G.R. No.

174893 July 11, 2012

FLORDELIZA MARIA REYES-RAYEL,


 vs.

PHILIPPINE LUEN THAI HOLDINGS, CORPORATION/L&T INTERNATIONAL GROUP
PHILIPPINES, INC.

FACTS:

In February 2000, PLTHC hired petitioner as Corporate Human Resources (CHR) Director for
Manufacturing for its subsidiary/affiliate company, L&T. In the employment contract, petitioner
was tasked to perform functions in relation to administration, recruitment, benefits,
audit/compliance, policy development/ structure, project plan, and such other works as may be
assigned by her immediate superior, Frank Sauceda (Sauceda), PLTHC’s Corporate Director for
Human Resources.

A year later, petitioner received a Prerequisite Notice from Sauceda and the Corporate Legal
Counsel of PLTHC, Ma. Lorelie T. Edles (Edles), which reads:

This has reference to your failure to perform in accordance with management directives in various
instances, which collectively have resulted in loss of confidence in your capability to promote the
interests of the Company.

The most deleterious to the Company has been your pronouncements against the Human
Resource Information System (HRIS) or HR2 Program, a corporate initiative that is at the core
and is crucial to the enhancement of personnel management for the global operations of the
Company. On numerous occasions, in the presence of colleagues and subordinates, you made
statements that serve to undermine the Company’s efforts at pursuing the HR2 Program. You
ought to have realized that when leveled by an officer of your rank, no less than a Director of the
Corporate Human Resources Division, such remarks are highly inflammatory and their negative
impact is magnified.

Just as flagrant is your inability to incite collaboration and harmony within the Corporate Human
Resources Division. Instead, colleagues and subordinates complain of your negative attitude
towards the Company, its officers and people. You have established notoriety for your temper
and have alienated most members of your division. You ought to have realized that when
exhibited by an officer of your rank, no less than a Director of the Corporate Human Resources
Division, poor interpersonal skills and the lack of moral suasion are extremely damaging.

The foregoing have, in fact, manifested in your own unsatisfactory performance rating, and in the
departure of promising employees who could not work with you.

In view of the above, we afford you the opportunity to submit your written reply to this
memorandum within forty-eight (48) hours from its receipt. Failure to so submit shall be construed
as waiver of your right to be heard. Consequently, the Company shall immediately decide on this
matter.

In petitioner’s written response dated September 10, 2001, she explained that her alleged failure
to perform management directives could be attributed to the lack of effective communication with
her superiors due to malfunctioning email system. This caused her to miss certain directives
coming from her superiors and likewise, for her superiors to overlook the reports she was
submitting. She denied uttering negative comments about the HR2 Program and instead claimed
to have intimated her support for it. She further denied causing disharmony in her division.
Petitioner emphasized that in June 2001, she received a relatively good rating of 80.2% in her
overall performance appraisal which meant that she displayed dependable work level
performance as well as good corporate relationship with her superiors and subordinates.

Respondents, tdismissed petitioner from the service for loss of confidence on her ability to
promote the interests of the company. This led petitioner to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal,
payment of separation pay, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
other unpaid company benefits against respondents

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner argued that her dismissal was without valid or just cause and was effected without due
process. According to her, the causes for her dismissal as stated in the Prerequisite Notice and
Notice of Termination are not proper grounds for termination under the Labor Code and the same
do not even pertain to any willful violation of the company’s code of discipline or any other
company policy. Even the alleged loss of confidence was not supported by any evidence of
wrongdoing on her part.

Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that they have a wide discretion in dismissing petitioner
as she was occupying a managerial position. They claimed in their Position Paper that petitioner’s
inefficiency and lackadaisical attitude in performing her work were just and valid grounds for
termination. In the same token, her gross and habitual neglect of duties were enough bases for
respondents to lose all their confidence in petitioner’s ability to perform her job satisfactorily. Also,
petitioner was accorded due process as she was furnished with two notices - the first requiring
her to explain why she should not be terminated, and the second apprising her of the
management’s decision to terminate her from employment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents deprived petitioner of her right to due process when respondents
dismissed petitioner without conducting any investigation to determine the veracity and
truthfulness of the allegations against petitioner in violation of respondents’ own company policies

HELD:

No. Petitioner was accorded due process.

