CHAPTER 3

SALIENT FEATURES OF THE HARYAN URBAN

(CONTROL OF RENT AND EVICTION) ACT, 1973

Rental housing has certain inherent advantages from the

individual’s point of view, such as low initial investment and
greater flexibility for future tenure options. This makes it a more
preferred alternative for more mobile younger households, the
floating population and new migrants.72

The beginning of the Second World War brought a dual pressure to

bear on the urban housing stock in India. The demands of the
military increased the pressure on existing housing and wartime
shortages prevented an increase in supply. Purely as a temporary
measure, therefore, the British government introduced laws relating
to the control of rent and accommodation. But since then various
state governments extended the rent regulations to deal with the
special situation first arising out of migrations triggered by
partition of India, and then that influenced by industrialisation. So
though intended to deal with special conditions, rent control
became a permanent feature.

3.1Formation of the Act

Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 received
the assent of Governor of Haryana on 25th April, 1973 and first
published in Haryana Government Gazette (Extraordinary)
Legislative Supplement Part I of 27th April, 1973. The Haryana

72
Sundaram, P.S.A.,“Options for public and private sector collaboration on rental−housing
provision and management in India” UNCHS (1990).

75
Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 came into force on
the 27th of April, 1973.73
Though Haryana got the status of a state on 1st November, 1961,
The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 continued to
apply to Haryana till 1973 when the Haryana Urban (Control of
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 came into force.

3.2Extent and application of the Act

3.2.1 Urban Area
An urban area is characterized by higher population density and
vast human features in comparison to the areas surrounding it.
Urban areas may be cities, towns or conurbations, but the term is
not commonly extended to rural settlements such
as villages and hamlets.74
Urban areas are created and further developed by the process
of urbanization. Measuring the extent of an urban area helps in
analyzing population density and urban sprawl, and in determining
urban and rural populations.75
For the Census of India 2011, the definition of urban area is as
follows:
1. All places with a municipality, corporation, cantonment board or
notified town area committee, etc.
2. All other places which satisfied the following criteria:
1. A minimum population of 5,000;
2. At least 75% of the male main working population
engaged in non agricultural pursuits; and

73
J.G Kohli v. The Financial Commissioner, AIR 1976 PH 107.
74
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urban_area (visited on 15-07-2013).
75
Ibid.

76
 3. A density of population of at least 400 persons per sq.
km.76

Section 1(2) of the Act covers within its ambit urban areas as
defined under section 2(i)77 of the Act.

3.2.2 Cantonment Area

Prior to the enactment of Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1973 the earlier Act (The East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949) applied to non-residential accommodation in
cantonment area within Haryana but exempted only residential
accommodation in cantonment area. But the Haryana Urban
(Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 has done away with this
distinction and exempted from its purview all accommodations
whether residential or non-residential lying within the limits of
cantonment area.
A look at the other rent legislations reveals that cantonment areas
are regulated by the relevant state rent acts whether in Delhi or in
Himachal Pradesh.

3.2.3 Newly Constructed Buildings

Under section 1(3)78 all buildings constructed on or after the
commencement of Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1973 are exempted for a period of ten years from the

76
Ibid.
77
“urban area” means any area administered by a municipal committee, a notified area
committee, Faridabad Complex Administration or any area declared by the State Government
by notification to be urban area for the purpose of this Act.
78
Substituted by section 2 of Haryana Amendment Act No. 16 of 1978.

77
provisions of this act. The exemption shall be computed from the
day of the completion of the building.

ISSUES
3.2.3.1 Whether exemption for a period of ten years
is arbitrary and has the effect of taking away vested
right of the tenant?

Numerous writ petitions were filed before the Apex Court

challenging the validity of this amended provision. Accordingly all
these writ petitions were bunched together and disposed of by a
common judgment in the case of Mohinder Kumar and Others v.
State of Haryana and Another79
The validity was challenged mainly on the following grounds:
(1) The provision is arbitrary and is violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
(2) In any event insofar as this provision operates retrospectively
and seeks to take away the vested rights of the petitioner under the
Act, prior to this amendment, the same must be held to be illegal
and invalid.
The argument advanced by the petitioners was that this provision
seeks to make an unjust distinction between buildings constructed
before the commencement of this Act and buildings the
construction of which was completed on or after the
commencement of this Act and on the basis of this invidious
distinction this provision discriminates between the landlords and
tenants of buildings constructed before the Act and after the Act.

79
1986 AIR (SC) 244: 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 859: 1985 (4) SCC 221.

