Block -thc :-.?nii.c: i r i t h c h o s t i l e d i r e c t i x ' s , u s i n z vchiclCS

.
c.n(l o t h o r m a n s , and dcfcn?, t h o c b o t n c l c s . Scnc rcxz.iil w i t h t h e aninr,ls
:~aii vehbclcs

251. D i s t i ~ r h c n c cof tiic :x~.rcli by hostile n r i l l c r y f i r o ?lcili, t h c

.1;..,in-8 of innrbh can b c n c t by 12,-.vin;: t h o r o u t c of 125~rcho r by clcp1:jynont.
.
i.,.
>
h - t t o r i o s s h c u l 6 be cnplo:,rcclcarly t o c:,nbn:; c r t i l l o r y obsors?.tiun
;>l.?)ic,?. XI' cur 07;rn a i r obscrv:iti - n i s possible, wc must hrinr; i n t o c c t i r n
q u i c k l y loni; r::n(;u f l a t Lrnjoctory w c a p n s ( 1 0 cn cnlltio?:).

112 t o r r a i n i n which o b s c r w i t i ? n i s not ~;oeC,wca!r h ~ s t l i ' f o r c c s

.-,,r t i c ? l y d c ~ l . s y i n 2an6 c n p l o y i n ~i t s heavy wcvpons .

n?rmally r.rc n c s t quiclcly pushc:d r.sicic b y t h c i n f a n t r y :rr:o-rice ::;urrd
,... If n c c c s s c r y t h o
cdrr::l~cc i:uard a r t i l l c r y i s cwplcycdrionr t h e r o u t e of march. Tn?!,:s can
*ic!cly brc:.k Chrouih t h i s s o r t of r c z i s t a n c c (weak hostile).

I n open t c r r n i i n c r whon c r o s n i n c broed t c r r a i r r s o c t o r s ::?ton c.nd

when nccossary t h o r , r t ? . l l c r y must 3 r o t c c t t h c xnrch. Tho f i r e rc:'.<.iticss
uf t h c p r s t c c t i i l ~n r t i l l c r y n u s t 3 c cxi?cclitcd by a l l cleans ?.v:~i.l.:blc.
Nc7rcrthclcss r.:~xiatincsn 8l.uclrir.,: of t h c sgcod of a2v::ico mst b e nadc i n
,.;r<!cr t o scv.1rc: :r.,?~rju?~ko ::rti.lli:ry p r i t r : c t i . : n .

Commn~.ors ,of naroh colu-m-:; c;r?;.'3.~ytilo i ~ r t i l l u r y1:::li.or.Icn which

l-i-vc boon ::t+;achc?. % $ thon.

I?-,a I I C F C ~ ,,n cr:;orc,l ro:icdn +hn c~arun,~.ndci.( ~ r ~ ~ ~ ] ? r : p f ~ ich~rl oy lro) y s

t h o r:rtilli;ry izu.~~c:'!i?.tcl.yuni!cr h i s eccxr:uc!, o;:cc$ t.hc horL-vyfli-t
t r - J c s t c r y nr-1;illcr.j , er;ly if t

f.jr ill.i:tcctl.::i, d h u al.tiiI.ory i!.i%;r.chsd t o

khc mr ch culu!nns r,h:wlfi. bc rolic.rct! i:f t h i s p o t c c t i n z n i s s i ~ x l .

i.11 c:,..xx~.nilr>rsn r o ri:s-c .-,~.n:l-Ic t'iak ?rt;l:lcry onr;l: :jcc! f::r r.mrch

;r;tccti:n i s ;>rc-~.rc!?.t? :;;:rtici;>ntr> i n , tllc b n t t l c ,

2 , T I r c i i r ;::unrc' uccuron t h c ~T>'.inborly a i ; ? i n s t sur;>ri.;c rrn? pro-

~i:!cs f o r it:: r o s t . It ct:n!?;it cx2cct sw2port f r o n t h c in?.in body, i.ooord*
in;: -t!~th5.s .::rinc.i?li:, t!!u ::-l;rcni;th nuci c<min;>i:si-ti.;~io f t h c ~ n ri:ui?.rcl ,., crc
, ; ; c c . . lic?i. !;qnr:ls ::.re cn~v,:o::ccl ififci~.t;ry, b i c y c l i s t s , :jtr:.:n;-.-,
t>f

::r.t<.llcry inol.u\l:in;; Ion:; rai~;;cf l u t t r c ~ j a c t o r j rrucl>t;ons, t7.n.l: rlofhi~sc

j s i L n a l .f:roc,]?sw i t h xarircjlucls r r . . o . ? if llccoc!::~.ry, tr(,r:l;s
t r o ci !.incs, cn;;inccrs n i t h cqui.;jncnt t o ;;,ro:::xrc lhc-tficli:s,
dcs-troy ??:-i.c!~cs C-to. 'i'cnks !:lay bc incluclcd. It nc.1:~ nay 'do ~:!~iLr?.blot o
2t.ti;cb s!z,,ko 311~7. c!ionic,al .troo;js. Scvr,rr:l. r c ? r :;nar,!:: c1r.y ?:c ij.nc'..;r r.nc
~ i : ; a r c i:rozuj..--onid, T?lc
ocixn:ani.cr, n2oquatc; si;:nnl :in(! c o : ~ ~ - r i i c c : t i : ~nc:als
div.isi3n roc:;nnais:,?nco bnt:;hl l n i s r!j.roci;ly unrlcr t h o .carxi:tni.:. <>I?t h o
r0.r ;..~;:r?c, unlcsc: i-i: i s at-!;:.ckicd 4 ~ 3cnc of t?:c;sc.

Rc?r ;:uarrls I:I.)VU ri;~rvrw".h y bmnr:.s. Dalay:: or'. Llio c a r t .,f hho
as5.n 11ccI;f r ~ u s tbc cxpoct,::d. Tho c!isti:ncc h c k ~ i i ; ~ro2.r
:~ r;~i.'.rC :lr;d .:!::i.ri
, i c 1 . 0 ( 1 ) jjroS;blc : : c l q p of t ~ l c1:c.n. be.,c?ye . ~ : ( 2 j t h c
. .
131 3:: z -;n.

C.l -hhc :x:r.c:; t h c rw.r su:.r.i: i:j :.ir;oiiizc-l a:; ro:;i;r'rc nrd ou;:lr;vrt
y i n t k c p.r?vc.r?cc: ~ u ? . ~ d .
w i t h mc;ro n<!5ilc 'tr>t?"s $r.ii.:layod s i ~ : ~ ! r l t l u o . : u s l r.S
Their rcc.:nn::ia:iriacc :i,cncics -:r.i;x1-:xin. cr;ni;nct w i t h t h e c.;~orjy. ,; s t r o q ;

.
rc!tr, :yLi,:.r< m y :.;l:ii: h:.~jo n "rcr.r :i::i:nt smpc:n:~", follcuiii;;: which is the
i!lf::"ntry pi t:i.?,.t nnt: ';hi r:lsunir.,:,i ::oii:t
 ,
I n r. imrch t o t h e rr3nr -the csscn-ti::l f a r t h e nab l>n?,y i s t h o
quiok p i n i n g \:f ilistr.nci:s. Fcr ::his p . ~ r p c s oiill ~.v2ilc'olc roi1~?8-1-c used.

253. Lilxnrisc r o ~ r!;u.rCs m y be clx>lf~ycdi n nn advcncc, i f ottaclc o r

anngyntico f r o n t h o ro::r r:::n ?>c c x ~ ; c c t c d . Oftcn 1.rcalc i n f n n t r y clcmcz~ts,
o e ; ? c c i a l l y heavy m.chine i;?~n3 '(!.t:~:'k d.efcnsc wccpens w i l l s u f f i c e .
A r t i l l e r y m y be uccossnry.

25b. D u r i n ~r c s t s t h o .tcrrzi!n i s so u t i l i z c d and t l l c tro~3p.s s o ?is-

tribiltccl a s t o n i n i n i z c t a t h o ntmost t h e obscrv:tti.in an(! c f f c c t i ~ ; c n c s s of
k L q s t i l e n i r rcconnuissanoo. Tllc h i ~ l l c rc'o~;nan:'or a r r a n g e s S e r t h o pro-
t c c t i . > r i t o bc ;.ivcn 3y a i r ik?fcnsc tr.;oj?s. I n d 3 < . i t i s n c v e r y u n i t securos
i.t!;elf a~:,.iilst a n a i r t h r o a t . Obsorvcrs w1rn icf t h o np;ro.ich
f l i e r s . The t r o o p s t z k c nr!.vaatzgc ,of :ill coTrcr ni;:? remain q u i c t
..,.rcul) c.t r c s t 1:roviiics "air i;unrds".
.
oP h:mtilo
Each

Should c. h o s t i l e 'lc>v?-flyin;; o r h i c h - f l y i n g a t t a c k Sc rcco.;nized

t h c "air G ~ ~ i t r d~' t i ~ Le ~ s warnin&
C ( " ~ 1 i ~ ~ c r ~ h . m "Evorycnc
). vihi.) hv.s n o t
some ; ; a r t i c u l a r 6 u t y t o p c r f ~ r m s ccks irnncdiatcly t,ho nc:.ros.t cover.
1V:'oq~snst o i ~ serx;leycd. a c n i n n t t h o ccttackcr open f i r e a s hi? c:~n.cs w i t h i n
n o . 'Thc co~xm.n.:.cr of t h c " r e s t zroup" d i r o c t c whons.ncria?.l. c o t i v i t y
s k ~ r ~be
l l resuncr!. If n c c c s i a r y , a t t h c h e g i n u i w 3f c, r c s t t h c c~i:u-u:ndcrs
.;c 1 1 ,~ t-~ .
L$ ...,. :ii: cu:.?:'ioncr!t:~ry o r d e r s c c n c o r n i i l ~t h e c i r t h r c n t an$.
i...q-
l t !; 1,:: given.

4gain:;t nn el;cmy or! t h e gronnrl thc? t r o o p s a r e secltrcd a s in-

d i c - t c d i n t h e !:ec?;io!l "Seciirity duri:lg t h e r c s t " .

Raoom~ai:;r,n,icc must bo maii~tni.n.cdB u r i u ~t h e r e s k .

S e c u r i t y throut;h Deployn.mcnt b e f o r c
the B l t t l ~ .

-- 255. 1. m r o h i n g f o r c c 'vhich cx;,oc';.s o n r l y crioountcr w i t h . t h o onorny

i a o r c n s e s by dep1o::siont iks rc!ndinc:x; f o r ti:tttlo -,rid t h e r e b y scc,ircs i t s
:Ippronch more e f f c c t i v o l y .

1x1 ridvancc :;~z~lrdo:;n be cmployod t o p r c t c c t t h c c!cl.poynont of t h o

rcin?.indci- of Ohc f o r c e . S'nould t h c ?clv?ncc guard co:rsc t o f u n c t i , ? n zs cr.n
nclvr,nc<? guard duririg t h e d@plop!e:xt, it:; tnsl::; sf(? nsr;i&;yed in kcc:piilg
w i t h thane of t h e ;.~holc : f o r c e , 2.6 n r?ale t h o o r d e r f o r t h e deiilo-,ment:
w i l i annul any s p a c i a l rncirch troci]? r ! i ~ p s i t i . o t - i .

256. I n additj.c;n t o t h o cenm::ndcrf.s i n t o n t i o n , t h e d i s t : m c c from t h o

cnerqr, -:id h i s r c : ~ d n o s n f o r b c t t l o , t h e t e r r a i n ttnd irj.sihi1.i-!;y c;;nli.;tions
?.rc of i n f l u o n w upon t11a ticic, t h e ire:\ arid t h e klnd of ;lcplo-y@e?rt.

Oijcri k c r r s i n , S!!.vorr.blo obeerv::tion by t h o oncmy, long r:;ngc fire

cnd strerig a i r tllroci'tc. miy n o c c s s i t & t o c : r r l i c r clc:pln~p.(;:lt.

Or; t h u o';her h n d , thc ;i i t u a t i r w : nn.; J

dcmn
in-rch i.flo r i . ~ i . n : ~f,ol r m t i o n -+rithout consi dcr?.'~jbu of lossc:: .
d t h e d<xntin7.:";ti0?1 of
I n such

shorl; c!c!+x~~.xrs .
inr;t??lccs, 1:T,07.5 ~ n d i i -hoski1.c o b ~ ~ ; r w . t , i o ur
n i l v ~ 1 s he t c ~ o i d c c ?5 y

257. I n ndx..nriso i ~ ocvernl.

i r.olu:?n~: can f ? o c c l i : r ~ t ct h o dcplogonon-l' and.
provldc t h c comni~n(1crw i t h tl=c o;~].)orl!inity of s e c u r i n g c::r?jr t h e i e r r c i n
:lcocsoary f o r t h c cngafjcmcnt an&, under c c n t n i n condlti.i-~nst o c f f o c t :in
cnvcl9prnr:nt of .the hostile f l n n k .
 IIovrci:cir, r I r 1 i : r L I b c?r:xin i;oi:oth::r f o r t k:
1 : . Tl~i;;111at;Lo~:rI..v>I. <I:-4ci-i.d by -f;i?c co!zrc:ndoi. I:(.forc tbi: I.n(ii.vi.duiil.
.
ar.nr3ci11d~~rnIi,~:vo commi.ttcd tl~amsc?.vc!r. i i t t h o onmnc '!;.i-rc t b , ~oaniminr:zdi>rvi ll.,
;111cn uoc'cs::cry f o r tilo ~x::elii;l.r;<l o r hi:; i n t a n t i o n s , or:lcr n:i or!?!:r?iz!?.ti
., clu
i:: di!ptlt.

