G.R. No. 76353 May 2, 1988 within forty-eight (48) hours (Rollo. p. 33).
within forty-eight (48) hours (Rollo. p. 33). All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming,
SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA, REMEDIOS BALTAZAR,
CORAZON BUNDOC JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHIELA DIÑOSO, RAFAEL ENCARNACION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), DR. JUAN D. LIM, in his
capacity as President and Chairman of Board of Trustees of PSBA, ATTY. P. PAULINO, etc., et al., respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with motion for preliminary mandatory injunction
seeking to nullify the action taken by herein respondent Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon
City Branch, in violation of petitioners' constitutional rights.
The factual background of this case is as follows:
Petitioners are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City, while
respondents, are the Philippine School of Business Administration (hereinafter referred to as PSBA) Quezon
City Branch, a 'non-stock institution of higher learning organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, Juan D. Lim, President and Chairman of the Board of PSBA; Benjamin P. Paulino, Vice President
for Admission and Registration of PSBA, Q.C.; Ruben Estrella, Officer-in-Charge; and Ramon Agapay, Director
of the Office of Student Affairs of PSBA, Q.C. and Romeo Rafer, Chief Security of PSBA, Q.C.
As early as March 22, 1986, the students of the respondent school and the respondent PSBA, Q.C. had
already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school (Rollo, p. 75). Among
the agreements reached at that time were:
On The exercise of student's democratic rights, it has been agreed that protest actions can be
conducted any day as long as they meet the following requirements:
a) that they be held at the PSBA quadrangle from 12:30 p.m. to 1:00 p.m. only;
b) that the protest action be removed to the PSBA parking lot if it will exceed the 1:00 time limit;
c) that if the protest move exceeds 1:00 it will be limited only up to 2:30 p.m.
d) However, before any action is taken the organizers of the protest action should secure a permit 6
days before, or if on the same day, it still be under the "first-come-first-serve served" basis in the use of
facilities, volume of sound system shall be adjusted so as not to disturb classes.
It is the firm stand of the administration of PSBA that it will not allow the students to directly participate in
the policy-making body of the school, as this is provided by law. However, the administration will be
open to suggestions and questions, especially those regarding tuition fee increases and other policies
that directly affect us.
In spite of the above-stated agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they
demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting
in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances (Rollo. p. 20; 347-348). "Subsequently dialogues
proved futile." Finally, petitioners received uniform letters from respondents dated October 8, 1986 (Rollo, p.
23) giving them 3 days to explain why the school should not take / mete out any administrative sanction on
their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on
Thursday (Oct. 2), Friday (Oct. 3) and Tuesday (Oct. 7).<äre||anº•1àw> The aforestated letter was
answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter dated October 22, 1982 Annex "E" (Rollo, P. 26).
During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly
blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of school year 1986-1987. On October 28,1986 the
President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the MECS against the PSBA for barring
the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders. (Annex "F" Rollo, p. 30). Simultaneously on
the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement
of the school's decision regarding their enrollment (Rollo, p. 31). Another demand letter was made by
Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romulo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients
hence this petition.
In the resolution of November 7,1986, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the
petition required respondents to comment thereon and set the hearing for preliminary mandatory injunction
on November 10, 1986 (Rollo, p. 35). In compliance therewith on November 9, 1986, respondents filed their
comment and opposition to the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
praying that the petition for the issuance of a writ be denied not only for lack of merit but also for being
barred by res judicata (Rollo, p. 67).
Meanwhile, a motion for intervention was filed on November 10, 1986, by the Philippine School of Business
Administration, Quezon City Faculty Union, (PSBA, QC-FU for brevity) representing the faculty members
hereinafter referred to as intervenors, on the ground of commonality of issues and cause of action with that
of the petitioners (Rollo, p. 36).
At the hearing on the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction, where counsel for all the parties
appeared and argued their causes, the Court Resolved to grant the motion for intervention and to require
the intervenors to comment on the petition and the petitioners to file a reply thereto (Rollo, p. 66, copy
corrected, p. 167). On the same day respondents filed their comment and opposition to the application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (Rollo, pp. 67-74).
On November 12, 1986, this Court resolved to issue a temporary mandatory order directing the respondents
herein (a) to re-enroll the petitioners herein and (b) to re-admit the intervenors to their former positions
without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted by the school authorities (Rollo, p. 141). Said Order
was issued on November 14, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 142-143).
A supplemental comment and opposition to application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
dated November 11, 1986 was filed by herein respondents (Rollo, p. 150), while an urgent motion to reiterate
prayer for issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction dated November 13, 1986 was filed by herein
petitioners (Rollo, pp. 162-163).
Instead of complying with tile resolution of November 12, 1986 an urgent motion for reconsideration was filed
by herein respondents on November 15, 1987 (Rollo, p. 194) praying that this Court reconsider the aforesaid
resolution.
On November 18, 1986 petitioners and intervenors filed a joint urgent motin to cite respondents in contempt
(Rollo, p. 199), while respondents filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration, also on the same date
(Rollo, p. 205).
In the resolution of November 19,1986, respondents' motion for reconsideration and sumplemental motion for
reconsideration were denied for lack of merit, and the denial was dedlared FINAL. The urgent motion of
counsel for petitioners and intervanorts to cite respondents in contempt of court was NOTED (Rollo, p. 225).
An urgent motion for intervention and answer in intervention was filed by Nelia M. Lat, Annalisa T. Geronimo,
Leonora Q. Bueniraje, Maria L. Arañas, Eduerijes Llanto, Charita, R. Chong, Marilou Garcia, Amelita R. Sia,
Loida O. Ladines, Dominic P. Santos, Noly R. Chong, and Arthur R. Cacdac for themselves and on behalf of
other students of the PSBA, Quezon City, who are similarly situated, to allolw them to intervene as
respondents dated November 11, 1986 (Rollo, p. 227) which was granted by this Court in a resoulution dated
December 3, 1986 (Rollo, p. 240)
On November 20, 1986, the respondents filed their compliance with the temporary mandatory order; Issued
by this Court pursuant to its resolution dated November 12, 1987 (Rollo, p. 237).
On November 29, 1986, respondents filed their comment on the motion for intervention of the PSBA Quezon
City Faculty Union (Rollo, p. 252).
A consolidated reply to respondents' supplemental comment and opposition to application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, urgent motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration was filed by herein in intervenors on December 2,1986 (Rollo. p. 242).
In the resolution of January 21, 1987, the petition was given due course and parties parties were required to
file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 266). Accordingly, respondents filed their memorandum on
February 23, 1987, (Rollo, p. 269) while the intervenor Union filed its memorandum on March 13, 1987 (Rollo,
p. 296). Respondents filed their reply memorandum on April 13, 1987 praying that the intervention of the
intervening teachers be dismissed (Rollo, p. 328).