78
That on the basis of this distinction between buildings constructed
before and after the commencement of the Act, a landlord enjoys in
case of the buildings construction of which is completed on or after
the commencement of the Act an exemption from the operation of
the Act and the tenant in respect of such building is denied the
protection and the benefits of the Act for a period of 10 years from
the date of completion of the construction of the building, whereas
the landlord of any building constructed before the commencement
of the Act does not enjoy any such exemption and the tenant of
such building enjoys the protection and all the benefits of the Act.
That this discrimination between one class of landlords and their
tenants and the other class of landlords and their tenants on the
basis of the time of completion of the buildings is clearly arbitrary
and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The submission
was that Rent Control Legislation was enacted for the purpose of
affording protection to the tenants. It was further contended that
this classification of buildings on the basis of the time of
completion of construction has no reasonable nexus with the object
to be achieved and may on the contrary frustrate the purpose for
which the Act has been passed inasmuch as in respect of the
buildings the construction of which was completed on or after the
commencement of the Act, the tenants are denied the entire benefit
and protection of the Act. It was argued that there can be no
rational basis in fixing the period of the completion of the building
with reference to the date of commencement of the Act and also in
prescribing a period of 10 years for exemption from the operation
of the Act for the buildings, the construction of which was
completed on or after the commencement of the Act. This

79
discrimination, it is submitted, is arbitrary and violative of Article
14 of the Constitution.
Another contention was that the amended provision has been given
retrospective effect inasmuch as the amendment which was
introduced in 1978 has been made applicable to any building
construction of which was completed on or after the date of
commencement of the Act in 1973 and the retrospective operation
of the Act has the effect of taking away the vested right of the
tenant and must, therefore, be held to be illegal and bad. It was
argued that Section 1(3) of the Act, as originally enacted, was void
and unconstitutional inasmuch as no period of exemption of any
building which may qualify for exemption had been fixed and it is
well settled that an indefinite or unlimited immunity to any
building from the purview of the Act is arbitrary and
unconstitutional. The argument is that as the original provision
contained in Section 1(3) of the Act, prior to its amendment was
void and unconstitutional no building enjoyed any exemption from
the operation of the Act and tenants of the buildings were entitled
to the protection and the benefit of the Act and had acquired a
vested right to be governed by the provision of the Act. It is
submitted that this vested right of the tenants is sought to be
interfered with by the amended Section 1(3) which has been made
applicable to all the buildings construction of which was completed
on or after the date of commencement of the Act.
The Honorable Supreme court negatived both the contentions and
held with reasons:
The exemption for a period of 10 years from the operation of the
Act allowed to buildings, the construction of which commenced or
was completed on or after the date of commencement of the Act, is

80
fair and reasonable. It is for a definite period and that period of
exemption cannot be considered to be too long; and this exemption,
the Legislature may be of the view, will serve the purpose of
encouraging the construction of new buildings. It is for the
Legislature to decide the period of exemption that may be allowed
and to fix the date from which the period of exemption should run.
This ordinarily be a matter of legislative policy and this Court will
not normally interfere unless the Court is of the opinion that the
period of exemption or the date from which the exemption is to
operate is unreasonable and arbitrary. The classification of
buildings with reference to the date of commencement of the Act
namely, buildings constructed before the commencement of the
Act and buildings the construction of which was completed on or
after the date of the commencement of the Act, has a rational basis
and has a clear nexus with the object to be achieved. For the
purpose of achieving the object and encouraging the construction
of new houses with a view to ameliorate the hardship of the tenants
by removing the scarcity of accommodation, the classification of
the landlord and the tenant of a house constructed before the
commencement of the Act and the landlord and tenant of a house,
the construction of which commences or is completed on or after
the commencement of the Act, is clearly founded on an intelligible
differentia which has a rational relation to the object and this
classification does not result in any invidious discrimination
between the classes of landlords and tenants so classified. This
classification is not arbitrary and is not violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution.
The other contention that this provision must be held to be bad
inasmuch as this provision operates retrospectively and seeks to

81
take away the vested rights of the petitioners under the Act is
equally without any merit. The section on its proper construction
clearly indicates that the section is not retrospective in operation.
Merely because the buildings the construction of which
commenced or was completed after the date of commencement of
the Act in 1973, come within the purview of this particular
provision which was introduced by amendment in 1978, the
provision does not become retrospective. This provision operates
prospectively and becomes effective after its incorporation in the
Act by the amendment, though the buildings completed on or after
the commencement of this Act in 1973 are brought within the
scope of this section. The argument that the tenants have acquired a
vested right under the Act prior to its amendment is without any
substance. Prior to the amendment of Section 1(3) by the
Amending Act of 1978, the provision as it originally stood cannot
be said to have conferred any vested right on the tenants. The
provision, as it originally stood prior to its amendment, might not
have been constitutionally valid as the exemption sought to be
granted was for an indefinite period. That does not necessarily
imply that any vested right in any tenant was thereby created. The
right claimed is the right to be governed by the Act prior to its
amendment. If the Legislature had thought it fit to repeal the entire
Act, could the tenant have claimed any such right? Obviously, they
could not have: the question of acquiring any vested rights really
does not arise. Even if it could be said that the tenants had acquire
any right because of any invalidity of the earlier provision before
amendment it is always open to the Legislature to remove any
defect to make it valid. It is well settled that if any provision made
by the Legislature is found constitutionally invalid for some

82
lacunae or otherwise such provision can always be validating by
removing the defect or lacuna by passing a validating Act.
Validating Acts may be passed and, in fact, are usually passed with
retrospective effect to remedy any situation which might have been
brought about as a result of the original provision being declared
invalid, provided however the validating Act sought to be passed is
within the competence of the Legislature.