250. If t h c co:u?a.!ldor i 8 ~linriblc i n hi:. rlo:>loyncn.t o r d c r .to r.r!;:,ign

b:>-tklc mi.ss;io!~s, novor-tiriclcss he ordors -tho d i r s c t i o n c.ncl oh jcci;ivc ol' the:
f u r t i c r :idv:.ncc, t h e b:rttl.c rcconnai.ssnnccs, t h o bo,,lndc~rioo be.hrrcn nd-
j::;ei!nt a n i t s , t h o ;~rotoct.!:n t o lie yrovidod by t h o r,r.!;illcry rind ':!%her
.;roo ;ion:; f 03- t h c :lc:>loyn~cn+;, i:nd t h o 1oc:ition of t h o s?oci:il unii;n .
roconno.issnrrco b:lt.t?l i o c i n fro.;* of &..
;; ~1ivi:liu.-. r,.:e*.*i.vcr>
or.i!ors f o r i.ts c,.,r:.diict i n nocordnncc 1 6 t h Far. 175,

2.59. As I r u l ? th:; d : i v i j i o ~ ~3-j.cn%1. b:..tt.::L~onrr:c(;ivs.s ? ~ no r d ~ rt o

c::t:?on t o t l i c f orv~crd i.nf 2ntx-l. rcgim.ci~%:ro r - t o thc
.?:;t:li:il in!! w i r ~coi!-.-c.il>.i.
i7,d;+ V L d.ucl r?..'.rci~ coIumns. .t;ho dt:r!lopcrrt con+;i.n~!.cs, t h c ~c?mm:~un:i.cn%%on
i s im:.i.rri::~.i!lod 9.n:'. ,i;?!c '~.rtil.:Loryn c t j s bsqjn. I c i s t o ho rcco-;onci-~dcd
t k c t -the li.ncr, b ~ : !;c 1.ai.d :IS i;o eel-yc t h o m;:xin~~::: .l;i.r.~cf o r t h c ~.n:;::.g.omon't.
Tha divio;.:~rr -i;r!ri~kl i n ~rii!w:nn ;:ot u;) t o i l l s rc:r; fer?v:rd .i.t sc;rvc:i t o
conni:ct c.11 ii?pnCry rcgirncrf;, (idotc: Tho tii:ris :.on trunl: i i r i c (S:::lmnloiC
I ) 5 . i ; l - ~1n:ti:n
~ rt-..r t o froirt r:oivn~~nic?:i;io:ilint2 of -(;he di.risioil, wrhj.ch

t
2nd t . 1 ~d j ,.lsl::ln co,~rni~~li:cr
o 0 o i .1 1 l
.
on t i l o n:trr;h is ?;:3.<l :ilor:l; t h o r(!:>:d o r s t ~ o o tu:jon which tile> mi.n colu!m
m.rc:lns
c
1x1. t h c d i v i s ion. ( o i $!?.a 1 b::.Lt'- ?ion)
r of v 0 ) , Sycci;:.l ci?s~:rva-tion.
i s f o r th,: 1 - o n c c t t ~ r e, ,.%~>.y from -i;h;, t i n ? 1 , ::r d co7-noc t c d
by side S.ln[::s. S h ~ u l d~ r o : i t:lcinz"s~dsbc mrrde on tli:: si;.rr:l ?>:?ti;,-.].ionf o r
L,r<.<. ~ : : ;,.:~d m~.~.ii~rtcr~:~ncc
... .,in of tiit? ri;;:rxi:lrd !ic!t :?.lid ti1i::ilri:hv i:!: ?I(: l..nn.hlo t o
tjrrridc d i r c c t vriro co!~~m.:ni.c;:-l;i,)lbullvocn the, ini?r.:i?;ry r::l~.;imc~rt;s <:;:d t;hc
1 1 j . vi c ~ :r, .Lhr rc{;i:~c;n t :: a i l ? connc c"i -I;hicmc::L.ics ; I : . : i.ntlici':t'o~i
: . ( . ) c . t i i . . ;.I1 ,i.;zi?:..);lc tro,.?:: :xi' t h c
sign;.? ?;::+trlion a r c t o bi; cnploycd t o c o n s t r i l c t t h o !:i.;jn-l riot f o r t h o
o n~nc,on1[;;2t , '.?he c~l;s-!:~ru c t i on of 1 : t i o r c l l i r i c : s :::-.-uo,? !.on?; ri:::ri:: r!l 1 irics
;jhcn t h c d:iv.is:.dn con'n?.r?dor cl;;?.nf;o:; liis C.P. 3 l f n k c r :,.tld l ~ t n ~?;5;;i1?.1s
1
si:rv-i: cr i: corn.oicn<>~~t to .tho v;;ri; o o : ~ n ~ i u i o n t i o in n s-ri.i;::Slc. t ~ ; r r ? ~ i n .

Tho Liixcly c:::pli,yxi31-,~; of' tiio sl:r!:rl t r o o p s r::.-.i.li!:'tr:s t;hc con-

:::riici;ion \,.,.
and i s the. trzsi:: f a r the rtdo,::i:+:l;<: <:i-cr:i;;:,n .>f -!;ho bni;<l; n,y'-

,I,*, . , Serco~:i:~:.:. I : !, , ; . a :
i :n s of .;.h:: -.rr??r ::'t.s% ordinor-
1 b; r . . 3 ; i s o i l . r n . : ; n c : . L,y:in:.;.t
;?. r c : : . . c;::ocsr;:.r:' 1.'. +;hi: :fY,o1-l: :in,! I?'.~:?.::I :.:nil i n *>x-
c c l - ! : : c hr r i t b u r i:iff'l;r::i~cli~u?. d~?i'ciii.:.i?rcly.

Tho 1:;-Lcr t l i c 2 ;.cri:r;ni.~;~;i s rocr:~';:i.zucl ni: ru:::.r. 1)y ti..:; c,!.;I"L~,

?;k.o
nor; , ; f f o c - t i t z l y i t fulf.ill.:i 2%;; :nissi!>n.
 2Q. Ccrc?;nin,c in tilo ::5.r i s r. ;,y:t:!-or f o r t h c a i r f o r c e . For 14ni.l;rd
,;cricjds it, cn:: soc:lrc;cl b ? ~t h e o:.r:>lopcnt of !>ur~ui.k:zud boi:!nkcr c:rir..tj.on
.
7 . ~ 2 :n:: (: h n s t i l c :~:.irdrr!;!lc:: If wc hrr?!i: o n l y .:rc:'.k c u r s u i t uni-ko vfo n u c t

....;.
dofiont O I I ~ E ~ ~ VwCi ;t h ~ o o ~ a h n t t i l ~tih
~~: !h ~ s t i l cz i r r ~ ~ ~ n r ? t r i s ~ : n nShould
, . trriocs $ 2 ~:'rc.i1~.':.l.o f o r c m j ~ l o y l x n J:!.ad ~ lio i:m!ployod, wc n u s t cor..:idsr
th3.t t]-,o cnr.l;iy wi.11 rzr7.rd .t:lc ::rc. i n ~ h i c 2 1thoy r ~ r on.ct;ivo .:: :li n.lTcn of
cc.

oo:1ciiiornbLo i3[iori;ano.;.

Tho s c r e e n i n g ae;a:it;st khc a i r enemy demund:: cnref!ll oain:?u:'lnge

on t h e gri?l~nd,at e v e r y opporC.hnity, g r s u a t e r diipersa!. of unit:;, ?nd -the
i l + i l i z a t i ( : n of iiigbt movea~euts.

267. Offf>:~sivec o u n t e r rrcnrtnuissancc i t ; t h e t a b k primal-ily of a:-my

co.valryi I t n7.10-1; endcavor t;o p r a v c n t t h o cnc:ny rocchin7 t t
h z clr:iilei.:ts bn-
i.ric scroono'cl. idor!:ov.?r, t h e h o s t i l c rcoonnais:inni;c .;ui:;k be xt%ao!:od and
1 .

dri-rcn hack.

2611. Deft?.n;;ivc Gci.ou?ini; i s &f:Cectivc whon .thc t c r r n i i i i s s ~ c l -a. s t o ,.

ccnfi.ne ! ~ o c t i l crcoounuissancc .I;o fow.ippro:~cllos; Tho;;" can. be blockod and
I;hc ol>sLacic~sc t c . , bc uli~ployccl i n rlcfcnsc iqainzJ; t h o c n c a y . It j.:; t o bo
rccomiilcr:docl that stronfi;cr f o r o c ; be 1oca:;cd further t o t h c r;sbr arid :it
: E a ~ ~ o r a b lpoi.nt;;;,
o pyr:par :d t o coun:tcr brcnk thro~zgha-ttciniik::. Suri; rind
rttplil aoln.111n-Lcai;jonw i t h i n tlic s c r c c n and t o t;hi; cc,m;;ndcr xi~cth z ~ r o v i r l c d
1.t~
ihi: <.q,-.
A. "I'W .
o o n r ~ ~r;.s::?:~.cc
i. o!.n!iu? r!Ix s';c.!~.l.i:b i ~ ni, r ! . far. tr! t h o f r o n t t o r e c o n n o i t e r

S c r c c n n g by i S f a h i ; ~ ~ i ar c. q u i r c d i r ; tcri.liin which l i m i t s o r f o r -
b,i.rl:j tilo ao!;'.vit;y of arnry oo.v.l;lry. Dcpcnil'j 14; o;i -the concll.tions, iihc
i.iti?ahtry i s t o bi: rc:ip-Forcod by o t l ? ~ zr rm.
l o r r c i r , poisoni:i;s, r,si>cci?J.l y ir it i s ; > ~ i i s i b l ei l l E ~ U C . ~ ;d ~ p t h ,
8-a

cxn c,onsi.dor:,lji.y n-tr.cni;t?~::r. t;l.!i. dci'i?n.si.xrc s o r c c n . Evcu w i t h a shiirt;.:!;c of

isLs $ j.;~~; , i - , 'zr:<. . cf ::.rc.c~s , l y j n{;

wcA,;c;.~5.~~1. i,l~c , ~ ~.,, c,+-,i
..,LL~.. &;*,.: ?i cta~?.ocs 7>ri! 1.1 ~!.gxfrt
t
h u t %cffi::ct !v32:Ly c i i o ~ e i ~0, : . ccnsid,..-cthlg L L i ~l %hc scr'z~rin:; opcrc!;j.c-ns .

.
265. Tpco !io;ti.J.c incs-.:.g,: nnrl 1
..:7.-y I > O R G i l l l . C
r c I b t 1 i:. c..irry

266. Slg!.&l -tro::?p:r cr;ntrib?:i;:: r!r i:~fv\.r.i.l:i t n t'll? :I 6rcci.,ij ng oy::s,:t:ins

t2iro:igh .tilt. :.:;nil of cq:J.op?nzr.:.t ::f ?;iivi.sX i r o l ~ s ! : ;%:!c;n::. They cr.i! ao0om.o-
,... ,. .,;;, I?:{;8 i j g i~?ti.rf'c.ri r t g :;$-ti: .tilt. 1~3~5-i;;
, 1; r..:,-'io s;ysI;cm, i!y rt:frnj.,.Lng from
s i i r . I 1 - 1 s They 1:c::n :;ccrc-L ?.nd w:ii;oh ovr.:r our o ~ n isli-:n:ll
.truf li c z:~;.ld l>y otki;:y ; j . c ' . : L I - 1 r d 'r ; 2 . ibhc
c : s o r c u n i n ~ODoi-.! t,if~ins.

268. Tho gr:..;?.bc;r :ior.i;ion 0.'' ti?o ciar noi;i:vity of' ,t;ronps consi.:;.hs i n
c ! I . :I;?on psr,prr o:~i,oiit i ~ r 3i ,' im;r(:l?os and the *.:.ro!: o~r~:-.i.:l.
i ~f
r
,
. lit,:; cs~.:!it.i : i t i y -the suoouss r,f 2.11 ?tr.:lcrtnlc~.n[:c,

26. Th,, marcjl c.b;.l.ity i:f 11 ?,>rcc i s ' c 1 i.f .tiic ~:l.c:fi::~?ts;.trc; n f ~ t
iqil:~!.ly : ~ c l i t - r ~ i i l c r irind :r.cc~sto:n<:dt o cr:ori:'ic;?i. 'i'hr:rcl'orc frolil 1:lie bo-'
. . t r r v y j ; I b l i c 0 1 ,r r I i.13
 .
mctrcb.ing. This .Lr; :;;i;cc;;.!!l~r ; i p p l i c : ~ ' t ~ lt ~o: f o o t tro,>p::, t;o uhon: t h o r~.c.d{
:root gcnr any <.!I).k i-.l'Ly cr-L:.:!, d:iSJ'i'icn?.ty.

270. P r o p c r l y ccjn,;i.!lircd inorczsc;: $.)I.' in,arch dizs-:;r!ncc:., r;rrq&r r,.:st:3

and >:Lc?.juzt~nr:!-it ? ~ . r i o d s , 3t;r:ic.t rn:rrc!~ d i s c i p l i n o , cc:rc of t h o fr:ct, 12r~j.n.-
tcilanc,; of clot.hing ?.nil cqu icincnt, of soddlos , nni~ncl.equ.p:ic:n.i; :?.:id sitoc;-
ing, c:,.ru of +.:kc hc:s.lth tind 3.dcqrintc 3 r d wholcsomo rnt.io:.is :.rc th: most
c f f c c t i v o ;rmans elf s c c ~ ~ r i nnnd g i.ncrc;:~sin(;:n>.rch c~~:p~~.bi.'litics, !Chc f.-:ll..
inc clut of mcn with sorr! fcc't aiid of ani.r:wl; vi3.ti.i sorc' bbc1k:; o r .l:r:r!ri.shn r i
, , i;ll!.ici!.tcs tilc c n r c w1;ioll choulil tio gi:vun both mun and imincil:;.

Conk .i nuou:: oll::orv?.t S o?l of f o o t -Lrr>ops, :ir:.3.miL 3 2.ncl ri<lc>,::,

d r i v i . r i and v n i ~ i c i c ; oil tkic m ~ ~ r o ht ,i m c l y r c l i c i ? ?.'or irlcn 2nd bo::s,l; 1-cf1u.j.r-
inp; r c l i a f , '.~;pr;:pri:.ttc :issist::?lcc during r c n t s : ri? m?ttorr;
i n ?:~j.~:oi~rc
f o r %hi: co~npariy :~nd highcr con7i:~ndors. Timoly ehhngu:: front :i?iri 1:o t h o
,;r?,lk, -I;ro-tanrl li:r.di.t~g i n o?vclry ui1.i-t:; nus st bc ~niilc5.r; orclor .!;(; i ~ r pro- ?
p e r l y f o r i h o ::.nina.ls. Such o . r c i.c:;sons t l i r : .trouble!: i~i-jsil,:~; d u r i n g LI
..
- i,r ~r!iious
. march.

271. Trn:sl;ort:!.tion !>y vch-i c l c 5 of :x:n's packs nuc! ::nitili:l s t loads

..
nfrordi; con;-ii.cr:tilc r - l i n f :ind i:riL2,:: t o t i l v 1o:lrch o f f i i ; i c n c y . Tho oorrcc-
p : i r l o g iaerrj:iro .i.c t;ho nur,Iwr CI? 'v-<.kiiclr>,",:I.<~::rik~: .?;itis pr(.c.?.CU~-c .kt;
ox:-
ao.;:t.icui~l cnscr, ~llii? rini~?l co:;i::tSrGnclg.

On t h o ck!~or ha?cl, v;?~i.cl.c:: ?.,:;.th.t'ric t r o o p s , i n r n f : i r :IF; .t:?lcir

r i n . ,
. i ,. i i s s:1e11l(!, ?ic i a i k i i i zed t o tr:iii.q:or-!; I i t : OI" t h o
r;lu.ipma~ii; 0.1.' ncil and h;iri;?a ir11u :l.rc i u n--;f:d of -.r,li.~f.

272. So ].oni; :CL! h:.btl.i: oonLIkJc:c?nn c x i s t , ro::.t ciayr: :..i*[:: i..oI: .i:o bo onn-
si.di.rcr1. TI-,orsfore ov::r?yrkt.rc o p p n r t i . ~ i i t ~~l?i.t::i:
r hi: !.!.til.i::i:d f o r kh; PC-

; ~ t i ; i n ,r
<>
, riquipmcut; 2n.i cl.vt;h:.ug .
&pur::.tfdn: of.' rn;:].? ;i.nd rnii,!2:l., f o r t h c c.?.ro :u'~clcoi?i:i:tionily [:p t r r ~ ~ l s p o r t -

:>h<;:ild t!ct:r m :ro;lc:s i-1;. nccos r.::r.y i n thr. :!st; I , : 1:: 3dn::n.t-
;:gcr~u.s tc .:,ro,,,!,d..: f(.,,rz ,<:$:,; cl,.~ri;t~~,
.k?~: III:,~~;C::<Y
~>:,,r.kc:bi' +;kc;& ~ ! y .
 In xnmr z ~ t do7Tr.i n:ajo';l~-i:~~: ~.~?.rch sp~:crl :mil c a p b i l i t i c s nrr.
..,.,L,lit..i::blljr d ~ o r ~ . . c s c d .Troo;!s rxirchlilc i n f r o n t sh<>uld.f ' r c q u c n t l y i!r: r e -
C7L.,.

licvod. Ia dccp s:l<>y< it i!lqy ha ncocss::ry t o cnplrif. v o i i i c l t : ~ v.d.th s l e d

r C r ,?r s l o i ~ l i s-LC: br,.;nk t h o v;,;n;r f o r .the t r o o p s .