Respondents filed their manifestation and motion dated April 27, 1987 stating that pursuant to this court's
order dated November 12, 1986, the school authorities created a special investigating committee to
conduct an investigation, which submitted a report with recommendations (Rollo, p. 335), the report reading
as follows:
After due deliberation, the Committee hereby submits the following recommendation:
STUDENT-RESPONDENTS
A. RENATO PALMA, BERNADETTE ANG, ROGELIO TAGANAS are hereby recommended to be
EXONERATED of all charges.
B. SOPHIA ALCUAZ (up to No. 19) are hereby recommended to be HONORABLY DISMISSED from PSBA
Q.C. roll of students without prejudice to reenrollment on a case to case basis if found suitable and
justified.
FACULTY-RESPONDENTS
A. To be EXONERATED of all charges JOSE C. ANTONIO, DONALLY BRINGAS, DANTE CAJUCOM, LEO
LOQUELLANO SOLITA A. CRUZ, and N TOLENTINO.
B. To be reprimanded with a WARNING that a repetition of similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely FLORANTE BAGSIC and ATENOGENES BONDOC.
C. MR. SEVERINO CORTES, JR. is hereby recommended for non-renewal of his semester to semester
appointment.
D. MESSRS. ASSER (BONG) TAMAYO and RENE Q. ENCARNACION are hereby recommended for
termination of their services as faculty members.
Respondents adopted the aforestated recommendations of the Committee and prayed that the case be
dismissed for having become moot (Rollo, p. 341). On April 30, a second urgent manifestation and motion
was filed by respondent praying that the recommendation of special Committee as implemented by its
President be made effective by the discontinuance of the summer enrollment of petitioners Anna Shiela A.
Dinoso, Zeny Gudito and Ma. Shalina Pitoy upon the refund to them of all the fees they have paid to the
school (Rollo, p. 397).
An urgent motion to cite for contempt herein respondents was filed on May 5, 1987 for violating this court's
temporary mandatory order on November 12, 1986, by discharging and striking off from the roll of students
petitioners Dinoso, Gudito and Pitoy (Rollo, p. 400) while an opposition to urgent motion to cite for contempt
was filed by herein respoddents on May 20, 1987 (Rollo, p. 413).
On May 20, 1987, Intervenor Union filed their Intervenor's Comment on Respondents' reply memorandum and
manifestation and motion with motion to cite respondent in contempt (Rollo, p. 417).
On June 8, 1987, petitioners filed their very urgent motion for an order to re-enroll (Rollo, p. 620) followed by
an urgent supplemental motion and Reply to opposition dated June 9, 1987 (Rollo, p. 623).
Later on, an Opposition to "very urgent motion for order to re-enroll was filed by herein respondents on June
11, 1987 (Rollo, p. 625) while on June 15,1987, herein intervenor Union filed its manifestation and motion with
urgent motion reiterating intervenor's motion to cite respondents in contempt (Rollo, p. 629).
On June 16,1987 respondents filed their opposition to urgent motion to oppose petitioners' urgent motion
dated June 9, 1987 (Rollo, p. 795)'. Petitioners filed their memorandum on June 17, 1987 (Rollo, p. 799).
On June 18, 1987, respondents filed their counter-comment and opposition to motion to cite respondents in
contempt (Rollo, p. 815). Subsequently, on June 25,1987, respondents filed their Reply Memorandum on the
petitioners' memorandum (Rollo, p. 820.).
In the resolution of June 29, 1 987 the motion of petitioners to compel respondents to readmit or re-enroll
herein petitioners was denied except in the case of three (3) student petitioners cleared by the investigating
committee and who had been recommended to be readmitted or re-enrolled. This court further stated that
the reason for the non-enrollment of the others is that the results of the investigation conducted
indicate prima facie the violation by the majority of the petitioners of the rules and regulations of respondent
school (Rollo, p. 793). The Court further resolved to require respondent school to show cause why it should
not be adjudged in contempt for refusing to reinstate the intervenors-faculty members in the interim.
Respondents filed the manifestation on July 3, 1987 informing this Court that they did not refuse to reinstate
the intervenors/faculty members; that they were in fact actually reinstated in compliance with the Court's
temporary mandatory order (Rollo, p. 829). Hence, the motion for contempt should be dismissed.
The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners-
students who have been barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors teachers whose services have been
terminated as faculty members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged
by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly.
Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural due process which requires that there be due
notice and hear hearing and of substantive due process which requires that the person or body to conduct
the investigation be competent to act and decide free from bias or prejudice. They claim that barring them
from enrollment for the second semester is equivalent to expulsion which cannot be valid and effective
without the required MEC's approval (Rollo, pp. 12-13).
Furthermore, petitioners point out that the acts of respondents constitute a wanton and deliberate disregard
of petitioners' freedom of expression (ibid).
In the same manner, intervenors-teachers claim that their constitutional right to due process has been
violated when they were summarily dismissed without affording them the opportunity to be heard (Rollo, p.
301).
It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is
provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers
in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual,
that the "written contracts" required for college teachers are for 'one semester." It is thus evident that after
the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or
with the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is a
time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties (Henson vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456, February 19, 1987, citing: Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 99
SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 1 00 SCRA 197).<äre||anº•1àw> The contract having been
terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another
contract with said students and teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court,
have no power to make contracts for the parties." (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., supra).
Under similar circumstances where students have been refused re-enrollment but without allegation of
termination of contracts as in the instant case, this Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an
essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of
procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case
(Guzman vs. National University, 142 SCRA 706-707 [1986]).
Tested under said standards, the records show that the proceedings in the case at bar, at the outset satisfied
conditions No. 1 and 2, but, without a hearing, conditions No. 3, 4 and 5 had evidently not been completed
with.
It is not disputed that printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. are distributed at the beginning of
each school year to the students including petitioners. The Rules, among other things, provide:
Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature and upon admission to the School, the Student is
deemed to have agreed to bind himself to all rules/regulations promulgated by t he Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, he agrees that he may be required to withdraw from
the School at any time for reasons deemed sufficiently serious by the School Administration.
As previously stated, in violation of aforesaid Rules and Regulations, sore students staged noisy
demonstrations in the premises of the school. For the settlement thereof, an agreement was reached
providing among otliers the regulations for the conduct of protest actions. Despite said agreement, it was
alleged that petitioners, acting as the core group of a noisy minoritv, committed tumultuous and anarchic
acts within the premises of the school, fanned by the cooperation of the intervening teachers, causing
disruption of classes to the prejudice of the majority of the students including the intervening ones; which
acts now constitute the subject of this controversy (Rollo, p. 217 ).
Accordingly, both students and teachers were given three (3) days from receipts of letter to explain in writing
why the school should not take / mete out any administrative sanction on them in view of their participation
in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on the dates stated.
Respondents alleged that none of the students ever filed a reply thereto. The records show however that a
letter was sent by Atty. Alan Rollo Yap, in behalf of all PSBA students to the President of the School Mr. Juan
D. Lim, explaining why said students are not guilty of the charges filed against them (Rollo, pp- 26-28).
Similarly, a faculty member of the PSBA filed as answer in a letter to the same President of the school, where
he denied the charges against him (Rollo, p. 52). It therefore becomes readily apparent that while the
students and the teachers have been informed in writing of the charges filed against them and they in turn
filed their answers thereto, no investigating committee or official was designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case upon the presentation of evidence of both parties. Presumably, the schools
banking on the theory that the contracts have already expired, said procedural steps are no longer
necessary.
