G.R. No.

169303 February 11, 2015

PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY, INC.,

vs.
CELSO E. FUENTES

Facts:

Celso E. Fuentes, a security guard by Protective designated at Post 33. On

July 20, 2000, NPA ransacked Post 33 and took some firearms, Agency-
issued uniforms and personal items. On the same day, Fuentes and his fellow
security guards reported the raid to the PNP.

However, a complaint for robbery committed by a band against Fuentes was

filed due to the affidavit of Lindo, Jr. and Cempron that Fuentes conspired
and acted in consort with the New People’s Army basing.

While was Fuentes was detained, he alleged that he was "mauled and tied
up by the security officers of [Protective]." To preserve proof of these claims,
Fuentes had pictures taken of his injuries while in custody and acquired a
medical certificate detailing his injuries. But On August 15, 2001, the OPP of
dismissed due to lack of Probable cause.

Fuentes ,right after the criminal complaint was dismissed, demanded to

return to work but he was refused entry on the ground that he was a
member of the NPA and that his position had already been filled up by
another security guard.

Hence, On March 14, 2002, Fuentes filed the Complaint "for illegal dismissal,
non-payment of salaries, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest
day, 13th month pay, service incentive leave and damages against
Protective.

On their part petitioner alleged that Fuentes abandoned his work and that
he only filed for illegal dismissal after 6 mos.

Issue:

1. WON Fuentes abandoned his work to constitute legal dismissal.

 2. WON Fuentes belatedly filed his complaint. Kahit dina basahin,unless
asked
3. Won respondent is entitled to backwages
4. Won Respondent’s right to procedural due process was observed

Held:

1. The absence of respondent does not constitute abandonment.

Abandonment constitutes a just cause for dismissal because "[t]he law in

protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-
destruction of the employer." The employer cannot be compelled to maintain
an employee who is remiss in fulfilling his duties to the employer, particularly
the fundamental task of reporting to work.

However in the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, this

court discussed the concept of abandonment:

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to

resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause
for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of
abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report
for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear
intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the
more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it
may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to work. The
intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it
was deliberate and unjustified.

In the present case, According to petitioner, respondent’s actions constitute

a failure to report to work without a valid and justifiable reason. The
respondent’s failure to return to work was justified because of his detention
and its adverse effects. Moreover, while in the custody of the police, he
suffered physical violence in the hands of its employees. Thus, the
intervening period when respondent failed to report for work, from
respondent’s prison release to the time he actually reported for work, was
justified. Since there was a justifiable reason for respondent’s absence, the
first element of abandonment was not established.
For the second element, Petitioner alleges that since respondent "vanished"
and failed to report immediately to work, he clearly intended to sever ties
with petitioner.

However, respondent reported for work after August 15, 2001, when the
criminal Complaint against him was dropped but petitioner refused to allow
respondent to resume his employment because petitioner believed that
respondent was a member of the New People’s Army and had already hired
a replacement.

Respondent’s act of reporting for work after being cleared of the charges
against him showed that he had no intention to sever ties with his employer.

Thus, respondent’s actions showed that he intended to resume working for

petitioner. The second element of abandonment was not proven, as well.

2. The six-month period from the alleged date of dismissal by petitioner

to the date of filing of the complaint is justified.

In Arriola v. Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc., this court made the distinction
between money claims under Article 291 and the claims for backwages under
Article 1146 of the Civil Code:

Art. 291. MONEY CLAIMS. All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three
(3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be
forever barred.

Article 291 covers claims for overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive
leave pay, bonuses, salary differentials, and illegal deductions by an
employer. It also covers money claims arising from seafarer contracts.

The provision, however, does not cover "money claims" consequent to an

illegal dismissal such as backwages. It also does not cover claims for
damages due to illegal dismissal. These claims are governed by Article 1146
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1) Upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff[.]

