Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194

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The role of desires in sequential impulsive choices 夽

Utpal M. Dholakia a,¤, Mahesh Gopinath b, Richard P. Bagozzi c
a
Rice University, Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Management, 6100 Main Street, Houston, TX, USA
b
Old Dominion University, USA
c
University of Michigan, USA

Received 1 May 2003

Available online 1 August 2005

Abstract

The present research provides evidence for a sequential mitigation eVect, which is the phenomenon that participation in a prior
impulsive choice task signiWcantly reduces the decision maker’s likelihood of choosing impulsively in a subsequent task. The results
of Wve experiments: (a) provide evidence for the Sequential Mitigation EVect using diVerent study materials and contexts (Experi-
ments 1–3), (b) show that prior impulsive (as opposed to non-impulsive) choice is required for the eVect to occur (Experiment 4), and
(c) Wnd that the decision maker’s chronic sensitivity to positive and negative outcomes moderates the eVect (Experiment 5). The
results support the notion that desire for impulsive options functions as a limited motivational resource, and being consumed in the
Wrst task, is experienced to a lesser extent in the second task. The sequential mitigation eVect may be characterized as a motivational
contextual inXuence on decision making, complementing existing research showing that cognitive context eVects inXuence sequential
choices.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Sequential decision making; Impulsive choice; Desire; Motivation and decision making

In many everyday activities, decision makers make
sequential choices, where one choice follows another.
For instance, a shopper may choose diVerent products in
sequence during a trip to the mall or a web site. A man-
ager, whose activities are often “characterized by brev-
ity, variety, and discontinuity” (Mintzberg, 1975, p. 50),
may make decisions regarding many diVerent projects
one after the other. And an oYce-worker may plan dis-
tinct activities on Friday to occupy his or her weekend.
Quite a lot is known regarding how prior choices inXu-
ence subsequent ones during sequential decision making.
夽
We thank Sangwon Lee, R. Sukumar, Sudhakar Vissa, and the
folks at MindSearch for their help with data collection, Itamar Simon-
son and Partha Krishnamurthy for their helpful comments, and Scott
Baggett for his suggestions regarding data analysis. We are grateful to
the associate editor and three reviewers for helping to clarify and
strengthen the contribution of this research.
*
Corresponding author. Fax: +1 713 348 6331.
E-mail address: dholakia@rice.edu (U.M. Dholakia).
For instance, a large body of research on contextual
eVects in decision making shows that information used
in a prior choice task inXuences such aspects of a subse-
quent choice as which attributes are used, how they are
weighted, and which option is chosen by the decision
maker (e.g., Dhar & Simonson, 1999; Drolet, 2002;
Simonson & Tversky, 1992). The criteria and processes
studied in this research are largely cognitive.
However, in many cases, such choices also engage, and
are inXuenced by, motivational variables. For instance,
consider an individual making sequential decisions when
visiting a mall or a web site. Such an individual may
encounter many tempting options one(s) after another,
and may have to make decisions regarding what to buy
and where to surf next, respectively, each time. As numer-
ous studies have shown (Lejoyeux, Adés, Tassain, & Sol-
omon, 1996; Rook, 1987; Rook & Fisher, 1995), many
sequential choices can be characterized as impulsive in
the sense that the person considers and chooses option(s)

0749-5978/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.05.003
180 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194

