LLora vs Drilon GR 82895

private respondent Primitivo V. Alviar began his employment with petitioner Llora
Motors, Inc. As a truck driver. At the time he stopped working, Mr. Alviar was 65 Years
of age.

private respondent Alviar filed with NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch a complaint for
"Separation Pay and Non-Payment of Daily Wages" against petitioners Llora Motors. Mr.
Alviar claimed entitlement to, among other things, retirement benefits. The complaint
was opposed by petitioners alleged that all of the employment benefits claimed by
private respondent had already been fully paid. On the matter of retirement benefits, it
was contended that Mr. Alviar had not been dismissed by Llora Motors, but that Alviar
showed utter lack of interest in his work and would be absent for no apparent reason.

respondent Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, order the respondents to pay

complainants Alviar. An appeal was subsequently interposed with public respondent
NLRC, but affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue:

It is urged by petitioners that the award of retirement benefits to private respondent

Alviar is improper, there being no contractual or statutory basis for such award.

Held:

There was in the instant case no consensual basis for the required payment of
additional retirement benefits. Pointing to the fact that there was no collective
bargaining agreement or other contractual basis or any "established employer policy"
that contemplated the grant of such retirement benefits.

The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had not declared private respondent Alviar to have
been illegally dismissed by petitioners. Under these circumstances, the Labor Arbiter's
award which required petitioners to pay an amount equivalent to a half month's pay for
every year of service of Mr. Alviar cannot be justified either as (additional) retirement
benefits or as termination pay.

There was some confusion in the mind of the Labor Arbiter in the case at bar between
"termination pay" and "retirement benefits" would seem entirely possible: private
respondent Alviar initially asked for "separation pay" and the Labor Arbiter awarded
him "retirement benefits."
MLQU vs NLRC GR 141673

Noemi B. Juat, now 68 years of age, worked for almost twenty nine (29) years and
started as a part-time instructor of the petitioner until her compulsory retirement.
MLQU President informed in writing private respondent Juat that she was eligible for
retirement. However, the retirement of private respondent was deferred because she
was still given teaching load for school year. She received another letter from President
Dizon informing her that she was considered compulsorily retired effective at the end of
second semester of school year 1993-1994 pursuant to the Retirement Plan. A letter
was sent by private respondent to petition inquiring the amount of retirement benefits
due to her. Private respondent Juat received, under protest, the two installments of her
retirement pay.

Believing that she was entitled to a higher amount of retirement benefits, private
respondent engaged the services of the University of the Philippines, Office of Legal Aid
to prosecute her claim for deficiency. Petitioner replied, alleging that private respondent
was not entitled to receive retirement benefits as she was only a part-time employee of
MLQU, much less to the payment of deficiency.

Issue:
Whether respondents are entitled to the retirement benefits provided for under RA
7641, even if the petitioner has an existing valid retirement plan.

Held:

Yes, The law, RA 7641, intends to give the minimum retirement benefits to employees
not entitled thereto under collective bargaining and other agreement

PAL vs ALPAP GR 143686

Facts:

Claiming that PAL committed unfair labor practice, ALPAP filed a notice of strike against
PAL. Despite reminders to the parties prohibiting all strikes and lockouts at PAL, ALPAP
went on strike on June 5, 1998. The DOLE issued a return-to-work order on June 7,
1998. However it was only on June 26, 1998 when ALPAP officers and members
reported back to work as shown in a logbook signed by each of them. As a consequence,
PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their failure to comply immediately with
the return-to-work order. On June 29, 1998, ALPAP files a complaint for illegal lockout.
On June 1, 1999, the DOLE Resolution declared the June 5, 1998 strike as illegal and
pronounced the loss of employment status of ALPAP’s officers and members who
participated in the strike in defiance of the June 7, 1998 return-to-work order.

Issue:
Whether all of ALPAP’s officers and members are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE
Resolution for participating in an illegal strike and for defying the DOLE return-to-work
order?

