Republic of the Philippines under the obligation of administering them and of collecting the revenues

SUPREME COURT therefrom, and for this reason we notify you that from this date all of the revenues
Manila and products therefrom must be turned into the treasury of the municipality in order
that the people may properly preserve them.
EN BANC
We hope that you will view in the proper light and that you will deliver to the
G.R. No. L-2352 July 26, 1910 bearer of this letter the key of the alms box of the said image in order that we may
comply with our obligation in conformity with the dispositions of said order.
ELADIO ALONSO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. We beg to remain as always by your spiritual sons. Q. B. S. M.
TOMAS VILLAMOR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
(Signed) ANDRES OJEDA.
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos, for appellants.
J. C. Knudson, for appellee. TOMAS VILLAMOR.

MORELAND, J.: ANDRES CALINAUAN.

This is an action brought to recover of the defendants the value of certain articles taken BERNARDINO TANDOY.
from a Roman Catholic Church located in the municipality of Placer, and the rental value of
the church and its appurtenances, including the church cemetery, from the 11th day of EUSEBIO LIRIO.
December, 1901, until the month of April, 1904. After hearing the evidence, the court below
gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P1,581, with interest at 6 per cent from ELEUTERIO MONDAYA.
the date of the judgment. The said sum of P1,581 was made up of two items, one of which,
P741, was for the value of the articles taken from the church, and the other, P840, the
MAXIMO DELOLA.
rental value of the premises during the occupations by defendants. From this judgment the
defendants appealed to this court.
SEGUNDO BECERRO.
It appears that the defendants were on the 11th day of December, 1901, members of the
municipal board of the municipality of Placer, and that they on that date addressed to the ONOFRE ELIMANCE.
plaintiff in this case, who was the priest in charge of the church, its appurtenances and
contents, the following letter: On the 13th of December, 1901, the defendants took possession of the church and its
appurtenances, and also of all of the personal property contained therein. The plaintiff, as
PLACER, 11th December, 1901. priest of the church and the person in charge thereof, protested against the occupation
thereof by the defendants, but his protests received no consideration, and he was
summarily removed from possession of the church, its appurtenances and contents.
R. P. ELADIO ALONSO, Benedicto, Suriago.
The only defense presented by the defendants, except the one that the plaintiff was not the
ESTEEMED PADRE: After saluting you, we take the liberty of writing you that in
real party in interest, was that the church and other buildings had been erected by funds
the municipality of which we have charged we have received an order from the
voluntarily contributed by the people of that municipality, and that the articles within the
provincial fiscal, dated the 5th instant, which says: "The cemeteries, convents, and
church had been purchased with funds raised in like manner, and that, therefore, the
the other buildings erected on land belonging to the town at the expense of the
municipality was the owner thereof.
town and preserved by it belong to the town, and for this reason the municipality is
1
The question as to the ownership of the church and its appurtenances, including the SEC. 110. Amendments in general. — The court shall, in furtherance of justice,
convent and cemetery, was before this court on the 23rd day of September, 1908, in an and on such terms, if any, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading
action entitled "The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church against the municipality of or proceeding and at any stage of the action, in either the Court of First Instance or
Placer."1 Substantially the same facts were presented on the part of the defendants in that the Supreme Court, by adding or striking out the name of any party, either plaintiff
case as are presented by the defendants in this. The question there litigated was the claim or defendant, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistaken or
upon the part of the municipality of ownership of said church and its appurtenances on the inadequate allegation or description in any other respect so that the actual merits of
ground that according to Spanish law the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church was not the the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and
owner of such property, having only the use thereof for ordinary ecclesiastical and religious in the most expeditious, and inexpensive manner. The court may also, upon like
purposes, and that the true owner thereof was the municipality or the State by reason of terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be made after the time limited by the
the contributions by them, or by the people, of the land and of the funds with which the rules of the court for filing the same. Orders of the court upon the matters provided
buildings were constructed or repaired. The court decided in that case that the claim of the in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the
defendants was not well founded and that the property belonged to the Roman Catholic adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
Church. The same question was discussed and decided in the case of Barlin vs.
Ramirez (7 Phil. Rep., 41), and the case of The Municipality of Ponce vs. Roman Catholic Section 503 of the same code provides:
Apostolic Church in Porto Rico (28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 737, 6 Off. Gaz., 1213).
SEC. 503. Judgment not to be reversed on technical grounds. — No judgment
We have made a careful examination of the record and the evidence in this case and we shall be reversed on formal or technical grounds, or for such error as has not
have no doubt that the property sued for was, at the time it was taken by the defendants, prejudiced the real rights of the excepting party.
the property of the Roman Catholic Church, and that the seizure of the same and
occupation of the church and its appurtenances by the defendants were wrongful and We are confident under these provisions that this court has full power, apart from that
illegal. We are also convinced, from such examination, that the conclusions of the court power and authority which is inherent, to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings, and
below as to the value of the articles taken by the defendants and of the rent of the church decision in this case by substituting, as party plaintiff, the real party in interest. Not only are
for the time of its illegal occupation by the defendants were correct and proper. While some we confident that we may do so, but we are convinced that we should do so. Such an
objection was made on appeal by counsel for the defendants that the value of the articles amendment does not constitute, really a change in the identity of the parties. The plaintiff
taken and of the rent of the church and its appurtenances had not been proved by asserts in his complaint, and maintains that assertion all through the record, that he is
competent evidence, no objection to the introduction of the evidence of value was made at engaged in the prosecution of this case, not for himself, but for the bishop of the diocese—
the trial and we can not consider that question raised for the first time here. not by his own right, but by right of another. He seeks merely to do for the bishop what the
bishop might do for himself. His own personality is not involved. His own rights are not
We have carefully examined the assignments of error made by counsel for defendants on presented. He claims no interest whatever in the litigation. He seeks only the welfare of the
this appeal. We find none of them well founded. The only one which deserves especial great church whose servant he is. Gladly permits his identity to be wholly swallowed up in
attention at our hands is the one wherein the defendants assert that the court below erred that of his superior. The substitution, then, of the name of the bishop of the diocese, or the
in permitting the action to be brought and continued in the name of the plaintiff instead of in Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, for that of Padre Alonso, as party plaintiff, is not in
the name of the bishop of the diocese within which the church was located, or in the name reality the substitution of one identity for another, of one party for another, but is simply to
of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, as the real party in interest. make the form express the substance. The substance is there. It appears all through the
proceedings. No one is deceived for an instant as to whose interest are at stake. The form
It is undoubted the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic Apostic Church itself is the of its expression is alone defective. The substitution, then, is not substantial but formal.
real party in interest. The plaintiff personally has no interest in the cause of action. Section Defect in mere form can not possibly so long as the substantial is clearly evident. Form is a
114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted in the method of speech used to express substance and make it clearly appear. It is the means
name of the real party in interest. The plaintiff is not such party. by which the substance reveals itself. If the form be faulty and still the substance shows
plainly through no, harm can come by making the form accurately expressive of the
Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, provides: substance.

