Legarda vs Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; GR No.

8936, October 2, 1915

Posted by Pius Morados on November 27, 2011
(Land Titles and Deeds – Purpose of the Torrens System of Registration)
Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip
of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years
after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot
under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and
the strip of land where it stands.
Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the name
of two persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be
construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier
one continues to hold title and will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting
in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013 Possession,
Property Registration Decree, Regalia Doctrine
NOVEMBER 13, 2018
FACTS:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property he purchased from
Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public
and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the
judicial confirmation of his title.
The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the Republic appealed the judgment to
the CA, which reversed the RTC Judgment.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the said decision
to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petition was denied.
Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
What are the classifications of public lands?
Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.

RULING:
1.
Classifications of land according to ownership.
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either:
(a) is intended for public use; or
(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that
is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from
the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and
is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also,
public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or
national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of
such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
2.
Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period
of possession – possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June
12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
Sta. Rosa vs. CA, GR 112526, Oct. 12, 2001 121 SCRA 254
Facts: Petitioner was the registered owner of two parcels of land, MARO issued a notice of coverage to
petitioner and invited its officials or representatives to a conference. During the meeting It was the
consensus and recommendation of the assembly that the landholding of SRRDC be placed under
compulsory acquisition. Petitioner filed a “Protest and Objection” to the compulsory acquisition of the
property. Secretary of Agrarian Reform sent two notices of acquisition to petitioner. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform sent two 2 notices of acquisition to petitioner, stating that petitioner’s landholdings covered by
TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at
P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. petitioner SRRDC in two letters 2 separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad
and the Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting not only
the amount of compensation offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2) notices of acquisition.
Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just
compensation. Petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating that its property under
the aforesaid land titles were exempt from CARP coverage because they had been classified as watershed
area and were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion. Office of the Secretary, DAR, through
the Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations) and the Regional Director
of Region IV, submitted a report answering the two issues raised. According to them, firstly, by virtue of
the issuance of the notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice of acquisition on December 12,
1989, the property is covered under compulsory acquisition. Secondly, Administrative Order No. 1, Series
of 1990, Section IV D also supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said property. During the
consideration of the case by the Board, there was no pending petition for land conversion specifically
concerning the parcels of land in question. The Board sent a notice of hearing to all the parties interested,
setting the hearing for the administrative valuation of the subject parcels of land. However, SRRDC
submitted a petition to the Board for the latter to resolve SRRDC’s petition for exemption from CARP
coverage before any administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board. The initial
DARAB hearing of the case was held and subsequently, different dates of hearing were set without
objection from counsel of SRRDC. Adrian Avilado Antazo
Issue: Whether the respondents complied with the procedural requirement of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law?Adrian Avilado Antazo
Held: No, we held that failed to comply with the requirements of the CARP Law. for its part, conditions
the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt of the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either. DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment of just
compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash
or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done by DAR.Adrian Avilado Antazo
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983SERAFIN B. YNGSONvs.THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and
NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DEGONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZFacts: A number of people, including the
petitioner and private respondents, applied for a permitto utilize 66 hectares of mangrove swamps for fishpond purposes, but
were not granted, thearea still being considered to be communal forest. When the area was released for saidpurpose, the three
private parties in this case had conflicting claims on the same. Initially, theBureau of Fisheries awarded the whole area in favor
of petitioner. However, the Sec.
of Agriculture and Natural Resources later ordered the division of the area into three portions,one part for
each of the petitioner and the private respondents. Not satisfied with the portionreceived, petitioner appealed the order.Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the whole of the area concerned.Held: No. It is elementary in the law governing the
disposition of lands of the public domain thatuntil timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the
Bureau ofLands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose ofthese lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpondleases, and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of
Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administerand dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain
while suchlands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or otherpurposes. All the applications
in this case were premature; therefore not one of the applicantscan claim to have a preferential right over another. The
interpretation by the Office of thePresident was held to be an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.

