Vinci M.

Petilos Law 4-B Legal Counseling

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149. March 9, 2011

LYDIA A. BENANCILLO, complainant, vs. JUDGE VENANCIO J. AMILA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 3,
TAGBILARAN CITY, respondent.

Judges; Code of Judicial Conduct; Impropriety; Judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys and
other persons not [vested] with public trust.—The Code recognizes that even acts that are not per se improper can nevertheless be perceived
by the larger community as such. “Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys
and other persons not [vested] with public trust.” In this case, the respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and
the intervenors to a meeting inside his chambers.

FACTS:

A verified-Complaint was filed by complainant Lydia A. Benancillo charging respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila (Judge
Amila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Tagbilaran City with Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Procedure, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order, Partiality and Impropriety relative to Civil Case
entitled "Lydia A. Benancillo v. Paul John Belot," a Petition for Temporary Protection Order and Permanent Protection Order
under Republic Act No. 9262

The complainant, avers that herein respondent judge issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her live-in partner,
Paul John Belot (Belot). The TPO included a directive to Belot to turn over to her personal effects, including properties in their
diving business called the Underworld Diver’s Panglao, Inc. (Underworld). Belot sought the reconsideration of the issuance of
the TPO. Meanwhile, their business partners, filed a motion for intervention with respect to the properties of Underworld. The
complainant filed an opposition to the motion for intervention with prayer for preliminary injunction.

The complainant states that the respondent judge constantly ruled in her favor as he consistently held that the intervenors had
no legal personality in the case. However, the respondent judge refused to enforce the TPO.

The complainant claims that the respondent judge called her and her counsel to a meeting in his chambers. They agreed to the
meeting but they did not proceed when they learned that the intervenors were joining them. Subsequent to the respondent
judge’s meeting with the intervenors, he issued an order which rescinded his previous order. Thereafter, he denied the
complainant’s motion for reconsideration.

The complainant further observed that the respondent judge revoked his order without any motion being filed by any of the
parties. Moreover, it was based on an inexistent ground as the respondent judge mentioned in this Order a petition for
certiorari supposedly filed by Belot which had not yet been filed with the Court of Appeals.

The respondent judge claimed that the complainant was motivated by her insatiable greed to have exclusive control and
possession pending trial of the case of all the properties of the Underworld Divers Panglao, Inc. of respondent Paul John Belot.
He added that the complainant is only a live-in partner of respondent with no specific address who was branded repeatedly
by Belot as a ‘prostitute’ and one only after his money.

Issue: WON the respondent judge acted with impropriety in handling the instant case.

Ruling:

The respondent Judge acted inappropriately in calling the intervenors to a meeting in his chambers. It was also noted that he
used derogatory and irreverent language in presenting complainant in his Comment as an opportunist, a mistress in an
illegitimate relationship and that she was motivated by insatiable greed. As regards the charge for gross ignorance of the law,
the OCA noted that the same is premature considering that complainant filed before this Court a petition assailing the Orders
of respondent Judge.

Thus the respondent judge is found guilty of impropriety for the use of intemperate language and unbecoming conduct and
be FINED in the amount of ₱10,000.00 with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.

G.R. No. 202967. August 5, 2015

ALICIA Y. LAUREL, substituted by her sole heir and legal representative JUAN MIGUEL Y. LAUREL, petitioner, vs.
FERDINAND M. VARDELEON, respondent.

Judges; The unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes a
ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate.—For its part, the trial court was remiss in its duty to act on the two
pending motions before it. It appears that it did not even grant the parties the opportunity to comment respectively on these motions, and
instead simply summarily denied them in open court during the October 12, 2005 scheduled hearing. The trial court should be reminded
that “the unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes a
ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate.”

Facts:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for recovery of possession and ownership and/or quieting of title against respondent concerning
a 20,306-square meter island in Caticlan, Aklan. Respondent denied the material allegations in the complaint, claiming that he
bought the island from one Avelina Casimero, and that petitioner was guilty of laches in filing her claim
Petitioner was scheduled to present her evidence on three separate dates: September 7, 2005; October 12, 2005; and November
23, 2005. Previously, on August 1, 2005, respondent moved to correct the Pre-Trial Order, in order to reflect therein petitioner's
supposed admission made during pre-trial that she knew of respondent's possession of the subject property since 1975.
Petitioner opposed the same.

The trial court denied respondent's motion to correct the Pre-Trial Order. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but
the trial court did not act on the motion.

Petitioner's counsel moved to reset the schedule to any available date. The trial court, in a September 7, 2005 Order, granted
the motion provided that the petitioner defrays the transportation expenses as well as the appearance fee of respondent's
counsel. Petitioner moved to reconsider, but the court failed to act on the same.

During the scheduled October 12, 2005 hearing, petitioner was present, together with substitute counsel and her first witness.
Petitioner moved in open court to postpone trial on the ground that there are pending motions that have to be resolved, and
that the substitute lawyer had yet to confer with the witness, since her true counsel - who originally interviewed the witness -
was not present.

This time, the trial court denied: 1) the petitioner's oral motion to postpone trial; 2) the motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's September 7, 2005 Order directing her to defray respondent's counsel's transportation expenses and appearance fees;
and 3) the respondent's motion for reconsideration of the trial court's August 19, 2005 Order denying his motion to correct the
Pre-Trial Order. It likewise dismissed Civil Case No. 7249 on the ground of failure to prosecute on petitioner's part.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court denied the same. Hence, the dismissal of the complaint for
failure to prosecute as mentioned at the outset.

Issues: WON the honorable Court of Appeals and the court a quo committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioner's complaint for supposed failure to prosecute despite the fact that petitioner through her counsel had
actively participated in the proceedings in the court a quo and despite the fact that there was a pending unresolved motion
involving the pre-trial order.

Ruling:

The Petition must be granted.

This Court has said that "the fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is
chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the
part of the plaintiff to... prosecute."

To constitute failure to prosecute, his non-appearance must be equated with unwillingness to proceed with the trial as when
both plaintiff and counsel made: no appearance at all, or with the assumption that plaintiff has already lost interest in
prosecuting... his action, in the same way that should the ground for dismissal be delay, this delay or failure to proceed must
be for an unreasonable length of time beyond the reasonable allowance which by judicial leniency, litigant is normally
entitled.
Furthermore, while a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test of such power is whether, under
the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the
absence of a pattern or a scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement
of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.

The Court declares that the trial court erred in dismissing the Civil Case, and the appellate court should not have affirmed
such dismissal. Petitioner's actuations indicate that she was not at all unwilling to prosecute her case; nor can it be said that -
as the trial court puts it - she "refused" to present her evidence. Far from these, she was indeed more than eager to see her case
through. When she instituted Civil Case, petitioner was already eighty-one (81) years of age. Yet, despite her advanced age,
the record indicates that petitioner attended the scheduled hearing of October 12, 2005, together with her counsel and the first
witness - only that the lawyer who attended was a mere proxy, and not petitioner's true counsel who previously conferred
with the witness.

Postponements should not be allowed except on meritorious grounds, in light of the attendant circumstances. Deferment of
the proceedings may be allowed or tolerated especially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any
party. 'The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's
right to present evidence and either in the plaintiffs being non-suited or of the defendant's... being pronounced liable under an
ex-parte judgment' While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non-prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such
power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to... proceed with
reasonable promptitude.