“Any building” u/s 1(3) of the Haryana Act cannot be confined to

the building constructed for the first time. The expression "any
building" used-in S. 1(3) will apply to the building which is
constructed for the first time on an open land as well as a building
which is constructed after demolition of an existing building which
may have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation.80

In Sardar Singh v. Smt. Champa81 it was held that "construction

and "reconstruction" are interchangeable terms and the only
difference is that the phrase "construction" will be used where a
new building is put up where none existed before but
reconstruction will apply to a building which is rebuilt in place of
an existing building, in both the cases there would be construction
and the notification exempting buildings constructed during a
particular period would apply. Additions, improvements or
alterations may amount to construction, yet it cannot be said with
any reasonableness that they would amount to construction of a
building. When a part of the building is taken as a building for
purposes of the Act any partial construction in such part would not

80
Ram Sarup and Another v. Din Dayal AIR 1997 PH 1, 1996 (2) RLR 25 (P&H).
81
(1998) 118 PLR 497, 1998 (1) RCR (Rent) 205 (P&H).

83
be a construction of the building but where the entire part is pulled
down and rebuilt, it would certainly be construction and would fall
within the ambit of the notification".

3.2.3.2 Whether expiry of period of 10 years from

the date of construction during the pendency of
proceedings for eviction of tenant affects the
jurisdiction of the court?

This question was dealt with in case of Jagdish Lal Kalra v. M/s.
Jagdish Chand Satish Kumar82
A suit for possession of the shop in dispute was filed within a
period of ten years from the date of the construction of the shop.
Trial court passed the decree for possession in favour of plaintiff-
landlord. Defendant tenant moved to lower appellate court against
the judgment and decree passed in favour of plaintiff landlord. But
during the pendency of appeal the exemption period of ten years as
provided in Section 1 (3) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent &
Eviction) Act, 1973, had expired and so the lower appellate Court
had disallowed the relief of possession to the plaintiff on the
ground that the remedy of the plaintiff lay under Section 13 of the
said Act and not by way of a Civil Suit.
Plaintiff–appellant moved to High Court. High Court held that the
suit was maintainable as it has been filed by the landlord within the
exemption period of ten years. Held further, that the date of
institution of the suit is relevant date for the purpose of finding out

82
1988(2) PLR 602 (P & H).

84
the maintainability of the suit and the subsequent of supervening
events could not affect such maintainability.

Another case of Punjab & Haryana High Court need to be

mentioned here is Atma Ram Mittal v Ishwar Singh Punia83
The plaintiff-landlord filed a civil suit against the respondent-
tenant for possession of a shop which had been rented out by him
in 1978. The suit was filed on the basis that the respondent was in
arrears of rent from 1st December, 1981 to 31st May, 1982, that the
tenancy had been terminated by giving a suit notice, and that
section 1(3) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1973 exempted the building from the purview of the Act. On
or about 15th February, 1983, the respondent-tenant filed his
written statement, and in November, 1984, moved an application
for dismissal of the suit stating that the shop in question was
constructed in June 1974 and as such, the period of 10 year had
elapsed by June 1984 in terms of section 1(3) of the Act and as
such, the immunity from the application of the Act having expired,
the suit under the Act is not maintainable, and that the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court was barred.
The Sub-Judge held that the decree was not necessary, to be passed
within the exemption period of 10 years under section 1 (3) of the
Act, and accordingly dismissed the respondent's application.
The respondent preferred a revision petition to the High Court,
which held that as the suit had not been decreed within the period
of 10 years, the building in question came within the operation of
the Act and as such, the rent Act was applicable and the Civil

83
1988 AIR 2031, 1988 SCR Supl. (2) 528.

85
Court had no jurisdiction. The High Court allowed the petition and
consequently dismissed the suit pending before the Sub- Judge.

(These two diametrically opposite decisions by Punjab and

Haryana High Court brought uncertainty on this point of law.)

Fortunately the case was brought to the notice of Apex Court

which removed the ambiguity of the two decisions and held as
under:
(a) The rights of the parties will have to be determined on the
basis of the rights available to them on the date of the suit. The
Judgment and Order of the High Court set aside and order of the
Sub-Judge restored. The suit to proceed in accordance with law.
(b) Section 13 of the Act provides that the tenant in possession
of a building or a rented land shall not be evicted there from except
in accordance with the provisions of the said Section. Those
provisions world not be applicable under Section 1(3) to a suit
instituted within 10 years from the date of the completion of the
building in question.
(c) It is well-settled that no man should suffer because of the
fault of the Court or delay in the procedure. "Actus curiam
neminem gravabit''-an act of Court shall prejudice no man.
(d) Having regard to the time normally consumed for
adjudication, the 10 years exemption or holiday from the
application of the Rent Act would become illusory, if the suit has
to be filed within that time and be disposed of finally.
(e) It is common knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon
after the date of letting, it would never be disposed of within 10
years and even then within that time it may not be disposed of.