Thr: viintcr cqui.::mu:;t i~f mnzn ::db c a s t must h e prcmj.dcd c:!.rly.

2 IRscrfnr a s tlic oitu?tic!n n c r n i t s , t h e rolltcs of mnrch ~ ~ 1 be s t

rcc3rm:1itorcd i.f - 1 . 1 ~ doubt e x i s t s a:: t o t h e i r u c n b i l i t y (ropc.ir rrark,
1)?-:1 c?ii:,.z';.ty of h r i d ~ c c , olst?.clcs, 5 ~ c . qsnow, b t c . ) Zspcci[~.I.lyis r e -
ciin!:?i:;:;:incc f'cr niwtor tr:l.ffi.c.
:ICC~:E.I::T.Y ! ~ P R?.r:, not ::l?b-v.:;~ reli:!bl.o
as t>u the r0o.d !lot. Air [.>hd.L<)gr:xphs:arc :I. .v?.l~dtit~lc; :?.clj!~rlc;t.

S h ~ u l dt h u r e x i s t t h c p c s c i b i l i t y o f dcu;~,:~gecl
r o u t c s , i.n;it?oi:rs
.ire :;eill; foi..r?.rd., ofteil w i t h briic1gi::g nr.ltorj.:ll, o r z r z ctt-lnh,;d tq., tilo
:.tiv:~i;ce gu-rd f o r r e p a i r vor!~. It may be s u i t c b l c .ti: time rc s-c,: f o r t h e
posir>ds i n % - ~ h i ct hh c rcpai,r 'fork w i l l !~roh?bl.y -i;n!ci! pl.::cc.

6 . I i r e i : insrc, ~lc.pcilclarit upcin rcl;;:;Llc: n::p:; . I ro-ds j.11

i;i'ocl ci:ridii;ioi: +;ha11 i s G d;iy m r c h . Shuuld rccc!?n?.isszr!cc 'uc irq::::;-ilili:
or- shc1:ld :tnji do~:Li-t cxi::t, I.oc::!.l.y':.or~L~~iri;cc?guid%;c.ci-lmld b,: :;,:,our~~~l, '
i f p o s s i h l c , ~ ~ j ~ o e i ? -flol ry bn.d stri:-tci.!~fi cf ilo:rrl :'.~<l (in v c r y d.i..r!c !iii;t!Cn.
Wight n~crrchos, o c l f ' u iif?;n!l r c q u i r c -\:hi: ]:iI::cing of
s i & x zrid r l r l ; . . : . ., ~ 1 k c m i r col.~crc!:c:;! c f -kh:!
r c
,.," i t r o o ; ~ c,

If lios.;;ile rrc~;o~~:ii.::cnilcc: or s?>scrv-:ti;i; ;.s' n r o b s b l c , thi:rc must

bc 1.o li.g.hi -visj.i,lc. Oth,:,rui.i~~
f : . c , i l i ; ; 1 . ; c.iir;ror:cc I
:lr.:!t~:.r::li. ~ 3 . t t h o <.nd of c::cll ccnitxtny <;to
no:in.:ci; i c,i! br;i;$p:on ul!.:mciltk of .i;l);? 3:;xrch
.,
I - i n . If n o t i r . vohicli.:: tr:;vol. .~r:ti?:>utliehi::;, tho!,. . L i ~ o i rcr>:?~:!l n u s t hr;
rcducctl.
, .

7- .
i;xccs;;;.vo .dcn:lc.?u .;vtltl,ni:j dj,~t.i.ri5.~1; Yp3<; 'llc.!;.(;I!(. :,{;v;-.. ,+!
,, I:.iri; t:.1i.i
;t

ia0rnl.c i:f t h o tri :>I>:;.

)Tktc.?: c;: rl-: c:,:rk;:c:!; i a :t.~!.l; c~x;jc;'ci;c?d. crct.:}; c<>~~>;itJ.cr<~l;i:>r:. c:,.r> 1:o
~~3:.n,~~~. ;l::i,:>c>n:>.l,:<,!?f.:l-?t.!f t;l(;! tr:i.~]>,?. . ~ i ~ : ! . ~ ,~i.8 p r Z ~ v i : l ( d
C c ~ ~ . , ~ i ~ l ~ : r c :r<;l.i,~,..i.'
...,
,:,I- ,b.. u:li;tz i~c.ilo% j3. s: ,;.,.Il !:rt:~apa t ' r :voc:ird i : . ,t ~c :rm. S;.~:r~ilt:.,.~!~~
..
<>:~c;l.;,? i,?
.i;hi; 1 ., - I r 1 - i i . , on .t!~?c.!;r~!:r ~IP.?I~, ~ l ' r , ? ~ l ~ ?t<>s:;ilo
i:.
I:.,lil-?:n!;, b,.: ,::iy?c c.?i d c pop., : , I : r:s :.c i.,:.~.!;.!:;l.c! r<:.:.d ii>i:i: :f ::,ri, pr.r:!.-
icr..niii.
,,r
jii i.c.
sl:$,.;;., q : r ::u.d i::>ci;r i t y ~.ir.(:::ur!;s .
T!;os;: ri;q:,r'.ro ?;bzf.rm,::.-!;i!:.n of u n i t s i::F "!:1i1:o11 :;.m:,3", !.~l;oi.ccvf
.:
 279. T ~ Mmiroil ijf :; f o r c e f 2 . 1 1 8 d i l o n i ; GCYCI.CL?. ( d r . ! . : is
.oasi,:r oil the :;roops, ii; :?[;ct:lcratr:.s t h o ~!is.rch m i i u c r c a s $ > ct h e ha:i;lc
ro:>.i!%ncs:; i n tn!? : i i . r s c t i n n !:sf n n r c h . On thr; other hand, t h o n o s . l i . b i l i t y
S:x %:: t s t hs:t t hc c olrs,~:Lri8~:.rr::-of i:!.ic! i n v i l . ? . 1 col!:m~ns TJ ill r ; : - , ~ - n i t l.,r;:3s o l v c s
n o t i n n c o o ~ dw i t h tllc & & c i r o ~f tlio coimnu14cr and b o f e r c hc i s : i t l o t o
fntcrvonu. It ;:j i;l:;c i a o r c di.ffi[;:?lt f o r ' h i 2 40 origni;o hi8 fort:::; t r , t h o
fl,nnlr and. ~ L.ickl:;
L. tc c .t i : irr fjnc ?L~<!:L,

l i c c o r t 5 ng t , thc; -tciot;icr.l rcq;~irc,:len-tst h o coi:~~.c~:r.l~r c::n prcvcrrt

of 1;ho dcl;::rtur!;
~.
:;cc?! d:.ni;~r t o h i s r"rorci<m of : l c t i ! ~ ncitl!c:r
in;; an f,~d.v::iice 1;y boimd.;; For t f . 1 : ~purpose
by :..n cc'nclorml!:r!t o r i:y d j . r a c t -
ho c:r!lorr; t h o ttimc; plr.cc
of tl!? maroh a .;3.?,imn:; o r t.11i. tixnc zt vrh:cch t l q o i r fo~wc.rd
cl.c!mcr!ts sllz3.l qroz:; 3 G ~ V C I I 1.iiio.

Chnrigzr ir, I! ch?lcn;!!cnt: i l u r i n c t h o maroh rLus:: b e bf:.l'-.-iced '~y hr,ld-

;.n; l.,c~cIcm;!.rch uol\i~:;ns o r h c cqiir;liza:l di~rii.~;; p c r l-d:: or" r c n . t .

If XI c.dv:~!~coi:: 1:r~dcb y b<!undr, t h o ~ l i i r c hcolllxl:~:, i f ~:~~js~~iblc

;:hb:i~ld bc ;;ri;.ri.!?cd z r i k h i ~ ; . n t i * a c - t i c i i!rri?:r
s ';o t h c i r :!.I-ri?:.r.'i. :t:k ;.!I itikc?-
~ncdi.:~:b<:o b j c r i i v c . ,cL:!tir;l whi;k?~cri;hoy sh-I!. h a l t cr co!:.';i;src I;:. nl-rch.
I n t h i s xr~c..?ni:r, u ! ~ u o a c s r . , " : yh?.:l:!;s ! ~v,ii,dsi!. I : c r l nrLy :lilccwi:!o
r I . i ? :f:,r -i;k,?s ~ i i g ,.i ~ l. . .: ; t ~ vc nf ::d-~:i:,o; .-f b,:,L~nrl:;.

2!1(j, C~.:r:x:il~:iic:rtj.~n 't)::'i-,m.:cn thc; suio!~::.r:di:r I 1 f i r L u ~ .~r:c! i

bct.;:,-cn nr;.rcll coli~jr~yir;lur;.'; ni:o;rrcd . n c.:vt.:ry y,;,:-r:i>:.~ ~::p.y. 3i?j3i.wlt
t

.
i
m.:?.:;cr<!z
,c
. .r : 1 3 . ; . 1
!She, .'L.; c ? j.c:>.l
c: . I ; j . . : r
~ ?:.ti
, : ? n.i,;ht rccjui i ' f ; >::pr;c,5.:~1~

.
I.,.? ,!.?id. 1i(;hi; .t;omiuni.f:
,i ; r . ..
;i~7 1 1 hct,'<w<~
1.y e::.~-oj.'i~
1
!I :.ri;j:;c~;r.t
Uur En; :I l y l i l ; h t :r.,:j : :A 01:s c?n
f .; ; i n t i o c,.rn,-:x:ii:cr c!~,!i.& ?. i iI? sI !A<. . ti.c.n o f c r ~ i : ~ ~ i r r n n c6ii.thi.n
c:~ in-
7 : . : 'init os -I;[.tlir :?ri.i.;--1a:; nrrrcl.~CI?>J'<:C~%V~.:S.

2lj:?. I I ? : 2 , j ; .:C~,UZ-C]:;' ill }lj!: :;y;p~ ]:i~!;i;,~ :Lj>t?

r c k sii.rl.: i;:c,cr:t;c~ l'rrcdam ct' cloci.:; j~zn -,".ion hi.:; c,ir.?mai-;6 ili:i,r r:l!sr: j . : I:,,lilr!lrl.

Lll:,;
:(, !~:,.:c<;,::.r .khc. ?.?~ix<:<c~ur.::.:~<" !!iaychj.;~~:,;?. c:!7!cj :;~.d, .;*:;,,; rb:.>i,<, iirc
t11; :Tc,ii?..:d:i 1 : ; I i r : : f ' o r +:.hc: :Locom~:lisi~r~ci.:; :?f .>. :;]:..!ci.L'j.c~l
..,.
,L:T ch.

Ti?:: : 1 2 c,>l,;,i:ji lcn; !,I: ktl.:; rz,ri ...

', r i s $:b!.c ,dtiq<:rf r ~ ; ~ .
air
:,
&,

a t l :.,c?: :!r~c: i ,1 ; j fi k h z ?. i r ~ cr:,q,uirt;d ' c,! r:oon::r?.f i ,

,;....,,,
.,>-, - r c:: ~:f
Cansidorj.il:; t h c a c t j . v i t y df h n s t i l o cijnb:~t~xviztiori, let-gc
tro:jps should n:jt be nsscl-iolcd i n onc r.rec. boforo t h e l a r c h .

If v . r i o u s u n i t s mdst irirrrch f r o n t h o s'm poiirt, the:? should

z r r i u c scqucnti?.l.ly, s o th:lt no u n i t hns .to 7 ; r ; m i t unr.cccss;:ri.ly 2nd crowd-:
ing i s avoidcd.

Gcncr~.ll.yit js b c t t c r t!?hnvc t h c ~ a r i . 3 ~ u n1i~t s , dcpcndcnt upon

t l ~ ~ c bivnil?c
ir arc?< and t h o i r intendor1 loc-.tic:n i n t h o col.ur,i? brou:;ht b y
..,,. of' s i d e o r i n t o r s c c t i n ~roads t o t h o r o u t e of' march nnd t h o t c j c i n t h c
"I.:.,:
colr1mn. Had t h c t r o o p s bccn hrought i n t o bivou:.cs in. liiv.)urrc Krcups, t h o
ccm%%v.dcr t h c r o o f c-n -xrcll bc c b L a r ~ ccdi i t h tlnciir proper .:?xrivr.l a t khc
r r , u t c r;f r n r c h ,and t l i c i r p r q ; c r attzchmacnt t o t h e co1u1:m.

Should p a r c h columns b c fcrincd imclcr thc' pr?tccki,:n of o u t u o s t ~ ~

t l ~ i n c211s-L br: t i n c l y b r i ; u ~ ; h ti i l t o t h e m r c h colimui.

285. Tlic horn- of march dcpcnds on t h c o i t u n t i o n , t h e 1 c n i ; h of -tho

imrch, t h o ~wx.thcr and o t h c r c o n d i t i r ! l s . 1nsufl:icicnt r c s t i i ~ p a i r : : .tho
cn;j::l:ilitit:s i>fthc troops.

It may bc of & r a t i n p o r t ~ n c ct o conplc-tc ,-.I1 incvu!nci~:tc of' r:

n i ~ h tmc.rcli rlaring; t h o hours of dnrkncss.

it shoizlil ho ~p?kci!.1;h:ti; it i s .mdi n?.ri.ly b c t t , c r , i ' r w :: d:-:yli(.:ht

~ c r c i : , t o .lee-ic t h c ~ l nrnn
d t h z n i;n ni,ri-~?(:i!i -t:v: n r N
b c f ' n r ~d~.y.yl.rn~k
3fti.r dar!:. Trc?:;]?s w i t h ::fii~nc.l:s niid motorized !.'i.its riusi; !ir?.l?.i::rily hrLvc
::bciit b:xa hcmurs grcp,:~.r::t:ir~nfc~rt h o march .:.nrl a t t h o .complc:ti-jn c.1' t h o
..
;zalrch
<. t h y bc,.;in t h c i r rcs'i; l c t c r t h a n 6.0 f i ~ o t-troops., Tibi: llurricd f::~d-
i n c and c2r.i; of .c:nil:~:.\ls nnc! irir^.dcqu;;tc cnrc o f v c h i c l c s 1i.s~-:ns L h : \:cork
o.:r,rr::itg of b<rth.

286, Thc "mircii s::qucn cc" d o t ~ r m i n c st h c l o c - t i c n i:f t h c -tr,::or,s i'n

- t h r oolunhn. li'k.is if:t u r n i s i>zscdnpi:;: thi: :;rnht:bli, h r . t t l c or?pl~)n:.cnt.
Corri;c-t "mrrrch scquincc" i r cf t l ~ r :fi~::;t?t4:ps tc,wird b ~ t t 1 . cS I I C C C S ~ .