Held: No, only the returning pilots are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution. A
review of the records reveals that the DOLE Secretary declared the ALPAP officers and
members to have lost their employment status based on either of two grounds, viz: their
participation in the illegal strike on June 5, 1998 or their defiance of the return-to-work
order of the DOLE Secretary. The records of the case unveil the names of each of these
returning pilots. The logbook with the heading "Return To Work Compliance/
Returnees" bears their individual signature signifying their conformity that they were
among those workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the deadline
imposed by DOLE. From this crucial and vital piece of evidence, it is apparent that each
of these pilots is bound by the judgment. Besides, the complaint for illegal lockout was
filed on behalf of all these returnees. Thus, a finding that there was no illegal lockout
would be enforceable against them. In fine, only those returning pilots, irrespective of
whether they comprise the entire membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999
DOLE Resolution.

Postigo vs Phil Tuberculosis Society 479 SCRA 628

Petitioners Dr. Perla A. Postigo, et al., were regular employees of the respondent
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTSI). Upon retirement from service, some of the
petitioners who were compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) obtained retirement benefits from the GSIS.

At the time the petitioners retired, Article 287 of the Labor Code had been amended by
RA 7641. RA 7641 granted retirement pay to qualified employees in the private sector,
in the absence of any retirement plan or agreement with the company. As the
respondent did not have a retirement plan for its employees, aside from its contribution
to the GSIS, petitioners claimed from the respondent their retirement benefits under RA
7641. The respondent denied their claims on the ground that the accommodation
extended by the GSIS to the petitioners removed them from the coverage of the law.

Labor Arbiter declared petitioners entitled to retirement benefits under RA 7641.

Respondent PTSI appealed to the NLRC. NLRC dismissed the appeal for failure to post
the required cash or surety bond.

Issue:

Are the petitioners entitled to benefits under Rep. Act No. 7641?

Held:

Employees of GOCCs with special charters are covered under the Civil Service. On the
other hand, employees of GOCCs under the Corporation Code are governed by the
provisions of the Labor Code. The Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTSI) belongs to
the latter category. Respondent is a non-profit but private corporation organized under
the Corporation Code, and the petitioners are covered by the Labor Code and not by the
Civil Service Law. Petitioners are employees in the private sector, hence entitled to the
benefits of RA 7641.

The accommodation under RA 1820 extending GSIS coverage to PTSI employees did not
take away from petitioners the beneficial coverage afforded by RA 7641. Hence, the
retirement pay payable under Article 287 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 7641
should be considered apart from the retirement benefit claimable by the petitioners
under the social security law or, as in this case, the GSIS law.

Razon vs NLRC 185 SCRA 44

Facts:

private respondent had been employed by petitioner company then known as E. Razon,
Inc. Sometime in 1979, Alfredo Romualdez, the youngest brother of the then First Lady,
Imelda R. Marcos, acquired control of E. Razon, Inc. and renamed it Metroport Services,
Inc. After the February Revolution, petitioners regained control of the company. because
of failing health and having qualified for compulsory retirement at age 65, private
respondent, then the company's chief accountant, submitted a letter request for
retirement. Petitioners withheld action on said request pending completion of audit.
In the course of such audit, petitioners discovered that several books of account
allegedly in the custody of private respondent as chief accountant were missing.
Petitioner Enrique Razon, Jr. issued a memorandum terminating the services of private
respondent on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.

Acting on private respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal and unpaid retirement
benefits, the Labor Arbiter ordered respondent Metro Services to pay complainant of
retirement benefits. On appeal, the NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter. Hence, the instant
petition.

Held:

Having rendered twenty years of service with Metroport Services, Inc., it can be said
that private respondent has already acquired a vested right to the retirement fund, a
right which can only be withheld upon a clear showing of good and compelling reasons.

They abruptly dismissed him without giving him a chance to explain his side. In short,
there was not the slightest pretense at fair play. Had petitioners been less hasty and
conducted an investigation, they would have found out that a fire gutted the western
portion of petitioners' warehouse, destroying records, books, vouchers and general
ledgers. The circumstances surrounding the fire were duly investigated and reported to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

The resulting dismissal of private respondent was in itself marked by arbitrariness and
lack of due process. Petitioners cannot now be allowed to use that as their legal excuse
for denying the employee's legitimate claim for retirement pay.

In further support of their refusal to give private respondent his retirement benefits,
petitioners argued that the discharged employee impliedly withdrew his intention to
retire when he joined Marina Port Services, Inc. The fact that private respondent sought
employment elsewhere should not hinder him from claiming his retirement benefits. It
is an inexorable fact that at 65 years, he reached the mandatory age for retirement and,
therefore, qualified to retire.