At any rate, this Court obviously to insure that full justice is done both to the students and teachers on the
one hand and the school on the other, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities,
in the resolution of November 12, 1986.
The investigating committee found among others that: there were concerted mass assemblies conducted
on October 2, 3, 7 and 8 at PSBA Quezon City, which were participated in by said students and teachers,
and which disrupted classes. The disruption of classes and the barricades in the school entrances constitute
violations of existing MECS and PSBA rules and regulations (Rollo, pp. 348-349). It is ironic that many of those
who claim that their human rights have been violated are the very ones who emasculate the human rights
of the innocent majority.
Moreover, petitioners named in the report were found to be academically deficient (Rollo, p. 273) while the
intervening teachers apart from participating in acts of illegality against the school were found to have
committed various acts of misconduct (Rollo. p. 275). Accordingly, three students were recommended for
exoneration from all charges, and some to be honorably dismissed. Of the faculty members eight were
recommended to be exonerated of all charges, two to be reprimanded, one for non-renewal of his
semester to semester appointment and two to be terminated (Rollo, pp. 359-360).
The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of
disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by this Court (Tangonan vs. Paflo, 137 SCRA 246 [1985];
Ateneo de Manila University vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100 [1986]). Thus, the Court has ruled that the school's refusal is
sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations vs as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students.
The opposite view would do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under
the Constitution. More specifically, academic freedom is defined by the Court as follows:
This institutional academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified
persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their
competence subject to no control or authority except of rational methods by which truths and
conclusions are sought and established in their disciplines, but also the right of the school or college
to decide for itself, its ms and objectives, and how best to attain them the grant being to institutions
of higher learning-free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. (Tangonan vs. Paño, supra).
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific
matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual
findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence; where the
findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is
irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest. (Ateneo de Manila University vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 106 (1986); citing:
International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines vs. Leonardo, 11 7 SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club
Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 94 SCRA 61 and Eusebio vs. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569).
A careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows it does
not fall under any of the above exceptions. On the contrary, it is readily apparent that the investigation
conducted was fair, open, exhaustive and adequate.
Accordingly, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb the finding of said committee and as
manifested by the respondents, the report of said committee has virtually rendered this petition moot and
academic.
The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to cite respondents in contempt of court is likewise
untenable.
Contempt of court has been defined as a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such
conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or
prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation. (Hahn vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 57
[1985]).
In the case at bar, there appears to be no defiance of authority by the mere filing by respondents of a
motion for reconsideration of the resolution of November 12, 1986. In fact respondent school explained that
the intervenors were actually reinstated as such faculty members after the issuance of the temporary
mandatory injunction. Thus, in the compliance submitted by said school on November 20, 1 986, it ma
manifested that 'without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted by the school authorities, ... and in
order that dislocations may not result with respect to the academic activities of the students and the
distribution of teaching loads among the teachers, the respondent school has created new classes for the
petitioners and the intervening teachers" beginning November 20, 1986.
The school manifested that while the investigation was going on, the intervenors-faculty members were
teaching and it was only after the investigation, that the recommendations of the Committee were
adopted by the school and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case for having become moot and
academic. Otherwise stated, respondent school has fully complied with its duties under the temporary
mandatory injunction (Rollo, pp. 830- 832).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, but in the light of compassionate equity, students
Who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year
when this petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133254-55 April 19, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon
City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of §16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of §8 of
the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P700, 000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28, 1995. In
Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license and/or
prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW .2
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not
being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of
Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW ,3
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty4 whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist and chief of
the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo
Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10,
Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant5 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Dasmariñias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St.,
Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-
buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in
accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet
inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge
Dolores L. Español.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer,
went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.6
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened it. They heard people
inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the
house.7
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching
the house.8 They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves
which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint9 having a total weight of approximately 1,255
grams.10 A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. 11
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.12
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence.13 The white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37
grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of
dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.14
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his
mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their
house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in
civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the
roof.15
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was
waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and
he had no chance to read it.16
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen
conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber
firearm, jewelry , and canned goods.17
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on accused-
appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was
detained.18
Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified that the
policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and other valuables. 19
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a
minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks are
hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The evidence custodian of
this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation
pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE(SHABU)
 THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION §8, R.A.
No. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN
ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of the shabu allegedly
recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it
was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant
pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the
execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure21 provides that a search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify its issuance.22 Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the
legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH WARRANT
NO.160 For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO
V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to
believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San
Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex "A", the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the
premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated properties
and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no probable cause
to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense;
and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia." Evidence
was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void because no
evidence was presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have been
ordered to be seized by the trial court.23
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who acted as a
poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything about drug
paraphernalia. He stated:
Q -Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you
remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A -Yes, sir.
Q – Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
A – Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan St.,
San Jose Quezon City, Sir.
Q – Do You know the person who occupies the specific place?
A – Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q – Are you familiar with that place?
A – Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established
contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to the former.
Q – In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A – When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir .
Q – Were you able to buy at that time?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A – I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir .
Q – Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the stuff
(shabu) were being kept?
A – Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q – How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A – When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I saw that
the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q – Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A – Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q – How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine
shabu?
A – After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and
reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12, grams of shabu I
bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central
Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a
regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19
December 95.
Q – Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
 A – Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy bigger
quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q – Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A – Yes, sir.24
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material
only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the
search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of
drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which
evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,25 the
warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a
whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if
viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect
to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to
the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and
seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other
articles. ...In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions "of a warrant will be treated
as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained
which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of
particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the
seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant
procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly
describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in
authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.26 Accordingly, we hold that the first part
of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity
of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because
possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished
under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.27 It will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar case to
dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with "Violation of
R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it is clearly recited in the text
thereof that "There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias 'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of
No.628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and custody of
marijuana dried stalks/leaves/ seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt
narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above." Although the specific
section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific
offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search
warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be
made of the "place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 28
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso29 the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425," without specifying
what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of "dried marijuana leaves
and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic)." This Court, however, upheld
the validity of the warrant:
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1) offense,
hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in
semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of
marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific
offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants,
one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for
illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a
special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and
"regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or
which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly
issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30
Similarly, in another case,31 the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of P .D. No.1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms, etc.)." The validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground that it was issued
without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No.1866, which punished several offenses. We held,
however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under §1 of P.D. No.1866 and illegal possession
of explosives is penalized under §3 thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within
the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No.1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary
to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
Particularly of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with
sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
.....While the address stated in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City," the trial
court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No.160 contained several
documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search
warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No.7 and 11 at
Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the premises
as "a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil
sketch of the location of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who raided
appellant's house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have
been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant
lives and in fact Aguilar's place is at the end of appellant's place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house
raided by Aguilar's team is undeniably appellant'.s house and it was really appellant who was the
target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant was inside his
residence before they actually started their operation.32
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.33 For example, a search
warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough,
Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the
ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description
was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was
occupied by the accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass."34 In this case, the location of
accused-appellant's house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the
warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.1âwphi1.nêt
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellant's residence, Search
Warrant No.160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined
by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not
marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was seized within
the "plain view" of the searching party. This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.35 For this doctrine
to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate
apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.36 The question is whether these requisites were
complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is
reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the
search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for admitting
the other items subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification -
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused -and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.37
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search pursuant to
"accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is
limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control.18 The rationale for
permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or
to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-
appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the
search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in
his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This
case is similar to People. v. Musa39 in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM
agents because the said drugs were contained in plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents. We
explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen,
they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When
the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v.