that he/she had not planned on choosing beforehand or
one that he/she would not usually choose. Such choices
often stem from the experience of a sudden and intense
desire for such option(s) by the decision maker (Loewen-
stein, 1996; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2000).
In this research, our interest is in studying how subse-
quent impulsive choices are inXuenced by prior ones,
when such choices are driven by desires. SpeciWcally, we
hypothesize that decision makers will become less likely
to choose an impulsive option on account of having par-
ticipated in a prior impulsive choice task. We refer to this
inXuence as the Sequential Mitigation EVect (SME). In
the Wrst three experiments reported here, we provide evi-
dence for the SME using diVerent study materials and in
diVerent contexts involving sequential impulsive choices.
In the fourth experiment, we verify that participation in
prior impulsive (as opposed to non-impulsive) choice
tasks is required for the SME to occur. This Wnding sup-
ports our proposition that the SME may have a motiva-
tional basis.
We also seek to understand why the SME occurs.
Drawing upon motivational theories of behavior (e.g,
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Naylor, Pritchard, & Ilgen,
1980), limited resource models of motivational strength
(e.g., Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989), as well as recent
research on how self-control functions (e.g., Muraven &
Baumeister, 2000), we conceptualize desire for impulsive
options to be a limited motivational resource of the deci-
sion maker. We suggest that participation in a prior
impulsive choice may consume it, leading to its deple-
tion. As a result, the decision maker may experience
lesser desire for impulsive option(s) in the subsequent
choice, leading to the SME’s occurrence. We test this
proposition in the present research by examining respon-
dents’ expressed desire levels for impulsive options in the
prior and later choice tasks. Across diVerent contexts
and experimental materials, our Wndings reveal a signiW-
cant decrement in desire level from the Wrst to the second
impulsive choice for participants (see Table 1 for a sum-
mary of the results).
Furthermore, in Experiment 5, we consider the mod-
erating role of the decision maker’s chronic sensitivity
to either positive or negative outcomes (e.g., Higgins,
1999). Our goals are: (1) to explore one particular way of

Table 1
Summary of results, Experiments 1–5
Experiment Second (focal) Two-choices participants Single-choice
scenario participants
Desire in Wrst Desire in second % expressing lower desire in
Desire in focal
choice (focal) choice second choice
choice
A: Level of expressed desire
1 Gourmet sandwich 5.08 4.14a,¤¤¤ 72.6b 4.70c,¤
2d Cheesecake — — — —
3 Charity 5.00 3.82a,¤¤¤ 72.2b 4.20c,¤¤¤
4 Sweater 5.71 4.37a,e,¤¤¤ 82.9b,e 5.70c,¤¤¤
5d Cheesecake and sweater — — — —