Capili vs NLRC 273 SCRA 576

Jaculbe vs Siliman University 518 SCRA 445

FACTS:
Alpha C. Jaculbe is employed in Siliman University’s Medical Center as a nurse since
1958. In 1992, Jaculbe was informed of her mandatory retirement as per the unversity’s
retirement plan formulated sometime in 1970 that its employees will be automatically
retired upon reaching the age of 65 or after 35 years of uninterrupted service to the
university. Her retirement is due a year after the notice.
Jaculbe filed with the NLRC a Complaint for Termination of Service with Preliminary
Injunction or Restraining Order. The Labor Arbiter found the University guilty of illegal
dismissal and ordered it to reinstate Jaculbe and to pay the latter full backwages.

The university appealed from the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. The NLRC
reversed the decision of the LA for lack of merit. Later, the CA also affirmed the decision
of the NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the compulsory retirement imposed by the university through its
retirement plan for its employees is against the security of tenure clause in the 1987
Constitution, and is thereby, in the form of an illegal dismissal.

HELD:
Yes. Anent the provisions of the Labor Code, it is not per se illegal for employers to retire
its employees below the age of 65 if it is pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
or other applicable retirement contracts between the employer and the employee.

RATIO:
The retirement plan came into being in 1970 or 12 years after petitioner started
working for university. In short, it was not part of the terms of employment to which
petitioner agreed when she started working for the University.

Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between
the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age agrees to
sever his or her employment with the former. … The truth was that petitioner had no
choice but to participate in the plan, given that the only way she could refrain from
doing so was to resign or lose her job.

It is axiomatic that employer and employee do not stand on equal footing, a situation
which often causes an employee to act out of need instead of any genuine acquiescence
to the employer. This was clearly just such an instance. … an employer is free to impose
a retirement age less than 65 for as long as it has the employees’ consent … having
terminated petitioner solely on the basis of a provision of a retirement plan which was
not freely assented to by her, respondent was guilty of illegal dismissal.

Cercado vs UNIPROM

FACTS:

Petitioner Lourdes A. Cercado (Cercado) started working for respondent UNIPROM, Inc.
(UNIPROM) on December 15, 1978 as a ticket seller assigned at Fiesta Carnival, Araneta
Center, Quezon City. Later on, she was promoted as cashier and then as clerk typist.

On April 1, 1980, UNIPROM instituted an Employees Non-Contributory Retirement Plan

which provides that any participant with twenty (20) years of service, regardless of age,
may be retired at his option or at the option of the company.

On January 1, 2001, UNIPROM amended the retirement plan in compliance with

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7641. Under the revised retirement plan, UNIPROM reserved the
option to retire employees who were qualified to retire under the program.

Sometime in December 2000, UNIPROM implemented a company-wide early retirement

program for its 41 employees, including herein petitioner, who, at that time, was 47
years old, with 22 years of continuous service to the company. She was offered an early
retirement package amounting toP171,982.90, but she rejected the same.

UNIPROM exercised its option under the retirement plan, and decided to retire Cercado
effective at the end of business hours on February 15, 2001. A check of even date in the
amount ofP100,811.70, representing her retirement benefits under the regular
retirement package, was issued to her. Cercado refused to accept the check.

UNIPROM nonetheless pursued its decision and Cercado was no longer given any work
assignment after February 15, 2001. This prompted Cercado to file a complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter (LA), alleging, among others, that UNIPROM
did not have a bona fide retirement plan, and that even if there was, she did not consent
thereto.

For its part, respondent UNIPROM averred that Cercado was automatically covered by
the retirement plan when she agreed to the companys rules and regulations, and that
her retirement from service was a valid exercise of a management prerogative.

The LA rendered a decisionfinding petitioner to be illegally dismissed. Respondent

company was ordered to reinstate her with payment of full backwages.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the LAs decision, adding
that there was no evidence that Cercado consented to the alleged retirement plan of
UNIPROM or that she was notified thereof.

On certiorari, the CA set aside the decisions of the LA and the NLRC.Cercado moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the instant recourse. ISSUES:

[1] Whether UNIPROM has a bona fide retirement plan; and,[2] Whether petitioner was
validly retired pursuant thereto.

