Conchada V Director of Prison

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 031 16/06/2019, 10)58 PM
[No. 10292. March 31, 1915.]
EUSTAQUIO CONCHADA, petitioner, vs. THE

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
1. COURTS; NATURE AND SOURCE OF JUDICIAL

AUTHORITY.·The provisions of Act No. 136 had for their
object the organization, or rather the creation, of the
judiciary in the Philippine Islands under the system of
government established therein by the United States of
America in substitution for that which existed when, by
virtue of the Treaty of Paris, the' Spanish Government
transferred its sovereignty over said Islands to the United
States of America. After the judiciary was organized, the
jurisdiction corresponding to each of its divisions was
assigned and, after the courts established by virtue of said
Act were already in operation, the Congress of the United
States passed the Act known as the "Philippine Bill," which
among other things said in its ninth section: "That the
Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the
Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as
heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall
hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands,
subject to the power of said Government to change the
practice and method of procedure."
2. ID.; ID.; APPROVAL OF CONGRESS.·The Congress of the

United States by the Philippine Bill placed its high sanction
on the organization of the judiciary·that is, upon the
institution for the administration of justice·in approving
and confirming it, as it had been established by Act No. 136
and in, at the same time, setting forth what appears in said
section 9 with relation to the jurisdiction of the different
divisions of that branch, the appointment of the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and
judges of first instance.
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3. ID.; ID.; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE NOT

CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS.·The Courts of First
Instance of these Islands are not constitutional courts or
courts created by the Constitution, but by the Legislature of
the Philippine Islands, as territory not incorporated into the
United States of America and governed by the Congress of
those States under the Philippine Bill, which has
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VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 95
Conchada vs. Director of Prisons.
come to be the constitution of said Islands. The fact that the

creation of said courts was sanctioned by that constitution
did not convert them into constitutional courts in the sense
understood by petitioner's counsel·that is, in such manner
that the Philippine Legislature cannot act with respect to
the division of the judicial territory without awaiting the
consent or approval of Congress.
4. ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS BY ACT

No. 2347.·In said Philippine constitution Congress did not
arrogate to itself or assume any authority on this point,
concerning the organization of the judiciary, and
consequently the courts, that by virtue of Act No. 2347 have
replaced or supplanted those previously established by Act
No. 140 and the later Acts Nos. 450, 496, 501, 552, 867,
1345, 1708, 1952, and 2038, were also created by the
Legislature by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by said
constitution.
5. ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS BY ACT

No. 2347 NEITHER INCREASES NOR DIMINISHES
JURISDICTION.·"Jurisdiction is the power one has to
govern or to execute the laws and especially the power with
which judges are invested for administering justice·that is,
for trying civil or criminal cases, or both, and deciding them
and rendering judgment in accordance with the laws."
(Escriche, Diccionario de Legislación y Jurisprudencia, vol.
3, p. 743, ed. 1875.) If this be jurisdiction, the increase in

the number of districts in the judicial division of the
territory of the Philippine Islands and the formation of each
of these new districts by a larger or smaller number of
provinces than those assigned to each district by Act No.
140 and the other Acts mentioned above, as well as the
change in the designation of some of these districts and of
some of the provinces comprised in the former districts for
others among those finally designated in Act No. 2347, and
the reduction of" the number of provinces in some of the
new districts, do not constitute limitation or increase of the
jurisdiction of the courts, because the power and authority
to hear, try, and decide civil or criminal cases are always the
same. What was increased or diminished by said Act No.
2347 was the places wherein said jurisdiction is exercised or
the exercise of the jurisdiction itself with reference to the
place in which it is publicly manifested.
6. ID,; ID.; TERRITORY WHEREIN JURISDICTION is

EXERCISED.·It is true that the word "jurisdiction" is also
understood, according to Escriche, "as the district or
territory over which a judge's authority extends; and as the
boundary of a place or province; and likewise as the court in
which justice is administered;" but this is not the sense in
which it is used in section 9 of the Philippine Bill, where it
is employed in the legal sense given
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96 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
above, for there can be no doubt that in said section 9 the

Congress of the United States referred only to the authority
of the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance to
have original and appellate jurisdiction in the cases
mentioned·the former by sections 16, 17, and 18, and the
latter by sections 55, 56, and 57, of the Act organizing the
judiciary·and to perform the acts specified in some of the
said sections.
7. ID.; ID.; ACT No. 2347 HAS NOT ABOLISHED THE

COURTS CREATED BY ACT No. 136.·The Philippine
Legislature has not by Act No. 2347 abolished, suppressed,
or destroyed the Courts of First Instance of these Islands,
created by the Act organizing the judiciary, for an organism
is not destroyed, abolished, or suppressed by varying its
original form. Said Act has done nothing more than
establish a new division of the judicial territory; it has
preserved the Courts of First Instance in each province,
according to the purport of the prescription in section 1 of
said Act organizing the judiciary, or, what amounts to the
same thing, has reorganized said courts without altering
the organism thereof and without depriving them of their
jurisdiction.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Habeas

corpus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Reyes & Millar and Mariano A. Albert for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Corpus for respondent.
ARAULLO, J.:
On May 19, 1914, the provincial fiscal charged Eustaquio