Experiment Second (focal) Two-choices participants Single-choice

scenario Impulsiveness of Impulsiveness of % choosing less impulsively participants
Wrst choice second (focal) choice in second choice Impulsiveness of
focal choice
B: Impulsiveness of choice
1 Gourmet sandwichf 64.9 44.54a,¤¤¤ 74. 2b 58.0c,¤¤
2 Cheesecakeg 2.92 2.51h 76.9b 3.08c,¤¤
3 Charityf 72.5 52.0a,¤¤¤ 73. 3b 60.3c,¤
4 Sweaterf 78.9 51.9a,e,¤¤¤ 77.1b,e 78.6c,¤¤¤
5 Cheesecakeg,i 2.71 2.45j 63.9b 3.05c,¤¤
Sweaterg,i 3.06 2.26a,¤¤ 71.6b 2.89c,¤¤
a
SigniWcantly lower than Wrst choice.
b
SigniWcantly greater than 50%.
c
SigniWcantly higher than second (focal) choice of two-choices participants.
d
Participants’ desire was not measured in this Experiment.
e
Third scenario results are provided here, results for the second scenario were similar (see text for detailed discussion).
f
Impulsive choice measured using 100-point likelihood scale.
g
Impulsive choice measured using Wve-point behavioral options scale.
h
Lower than Wrst choice at p D .07 level of signiWcance.
i
Only negative outcome sensitivity participants included.
j
Lower than Wrst choice at p D .11 level of signiWcance.
¤
p < .05.
¤¤
p < .01.
¤¤¤
p < .001.
 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
mitigating the SME’s occurrence and (2) to obtain fur-
ther evidence for our proposition that the SME has a
motivational basis. Drawing upon research on the deci-
sion maker’s self-regulatory focus (e.g., Crowe & Hig-
gins, 1997; Freitas, Liberman, Salovey, & Higgins, 2002),
we reasoned that a greater sensitivity to positive out-
comes, marked by heightened appetitive motivation
(Carver & White, 1994), should counteract the depletion
of desire in the Wrst task for decision makers. As a result,
he/she should be more likely to choose the impulsive
option in the second task, leading to attenuation of the
SME. Such an eVect is not expected for those with a neg-
ative outcome sensitivity who have a heightened aversive
motivation. For such individuals, the SME should be
persistent.
From a theoretical standpoint, our Wndings comple-
ment existing judgment and decision making research
examining cognitive contextual inXuences by providing
evidence for a motivational contextual inXuence on
sequential decision making. The Wndings also contribute
to a better understanding of how motivational variables,
speciWcally desires (Loewenstein, 1996), inXuence impul-
sive choices of individuals. Finally, our work contributes
to the growing literature on how decision makers regu-
late their choices and actions (e.g., Muraven & Baumei-
ster, 2000; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003), by providing
evidence that the desire for impulsive options seems to
function as a limited motivational resource of the deci-
sion maker, and by studying sequential decisions
wherein choices are driven by desires.
Theoretical overview
Cognitive contextual inXuences on sequential decision
making
In studying how a prior choice inXuences subsequent
choice, research has shown that decision makers are sus-
ceptible to Background Context EVects (BCEs), whereby
the trade-oV values between attributes in an earlier
choice serve as a frame of reference (i.e., the “Back-
ground Context”) for trade-oV values in later choice
tasks, and inXuence these choices systematically. Mark-
edly, high or low prior trade-oV values between salient
attributes in the earlier option set can lead to the system-
atic selection of one or the other alternative from the
later option set, resulting in occurrence of the BCE (Loe-
wenstein & Prelec, 1993; Simonson & Tversky, 1992; see
also Priester, Dholakia, & Fleming, 2004).
Consider a decision maker who is deciding how much
pre-packaged cheese to buy at the supermarket. Accord-
ing to the BCE, if a Wrst choice establishes a relatively
high cost for the purchase of additional cheese ($3.50 for
100 g or $4.50 for 120 g), a second choice in which pur-
chase of additional cheese is not as expensive ($5.00 for
181
150 g or $7.00 for 210 g) will result in a greater choice of
the alternative with more cheese (i.e., the $7.00 for 210 g
alternative). In contrast, if a Wrst choice establishes a rel-
atively low cost for the purchase of additional cheese
($7.50 for 300 g or $8.50 for 500 g), the same second
choice ($5.00 for 150 g or $7.00 for 210 g) will result in a
greater choice of the alternative with less cheese (i.e., the
$5.00 for 150 g alternative). As such, the second choice is
systematically inXuenced by the trade-oV value between
attributes established by the Wrst choice. This eVect usu-
ally applies to sequential choices within the same cate-
gory of objects.
Other research studying sequential complementary
choices—i.e., choices involving objects in related catego-
ries—has shown that such choices may be susceptible to
either highlighting or balancing eVects, depending on
how the overall task is framed by the decision maker
(Dhar & Simonson, 1999). When the decision maker
frames the task as a trade oV between a goal (such as
enjoyment) and a resource (such as money), he/she is
susceptible to the highlighting eVect, where a subsequent
choice is made using the same criteria as the prior choice.
For instance, in a trade-oV decision frame, if an individ-
ual selects a tasty and expensive entrée in a restaurant,
he will be more likely to select a tasty and expensive des-
sert afterward, for the sake of having a memorable meal.
In this case, the decision maker’s goal, to maximize
enjoyment, drives the later choice once it is used in mak-
ing a prior choice.
In contrast, when decision makers frame their task