2137. Tiiu r!:.~,oli :;iqucTicc :jf seciirit:; dctt:eb;l;n.!;.: ( 1 - n 1 ota.)

..
is ..:i-dj.??ar..iy clcci.d;:i! by t)ic corr.i.%?dcr6 t h c r c o f . Yct, . i n ~ircli'r t o s i l ? ] > l i f y
th.: $'roiii~l,;-ti,-n or" ~ r d c r o , !;he :1.?.rcl: oolunn c:o?wr.nc!cr mn:y .:rdcr tlic :so-
quciicc of i,l:.ri-?!: :sf -tlicsr: :lctr:ckimci?t::.

The m a r cl? colixnri ~or,u??.ilili:r6 . u ~i :;n::i~:j .the n:. I: ~ 1 : s,,q~~i;j: cu r,f t h o

: I. 5 . 2 ch?.r:;ci.l iii-t;h t l ~ cpr*2r;cr nrir..: ti~:i;ly i?:tr-i ,)f tl;c -:-i,.r.i.nus
I ,
c'l.crncn%s, i.i!t~i
t.hri C;I!.UT?.VI .:riii c r c i ! 't i : e l u ~&
~ ~ i~- . i ntho
~ , lx;.roh.
, . .. -
Hi: provicici; :for c;:~c~~nui-iuc
.e, c.,>,,.r:y
m flc!:~lc prce?cd~:~:? .
0:iii?31n i c;.t;i. )n w l i h t h c ::ii.v:.nc~ ~:?i:.~rd
{I %'nd. ,;~.i:~.r<Is ShouI.!i b.c 41
i.r,(i !;llo
:s r: rLt t i i ~ s If
iric.i;~bc;ciy i c r l c s i ~ x ~ t o :;; ; r-u:!rcsciii: Lii;~: ::a~r.iiig lii,? o;~sc:c~. !then thr.
o frm tho

h
x i .1 :
r l .s
.
. cc;l.?us, thi: co.il~:,qd;r :!f th:. mnin ;;e;dy ~ - r : ~ i r : r t nk o h i s
(u11i.C e0ri'i:~3el.cr i>f Xi:; c7.w ?1?ti.I;)

S : ' : t x in i i r 1 . ri; iv~,j?:~rcci: Ir?f'f:.iit;y so-

i i t i?-i:,,:ly t.*: ,iirtri.3u-l-<: i n d o p t h i n so-.or!:l. :.znr ci. ,;r,:,:l;,s ,

2 I i1. Ir~i':.nl.ry d i v i d i . . : r :rdvr'?.cc:, ::lops sc?rc'r::l r,:ui;cs, ilormhlly

c.9 it!fc1:I;rv cloi!~ctyt 13-:rchi.s ::>.t thi: 11cr.i <I.C o nch n;!iir i.r:>;lg, St < s hci-i; t l ~ ~ t

.
$.r;(>.(!
1-1
.
i;lio bum:.:l:l~.or of' t h o ?.lv,in ho:?y c9r.x-.lly x:rohc,~ (:it :,r nccr hc-.(I
Uiii3 th- s ? r c > c o l . u ! . ~u?ii;h
~ ~ v:hj.nh t h c di-;isii:n con~c~~.:i!c>r
:zrj. I.? :lorn'?.1.1y bc f':>unr? 1:?1;! n o ~ ~motoriz
r
+.~i.ii~
::,!vc::~ccs,
i-d i.lcjriont;o ;>f' C'hc <i;-is i:-,n
c~:':z~::ndcchclo!l r:nd 01' t l ~ cn r t i : l l c r y c:,xmanil coj-icl~on.>j+.:.c'i: ?,re cs;r;i~!;ial
-k:; -i.hc c;::,c'uck of b:l.ttlc; a l s o t h o horse-:ir?.vrn t:lor:lcnt'n t h o i:j,v?.siin
::i(jii;..l batt?lic:n, 1 : :iot w i t h +hc: i:d-il:::ci, ;:u:,l7(1.,
 The l i g h t and heavy horse-drawn a r t i l l e r y and engineers vhich
a r e n o t with t h e advance guard are kept a s f a r forvard a s t h e i r employment
requires. According t o these' requirements t h e l o c a t i o n 'or t h e ,remainder
of t h e i n f a n t r y i s determined-. The horse-drawn platoon of t h e medical
company follows i n t h e .column i n xhich t h e d i v i s i o n command ehhelon marches.
The l i g h t horse-dravm eoluhns follow normally t h e i r ovm units, The horse-
drawn elements of t h e bridge column can follow when t h e y a r e n e i t h e r vrith
t h e advance guard o r a r e n o t l a t e r t o be advanced. Tank defense guns of
t h e unit's and machine gun u n i t s with' a n t i a i r c r a f t missions normally are
d i s t r i b u t e d xrithin t h e march columns,

*men t h e d i v i s i o n marches along one road s i m i l a r measures a r e

- taken.
I n a reePrement t h e march sequence of t b main body 16.11o r t e n

be i n rovcrso crdor.

The some p'inciples apply t o t h e main bodies o f cavalry columns

of army cavalry.

289. Insofar a s t h e y Lure not employed on reconnaissance o r s e c u r i t y

missions o r do n o t bolong t o t h e advance guard, t h e motorized elements of

t h e d i v i s i o n are organized i n t o on0 o r more motor echelons and follorv by

bounds t h e march columns. Phen t h e s i t u a t i o n and tho road n e t permit,

thcy can bo grouped wholly o r 2 a r t l y a s a motorizcd march c o l u m nnd march
n l o n ~a s p e c i a l road. Should contact with t h o encay b@ oxpoctod, only
moto~izcd~clomcn'ts capablc of combat cax be so grouped on a spocial o r
individual route.

Tho movement of motorizcd ccholons and march groups can bo

changed t o tho commanders of columns along whose rovkcs t h c y march.

Motorizod'march columns remain d i r o c t l y under tho cormnand a f t h e d i v i s i o n

cornandor

Tho cornlandor of .a motorizcd ochclon o r motoriicd march group

has t h e s a m e t a s k s during a march a s does t h e commander of a main body,

t h e c o m n d c r o f t h e motorizod march column, according t o t h e coanfi2hions,

t a s k s similab t o those of tho commndcr of tho remaining march columns of

t h e division. Sim-ilar moasuros t o thoso givon i n paragraphs 286

apply tb t h e maroh soquonco of motorizcd echelons, march groups and march

288
-
columns.

Those motorized olemonts belonging t o tho advnnoe guard alvmys,

motor vohiclos of tho s t a f f ofton, suocial motorized elcmonts, such a s

motorized olomcnts o f t h e a m r y , oto., cxccptionally and t h e n only

temporarily march bctxcon t h o advcmcc guard and t h o &Do-:

290. The combat t r a i n s of battalions, cavalry rogimants, a r t i l l c r y

b a t t a l i o n s , cto., march a s a u n i t ~ & t ht h e i r troops; thoso belonging t o
t h e command eremonts and' s t a f f a r c attached t o those of a u n i t o r arc
indepondontly formed i n t h c m r o h column, Tho combat t r a i n s of t h o fokvard
elcmonts of advnnco guhrds march with t h o rosorvo o f thc advnnoe guayd.'
Datnchcd companics etc., normally take t h e i r combat . t r a i n s .rrith thom.
Motorizod and mountcd rccom~aissanccb a t t a l i o n s n o m ~ l l yindo pendently
control t h e i r combat t r a i n s and i f possiblo have t h o t r a i n s nccompany them.
If circumstances roquiro, thoy must t'om@orari%ybe soparatod from t h e i r
combat t r a i n s . I n such i n s t m c o s tho comnclcr can d i r c o t t h e i r attach-
mont t o another u n i t ,

291, During tho march of 'an in'fantry division, tho d i v i s i o n s i g n a l

b a t t a l i o n normally lays a t r u n k line. Before tho march begins, it i s l a i d

a s f a r for-mrd a s tho s i t u a t i o n pormits. Tho loading cofistructing troops

march a p p r o x k t 0 1 . y r d t h tho support o'f t h o admnco guard. A t important

points, c o n t r a l s a r c t o he bstablishpd. The troops arc informed of t h c i r

l o o a t i o n i n t h o march ordor.

 I n c mc.rch dton:; s c v c r a l ronds t h o t r u n k l i n o i s norm117 l o l d

clc.ng t h c r o u t o of t h o di-iisiror, cox-~c~i!i:rcnr.! h i s st,rff.

In n r o t i r c m ~ ~bcforc?
t an. oncry, $run?€ l i n o s no' longor of usc
nrc c i t h a r 6cstroyod o r .tal.:cn up.

I n additi.on t ~ ot h o c o n s t r u c t i n n of t h o trunlc l i n c , b s t h i n
a d m ~ c can<!
. r c t i r o m c n t , t h c d i v i s i o n sign9.1 b a t t a l i o n . must h::vc r a d i o
conmunication a h f a y s rca&y b o t h t o t h o rc9.r and t o t h o flnnk; t h a t t o nd-
mr,co c l c n o n t s . w i l l be rci;islnted according t ? conditions.

A s t o s i g n n l c o m u s i c n t i o n s w i t h army cn7rnlry on t h o xu-ch s e e

par. 724.

292. Tho c s t i m n t c ~s t o th.2 o u t c n t of t?io r.mrch :'ad t h e marc:i.'ni; tin0

f o m s a n - o n s e n t i c 1 b z s i s f o r t h c m c h ordcro. Thc d i s t a n c e t n be covorod
by ouch u n i t f r o = o l d bivouac t o ncv? bivoimc nest b c co:lsidcrcd.

X march o f f roads, t h a t i s c r o s s coun'try l e s a e h s , t h e spood of

l a r g e u n i t s w i t h f o o t troops 2 t o 3 k i l o m e t e r s 2er hours.

On ~ o o droads f o o t t r o o p s af4da a v a l r y cat1 march almost nn fast

by n i g h t a s by d a y , .on poor roads and v e r y der!: n i g h t s , t h e speed i s con-
s i d e r a . b l y diminf 6Md.
..
B i c y c l i s $ s and motorized t r o c ? s march more slowly a t fight.

293. If p o s s i b l e a w e r n i n g o r d e r i s i s s u e d f o r t h e march. This order

s t a t e s t h e tire and g l a c e o f de?nrturc, t h e r o u t e and pro!b;i'lilo march dur-
ation. It c o n t a i n s i n s t r u c t i o n s ccncerning t h e b r i n g i n g of troopr:
. .t o t h e
r 6 u t e of m r c h and t h e i r jciniag t h e oolumn.

294. Should corps o r army troop:: o r l a r g e r independent unitr: f o l l o w

nlong t h o r o u t o of t h o d i v i s i o n , proirS.s5.nns m s t be rnado t o avoid f r i c t i o n
between t h o d i v i s i o n t r a i n s awl s c r v i c c elortents and t h c s c following u n i t s .

295. Skould l a r g e "mixed c o m a n ~ l s "make marcl~o:;. of a o v e r a l days dur-

a t i o n , d'urfng which no enemy c o ~ i t e c ti s ex:~acted,~a;march t a b l e can be
prcparcd, It c o n t a i u s i~lformeti.ona:; t o tile r o u t e s , t h c d a i l y msrch
objective, 'nivoiiac3 and s t a f f q u a r t e r s .

296. Unless s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o q s e x i x t , a s soon as t h e o o m n c l " ~ c s t "

is given, t r o o p s ,my tnLk, s i i x and smc?ce.

, Higher comanrlorn wfio r i d e ' p a s t t h e t r o o p s a r c hr?norcd w i t h

n-
byes r i g h t w ; t r o o p s oorqeto "silouldor arm1' o n l y on cornmaria. Othcr cour-
t c s i o s a r c not extcndcd. "

297. Only upon ordor w i l l c o l l ~ r s30 . ~ n b u t t o n c d ,hafcp%s rcmovod otc.

ShouLd si..!ch be nccoos;rry it m ? . l l hn t;~.v..alyordorod.

239. Cn.0 si.dc of t h o road, and if t r o o p march on cit!lor i i d o , t'kc

cootor af tkc r o a d ?xist bc, lcirp-1; f r o c f o r t h c pasriagc of o r d c r uud r1c.;scngcr
c a r r i o r o . Kotor v o n i c l c s a r o f o r b i d d m t o pass 'l;raops r a p i d l y .

Io g"nr?ral .';r~opP m r c h or? .k!lc r i g t i t itidc of t h o A n d bui: s h o u l d

thq l o f t 1c, mwf. f i v o r a b l o f o r f lto ., l;roops o r should 5.1; provide 'cdncoa1~1ont
a$jv.inst h o s t i l c air o b s r r v a t i ~ ~it
n is uscd. Should both sidbo ::~r!n$.dc con-
c c a l ~ w n ta e : ~ i . n s ta i r 'obsofvatio!i, f o o t and cavdr:f troops, if ncccssnry,
u s c by day b0t.h s i d c s ; Vokiclcs, n o t o r and animal drawn, and b i c y c l i s t s
use t h o most f a v o i a b l o s i d e .
 Also vfhc~urends nrn n o t plentiful and during h o t l i ~ c a t l ~ oitr m y

.
b:; advuntagcov.~t o march on citliccr sj.dc and h o l d t h o c c n t o r I'roo of t h c
marching troopo

Dusty r o a d s urr: t o bc avoidcd.

Whon t r o o p s pass others;, t h c s o b c i n g passcd prcvido adecl,uatc; room

by g i v i n g may t o onc o r b o t h s i d e s . During h a l t s t h o road should b e
clcnrcd.

300. All clcmcntn ,of 2 march column must m a i n t a i n t h c i r proper d i s -

t m c c s an.d n o t strcc;;lc. h uniform march r 2 . t ~ must be muit-.tt3i:1cd i n ordor

.
t o prcvcrlt t i r i n g l i a l t s artd t o nvoid t h c fatiguinr; h u r r y on t h e p u t of
t h o rozmiard clcmcnts

301. In order t o accomncdatc t h e s:nall variati.on.s n t h o m r c h dopth

of i n d i v i d u a l c l c m n t s , small "march d i s t a n c c s " a r c t o b e tr.kcn botvrc:cn
companies c t c . Thosc m o u n t t o 10 mctcrs, f o r f o o t t r o o p s , f o r o n v a l r y and
vo2-~iclctroopo and s t a f f s , f i f t c c n motcrc.

"lvbLrch distnncos" ccnso t o e x i s t whcu " ~ 1 i c ~ c r m n ~ r a o h t ic"

i:f
(march donth a s p r c t c c t i o n nguj.ixst a i r at4;%cks)i s t2kcn up.
~.
l"ountcd officers, i.ndividual h c r s o s , c.l;c., a r c t o bi: .considcrcd
a s p a r t of t h c t r o o p s and n o t a s occupying t h c "marcir dist-.ncol'. Thc
"narch distance" s c r v c s t h e p u ~ p o s cof c q u a l i z f h g t c ; ~ p o @ adr c~l z y s ; t h c r c -
f o r c i.t m y bo -tcnpor:lrily l o s t .

For "march dist::i~ocs" bctwccn motcrizcd u n i t s s c c s o c t i o ~Y L I I

(socrct).