Conchada with the crime of murder in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial
District, then presided over by the Honorable George R.
Harvey, judge. The case against him having been duly
prepared, he was tried on July 23, 1914, before the same
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, then presided over by
the Honorable Isidro Paredes and on that date included in
the Fourteenth Judicial District by virtue of Act No. 2347
of the Philippine Legislature which went into effect on the
1st day of the same month of July and which provided for
the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and of
the Court of Land Registration. Defendant was
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VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 97

sentenced on September 23 of that year, 1914, by the same

judge, the Honorable Isidro Paredes, to the penalty of life
imprisonment and consequently confined in- Bilibid Prison
of this city of Manila under an order issued by said
Honorable Isidro Paredes as judge of the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas.
During the course of the trial, defendant filed a motion
praying that said court refrain from proceeding further in
the case and from sentencing him, and that it disqualify
itself in favor of the competent court, on the ground that it
was not legally constituted, because said Act No. 2347,
which had created it, was contrary to the Organic Act of
the Philippines and therefore void, and said court and the
judge presiding therein lacked jurisdiction to try and decide
the case and sentence him, because such jurisdiction
belonged to the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, Seventh
Judicial District, in which the complaint had been filed and
which still existed in the province. This motion was denied
by the court, with exception on the part of the def endant,
and the trial was carried forward in the same court
presided over by the Honorable Isidro Paredes, who, as has
already been said, rendered the said judgment of
conviction.
Later the attorneys Reyes, Millar, and Albert,
representing the said Eustaquio Conchada, prayed this
Supreme Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to the
Director of Prisons to compel him to produce said
defendant and, after due hearing, to order his release or
grant him a trial in a competent court. After mentioning
the facts already set forth, they virtually alleged that the
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, Fourteenth Judicial District, on September 23,
1914, against the defendant was illegal, null, and void,
because: (1) The Philippine Legislature had no authority to
abolish or deprive of jurisdiction the Court of First Instance
of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District, created by the
constitution, nor to substitute therefor another court of its
own creation; (2) the Philippine Legislature had no
authority to dismiss or remove the judge of said Court of
First Instance,
98

which had exclusive jurisdiction, as established by the

constitution, of the crime specified in the complaint; and (3)
the judge of first instance of Tayabas, Seventh Judicial
District, established by the Organic Act, having first
acquired jurisdiction over the cause of action and the
person of the defendant, no territorial law could validly
compel the defendant-petitioner to submit to the
jurisdiction of another court created by the Legislature and
presided over by a judge who held office subject to the will
of that Legislature.
After this court had directed that the respondent
Director of Prisons show cause why the writ of habeas
corpus sought should not issue, and the Solicitor-General,
representing the said Director of Prisons, had submitted
such arguments as he deemed proper, the hearing was had,
and counsel for the petitioner set forth in their brief that on
the appeal they relied upon the following legal
propositions:
"1. The Philippine Legislature has no authority to limit

the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts created
by the Organic Act and still less to abolish,
suppress, or destroy said courts.
"2. The Philippine Legislature has no authority to
remove the judges appointed under the Organic Act
to preside over the courts created thereby, without
abolishing the courts in which they sit.
"3, The Philippine Legislature, by Act No. 2347, has
decreed the final extinction, abolition or destruction
of the constitutional courts created by the Organic
Act, and has replaced or supplanted them with
other courts of its own creation.
"4. The removal of the judges, along with all the
officers and employees of the old courts, and the
limitation of their jurisdiction to certain causes
pending, necessarily imply the destruction or
abolition of said courts.
"5. The courts 'organized' by Act No. 2347 are not
legally constituted and the judges appointed by

virtue of said Act lack jurisdiction to try and
sentence the petitioner."
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VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 99

These five propositions rest upon the following hypotheses:
1. That the courts created by the Organic Act, or the

law organizing the courts of justice of the Philippine
Islands, to wit, Act No. 136, passed on June 11,
1901, by the United States Philippine Commission,
are constitutional courts and that said courts have
been replaced or supplanted by the Philippine
Legislature through Act No. 2347 with other courts
of its own creation.
2. That the same Philippine Legislature, through Act
No. 2347, without authority therefor, has limited
the jurisdiction of the courts, characterized by
petitioner's counsel as constitutional, created by the
Organic Act, and has abolished, suppressed, or
destroyed said courts.
3. That the Philippine Legislature has removed,
likewise without authority therefor, the judges
appointed under the Organic Act to preside over the
courts created thereby.
From these hypotheses said counsel for the petitioner, after

arguing at length in support of the propositions laid down
by them, deduce that the courts "organized" by Act No.
2347 are not legally constituted and that Judge Paredes,
appointed under said Act, lacked jurisdiction to try and
sentence Eustaquio Conchada, the petitioner.
When the United States Philippine Commission on June
11, 1901, pased Act No. 136, the law organizing the courts
of justice of the Philippine Islands, the law known as "The
Philippine Bill''·that is, the Act of July 1, 1902·had not
yet been passed by the Congress of the United States. The
organization of the courts of justice in the Philippine