86
That will make the 10 years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and
provide no incentive to the landlords to build new holiday to solve
problem of shortages of houses. The purpose of the legislation
would thus be defeated.
(f) Bearing in mind the well-settled principle, that the rights of
parties crystallize on the date of the institution of the suit, the
meaningful construction must be that the exemption world apply
for a period of 10 years and will continue to be available until the
suit is disposed of or adjudicated. Such suit or proceedings must be
instituted within the stipulated period of 10 years. Once rights
crystallize the adjudication must be in accordance with law.
In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High
Court was in error in the view it took. The judgment and order of
the High Court are set aside and the order of the learned Sub-Judge
is restored.84

The aforesaid question once again came before the Honorable

Supreme Court:
Landlord filed suit for possession. But before the trial concluded,
the moratorium period of ten years came to an end and the decrees
were passed only thereafter. The appellants contend that the Court
lost its jurisdiction on the expiry of the ten years period and the
decree passed of thereafter is a nullity.
Held, that there is no provision in the Act taking away the
jurisdiction of a civil court to dispose of a suit validly instituted.
There is also no provision preventing the execution of a decree
passed in such a suit. It is common knowledge that a proceeding in

84
Ibid.

87
a civil court for recovery of immovable property could be dragged
on by the defendant easily for a period of ten years or more and
thereby a tenant whose tenancy had been terminated validly before
the suit would successfully make the proceeding infructuous by
prolonging the litigation.
The Bench pointed out that if the immunity from the operation of
the Rent Act is made an depended upon the ultimate disposal of the
case within the period of exemption of ten years which is in reality
an impossibility, the community or exemption would become
illusory and provide no incentive to the landlords to build new
houses to solve problem of shortage of houses. The Court referred
to the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit i.e., an act of Court
shall prejudice no man and held that once rights are crystallized,
the adjudication must be in accordance with law. The Court also
relied upon the principle that purposive interpretation in a social
ameliorative legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything
else and while ascertaining the legislative intent the Court should
look into the true meaning of the words that the legislature has
used. 85

3.2.4 Application of Rent Act to a particular area

3.2.4.1 Effect on the jurisdiction of a civil court to

try possession suits pending before it
The point is raised in the case of Sawan Ram v. Gobinda Ram
And Another86

85
Shri Kishan & Krishan Kumar v. Manoj Kumar etc. 1998 (1) RCR (Rent) 283 (SC).
86
AIR 1980 P H 106, 1980 (1) RCR (Rent) 21 (FB); J.U. Katyal And Another. v. Krishan
Kapur And Others (2005) 139 PLR 558, 2005 (1) LAR 495 (P&H).

88
Gobinda Ram respondent-landlord had on May 31, 1975 preferred
a suit for possession of a shop claiming that the construction
thereof had been completed in the month of August, 1969. During
the pendency of the suit, the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent &
Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter called the Act) was amended with
the result' that all the non-residential buildings constructed after
March 1962, would also come within the ambit of the Act. As a
necessary consequence the ground on which the ejectment of the
tenant was sought from the shop in dispute disappeared and the
petitioner tenant preferred an application that the suit may be
dismissed at least qua the relief of ejectment. The trial court,
however, rejected the application holding apparently that despite
the virtual barring of the relief of ejectment by a decree of the Civil
Court, the suit was nevertheless maintainable. The petitioner-tenant
has come up by way of this Revision Petition.
Held, that subsequent applicability of the Rent Act on account of
declaration of urban area would render the decree of the civil court
inexecutable.

Another case need to be cited here is Ram Narain and others v.

Ram Lal and others87:
Plaintiff-appellant filed suit for possession after serving a notice
under section 106 of Transfer of Property Act for termination of
tenancy. Suit was decreed by trial court. But when appeal was
pending Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973
became applicable as town Kharkhoda was declared a notified area
in 1986. Held that ejectment decree though passed before

87
2004 LAR 93 (P&H), (2004) 136 PLR 634.

89
enforcement of Rent Act was not executable due to subsequent
events.
Pasupudeti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders88
was relied upon where it was held by the Apex Court that a fact
arising after the lis, coming to the notice of the Court and having a
fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of
moulding it and brought diligently to the notice of the Court cannot
be blinked at. The Court may in such cases bend the rules of
procedure if no specific provisions of law or rule of fair play is
violated for it would promote substantial justice provided that there
is absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. The
Court speaking through Krishna Iyer, J. affirmed the proposition
that Court can, as long as the litigation pends; take note of updated
facts to promote substantial justice. However, the Court cautioned;
(i) the event should be one as would stultify or render inept the
decretal remedy,
(ii) rules of procedure may be bent if no specific provision or
fair play is violated and there is no other special circumstance
repelling resort to that course in law or justice,
(iii) such cognizance of subsequent events and developments
should be cautions, and
(iv) The rules of fairness to both sides should be scrupulously
obeyed.

3.2.4.2 Deemed date of completion of construction of

building i.e., date from which ten years period of
exemption is to be computed.