. . . . This four-year prescriptive period applies to claims for backwages, not
the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code. A
claim for backwages, according to this court, may be a money claim "by
reason of its practical effect." Legally, however, an award of backwages "is
merely one of the reliefs which an illegally dismissed employee prays the
labor arbiter and the NLRC to render in his favor as a consequence of the
unlawful act committed by the employer." Though it results "in the
enrichment of the individual [illegally dismissed], the award of backwages is
not in redress of a private right, but, rather, is in the nature of a command
upon the employer to make public reparation for his violation of the Labor
Code." Actions for damages due to illegal dismissal are likewise actions "upon
an injury to the rights of the plaintiff." Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, therefore, governs these actions.122 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner admits that respondent filed the Complaint for illegal dismissal six
(6) months after the first time petitioner had refused to allow respondent to
work. This is well within the four-year prescriptive period provided by Article
1146 of the Labor Code, as mentioned in Arriola.

In this case, the six-month period from the date of dismissal to the filing of
the Complaint was well within reason and cannot be considered "inexcusable
delay." The cases filed before the courts and administrative tribunals
originate from human experience. Thus, this court will give due consideration
to the established facts which would justify the gap of six (6) months prior
to the filing of the complaint.

3. Applying the doctrine of "no work, no pay," the computation of

backwages should only begin from the date of the filing of the
Complaint.

The SC applied the case of Standard Electric wherein respondent was not
entitled to the entirety of the backwages during the time of his detention

Hence, respondent is not entitled to backwages from August 15, 2001, the
date of the Resolution dismissing the Complaint against respondent. Absent
proof of the actual date that respondent first reported for work and was
refused by petitioner, the date of the filing of the Complaint should serve as
the basis from which the computation of backwages should begin. Thus, this
court finds that respondent is entitled to full backwages starting only on
March 14, 2002 until actual reinstatement.

4. Respondent’s right to procedural due process was not observed.

The two-notice requirement was not followed. There was no attempt from
petitioner to serve the proper notice on respondent at the address
contained in its employment records. Respondent was replaced without
being given an 'opportunity to explain his absence.
G.R. No. 190303 July 9, 2014

COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN-CALAMBA,

vs.
ENGR. DEBORAH P. TARDEO

Facts:

Respondent was employed as a full-time faculty member of the petitioner

since 1985. She manifested her intention to attend the 30th National
Physics Seminar workshop and asked for financial assistance. However as
found out during the pre-audit the respondent’s letter request was altered.

During the investigation respondent raised as a defense her good faith in

omitting some parts of the PPS Seminar.

Hence, she was found guilty of Dishonesty and serious misconduct and
meted out a penalty of suspension for one semester.

Issue:

1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMMITTED DISHONESTY AND

SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IN KNOWINGLY SUBMITTING A
MATERIALLY ALTERED DOCUMENT TO SUPPORT HER FUNDING
REQUEST

HELD:

The petition is devoid of merit.

Misconduct is defined as improper and wrongful conduct. It is the

transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent
and not mere error in judgment. Of course, ordinary misconduct would not
justify the termination of the services of an employee. The law is explicit
that the misconduct should be serious.
Under Article 282 of the labor Code, the misconduct, to be just cause for
termination, must be serious. This implies that it must be of such grave
and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant.

As amplified by jurisprudence, the misconduct must (1) be serious; (2)

relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (3) show that the
employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.20

Although respondent was not terminated from employment but was

merely suspended from work for one semester or equivalent to 101 days
school days, her infraction should still be measured against the foregoing
standards considering that the charge leveled against her is serious
misconduct.

There is no basis for the allegation that respondent’s act constituted

serious misconduct that warrants the imposition of penalty of suspension.
Indeed, considering the fact that before the act complained of, respondent
has been rendering service untarnished for 23 years, it is not easy to
conclude that for ₱600.00, respondent would willfully and for wrongful
intentions omit portions of the documents taken from the PPS website. In
other words, as found by the Voluntary Arbitrator and the Court of Appeals,
there is no substantial proof of petitioner's allegation of malicious conduct
against respondent.

The Court recognizes the right of the employers to discipline its employees
for serious violations of company rules after affording the latter due
process and if the evidence warrants.23 Such right, however, should be
exercised in consonance with sound discretion putting into mind the basic
elements of justice and fair play.
 3. G.R. No. 209499 January 28, 2015

MA. CHARITO C. GADIA vs.

SYKES ASIA, INC./ CHUCK SYKES/ MIKE HINDS/ MICHAEL
HENDERSON

Facts:

Sykes Asia and Alltel Communications, Inc. entered into a contract. To

accommodate the needs and demands of Alltel clients for its postpaid and
prepaid services, Sykes Asia hired petitioners as customer service
representatives, team leaders, and trainers for the Alltel Project.