2
No one has been misled by the error in the name of the party plaintiff. If we should by
reason of this error send this back for amendment and new trial, there would be on the
retrial the same complaint, the same answer, the same defense, the same interests, the
same witnesses, and the same evidence. The name of the plaintiff would constitute the
only difference between the old trial and the new. In our judgment there is not enough in a
name to justify such action.
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole
purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.
They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the
administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always
striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that
thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one
and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are
correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.
The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes than to
cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal to the plaintiff's
case smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which
one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps
and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly
lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be
done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it desserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no
vested rights in technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record of a
court of these Islands for defect of form when his substantial rights have not been
prejudiced thereby.
In ordering this substitution, we are in accord with the best judicial thought. (McKeighan vs.
Hopkins, 19 Neb., 33; Dixon vs. Dixon, 19 Ia., 512; Hodges vs. Kimball, 49 Ia., 577;
Sanger vs. Newton, 134 Mass., 308; George vs. Reed, 101 Mass., 378; Bowden vs.
Burnham, 59 Fed. Rep., 752; Phipps and Co. vs. Hurlburt, 70 Fed. Rep., 202; McDonal vs.
State, 101 Fed. Rep., 171; Morford vs. Diffenbocker, 20 N. W., 600; Costelo vs. Costelo vs.
Crowell, 134 Mass., 280; Whitaker vs. Pope, 2 Woods, 463, Fed. Cas. no. 17528; Miller vs.
Pollock, 99 Pa. St., 202; Wilson vs. Presbyterian Church, 56 Ga., 554; Wood vs. Circuit
Judge, 84 Mich., 521; Insurance Co, vs. Mueller, 77 Ill., 22; Farman vs. Doyle, 128 Mich., In their Complaint dated December 15, 2010, petitioners prayed before the Civil Service
696; Union Bank vs. Mott, 19 How. Pr., 114; R. R. Co. vs. Gibson, 4 Ohio St., 145;
Hume vs. Kelly, 28 Oreg., 398.)
It is therefore, ordered and decreed that the process, pleadings, proceedings and decision
in this action be, and the same are hereby, amended by substituting the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church in the place and stead of Eladio Alonso as party plaintiff, that the
complaint be considered as though originally filed by the Catholic Church, the answer
thereto made, the decision rendered and all proceedings in this case had, as if the said
institution which Father Eladio Alonso undertook to represent were the party plaintiff, and
that said decision of the court below, so amended, is affirmed, without special finding as to
the costs.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson and Trent, JJ., concur.
November 22, 2017
G.R. No. 208224
DR. JOSEPH L. MALIXI, DR. EMELITA Q. FIRMACION, IVIARIETTA MENDOZA,
AURORA AGUSTIN, NORA AGUILAR, MA. THERESA M. BEFETEL, and MYRNA
NISAY, Petitioners
vs.
DR. GLORY V. BALTAZAR, Respondent
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, praying that the January 22, 20132 and July 16, 20133 Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127252 and the October 17, 2011 Decision4 and July 17,
2012 Resolution5 of the Civil Service Commission be reversed and set aside.6 The Civil
Service Commission dismissed the administrative complaint of herein petitioners Dr. Jose
L. Malixi (Dr. Malixi), Dr. Emelita Q. Finnacion (Dr. Firmacion), Marietta Mendoza
(Mendoza), Aurora Agustin (Agustin), Nora Aguilar (Aguilar), Ma. Theresa M. Befetel
(Befetel), and Myrna Nisay (Nisay) against herein respondent Dr. Glory V. Baltazar
(Baltazar) for violating the rule on forum shopping.7 The Court of Appeals dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners on procedural grounds.8
9
Commission that respondent Dr. Baltazar be held administratively liable for gross
misconduct and that she be dismissed from service.10
3
Petitioners were employees of Bataan General Hospital holding the following positions: Dr. ....
Malixi was the Vice President of the Samahan ng Manggagawa ng Bataan General
Hospital, Dr. Firmacion was a Medical Specialist II, Mendoza and Agustin were both Nurse SECTION 21. Recruitment and Selection of Employees. - (1) Opportunity for government
III, Aguilar and Befetel were both Nurse II, and Nisay was a Nursing Attendant II. employment shall be open to all qualified citizens and positive efforts shall be exerted to
Meanwhile, Dr. Baltazar was the Officer-in-Charge Chief of Bataan General Hospital.11 attract the best qualified to enter the service, Employees shall be selected on the basis of
fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the positions.
Petitioners alleged that sometime in May 2008, the Department of Health and the Province
of Bataan entered into a Memorandum of Agreement regarding the construction of Bataan ....
General Hospital's three (3)-storey building. While this Memorandum was in effect, the
Department of Health, through then Secretary Francisco T. Duque (Duque), issued SECTION 22. Qualification Standards. - (1) A qualification standard expresses the
Department Personnel Order No. 2008-1452, appointing Dr. Baltazar as the hospital's minimum requirements for a class of positions in terms of education, training and
Officer-in-Charge.12 experience, civil service eligibility, physical fitness, and other qualities required for
successful performance. The degree of qualifications of an officer or employee shall be
According to petitioners, the Department of Health and the Province of Bataan entered into determined by the appointing authority on the basis of the qualification standard for the
a Supplemental Memorandum.13 One (1) of the provisions stated that the parties agreed to particular position.
give the supervision of the hospital to the Secretary of Health or "his duly authorized
representative with a minimum rank of Assistant Secretary[.]"14 A third Memorandum of Qualification standards shall be used as basis for civil service examinations for positions in
Agreement was executed by the parties on June 16, 2009, but the Department of Health the career service, as guides in appointment and other personnel actions, in the
refused to renew the agreement "due to a complaint already filed before the Honorable adjudication of protested appointments, in determining training needs, and as aid in the
Congresswoman Herminia Roman, and before the Department of Health."15 inspection and audit of the agencies' personnel work programs.

In their Complaint, petitioners questioned the validity of Dr. Baltazar's appointment and It shall be administered in such manner as to continually provide incentives to officers and
qualifications.16 They alleged that her appointment was "without any basis, experience[,] or employees towards professional growth and foster the career system in the government
expertise[.]"17 They claimed that she was appointed only by virtue of an endorsement of service.
the Bataan Governor and without the prescribed Career Service Executive Board
qualifications.18 Thus, her appointment violated Sections 8(1)(c), 8(2), 21 (1), and 22 of
(2) The establishment, administration and maintenance of qualification standards shall be
Book V of the Administrative Code, which provide:
the responsibility of the department or agency, with the assistance and approval of the Civil
Service Commission and in consultation with the Wage and Position Classification
SECTION 8. Classes of Positions in the Career Service.- (1) Classes of positions in the Office.19 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
career service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three
major levels as follows;
Petitioners pointed out that Dr. Baltazar's appointment was by virtue of a secondment
pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement. Her third year as Officer-in.Charge via
.... secondment already violated the law for failing to comply with the required qualification
standards.20 Granting that there was compliance, secondment that exceeds one (1) year is
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service. subject to the Civil Service Commission's approval under Section 9(a),21 Rule VII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Department of
(2) Except as herein otherwise provided, entrance to the first two levels shall be through Health Administrative Order No. 46, series of 2001. Civil Service Commission
competitive examinations, which shall be open to those inside and outside the service who Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999 likewise provides that the contract of
meet the minimum qualification requirements. Entrance to a higher level does not require secondment should be submitted to the Commission within 30 days from its execution. A
previous qualification in the lower level. Entrance to the third level shall be prescribed by year after Dr. Baltazar's secondment, the Commission did not issue any authority for her to
the Career Executive Service Board. continue to hold office as Officer-in-Charge of the hospital. Hence, her assumption without
the required authority was deemed illegal.22
4
Petitioners averred that the non-renewal of the Memorandum of Agreement by the submit within 30 days from the execution of the agreement or contract will only make the
Department of Health rendered her appointment ineffective. Her holding of the position secondment in effect 30 days before the submission date.35
after this non-renewal was already illegal.23
On the alleged violation of the next-in-line rule, the Civil Service Commission held that
In addition to Dr. Baltazar's alleged invalid appointment and lack of qualifications, "[e]mployees holding positions next-in-rank to the vacated position do not enjoy any vested
petitioners contended that she committed several abusive and malevolent acts detrimental right thereto for purposes of promotion."36Seniority will only be considered if the candidates
to Bataan General Hospital's officers and employees.24She authorized the collection of possess the same qualifications.37
fees for the insertion and removal of intravenous fluids and fees for the Nurse Station
without any legal basis.25 She also caused the removal from payroll of an employee, who, The dispositive portion of the Civil Service Commission Decision read:
up to the filing of the Complaint, had yet to receive remuneration, hazard pay, subsistence,
and other allowances.26 WHEREFORE, the complaint of Dr. Joseph L. Malixi, Dr. Emelita Q. Firmacion, Marietta
Mendoza, Aurora Agustin, Nora Aguilar, Ma. Theresa M. Befetel and Myrna Nisay against
Petitioners likewise alleged that Dr. Baltazar manipulated the creation of the Selection and Dr. Glory V. Baltazar for Dishonesty; Misconduct; Oppression; Violation of Existing Civil
Promotion Board to give her control over the personnel's employment and promotion. She Service Law and Rules or Reasonable Office Regulations; and Conduct Prejudicial to the
also disregarded the next-inline rule when it comes to appointment and promotion of Best Interest of the Service and Being Notoriously Undesirable is hereby DISMISSED for
employees.27 violation of the rule against forum-shopping.38 (Emphasis in the original)