302. Gotv~ocii+;IS various clcmorits of t h o mnarch cclurnn com~~:.nicnt i o n is

m c i n t n i n e d ' l y ini:;.ps of inr~untcdt r o o p s , b i c y c l i z t s , o r ;notsr:i.zcd t r o o p s ,
f o r s h o r t , , r dist::nci, by dismoun-tcd counod;iui; i':Llcs. .dir"fioult s i t u a t -
i o n s offi.ccrs art; chnrgcd w i t h tile mainto:v!.:.;ncc of co-.?tact. A t n i c h t , dilr-
i n g wc:ith;;r of low v i s i b i l i t y or i n rnggccl t c r r c i n , t h c numlicr of ooiincct-
i n g clomcnts i s i u c r c a s c d . Thc ccmxiandcr of t h o l i l r g c r u n i t i s :always
rcsponsi'alc f o r conliccticn v e t h t h o slixtllcr, y c t vchcn difficulties z r i s o
o r :arc p r o b c b l . ~ , t h o s;n~.ll c r must supizort t h o o f f o r t n of t:~:: l x - g o r . Evcry
u n i t i s rcspor,sibl.o t h z t t h c one succeeding f o l l o w s tilo propor r o n t c . When
c.loxcats :Lro v r j . t h ~ r : ~ w from
~ t h e column, t h o u n i t s i'ollow?.ng thct. from which
1:ic 01i;nlcnts wcrc L.?kcn, must bc infcriiicrl by t11c o~rn:;:~nd~rur1.10 crCi.rcd tho
w5:thd.r:~v:c.l. It i s oEtoii advisc!)lc t o l c ~ v cguidcs o r p n r t Tics a.t (1.m.port:mt
p o i n t s who i n d i c - t c t h e r o u t c tc. fo1l'ov:ing u n i t s , mcsscngcrs, str:igi;lcrs
o t c . , and uhn b r i n g fon7znrd s i g n s c t c .

Radio n,c::i 1,liulrur com~?unicati.onip.0.y bc d i r c c t c d b o t v ~ c ~advc3.ncc

n
gu?rd and main body.

- 303. I n a d d i t i o n .to c s h o r t h ~ l soon t n f t c r t h o march i s h c ~ r ~ (rfio r

t h c cdjnstrlcnt o r p:.clcs and cq.uipmcnt nl;d r c l i o f of alcn and an?.v.al.~,) on0
o r marc h!-At$, doponding on t h o i!ist?>inc; t o be covcrcd, t h c v.roi:th-r, t h o
0 : ~ : ; - b i . l i t i ~ s of t h o t r o o p s and t k c t c r r c i n , c r c mado nncl ~-~ill.ch r.rc u-';iliz-
cd f o r t h e focdinf; nnd vmtcring or" rlcn and ?.nix!.ls. ; r o s t ( t l l r c i hours)
i
i s uormr.lly t?.kcn a f t o r tiic go:'.tcr p o r t i o n of t h o m::rch has boon m:xlo.
Of-tan a r c ~ it s talcon ovory tvro hcurr,. During n i g h t mc!rchcs a s:icrt r e s t
o v c r y hour i s of-l;cn prof or?.blc. %lo -i;imr: and. d u r n t i o n of t h c r o s t a r c
stQ)ul:,.tod, vfhcn :!ossJ.blc, i n t h e i ~ ; r r c h . o r d c r . A r o s t i n whicEi licrscs r:ro
f o d c..:.ld :x?.tcrce., ct wb.ich t i z w onddlcs -!ld oquipmcnt nru ronovod, s:lould
n o t bc l c s ~th a n hi0 ilcurs. Khcn t h c mzrch i s madc nlctlg s c v c m l r o ~ r t c s
t h o t i a c , p l a c e nnd durr:tivn or' r o s t s mn;r bo l c f k t o th d i s o r c . t i o n of e a c h
column com.iciod;:s.
 Even vhcn h n s t c i s r c q u i r o d , on long rmrchcs ndcqu?.to r c s t must
bo providcd s o thfit t h c t r o o p s n r r i v c i n f r o n t of. t h o cncmy "fit f o r act+,-:.
c . . Thc omission. of t i m e l y %nd s u f f i c i c . c t r c s t pc?riods p l a c c s :.hcavy
rcs~>onsibility on t h o co;=ndcr. Only when kt bccomes r?bsolutcly c s s c n t -
i a l t o r c n c h t h c b a t t l c f i c l d o r d c c i s i o n p o i n t w i t h b u t a f r z c t i o n of t h o
f o r c c w i l l -11 c o n s i d c r a t i o n s ;zs t o t h o physic21 c o n d i t i o n of t h e t r o o p s
bcccmc of scccndary irnpcrtcncc;

304. By d-y, d u r i n g r c s t s t r o o p s w i l l bo d.istri'nutcd by groxps and

canouflngcd (ccriopc.lcd) ncnr t h e rou.bc of im.rch. During long r c s t t r o o p s
w i l l n o k j m l l y r o s t i n " r o s t groups". Such a f o r m c t i c n can bo s o i v i c c a b l c
f o r t h e b c t t c r u t i l i z a t i o n of w a t c r sourocs, it ccn incronsc t h o r c n d i n c s s ,
f o r b : ~ t t l c , and osn mrl.ko o::ni.cr t h c c o n t i i m j l t i i ~ nof t h o mnrch f o r rc;c.rward
tronps i

Troops r o s t a t n i g h t a l o n g tho rocd.

Rc::-t aro:is 2 . r ~t o bc r e c o n n o i t c r c d i n advnncc, Thcir c h c i c c

should bc gcvcrncd, :lpnrt f r o m lnarch t c c l l n i c ~ . n dt c c h n i c n l c c n ~ i d c r a t i e n s ,
ospcci.nlly i n reg-.rd t o nn n i r f o r , by a o e n s i d e r : ~ t i c n of t h c follmfj.ng
f a c t o r s : time of t h c yc:lr, vron.thcr, ti.mc of dcy, nccd of wator, shndo, :
covcr a g z i n s t ~vilxdand r a i n , snom and cold, t h o comfort nnri prc~tccti-onof
t h u t r o o p 2nd tho p c c u l i o r rlccds of t h c v a r i o u s clrlns.

305. TJnlcss spoken t o o r c o l t c d , t r o o p s vrhilc r e s t i n g rcmain r c o t i n g

vvhon 3 s ~ n i o rcc~nm.ndc,r approaches.

306. Thu ccnwandir d i r u c t s t h e soquanoc a:ld i f ncccssnry t h o d i s t n n c c s

t o bc maint.*incd i n c r o s s i n g a. m i l i t c r y b r i d & o . Vchiclcg vrhoso weight a r c
t o o g r c n t f o r t h e b r i d g c c r c t o ha "cut out" nnd coudnctcd over a s u i t -
c b l c b r i d g c o r cronsod b y f e r r y .

307. The brid:gc co:nimnd~nti s r c s p c l i s i h l c f o r t h e s e c u r i t y Sf t h c

b r i d g c , f o r q i r i c t and o r d b r on t h o b r i d ~ o sand t h o a$>proac:?os cnd c x i t
r c u t c s t h c r o f r o r ~ . A l l i n s t r u c t i o n s i s s u o d by him and t h e c n g i n c s r o f f i c e r
:ut t'hc b r i d g c must bc cbcycd.

308. Troops and. .vchiclco a r c n o t p c n n i t t c d t o croxd n c c r t h e briijgc.

Eridgc naprqncl?os and c x i t s must not bc j z m d . Thc =arch ovor t h o b r i d g c
must n o t h - l t t:;,'r!:on. O r d i n n r i ~ l y ,t r o o p ~ : ? i l ~ lfrorn
; nssombc.[ p o i n t s , bo
d i r o c t i d t o c r o s s by u n i t s a s t h c b r i d g c i s f r c c .

309, Every u n i t w i l l taka t h o i7.cccsstiry m.rch formstion. u t l e a s t 100

n~ct!:rs bcforo ri;zching t h e h r i d g c and w i l l mc.inta3.n. t h i s f o r ~ ~ l a t i ounn t i l
t h o t c . i l of t h e u n i t i s ::.I; i o n s t 100 mctc~rsbeyond t h e b r i d g c ,

310. Foot t r o o p s c r o s s i n r o u t e s.Lcp and i n t h c mznncr d i r c c t c d .

Moantcd t r o o p s , dismounted, c r o s s hy twos, t h e mGi1 on tllc c u t s i d c
t r o o p s which hcrvc cror;scc? docroasc ti-rclr
.
Iiountcd
s o t h a t t h q aar?ir?--ls s'~j.11
c r o s s i n g will, n o t bocomc c~i.cquict:~d. FIorsc-drc.~~nu h i t s and singla vchic-
l c s h o l d t o t h o middlc of t n c b r i d g e , d r S , ~ a r sr.:~iain rno~ultcd, c:ssist:;nts
p l a c c thcmsclvcc on c i t h c r . s i d c tkio anincils, brakcs ?.re cng:!.gcd.

Notor v e h i c l c s t r o v c l slcvvly, lioldin(r, t o t h o c c n t c r of thr:

brirlgo und w i n t a i n ' k K c d i s t a n c e bcb<iiccn v o h i o l c s r c q u i r c d b y t h o t y p c and
s t r o n g t h or" t h e bridgc.

Thc. cnrryi~ngof t;.~i:m i l i t a r y i r i d s c 5.s t o bc m d c 1.mown p r o s ~ p t l y

t o t h a trocpc. 1.t m i l l a l s o bc indic::tod on t h c 'signs p o i . ! ~ t i ! ~-tho
g rautc
ko t h c bridgc. and 011 s i g n s r.t .tho b r i d g c apjiro;.o!i.
 311. A cor;r?lmd t o I m l t on t h c b r i d g c i s g i v c n o n l y by 'thc b r i d g c
comn:.r+l?nt o r t h c "cffi.cor of b r i d g c scrvicc". .In cncrgcr.cics, ovary
cllgincor o f f i c c r i s aukhorizcd t o g i v o t h c ordt:r.

Should a n cir att:lck tzlcc pl:'.cc, t h o bridgo i s t o bo cvr.cuc.t.tud

q u i e t l y and o r d c r l y . Cornr.~nndcrs of a l l grz.dos pr63vcr.t a n iticrensc of t!lc
marching r o u t e and n joiiling to[;othcr of t h e troops.

312. During t h o c r o s s i n g o n l y cnginccrs o f t h e bri&gc s c r v i c c a r c

n u t h c r i z c d t o c r o s s t h e bridgc i n t h c o p p o s i t e dircctj.on. Th;; "ofEicor o f
b r i d g c s c r v i c o " :ncy I I Z L ~ C o::ocptians.

Milikr.ry b r i d g o s ~sr!lich arc t o h~ uscd s i n ~ i l t a n c c u s l yf o r t r : ? f f i c

i n b o t h directions r r i l i b e s o marked.

313. For f o r c i g n o p c r z t i o n s t r o o p s a r c placod i n crssenbly p o s i t i o n s

and based upon t h o c a r r y i n g c n p a c i t y of t h c fcrl-yiug ixcans zrr: t o be
tr-ilsportcd over, s o f a r as p c ? s i h l c , i n tnciiicnl. u n i t s , From thi! Gcnc;nb-
1.i posii;'i.ans t h c g a r c conduc'tcd by c n g i n c c r o f f i c c r s t o t h e p l n c c s of
crossing.

Conduct duri'ng lorLdj.ng, unlondirg and on t h e f e r r y i n g mcnnr, t o

bc d i r o c t o d boforchnud. Thc soqucncc of conduct crdcrcd is t c bc Sollmfcd,

Tho swimming of horscs a c c c l c r n t c s t h e f e r r y i n g .

 (Pages 119 - 175, incl.)

!Cruppenf chrung

F i r s t Part

V I . Attack

314. The a t t a c k i s effected through movement, fir.e, t h r u s t s and through

tho d i r e c t i o n i n which it i s directed.

The a t t a c k can be directed f r o m one d i r e a t i o n against the front, but

o r d i n a r i l y the greatest strengt'n i s lannched against t h e flnnk or r e a r of t h e
enemy. Moreover, an a t t a c k &XI be launched from several directions. With a
break through of tho h o s t i l e f r o n t new a t t a c k directions a r e provided.

315. T b f r o n t a l a t t a c k i s t h e most d i f f i c u l t of execution, jwt it i a %be

most frequent. %en the t r a o p s which a r e not employad i n t h e f r o n t a l a t t a c k
must o r d i m r i l y a t t a c k f r o n t a l l y (the enemy having covered h i s f l a n k ) .

Against en aemy of q u a 1 worth and one who i s defensively prepared,

t h e f r o n t a l a t t a c k i s a long, obstinate struggle for superiority. The f r o n t a l
a t t a c k presupposes considerable superiority of forces and means. Jt leads, a s
a rule, only t o decisive r e s u l t s i f the enemy i s brolien through.

316. The outflanking a t t a c k i s more e f f i c i e n t than the frontal. S h w L

tar~eousoutflanking of both memy f l a n l s presumes considerable su>eriority.
An envelopment of one o r both h o s t i l e flar,ks and reaching deep into h i s r e a r
can lead t o t h e a n n i h i l a t i o n of -the enemy.

The outflanlcir$ movement i s simplest of execution if the foroes in-

tended f o r t h e envelopment a r e employed from a distance, against t h e h o s t i l e
fla* or wing, It i s more d i f f i c u l t t o i n s t i t u t e the outflanking i n proximity
t o the eqemy; the troop movements necessary for the maneuver e r e , on the b a t t l e -
f i e l d , o n l y possibls with favorable t e r r a i n o r a t n i g h t ,

The envelopment mdst seek t o s t r i k e t h e main h o s t i l e forces i n a

decisive direction. T k success of t h e envelopment i s dependent upon t h e ex-
t e n t t h e enemy i s able to mako timely displacement of f o r c e s i n t h e threatened
direction.

Thr endeavor t o extend the enveloping flank f u r t h e r and f u r t h e r

e a s i l y leads t o over extension and t o d i s p e r s a l of forces. Therefore, i n ab-
scure situations, it is b e t t e r i n i t i a l 1 y " t o organize t h e enveloping force i n
depth.
He who cr.volop8 endangers himself t o envelopment. T h e commander
must considcr t h p~o s s i b i l i t i e s . Yet, he must nct h e s i t a t e t o vreaken the
f r o n t i f tl.ercby t h e s u p e r i g r i t y of h i s envlloping f l a n k can be accomplished.

317. T h e envelopmat presums the f r o n t a l f i x a t i o n af t h e enemy.

The en&y i s most c e r t a i n l y fixed i f h i s e n t i r e front i s nttacked.

Howet~er, such a n a t t a c k dmands strong forces, which must be absent from t h e
enveloping uing. Oi'ten, alerefore, must the? a t t a c k e r be content x t t h limi$ed
objective o r f c i a t attacks,: Occasionally a strongor enemy can be contained,
In o q e c t n t i o n of d o c i s i v e a t t ~ c k .

Should t h e mcay attack. from his f r o n t , our f r o n t defends o r exe-

cutes delaying action. T h c ~can t h e carrying through of tho envelopmmt bring
tho grouter, but; tho stopping of tho envelopment and the t u r n i n g of' it t o coun-
t e r a t t a c k , the s u r e r success.

Report. No. 14,507.

 318. The f l a n k a t t a c k r e s u l t s from previous march directions o r from
flank marches. I t i s e s p e c i a l l y e f f e c t i v e i f it s t r i k e s the enemy with sur-
p r i s e and permits him no time f o r countermeasures. It demands superior mobil-
i t y end deception of the enemy a t other positions.