88
AIR 1975 SC 1409.

90
The Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 does
not contain any provision as to what shall be the deemed date of
completion of construction from which the period of ten years
exemption shall be reckoned. This leads to practical difficulties in
implementation of the act and we have to seek guidance from the
provisions of other state rent Acts which clearly address this
problem by mentioning the deemed date of completion of
construction.
The question came for consideration before Punjab and Haryana
High Court in case of Vinod Kumar v. Naranjan Dass89
The property in dispute is the instant case had been purchased by
the plaintiff on 21-11-1975 construction of the shop was started
and completed in the year 1977 The appellant dispute the claim of
the plaintiff that old structure had been demolished and a new
building is raised thereupon. the appellant highlights the non-
existence of any site plan submitted to the municipal authorities,
existence of the electric meter at the premises in dispute even
during the alleged reconstruction non-existence of any evidence
with regard to purchase of building material and source of money
spent upon such a construction.
It has to be established without any iota of doubt as to when such a
building was completed. Unless there is clear proof on record as to
the exact date when construction of a building is started the period
of exemption granted vide Section 1(3) of the Act cannot be
determined with precision.
Keeping in mind the observations made by the Apex Court in M/S
Punjab Tin Supply Co. Chandigarh v. The Central Government

89
(1993) 104 PLR 489.

91
and others where the validity of section 390 of East Punjab Urban
Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as applicable to the Union Territory of
Chandigarh was upheld, it was held Absence of clear date as to
when the new construction had been raised can, of course, make
adjudication of such a matter somewhat difficult. But so on the
facts of the present case, this question can be termed as purely
academic. The property in dispute in the instant case had been
purchased by the plaintiff on 21-11-1975 Even if it be taken that
sometime thereafter the plaintiff demolished the old structure and
raised new one yet the same would come within the ambit of
Section 1(3) of the Act on the short ground that the suit in the
instant case had been filed on 17-7-1985 i.e. less than 10 years
after the date of the execution of the sale deed dated 21-11-1975. I
am thus of the firm view that the building stood exempted under
Section 1(3) of the Act and the suit for possession was
maintainable before a Civil Court.
Another case on the same issue is Bank of Maharashtra v.
Mahesh Chander and Others91
Plaintiffs were the owners of the building and defendants were in
the need of the premises. They requested the plaintiffs to give them

90
The period of 5 years' exemption shall be computed in the manner indicated below:
(a) Where sewerage connection can be given, from the date such connection is granted
by the competent authority;
(b) Where sewerage connection cannot be granted, as for instance, in the case of booths,
from the date electric connection is first given by the competent authority;
(c) Where sewerage connection has already been given and new building is constructed
in addition to or over and above the existing building and has been separately let out,
from the date new building is actually occupied;
(d) In cases not covered in categories above, from the date the building is actually
occupied.
91
(2000) 126 PLR 253.

92
premises on lease on the ground floor of the three storey building
to be constructed by them after demolishing the aforesaid old
building for a period of five years with option to renew the lease
for further period of four years at the rate of Rs. 2.50 per square
feet of the carpet area. The plaintiffs requested the defendants to
grant finance for construction of building. Defendants agreed to do
so. An agreement to that effect dated 9th April, 1981 was reduced
into writing. Plaintiffs agreed to give the possession of the said
premises to the defendant within six months or by 15th August,
1981 whichever was earlier. The defendants advanced loan of Rs. 2
lacs to the plaintiffs to raise construction.
The plaintiffs raised the construction in the shape of three storey
building and let out the premises on the ground floor to the
defendants as per agreement. Plaintiffs could not hand over the
possession by 15th August, 1981 as agreed. Defendants wrote a
letter to the plaintiffs dated 16.11.1981 to expedite the delivery of
the possession. The plaintiffs assured to the defendants that the
possession for the ground floor will be delivered by 10.1.1982.
Ultimately, the possession was handed over to the defendants on
5.2.82. According to the plaintiffs, the possession could not be
delivered in time because the construction could not be completed
by the agreed time. After the expiry of five years period, the
defendants wanted to extend the lease agreement for a period of
four years w.e.f. 1.7.1989 at the rate of Rs. 2.87 per square feet
carpet-area to which the plaintiffs did not agree. Plaintiffs
terminated the tenancy by serving the defendants with a notice
under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Hence this suit
was instituted on 3.11.1991.

93
The suit was contested by the defendants mainly on the ground that
the building was an old one; it was not a case of new construction.
Rather it was a case of renovation.
Trial court observed that it was a case of new building and the suit
has been instituted within ten years from the date of the completion
of the building. Resultantly, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed.

Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the

defendant-Bank filed the appeal before the first appellate Court and
the appeal was dismissed on the basis that the building was
completed on 7.2.1982 and earlier to that the possession could not
be delivered to the defendant who was craving for all the times for
the delivery of the possession. In these circumstances, the suit has
been instituted within ten years from the date of the completion of
the building and, therefore, the provisions of Rent Act are not
applicable in this case.
Attention of the court was drawn to the case of Suresh Kumar
Jain v. Shanti Swarup Jain & Others92 where the honorable
Supreme Court referred to Explanation I93 of Sub-Section (2) of

92
A.I.R. 1997 SC 2291.
93
Explanation I - (For the purposes of this Section) –
(a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have completed thereof is reported
to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and
(b) in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment
thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the
said dates, and
(c) in absence of any such report , record or assessment, the date on which it is actually
occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the
construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time:
Provided that there may be different dates of completion of construction in respect of
different parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are
occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants.