Furthermore, Dr. Baltazar allegedly employed two (2) doctors as contractual employees Petitioners moved for reconsideration and argued that the letter before the Department of
who were paid ₱20,000.00 but worked only half the time rendered by an employee-doctor Health was simply a request to meet the Secretary, and not a Complaint. Furthermore, the
of Bataan General Hospital. Lastly, petitioners claimed that Dr. Baltazar allowed her doctor letter before the Department of Health and the Complaint before the Civil Service
siblings to accommodate private patients while expressly prohibiting other doctors to do the Commission did not contain the same parties or seek the same relief.39
same.28
On July 17, 2012, the Civil Service Commission promulgated a Resolution40 denying the
On October 17, 2011, the Civil Service Commission rendered a Decision29 dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration. It held that it was the Department of Health that considered
Complaint on the ground of forum shopping. The Civil Service Commission found that all petitioners' letter as their complaint, and not the Civil Service Commission. Moreover, the
elements of forum shopping were present in the case and that petitioners' letter dated Department of Health already exercised jurisdiction over the case when it required Dr.
September 7, 2010 filed with the Department of Health contained the same allegations Baltazar to comment on the letter-complaint.41
against Dr. Baltazar and sought for the same relief. Finally, the judgment by the
Department of Health would result to res judicata in the case before the Civil Service Petitioners elevated the case before the Court of Appeals.
Commission. It also noted that another case was pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman in relation to the alleged removal of an employee in the hospital's payroll.30
On January 22, 2013, the Court of Appeals issued a Minute Resolution,42 dismissing the
appeal:
Nevertheless, the Civil Service Commission resolved the issue of Dr. Baltazar's
appointment "[f]or clarificatory purposes[.]"31 It held that Dr. Baltazar was not appointed as
The petition is DISMISSED in view of the following:
Officer-in-Charge of Bataan General Hospital but was merely seconded to the position.
Section 6 of the Civil Service Commission Circular No. 40, series of 1998, only requires
that seconded employees occupy a "professional, technical and scientific position[.]"32 1. the dates when the assailed Decision was received and when [a Motion for
Reconsideration] thereto was filed are not indicated;
The Civil Service Commission added that the approval requirement for secondments that
exceed one (1) year was already amended by Civil Service Commission Circular No. 06- 2. the attached October 17, 2011 Decision and July 17, 2012 Resolution are mere
33
1165. The new circular merely required that the Memorandum of Agreement or the photocopies;
34
secondment contract be submitted to the Commission "for records purposes[.]" Failure to
5
3. petitioner's counsel's [Mandatory Continuing Legal Education] date of compliance is not
indicated; and
4. there are no proofs of competent evidence of identities.43
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its July
16, 2013 Minute Resolution.44
On September 4, 2013, petitioners filed a Petition for Review45 against Dr. Baltazar before enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.
this Court. They pray for the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals and of the Decision and Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.46
Petitioners maintain that they indicated the important dates in their appeal before the Court acknowledge.
of Appeals and that they attached certified true copies of the assailed Decision and
Resolution.47 However, they admit that they failed to indicate the date of their counsel's
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLB) compliance and to provide proof of
"competent evidence of identities."48
Petitioners also deny that they committed forum shopping. The alleged Complaint sent to
the Department of Health was a mere letter stating the employees' grievances and
objections to the illegalities and violations committed by respondent. It was a mere request
for the Department of Health Secretary to tackle the issues and investigate the concerns in
the hospital's management. This letter was not intended to serve as a formal Complaint.
They request that this Court set aside the issue on forum shopping and that the case be
resolved on its merits.49
On January 14, 2014, respondent filed her Comment50 and prayed for the dismissal of the 2. the attached October 17, 2011 Decision and July 17, 2012 Resolution are mere
petition. She argues that the procedural infirmities of petitioners’ appeal are fatal to their photocopies;
case.51
On February 27, 2014, petitioners filed their Reply.52 They reiterated their request for the
relaxation of procedural rules and the resolution of the case based on its merits. They also
disclosed that Civil Service Commission Chairman Duque, who signed the October 17,
2011 Decision, was formerly the Department of Health Secretary who seconded
respondent as Bataan General Hospital's Officer-in-Charge. Lastly, petitioners added that
their letter to the Department of Health was not a Complaint since it was not assigned a
case number.53
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the petition based on procedural grounds.
I
Procedural rules are essential in the administration of justice. The importance of procedural
rules in the adjudication of disputes has been reiterated in numerous cases.54 In Santos v.
Court of Appeals, et al.:55
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will
to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in insuring the effective
These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed, to
provide for a system under which suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner and
at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they
56
The other alternative is the settlement of their conflict through the barrel of a
gun.
Moreover, in Le Soleil Int'l. Logistics Co., Inc,. et al. v. Sanchez, et al.:57
Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of
the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the
efficiency of, our judicial system.58
In this case, the Court of Appeals pointed out four (4) procedural infirmities:
1. the dates when the assailed Decision was received and when [a Motion for
Reconsideration] thereto was filed are not indicated;
3. petitioner's counsel's [Mandatory Continuing Legal Education] date of compliance is not
indicated; and
4. there are no proofs of competent evidence of identities.59
Technical rules serve a purpose. They are not made to discourage litigants from pursuing
their case nor are they fabricated out of thin air. Every section in the Rules of Court and
every issuance of this Court with respect to procedural rules are promulgated with the
objective of a more efficient judicial system.
On the first procedural rule that petitioners allegedly failed to comply with, this Court
explained the rationale of the requisite material dates in Lapid v. Judge Laurea:60
6
There are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Lastly, proofs of competent evidence of identities are required to ensure "that the
Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was allegations are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of
received; second, the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed; speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith."66
and third, the date when notice of the denial thereof was received ... As explicitly stated in
the aforementioned Rule, failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient II
ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Time and again, this Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to advance
The rationale for this strict provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to appreciate. As substantial justice.67
stated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the requirement is for purpose of determining the
timeliness of the petition, thus: In Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo,68 the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Petition for Review for
failure to state the date he received the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court and
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the date he filed his Motion for Reconsideration.69This Court held:
is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be [F]ailure to state the material dates is not fatal to his cause of action, provided the date of
assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt his receipt, i.e., 9 May 2006, of the RTC Resolution dated 18 April 2006 denying his Motion
of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was for Reconsideration is duly alleged in his Petition. In the recent. case of Great Southern
not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the Maritime Services Corporation V. Acuna, we held that "the failure to comply with the rule
motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident
stated... from the records." The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is
the date of receipt of the trial court's order denying the motion for reconsideration. The
Moreover, as reiterated in Mabuhay vs. NLRC, ... "As a rule, the perfection of an appeal in other material dates may be gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident.
the manner and within the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect an
appeal as required by law renders the judgment final and executory."61 (Emphasis in the ....
original, citations omitted)
Accordingly, the parties are now given the amplest opportunity to fully ventilate their claims
On the second procedural rule, this Court discussed the necessity of certified true copies and defenses brushing aside technicalities in order to truly ascertain the merits of this
in Pinakamasarap Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission:62 case. Indeed, judicial cases do not come and go through the portals of a court of law by the
mere mandate of technicalities. Where a rigid application of the rules will result in a
There is a sound reason behind this policy and it is to ensure that the copy of the judgment manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be disregarded in order to
or order sought to be reviewed is a faithful reproduction of the original so that the reviewing resolve the case. In Aguam v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
court would have a definitive basis in its detern1ination of whether the court, body or
tribunal which rendered the assailed judgment or order committed grave abuse of The court has [the] discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a
discretion.63 (Citation omitted) power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be
exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the
On the third procedural rule, this Court clarified the importance of complying with the circumstances obtaining in each case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law
required MCLE information in Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Atty. Maghari:64 abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render
or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Law suits, unlike duels,
The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast with law consideration from courts." Litigation$ must be decided on their merits and not on
and jurisprudence, maintain[ing] the ethics of the profession[,] and enhanc[ing] the technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
standards of the practice of law."65 and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus,
7
dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help
secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action
for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and
cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases
while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.70 (Citations omitted)
In Barroga v. Data Center College of the Philippines, et al.,71 petitioner likewise failed to
state in his Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals the date he received the
assailed Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission and the date he filed his
Partial Motion for Reconsideration.72 This Court held that "this omission is not at all fatal
because these material dates are reflected in petitioner's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration[.]"73 This Court, citing Acaylar, further held:
In Acaylar, .Jr. v. Harayo, we held that failure to state these two dates in the petition may
be excused if the same are evident from the records of the case. It was further ruled by this
Court that the more important material date which must be duly alleged in the petition is the
date of receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for reconsideration. In the case at
bar, petitioner has duly complied with this rule.
....
The Court has time and again upheld the theory that the rules of procedure are designed to rather than promote justice must be avoided. (Citations omitted)
secure and not to override substantial justice. These are mere tools to expedite the
decision or resolution of cases, hence, their strict and rigid application which would result in In Manila Electric Company v. Gala,81 respondent sought for the denial of petitioner's
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided. Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court for allegedly violating procedural rules,
The CA thus should not have outrightly dismissed petitioner's petition based on these
procedural lapses.74 (Citations omitted)
75
In Paras v. Judge Baldado, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' Petition
for Certiorari on purely procedural grounds. It found that petitioners failed to attach the
required certified true copy of the assailed Regional Trial Court Order in their
petition.76 This Court set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals and held:
[T]he records reveal that duplicate original copies of the said RTC orders were in fact
attached to one of the seven copies of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals;
moreover, copies of the same orders, this time accomplished by the clerk of court, were
submitted by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Court finds that there Union, "the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases may be relaxed to
was substantial compliance with the requirement and the Court of Appeals should have
given the petition due course.
"Cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for
ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better."77 (Citations omitted)
In Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan,78 petitioner also failed to attach certified
true copies of the assailed decisions of the Labor Arbiter and of the National Labor
Relations Commission in their petition before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition on procedural grounds; but this Court, upon review, decided the
case on its merits.79 This Court held:
[I]n the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court may disregard procedural lapses so that