HELD:

LABOR LAW

Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between
the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees
to sever his or her employment with the former.

Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7641, pegs the age for
compulsory retirement at 65 years, while the minimum age for optional retirement is
set at 60 years. An employer is, however, free to impose a retirement age earlier than
the foregoing mandates. This has been upheld in numerous cases as a valid exercise of
management prerogative.

In this case, petitioner was retired by UNIPROM at the age of 47, after having served the
company for 22 years, pursuant to UNIPROMsEmployees Non-Contributory Retirement
Plan, which provides that employees who have rendered at least 20 years of service may
be retired at the option of the company. At first blush, respondents retirement plan can
be expediently stamped with validity and justified under the all encompassing phrase
management prerogative, which is what the CA did. But the attendant circumstances in
this case, vis-vis the factual milieu of the string of jurisprudence on this matter, impel us
to take a deeper look.

In Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court upheld the retirement of private
respondent pursuant to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) allowing Pantranco to
compulsorily retire employees upon completing 25 years of service to the company.
Interpreting Article 287, the Court ruled that the Labor Code permits employers and
employees to fix the applicable retirement age lower than 60 years of age. The Court
also held that there was no illegal dismissal involved, since it was the CBA itself that
incorporated the agreement between the employer and the bargaining agent with
respect to the terms and conditions of employment. Hence, when the private
respondent ratified the CBA, he concurrently agreed to conform to and abide by its
provisions. Thus, the Court stressed, "providing in a CBA for compulsory retirement of
employees after twenty- five (25) years of service is legal and enforceable so long as the
parties agree to be governed by such CBA."

Similarly, in Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) v. Airline Pilots Association of the

Philippines(APAP), the retirement plan contained in the CBA between PAL and APAP
was declared valid. The Court explained that by their acceptance of the CBA, APAP and
its members are obliged to abide by the commitments and limitations they had agreed
to cede to management.

It is axiomatic that a retirement plan giving the employer the option to retire its
employees below the ages provided by law must be assented to and accepted by the
latter, otherwise, its adhesive imposition will amount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law.

In the above-discussed cases, the retirement plans in issue were the result of
negotiations and eventual agreement between the employer and the employees. The
plan was either embodied in a CBA, or established after consultations and negotiations
with the employees bargaining representative. The consent of the employees to be
retired even before the statutory retirement age of 65 years was thus clear and
unequivocal.

Unfortunately, no similar situation obtains in the present case. In fact, not even an iota
of voluntary acquiescence to UNIPROMs early retirement age option is attributable to
petitioner.

The assailed retirement plan of UNIPROM is not embodied in a CBA or in any

employment contract or agreement assented to by petitioner and her co-employees. On
the contrary, UNIPROMs Employees Non-Contributory Retirement Plan was unilaterally
and compulsorily imposed on them. This is evident in the provisions of the 1980
retirement plan and its amended version in 2000:

ARTICLE IIIELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION

Section 1. Any regular employee, as of the Effective Date, shall automatically become a
Participant in the Plan, provided the Employee was hired below age 60.

Verily, petitioner was forced to participate in the plan, and the only way she could have
rejected the same was to resign or lose her job. The assailed CA Decision did not really
make a finding that petitioner actually accepted and consented to the plan. The CA
simply declared that petitioner was deemed aware of the retirement plan on account of
the length of her employment with respondent. Implied knowledge, regardless of
duration, cannot equate to the voluntary acceptance required by law in granting an
early retirement age option to an employer. The law demands more than a passive
acquiescence on the part of employees, considering that an employers early retirement
age option involves a concession of the formers constitutional right to security of
tenure.

We reiterate the well-established meaning of retirement in this jurisdiction: Retirement

is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the
employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to
sever his or her employment with the former.

Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be explicit,

voluntary, free, and uncompelled. While an employer may unilaterally retire an
employee earlier than the legally permissible ages under the Labor Code, this
prerogative must be exercised pursuant to a mutually instituted early retirement plan.
In other words, only the implementation and execution of the option may be unilateral,
but not the adoption and institution of the retirement plan containing such option. For
the option to be valid, the retirement plan containing it must be voluntarily assented to
by the employees or at least by a majority of them through a bargaining representative.