Islands and the definition of their jurisdiction by means of
Act No. 136 were effected, as petitioner's counsel say, by
virtue of or under the instructions of the President of the
United States. What was the organization of those courts of
justice? How was the jurisdiction thereof defined? The very
Act, No. 136, categorically answers these queries.
Section 1 of said Act says:
"Courts of justice shall be maintained in every province
100

of the Philippine Islands in which civil government shall be

established; which courts shall be open for the trial of all
causes proper for their cognizance, and justice shall be
therein impartially administered without corruption or
unnecessary delay."
Section 2 of the same Act says:
"The judicial power of the Government of the Philippine
Islands shall be vested in a Supreme Court, Courts of First
Instance, and courts of justices of the peace, together with
such special jurisdictions of municipal courts, and other
special tribunals as now are or hereafter may be authorized
by law."
With reference to the Courts of First Instance, section 48
of the same Act says:
"There shall be in each province in which civil
government has been or shall be organized under the
sovereignty of the United States, a Court of First Instance.
in each of which a judge shall preside, to be appointed by
the Philippine Commission, to hold office during its
pleasure. Each. judge so appointed shall preside in all
Courts of First Instance in his judicial district, which shall
consist of such provinces as shall be hereafter by law
designated to constitute such judicial district."
Said section makes an exception with reference to the
city of Manila, which is dealt with in the next succeeding
section, 49, in a way not pertinent here.
In treating of the jurisdiction of the Courts of First
Instance, section 55 of said Act says that it shall be of two

kinds, original and appellate, the next succeeding section,
56, mentioning among the first kind that of trying and
deciding all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than
six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding $100 may be
imposed.
A simple reading of the provisions of the said Act No.
136 is sufficient for understanding that its object was to
organize, or, rather, to create, the judiciary in these
Philippine Islands under the system of government
established therein by the United States of America in
substitution
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VOL. 31. MARCH 31. 1915. 101

for that which existed when, by virtue of the treaty of

Paris, sovereignty over said Islands was transferred by the
Spanish Government to the United States of America.
After the judiciary was organized, the jurisdiction
corresponding to each of the divisions of that power was
assigned, and after the courts established by virtue of said
Act No. 136 were already in operation, the Congress of the
United States passed the Act of July 1, 1902, known as
"The Philippine Bill," which, among other matters relating
to the administration of the affairs of civil government in
the Philippine Islands set forth in section 9 thereof:
"That the Supreme Court and the Courts of First
Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and
exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such
additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by
the Government of said Islands, subject to the power of
said Government to change the practice and method of
procedure. The municipal courts of said Islands shall
possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided by
the Philippine Commission, subject in all matters to such
alteration and amendment as may be hereafter enacted by
law; and the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court shall hereafter be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and shall receive the compensation heretof ore

prescribed by the Commission until otherwise provided by
Congress. The judges of the Court of First Instance shall be
appointed by the Civil Governor, by and with the advice
and consent of the Philippine Commission: Provided, That
the admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts
of First Instance shall not be changed except by Act of
Congress."
It is therefore unquestionable that the Congress of the
United States through the Philippine Bill placed, as
petitioner's counsel say, its high sanction upon the
institutions already existing in said Islands and definitely
confirmed their existence, and it is also unquestionable
that, with reference to the organization of the judiciary·
that is, to the institution for the administration of justice·
said Act
102

approved and confirmed it, leaving- it as it had been

established by Act No. 136, while it sets forth what appears
in the section 9 above quoted with reference to the different
divisions of that same judiciary and to the appointment of
the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court and the judges of the Courts of First Instance.
Said section ratified the jurisdiction which Act No. 136,
prior to the Philippine Bill, has already conferred upon the
Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance, and also
clearly stated that such Supreme Court and Courts of First
Instance should thereafter have such additional
jurisdiction as might be conferred upon them by the
Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the power
of said Government to change the practice and method of
procedure.
"Jurisdiction is the power or authority one has to govern
and to execute the laws, and especially the power with
which judges are invested for administering justice·that
is, for trying civil or 'criminal cases, or both, and deciding
them and rendering judgment in accordance with the
laws.'' (Escriche, Diccionario de Legislación y