I f the march directions or f l a n k marches make possible exceptional

attacks a g a i n s t the h o s t i l e rear, great success can be a t t a i n e d i f t h e enomy
i s surprised and cur forces a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y strong.

319. Tho penetration seeks t o destroy the continuity o f the h o s t i l e f r o n t

and t o envelop t h e h o s t i l e flanks s o created. Requiranents for i t s success
w e : (1) surprise, ( 2 ) disposition o f the break tbx-ough f o r c e s i n the area
where the prospects f o r the attacking i n f a n t r y a r e favorable deeper i n the
enemy's t c r r a i n , m d ( 3 ) strong forces, order t o be able t o continue t h e at-
tack a f t e r the brealr through.

Thc a t t a c k must be launched on a broader f r o n t t h a n - t h a t intended

f o r the bree.1~through, i n order t o t i e and hold dovm the enemny'on e i t h e r side,
The remainder of t h a h o s t i l e f r o n t must b c containcd.

T h broader the penetration, the deeper can tho penetration wedge

be drivcn. Roserves must be present in order t o throw back hostilo counter-
a t t a c k s againat t h e f l m k s o f the penetration.

The s u c c e s s ~ break
l through must be u t i l i z e d bei'ore h o s t i l e coun-.
tormeasures w e i n s t i t u t e d . The deaper tho a t t a c k e r advonccs, t h e raorc effcc-
t i v e can he envelep and therefore the e a r l i e r f r u s t r a t o the a t t m p t s of the
enemy t o close again h i s front b y withdrawal t o the rear.

Therefore a too e a r l y change of front is t o be avoided.

S t r a t e g i c a l l y , a successful break through can f i r s t be u t i l i z e d by

army cavalry and motorized units. These e l e m n t s a r e supported by a t t a c k and
bombardment aviation against reinforced h o s t i l e forces.

320. The limited objective a t t a c k i s made t o win only limited success.

Ordinarily i t i s executed vhere the s i t u n t i o n provides expectation of such
success. Executed a t a favorable area, it can have groat effect. It can only
serve t o detain br f i x the enemy.

The execution of a limited objective a t t a c k d i r f e r s i n no way from

the execution of other attacks. Tho o b j e c t i v e can be placed c l o s e r and be
s t r i v e n f o r with weaker foroes, but it con a l s o demnnd t h e employment of a l l
forces. With close objectives or l i g h t a t t a c k s the attacker often can organ-
i z e without depth.

The a t t a c k must be well timed. The troops can go beyond t h e i r a t -

tack objective only i f authorized. The dccision for 1;his authorization re-
quires c a r e f u l considoration.

321. Sometimes it i s b e t t e r t o permit t h e enemy t o attacl: f i r s t and

then, when he has committed Iiis forces, ourselves to at.tack. The great d i f f i -
c u l t y l i e s in grasping the c o r r e c t time for our attack; tho d a n ~ e re x i s t s t h a t
the decision f o r o w a t t a o k is not made timely or i s not made a t a l l .

322. There is a l s o t h e consideration t h a t the enemy nay accept t h e a t -

tack i n order l n t e r t o a t t a c k himself o r to withdraw. These p o s s i b i l i t i e s
must be considered i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n and employnent of t h e forces.

323. Every a t t a c k requires coordinate dlroction; it i s n o t permitted t o

f a l l down i n individual attacks.

The main f o r c e and the mass of the mw-itions nre employed i n the
decisive area. In an envelopment t h e s e f b r c e a a r e placed on t h e enveloping
flank, that i s , o r d i n a r i l y there, where, according to tine intention, the s i t -

Report No. 14,507.

uation and the t e r r a i n , the e f f c c t of a l l arms can be u t i l i z e d for the success
of the action. I n t h i s a r e a the a t t a c k i s decisively executed. The decisive
a t t a c k i s distinguished by: (1) llarrovj zones, ( 2 ) provisions for the unified
f i r e cf a l l arms, including t h a t of neighboring zones, (3) the reinforcement
of f i r e s by means of especially a l l o t t e d heavy inpentry weapons and a r t i l l e r y .
&ring the excoution of t h e attack f i r e s a r e increased, tanlcs and reserves a r e
employed. The choice of t h e a r e a for decisive a c t i o n i s influenced by the ar-
t i l l e r y , s o m e t h e s b y the s u i t a b i l i k y of the t e r r a i n f o r continued tank oper-
ation.

Should t h o aroa of docisive a c t i o n not be h a m from tho f i r s t , t h e

decisive botibn must be fashioned i n uncertainty cnd l a t e r changed, i f neces-
sary*, Othervdkb it may not be docidcd u n t i l l a t e r . Should success) during
t h e attack; come a t a place other than thst of which oxpected o r intended,
decision should be rdade t o exploit it, Should the decisive front change o r
tho decision be made l a t e r a s t o the. decisive f r o n t , s u f f i c i c n t reserves must
be prescn!: and t h e r e must be tho strong, united, ccoperative action of a l l
arms i n the new direction.

The shaping of the decisive a c t i o n must be cxprcssed i n tho measures

ta$en by individual leaders. I t m y be expedient t o order individual u n i t s
where they s h a l l execute the decisive action.

324. As a.rule, every attack passes tnrough more or l e s s d i f f i c u l t

c r i s e s up t o t h e culmination; it becomes a question then, tllat the leader re-
cognize t h i ; zenith and t h a t he possess the c a p a b i l i t y o f decision 60 extent
ark i n i t i a t ~ dsuccess w i t h a l l h i s means, or t o prevent a f a i l u r e .

325. Should the a t t a c k be unable t o progress f u r t h e r with i t s o r i g i n a l

organization, then by changes i n the ' d i s t r i b u t i o n of forces, o r by the employ-
ment of new forces ruld by the rearrangement; of f i r e s i s the. attac!: resumed.
Should t h i s not be possible, it i s more correct t o suspend or stop t h e a t t a c k
than t o stnlre the combt strength of the troops on i t s f u r t h e r execution.

326. The width of infantry u n i t s i n a t t a c k must correspond t o t h e i r prob-

able b a t t l e uses. T h e widths of front a r e dependent on: (1) mission, (2) bat-
t l e s t r m g t h , ( 3 ) t e r r a i n , (4) f i r e support of a l l arm, and ( 5 ) the probable
strength of h o s t i l e resistunce. As a rule, the zone of intericr battalion
l i e s betweon 400 and l P O O meters.

As a guide for t h e zone assigned a mixed group i n a t t a c k it @anbe

s a i d tliat, for an infantry d i v i s i o ~ lconsis Ling of 3 i n f a t r y regiments and
adequate ( p l m t i f ' u l ) a r t i l l e r y , i n a meeting engagement and upon t e r r a i n favoy-
able f o r a l l arms, between 4000 cad 5000 meters a r e normal. Occasionally,
through the employment of the f o r c e s i n groups and tho i n s e r t i o n of gaps, t h e
breadth of the zone can be increased. Should the z o ~ ebe too widc, not only
the conduct of the b a t t l e , but reinforcement a t tho decisive orer becomes dif-
ficult.

T h e zone of en i n t e r i o r division, making & decisive attack f r o n t a l l y

aeainst m enmy in stl-01% position, cannot exceed 3,000 r a t e r s , if the a t t a c k
i s t o be c a r r i e d through without r e l i e f by fr6sh troops a success i s t o be
exploited.

Sometimes it may be necessary t o r e f u s e cornbat i n one area i n order

to decrease the -aidtll of t h e zones and assemble the forces rr.eoessary f o r the
attack,

327. T h e o b j e c t i v e determirles the d i r e c t i o n *f the attack. It i s stated

i n the attaclr order.
By the assimroent of zones, the development for, and the execution
of, t h e a t t a c k b
jr the adjacent elements a r e n o t hindered. These zones likewise
bound the b a t t l e reconnaissance. The proportions between zones a r e governed by

Report No. 14,507,

the decisive action. It i s unnecessary to f i l l up the whole width of the zone
with troops.

Through the assiejnmat of zones unity i s p r o m r e d i n t h e operation

of adjacent u n i t s , but these u n i t s need n o t i n f l e x i b l y and anxiously maintain
mutual contact.

Battle zcnes.provide the necessary limiting l i n e s for :the other

arms, and especially the a r t i l l e r y , which support the infantry. But they
should not prevent the a r t i l l e r y from u t i l i z i n g favorable observation and posi-
t i o n s i n neighboring zones. This also applies t o the heavy i n f a n t r y weapons. .

In large u n i t s b a t t l e zones a r e determined from t h e map, 'in smaller?

from the t e r r a i n . These zones must extend a s deep i n t o enany t e r r i t o r y a s it
i s psssible t o dcterminc according t o t h e plan of t h e battle. As the situa-
t i o n develops, chwg e s must be made. Important points should l i e within in-
dividual zones unless they a r e t o be attacked by several units.

An open f l a n k i s o r d i n a r i l y not bounded. For neighboring, but not

imnediately adjac'ont units, frequent1y a l i n e of separation sufficeo. Under
same circumstnnces it i s s u f f i c i e n t merely t o designate t h e objective.

328. The order f o r the a t t a c k must c l e a r l y delineate the intended man-

euver. I n the assignment of missions propor consideration must 'be given t h e
r e l a t i o n between the necessary unity of a c t i o n and the independent a c t i o n of
w i t a . Morcover, tho speed and verve of t h e a t t a c k should not be checked by
too f a r .renohi& orders.

Execution nf Attacks
Bases nf t h e cooperation of t h e arms.

329. The objective of t h e combined arms i n an a t t a c k i s t o bring t h e

infantry i n i t s decisive action, agedinst the enemy with suf f i c i e n t f i r e powen
an& shock a c t i o n so t h a t it i s ponsiblc t o drive through doeply and break down
the f i n a l h o s t i l e r e s i s t a n c e . T h i s goal i s f i ~ s reached
t when t h e h o s t i l e ar-
t i l l e r y i s token o r i s forced b r & i r e .

A l l arms cooperating i n an a t t a c k must recognize t h e i r mutual capa-

b l l i t i e s and consider t h e i r respcctivo limitations. They require continuous
close communication one with onother.

330. T 1 z cooperation be.t;viectn t h e attooking infantry and t h e supporting

a r t i l l e r y governs the course of t h e a t t a c k . fill cooperatioil must e x i s t i n
time cLnd spacc throughout the attack.

T support of t h o a r t i l l o r y extends from thc ncar l i m i t of i t s

e f f e c t i v e rangc. In g~mero.1, on our s i d e of t h i s minimum a r t i l l e r y ronge, t h e

infantry must execute the ottaclc with i t s own weapons alone.

831. Thc highor ( j c . i n t ) commandor is responsible tkt the a r t i l l e r y sup-

p e r t continue s i n harmony with the i n f a n t r y attack.

I n general, t h e a r t i l l e r y locdor ( d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y o f f i c e r ) should

be i n c l a s e proximity t o t h e d i v i s i o n c o m n d e r .

Should t h e infantry division ha-re no d i v i s i o n a r t i l l o r y officer, t h e

senior n r t i l l o r y oom&or can e s t a b l i s h h i s command post m a r t h a t of t h e di-
v i s i o n commander, shauld t h e s i t u a t i o n so requiro. '

Report No. 14,507.

-60-
 The senior commander of a r t i l l e r y of a smaller u n i t , f o r example,
a reinforced i n f a n t i y regiment, frequently w i l l have t o e s t a b l i s h h i s com-
nand post where it i s most favorable f o r t h e support of t h e infantry. For
t h i s t a s k he yequires personal observation of t h e t e r r a i n and s u r e oommunica-
t i o n with t h e infantry he i s supporting and with h i s own a r t i l l e r y .

Ordinarily, because of t h e r a p i d l y changing s i t u a t i o n , t h e senior

a r t i l l e r y aommander with Army cavalry, remain with t h e cavalry commder.

Through personal agreement m u s t t h e corrBct a c t i o n be determined.

Where it i s possible, t h e d e s i r e of t h e senior a r t i l l o r y commander must be
accepted by the higher bommander. Should t h e command p o s t s ef t h e two be
separated, comunicatien must be maintained by technical means and t h e a r t i l -
l e r y must' provide a l i a i s r n o f f i c e r .

332. Unified f i r e c o r ~ t r o lincreases t h e o f f e c t of a r t i l l e r y fi;e and

.
makos possible i t s r a p i d concentration on decisive areas'and a t decisive
mommt s

I n t h e execution of , i t s a t t a c k against t h e h o s t i l e i n f a n t r y , which

i s d i s t r i b u t e d broadly and deeply, ond which o f f e r s t a r g e t s not so e a s i l y
recognizable, our i n f a n t r y needs t h e cooperation of a r t i l l e r y which can answer
r e a d i l y t h e seeds of t h e infnntry.

As a r u l e t h e i n f a n t r y regiment i s supported by an a r t i l l e r y u n i t ,
according t o conditions, a b a t t a l i o n or a .battery, for immediate cooperation.
Has t h e i n f a n t r y unit an independent mission, t h i s a r t i l l e r y can be attached.
Other reasons f o r attacbm'nt a r e $ (1) a b a t t l e f i e l d with i n s u f f i c i e n t obser-
v a t i o n o r one very extended i n width or ( 2 ) other reasons which make t h e uni-
f i e d control of the a r t i l l e r y impossible. Tho value of cooperation i s en-
hanced if t h e samc u n i t s always m r k together.

The a r t i l l e r y commandcr (the senior a r t i l l e r y comnandcr i n a u n i t

of ce;nbined a r m s ) c o m d s d i r e c t l y (immediately) t h e a r t i l l e r y assigned f o r

:as)o r + * but colnmands t h e attached a r t i l l e r y through t h e o r d e r s of tho unit

codmander, bvL must previously inform tho i r s a n t r y cormnander con-

cerned. Also, a r t i l l e r y which i s attached t o t h e i n f a n t r y must remain i n com-
munication with the a r t i l l e r y commander.

T h e unit commander om o f t e n prepare t h e a r t i l l e r y more quickly f o r

other t?sks by asnignimg it p o s i t i o n areas.

k i d of support rcquirod. +-+

333. The i n f a n t r y commander recommends t o t h e su o r t i n a r t i l l o r y t h e
Tho a r t i l J e r y commander has o m e t h e s e recommen-
dations. Should t b a r t i l l e r y oomrrnndor receive simultanoousl y o t h e r missions
from t h e s e n i o r a r t i l l e r y w m n d e r , hc t r i e s to dotennine which t a s k i s
f i r s t t o bc executed. I n urgent instances he must o.ct upon h i s o w rosponsi-
bility.

Attc.ched a r ' h l l e r y supp-orts t h e i n f a n t r y i n accordance with t h o

orders of t h e supported i'hfantry u n i t commander. A f u r t h e r attachment .to

smaller i n f a n t r y elements decreases t h e f i r s t s f f o o t of t h e e n t i r e a r t i l l o r y

unit. Such assignment should be madc only except;io&%lly and when ,w.de t h e

infantry commander must r e p o r t it t o t h e higher, . .

oommander.