We disagree with the CAs conclusion that the retirement plan is part of petitioners
employment contract with respondent. It must be underscored that petitioner was
hired in 1978 or 2 years before the institution of UNIPROMs retirement plan in 1980.
Logically, her employment contract did not include the retirement plan, much less the
early retirement age option contained therein.

We also cannot subscribe to respondents submission that petitioners consent to the

retirement plan may be inferred from her signature in the personnel action forms
containing the phrase: Employee hereby expressly acknowledges receipt of and
undertakes to abide by the provisions of his/her Job Description, Company Code of
Conduct and such other policies, guidelines, rules and regulations the company may
prescribe.

It should be noted that the personnel action forms relate to the increase in petitioners
salary at various periodic intervals. To conclude that her acceptance of the salary
increases was also, simultaneously, a concurrence to the retirement plan would be
tantamount to compelling her to agree to the latter. Moreover, voluntary and equivocal
acceptance by an employee of an early retirement age option in a retirement plan
necessarily connotes that her consent specifically refers to the plan or that she has at
least read the same when she affixed her conformity thereto.

Hence, consistent with the Courts ruling in Jaculbe, having terminated petitioner merely
on the basis of a provision in the retirement plan which was not freely assented to by
her, UNIPROM is guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioner is thus entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and to full backwages computed from the time of her
illegal dismissal in February 16, 2001 until the actual date of her reinstatement. If
reinstatement is no longer possible because the position that petitioner held no longer
exists, UNIPROM shall pay backwages as computed above, plus, in lieu of reinstatement,
separation pay equivalent to one-month pay for every year of service. This is consistent
with the preponderance of jurisprudence relative to the award of separation pay in case
reinstatement is no longer feasible.

GRANTED

Cainta Catholic School vs CCSEU May 4, 2006

FACTS

On 15 October 1993, petitioner school retired Llagas and Javier, President and Vice-
president of respondent union, respectively, who had rendered more than twenty (20)
years of continuous service, pursuant to Section 2, Article X of the CBA, to wit:

An employee may be retired, either upon application by the employee himself or by the
decision of the Director of the School, upon reaching the age of sixty (60) or after
having rendered at least twenty (20) years of service to the School the last three (3)
years of which must be continuous.

Because of the foregoing, the union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB and later
staged a strike and picketed in the school’s entrance. Later, the union filed a complaint
for unfair labor practice against petitioner school before the NLRC.

The School avers that the retirement of Llagas and Javier was clearly in accordance with
a specific right granted under the CBA. The School justifies its actions by invoking our
rulings in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC and Bulletin Publishing Corporation v.
Sanchez that no unfair labor practice is committed by management if the retirement
was made in accord with management prerogative or in case of voluntary retirement,
upon approval of management.

The Union, on the other hand, argues that the retirement of the two union officers is a
mere subterfuge to bust the union.

ISSUE

Whether or not the retirement of Llagas and Javier is legal.

HELD

The SC held that the termination of employment of Llagas and Javier was valid, arising
as it did from a management prerogative granted by the mutually-negotiated CBA
between the School and the Union.

Pursuant to the existing CBA, the School has the option to retire an employee upon
reaching the age limit of sixty (60) or after having rendered at least twenty (20) years of
service to the School, the last three (3) years of which must be continuous. Retirement is
different specie of termination of employment from dismissal for just or authorized
causes under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code. While in all three cases, the
employee to be terminated may be unwilling to part from service, there are eminently
higher standards to be met by the employer validly exercising the prerogative to dismiss
for just or authorized causes. In those two instances, it is indispensable that the
employer establish the existence of just or authorized causes for dismissal as spelled
out in the Labor Code. Retirement, on the other hand, is the result of a bilateral act of
the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee whereby
the latter after reaching a certain age agrees and/or consents to sever his employment
with the former.

Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended, governs retirement of employees, stating:

ART. 287. Retirement. – Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement
age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment
contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement
benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining
agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee’s retirement
benefits under any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements shall not be
less than those provided herein.
 In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement
benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty
(60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the
compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said
establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least
one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6)
months being considered as one whole year.