as involving the attainment of two opposing goals
(such as pleasure and thrift), they are susceptible to the
balancing eVect. Here, the decision maker uses oppos-
ing criteria when making the second choice, relative to
those used for the Wrst choice, to achieve both goals.
As an example, in the opposing goal attainment frame,
the choice of an expensive tasty entrée in a restaurant
is more likely to be followed by the selection of a
cheaper less-tasty dessert to balance the attainment of
both the pleasure and the thrift goals by the decision
maker.
More recently, in studying sequential choices in diVer-
ent categories, Drolet (2002) demonstrated that the pro-
cesses by which decisions are made, speciWcally the decision
rules used, are also subject to contingency. In her research,
decision makers tended to vary the decision rules that they
used from one choice to the next. For instance, if partici-
pants had selected a lower priced option in an earlier
choice, they tended to choose an option with a higher
price in the later choice. These changes were ascribed to
“inherent rule variability,” meaning that decision makers
favored a change in the decision rules that they used, sim-
ply for the sake of variety.
A common thread running through these analyses of
prior choice inXuences on later choices is the use of an
information processing perspective, reliant on the role
182 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
and function of prior option attributes (e.g., Simonson &
Tversky, 1992), the manner in which the task is framed
(e.g., Dhar & Simonson, 1999) or prior decision rules
(Drolet, 2002) in causing these eVects. Indeed, for this
reason, such inXuences are cognitive contextual inXuences
on sequential decision making.
Furthermore, in contrast to choices involving actions,
researchers have also examined how prior inactions can
inXuence subsequent choices within the same object cat-
egory (Arkes, Kung, & Hutzel, 2002; Butler & High-
house, 2000; Tykocinski, Pittman, & Tuttle, 1995). This
research has found evidence of inaction inertia—the phe-
nomenon that when decision makers forgo an initial
attractive opportunity to act, such as to sign up for a fre-
quent Xyer program, to buy a ski-lift ticket or a pair of
shoes at a discount, etc., they tend to decline a signiW-
cantly less attractive action opportunity subsequently,
choosing not to act even when such an option has a net
positive value. The process underlying this eVect is the
avoidance of anticipated counterfactual regret by the
decision maker (Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998), suggest-
ing that this is a motivational contextual inXuence on
sequential decision making.
In contrast to the studies reviewed here, in the present
research, we study sequential decisions where the deci-
sion maker has the opportunity to choose impulsively
each time from diVerent categories, with desires for the
impulsive option(s) dictating choice.
Conceptualization of impulsive choices and desires
Before explaining the sequential mitigation eVect, it is
useful to elaborate on what we mean by impulsive
choices. We distinguish between “impulsive behavior,”
as deWned by psychologists more generally, and “choos-
ing an impulsive option,” which is of greater relevance to
judgment and decision making research. As a behavioral
tendency, psychologists have long viewed impulsive
behavior as actions stemming from an inclination to
behave reXexively and without deliberation (e.g., Lejo-
yeux et al., 1996; Murray, 1938). A student may impul-
sively skip class, or a manager may impulsively Wre a
subordinate, according to this deWnition. Building on
this idea, the decision making process itself can be
“impulsive,” when the decision maker chooses an alter-
native “spontaneously, unreXectively, immediately, and
kinetically” (Rook & Fisher, 1995, p. 306), without going
through a deliberate thought process, and weighting his
or her options carefully.
Following from such a process, an option chosen by
the decision maker may also be deWned as impulsive. In
this sense, an impulsive choice means that the option
actually chosen deviates from the one that the decision
maker had planned on choosing beforehand, or one that
he/she usually chooses (Dholakia, 2000; Rook & Fisher,
1995). For instance, a shopper who has gone to a grocery
store to buy bread may end up choosing chocolate cake
instead. A person who usually donates to UNICEF
every year may elect to give to the Humane Society
instead, impelled by an unexpected solicitation. In such
cases, the decision maker may be said to choose an impul-
sive option.
The choice of impulsive options is especially relevant
for tasks where there is a gap of time between the initial
decision making process and the decision’s enactment by
the individual (e.g., Bagozzi, Dholakia, & Basuroy,
2003). In these cases, other unconsidered and/or tempt-
ing option(s) may become known at or before the time
of decision enactment, impelling the decision maker to
deviate from acting according to plan. What impels such
a deviation is the experience of desire for the new
option(s).
Desires have been characterized as “urges,” “crav-
ings,” “hot Xashes,” etc., by psychologists (e.g., Loewen-
stein, 1996; Rook, 1987; Rook & Fisher, 1995).
Ontologically, desires: (1) are subjective, (2) have a Wrst
person ontology, i.e., they exist only when experienced by
a person, (3) lead to behavioral intentions since they are
directed toward the object(s) and action(s) involving the
object(s),1 and (4) are motivating in the sense that they
lead to behavior (Bagozzi et al., 2003; Lejoyeux et al.,