a case may be resolved on its merits. Rules of procedure should promote, not defeat,
substantial justice. Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolve
substantial issues raised by the parties.
It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases
shall be determined on the merits, after full opportw1ity to all parties for ventilation of their
causes and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In so
doing, the ends of justice would be better served. The dismissal of cases purely on
technical groW1ds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice, and thereby defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict
and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
80
Among the grounds that respondent relied upon was the failure of petitioner's counsels to
state in the petition their updated MCLE certificate numbers.82 This Court brushed aside
the technical infirmity and held:
We stress at this point that it is the spirit and intention of labor legislation that the NLRC
and the labor arbiters shall use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, provided due
process is duly observed. In keeping with this policy and in the interest of substantial
justice, we deem it p. roper to g.ive due course to the petition, especially in view of the
conflict between the findings of the labor arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the
CA, on the other. As we said in S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor
serve the demands of substantial justice."83 (Citations omitted)
8
In Doble, Jr. v. ABB, Inc.,84 this Court held that the Court of Appeals erred when it on Notarial Practice requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence of
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari due to the failure of petitioner's counsel to provide identity. Sec. 12, as amended, provides:
information regarding his MCLE compliance.85 Citing People v. Arrojado,86 this Court held:
Sec. 12. Competent Evide1we of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity"
On point is People v. Arrojado where it was held that the failure of a lawyer to indicate in refers to the identification of an individual based on:
his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of
Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case: (a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport, driver's
In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation
counsel's failure to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter's ID, Barangay certification, Government
her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Banc Resolution, dated Service Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, PhilHealth
January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID,
disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction seaman's book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration,
of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required government office ID, certificate from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action." Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development certification [as
Thus, under the amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her amended by A.M. No. 02-8- 13-SC dated February 19, 2008]; or
pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will
no longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings .from the (b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
disciplinary action. individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary
Granted that the Petition for Certiorari was filed before the CA on October 29, 2013 even public documentary identification.
before the effectivity of En Banc Resolution dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M.
No. 1922, it bears to stress that petitioner's counsel later submitted Receipts of Attendance It is clear from the foregoing provisions that a senior citizen card is one of the competent
in the MCLE Lecture Series for his MCLE Compliance IV on March 3, 2014 and the identification cards recognized in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. For said reason,
Certificate of Compliance albeit on January 26, 2015. Hence, the CA erred in issuing the there was compliance with the requirement. Contrary to the perception of the CA,
assailed November 28, 2014 Resolution denying Doble's motion for reconsideration, there attachment of a photocopy of the identification card in the document is not required by the
being no more reason not to reinstate the petition for certiorari based on procedural defects 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Even A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, amending Section 12 thereof,
which have already been corrected. Needless to state, liberal construction of procedural is silent on it. Thus, the CA's dismissal of the petition for lack of competent evidence on the
rules is the norm to effect substantial justice, and litigations should, as much as possible, affiant's identity on the attached verification and certification against forum shopping was
be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.87 (Emphasis in the original, citations without clear basis.
omitted)
Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required,
In Heirs of Amada Zaulda v. Zaulda,88 one (1) of the grounds cited by the Court of Appeals non-attachment thereof would not render the petition fatally defective. It has been
to support its dismissal of the Petition for Review was petitioners' failure to provide consistently held that verification is merely a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement,
competent evidence of identities on the Verification and Certification against Forum affecting merely the form of the pleading such that non-compliance therewith does not
Shopping.89 On this point, this Court held: render the pleading fatally defective. It is simply intended to provide an assurance that the
allegations are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of
As regards the competent identity of the affiant in the Verification and Certification, records speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may in fact order the
show that he proved his identity before the notary public through the presentation of his correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or it may act on the pleading although it
Office of the Senior Citizen (OSCA) identification card. Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules may not have been verified, where it is made evident that strict compliance with the rules
may be dispensed so that the ends of justice may be served...
9
.... very technical sense when it defeats the purpose for which it had been enacted, i.e., to
ensure the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases. We maintain this ruling in this
93
Again, granting arguendo that there was non-compliance with the verification requirement, procedural aspect of this case. (Citations omitted)
the rule is that courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses which do not really
impair the proper administration of justice. After all, the higher objective of procedural rule Despite the number of cases wherein this Court relaxed the application of procedural rules,
is to ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as this Court has repeatedly reminded litigants that:
much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant
must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free [T]he bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will
from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. "Procedural rules are not to
be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
In Coca-Cola Botilers v. De la Cruz, where the verification was marred only by a glitch in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed
the evidence of the identity of the affiant, the Court was of the considered view that, in the except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a
interest of justice, the minor defect can be overlooked and should not defeat the petition. litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed." The Court reiterates that rules of procedure . . .
The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained by "have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and
precipitate, if not preposterous, application of technicalities, justice would not be served. to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.... The reason for rules of this nature is
The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays
to render or dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of action for the court to excuse would result, without rules governing practice. . . . Such rules are a necessary incident to
a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal rather than dispose the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions." Indeed, in no uncertain
of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false terms, the Court held that the said rules may be relaxed only in "exceptionally meritorious
impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not cases."94 (Citations omitted)
miscarriage of justice.''
Circumstances that may merit the relaxation of procedural rules are enumerated in Barnes
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given the v. Hon. Quijano Padilla,95citing Sanchez v. Court of Appeals:96
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to
lose life, liberty, honor, or property on technicalities. The rules of procedure should be In the Sanchez case, the Court restated the range of reasons whichmay provide
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid justification for a court to resist a strict adherence to procedure, enumerating the elements
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote for an appeal to be given due course by a suspension of procedural rules, such as: (a)
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.90 (Emphasis in the original, citations matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
omitted) circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing
In Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, respondent prayed for this Court's outright that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (t) the other party will not be
91
97
denial of the Petition for Review due to petitioner's failure to provide competent evidence of unjustly prejudiced thereby.
identity in the verification page.92 This Court brushed aside this technicality and held:
In Republic v. Dagondon,98 the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure to
Contrary to Uniwide's claim, the records of the case show that the petition's verification timely file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court decision.99 The Court of Appeals
page contains Trajano's competent evidence of identity, specifically, Passport No. held that the trial court decision "could no longer be assailed pursuant to the doctrine of
XX041470. Trajano's failure to furnish Uniwide a copy of the petition containing his finality and immutability of judgments."100 This Court relaxed its application of the doctrine
competent evidence of identity is a minor error that this Court may and chooses to brush on immutability of judgment and held:
aside in the interest of substantial justice. This Court has, in proper instances, relaxed the
application of the Rules of Procedure when the party has shown substantial compliance
with it. In these cases, we have held that the rules of procedure should not be applied in a
10
The mandatory character, however, of the rule on immutability of final judgments was not affirmance of the writ's denial to the detriment of the petitioner's right of ownership - we
designed to be an inflexible tool to excuse and overlook prejudicial circumstances. Hence, give due course to this petition despite the late filing of the petitioner's MR before the
the doctrine must yield to practicality, logic, fairness, and substantial justice. CA.106 (Emphasis in the original)
....
[A] departure from the doctrine is warranted since its strict application would, in effect,
circumvent and undermine the stability of the Torrens System of land registration adopted
in this jurisdiction. Relatedly, it bears stressing that the subject matter of the instant
controversy, i.e., Lot 84, is a sizeable parcel of real property. More importantly, petitioner
had adequately presented a strong and meritorious case.
Thus, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the Court deems it apt to exercise its
prerogative to suspend procedural rules and to resolve the present controversy according
to its merits.101 (Citations omitted)
In People v. Layag,102 this Court likewise relaxed the rule on immutability of judgment due
to a special or compelling circumstance. This Court held that the death of accused-
appellant is a compelling circumstance t h at warrants a re-examination of the criminal
case.103
In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Yeung,104 petitioner belatedly filed its Motion for
Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.105 Nonetheless, this Court gave due course
to the Petition for Review and held:
[W]e find the delay of 7 days, due to the withdrawal of the petitioner's counsel during the
reglementary period of filing an MR, excusable in light of the merits of the case. Records
show that the petitioner immediately engaged the services of a new lawyer to replace its
former counsel and petitioned the CA to extend the period of filing an MR due to lack of
material time to review the case. There is no showing that the withdrawal of its counsel
was a contrived reason or an orchestrated act to delay the proceedings; the failure to file
an MR within the reglementary period of 15 days was also not entirely the petitioner's fault,
as it was not in control of its former counsel's acts.
Moreover, after a review of the contentions and the submissions of the parties, we agree
that suspension of the technical rules of procedure is warranted in this case in view of the
CA's erroneous application of legal principles and the substantial merits of the case. If the
petition would be dismissed on technical grounds and without due consideration of its
merits, the registered owner of the prope11y shall, in effect, be barred from taking
possession, thus allowing the absurd and unfair situation where the owner cannot exercise
its right of ownership. This, the Court should not allow. In order to prevent the resulting
inequity that might arise from the outright denial of this recourse - that is, the virtual
In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,107 petitioner failed to file its
appellant's brief within the extended period granted by the Court of Appeals. Thus, the
Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal.108 This Court reversed the dismissal and
held:
Similarly, the case at bar is impressed with public interest. If petitioner's appeal is denied
due course, a government institution could lose a great deal of money over a mere
technicality. Obviously, such an appeal is far from being merely frivolous or dilatory.
....
Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere
tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather thm1 frustrate it. A strict and rigid