Jurisprudencia, vol. 3, p. 743, ed. 1875.)
"Jurisdiction, when applied to courts, is defined to be the
power to hear and determine the cause." (Wightman vs.
Karsner, 20 Ala., 446, 451; Pullman Palace Car Co. vs.
Harrison, 25 South, 697, 699; 82 Am. St. Rep., 68; In. re
Greenough St, 32 Atl., 427, 428; State vs. Wakefield, 15
Atl., 181, 183', and innumerable cases.)
"In the meaning of the law, 'jurisdiction' is the authority
or power which a man hath to do justice in causes of
complaint brought before him:" (State vs. Whitford, 11 N.
W., 424, 426; 54 Wis., 150.)
"The term 'jurisdiction,' when confined to the judicial
department of the Government, means the legal authority
to administer justice." (Holmes vs. Campbell, 12 Minn. 221,
227, [141, 146].)
" 'Jurisdiction' is 'controlling authority; the right of
making or enforcing laws or regulations, the capacity of
deter-
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VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 103

mining rules of action or use, and exacting penalties; the

function or capacity of judging or governing in general; the
inherent power of decision or control.'" (People vs. Pierce,
41 N. Y. Suppl., 858, 860.)
"Jurisdiction is the power of hearing and determining
causes, and of doing justice in matters of complaint." (State
vs. Whitford, 11 N. W., 424, 426; 54 Wis., 150.)
So there can be no doubt that in speaking in said section
9 of the Philippine Bill of the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and of the Courts of First Instance of these Islands,
the Congress of the United States referred to the power
and authority with which the Supreme Court and the
Courts of First Instance of these Islands are invested by
Act No. 136, which organized the courts of justice of these
Islands, and to such as they might in the future be invested
with or as might be granted to them by the Government of
the Islands, subject to the power of said Government to
change the practice and method of procedure; but in no way

did it refer to the districts or provinces wherein the Courts
of First Instance or the judges appointed to exercise such
jurisdiction were then exercising it by virtue of Act No. 140,
which was passed by the same United States Commission'
in these Islands on June 12, 1901, prior to the Philippine
Bill itself; or, rather, this Act did not refer to the place
where said jurisdiction was to be exercised, or to the
particular extent of territory in which it was then being
exercised, or to the place or the particular extent of
territory in which it might be exercised, by virtue of the
laws which might in the future be enacted for such purpose
by the Government of these Islands through the medium of
the Philippine Commission or Philippine Legislature. In
short, the Congress of the United States did not in the
Philippine Bill pay any attention to the organization of the
judiciary with reference to the creation and establishment
of judicial districts, or to the number of such districts, or,
finally, to the number of provinces that should be
comprised in each district; it accepted the organization of
the judiciary in this respect as had been
104

provided by said Act No. .140, and it did not restrict, limit,
or modify the authority which the Philippine Commission
had exercised in said Act No. 140 in dividing the judicial
territory of the Islands into various districts, each of which
embraced one or more provinces of the Archipelago, and in
establishing therein the Courts of First Instance, or courts
of justice, in accordance with the provision of section .1 of
the same Organic Act, No. 136, nor did it attempt to
assume authority or to establish regulations or procedure
to which the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature must conform in its future exercise of that
authority. Otherwise the said Congress would have stated,
as it did state in section 9 of the Philippine Bill in speaking
of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the Courts
of First Instance as well as the jurisdiction of the municipal
courts, that the establishment by the Philippine

Government of judicial districts or the determination of the
provinces to be comprised in each district should be made
subject to certain regulations or to the changes or
amendments which might be necessary in the future. Since
the Congress of the United States in the said Philippine
Bill did not so state, it is evident that it left the Philippine
Commission and the Philippine Legislature (which was
created by the same Act and which succeeded said
Commission in the exercise of the legislative power) at
liberty to enact such laws as said Legislature might deem
expedient or necessary to modify or change the division of
the judicial territory of the Islands, as effected under Act
No. 140, and to establish new districts which might be
included in such divisions of the judicial territory, as has in
fact been done, first by the Philippine Commission and
afterwards by the Philippine Legislature through the
medium of Acts Nos. 450, 496, 501, 552, 867, 1345, 1708,
1952, and 2038, all these being Acts of which the Congress
of the United States had knowledge, in compliance with the
provision in section 86 of the same Philippine Bill, without
annulling them in the exercise of the authority it naturally
reserved to itself in that section.
105
VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 105

From all of the foregoing it necessarily follows that the

Courts of First Instance for these Islands, which are the
ones to which the appellant refers in the question raised on
the appeal, are not constitutional courts, or courts created
by the Constitution, but by the Legislature of the
Philippine Islands, as territory not incorporated into the
United States of America and governed by the Congress of
those States through the medium of the Act of July 1, 1902.
This Act has come to be the constitution of the Philippine
Islands, and the fact that the creation of said courts was
sanctioned by that constitution did not convert them into
constitutional courts in the sense understood and
maintained by petitioner's counsel·that is, in such
manner that the Philippine Legislature cannot act with