California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this
case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not
forcibly opened it; Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the
plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their
"plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents
of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be
claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer .40
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to
justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.41 In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in
the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a
transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as
marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for
failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in
accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against
accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the searching party in
effecting the raid.
Rule 126, §7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure42 provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. - The officer, if refused admittance to the place of
directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner
door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain entry and
had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit
or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by
accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be
doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the
fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious
movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry
into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated
unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon
City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under §16 of R.A.
No.6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison
term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride is AFFIRMED .
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant Roberto
Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under §8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Pl00,000.00 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused- appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the
confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably
there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses
— like "stop-and-frisk" — which are graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the
lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional
rights against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.
The Case
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its Resolution dated
January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon."
In an Information dated April 11, 1988,1 Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan
City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly
committed as follows:2
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his custody, possession and control
crushed marijuana residue, which is a prohibited drug and knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.3 With the agreement of
the public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond.4 After trial in due course,
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May
19, 1989 a decision5convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:6
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended (Illegal Possession of Marijuana residue), and hereby sentences (sic) said accused to
suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay
the costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant remained on provisional liberty.7
Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of
Appeal8dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court9 promulgated its assailed Decision,
denying the appeal and affirming the trial court:10
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
Costs against appellant.
Respondent Court11 denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1994, disposing:
ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby DENIED.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:12
At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of
the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan
City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat.
Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the
official car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of
information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then
chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male
person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male
person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as
police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The
male person tried to resist. Pat Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said
male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to
examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed
marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also
turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The
man turned out to be the accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong
wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote "Evidence "A" 4/11/88 Alain
Manalili". The white sheet of paper was marked as Exhibit "E-3". The residue was originally wrapped
in a smaller sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit "E-4").
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section
requesting a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit "D"). Cpl. Tamondong
thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the apprehending policemen (Exhibit "A"). Pat. Angel
Lumabas handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit "D") to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
including the subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas
appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit "D".
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the subject
marijuana residue at 7:40 o'clock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion
of Exhibit "D".
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations of the
specimen which she identified. (Exhibit
"E")13 Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as "crushed marijuana leaves" in her
Certification dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit "F").14 These crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results
for marijuana, according to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this examination,
she also found that the "crushed marijuana leaves" gave positive results for marijuana. She then
prepared a Final Report of her examinations (Exhibit "G").
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope
and sealed it. (Exhibit "E"). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit "E-1").
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit "F" from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section
to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to
the City Fiscal of Kalookan City. (Exhibit "C")
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front of the
cemetery when he was apprehended.15
Version of the Defense
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows:16
 At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a
tricycle at A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house.
Three policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone
passenger were under the influence of marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the
tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The policemen then bodily
searched the accused and the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused asked the policemen why
he was being searched and the policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying marijuana.
However, nothing was found on the persons of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed
the tricycle driver to go while they brought the accused to the police headquarters at Kalookan
City where they said they would again search the accused.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signalled the latter to
follow him. The neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters.
Upon arrival thereat, the accused was asked to remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor
and another companion. The policemen turned over the pants of the accused over a piece of
bond paper trying to look for marijuana. However, nothing was found, except for some dirt and
dust. This prompted the companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to release
the accused. The accused was led to a cell. The policemen later told the accused that they found
marijuana inside the pockets of his pants.
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought outside the cell
and was led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen to call his parents in order to
"settle" the case. The policemen who led the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat.
Espiritu and Cpl. Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman who told the accused to call his
parents. The accused did not call his parents and he told the policemen that his parents did not
have any telephone.
At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the office of
an inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was found on his person but
the Fiscal told the accused not to say anything. The accused was then brought back to the
Kalookan City Jail.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and the
accused were stopped by policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said
that the policemen found nothing either on his person or on the person of the accused when both
were searched on April 11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the Kalookan
City Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched the accused who was
made to take off his pants at the police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of
the accused.
Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several pictures showing that
tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery.17
The Rulings of the Trail and the Appellate Courts
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the strength of the
arresting officers' testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were "neutral and disinterested" witnesses,
testifying only on what transpired during the performance of their duties. Substantially they asserted that the
appellant was found to be in possession of a substance which was later identified as crushed marijuana
residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellant's defense that this charge was merely "trumped up," because the
appellant neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a
reinvestigation before the city fiscal of Kalookan City.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on speculations,
surmises or conjectures. On the alleged "serious" discrepancies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, the
appellate court ruled that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of the
narration. It further found petitioner's contention — that he could not be convicted of illegal possession of
marijuana residue — to be without merit, because the forensic chemist reported that what she examined
were marijuana leaves.
Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and)
in ruling that the guilt of the accused had been proved (beyond) reasonable
doubt.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses were material and substantial and not minor.
IV
The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused
was framed for the purpose of extorting money.
V
The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence
presented is consistent with both innocence and guilt.
VI
The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which
are inadmissible in evidence.
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against him, (2) the
credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate courts of the defense of
extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized
During a Stop-and-Frisk
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that they were
products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted
as memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived
because petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their admissibility in
evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search was legal because
it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the
landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio,18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a
police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior
he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
 initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon
seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.19
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime
prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and
manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable
cause to make an actual arrest. This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden
discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have
hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended period of time, while not waiting for anyone;
paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred with a third person. It would have
been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years' experience to have failed to investigate this behavior
further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held that what
justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously
secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to
challenge.20 Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a "fruit of
the poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:
Sec. 3. . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
This right, however, is not absolute.21 The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized
exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2)
search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused
themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure."22 In People vs. Encinada,23 the Court
further explained that "[i]n these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as
the essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best,
defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched."
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without
a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,24 the Court held that there were many instances where a search
and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-
frisk. In said case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying
a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of
live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of
the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained
a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a
situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his
shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant
had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police
information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics
Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were
"high." The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high
on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's possession:25
FISCAL RALAR:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan
Cemetery, Sangandaan, Caloocan City?