application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the rules' primary
objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. Technicalities should never be
used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities.109 (Citations omitted)
In Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,110 respondents prayed for the
denial of the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to file 12 copies of its brief, in
violation of Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.111This Court dismissed the technical
defect and held:
We have ruled that when non-compliance with the Rules was not intended for delay or did
not result in prejudice to the adverse party, dismissal of appeal on mere technicalities - in
i:ases where appeal is a matter of right - may be stayed, in the exercise of the court's
equity jurisdiction. It does not appear that respondents were unduly prejudiced by
petitioner's nonfeasance. Neither has it been shown that such failure was
intentional.112 (Citation omitted)
III
Due to compelling circumstances in this case, this Court opts for a liberal application of
procedural rules. First, Department Personnel Order No. 2008-1452,113 which designated
respondent as Officer-in-Charge of Bataan General Hospital, Was signed by then
Department of Health Secretary Duque. Duque was also tl1e signatory in the 2008
11
Memorandum of Agreement,114 the undated Supplemental Memorandum of
Agreement,115 and the June 16, 2009 Memornnduh1 of Agreement,116 which were the
bases of respondent's secondment. Duque was later appointed as Civil Service
Commission Chairman and signed the October 17, 2011 Decision and the July 17, 2012
Resolution of the Civil. Service Commission, dismissing the complaint against respondent.
Clearly, a conflict of interest existed when the public officer authorizing the secondment of
respondent was also the same person dismissing the complaint questioning respondent's
secondment.
Second, resolving the merits of the case would "give more efficacy to the constitutional
mandate on the accountability of public officers and employees[.]"117 In Executive Judge
Paredes v. Moreno,118 this Court found respondent "guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. If a situation of litis
interest of the service"119 for his continued absence of almost three (3) months.120 This
Court held:
His misconduct is prejudicial to the service. Although a mere employee/laborer in the City
Court of Manila, respondent is as much duty-bound to serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency as all other public officers and employees . . . "decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to purely
We find respondent's shortcomings to warrant a sanction to serve as deterrent not only to administrative proceedings[.]"128 In Salazar v. De Leon,129this Court further held:
him but also to other court employees who shall commit the same or any and all forms of
official misconduct which undermine the people's faith in their fitness for public service.121 Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in accordance with
Furthermore, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court of Appeals should avoid
dismissal of cases based merely on technical grounds. Judicial economy requires the
prosecution of cases "with the least cost to the parties"122 and to the courts' time, effort,
and resources.123
IV
On a final note, this Court clarifies the concept of forum shopping.
Forum shopping is generally judicial. It exists:
[W]henever a party "repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues
either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other court." It has also been
defined as "an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition." Considered a pernicious evil, it adversely affects the
efficient administration of justice since it clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the
financial and human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial
processes.124 (Citations omitted)
The test to determine whether or not forum shopping was committed was explained in Dy,
et al. v. Yu, et al.:125
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum Shopping, the most important
factor to ask is whether the element of litis pendentia is present, or whether a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Otherwise stated, the test for
determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity
pendentia or res judicata arises by virtue of a party's commencement of a judicial remedy
identical to one which already exists (either pending or already resolved), then a forum
shopping infraction is committed.126 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
In Ligtas v. People,127 this Court reiterated that res judicata may also be applied to
the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res
judicata: "The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public,
executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the
judgments of courts having general judicial powers ... It has been declared that whenever
final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the
citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final
adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already
mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions
rendered by what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing
the scope thereof; and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense
to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.130 (Citations
omitted)
Thus, forum shopping, in the concept of res judicata, is applicable to judgments or
decisions of administrative agencies performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 22, 2013 and
July 16, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 127252 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for a resolution on the
merits of the case.
12
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151168 August 25, 2010
CEBU AUTOMETIC MOTORS, INC. and TIRSO UYTENGSU III, Petitioners,
vs.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition filed by Cebu Autometic Motors, Inc. (CAMI) to assail the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64363. The CA decision:
a) reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch
16 (RTC) in Civil Case No. CEB-25804 dismissing respondent General Milling
Corporation’s (GMC) unlawful detainer complaint against CAMI;2 and
b) reinstated the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Civil Case
no. R-419233 ordering: CAMI to vacate the subject property; and CAMI and Tirso
Uytengsu III (Uytengsu) to pay GMC actual damages in the amount of ₱20,000.00
a month from the date of demand until property has been vacated, as well as
₱50,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
GMC, a domestic corporation, is the registered owner of the GMC Plaza Complex, a
commercial building on Legaspi Extension corner McArthur Boulevard, Cebu City. On
February 2, 1998, GMC, represented by its General Manager, Luis Calalang Jr. (Calalang), the execution of the lease contract.
entered into a contract with CAMI, a domestic corporation, for the lease of a 2,906 square
meter commercial space within GMC’s building (leased premises).
The lease contract was for a period of twenty (20) years, with the monthly rental fixed at
₱10,000.00. The contract further stipulated that the property shall be used exclusively by
CAMI as a garage and repair shop for vehicles,4 and imposed upon CAMI the following
terms and conditions:
C. The LESSEE shall upon the signing of this contract immediately deposit with the
LESSOR the following amounts:
a. The sum of PESOS: - TEN THOUSAND & 00/100 (₱10,000.00) inclusive
of VAT Philippine currency, to be applied as rental for the last month;
b. The sum PESOS – TEN THOUSAND & 00/100 – (₱10,000.00) as
guarantee deposit to defray the cost of the repairs necessary to keep the
leased premises in a good state of repair and to pay the LESSEE’S unpaid
bills from the various utility services in the leased premises; that this
amount shall be refundable, if upon the termination of this contract, the
leased premises are in good state of repair and the various utility bills have
been paid.
xxxx
H. The LESSEE shall not place or install any signboard, billboard, neon lights, or
other form of advertising signs on the leased premises or on any part thereof,
except upon the prior written consent of the LESSOR.
xxxx
M. Finally, the failure on the part of the LESSOR to insist upon a strict performance
of any of the terms, conditions and covenants hereof shall not be deemed a
relinquishment or waiver of any right or remedy that said LESSOR may have, nor
shall it be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach or default of the terms,
conditions and covenants herein contained, unless expressed in writing and signed
by the LESSOR or its duly authorized representative.5
According to GMC, CAMI violated the provisions of the lease contract when: a) CAMI
subleased a portion of the leased premises without securing GMC’s prior written consent;
b) CAMI introduced improvements to the leased premises without securing GMC’s
consent; and c) CAMI did not deliver the required advance rental and deposit to GMC upon
On June 11, 1999, GMC sent CAMI a letter informing the latter that it was terminating the
lease contract and demanding that CAMI vacate the premises and settle all its unpaid
accounts before the end of that month.
On July 7, 1999, GMC filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC against CAMI,
asserting that it terminated the lease contract on June 11, 1999 because CAMI violated the
13
terms of the contract and continued to do so despite GMC’s repeated demands and
reminders for compliance; and that CAMI refused to vacate the leased premises. GMC
also impleaded Uytengsu, the General Manager of CAMI, in his official and personal
capacities.
In response, CAMI denied that it had subleased any portion of the leased premises. On the
improvements allegedly introduced without GMC’s consent, CAMI explained that these
were introduced prior to the execution of the present lease contract; in fact, these
improvements were made with GMC’s knowledge and were the reason why GMC decided
to enter into the present lease contract with CAMI for 20 years at the low rental of only
₱10,000.00 a month. On its alleged failure to deliver the advance rental and deposit, CAMI
pointed out that Calalang, GMC’s representative, had verbally waived this requirement.
Moreover, CAMI contended that a party is considered in default only if it fails to comply
with the demand to observe the terms and conditions of the contract. Since CAMI
immediately deposited the amount of ₱20,000.00 with the court as advance rental and
deposit after it learned of the unlawful detainer complaint, it could not be considered in
default. Consequently, CAMI posits that it did not violate any of the provisions of the lease
contract, and GMC had no right to terminate the lease contract and to demand CAMI’s
ejectment from the leased premises.
On July 5, 2000, the MTCC rendered its decision in favor of GMC. The dispositive portion
of its ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [GMC] and against the
defendant [CAMI], to wit:
1. Ordering the defendants and all other person (sic) staying in the premises of the CAMI now comes to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari,6 claiming that the CA
plaintiff to vacate the property and remove all their temporary structure therein;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of
₱20,000.00 a month from date (sic) demand until defendants vacate plaintiff
property;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff Attorney’s Fees in the amount of
₱50,000.00;
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC reversed the MTCC decision and dismissed GMC’s complaint after finding that
CAMI had not violated the terms and conditions of the lease contract. The RTC learned
that Calalang had waived payment of the advance rental and deposit, and had given his
consent to the introduction of improvements, signboards and alterations on the leased
premises. The RTC also held that CAMI did not sublease the premises.
GMC sought relief from the RTC decision through a petition for review with the CA. GMC
claimed that Calalang’s waiver of the advance rental and deposit was void since it was not
in writing. In response, CAMI questioned whether GMC had complied with the requisites of
Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court prior to the filing of the unlawful detainer complaint
– an issue that, according to GMC, was raised for the first time before the CA.
In the assailed September 28, 2001 decision, the CA reversed the RTC decision and held
that even though the advance rental and deposit payments could be waived under the
contract, the waiver had to be in writing and signed by a duly authorized representative of
GMC in order to be effective. Since Calalang’s waiver was not contained in a written
document, it could not bind GMC.
As to the contention that GMC failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement found in
Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the CA held that such a belated claim could no
longer be entertained at that late stage of the proceedings. Since CAMI freely litigated on
the issues presented by GMC before the lower courts without raising this issue, it cannot
now raise the issue on the basis of estoppel.
THE PETITION
committed reversible error in its September 28, 2001 decision and November 22, 2001
resolution.
First, CAMI contends that the demand letter sent by GMC merely stated that it expected
CAMI to vacate the premises and pay all its unsettled accounts by the end of June 1999;
the letter did not demand compliance with the terms of the contract. Thus, CAMI could not
be considered in default and GMC had no cause to terminate the lease contract. The
defective demand letter also failed to comply with the demand required by Section 2, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court; pursuant to Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank7 – which held
that the demand from the lessor to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to
vacate the premises must be alleged in the complaint for unlawful detainer for the MTCC to
acquire jurisdiction over the case – the MTCC thus failed to acquire jurisdiction over GMC’s
complaint against it.
14
Next, CAMI assails the CA interpretation of paragraph M of the lease contract.8 According
to CAMI, paragraph M only applies when the waiver refers to the right of GMC to take
action for any violation of the terms and conditions of the contract. Where the waiver
relates to the performance of the term or condition, such as waiver of the payment of
advance rental and deposit, the waiver does not need to be in writing.
Last, CAMI questions the reinstatement of the MTCC decision, which ordered CAMI and
Uytengsu to pay for actual damages to GMC in the amount of ₱20,000.00 per month from
the time of demand until CAMI actually vacated the property, and attorney’s fees in the
amount of ₱50,000. CAMI assails the award of damages for having no legal or factual
basis.
GMC, on the other hand, contends that CAMI never raised the issue of GMC’s lack of
demand before either the MTCC or the RTC as one of its defenses; instead, this issue, as
well as the corresponding issue of the MTCC’s lack of jurisdiction, was raised for the first