respect to the division of the judicial territory without
awaiting the consent or approval of Congress, for the
simple reason that Congress by virtue of the constitution of
the Philippines did not arrogate to itself or assume any
authority on this point concerning the organization of the
judicial power, and, consequently, the courts that have, by
virtue of Act No. 2347, replaced or supplanted those that
had been previously established by No. 140 and the
subsequent Acts enumerated above, are also created by the
Legislature by virtue of the powers which said constitution
confers upon it.
If, as has already been seen, jurisdiction is the power
with which judges are invested to try civil and criminal
cases and to decide them or render judgment in accordance
with the law, the increase in the number of districts in the
judicial division of the territory of the Philippine Islands
and the formation of each of these new districts by a larger
or smaller number of provinces than those assigned to each
district by Act No. 140 and the other Acts mentioned above,
as well as changes in the designation of some of those
districts and of some of the provinces comprised in the
former district for others finally designated in Act No.
2347, and the reduction in some of the new districts,
according to the same Act, of the number of provinces
comprised, to the extent that the Fourteenth Judicial
District
106

should include only the Province of Tayabas, which, with

the Province of Batangas had formed the Seventh Judicial
District under Act No. 501 and prior thereto under Act No.
140 the Sixth District, along with the Provinces of Laguna,
Cavite, Principe and Infanta, and Polillo Island, do not
constitute limitation or increase of the jurisdiction of those
courts, because the power and authority to hear, try, and
decide civil and criminal cases pertaining to each court are
always the same, and what was increased or diminished by
said Act No. 2347 was the places wherein said jurisdiction
is exercised or the exercise of the jurisdiction itself with
reference to the place in which it is publicly manifested.
It is true that the word "jurisdiction" is also understood,
according to Escriche in his work above cited, "as the
district or territory over which a judge's authority extends;
and as the boundary of a place or province; and likewise as
the court in which justice is administered;" but this is not
the sense in which the word "jurisdiction" is used in section
9 of the Philippine Bill, as petitioner's counsel seem to have
understood in saying that the Philippine Legislature had
no authority to limit the jurisdiction of what they call the
constitutional courts, created by the Organic Act, and in
establishing as the grounds for the whole argument
developed in their brief that the Philippine Legislature has
by Act No. 2347 limited such jurisdiction. Though that is
the meaning commonly given to the word, it is there
employed in its strictly legal acceptation as defined above,
for there can be no no doubt that when the Congress of the
United States said in section 9 "that the Supreme Court
and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands
shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore
provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter
be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, etc.," it
referred only to. the powers of the Supreme Court and of
the Courts of First Instance to have original and appellate
jurisdiction of the cases mentioned·the former by sections
16, 17, and 18, and the latter by sections 55, 56, and 57, of
Act No. 136·and to
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VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 107

perform the acts specified in some of those sections. This is

so perfectly plain that at the close of section 9 of the
Philippine Bill it is stated that the admiralty jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance shall not
be changed except by Act of Congress·that is, that the
power and authority of the Supreme Court and of the
Courts of First Instance with reference to said actions and
to deciding the cases arising thereunder shall be the same

as stated in section 56, No. 4, of Act No. 136·that is,
original for the Courts of First Instance, irrespective, of the
value of the property in controversy or the amount of the
demand, and appellate for the Supreme Court, according to
section 18 of the same Act. It cannot be altered except by
act of Congress. And if petitioner's counsel have tried, in
the second of the hypotheses they have started from in
laying down the five propositions contained in their brief.
to show that by Act No. 2347 the Philippine Legislature
has limited the jurisdiction, strictly speaking, of the courts
·that is, of the Courts of First Instance f rom among those
in question·created by the Organic Act, and the particular
extent of the exercise of that jurisdiction by reason of the
increase of new judicial districts, they have also fallen into
a flagrant inaccuracy, because the fact really is that said
Act No. 2347 contains no provision which alters or modifies
the provisions in sections 55, 56, and 57 of said Act for the
organization of the judiciary.
Neither is it true that the Philippine Legislature has by
Act No. 2347 abolished, suppressed, or destroyed the courts
to which the appellant's counsel refer, to wit, the Courts of
First Instance in these Islands, created by the Act
organizing the judiciary, for an organism is not destroyed,
abolished, or suppressed by varying its original form, and
said Act has done nothing more than make a new division
of the judicial territory by increasing the number of
districts and by including only one, or two or more
provinces in each district, but preserving the Courts of
First Instance in each province, according to the purport of
the prescription in section 1 of said Judiciary Act, or, what
amounts to the
108

same thing, has reorganized the Courts of First Instance of

the Islands without altering the organism thereof or the
system of which they form a part, and without also
depriving them of any portion of the jurisdiction conferred
upon them from the time of their creation.