Alba vs. Dela Cruz G.R. No. 5246Posts Sept. 16, 1910 FACTS: The petitioners herein are the he only
heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey. The four petitioners, as co-owners, on Dec.
18, 1906 sought to have registered a parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. The petition was accompanied
by a plan and technical description of the said lot. After hearing the court, on Feb. 12, 1908, entered a
decree directing that described in the petition be registered in the names of the 4 petitioners. On Jun,
1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration (CLR) asking for a
revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the 2 parcels
of land described in said motion and which he alleges to be included in the lands decreed to the
petitioners. He alleges that the decree of Feb. 12, 1908 was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the
petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands. For him, The petitioners deliberately omitted to include
in their registration his name as one of the occupants of the land so as to be given notice of registration.
He further alleged having inherited the 2 lots from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state
grant for the same (was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on April 6, 1895.) He
therefore asked a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two
parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after
hearing the additional evidence presented by both parties, rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its decision
modifyingthe former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto
Ratilla de la Cruz. From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed. The court below held that
the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an
occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this
constituted fraudwithin the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further
held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of purchase of 1864. ISSUE:
Did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been
entered in February of the same year? 2. Whether or not,the petitioners did obtain the decree of Feb 12,
1908, by means of fraud. HELD: The judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed
and judgment entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court of
February 12, 1908. 1. The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of
the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only
on the ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. 2. The application for the registration is to
be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is
to contain, among other things, the names and addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining
owners, if known. The subject land was first rented to Baldomero de la Cruz by petitioners’ uncle Jose
Grey and this contract was duly executed in writing. (While the appellee admits that his father and brother
entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners’ land, nevertheless he insists
that the two small parcels in question were not included in these contracts) The subsequent State grant
was obtained by Baldomero after the death of the petitioners’ parents and while he petitioners were
minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said
parcels as their lessee at the time they presented their application for registration. They did not act in bad
faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their application the name of the
appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they
include in their application the names of their tenants. Indeed, the Land Registration Act requires that all
occupants be named in the petition and given notice by registered mail. However, this did not do the
appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means
of the publication “to all whom it may concern.” Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet
title thereto, subject only to the [given] exceptions. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description “to all whom it may concern.” As to
whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the prov
Francis Joseph
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA;
Regalian Doctrine GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000 FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa
filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of
the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership
over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. ISSUE: Do the provisions of
IPRA contravene the Constitution? HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over
the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale development and exploitation. Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs
by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the
State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same. CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC
ESTATE AUTHORITY FACTS: From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were
being reclaimed. A law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power
to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a
private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA, several hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay
were going to be transferred to AMARI . ISSUE: Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for
the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates
glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the commerce of
men,” are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to defend and
uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio
BUREAU OF FORESTRY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO
G.R. No. L-37995
August 31, 1987

FACTS:

In 1961, Mercedes Diago applied for the registration of 4 parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo
containing an approximate area of 30.5 hectares. She alleged she occupied said parcels of land having
bought them from the estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn
from Canuto Gustilo in 1934.

The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could be registered under
the Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the
said lands for at least 30 years.

The Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that certain portions of the lands, with an area of
approximately 19.4 hectares are mangrove swamps and are within a Timberland Block.

In 1965, Filomeno Gallo purchased the subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago, and moved to be
substituted in place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title.

Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved to substitute petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor,
since supervision and control of said portion have been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to the
PFC.

In April 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the 4 parcels of land in the
name of Filomeno Gallo. It ruled that although the controverted portion of 19.4 hectares are mangrove
and nipa swamps within a Timberland Block, petitioners failed to submit convincing proof that these
lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural purposes, and the presumption is that these are
agricultural lands.

ISSUE:
WON the classification of lands of public domain by the Executive Branch of the Government into
agricultural, forest or mineral can be changed or varied by the court. NO

HELD:
Admittedly, the controversial area is within a timberland block classified and certified as such by the
Director of Forestry in 1956. The lands are needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the
public domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings.

Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of Forestry to submit
convincing proofs that the land is more valuable for forest purposes than for agriculture.

As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the classification or reclassification of
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive
Department and not of the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not
the court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain but the Executive Branch,
through the Office of the President.

Furthermore, respondents cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription since the application
filed by them necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain
and cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that
possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.