94
Section 2 of U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 and submitted that it was obligatory on the part
of the owner to prove the exact date of the, completion of the
building and since there is no satisfactory evidence led on behalf of
the plaintiffs to prove this fact, therefore, the plaintiffs cannot take
the benefit of the exemption provided under Section 3(1) of the
Haryana Urban Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1973.
The High Court upheld the judgment of the first appellate court.
Again in 2007 in case of Puran Chand v. Kamlesh And Another94
High Court faced same sort of question:
Plaintiff is the owner and landlady of the newly constructed shop.
The shop was erected in 1988. Pursuant to the oral agreement dated
9.2.1989 Puran Chand, defedant was inducted in this shop on
monthly rent of Rs.500/- for a period of 11 months. Prior to the
construction thereof, an application seeking sanction to raise
construction was filed by the plaintiff on 23.3.1988. The requisite
permission was granted vide order dated 7.5.1988. Thus the
provisions of Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,
1973 are not applicable. His tenancy was terminated in pursuance
of the notice dated 13.1.1998, where after he was asked to hand
over the vacant possession of the shop, but of no avail. Ms.
Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant urged with great
eloquence that the learned First Appellate Court has gravely erred
in holding that the demised premises is a newly constructed
building and sequelly the provisions of Section 13 of the Rent Act
are inapplicable as the landlady did not produce any cogent
evidence in proof of this fact. The onus heavily lay upon her to

94
R.S.A. No.3883 of 2007 -1- In The High Court Of Punjab and Haryana

95
prove these facts on record in view of the observations rendered by
the Apex Court in re: Ram Saroop Rai v. Smt. Lilavati95. The suit
was decreed for ejectment of respondent- Puran Chand from the
suit shop with a direction to hand over the vacant possession of the
same to the appellant- Kamlesh Devi within a period of one month
from the passing of the judgment.
It was held that earliest of the following dates will be considered
deemed date of construction:-
1. Date on which completion of building is reported to local
authority;
2. Date on which completion of building is otherwise recorded by
local authority;
3. Date on which the assessment of property is first made; and
4. In absence of any such report, record of assessment, the date on
which the building was actually occupied.
In the instant case the building plans were sanctioned on 7.5.1988.
The site plan got prepared on 1.10.1986. It was submitted before
the Municipal Committee for sanction in March, 1988. It is a
common-place experience that the construction of the whole
building would have taken adequate time as the different parts
thereof were to be completed on different dates. The plea of the
appellant in the terms that the shop was constructed about 17 years
back pales into insignificance in view of the fact that vide sale
deed, the land was purchased only on 5.1.1984. Petitioner witness
has solemnly affirmed that the building was constructed by him.
His testimony carries conviction being not interested in any party.
If the appellant was confident that the disputed building was not

95
AIR 1982 SC 945, (1980) 3 SCC 452, 1980 3 SCR 1034.

96
completed in December, 1988, he could have summoned the
relevant record from the local authority. The above referred
documentary evidence sustains the landlady's plea that the
construction was completed in December, 1988. The facts with
regards to the rate of interest as well as completion of the disputed
building in the month of December, 1988 being directly and
substantially in issue in the subsequent case, i.e., the present one,
have been rightly determined by the First Appellate Court.

3.3Interpretation of formal expressions under the Act

3.3.1 Building meaning
It may be stated that when one talks of a building, it is necessarily
implied that the building will not cease to be so if it is partly or
fully furnished. To borrow the words of Krishna Iyer Justice (as his
Lordship then was),-“ a building which is ordinarily let, be it for
residential or non residential purposes, will not be the bare walls,
floor and roof, but will have necessary amenities to make
habitation happy. That is why the legislature has fairly included
gradens, grounds and out houses, if any, appurtenant to such
building. Likewise, leases some times are of furnished buildings
and that is why 'any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in
such building' is treated as part of the building. In the same strain,
we may notice, as a matter of common occurrence, many fittings
'such as electrical fittings, sanitary fittings, curtains and venetian
blinds and air-conditioning equipment being fixed to the building
by the landlord so that the tenant's enjoyment of the tenement may
be more attractive. The crucial point is that these additions are
appurtenant, subservient and beneficial to the building itself. They
make occupation of the building more convenient and pleasant but

97
the principal thing demised is the building and the additives are
auxiliary…” 96

The term 'building' as defined in U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation

of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 came up for the
consideration of this Court. The definition is not similarly worded.
However, during the course of its order, this Court quoted with
approval Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Vol. 1, 5th Edn.) stating that
'what is a building must always be a question of degree and
circumstances'. Again citing with approval Victoria City
Corporation v. Bishop Vancouver Island (1921) 2 AC 384 and
quoting therefrom this Court approved the observation of a
celebrated lexicographer that 'the ordinary and natural meaning of
the word building includes the fabric and the ground on which it
stands'. Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.) was also cited with
approval, which gives the meaning of the building as 'a structure or
a edifice enclosing a space within its wall, and usually, but not
necessarily, covered with a roof'. A roofless structure was held to
be a building… the term 'building' has to be interpreted liberally
and not narrowly.97

A perusal of sections 2(d) and (g) of the Act makes it evident that a
building which is being used for both purposes i.e. residential and
non residential would be treated as a residential building and
cannot be considered as non residential, building alone. The
mandate of Section 11 of the Act further is that no one would be
entitled to convert a residential building in a non residential
96
Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, 1975 RCR 712 (SC).
97
A. Satyanarayan Shah v. M. Yadgiri, (2003) 1 SCC 138.