334. It i s the duty of both i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y t o secure t h e i r

cooperation through ~ Z ~ t u a l
establjshed permanent hrd e f f e c t i v e c o ~ m n i c a t i . o n .
Not only i s t h i s c o ~ m n i c a t i o nto be m i n t a i n e d between the conrmanders but
between the i n f a n t r y h r t h e s t advanced, e a p e c i a l l y tho heavy i n f a t r y weapons
o r , a s the case may be, t h e i r observation points, and the a r t i l l e r y observa-
t i o n points, from nhich d o n e o f t e n can the t e r r a i n f o r the i n f a n t r y a t t a c k
be thoroughly observed.

Report No. 14,507.

 The close proximity of a r t i l l e r y and heavy infantry observation
posts i s t o be avoided. The senior commander i n the area has often t o make
a decision thereupon. Normally the a r t i l l e r y g e t s t h e observation posts with
t h e g r e a t e s t observation.

The cooperation and the correct choice of objectives a r e aided

through rapid, correct transmission of observation and designhtions of objeo-

t i v e s be;tween infantry and a r t i l l e r y *

335. Neichboring csmmend p o s t s f o r both arms make possible a rapid ex-

change bf thoughts. Battery end b a t t a l i o n ( a r t i l l e r y ) commanders a r e often

'confined t o c e r t a i n t e r r a i n points for observation and f i r e control. Some-

times the infantry cemandars can place t h e i r c o m d p o s t s near these points.
I
Should t h e command p o s t s of Qoth arms-not be i n close proximity,

they must be connected by technical m a n s or special personnel.

336. The l i a i s o n (communicatioli) detachment of 8n a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n

i s o r d i n a r i l y employed ( s e t i n ) where t h e a r t i l l e r y support is most important
and where it can be u t i l i z e d Enr rapid demands for support from t h e a r t i l l e r y ,
Often it i s asnigned t o t h e i n f a n t r y b ~ k t a l i o nwhich executes t h e docisive :
action. Occasionally it can represent t h e a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n commander a t
t h e command post of t h e i n f a n t r y regiment. Alsp, a b a t t c r y engaged outside
oT'i,&i b a t t a l i o n may find it neccssary,to . . send out a
l i a i s o n u n i t ~ o r r e < ~ o n d -
ing t o the l i a i s o n detachment.

The infantry i s under obligation t o support tho a c t i v i t y of t h e

a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n party. T h i s i s complete6 through the d i r s c t communioation

between the a r t i l l e r y 0.P.s or, a s the c a s e may be, the advanced a r t i l l e r y

O.P.s, and t h e most advmccd i n f c a t r y clemen.l;s.

Telephone means of buth arms, infantry l i g h t s i g n a l and a i r rocon-

naissanco a t low elovations a r e ,additional means of enhnnoing t h e . connection

betwoen the t w o arms.

337. The i n f a ~ t r ymust k n a v c ( 1 ) how the a r t i l l e r y i s organized,

( 2 ) which,&r:tilleryu n i t s support i t , ' ( 3 ) where t h e a r t i l l e r y 0.P.s an6 C.P.s

a.rG$;.($j-&d so' f a r a s possible, what f u r t h e r a r t i l l e r y 0.P.s lie, i n t h e in-

, f a n t r y p n o s a n d (5) what t e r r a i n the a r t i l l e r y aommands with i.ts.iobs&rvation

a a d f i r e . ' This information forms a basis for the cmploym~qtaftb heavy in-
fantry vieapons. Thc i ~ d - a n t r ymust keep t h e a r t i l l c r y inf'ormed of i t s . forward
l i n e s , likowisc must it i u f o m the n r t i l l o r y of chmgcs i n the h o s t i l c situa-
t i o n , which a r e lesrned through thc b c t t l o rcconnnissnnce.

Tho a r t i l l e r y must know vthore tho n e a r e s t infantry C.P. and t h e

C.P. of the ~ u p p o r t e dinfnntry :rrc located andvihnt t c r r a i n the .infantry com-
mands ~ $ t hi t s war,:,ons, und it must htivo c o n s t a r l y informa.t;ion about tho most
adv8med i n f a n t r y elements and t h c f u r t h e r i n f a n t r y planins. Tkcrtgoro i.t has
t h e duty, constantly t o observe i t s own nnd the h o s t i l e forward l i n e s ,

338. It i s through t e r r e s t r i a l observation t h a t the a r t i l l a r y executes

most e f f i c i e n t support agtiinst t k host,ile infantry. itiorower, i t s support

i s quickest and most r e l i a b l e i f the 0.P.s and positions are i n r e a r of t h e

supported infantry, even if the infantry i s making a wide elivelopment. 'Nhero

the a r t i l l e r y oan deliver no t e r r e s t r i a l l y observed f i r e , the i n f a n t r y mlust

undertake the supporting missions with i t s own weapons, since map f i r i n g by

a r t i l l e r y does not suf r i c e for the d a t a i l s of infantry battle.

339. Tanks and infantry whioh vmrk together o r d i n a r i l y s h a l l have the

same objectives, the h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y . As a rule, t m k s a r e employed where

t h e d e c i s i v e action i s desired.

Report No. 14,507.

 Tank a t t a c k s follow e i t h e r t h e d i r e c t i o n of i n f a n t r y a t t a c k or
another. The. 'errain decides t h e issue. Close1y t i e d t o the i n f a n t r y , t h e
tanks losa t h e a.dvantage of t h e i r speed'.and midor o e r t a i n circumstances my
beoome s a c r i f i c e t o the h o s t i l e defense. Yet, they a r e so u t i l i z e d t h a t they
put out of a c t i o n t h e h o s t i l e arms which a r e stopping t h e infantry, and above
a l l the h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y , or they a r e employed with t h e i n f a n t r y t o break
down the enemy. In the l a t t e r instance it i s suggested t h a t tllc tanks bo at-
tached t o tho com,ander of t h e i n f a n t r y i n whose zone they a t t a c k .

Occasionally can a tank a t t a 6 k augwnt i n t h e l a s t Btage of t h e

i n f a n t r y a t t a c k the a r t i l l e r y support, which become incrcaeingly d i f f i c u l t ,
or it can bridge ovor t h e a r t i l l e r y c h n g e of- p o s i t i o n , i f it must advance
f u r t h e r t o sukpa't t h e a t t a b k r

340. Tho senior conrmandor a o o r d i d t e s thb b a t t l e a c t i v i t y of t h e tanks

with the ceoperatlon of the other arms. The b a t t l e engaged i n by other arms
must d i r e c t i t s e l f i n aocordance with t h e zone of t h e tanks. .
Infantry must u t i l i z e for a rapid advance the e f f e c t ' produced by
the attacking tanks.

A portion of tiie heavy weapons b e a t down t h e h o s t i l e . t a n k defense .

weapuas. Should t h e h o s t i l e r e s i s t a n c e be revived and bring t h e ' rapid contin-
uance of aur a t t a c k t o a h a l t , we must break through a s r a p i d l y as possible,
often through t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of t h e rearvmrd t& echelons.

A r t i l l e r y supports the tank attack. It t a k e s under f i r e t h e h o s t i l o

defense weapons, subdues h o s t i l e 0.P.s o r p l a c e s smoke upon them, n e u t r a l i z e s
woods and v i l l a g e s Which the t a n k a t t a c k passes, o r b e a t s down t h e s e a r e a s
and prevents t h e iritervrntion of h o s t i l e reserves. Armored and motorized a r -
t i l l c r y and motorized t m k defense mns may a ~ c o m ~the & ~tanks i n attack.

Motorized engineers may ba attached t o tank units. They remove

hinderanoes and obstructions, they strengthen bridges and f a c i l i t a t e t h e pas-
sago w a r d i t c h e s and swamp ground.

Attack a v i a t i o n supports the tanks by attacking h o s t i l e dofenso

weapons, a r t i l l e r y and reserves. Planes f l y i n g .deep i n t o h o s t i l e t e r r i t o r y
can maintain communication betrreen the troop w m a n d e r and the tanks and can
vyarn of h o s t i l e tank attacks.

Under favorable conditions the t a n k attack can be a s s i s t e d by

smoke.

Communication betweon t h e twks and other arms p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n

t h e i r a t t a c k i s indisprmsable, above a l l with tho a r t i l l e r y . Either 2re~ar-m
ranged signals o r other means'of comunioation a r e used. Before t h e a t t a c k ,
t h e c o m n d e r s p a r t i c i p a t i n g t h e r e i n should seek occasion t o d i s c w s it
mutually.

341. Attack and borcbardment a v i a t i o n can bc mployed d i r e c t l y f o r sup-

p o r t of t h o a t t a c k b r i n d i r e z t l y a g a i n s t d i s t a n t t a r g e t s .

342. A n k i a i r c m f t trnops a r e employed t o secure t h o development and as-

sembly areas of t h o cttaclc f o r c e and t h e forming up of t h e a r t i l l c r y and t o
support t h e b a t t l n a i r r e c o n m i s sance r

Several AA bdtt'er i o s . a k wdvanced s u f f i c i e n t l y .fay forward t o be

able t o reach planes q u i t e a distance over the enmy l i n e .

The p r o t a c t i o n a g a i n s t a i r reconn~issnr&a,~and
a i r a t t c c k s over tho
a t t a c k .nrea muet ,be secured onrly,

Report No. 14,507.

 343. Engineers support t h e supporting i n f a n t r y by r e m v i a g blockades,
by overcoming hindrances, and by a t t a c k s upon f o r t i f i e d strong points. As f o r
t h e r e s t , they can g i v e e s s e n t i a l b a t t l e s e r v i c e by preparing the t e r r a i n f o r
t h e supply columns i n r e a r of the troops.

344. Outside of engaging a r t i l l e r y end reserves, gas can be advantageou6.r

l y employed t o provide or strengthen blockades on t h e flank. The a t t a c k i n g in+
f a n t r y must be i n s t r u c t e d e a r l y where and when it i s employed, t h e length of
time e f f e c t i v e , so t h a t it cran arrange i t s advance accordingly.

345, A r t i f i c i a l fog (smoke) can, i n favorable weather and %rindconditions,

be used to camouflap our own a t t a c k troops-and b l i n d h o s t i l e 0.P.s and defense,
It i s e s p e c i a l l y valuable i n overcoming t e r r a i n without cover. The a t t a c k
troops must u t i l i z e its s h o r t duration. The a r t i l l e r y must be -<nf'crmed of the.
probable a r e a of t h e intended make screen so t h a t it can 'taE5 t l e . . appropriate
. .
measures.

346. The d i v i s i o n signal b a t t a l i o n , s o f a r aS possible, establishes and

m a i k a i n s wire communication between tk,e d i v i s i o n commandnr a n d 2 h & ' a r t i l . l e r y
oomander ~ n each d subordirmtc? commander under t h e i r orders. A l l subordinate
leaders provide communication during t h e advance and w i t h . th'e establishment *'
of
the C.P...

The employment of cammunication means mbst correspond t o t h e deci-

s i v e action.

The i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l c r y n e t s a r e t o be planned sopsrately. The

a r t i l l e r y n e t t a k e s precedence.

Signal means i n reserve a r e kept ready t o guarantee a sure communi-

c a t i o n between the f i g h t i n g troops, e s p e c i a l l y i n f m t r y and a r t i l l e r y , i n an
advcanaing attack.

.
Cross communication f a c i l i t a t e s the cooperation batweon arms and
t h e rap id exchange of observation r e s u l t s

347. Exceptionally, during t h e a t t a c k , the d i r e c t wire c o m m ~ i c a t i o nt o

subordinate commanders e a n n d be maintained. I n t h e s e instances t h e d i v i s i o n
sisal b a t t a l i o n advances only t h e t r u n k line, consisting o f m y wires. A t
t h e end of t h e trunk l i n e t h e r e i s e s t a b l i s h e d an advanoed message oontor from
%hinh c o m m i e a t i o n t o u n i t s i s e s t a b l i s h e d .

348. The d i v i s i o n C.P. must be e s t a b l i s h e d e a r l y , since i t s location has.

g r e a t influence on the building up of a division communication net. This nct
is augmented through the communicati on n e t of t h e observation b a t t a l i o n , of
t h e a i r u n i t s , and of t h e a n t i a i r c r a f t u n i t s . The division signal b a t t a l i o n
cstfiblishes connection bdtween thoso n e t s and the d i v i s i o n net.

A s s a b l y Areas f o r t h c Attack.

349. Should reaonnaissance determine t h a t t h c enemy has apparently do-

cided t o def~md, the troops, a s a r u l e , a f t e r the precedinp; dovclopnont,are
prepared f o r b a t t l z .

350. The order for t h e assembly paaitione f u r t h e a t t a c k p r e v i d e s f o r

i n f a n t r y assembly areas, s e c u r i t y f o r t h e assembly areas, the conduct of those
elements already engaged, t h e a r t i l l e r y Porming up, a s well a s f u r t h a r reom-
naissance information. An e f f o r t i s made t o give a s many d i r e c t i o n s as
possible, i n the a s s a b l y p o s i t i o n order, f o r t h e l a t e r execution of t h e a t -
tack, so t h a t t h e noeessary preparations can be mads: such as, missions f o r
t h e individual arms, arrangment s f o r t h e ammunition replacement, and t h e can-

Report No. 14,507.

duct of t h e l i g h t ,columns* and of t h e wagon elements, a s vrell a s f o r t h e medi-
c a l and veterinary scrvice. As a r u l 6 , t h e locction of tho horse-dram supply
column can bc ordered. As a r e s u l t t h e l a t t e r a t t a c k ortler can bo b r i e f .

*h l i g h t i&antry column consists of:

27 trucks (ammunition)

2 motorcycles

90 men

nnd t h e r e i s on0 i n each regiment .

351. The t e r r a i n f o r t h e i n f a n t r y asscmbly i s favorable if it o f f e r s
cover against observation and f i r e and permits the i n f a n t r y t o advance i n t h e
most ffivcrnble a t t a c k diroction under tho protection cf t h e supporting arms.
For t h e ad&ce from t h e assembly area, t e r r a i n without cover i s t o bc avoided,
vrhere poscible,- a n d is t o be observed only by a r t i l l e r y ~ n d heavy infantry >.ma-
pons. Terrain which i s neoessary f o r obsorvntion and for the deployment of
infantry mus.t, under some conditions, be taken beforo'hwd.

As a r u l c , i n open t e r r a i n t h e assembly a r e a s must bo a t a greater

d i s t m c e from t h e enomy.

Units ~ e e dnot be oqunlly f a r advanced. Thoso which find themselves

prepared nearer the e n e w must f a c i l i t a t e t h e advanae of t h e more rearward ele-
ments.

Infiurtry whioh is i n an ussembly nrea for a (wide) avelopment i s

s u f f i c i e n t l y f a r removed from those elements m a l r i n g t h e f r o n t a l a t t a c k so t h a t
t h e inner flanks clo not come togokhsr. .
A t t h e l a t e s t t h e i n f a n t r y executes b a t t l e reconnaissance a s it
goes i n t o assembly positions. Niorswar, it m u s t seoure the assembly creas , a d
l a t e r deployment by reconnaissarce.

352. The deployment of the a r t i l l e r y i s executed t o meet the demands of

t h e gradual assanbling of t h e infnntry, which the a r t i l l o r y must cover.

Before the a r t i l l e r y i s deployed (formed up) the a r t i l l e r y commander

s h a l l liear from t h e higher commander concerning t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a r t i l l e r y
support since they a r e of great influence i n the execution of t h e a t t a c k and
may require special reconnaissance.