A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were
roaming around at A. Mabini Street in front of the Caloocan Cemetery,
Caloocan City.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel
Lumabas and one Arnold Enriquez, what happened, if any?
A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery
then when we called his attention, he tried to avoid us, then prompting us to
approach him and introduce ourselves as police officers in a polite manner.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced
upon him?
A That person seems like he is high on drug.
Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced
upon was high on drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.
Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?
A He was roaming around, sir.
Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?
A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite
manner, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourselves?
A In a polite manner, sir.
Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?
A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.
Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was
holding in his hands?
 A He tried to resist, sir.
Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?
A I requested him if I can see what was he was (sic) holding in his hands.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was he holding?
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic)
crushed residue.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during
the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search,
requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person
waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to
relinquish the right.26 Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary
right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its
violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal
cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by
petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.27
Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers' testimony contained "polluted, irreconcilable and
unexplained" contradictions which did not support petitioner's conviction.
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great weight and
respect, since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified before it.
Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court
which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a departure
from this rule.28
We concur with Respondent Court's ruling:
(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies in the
prosecution witnesses' testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential
veracity of their narration. In People vs. Avila, it was held that — "As long as the witnesses concur on
the material points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the
essential veracity of their statements.
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, the bestowal of
full credence on Pat. Espiritu's testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas'
contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint Affidavit29 signed by both arresting
policemen. The question of whether the marijuana was found inside petitioner's wallet or inside a plastic bag
is immaterial, considering that petitioner did not deny possession of said substance. Failure to present the
wallet in evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in petitioner's possession. This shows that such
contradiction is minor and does not destroy Espiritu's credibility.30
Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.31
The substance found in petitioner's possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be
crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioner's lack of authority to possess these leaves was established. His
awareness thereof was undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the
policemen and that he resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he was holding. Such behavior
clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds to believe the
extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case against the arresting
officers or present any evidence other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for his life was lame
and unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail as early as April 26,
1988.32 Since then, he could have made the charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the custody of
the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this Court with disfavor, because it is easy to
concoct and fabricate.33
The Proper Penalty
The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended)
by sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of imprisonment, aside from the
imposed fine of six thousand pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty:
Sec. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those
who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those
whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced
by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty for illegal
possession of marijuana:
Sec. 8. . . . .
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging
from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess or use Indian hemp.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years.34
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to
PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-
ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per Curiam Resolution of this
Court promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding him guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending
him indefinitely from the practice of law; and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration of the
same Resolution holding her in contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing violated his right to life and
due process of law and by reason thereof the Order is null and void; that the acts of misconduct imputed to
him are without basis; that the charge against him that it was he who had circulated to the press copies of
the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan is unfounded such that, even in this Court's Resolution, his having
distributed copies to the press is not stated positively; that the banner headline which appeared In the Daily
Express is regrettable but that he was not responsible for such "misleading headline;" that he "did nothing of
the sort" being fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law practitioner and officer of the Court; that as a
former newspaperman, he would not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of the Complaint to
the press in envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would have written stories about the case in a
manner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicy articles perhaps, something that would have further
subjected the respondent justices to far worse publicity;" that, on the contrary, the press conference
scheduled by Ilustre was cancelled through his efforts in order to prevent any further adverse publicity
resulting from the filing of the complaint before the Tanodbayan; that, as a matter of fact, it was this Court's
Resolution that was serialized in the Bulletin Today, which newspaper also made him the subject of a
scathing editorial but that he "understands the cooperation because after all, the Court rendered a
favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year;" that he considered it "below his dignity to plead for
the chance to present his side" with the Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez, "a long-time personal friend" since he "can
afford to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the Honorable Court uphold its integrity;" that he was called
by a reporter of DZRH and was asked to comment on the case filed before the Tanodbayan but that his
remarks were confined to the filing of the case by Ilustre herself, and that the judgment of the trial Court had
attained its finality long ago; that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and did not prepare the
complaint filed before it, his professional services having been terminated upon the final dismissal of Ilustre's
case before this Court; that similarities in the language and phraseology used in the Ilustre letters, in
pleadings before this Court and before the Tanodbayan do not prove his authorship since other lawyers
"even of a mediocre caliber" could very easily have reproduced them; that the discussions on the merits in
the Per Curiam Resolution are "more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M. Gonzales being
competent to deal with the case before him;" that he takes exception to the accusation that he has
manifested lack of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the two highest Courts of the land, all he did
having been to call attention to errors or injustice committed in the promulgation of judgments or orders;
that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or abetted and could not have prevented the contemptuous
statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of Eva Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer his client when
these alleged acts were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the reminder on the first duty of a lawyer
which is to the Court and not to his client, a duty that he has always impressed upon his law students;" and
finally, that "for the record, he is sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the complaint
against the Justices before the Tanodbayan."
In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her main ground the alleged
deprivation of her constitutional right to due process. She maintains that as contempt proceedings are
commonly treated as criminal in nature, the mode of procedure and rules of evidence in criminal
prosecution should be assimilated, as far as practicable, in this proceeding, and that she should be given
every opportunity to present her side. Additionally, she states that, with some sympathetic lawyers, they
made an "investigation" and learned that the Resolution of the First Division was arrived at without any
deliberation by its members; that Court personnel were "tight-lipped about the matter, which is shrouded
mystery" thereby prompting her to pursue a course which she thought was legal and peaceful; that there is
nothing wrong in making public the manner of voting by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she
addressed Identical letters to Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani Cruz and
Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of my opponents were not a Solicitor General, and member of the
Supreme Court and a Division Chairman, respectively, the resolution of May 14, 1986 would not have
aroused my suspicion;" that instead of taking the law into her own hands or joining any violent movement,
she took the legitimate step of making a peaceful investigation into how her case was decided, and
brought her grievance to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against those whom she felt had committed
injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."
We deny reconsideration in both instances.
The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit. What due process
abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The
word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this
Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the
reasons why he should not be subjected to dispose action. His Answer, wherein he prayed that the action
against him be dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also
given a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or the
official actions of the Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the contempt
proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced. Both were afforded
ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having authored the letters written by Ilustre, his
being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed
before said body, and his having committed acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court believed
otherwise and found that those letters and the charges levelled against the Justices concerned, of
themselves and by themselves, betray not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but also the
lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete obliviousness to the fundamental principle
of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the cardinal doctrine of independence of the
Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to have been said or proven. The necessity to conduct
any further evidentially hearing was obviated (See People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19,
1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and Ilustre were given ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact,
heard.
(1)
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his Answer to the show-cause
Resolution that his professional services were terminated by Ilustre after the dismissal of the main petition by
this Court; that he had nothing to do with the contemptuous letters to the individual Justices; and that he is
not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan.
Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre's Complaint was
furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the complainant" at his address of record. Of note, too, is the fact that
it was he who was following up the Complaint before the Tanodbayan and, after its dismissal, the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.
Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this Court, that after having failed to
serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at her address of
record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City," having been informed that she is 6 not a resident of the
place," he proceeded to the residence of Atty. Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the two
copies of decision for her husband and for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. 11).