By their acceptance of the CBA, the Union and its members are obliged to abide by the
commitments and limitations they had agreed to cede to management. The questioned
retirement provisions cannot be deemed as an imposition foisted on the Union, which
very well had the right to have refused to agree to allowing management to retire retire
employees with at least 20 years of service.

It should not be taken to mean that retirement provisions agreed upon in the CBA are
absolutely beyond the ambit of judicial review and nullification. A CBA, as a labor
contract, is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest. If the
retirement provisions in the CBA run contrary to law, public morals, or public policy,
such provisions may very well be voided. Certainly, a CBA provision or employment
contract that would allow management to subvert security of tenure and allow it to
unilaterally “retire” employees after one month of service cannot be upheld. Neither will
the Court sustain a retirement clause that entitles the retiring employee to benefits less
than what is guaranteed under Article 287 of the Labor Code, pursuant to the
provision’s express proviso thereto in the provision.

Yet the CBA in the case at bar contains no such infirmities which must be stricken down.
Twenty years is a more than ideal length of service an employee can render to one
employer. Under ordinary contemplation, a CBA provision entitling an employee to
retire after 20 years of service and accordingly collect retirement benefits is “reward for
services rendered since it enables an employee to reap the fruits of his labor —
particularly retirement benefits, whether lump-sum or otherwise — at an earlier age,
when said employee, in presumably better physical and mental condition, can enjoy
them better and longer.”

A CBA may validly accord management the prerogative to optionally retire an employee
under the terms and conditions mutually agreed upon by management and the
bargaining union, even if such agreement allows for retirement at an age lower than the
optional retirement age or the compulsory retirement age.

Petition is granted.
Pantranco North Express Inc vs NLRC 259 SCRA 161
Private respondent was hired by petitioner in 1964 as a bus conductor. He eventually
joined the Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO. He continued in petitioner's
employ until August 12, 1989, when he was retired at the age of fifty-two (52) after
having rendered twenty five years' service. The basis of his retirement was the
compulsory retirement provision of the collective bargaining agreement between the
petitioner and the aforenamed union.

Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. Labor
Arbiter rendered his decision in favor of private respondent.

Petitioner appealed to public respondent, which issued the questioned Resolution

affirming the labor arbiter's decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the CBA stipulation on compulsory retirement after twenty-five years of

service is legal and enforceable. If it is, private respondent has been validly retired.
Otherwise, petitioner is guilty of illegal dismissal.

Held:

Art. 287 of the Labor Code as worded permits employers and employees to fix the
applicable retirement age at below 60 years. Moreover, providing for early retirement
does not constitute diminution of benefits. In almost all countries today, early
retirement, i.e., before age 60, is considered a reward for services rendered since it
enables an employee to reap the fruits of his labor particularly retirement benefits,
whether lump-sum or otherwise at an earlier age, when said employee, in presumably
better physical and mental condition, can enjoy them better and longer.

Capitol Wireless vs Confesor 264 SCRA 68

Petitioner Capitol Wireless, Inc., and respondent Kilusang Manggagawa ng Capwire

KMC-NAFLU (Union) entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on respondent Secretary of Labor for

holding that it failed to accord due process to the dismissed employees; in not applying
and, in awarding retirement benefits beyond those granted by R.A. 7641.

R&E Transport Inc vs Latag GR 155214, Feb 13, 2004

Facts: Pedro Latag was a regular employee of La Mallorca Taxi since March 1, 1961.
When La Mallorca ceased from business operations, Latag transferred to R & E
Transport, Inc. He was receiving an average daily salary of five hundred pesos (P500.00)
as a taxi driver. Latag got sick in January 1995 and was forced to apply for partial
disability with the SSS, which was granted. When he recovered, he reported for work in
September 1998 but was no longer allowed to continue working on account of his old
age. Latag thus asked Felix Fabros, the administrative officer of [petitioners], for his
retirement pay pursuant to Republic Act 7641 but he was ignored.

Thus, on December 21, 1998, Latagfiled a case for payment of his retirement pay before
the NLRC. Latag however died on April 30, 1999. Subsequently, his wife, Avelina Latag,
substituted him. On January 10, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
Latag.

Issue: Whether or not Latag is entitled to retirement benefits considering she signed a
waiver of quitclaim.