1996; Loewenstein, 1996; Searle, 2004). Additionally, in
the present research, we study desires for impulsive
option(s) that: (5) arise from the decision maker’s con-
scious exposure to the new, impulsive option(s), (6)
impel the decision maker to act with respect to the
option(s) within a short window of time, and (7) discour-
age consideration of potential negative consequences
from choosing the impulsive option(s) (Dholakia, 2000;
Lejoyeux et al., 1996; Loewenstein, 1996).
The experience of desires for impulsive options is
quite common in every day decision making, as when
shoppers prepare an actual or mental list of items to buy
at the supermarket beforehand, but are then confronted
with dozens of unconsidered options upon actually visit-
ing the store, or when managers begin a meeting with a
planned discussion agenda, but some tangential issue
comes up during its course and is discussed instead. This
conceptualization of impulsive choice also applies to sit-
uations, where the selection of a particular option at the
time of implementation has become habitual for the
decision maker as in the charity example above, or as
when many people go to the same vacation destination
every summer, eat lunch at the same coVee shop every
day, etc.
Such a conceptualization of impulsive choice empha-
sizes decision implementation, i.e., which option is actu-
ally chosen at the time of enacting the decision, rather
1
It is worth noting that in some cases, desires may be counterinten-
tional, i.e., they may conXict with other active and important goals,
plans, and/or habits of the decision maker (e.g., Loewenstein, 1996).
 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
than the decision making process that precedes choice,
and is consistent with how many every day decisions are
made and enacted (e.g., Bagozzi et al., 2003). This view
also Wts with conceptualizations of time-inconsistent
preferences which show that an option chosen deliber-
ately beforehand is often abandoned afterward in favor
of another, in our terminology, impulsive option, at a
later point in time (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991;
O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2000). The decision maker’s
actual impulsive choice, i.e., whether the person chooses
an impulsive option or not when given the opportunity
to do so, is Wrst key dependent variable in the present
research. Since this choice is driven by desire, desire for
the impulsive option(s) is the second important depen-
dent variable in our analyses.
The Sequential Mitigation EVect
Consider the sequential impulsive choices of a deci-
sion maker involving objects or issues from diVerent cat-
egories. For example, managers may make decisions
regarding diVerent projects, shoppers may choose
sequentially from diVerent product categories during a
trip, and so on. In such cases, cognitive theories of
sequential decision making that we reviewed earlier are
unlikely to be helpful for at least two reasons: (1) the
information used in the Wrst choice may not be applicable
to the second one and (2) such decisions are usually not
made with much thought.2
Considering the motivational aspects of impulsive
decision making provides clearer guidelines in such
cases. Such a perspective suggests that instead of
thought or information content, per se, impulsive
choices are primarily determined by the level of desire
that the decision maker experiences for the impulsive
option(s). To the extent that a tempting (but unplanned
or unusual) option is desired by the decision maker, he/
she will be likely to choose it. When the decision maker
can choose impulsively in sequential choices, desire for
the impulsive option(s) will be experienced each time
and is likely to determine whether each choice in the
sequence is impulsive or not. Therefore, the inXuence of
prior choice on subsequent choices is likely to occur
through the inXuence that the prior choice has on the deci-
sion maker’s experience of desire for the impulsive
option(s) in the second task.
Our main proposition is that when sequential impul-
sive choices are desire-driven, participation in a prior
impulsive choice will reduce the intensity of desire expe-
rienced for the impulsive option(s) in the subsequent
choice, leading to a reduced likelihood of choosing
2
Prior research has shown that cognitive context eVects such as the
Background Contrast EVect occur when decision makers make choices
thoughtfully and information from prior choices is seen as applicable
to subsequent choices (Priester et al., 2004).
183
impulsively, i.e., selecting an impulsive option. We refer
to this inXuence as the “Sequential Mitigation EVect”
(SME).
In explaining occurrence of the SME, we propose that
desire for impulsive options may function as a limited
motivational resource of the decision maker and get con-
sumed upon being experienced by the person. Such a
view of desire as a limited resource or energy reserve is
similar to the notions of motivation (e.g., Kanfer & Ack-
erman, 1989), willpower (e.g., Mischel, 1996), the sexual
drive (e.g., Singer & Toates, 1987), and self-control (e.g.,
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). This view is congenial
with several psychological perspectives and lines of
research.
For example, in their theory of behavior in organi-
zations, Naylor et al. (1980) conceptualize a decision
maker’s motivated actions to be governed by a
resource allocation process, whereby the person dis-
tributes limited motivational resources at his or her
disposal in the service of choosing and performing var-