time on appeal before the CA. GMC also reiterates the CA’s ruling that any waiver of the
lease contract’s terms and conditions must be in writing in order to be effective. Finally,
GMC dismisses CAMI’s questions on the inclusion of Uytengsu, as well as the award of
actual damages and attorney’s fees, for not having been raised before the lower courts.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to grant the petition.
Petition raises factual questions
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only
questions of law may be raised and passed upon by this Court. As in any general rule,
however, certain exceptions may exist.9 In the present case, we are asked to either uphold
GMC’s unlawful detainer complaint or dismiss it outright under a situation where the
findings of facts of the trial court and the appellate court conflict with each other, which is
one of the recognized exceptions to the requirement that Rule 45 petitions deal only with
questions of law. If necessary, therefore, we can examine the evidence on record in this
case and determine the truth or falsity of the parties’ submissions and allegations.
On the issue of demand
GMC claims that CAMI belatedly raised the issue of lack of demand. On the other hand,
CAMI contends in its Motion to Admit Reply10 that it raised this defense as early as its
Answer before the MTCC.
We agree with CAMI. The MTCC decision, which quoted CAMI’s Answer extensively,
clearly shows that CAMI stated that it will be in default with respect to the advance rental
and deposit only after GMC has made a demand for the payment. CAMI also stated that it
had already deposited the advance rental and deposit with the Clerk of Court of the MTCC.
Lastly, CAMI denied GMC’s claim in its complaint that a demand had been made.11 These
statements, taken together, clearly belie GMC’s claim that CAMI never raised the lack of
demand as an issue before the lower court.
Another issue raised, relating to demand, is whether GMC sent CAMI the required demand
letter. Invoking Article 1169 of the Civil Code,12 CAMI principally contends that it could not
be considered in default because GMC never sent a proper demand letter.
CAMI, in invoking Article 1169, apparently overlooked that what is involved is not a mere
mora or delay in the performance of a generic obligation to give or to do that would
eventually lead to the remedy of rescission or specific performance. What is involved in the
case is a contract of lease and the twin remedies of rescission and judicial ejectment after
either the failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease. This situation
calls for the application, not of Article 1169 of the Civil Code but, of Article 1673 in relation
to Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Article 1673 states:
Article 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes:
xxxx
(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract; xxx
Based on this provision, a lessor may judicially eject (and thereby likewise rescind the
contract of lease) the lessee if the latter violates any of the conditions agreed upon in the
lease contract. Implemented in accordance with Section 2, Rule 70, the lessor is not
required to first bring an action for rescission, but may ask the court to do so and
simultaneously seek the ejecment of the lessee in a single action for unlawful
detainer.13 Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand.
Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced
only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is
made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person
found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found
thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land
or five (5) days in the case of buildings. [Emphasis supplied.]
15
GMC insists that it complied with the required demand when it sent CAMI the following
letter:
June 11, 1999
CEBU AUTOMETIC MOTORS, INC.
GMC Plaza Complex
Legaspi Extension cor.
MacArthur Boulevard
Cebu City
ATTENTION: MR. TIRSO UYTENGSU III
Gentlemen:
We are informing you of the termination of the Contract of Lease over our clients, General
Milling Corporation premises at GMC Plaza Complex effective June 30, 1999.
Your repeated violations of the terms of the contract, failure to deposit the required
amounts (equivalent to two to three months rent) the subleasing of a portion of the leased
premises without the required prior written consent, the introduction of improvements and
alterations and the installation of a signboard without the prior written consent, leave us no
choice.
It should be mentioned that the latest Contract of Lease was questionably entered by you the lessee after extrajudicial rescission has taken place. These combined remedies
and Mr. Luis Calalang, Jr. hurriedly, knowing fully well that the same was completely one- account for the separate aspects of the demand letter: the demand to pay rentals or to
sided in your favor and totally disadvantageous to GMC. It was as if there was a plot or
scheme to take advantage of the situation at the time.
We expect you to vacate the premises, settle all your unpaid accounts on or before the end action.15
of June, 1999. [Emphasis supplied.]
With this demand letter as evidence, we hold it undisputed that GMC did serve a prior
demand on CAMI. The question, however, is whether this is the demand that Section 2,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court contemplates as a jurisdictional requirement before a lessor
can undertake a judicial ejectment pursuant to Article 1673 of the Civil Code.
Section 2, Rule 70, on its face, involves two demands that may be made in the same
demand letter, namely, (1) the demand for payment of the amounts due the lessor, or the
compliance with the conditions of the lease, and (2) the demand to vacate the premises.
These demands, of course, are not intended to be complied with at the same time;
otherwise, the provision becomes contradictory as it is pointless to demand payment or
compliance if the demand to vacate is already absolute and must be heeded at the same
time as the demand to pay or to comply. It is only after the demands for payment or
compliance are made on the lessee and subsequently rejected or ignored that the basis for
the unlawful detainer action arises.
The twin aspects of the demand letter can best be understood when Section 2, Rule 70 is
read and understood as the specific implementing procedural rule to carry out the results
that Article 1673 mandates – the rescission of the contract of lease and the judicial
ejectment of the lessee. The judicial rescission of a contract of lease is essentially
governed by Article 1659 of the Civil Code, grounded on the breach of the parties’ statutory
obligations: in the case of the lessee, for its failure to pay the rent or to use the property
under lease for the purpose it was intended. Article 1673, read with Section 2, Rule 70 of
the Rules, does away with the need for an independent judicial action to rescind prior to
ejectment by combining these remedies in an unlawful detainer action.
The law of contracts (essentially, Articles 1191 of the Civil Code for judicial rescission and
Article 1659 for the judicial rescission of lease agreements) firmly establishes that the
failure to pay or to comply with the contractual term does not, by itself, give rise to a cause
of action for rescission; the cause of action only accrues after the lessee has been in
default for its failure to heed the demand to pay or to comply.14 With the contract judicially
rescinded, the demand to vacate finds full legal basis.
Article 1673, implemented pursuant to Section 2, Rule 70, does away with a separate
judicial action for rescission, and allows under a single complaint the judicial ejectment of
comply with the terms of the lease, and to vacate. The tenant's refusal to heed the demand
to vacate, coming after the demand to pay or to comply similarly went unheeded, renders
unlawful the continued possession of the leased premises; hence, the unlawful detainer
In Dio v. Concepcion, we ruled that:
Under Article 1673 of the Civil Code, the lessor may judicially eject the lessee for, among
other causes: (1) lack of payment of the price stipulated; or (2) violation of any of the
conditions agreed upon in the contract. Previous to the institution of such action, the lessor
must make a demand upon the lessee to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease
and to vacate the premises. It is the owner’s demand for the tenant to vacate the premises
and the tenant’s refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of
possession.16 Such refusal violates the owner’s right of possession giving rise to an action
for unlawful detainer. [Emphasis supplied.]
16
Mr. Justice Jose Vitug further explained the Court’s action in this case in his Separate right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer. However, prior to the
Opinion when he said: institution of such action, a demand from the lessor to pay or comply with the conditions of
the lease and to vacate the premises is required under the aforequoted rule. Thus, mere
I just would like to add, by way of clarification, that the principal remedies open to an failure to pay the rents due or violation of the terms of the lease does not automatically
obligee, upon the breach of an obligation, are generally judicial in nature and must be render a person's possession unlawful. Furthermore, the giving of such demands must be
independently sought in litigation, i.e., an action for performance (specific, substitute or alleged in the complaint, otherwise the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case.
equivalent) or rescission (resolution) of a reciprocal obligation. The right to rescind [Emphasis supplied.]
(resolve) is recognized in reciprocal obligations; it is implicit, however, in third paragraph of
Article 1191 of the Civil Code that the rescission there contemplated can only be invoked A close examination of GMC’s letter to CAMI tells us that the letter merely informed
judicially. Hence, the mere failure of a party to comply with what is incumbent upon him recipient CAMI that GMC had terminated the lease based on the cited violations of the
does not ipso jure produce the rescission (resolution) of the obligation. terms of the lease, and on the basis of this termination, required CAMI to vacate the
premises by the end of the month. In other words, the letter did not demand compliance
Exceptionally, under the law and, to a limited degree, by agreement of the parties, with the terms of the lease; GMC was past this point as it had rescinded the contract of
extrajudicial remedies may become available such as, in the latter case, an option to lease and was already demanding that the leased premises be vacated and the amounts
rescind or terminate a contract upon the violation of a resolutory facultative condition. In owing be paid. Thus, whether or not the amounts due were paid, the lease remained
the case of lease agreements, despite the absence of an explicit stipulation, that option terminated because of the cited violations.
has been reserved by law in favor of a lessee under Article 1673 of the Civil Code by
providing that the lessor may judicially eject the lessee for, among other grounds, a From this perspective, GMC did not fully comply with the requirements of Section 2, Rule
violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract. The provision, read in 70.1âwphi1 Technically, no extrajudicial rescission effectively took place as a result of the
conjunction with Section 2, Rule 70, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, would, absent a cited violations until the demand to pay or comply was duly served and was rejected or
contrary stipulation, merely require a written demand on the lessee to pay or to comply with disregarded by the lessee. This aspect of the demand letter – missing in the demand letter
the conditions of the lease and to vacate the premises prior to the institution of an action and whose rejection would have triggered the demand to vacate – gave GMC no effective
for ejectment. The above provisions, in effect, authorizes the lessor to terminate cause of action to judicially demand the lessee’s ejectment. All these, the appellate court
extrajudicially the lease (with the same effect as rescission) by simply serving due notice to unfortunately failed to appreciate.
the lessee.
Our above conclusion renders unnecessary any further ruling on the merits of the parties’
In this particular instance, therefore, the only relevant court jurisdiction involved is that of positions on the existence of the substantive grounds for rescission and ejectment.
the first level court in the action for ejectment, an independent judicial action for rescission
being unnecessary. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 28, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP. No.
Thus, as further clarified, an extrajudicial rescission gave rise to the demand to vacate that, 64363. We accordingly DECLARE General Milling Corporation’s complaint for unlawful
upon being refused, rendered the possession illegal and laid the lessee open to ejectment. detainer, Civil Case No. R-41923 before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City,
The rescission, an extrajudicial one, was triggered by the lessee’s refusal to pay the rent or DISMISSED for lack of cause of action. Costs against the respondent General Milling
to comply with the terms of the lease. The Court put it in plainer terms in Arquelada v. Corporation.
Philippine Veterans Bank:17 where it said:
SO ORDERED.
As contemplated in Section 2, the demand required is the demand to pay or comply with
the conditions of the lease and not merely a demand to vacate. Consequently, both G.R. No. 139292 December 5, 2000
demands - either to pay rent or adhere to the terms of the lease and vacate are necessary
to make the lessee a deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed. It is the JOSEPHINE DOMAGSANG, petitioner,
lessor's demand for the lessee to vacate the premises and the tenant's refusal to do so vs.
which makes unlawful the withholding of the possession. Such refusal violates the lessor's
17
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 63, of having
violated Batas Pambansa ("B.P.") Blg. 22 (Anti-Bouncing Check Law), on eighteen (18)
counts, and sentenced to "suffer the penalty of One (1) Year imprisonment for each count
(eighteen [18] counts)." Petitioner was likewise "ordered to pay the private complainant the
amount of P573,800.00."1 The judgment, when appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
CR No. 18497), was affirmed in toto by the appellate court.
"said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, she did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such
check upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90)
days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason `ACCOUNT CLOSED' and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused
failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full
payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Subsequent Informations, docketed Criminal Cases No. 92-4466 to No. 92-4482, inclusive,
similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. 92-4465 except as to the dates, the number, and
the amounts of the checks hereunder itemized -