That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs. Laureta is shown by the
fact that she filed, as of March 27, 1987, a "Petition for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration"
and subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the
Resolution on March 12, 1987, the very same date Mrs. Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-
client relationship between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedly completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta
had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copy intended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty.
Laureta proved to be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie- up between the corespondents is heightened
by the fact that three process servers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution
on Ilustre personally.
Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a "reporter" of DZRH
to comment on the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the
complaint, he would not have been pinpointed at all. And if his disclaimer were the truth, the logical step for
him to have taken was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of
elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did nothing of the sort. " He gave his comment with alacrity.
The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces when he asserts in his
Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the
serialized publication of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing
editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin
union case last year." The malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming of an officer of the Court and
is an added reason for denying reconsideration.
challenged Resolutions of the First Division emphasizes the irrespective of Ilustre's case irrespective of the
personalities involved.
Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process servers the run-around. Three of
them failed to serve on her personally her copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 at her
address of record. Mrs. Laureta informed process server Lorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre was residing at 17-D,
Quezon St., Tondo, Manila. Romeo C. Regala, another process server, went to that address to serve copy of
the Resolution but he reported:
4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of ms.Eva Maravilla-Ilustre, said
address could not be located;
5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17 Quezon Street, Tondo,
Manila, and they informed that there is no such Ms. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre in the
neighborhood and/or in the vicinity; ... (p. 672, Rollo, Vol. 11).

Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court's Per Curiam Resolution The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy of this Court's Resolution on
are more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, forgetting, however, his own discourse on the merits in his Ilustre. He reported:
Answer to this Court's Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He thus incorrigibly insists on subordinating the 2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house in the address furnished
Judiciary to the executive notwithstanding the categorical pronouncement in the Per Curiam Resolution of at; the notice of judgment (101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City), and was received
March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code has no application to the members of a by an elderly woman who admitted to be the owner of the house but vehemently refused
collegiate Court; that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a to be Identified, and told me that she does not know the addressee Maravilla, and told
collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended dissertation in the same Per me further that she always meets different persons looking for Miss Maravilla because the
Curiam Resolution on the fundamental principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances, latter always gives the address of her house;
pursuant to which it is this Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all
justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or 3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in the same place trying to
declare them 'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice." serve a resolution to Miss Maravilla which was returned unserved because she is not
known in the place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).
Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of this Court are
belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance for the "adverse publicity" And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for Reconsideration she persists in giving that
generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned before the Tanodbayan rings with address at 101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers were told that she was not a
insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that very purpose. The threat to bring the case to resident of and that she was unknown thereat. If for her contumacious elusiveness and lack of candor alone,
"another forum of justice" was implemented to the fun. Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure Ilustre deserves no further standing before this Court.
to the glare of publicity is an occupational hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it is
ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G. Laureta for the setting
because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to destroy the
aside of the order suspending him from the practice of law, and of Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the lifting of the
"authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court
penalty for contempt are DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustre shall pay the fine of P1,000.00
as the final arbiter of all justifiable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the Courts
imposed on her within ten (10) days from notice, or, suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure to pay
and the Justices concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice.
said fine within the stipulated period.
In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that would call for a modification,
SO ORDERED.
much less a reversal, of our finding that he is guilty of grave professional misconduct that renders him unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to an attorney and officer of the
Court.
(2)
Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned deaf ears to any reason or
clarification. She and her counsel have refused to accept the untenability of their case and the inevitability
of losing in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone to blind their actions and in so doing degraded the
administration of justice. "Investigation" was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court,
be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation. The fact that no dissent was indicated
in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986 showed that the members of the Division voted
unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case because all deliberations
are held behind closed doors without any one of them being present. No malicious inferences should have
been drawn from their inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired The personality of
the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It was Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was
Chairman of the First Division when the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was rendered.
Thereafter Justice Yap inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en banc upheld the
G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC,
TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL
RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice,
Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
RESOLUTION
EN BANC:
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to
national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former
President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:
In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately
conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos
will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this
administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p,
443.]
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following major arguments:
1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the
inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the
rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;
2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and
3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the
Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to
return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of
the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.
Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is
moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by
the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance
a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at
destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants, petitioner
herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.
2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of the view
that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's
decision.
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario
under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses
has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of
erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the
basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not
Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all
the courts of the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]
3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to
comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly
enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of
the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific
power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power.
That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized
under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three (3)
separate branches.
Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere
shorthand for the specific executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the
difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional language of
article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States
. . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be
considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of execution
power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity with other
parts of the Constitution...
In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the
federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as
not forbidden by the constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by
specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where
limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional
concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept suggests only that
not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that,
within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is implied unless there or
elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]
And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual powers is
tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers
of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973
Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which provides:
Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or
is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action,
he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which
shall form part of the law of the land,
There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the
President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an
express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific
power of legislation.
4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to
protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with
this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of
discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321 March 10, 2004
VICTORY LINER, INC., represented by JOHNNY T. HERNANDEZ, President, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO B. BELLOSILLO, respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
For our resolution is the verified complaint of Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) against respondent Judge Reynaldo B.
Bellosillo, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Orani, Bataan, and Acting
Presiding Judge of the MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse
of authority, oppression, and inaction on a pending motion.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 2 March 2000, while a Victory Liner bus bearing Plate No. CWF-935 was cruising along the National
Highway of Dinalupihan, Bataan, it accidentally hit and fatally injured Marciana Bautista Morales. Marciana
died the following day. VLI shouldered all the funeral and burial expenses of Marciana. Subsequently, on 6
March 2000, VLI and the heirs of the victim entered into an Agreement/Undertaking.1 On 14 March 2000,
after payment by VLI of the claims, Faustina M. Antonio, the authorized and designated representative of
the heirs of the victim, executed a Release of Claim2 and an Affidavit of Desistance3 in favor of VLI and the
driver Reino de la Cruz.
However, earlier or on 3 March 2000, two of Marciana’s sons Rolando B. Soriano and Jimmy B. Morales, who
were also signatories to the Agreement/Undertaking, executed a Pinagsamang Salaysay4 against Reino de
la Cruz. On the strength of that document, a criminal complaint was filed with the MCTC of Dinalupihan-
Hermosa, Bataan, for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
10512.
After preliminary examination, or on 13 March 2000, respondent Judge Bellosillo ordered the immediate
issuance of a warrant of arrest against De la Cruz and fixed his bail at P50,000 to be posted in cash. He
further directed the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan, to immediately impound the bus involved in the
accident, which could be released only upon the posting of a cash bond in the amount of P50,000.6
On 30 March 2000, VLI filed a Manifestation and Motion7 manifesting that it was depositing to the court under
protest a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of its bus. After making the deposit, VLI’s counsel presented
the receipt issued by the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Dinalupihan, to the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan,
who then released the bus.
On 4 April 2000, VLI filed with respondent’s court a petition8 to declare null and void the order directing it to
post bond for the release of its bus. This petition was, however, dismissed for improper venue and lack of
jurisdiction.