The reconnaissance for 0.P.s and f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s must consider the

p o s s i b i l i t y of f i r e u n i t y upon the probab1.e decisive attack arecs. The higher
o o m n d e r and tho infantry commander, t o whom a r t i l l e r y i s attached o r whom
it s u p ~ o r t s ,must therefore inform the e r t i l l e r y e a r l y a3 t o the m n e r i n
vrhich they i n t a d t o conduct the attack.

Where possible, the w t i l l e r y i s t o be so put i n p o s i t i o n t h a t from

one doploymenk it o m execute its mission? during t h e attack. I n addition,
several bakterios, m.d a l s o those k exocute counterbattory, m u s t oeoupy ad-
vnncod f i r i n g positions. Thb t e r r a i n , i t s no.turu1 g r d h s , t h e curve cf t h e
t r a j e c t o r y a t different ranges and the p o s s i b i l i t y of t r a v e r s e may place l i m i -
t a t i o n s upon those demnds,

Supparting or attached a r t i l l e r y must r m a i n near t h e infantry.

Thus an2 through short cohneotions beLwoen 0.P.s md f i r i n g positions it in-
creases the speed, surety, m d effectiveness of i t s support.

Where a change of p o s i t i o n connot be avoidod, f i r e e f f e c t m y not be

annulled and the changes must be m ~ d ei n echelon.

The accumulation of b a t t e r i e s i n s m a l l areas i s t* be avoided.

Report No. 14,507.

 I n divisions which a m strong i n a r t i l l e r y , it i s occasionally
suitable t o form the a r t i l l e r y u n i t s into groups: i n t h e f r o n t l i n e such or-
ganization comes i n t o question i n an attack against a position.

353. The i n f a n t r y i n f r o n t of t h e a r t i l l e r y provides f r o n t a l security

therefor. Special f l a n k protection may be necessary. The watchfulness of the
a r t i l l e r y must provide against surprise. Each a r t i l l e r y u n i t must prepare i t s
own self defmse, e s p e c i a l l y against tanks, by close-in security and observa-
tion,

354. While t h e i n f a n t r y i s i n assembly positions, t h e a r t i l l e r y makes

a l l preparations for t h e support of t h e a t t a c k . It t a k e s under f i r e compenh
sating t a r g e t s i n adjacent zones, draws out the h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y f i r e , exeb
cutes counterbattery against known b a t t e r i e s , a s well a s AA b a t t e r i e s . In
addition, a r t i l l e r y f l i e r s a r e to be placed e a r l y a t t h e disposal of the ar-
t i l l e r y tommander. The ballbon platoon and t h e observation b a t t a l i o n a r e t o
be employed (for Oomtarbattery execution, see pat. 368). Large troop move-
ments an6 e s p e c i a l l y impor'tant t a r g e t s a r e t o be taken under f i r e a t great
distances.

It i s suitable t o l i m i t t h e number of b a t t e r i e s charged with thi?

oxeeution of t h e above missions in order not t o 'betray t o the h o s t i l e ~ r t i l l e n y
our own intentinns and firing positions.

Progress of the Attack,

355. Insofar a s it has not already ordered i n the assembly Brea, the a t -
t a c k order f i x e s t h e objectives, t h e organization of t h e infantry, i t s zones
and boundaries accord* t o the circumstanc as, the organization and f i r e sup-
port of the a r t i l l e r y , the time of the a t t a c k , t h e reserves and t h e i r location.

356, The r e l a t i v e strength of t h e opposing a r t i l l e r y and the p o s s i b i l i t y

of engaging the h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y influences t h e choice of a t t a c k t e r r a i n f o r
t h e infantry, t h e t h e of the a t t a c k and, under some conditions, n e c e s s i t a t e s
t h e bringing forward of &her arms and b a t t l e means.

Infantry attacking with strong a r t i l l e r y support has no need t o

f e a r t h e overcaning of open t e r r a i n . I n c e r t a i n instances, and e s p e c i a l l y
with not so strong a r t i l l e r y support, it i s preferable f o r the i n f a n t r y t o work
forward a s fnr as pnssible i n t e r r a i n with cover and which deprives t h e h o s t i l e
a r t i l l e r y and heavy arms of observation. Darkness and smoke come into question
i f the h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y f i r e must be-deprived of t e r r e s t r i a l observation,

357. Tho i n f m t r y a t t a c k begins with the advrusoo of the l i g h t i n f a n t r y

arms under protection of a r t i l l e r y and heavy i n f a n t r y weaponso

NoCer Each Infantry Co. a o n s i s t s of t h r e e platoons,

each platoon of t h r e e groups, each group, 16 men, 1 LeAfbG,

I n the advance t h e u n i t s develop ?ad deploy, a s t h e t e r r a i n and hos-

t i l a reantions demend, with i r r e g u l a r distances and interval8 and ' i n s u f f i o i e p t
'

depth. Cwer and a r e a s d i f f i c u l t for h o s t i l e f i r e a r e t o be used. Should hoe-

t i l o f i r e force it, t h e advance is made by bounds or by rushes i n groups, e i t h e r
large a small. In +he h a l t s tii riflemon seek cover so that t h e y decrease t h e
h o s t i l e f i r e e f f e c t a s much a s possible. A t e f f e c t i v e distances the f i r e of :
the l i g h t machine guns i s opened. Under t h e i r p r o t e c t i o n the. riflemen continile
t o advance. Up.on c l o s e r spproach they likewise p r t i c i s t e i n t h e f i r e fight,
t o the extent necessary.

Hand i n hand with the advance of t h e l i g h t , the heavy i n f m t r y ~vea-

pons follw? the echelon. These must cooporate mare c l o s e l y wit,h the forward
elements a s the focal point of the h o s t i l e r e s i s t a n c e i s determined, A t t h i s
t i n e it may be necessary to a t t a c h a portion of the heavy infantry weapons to
the most advanced u n i t s .

Report; Go. 14,507.

 I n t e r r a i n affording poor observation t h i s may be necessary a t the
beginning of t h e engagement. The remaining heavy infantry weapons support t h e
a t t a o k from positions f u r t h e r t o the r e a r , They a r e advanoed by echelon. In
t h e enylloyment of t h e heavy i n f d r y weapons every endeavor must be made t o
concentrate t h e i r e f f e c t and t o complement the f i r e of t h e a r t i l l e r y , es-
p e c i a l l y with minenworfcrs, against t a r g e t s which are d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e a r t i l -
lery to hit.

The a d v a a e against the enemy i s executed under c a r e f u l regulation

of f i r e ' a n d movement. Elements advancing without oover must not lack f i r e
support. While these m r k forward, the adjacent u a i t s hold down the enemy
e s p e c i a l l y by m a n s of t h e i r l i g h t machine gms i n conjunction with t h e
heavy arms. Up t o the decisive t h r u s t , it is always a question of having
t r a n s i k e r y and l o c a l f i r e superiority md o f u t i l i z k g t h i s for a rapid ad-
vanoft. Elements unable t o advance dig i n for protection. EvBry oppertunity
i s used t o .%doonce. As'weRk places develop i n t h e enemy l i n e ; t h e elements
heretofore retarded arc, with roinfcrcements, directed against these areas.

Independence of a c t i o n of the lower commanders and t h e i r joint oo-

operation nre a t a l l momonts of t h e advance of decisive importanoo,

353. The a r t i l l e r y supports the i n f m t r y attaok primarily by engaging

t h e h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y m d infantry. Both must be engaged throughout t h e
b a t t l e by o w a r t i l l c r y . Thc engaging of othor t a r g e t s i s l i m i t e d t o short
time periods.

The h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y i s uniformly engaged under t h e d i r e c t i o n of

the a r t i l l e r y aommander or another a r t i l l e r y leader. The countcrbattery of
t h e a r t i l l e r y depends e s s e n t i a l l y on the reconnaissanoe (ififormation) possi-
b i l i t i e s and t h e available ammunition, A r t i l l e r y aviators, observation bat-
t a l i o n s and balloons provide with their e a r l y observation and informatien of
t h e t e r r a i n of t h e attack the bases f a r the engagemnt of t h e a r t i l l e r y . The
comm~derof the counterbattery w r k must be c l e a r l y connected vrith the com-
mender of t h e AA a r t i l l e r y and the a i r service in order t o guarantee, with
t h e i r halp, the a c t i v i t y of the a r t i l l e r y f l i e r . The supression of h o s t i l e
b a t t e r i e s i s secured through the simultaneous s u r p r i s e f i r e of several batter..
ies, for longer periods b y gas4 The silencing of h o s t i l e b a t t e r i e s i s pos-
s i b l e only with great ammunition expenditure and sure observation heavy c a l i -
bers a r e most suitable.

By t h e engagement of our a r t i l l e r y w i t h h o s t i l a ' i n f a n t r y it i s a

matter of increasing the effectiveness af our own infantry. T h e e f f e c t i v e
range of t h e a r t i l l e r y , and often t h a t of t h e heavy machine guns, o f t e n ex-
tends deep i n t o enemy t e r r i t o r y and on the f l a n k of our attacking infantry,
vvhercns thr: f i r e - o f the l i g h t machine guns, p a r t l y t h a t also of the minenwer-
f e r s , can remain, u n t i l immediately before the a s s a u l t , on the fnremost h o s t i l e
elements. Should t h e a r t i l l e r y working . d i r e c t l y with t h e infantry prove inade-
quate f o r the required support, t h e a r t i l l e r y commander must augment with the
remaining a r t i l l e r y , preferably by placing it i n suppbrt of t h e decisive ac-
tion. '

350. Every attempt i s madc t o engage t h e g r e a t e r p a r t of t h e h ~ s t i l ear-

t i l l o r y before t h e a t t a c k of the i n f m t r y .

Nut infrequently t h e h o s t i l e forces and weapsns which oppose t h e at-

t a c k are f i r s t disclosed & s the i n f a n t r y attacks, Especially a r e many a r t i l .
1ery.positions often unrecognieable or only p a r t i a l l y defined p r i o r t o t h e a t -
tack, with the r e s u l t t h a t t h i s a r k i l l o r y can be energetioally engaged only
a f t e r thc: various reconnaissence agencies have d e f i n i t e l y i d e n t i f i e d it.

A t t h e beginning of tho i n f a n t r y attack, therefore; numerous b a t t e r -

ies, i f possible, must withhold t h e i r f i r o and l i e i n waiting, i n order t o en-
gaga ?rc-vio8sly unknown h o s t i l e elanents, e s p e o i a l l y b a t t e r i e s which were pre-
viously s i l e n t . Moreover, it i s a wasto of m u n i t i o n , t o f i r o , p r i o r t o t h e
attaok, upon areas whose occupation has nut been determined.

Report No. 14,507.

 ..
360, Should t h e s i t u o t i o n be such t h a t t h e a r t i l l e r y appears t o have

inaclequate s t r e t h and observation f a c i l i t i k s for the, engagement Of h o s t i l e

a r t i l l e r y prior t o t h e a t t a c k and should the engagomcnt ,of., .h c. s. $

i l & . . a r t i l l e r y

during the attaclc be without great prospect, then aur w%illery.Ss..employed

. .
against t h e h o s t i l e infantry.

361, The more the p i o t u r e of t h e h o s t i l e resistance i s ' c l a r i f i c d , a l l

the more important i s it to ~ o n c e n t ~ r a tsuperior

e
a r t i l l e r y f i r e on those

areas of the h o s t i l e front where our success has boen l e s s . I n . suoh citua-

t i o n s t h e infantry c o b d e r cannot delay i n withdrawing art,iilory. support

from om M a s t r y unit i n c r d o r successively t o support the.attaclcs;.of' . ,

. adja-

cent elements.

T h e k d i n t e u t i l i z a t i o n of the a r t i l l e r y f i r e . e f f e c t by t h e in-

f a n t r y i s of d e c i s i v e importance. Shou)d the h - t h e r ndvance of t h e i n f m t r y

require additional- agreements between t h e 'two arms, then we f i n d pauses i n t h e

advance unavoidable. T h e nearer the i n f a n t r y att,ack approaches t h e enemy, the

more t* is required t o d e l i v e r orders and to receive instructions concerning

%&f c r e cooperation
. .
from the a r t i l l e p y .

362, Gradually thc i n f a n t r y works forward in several placqs t o close

range and t o penetration capability. With a decision of the front l i n e element
to' execute a penetration, the supportihg weapons a r e kept in$ormed by means o f
l i g h t o r othwr signals O r by information imparted through a 4 1 :m&ags a t ; i t s
disposal. A s necessary, the supporting weapons r a i s e t h e i r f i r e from t h e
areas o f penetration and place them correspondingly. i n advance of t h e i n f a n t r y
attnck, Abovo a l l , thcy l i e i n wait f o r those t n r g e t s which now f o r tho f i r ~ t
time appear, engage thcm forthwith, and continue engaging opportune t a r g e t s i n
t h e zone of the br&tbrough, u n t i l l i k e w i s ~t h e f i r e must be l i f t e d from
these. The doopcr t h e infantry , penetrates, the more i n i p o r t a t ?he , c u t t i n g off
of h o s t i l e enfilade f i r e , Observer? of a l l supporting arms must c l o s e l y fol-
l& t h e ' advanced i n f i n t r y elemsnt s., ,

I s previous understanding between the supporting weapons and the

infantry which i s breaking through nut possible, these weapons must, by excel-

lent observation, seek t o determine the intentions of t h e i n f a n t r y apJ t o meet

i t s demands. Und$r c e r t a i n conditions the'supporting weapons can, by l i f b i n g

t h e i r f i r e from the foranost h o s t i l e elements, give an impetus t o the infan-

t r y attack.

I f th i n f l n t r y works forward t o break thmugh p o s i t i o n on a bread

front and i f t h e break through con'be uniformly hunched, then t h e necessary
. l i f t i n g of f i r e p r i o r t o the break through, the time of the break through and
t b t r a n s f e r of f i r e s according t o time snd place a r e governed by orders.
363. Penetrations are of s m l l e r or g r e a t e r e x t a t , depending upon the

s i z e of the break through element. The suocess i s exploited i n dapth. The

infantry, reinforced b y rearward eleracnts, attaoks s t r a i @ t ahead against the

h o s t i l e strong p o i n t s and n6sts. Now the a t t a c k resolves i t s e l f into.individ-

u a l engagments, ordi&rily. Heavy i n f a n t r y wcppons and utllor rearward ale-

ments p r o t e c t t h e flanks and r e a r of the forward elements and a r e t o be kept

near. By additional forces from the rear and the forwarding o f muni$ions, t h e

a t t a c k i s continually strengthcne'd, o t h e r v ~ s gnur force i s soon consumed i n

t h e depth of tho h o s t i l e position, I n rapid, powerful u t i l i z a t i o n of t h e hi-

t i a l success l i e s the busis for i t s enlargemat.

As soon af'ter the break through a s it i s dctcmined t h a t t h e a r t i l -

l e r y which.hns been engaged can ng longer from i t s i n i t i a l positions support

t h e attnck, e i t h e r upon qr dor or independently tho b a t t e r i e s advance,

T h y a61re.m e t o p o s i t i o n s a s close n s possible t o t h e infantry,

gain contact therewith, a g a g c h o s t i l e elements, a s s i s t i n rap l l i n g sounter-

attacks md by t h e i r f i r e secure the f u r t h e r u t i l i z a t i o n of t h!e success.

.Report No. 14,567.

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