Ruling: The respondent is entitled to retirement benefits despite of the waiver of

quitclaims. There is no dispute the fact that the late Pedro M. Latag is entitled to
retirement benefits. Rather, the bone of contention is the number of years that he
should be credited with in computing those benefits. The findings of the NLRC that
Pedro must be credited only with his service to R & E Transport, Inc., because the
evidence shows that the aforementioned companies are two different entities. After a
careful and painstaking review of the evidence on record, the court supports the NLRC's
findings.

As to the Quitclaim and Waiver signed by Respondent Latag, the CA committed no error
when it ruled that the document was invalid and could not bar her from demanding the
benefits legally due her husband. This is not say that all quitclaims are invalid per se.
Courts, however, are wary of schemes that frustrate workers' rights and benefits, and
look with disfavor upon quitclaims and waivers that bargain these away.

Undisputably, Pedro M. Latag was credited with 14 years of service with R & E
Transport, Inc. Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7641, 30
provides: Retirement. — In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for
retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the
age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby
declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in said
establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least
one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6)
months being considered as one whole year. Unless the parties provide for broader
inclusions, the term one half-month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth
(1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of
service incentive leaves

The rules implementing the New Retirement Law similarly provide the above-
mentioned formula for computing the one-half month salary. Since Pedro was paid
according to the "boundary" system, he is not entitled to the 13th month 32 and the
service incentive pay; hence, his retirement pay should be computed on the sole basis of
his salary.

It is accepted that taxi drivers do not receive fixed wages, but retain only those sums in
excess of the "boundary" or fee they pay to the owners or operators of their vehicles.
Thus, the basis for computing their benefits should be the average daily income. In this
case, the CA found that Pedro was earning an average of five hundred pesos (P500) per
day. We thus compute his retirement pay as follows: P500 x 15 days x 14 years of
service equals P105,000.

UE vs Minister of Labor GR 140007, July 31, 1989

FACTS:
 Labor and Employment directing the University of the East to pay the faculty
members concerned retirement benefits in accordance with their collective
bargaining agreement, in addition to the payment of separation pay according to the
Termination Pay Law.
 The then president of the University of the East (UE) announced the phase-out of the
College of Secretarial Education and the High School Department respectively on the
grounds of lack of economic viability and financial losses.
 The respondent UE Faculty Association opposed the phaseout, contending that such
action contravened the law because it constitutes union busting. The private
respondent filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
 BLR conducted several conciliation proceedings but when no amicable settlement
was reached, the respondent Minister issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the
case and directing the BLR to receive evidence in connection with the dispute.
 Respondent Minister of Labor ruled that the phaseout of the two departments was
arbitrary and ordered UE to pay all affected faculty members of the College
Secretarial Education and the High School Department a separation pay. In addition
to the termination pay, the University is likewise directed to pay retirement benefits
to all affected faculty members who, in accordance with the collective bargaining
agreement, are retireable prior to or at the time of the phase-out."
 Petitioner arguesns that the award of separation pay pursuant to the Termination
Pay Law necessarily excludes retirement benefits.
Issue: Whether the Minister of Labor and Employment committed grave abuse of
discretion in awarding both retirement benefits and separation pay to the faculty
members affected by the phase-out.

HELD: NO. We rule for the respondents.

Separation pay arising from a forced termination of employment and benefits given as a
contractual right due to many years of faithful service are not necessarily exclude each
other.

Clearly, the only situation contemplated in the CBA wherein an employee shall be
precluded from receiving retirement benefits is when said employee is not separated
from service but transferred instead from one college or department to another. There
is no provision to the effect that teachers who are forcibly dismissed are not entitled to
retirement benefits if the MOLE awards them separation pay. Furthermore, since the
above provision has become in effect part of the petitioner's policy, the same should be
enforced separately from the provisions of the Termination Pay Law.

Aquino vs NLRC GR 87653

Facts:
The petitioners were employees of private respondent Otis Elevator Company when
they were informed of the termination of their employment in line with the need of the
company "to streamline its operations, consolidate certain functions, reduce its
manpower and cut non-essential spending." The separate letters addressed to the
petitioners advised them that —

The separation pay was based on Section 4, Article VII of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the company and its employees providing thus:

All employees in the bargaining unit separated without cause shall be granted
separation pay of not less than one (1) month's latest basic rate for every year of service
subject to the existing provisions of the Retirement Plan.