REASONS:

We have examined the Prerequisite Notice and contrary to petitioner’s assertion, find the same to
be free from any ambiguity. The said notice properly advised petitioner to explain through a
written response her failure to perform in accordance with management directives, which
deficiency resulted in the company’s loss of confidence in her capability to promote its interest. As
correctly explained by the CA, the notice cited specific incidents from various instances which
showed petitioner’s "repeated failure to comply with work directives, her inclination to make
negative remarks about company goals and her difficult personality," that have collectively
contributed to the company’s loss of trust and confidence in her. Indeed, these specified acts, in
addition to her low performance rating, demonstrated petitioner’s neglect of duty and
incompetence which support the termination for loss of trust and confidence.

Neither can there be any denial of due process due to the absence of a hearing or investigation at
the company level. It has been held in a plethora of cases that due process requirement is met
when there is simply an opportunity to be heard and to explain one’s side even if no hearing is
conducted.
In this case, petitioner's written response to the Prerequisite Notice provided her with an avenue
to explain and defend her side and thus served the purpose of due process. That there was no
hearing. investigation or right to appeal. which petitioner opined to be violation of company
policies, is of no moment since the records is bereft of any showing that there is an existing
company policy that requires these procedures with respect to the termination of a CHR Director
like petitioner or that company practice calls for the same. There was also no request for a formal
hearing on the part of petitioner.

As she was served with a notice apprising her of the changes against her and also a subsequent
notice informing her of the management's decision to terminate her services alter respondents
found her written response to the first notice unsatisfactory, petitioner was clearly afforded her
right to due process.

ENRIQUE ZALDIVAR
VS
SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Enrique Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of criminal cases
filed against him on the ground that said cases were filed by the Tanodbayan.

The 1987 Consti provided that it is only the Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with
the Sandiganbayan.

The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from
investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded
by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of
the State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the
Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included
statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had
been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on
Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from
investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will
embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called
over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against
two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SC’s order '"heightens
the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people
have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free” was publicized in
leading newspapers.

Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be
punished for contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media.
Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution
of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the
whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on
responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that
respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of
judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his
freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the
"visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and
contempt charges."

ARGUMENTS:

Respondent Gonzalez has asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich
and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful
on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful"
accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor
and small offenders. The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely
exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified
privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.

HELD:

No,there was no violation. Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech.

REASONS:

No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is
that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is
no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For
the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other
words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community.

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:

The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must
be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for
charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in
this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its
true sense. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of
the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the
Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for
good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse
inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and the
courts.

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to
prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost,
indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited
than that of a layman
 [G.R. No. 136726. September 24, 2003]

PANFILO V. VILLARUEL, JR.,

vs.
REYNALDO D. FERNANDO, MODESTO ABARCA, JR. and MARILOU M. CLEOFAS,

FACTS:

Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. (“petitioner”) is the former Assistant Secretary of the Air
Transportation Office (“ATO”), Department of Transportation and Communication
(“DOTC”). Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. (“Abarca”), and Marilou
M. Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and Administrative Assistant,
respectively, of the Civil Aviation Training Center (“CATC”). The CATC is an adjunct agency of
the ATO tasked to train air traffic controllers, airway communicators and related civil aviation
personnel for the local aviation industry as well as for the Southeast Asian and Pacific region.

Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995 addressed to the respondents,

detailing them to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May
1995. Respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina T.
Lichauco through petitioner requesting for reconsideration of the detail order.

In compliance with the detail order, respondents reported to the Office of Undersecretary
Cal at DOTC.

Without acting on respondents’ request for reconsideration, petitioner issued a

memorandum addressed to Abarca placing him under “preventive suspension” for 90 days
without pay pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct. Respondents requested
Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return to their mother unit since more
than 90 days had already lapsed. Respondents also sought the intervention of the Ombudsman
in their case. As a result, the Ombudsman inquired from Secretary Garcia the action taken on
respondents’ request for reconsideration of the detail order.

Secretary Garcia replied to the Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum dated 9
November 1995 directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia
declared that the law does not sanction the continuous detail of respondents. Despite repeated
demands by respondents, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their mother
unit.

The trial court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering petitioner to
comply with the 9 November 1995 order of Secretary Garcia directing petitioner to recall
respondents to their mother unit until further orders by the trial court.

For petitioner’s continued failure to comply with the writ of preliminary injunction,
respondents moved to cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to declare petitioner
in default for not filing an answer within the period prescribed in the trial court’s order. RTC
rendered decision in favor of the petitioners and against the respondent declaring mandamus
permanent and to pay damages.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner essentially contends that the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 96-0139 is
void for lack of due process. Petitioner alleges that the trial court never gave him the chance to be
heard and to submit his evidence. Petitioner, formerly represented by the OSG, failed to file an
answer to respondents’ petition for mandamus and damages. Consequently, the trial court
declared petitioner in default. While the OSG filed a notice of appeal of the judgment by default, it
failed to file with the Court of Appeals the required memorandum resulting in the dismissal of the
appeal. In petitioner’s words, the OSG “virtually abandoned” his case. Petitioner argues that the
inexcusable negligence of the OSG did not bind him and prevented the decision of the trial court
from becoming final and executory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court denied petitioner of his right to due process.