However, Alltel manifested its intent to terminate all support services

provided by Sykes Asia related to the Alltel Project. As a result, Sykes Asia
sent each of the petitioners end-of-life notices, informing them of their
dismissal from employment due to the termination of the Alltel Project.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed for illegal dismissal.

As a defense respondents averred that petitioners were not regular

employees but merely project-based employees, and as such, the
termination of the Alltel Project served as a valid ground for their dismissal.
Such was expressly indicated in petitioners’ respective employment contracts
that their positions are "project-based" and thus, "co-terminus to the
project."

Issue: Won the dismissal was valid.

Held: The petition is without merit.

Art. 294. Regular and casual employment.—The provisions of written

agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer,
except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services
to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration
of the season.

In Omni Hauling Services, Inc. v. Bon, A project employee is assigned to a

project which begins and ends at determined or determinable times. Unlike
regular employees who may only be dismissed for just and/or authorized
causes under the Labor Code, the services of employees who are hired as
"project[-based] employees" may be lawfully terminated at the completion
of the project.

According to jurisprudence, the principal test for determining an employee

to be considered project-based is that: (a) the employee was assigned to
carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope
of which were specified at the time they were engaged for such project.

In this case, records reveal that Sykes Asia adequately informed petitioners
of their employment status at the time of their engagement, as evidenced
by the latter’s employment contracts which similarly provide that they were
hired in connection with the Alltel Project, and that their positions were
"project-based and as such is co-terminus to the project."

In this light, the CA correctly ruled that petitioners were indeed project-based
employees, considering that: (a) they were hired to carry out a specific
undertaking, i.e., the Alltel Project; and (b) the duration and scope of such
project were made known to them at the time of their engagement, i.e., "co-
terminus with the project."

When the Alltel Project was terminated, petitioners no longer had any project
to work on, and hence, Sykes Asia may validly terminate them from
employment.
 4. G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990

BRENT SCHOOL, INC

vs.
RONALDO ZAMORA

Facts:

Doroteo R. Alegre was the athletic director by Brent School, Inc. with a
contract fixed at a specific term for its existence for five (5) years from the
date of execution of the agreement.

Three months before the expiration of the stipulated period Alegre was
informed of his termination of service. The stated ground for the termination
was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of
employment." Hence, Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed
a receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the
period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."

However, at the investigation conducted by a Labor Conciliator of said report

of termination of his services, Alegre protested the announced termination
of his employment. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that
the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were
necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his
employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of a regular
employee and could not be removed except for valid cause

Issues: won the provision for fix term was valid making the dismissal of
Alegre valid.

Held:

Respondent Alegre’s contract of employment with Brent School having

lawfully terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term
of period thereof, he is declared not entitled to reinstatement.
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of
legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly
appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the
employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article
indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements
conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should
be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled
out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It
should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment
was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force,
duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and
absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it
satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other
on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being
exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview,
the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated
by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects
and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences.

 The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July
18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet
been promulgated. At that time, the validity of term employment was impliedly
recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787.
Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which governed
employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly acknowledged the propriety
of employment with a fixed period. The Civil Code of the Philippines, which was
approved on June 18, 1949 and became effective on August 30,1950, itself deals
with obligations with a period. No prohibition against term-or fixed-period
employment is contained in any of its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.

It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and
Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration
thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court.

The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts

under the Labor Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code
contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or
definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term employment
began to take place at about this time.
Article 320 originally stated that the “termination of employment of probationary
employees and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such
regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe.” Article 321 prescribed the just
causes for which an employer could terminate “an employment without a definite period.”
And Article 319 undertook to define “employment without a fixed period” in the following
manner: …where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment
is for the duration of the season.

Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with “a definite period” and
“regular” employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective December
16, 1975.

Article 320, dealing with “Probationary and fixed period employment,” was altered by
eliminating the reference to persons “employed with a fixed period,” and was renumbered
(becoming Article 271).

As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal
interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the
lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without
reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the
duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be
eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude
absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and
subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer’s
using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like
cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping
off the head.