For the same reason it cannot be said that the
jurisdiction of those same courts has been limited to certain
causes pending, as has occurred in the present case,
according to petitioner's counsel, with relation to the case
instituted against said petitioner, Eustaquio Conchada, by
virtue of the provisions of section 24 of said Act No. 2347,
in that it was tried and decided by a judge other than the
one who presided over the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, Seventh Judicial District, when the complaint
was filed against him, for the cause was submitted to the
same Court of First Instance of Tayabas wherein the
complaint had been filed, and was tried in said court,
belonging then to the Fourteenth District, presided over by
the judge who had jurisdiction to try it, as successor and
continuator of the judge who preceded him, having the
same jurisdiction as the former in his character of judge of
the Court of First Instance of said province, and it cannot
thereby be understood that any jurisdiction was taken
away from said court or from the judge who had formerly
officiated therein.
It is true that section 7 of Act No. 2347 of the Philippine
Legislature provided that the judges of the Courts of First
Instance, judges-at-large, and judges of the Court of Land
Registration should vacate their positions on the date when
said Act went into effect, but the same section went on to
say further that the Governor-General, with the advice and
consent of the Philippine Commission, should make new
appointments of judges of the Courts of First Instance and
auxiliary judges in accordance with the provisions of that
Act. So that the ceasing to hold their respective positions in
the cases of the judges to whom said section referred is not
and cannot be considered really as a removal or dismissal
of said judicial officers, as petitioner's counsel characterize
it, but a measure related to the new division of the judicial
109
VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 109

territory into a greater number of districts and the
assignment to each district of different provinces·in some

of them, of the provinces that composed the districts
theretofore existing·which made necessary the new
appointment of the respective judge for each district, an
appointment which the Governor-General of the Islands,
with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission,
was empowered to make, according to section 9 of the Act
of Congress, the Philippine Bill, nor can it be in any way
maintained, as petitioner's counsel contend, that the
ceasing of said judges to hold their positions, call it removal
or not, has necessarily implied the destruction, abolition, or
suppression of the courts in which they discharge their
duties, for the court as an entity is one thing and the
person of the officer who exercises his jurisdiction therein
is another.
The case cited by petitioner's counsel on page 23 of their
brief (People vs. Dubois, 23 111., 498), in support of their
contention to the effect that the Philippine Legislature had
no authority, according to the Philippine Bill, to reorganize
the Courts of First Instance of the Islands and that in
doing so it violated said Act·that is, the constitution·
making null and void both the ceasing of the old judges to
hold their positions as well as the appointment of the new,
effected by virtue of said Act No. 2347, shows the error into
which said counsel have fallen and the erroneous
hypotheses on which they have based their whole
argument.
In fact, the seventh section of the fifth article of the
constitution of the State of Illinois provides:
"The State shall be divided into nine judicial districts, in
each of which one circuit judge shall be elected by the
qualified voters thereof, who shall hold his office for the
term of six years, and until his successor shall be
commissioned and qualified: Provided, The General
Assembly may increase the number of circuits to meet the f
uture exigencies of the State."
The question that arose in the case cited, People vs.
Dubois (23 111., 498), is the following: "Can the legislature
expel a circuit judge from his office by creating a new
district,
110

and taking from him the territory which constitutes his

district?"
This question was answered as follows: "The bare
reading of the constitution [of the State of Illinois] must
convince every one that it intended to prohibit such a
proceeding. It was the intention of that instrument to place
the judges entirely above and beyond the legislative control
or interference, except by impeachment or address, as
provided for in the twelfth section of the fifth article. It is
the constitution which creates the office of circuit judge,
and not the legislature. All the latter can do is to create
new judicial districts, the constitution in advance having
created the office of circuit judge for such district.''
The syllabus of said decision states: "The office of circuit
judge is created by the constitution, which also fixes the
term. The legislature may increase the number of circuits,
but cannot deprive a judge of his office and compensation
by creating new circuits of the territory from which he was
elected. Once elected, he holds his office under the
constitution, unless removed by address or impeachment."
And in citing the said case petitioner's counsel have
quoted on page 23 of their brief from pages 507 and 508
[vol. 23] of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, as follows:
"When the office of judge is created by the constitution, it
cannot be abolished by the legislature (State vs. Scott, 9
Ark., 270); but when created by statute under authority of
the constitution, it may be abolished by statute and the
incumbent deprived of his office. Thus the legislature
cannot expel a circuit judge from his office by creating a
new district and taking from him the territory that
constituted his district. (People vs. Dubois, 23 111., 498.)"
In the Illinois case cited above, the State constitution
had fixed the number of judicial districts into which the
State should be divided. the time each circuit judge should
hold his office, and had provided, furthermore, that the
circuit judge of each district should be chosen through
election by the qualified voters of the State.
According to the statement of facts given in the decision
111
VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 111