It would appear that petitioner approached complainant Ignacio Garcia, an Assistant Vice "Check Number Dated/Postdated Amount
President of METROBANK, to ask for financial assistance. Garcia accommodated
petitioner and gave the latter a loan in the sum of P573,800.00. In exchange, petitioner
issued and delivered to the complainant 18 postdated checks for the repayment of the
loan. When the checks were, in time, deposited, the instruments were all dishonored by the TRB – No. 161181 July 18, 1991 P6,000.00
drawee bank for this reason: "Account closed." The complainant demanded payment
TRB – No. 149906 July 24, 1991 3,000.00
allegedly by calling up petitioner at her office. Failing to receive any payment for the value
of the dishonored checks, the complainant referred the matter to his lawyer who No. 182074 July 30, 1991 29,700.00
supposedly wrote petitioner a letter of demand but that the latter ignored the demand.
No. 182084 August 30, 1991 9,300.00
On 08 May 1992, Criminal Case No. 92-4465 was lodged against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Makati. The Information read: No. 182078 September 15, 1991 6,000.00
No. 161183 September 18, 1991 6,000.00
"That on or about the 24th day of June, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, No. 161177 September 18, 1991 100,000.00
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw and issue to
complainant Ignacio H. Garcia, Jr., to apply on account or for value the dated No. 182085 September 30, 1991 9,000.00
check/described below: No. 182079 October 15, 1991 6,000.00
No. 182086 October 30, 1991 10,500.00
"Check No. : 149900
No. 182080 November 15, 1991 6,000.00
Drawn Against : Traders Royal Bank
No. 182087 November 30, 1991 11,400.00
In the Amount of : P50,000.00
Dated/Postdated : June 24, 1991 No. 182081 December 15, 1991 6,000.00