98
building without the prior consent of the Rent Controller.
Admittedly, no consent in this case was ever taken for converting
the residential building into a non-residential building.98

The dominant intention of the parties was to create the lease of the
business and not that of the building. It was held that since the
lease created was of running the business, the same was not
protected under the Act.99

Tin shade put up by landlord and supported by his house’s wall,

falls within the term ‘Building”. However if it was put up by tenant
then it will not fall within the term ‘Building’.100

3.3.1.1 Residential and Non-residential building

Building rented out for the post office. Post master resided with
family in one room. Building still non-residential. Residence of the
postmaster an integral part for carrying out of the trade or
business.101

Tenancy was for the purpose of residence as well as for business. It

is not open to the tenant to assert that the building in question was
non-residential and not liable to eviction on the ground of personal
necessity.102

98
Harjit Singh v. Daya Ram Sat Narain, 2003(1) PLR 579.
99
Spun Casting & Engg. Co.Pvt.Ltd v. Dwijendra Lal Sinha, 2005(1) L.A.R. 591 (SC).
100
Harish Chandra v. Mohd. Ismail, (1990) 4 SCC 493.
101
Ram Niwas v. Union of India, 1978(2) Rent Law Reporter 332 (P&H).
102
Girwar Lal v. Khadi Bhandar, Dhuri (1992) 102 PLR 676.

99
No distinction between residential and non-residential building
could be drawn so far as bona fide requirement of landlord, for the
purpose of eviction of the the tenant for personal necessity, is
concerned.103

The room was constructed as a residential building, though, the

same was let out for commercial purpose and, therefore, the nature
of the building would not change merely because one of the room
was being used as a shop from the initiation of the tenancy. 104 This
judgment holds good in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Mohinder Prasad Jain v. Manohar Lal Jain105 where it
was held that a landlord is entitled to seek eviction of tenant from a
non-residential building on the ground that he requires it for his
own use.

3.3.1.2 Scheduled building

As defined in the parent Act of Haryana Urban (Control of Rent
and Eviction) Act, 1973 “Scheduled building” means a residential
building which is being used by a person engaged in one or more

103
Harbilas Rai Bansal v. The State Of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 857.
104
Rajinder Kumar v. Niranjan Lal & Another, 2006 (2) L.A.R. 253 (P&H).
105
AIR 2006 SC 1471.

100
of the professions specified in the Schedule I106 to this Act, partly
for his business and partly for his residence.107

Scheduled building means a building in which one of the

professions mentioned in the schedule is carried on. A building
does not become a scheduled building if person carrying on
scheduled profession lives in it. He must use the building or part of
it for scheduled profession. A ‘residential building’ can be a
‘scheduled building’. A residential building only becomes a
‘scheduled building’ if any one of the professions mentioned in the
Schedule to the Act is carried on in a part of it. If the whole of it is
used for such a profession and part of it is not used for residence or
vice-versa, it will cease to be a ‘scheduled building’. But a
residential building does not become a scheduled building merely
because a person carrying on the profession set out in the Schedule
resides in it. He must also use part of the building for his
profession. If the definitions of ‘residential building’ and ‘non-
residential building’ are read together, it will be apparent that there
could be a residential building where a business is carried on by the
tenant and yet the tenant could be evicted by the owner if he
requires that building for his residence. It is only in those cases that
a residential building is taken out of this category and is put in the

106
Schedule I
1. Lawyers.
2. Architects.
3. Dentists.
4. Engineers.
5. Veterinary surgeons.
6. Medical practitioners, including practitioners of indigenous system of medicine.
107
Section 2(h) East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.