mentioned, the legislature of the State of Illinois on

February 11, 1859, passed an act creating the twenty-third
judicial circuit and providing that the county of Bureau
should be added to and form a part of the ninth circuit,
thus leaving Judge Ballou, who was holding office by
election and should have held it under the constitution for
six years, without territory wherein to perform his duties
or exercise jurisdiction, or, what amounts to the same
thing, thus removing or dismissing him from said office;
and this was the point decided in that decision in a
favorable sense by granting the mandamus sought, on the
grounds already explained that the legislature could
increase the number of circuits but could not deprive a
judge of his office or of his compensation through the
creation of new circuits in the territory for which he had
been elected, and that after election he occupied the office
under the authority of the constitution and could only be
removed therefrom by address or impeachment.
It is perfectly understood that the act passed by the
legislature of Illinois to the effect already set forth was
unconstitutional, illegal, and null and void, for by reason of
the provision in such act that the county of Bureau should f
orm part of the ninth circuit, the same law creating
another judicial circuit as the twenty-third, Judge Ballou
was removed from the office he was holding before the
expiration of the term of six years, the time that he was
entitled to hold it, as no address or proceedings in
impeachment had been presented against him and as his
election had been effected under the authority of the State
constitution, which, in the seventh section of its fifth
article, contained provision for making the designation for
such office of circuit judge·that is, through the medium of
election by the qualified voters of the State.
Neither in Act No. 136, the law organizing the courts of
justice in the Philippine Islands, nor in the Act of July 1,
1902, the constitutional law or constitution of the
Philippines, Is there any provision which fixes or indicates

the time during which the judges of the Courts of First In-
112

stance of the Islands are entitled to hold such office, the

former Act merely stating in its section 48 that the judge
appointed by the Philippine Commission shall hold office
during its pleasure. Neither is there in the Act organizing
the judiciary or in the Philippine Bill any provision which
fixes the precise number of districts of the judicial territory
of the Philippines and the number of provinces to be
included in each district, it being merely stated in section 1
of said Act that "courts of justice shall be maintained in
every province in the Philippine Islands in which civil
government shall be established," and in section 48 thereof
that "there shall be in each province in which civil
government has been or shall be organized under the
sovereignty of the United States, a Court of First Instance,
in each of which a judge shall preside, to be appointed by
the Philippine Commission," and that "each judge so
appointed shall preside in all Courts of First Instance in
his judicial district, which shall consist of such provinces as
shall be hereafter by law designated."
Act No. 140 was the first to designate the judicial
districts and the provinces to be included in each district.
Thereafter and successively, first by the Philippine
Commission and afterwards by the Legislature, various
laws were enacted modifying the above-cited Act No. 140
with reference to the division of the judicial territory, the
designation and numbering of districts, and the provinces
that should form part of each district, nor has the Congress
of the United States, as has also been said above, declared
any of said laws to be null and void, which implies that
they were all approved by that Congress.
So there is no similarity at all between the case decided
by the supreme court of Illinois in People vs. Dubois (23
111., 498) and the case at bar.
The Illinois legislature could not, without violating the
constitution of that State, on the occasion of providing for

or modifying the organization of the judicial territory
thereof that forms part of a circuit, a certain county, that of
Bureau, and of creating a new judicial district, could
113
VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 113

not, we repeat, remove Judge Ballou from his office or

dismiss him, thus depriving him of the jurisdiction he
exercised in the territory for which he had been duly
elected, but the Philippine Legislature could, without
violating the law organizing the judiciary in the Philippine
Islands or the Philippine Bill passed by Congress on July 1,
1902, the constitution of the Philippines, by means of Act
No. 2347, reorganize the judicial territory of the Islands by
creating new districts, changing the numbers of those that
previously existed, including in each district one or more
provinces, whether or not they were those which formed
part of the districts previously created by Act No. 140 and
the others already enumerated. Furthermore, by reason of
this reorganization, it could provide that the judges should
cease to hold their respective offices in accordance with the
previous organization and that new judges should be
appointed to hold them in the districts newly created by
virtue of such reorganization, for neither the law
organizing the judiciary nor the Philippine Bill contains
any provisions fixing the number of districts of which the
division of the judicial territory of the Philippines must
necessarily consist, nor the provinces or the number thereof
which must be included in each district. nor has it limited
or restricted the power of the Legislature or of the
Government of the Philippines in connection with the
organization of the judiciary with respect to the Courts of
First Instance, nor has it laid down any rules to which
their actions must conform in the exercise of such power,
the Governor-General having been expressly empowered,
as we have already seen, by section 9 of the Philippine Bill,
to appoint the judges of the Courts of First Instance with
the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission. All
this clearly demonstrates that said Courts of First Instance

are not constitutional courts, and the hypothesis from
which petitioner's counsel have started in their brief being
incorrect, the whole argument advanced by them to show
that Act No. 2347, which provides for the reorganization of
the Courts of First Instance of these
114

Islands, is illegal and null and void, falls through.