On that same day also, respondent Judge Bellosillo issued an order directing the Chief of Police of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, and his deputies and investigators to explain in writing why they should not be held in
contempt of court for, and be administratively charged with, having released without a court order the
Victory Liner bus involved in Criminal Case No. 10512. Thus, the bus was re-impounded by the police
authorities of Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Subsequently, on 18 April 2000, respondent Judge acted on VLI’s Manifestation and Motion dated 30 March
2000 and issued an order9 for the release of the bus.
On 23 June 2000, VLI filed a verified complaint10 with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) claiming
that the respondent (a) is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in impounding its bus and requiring it to post a
cash bond for the release of the bus; (b) gravely abused his authority when it revoked the surety bond of
one of VLI’s driver Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373; (c) knowingly rendered an unjust and oppressive
order when he increased the bond to P350,000 and required that it be posted in cash; (d) gravely abused
his authority when he ordered the police authorities of Dinalupihan, Bataan, to file a case against Reino de
la Cruz; and (e) is guilty of inaction or dereliction of duty in failing to resolve, despite the lapse of two months,
VLI’s petition for the nullification of the order requiring the posting of a cash bond for the release of the bus
involved in the accident. Later, VLI filed with the Office of the Chief Justice a verified supplemental
complaint against the respondent, which was forthwith indorsed to the OCA.
In his comment,11 respondent Judge Bellosillo explains that in the exercise of his sound discretion and in the
greater interest of justice and fair play, he required a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of the police-
impounded vehicle to answer for damages by way of subsidiary liability in case of accused’s insolvency. The
requirement of a bond for the release of impounded vehicles involved in reckless imprudence cases is
practiced not only by him but by other judges throughout the country.
As for his order for the re-impounding of the Victory Liner bus, respondent Judge claims that it was just under
the circumstances considering that its prior release was illegal. The payment of cash bond for the release of
the impounded vehicle was made by the VLI when respondent Judge was at his official station in the MCTC
of Orani-Samal, Bataan. Thus, in his absence, no order could have been issued for the release of the
impounded vehicle. If ever said vehicle had to be re-impounded, it was the fault of VLI’s counsel, as he was
the one who misled the police authorities into believing that with the payment of the bond, the bus could
already be released.
The respondent justifies the substitution of the surety bond of accused Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No.
9373 with a cash bond on the strength of the prayer of the prosecutor that the bond be posted in cash in
view of the gravity of the offense. The Rules of Court leave to the discretion of trial judges the question of
whether a bail should be posted in the form of a corporate surety bond, property bond, cash deposit, or
personal recognizance. Having found that Serrano’s surety bond, which was not even attached to the
information but merely noted on the third page thereof, was in a minimal amount and had expired already,
he required a cash bond. He increased the bond after considering that Serrano was a fugitive from justice.
Respondent Judge Bellosillo denies that he ordered the police authorities of Dinalupihan to file the criminal
case against Reino de la Cruz. He points to (a) the Pinagsamang Salaysay dated 3 March 2000 of Rolando B.
Soriano and Jimmy B. Morales, which was the basis for the filing of the criminal complaint by the police
investigator and; (b) the fact that said criminal complaint filed by the police investigator was duly approved
by the Chief of Police. Thus, with these circumstances, it could not be said that he compelled the police
authorities into filing the criminal case.
As to the charge of dereliction of duty for failure to act on the petition for the nullification of the order
requiring a bond for the release of VLI’s bus, respondent Judge avers that the same is baseless. Contrary to
VLI’s contention, he acted on that petition as early as 10 April 2000, which was the date set by VLI’s counsel
for the hearing of such petition.12 VLI’s counsel did not appear on that date and refused to accept or
receive notices of hearing and court orders from court personnel.
In his Report and Recommendation, retired Justice Narciso T. Atienza, the OCA Consultant to whom this
case was referred by the Court, submits that Judge Bellosillo’s resignation, which was accepted by the
Court En Banceffective 27 March 2002, does not render moot and academic the instant administrative
complaint. He finds that the respondent Judge erred in ordering the impounding of the Victory Liner bus and
in requiring a cash bond of P50,000 for its release; in fixing an excessive bail bond for Reino de la Cruz in
Criminal Case No. 10512; and in increasing the bail bond of Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373
unconscionably from P60,000 to P350,000. He then recommends that the respondent Judge be penalized
with a fine of P20,000. But for lack of evidence, he exonerates respondent Judge from complainant’s charge
that he compelled the police authorities into filing the criminal case against De la Cruz. As to respondent’s
alleged inaction on VLI’s petition to declare null and void the order requiring a bond for the release of the
subject bus, Justice Atienza finds that the said petition was resolved on 10 April 2000, right on the day it was
submitted for resolution. Likewise, he disregards the additional charges in the supplemental complaint, there
being no showing that the respondent received a copy thereof.
Justice Atienza also notes that in A.M. No. 00-1293, promulgated on 5 July 2000, respondent Judge was
reprimanded for issuing a policy action and an order beyond the scope of his authority; and in MTJ No. 00-
1308, promulgated on 16 December 2002, respondent Judge was found guilty of undue delay in rendering a
decision and was ordered to pay a fine of P11,000 to be taken from his retirement benefits. He further notes
the pending administrative cases against respondent Judge: (1) OCA IPI No. 96-232-MTJ for conduct
unbecoming a judge; (2) OCA IPI No. 98-533-MTJ for ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and
gross misconduct; (3) OCA IPI No. 96-203-MTJ for issuing an unjust interlocutory order and gross ignorance of
the law; (4) A.M. No. 99-1222 for violation of the constitutional rights to information and to speedy trial; and
(5) undocketed cases for unprofessional and ill-mannered conduct, refusing to receive documents, and
illegal possession of firearms.
Verily, the resignation of respondent Judge Bellosillo does not render moot and academic the instant
administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge ceased to be in office during the pendency
of this case. The Court retains its jurisdiction to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the
charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications.13
We agree with Justice Atienza in exonerating the respondent from the charges of inaction on a pending
motion and of compelling the police authorities to file a criminal case against De la Cruz. We, however,
hesitate to hold the respondent administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the law in ordering (1)
the impounding of the vehicle involved in the vehicular accident and (2) the posting of a P50,000 bond for
the release of the vehicle, both of which were found by OCA Consultant Atienza to be erroneous.
Notably, in its Motion to Resolve, VLI submits that this case presents a good occasion for us to resolve, among
other issues, "the legality of the imposition by trial judges on bus operators to post bail bond for their
impounded vehicles in accident cases, in addition to the bail bond required for the provisional liberty of
accused-drivers." According to VLI, our ruling on this matter would guide trial court judges nationwide in
accident cases so that bus operators and their personnel would not be at the mercy of judges like the
respondent in this case, who during his incumbency had been requiring vehicle owners involved in
accidents to post cash bonds for the release of impounded vehicles.