Accordingly, petitioners were paid their separation pay, computed as follows:

Basic Salary Years in Service Separation Pay
Conrado M. Aquino P 4,300 22 P 94,600
Napoleon B. Aromin 10,350 22 227,700
Roberto A. Gaspan 3,800 19 72,200
Nicardo P. Blanquisco8,800 13 110,500

In justifying their subsequent demand for retirement benefits before the Labor Arbiter,
the petitioners invoked Section 1, Article XIV, of the CBA in relation to Section 5.2,
Article V, of the company's Retirement Plan, which provides:
5.2. A Participant who is terminated from employment and who has rendered at least
ten (10) years of service shall be entitled to receive in lump sum all or a portion of his
accrued benefit credits as of his date of termination, in accordance with the following
schedule:

Years of Service Upon Termination Vested Percentage of Benefit Credits

Less than 10 years
10 to less than 15 50%
15 to less than 20 75%
20 years and over 100%

They also cited the case of their co-employees Cleodeveo Soriano, Jr. and Patriciano
Destajo, Jr., whose services were terminated on the ground of redundancy in 1983 and
1982, respectively, and were both given separation pay and retirement benefits.

For its part, the respondent company argued that separation pay and retirement
benefits were mutually exclusive; hence, the petitioners could no longer claim the latter
after having received the former. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners.
However, NLRC reversed the said order contending that the case cited is is exceptional.

Separation pay is required in the cases enumerated in Articles 283 and 284 of the
Labor Code, which include retrenchment, and is computed at at least one month salary
or at the rate of one-half month salary for every year of service, whichever is higher. We
have held that it is a statutory right designed to provide the employee with the
wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment. Retirement
benefits, where not mandated by law, may be granted by agreement of the employees
and their employer or as a voluntary act on the part of the employer. Retirement
benefits are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life,
lessening the burden of worrying for his financial support, and are a form of reward for
his loyalty and service to the employer.

It is on the basis of these distinctions that the petitioners claim to be entitled not only to
the separation pay they have already received but also to the retirement benefits
provided for in the Retirement Plan of the respondent company.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are still entitled to the retirement benefits having
received their separation pay.

Ruling:
In the case of University of the East v. Minister of Labor, it was held that if there is no
provision contained in the collective bargaining agreement to the effect that benefits
received under the Termination Pay Law shall preclude the employee from receiving
other benefits from the agreement, then said employee is entitled to the benefits
embodied in the agreement in addition to whatever benefits are mandated by statute.
We have carefully examined the record, and particularly the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and the Retirement Plan, and have found no specific prohibition against the
payment of both benefits to the employee.

Guided by the principle that any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved
in its favor, pursuant to the social justice policy. The Court feels that if the private
respondent really intended to make the separation pay and the retirement benefits
mutually exclusive, it should have sought inclusion of the corresponding provision in the
Retirement Plan and the Collective Bargaining Agreement so as to remove all possible
ambiguity regarding this matter. It is presumed that the counsel of the respondent
company should have categorically provided in the CBA that the collection of retirement
benefits was prohibited if the employee had already received separation pay. Bargaining
is a process where the parties discuss their demands and counter-demands and, after
haggling, agree on what essentially a compromise reflecting the concessions mutually is
given by the parties to arrive at a common understanding. The resultant contract
provides for demandable rights, not withdrawable doles. When the employer signs a
collective bargaining agreement, it recognizes the rights of the workers and does not
merely concede certain privileges to them out of the goodness of its heart.

The private respondent asserts in its statement of facts that it gave the petitioners a
choice between accepting the separation pay and the retirement benefits and they
opted for the former. This is not borne by the record. In its letter advising the
petitioners of the termination of their services, the company merely informed them that
they would be given separation pay or retirement benefits, whichever was higher. The
petitioners received the separation pay because they felt they were entitled thereto but
they did not thereby waive their rights to the retirement benefits.

The point, however, is that the petitioners are entitled to this amount under the
provisions of the CBA and the Retirement Plan freely entered into by the parties. These
instruments are binding agreements, not being contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy, and must therefore be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent National Labor
Relations Board is REVERSED and a new judgment is hereby rendered directing the
payment