Moreover, without going beyond that same law organizing
the courts of justice of these Islands and the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Bill, we have a
plain demonstration of the difference between the
constitutional courts and those which are not such, a
difference which exists between the Courts of First
Instance of these Islands and the Supreme Court thereof.
The appointment of the Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court is made, according to said
section 9 of the Philippine Bill, by the President of the
United States of America with the advice and consent of
the Senate, a provision which repeals that of section 8 of
the said Act organizing the judiciary which states that the
Justices, including the Chief Justice, of the Supreme Court
should be appointed by the Commission and should hold
office during its pleasure. The Supreme Court, according to
the same section 8 of the Act organizing the judiciary, shall
consist of a Chief Justice and six Associate Justices, and
the same section provides the number of Justices necessary
to form a quorum and to try any case within its
jurisdiction, as well as the number of them whose
concurrence is necessary to pronounce a judgment; section
11 of the same Act authorizes the Supreme Court to hold
sessions, not only in Manila, but also in Iloilo and Cebu,
provisions of said Judiciary Act which, not having been
modified by Congress in the Act of July 1, 1902, have been
ratified and sanctioned thereby, and so the Supreme Court
of the Philippines has become a constitutional court, and
the Philippine Legislature cannot enact laws upon the
subject of its formation, the appointment of the Justices

that compose it, or the place where it must hold its
sessions. Hence it was necessary for Congress to adopt the
joint resolution of April 9, 1910, which petitioner's counsel
mentioned in their brief, in order that this Supreme Court
might hold sessions in Baguio, a joint resolution which it is
not necessary to secure f rom the Congress of the United
States to enable the Court of First Instance for one dis-
115
VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 115

United States vs. Lim Kiu Eng.
trict to be transferred to another district or to enable the

judge of the Court of First Instance of one district to hold
sessions in a different district, it being sufficient that the
Legislature so provide. And this is the clearest
demonstration that the Supreme Court and the Courts of
First Instance do not, as petitioner's counsel have
maintained in their brief, have the same status from the
constitutional point of view,
In conclusion, since Act No. 2347 of the Legislature,
whereby the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance
of these Islands was provided for, is not illegal and null and
void, and the said courts are legally constituted by virtue of
said reorganization, the Honorable Judge Isidro Paredes
had jurisdiction to try and sentence the petitioner,
Eustaquio Conchada, for the crime of murder and to order,
as he did, the imprisonment of said defendant by virtue of
the sentence imposed upon him.
It is therefore held that there is no ground for issuing to
the Director of Prisions the writ of habeas corpus applied
for by counsel for said petitioner. So ordered.
Torres and Johnson, JJ., concur.

Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur in the result.
Writ denied.
_______________
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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 031 16/06/2019, 10)58 PM

[No. 10292. March 31, 1915.]

EUSTAQUIO CONCHADA, petitioner, vs. THE

1. COURTS; NATURE AND SOURCE OF JUDICIAL

2. ID.; ID.; APPROVAL OF CONGRESS.·The Congress of the

3. ID.; ID.; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE NOT

VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 95

Conchada vs. Director of Prisons.

come to be the constitution of said Islands. The fact that the

4. ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS BY ACT

5. ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS BY ACT

3, p. 743, ed. 1875.) If this be jurisdiction, the increase in

6. ID,; ID.; TERRITORY WHEREIN JURISDICTION is

96 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Conchada vs. Director of Prisons.

above, for there can be no doubt that in said section 9 the

7. ID.; ID.; ACT No. 2347 HAS NOT ABOLISHED THE

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Habeas

On May 19, 1914, the provincial fiscal charged Eustaquio

VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 97

sentenced on September 23 of that year, 1914, by the same

98 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

which had exclusive jurisdiction, as established by the

"1. The Philippine Legislature has no authority to limit

legally constituted and the judges appointed by

VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 99

These five propositions rest upon the following hypotheses:

1. That the courts created by the Organic Act, or the

From these hypotheses said counsel for the petitioner, after

organization of the courts of justice in the Philippine

100 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

of the Philippine Islands in which civil government shall be

Instance, section 55 of said Act says that it shall be of two

VOL. 31. MARCH 31. 1915. 101

for that which existed when, by virtue of the treaty of

Senate, and shall receive the compensation heretof ore

102 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

approved and confirmed it, leaving- it as it had been

laws.'' (Escriche, Diccionario de Legislación y

VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 103

mining rules of action or use, and exacting penalties; the

change the practice and method of procedure; but in no way

104 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

courts, that the establishment by the Philippine

VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 105

From all of the foregoing it necessarily follows that the

manner that the Philippine Legislature cannot act with

106 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

should include only the Province of Tayabas, which, with

VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 107

perform the acts specified in some of those sections. This is

to deciding the cases arising thereunder shall be the same

108 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

same thing, has reorganized the Courts of First Instance of

upon them from the time of their creation.

VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 109

territory into a greater number of districts and the

assignment to each district of different provinces·in some

110 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

and taking from him the territory which constitutes his

VOL. 31, MARCH 31, 1915. 111

mentioned, the legislature of the State of Illinois on

Philippines, Is there any provision which fixes or indicates