In Lacadin v. Mangino,14 the respondent Judge therein was sought to be administratively liable for extending
the lifetime of a search warrant issued by him. We held that even if he may have committed an error of
judgment or an abuse of discretion for such act, he cannot be punished administratively therefor in the
absence of proof that he was motivated by ignominy or ill-will. Moreover, we ruled that the administrative
case is not the right forum to determine whether the life of a search warrant may be extended by the court
upon proper motion filed before the expiration of the 10-day period.
Worth noting also is the case of Cañas v. Castigador.15 In that case, an Isuzu trailer truck involved in a
vehicular mishap was ordered impounded in an Order of 11 September 1996 of the trial court where the
criminal case against its driver was pending. That order was addressed to the Chief of Police of General Trias,
Cavite, or any officer of the law. In an earlier order of 14 August 1996, the vehicle owner was required to
surrender the truck to the court. Subsequently, on motion of the prosecutor, the trial court declared the
vehicle owner guilty of indirect contempt for continued defiance of the 11 September 1996 Order. However,
upon the vehicle owner’s petition, we found respondent’s order holding the petitioner therein guilty of
indirect contempt to be highly improper for several reasons. But we did not pass upon the issue of the
legality of the impounding of the vehicle involved in the vehicular accident. We did not declare the order
for the impounding of the vehicle to be illegal or unauthorized. If it were so, it could have been one of the
several reasons for admonishing the respondent Judge therein.
In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to determine the issue of the legality of
respondent’s order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should
have raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly to us, and much less by way of an administrative
case. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,16 the propensity of
litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking a ruling directly
from us must be put to a halt.17
It must be recalled that on 4 April 2000, VLI filed with respondent judge’s court a Petition to Declare Order
Directing Victory Liner, Inc., to Post Bond for the Release of the Bus Null and Void.18 In that petition, VLI
submitted that there is no legal basis for the order directing the impounding of the bus and the posting by
the bus owner of a cash bond for its release, and hence that order is void ab initio.19 However, despite
notice, VLI’s counsel Atty. Reynaldo R. Romero did not appear on 10 April 2000, the schedule20 for the
hearing of that petition as set by him.21 The respondent thereupon issued an order22 dismissing the petition
outright on grounds of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction, and ordering that a copy of the said order be
furnished VLI’s counsel at his given address. However, VLI’s counsel reportedly refused to accept or receive
from court personnel notices of hearing and court orders. And, according to respondent Judge, he (VLI’s
counsel) never appeared and continued not to appear before the respondent for reasons known only to
him.23 VLI cannot, therefore, resurrect that issue directly before us, and much less through a mere verified
administrative complaint or motion to resolve.
To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon directly from us through an
administrative case would be to countenance a disregard of the established rules of procedure and of the
hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be able to evade compliance with the requirements inherent in the filing
of a proper petition, including the payment of docket fees. Hence, we shall shun from passing upon that
issue in this case.
In any event, the absence of a ruling in Cañas v. Castigador on the legality of the impounding of vehicles
involved in an accident, as well as the foregoing statements of VLI in its Motion to Resolve, implies that there
is yet no clear-cut policy or rule on the matter. They would, therefore, negate a finding of gross ignorance of
the law or grave abuse of authority on the part of respondent Judge. Moreover, even assuming that the
acts of the respondent in ordering the impounding and subsequent re-impounding of the subject vehicle
and in requiring the posting of a cash bond for its release were erroneous, as found by OCA Consultant
Atienza, such are errors of judgment that cannot be the subject of a disciplinary action absent proof of
fraud, dishonesty, corruption, or bad faith.24 A judge may not be held administratively liable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be to render a judicial office unbearable,
for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in rendering a judgment. For a judge to be held administratively liable for ignorance of the law, it is
necessary that the law be sufficiently basic that all that the judge must do is to simply apply it;25 or that the
error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith.26
We, however, find respondent administratively liable for imposing excessive cash bail bonds on accused
Reino de la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512 and Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373.
The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody the right to bail except those charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong.27 Section 9, Rule 114 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,28 provides that in fixing the amount of bail, the judge must
primarily consider the following factors:
a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
c) Penalty for the offense charged;
d) Character and reputation of the accused;
e) Age and health of the accused;
f) The weight of the evidence against the accused;
g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;
h) Forfeiture of the bonds;
i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.
The amount of bail should, therefore, be reasonable at all times. It should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when required, but no higher than is reasonably calculated to serve this purpose.
Excessive bail shall not be required.29 In implementing this mandate, the accused’s financial capability
should particularly be considered. What is reasonable to a wealthy person may not be so to a man charged
with a like offense. Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive.30
Moreover, under the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the Department of Justice (DOJ), crimes of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, bail shall
be P30,000 regardless of the number of deaths. 31
De la Cruz and Serrano were both charged with the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Although permanently employed as drivers of VLI, it could not be said that each was capable of posting a
cash bail bond of P50,000 and P350,000, respectively. In fixing such amounts, the respondent apparently did
not take into account the gravity of the offense charged and the financial capability of the accused. He
thereby willfully disregarded the guidelines under Section 9, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, and the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the DOJ. In effect, he violated the constitutional
right of the accused to bail, as well as the prohibition against excessive bail, making the right, in the words of
Justice Jackson, "a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper’s will." 32
The bail fixed by the respondent is all the more excessive because it was in the form of cash. The posting of a
cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its procurement could work
untold hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect of altogether denying the accused’s
constitutional right to bail. On the other hand, a surety bond may be obtained by the accused upon the
payment of a relatively small premium. A surety or property bond does not require an actual financial outlay
on the part of the bondsman or the property owner. Only the reputation or credit standing of the bondsman
or the expectancy of the price at which the property can be sold is placed in the hands of the court to
guarantee the production of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to conviction or
acquittal.33
While cash bail is authorized under our rules, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily
belongs to the accused,34 as can be gleaned from the language of Section 14, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended,35 which read:
SEC. 14. Deposit of cash as bail. – The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in
cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the
amount of bail fixed by the court or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the
case, and upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and of a written undertaking showing
compliance with the requirements of Section 2 hereof, the accused shall be discharged from
custody….
The respondent judge, therefore, grossly erred in converting Serrano’s surety bond to cash bond and in
demanding that De la Cruz post a cash bond to obtain their provisional liberty.36
It bears repeating that judges should exhibit more than cursory acquaintance with the basic legal norms
and precepts, as well as with statutes and procedural rules. As advocates of justice and visible
representations of the law, they are expected to keep abreast with the law and jurisprudence, and be
proficient in the application and interpretation thereof. When the law or rule is basic, judges owe it to their
office to simply apply it; anything less than that is gross ignorance of the law.37
In light of our current jurisprudence,38 the respondent should be fined in the amount of P10,000 for his act of
imposing on accused De la Cruz and Serrano an excessive bail to be posted in cash in violation of pertinent
rules and guidelines, as well as the constitutional right of the accused to bail and the proscription against
excessive bail.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law and oppression in imposing excessive cash bail bonds on Reino
de la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512 and Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373, respondent Judge
Reynaldo B. Bellosillo is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) to be taken from his
retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.