HELD:

No. Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not
denied petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of
Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly,
petitioner’s former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence, however, binds
petitioner. The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not
relieve petitioner of the effects such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from
becoming final and executory.

REASONS:

In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt him
from the general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not even
attempt to refute the respondents’ allegations in the petition for mandamus and damages.

Moreover, petitioner is not entirely blameless for the dismissal of his appeal. After the OSG’s
failure to file the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages and to have the order
declaring petitioner in default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with another
lawyer. However, petitioner still retained the services of the OSG, despite its apparent lack of
interest in petitioner’s case, until the trial court’s decision became final.

G.R. No. 192108 November 21, 2012

SPOUSES SOCRATES SY AND CELY SY


 vs.

ANDOK'S LITSON CORPORATION

FACTS:

Petitioner Cely Sy (Sy) is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Respondent Andok’s Litson Corporation (Andok’s) is engaged in the business of selling grilled
chicken and pork with outlets all over the Philippines. Sy and Andok’s entered into a 5-year lease
contract covering the parcel of land owned by Sy. Monthly rental was fixed at P60,000.00,
exclusive of taxes, for the first 2 years and P66,000.00 for the third, fourth and fifth year with 10%
escalation every year beginning on the fourth year. Andok’s alleged that while in the process of
applying for electrical connection on the improvements to be constructed on Sy’s land, it was
discovered that Sy has an unpaid Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) bill amounting to
P400,000.00. Andok’s presented a system-generated statement from MERALCO. Andok’s further
complained that construction for the improvement it intended for the leased premises could not
proceed because another tenant, Mediapool, Inc. incurred delay in the construction of a billboard
structure also within the leased premises. In its letter, Andok’s first informed Sy about the delay in
the construction of the billboard structure on a portion of its leased property. Three more letters of
the same tenor were sent to Sy but the demands fell on deaf ears. Consequently, Andok’s
suffered damages which comprises the advance rental and deposit, cost of money, mobilization
cost for the construction of improvement over leased premises, and unrealized income. The
complaint for rescission was filed three years after continued inaction on the request to have the
billboard construction expedited.

RTC rendered decision in favor of Andok’s. CA affirms RTC decision held that the trial court
correctly allowed the presentation of evidence ex-parte as there was no valid reason for the
urgent motion for postponement of the pre-trial filed by Sy. The appellate court found that Sy
repeatedly failed to comply with her obligation under the lease contract despite repeated
demands. The appellate court awarded damages for breach of contract

ARGUMENTS:

Sy decried deprivation of her right to present evidence resulting in a default judgment against her.
Sy denied that there was a breach on the lease contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA in affirming the RTC judgment failed to notice that the default judgment
from judicial precedent and policy, and amounted to an infringement of the right to due process
of Sy.

HELD:

No. The affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the judgment of the trial court is correct.

REASONS:

Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court requires the parties and their counsel to appear at pre-
trial, thus:

Section 4. Appearance of parties. – It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear
at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown
therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an
amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.

Section 5 of the same rule states the consequences of failure to appear during pre-trial, thus:

Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required
pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal
shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the
defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex-parte and the court to
render judgment on the basis thereof.

What constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and their counsels from appearing at the pre-
trial under Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court is subject to the sound discretion of a
judge.Such discretion was shown by the trial court, which was correct in putting into effect the
consequence of petitioners’ non-appearance at the pre-trial. While Sy filed an Urgent Motion to
Reset Pre-trial, she cannot assume that her motion would be automatically granted. As found by
the Court of Appeals, the denial of petitioners’ motion for postponement is dictated by the motion
itself:
A perusal of the Urgent Motion to Reset Pre-Trial Conference discloses that other than the
allegation that counsel will attend a hearing in another branch of the same court in Manila, yet, it
failed to substantiate its claim. It did not state the case number nor attach the Calendar of
Hearing or such other pertinent proof to appraise the court that indeed counsel was predisposed

In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, we reiterated that the
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit
any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. Where the opportunity to be heard,
either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can present its side or
defend its interest in due course, there is no denial of procedural due process.