Payable to : Ignacio H. Garcia, Jr. No. 182082 December 15, 1991 100,000.00

18
 No. 182088 December 30, 1991 12,000.00
No. 182089 December 30, 1991 100,000.00
3
No. 182090 December 30, 1991 100,000.00"
were also filed against petitioner. The cases were later consolidated and jointly tried
following the "not guilty" plea of petitioner when arraigned on 02 November 1992.
On 07 September 1993, petitioner filed a demurrer to the evidence, with leave of court,
premised on the absence of a demand letter and that the checks were not issued as
payment but as evidence of indebtedness of petitioner or as collaterals of the loans
obtained by petitioner. Opposed by the prosecution, the demurrer was denied by the trial
court.1âwphi1 In the hearing of 17 February 1994, petitioner, through counsel, waived her
right to present evidence in her defense. Relying solely then on the evidence submitted by
the prosecution, the lower court rendered judgment convicting petitioner. The decision, as
heretofore stated, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision of 15 February
1999. Reconsideration was also denied in the resolution, dated 09 July 1999, of the
appellate court.
Hence, the instant petition where petitioner raised the following issues for resolution by the shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless
Court -
"1. Whether or not an alleged verbal demand to pay sufficient to convict herein
petitioner for the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22;
"2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error
when it affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court, on the
ground that a written notice of dishonor is not necessary in a prosecution for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, contrary to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in
the case of Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572; (and)
"3. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering the alleged aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the
written demand letter, despite failure of the prosecution to formally offer the
same."4
The pertinent provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 "Bouncing Checks Law," provide:
"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment,
shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1)
year or by fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which
fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
"Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
"SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and issuance
of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check,
such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
"SEC. 3. Duty of drawee; rules of evidence. – It shall be the duty of the drawee of any
check, when refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon presentment, to cause to
be written, printed or stamped in plain language thereon, or attached thereto, the reason
for drawee's dishonor or refusal to pay the same: Provided, That where there are no
sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly
stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all prosecutions under this Act, the
introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal
to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as
due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same
was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on
such dishonored check.
"Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee shall state in the notice
that there were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of such
check, if such be the fact."5 (Underscoring supplied.)
19
The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be (1) the making, drawing and issuance
of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.6
There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker,
drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the check
issued if the dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the date of the check and
the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for
that purpose. The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because
"knowledge" which involves a state of mind would be difficult to establish.7 The
presumption does not hold, however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays
the holder thereof the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the
drawee bank of such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee bank.
In Lao vs. Court of Appeals,8 this Court explained:
"x x x. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not from the
mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that,
within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer failed
to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its
payment in full by the drawee of such check.
"It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator `a
compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal
action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated.’ This was also compared `to certain
laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the
illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability.’ In
this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days
from notice of dishonor is a `complete defense.’ The absence of a notice of dishonor
necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand – and the basic postulates of fairness
require – that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her
the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22."9
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals predicated the conviction of petitioner on the
supposed fact that petitioner was informed of the dishonor of the checks through verbal
notice when the complainant had called her up by telephone informing her of the dishonor
of the checks and demanding payment therefor. The appellate court said:
"The maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is legally presumed from the
dishonor of his check (People vs. Laggui, 171 Phil. 305). The law does not require a written
notice of the dishonor of such check.
"In the instant case, appellant had knowledge that her checks were dishonored by the bank
when complainant Garcia made several oral demands upon her to pay the value of the
checks in the amount of P573,800.00. Despite said demands, appellant failed and refused
to pay the same. Moreover, complaining witness further testified that his lawyer made a
written demand upon appellant but the latter ignored said demand (tsn., May 27, 1993, pp.
13-14). In this connection, appellant waived her right to present evidence or rebut
complainant's testimony that he made oral demands upon appellant to make good the
dishonored checks and his lawyer wrote her a demand letter.
"Likewise, appellant did not object to the admission of the complainant's testimony with
regard to the written demand by moving that it be stricken off the record for being hearsay,
hence, the same is admissible evidence. In the case of People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440,
the Supreme court ruled:
"`x x x (It) must be noted that neither the defendant nor his counsel below objected to the
admission of the testimonies which are now being assailed as hearsay. This is fatal to
defendant-appellant's present posture since the failure to object to hearsay evidence
constitutes a waiver of the x x right to cross-examine the actual witness to the occurrence,
rendering the evidence admissible.'"10
Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal.1âwphi1 The Court
agrees.
While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in
writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are
no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly
stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal,"11 a mere oral notice or demand to pay would
appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the
spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished
thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise
the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.12 The consistent
rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused.13
20
Evidently, the appellate court did not give weight and credence to the assertion that a No. 182088 December 30, 1991 12,000.00
demand letter was sent by a counsel of the complainant because of the failure of the
prosecution to formally offer it in evidence. Courts are bound to consider as part of the No. 182089 December 30, 1991 100,000.00
evidence only those which are formally offered14 for judges must base their findings strictly
17
on the evidence submitted by the parties at the trial.15 Without the written notice of No. 182090 December 30, 1991 100,000.00"
dishonor, there can be no basis, considering what has heretofore been said, for
establishing the presence of "actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds."16
or the sum of P563,800, has yet to be made good by petitioner. This amount, with 12%
legal interest per annum from the filing of the information until the finality of this decision,
The prosecution may have failed to sufficiently establish a case to warrant conviction, must be forthwith settled.
however, it has clearly proved petitioner's failure to pay a just debt owing to the private
complainant. The total face value of the dishonored checks, to wit-
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. Petitioner Josephine
Domagsang is acquitted of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. She is ordered,
1âwphi1 however, to pay to the offended party the face value of the checks in the total amount of
"Check Number Dated/Postdated Amount P563,800.00 with 12% legal interest, per annum, from the filing of the informations until the
finality of this decision, the sum of which, inclusive of the interest, shall be subject
thereafter to 12%, perannum, interest until the due amount is paid. Costs against
petitioner.
TRB – No. 149900 June 24, 1991 P50,000.00
TRB – No. 161181 July 18, 1991 6,000.00 SO ORDERED.

TRB – No. 149906 July 24, 1991 3,000.00

No. 182074 July 30, 1991 29,700.00

No. 182084 August 30, 1991 1,300.00

No. 182078 September 15, 1991 6,000.00

No. 161183 September 18, 1991 6,000.00

No. 161171 September 18, 1991 100,000.00

No. 182085 September 30, 1991 9,900.00

No. 182079 October 15, 1991 6,000.00

No. 182086 October 30, 1991 10,500.00

No. 182080 November 15, 1991 6,000.00

No. 182087 November 30, 1991 11,400.00
No. 182081 December 15, 1991 6,000.00

No. 182082 December 15, 1991 100,000.00

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