101
category of a ‘Scheduled building’ wherein a person who carries
on one of the professions specified in the schedule resides. The
phrase ‘used’ signifies ‘constant or regular use’ and not casual
use.108

The use of the building set apart for the purpose, by a doctor for
examining his patients and prescribing medicine to them, though
not extensively used for the purpose, makes the building scheduled
building.109

Merely because in a six bed room house, in one of the rooms,

certain office files brought home were disposed of; a table and a
chair was put in the room for that purpose where even the children
and members of the family used that room for study, did not
change the classification or character of the premises from
residential to non-residential. Tenant was not liable to be evicted.110

3.3.2 Landlord Meaning

A landlord as defined in Section 2 (c)111 of the Act can file
ejectment application against tenant. A "landlord" may not

108
Dr. Lekh Raj Laroya v. Jawala Devi, 1968 CLJ 358 (DB).
109
Dr. Sewa Singh v. Ravinder Kaur, 1970 RCJ 614 (SC).
110
M/s Atul Castigs Ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan Singh, AIR 2001 SC 1684.
111
“landlord” means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any
building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit of any
other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person,
and includes a tenant who subjects any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter
authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord.
A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the following categories of persons fall
within the meaning of landlord : (1) any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in

102
necessarily be "owner." Any person who is entitled to receive rent
in respect of any building on his own account or on behalf of or for
the benefit of any other person, is a landlord. Co-owner of the
property is a landlord and he can maintain ejectment application
for benefit of his own self and for benefit of other co-
owners/landlords.112

For the purposes of the act the legislature has made a distinction
between an owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act deals with
the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein.
Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act.113

Landlord is not required to be the owner of the premises let out by

him to a tenant. A landlord can be a person who is entitled to
receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on
his own account or on behalf of any other person and even would
include a tenant who sub-lets any building or rented land and also
any person from time to time deriving title under a landlord.114

Attorney of the landlord let out the demised premises on rent

without disclosing his status. It was held, power of attorney is a
registered document. Registration of a document is a notice to all.
Tenant cannot deny his relationship with landlord as tenant.

respect of any building or rented land; (2) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or
administrator for any other person; (3) a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the
manner authorised under the Act and (4) every person from time to time deriving title under a
landlord.
112
Surinder Mohan Aggarwal v. Krishan Mohan Madhok, AIR 2001 PH 33.
113
K.D. Dewan v. Harbhajan S. Parihar, AIR 2002 SC 67.
114
Ajay Kashyap v. Smt. Mohini Nijhawan, 2004 L.A.R. 117 (P&H) (Full Bench).

103
Landlord is competent to file ejectment petition against the
tenant.115

3.3.3 Specified landlord

Petitioner was not a landlord at the time of retirement. He became
landlord after retirement. He cannot be treated as specified landlord
as such.116

The petitioner retired as Chief Engineer from ME-CON (India)

Ltd. Ranchi which is a Government of India undertaking in the
Ministry of Iron and Steel, is specified landlord.117

A specified landlord could apply for recovery of immediate

possession of a residential or scheduled building within one year
preceding his retirement or within one year after the date of his
retirement. He is required to produce a certificate from the
authority competent to remove him from service indicating his date
of retirement. The petition is required to be supported by an
affidavit to the effect that he does not own and possess any other
suitable accommodation in the local area where he intends to reside
and occupy for his own use after recovering possession of
residential/ scheduled building.118

The best evidence to establish that the landlord was a Government

servant would have been his letter of appointment as Government

115
Jagdish Singh v. Mohan Lal, 2004 L.A.R. 227 (P&H).
116
Kewal Krishan v. Smt. Lajwanti, 1996 HRR 605 (P&H).
117
Harjit Singh v. Daya Ram Sat Narain, 2003 (1) PLR 579.
118
Suraj Bhan v. Joginder Sarup, 2005 (1) L.A.R. 31 (P&H).

104
servant or the letter by which he was sent on deputation to the
Aided School. Merely production of pension slip is not sufficient to
hold that landlord is a retired Government servant, particularly in
view of respondent's admission in his cross examination that
teachers of private government aided schools receive pension after
retirement.119

The employees of the Punjab State Electricity Board are the

employees holding an appointment in connection with the affairs of
the State and would be covered by the expression specified
landlord as defined in Section 2(hh) of the Act. Retirement
certificate exhibited amply proves the fact that the petition had
been filed within one year of his retirement. Once the petitioner
stood retired, the enquiry whether the certificate had been issued by
an authority competent to remove the landlord-petitioner from
service would lose its significance.120

3.4Conclusion
The Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973
applies to all urban areas in Haryana except the Cantonment areas.
Some states in India went further while making rent control laws
and formulated rent Acts for the entire state. Haryana is an
emerging state and the growth of industries in the state attracts the
youth to work outside their rural shell. Because industries are set
up near villages so people look for residence in close proximity.
The state legislature shall look into the matter and make the
provisions of the Act applicable to whole state.

119
Indrasen Jain v. Rameshwardas, 2005 (1) L.A.R. 262 (SC).
120
Sohan Lal v. Uttam Singh, 2005 (1) L.A.R. 336 (P&H).

105
There is no exemption provided to any building in Haryana on the
basis of rent wherever the states like Delhi and Rajasthan have
exempted the buildings from application of rent Act exceeding
certain amount of rent. The people who can afford paying big
bucks as rent they shall not be governed by the Act because it is
not petite in business society. Because once the rich people get
protection of the Act it becomes difficult to evict them from the
premises if they are not covered by the Act they can be evicted
from the premises at the time of expiry of lease.

Nonetheless, references to the provisions of other state laws make

sense in certain situations and operate as tool to analyse
uncertainties prevailing in the Act. Addition of the provision
provides a platform to attain more impactful law and also enhances
the scope for future research.

106