ious eVortful actions. They posit that “the person uses
some time frame, Wxed or variable, and the motivation
process is one of allocating resources to diVerent acts
within the time frame” (p. 161). Simon (1967) presents
the concept of “emotion,” which he deWnes as a
response to sudden intense stimuli from the environ-
ment which interrupts the decision maker’s ongoing
(planned) behaviors and replaces them with behaviors
concerned with responding to the emotion. These semi-
nal perspectives are consistent with the notions that
desire for impulsive options can be felt and dictate
choice, and it could be allocated between choices, so
that its experience in the Wrst task depletes it for the
subsequent task(s).
Kanfer (1987; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989) also
endorse a limited-resource view of motivation, and fur-
ther diVerentiate between distal motivational processes
that aVect the individual’s decisions to engage resources
toward a particular task and proximal processes that are
concerned with motivational resource allocations
between on-task, oV-task, and self-regulatory activities
of the individual. Implicit in her theory is the idea that
upon use, motivational resources are consumed, and are
available to a reduced extent, subsequently.
The “desire-as-a-limited-motivational-resource” per-
spective is also consistent with Carver and Scheier’s
(1981, 1998) feedback-loop model of self-regulation.
They view behavior to be controlled by discrepancy-
reducing feedback processes such that the eVects of a
particular behavior are compared by the decision maker
to some standard or reference value, and subsequent
behavior is enacted to reduce the discrepancy between
the two. The reference values that the person uses can be
either Wxed end points to be reached, such as goals, or
they can be changing levels of resources available to the
decision maker such as motivational strength or desires
184 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
(Carver & Scheier, 1998, pp. 150–152; see also Baumei-
ster, 2002). This later type of reference value in Carver
and Scheier’s (1998) model supports our explanation for
why the SME may occur, by suggesting that the Wrst
impulsive choice can not only aVect the environment
through the decision maker’s actions but also reduce his
or her available desire for the second choice (the refer-
ence value) through “providing a secondary input” of
depletion (pp. 24–26, 150–152) to the decision maker. As
a result, in the second choice, the decision maker experi-
ences a lower discrepancy between the reference value
and his or her current state (than in the Wrst choice), and
tends to choose less impulsively.
Even more directly with respect to sequential decision
making, recent research on self-control by Muraven and
Baumeister (2000), Muraven and Slessareva (2003),
Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister (1998) also supports this
idea. This work has shown that self-control that may be
conceptualized to be the motivational force that opposes
desire when it is perceived as inconsistent with other
goals and/or values of the decision maker (e.g., Stroud,
1994), functions like a limited resource.
If a person exerts self-control in one task, then his or
her ability to exert self-control again in a second task
soon afterward declines signiWcantly. For example, in
one study, participants were randomly assigned to regu-
late their emotions (either amplifying or suppressing
what they experienced) or not to do so, while watching a
distressing and sad video. All groups then participated in
a second hand-grip task involving stamina and resis-
tance to painful fatigue in one’s hand muscles. The per-
sistence in this task was measured and was the
dependent variable in the study. Results showed that
both groups that had regulated their emotions exhibited
subsequent decrements in physical endurance and persis-
tence in the hand-grip task, when compared to control
group participants (Muraven et al., 1998).
In other laboratory studies, when participants were
initially asked to suppress their thoughts regarding a
white bear, their persistence in a subsequent diYcult task
such as solving anagrams declined signiWcantly after-
ward in one study, and their subsequent eVorts to con-
trol the expression of amusement and enjoyment when
watching a humorous Wlm were impaired in another
study, when compared to control group participants
(Muraven et al., 1998).
To summarize, all of these theories support our prop-
osition that in sequential impulsive choices, the desire
for impulsive options may function as a limited motiva-
tional resource or reserve of the decision maker, so that
it gets consumed in the Wrst impulsive choice, and is
experienced less intensely in the subsequent choice. Con-
sequently, the decision maker will be less likely to choose
the impulsive option(s) in the second task.
As noted earlier, this reasoning applies to sequential
impulsive choices where the options between the two
choices themselves are not directly related to each other
(objectively, or in the decision maker’s mind). As a
result, it does not apply to the sequential selection of
food items from a menu (e.g., Dhar & Simonson, 1999),
where the Wrst choice may Wll the person up and deter-
mine what he/she chooses next, rather than the desire
experienced for options in the subsequent choice. It also
does not apply to those gambling situations, where the
outcome in a Wrst choice is viewed by the gambler as
diagnostic of a subsequent outcome (e.g., a win-streak)
or where an earlier loss creates a “sunk cost eVect” (e.g.,
Arkes & Blumer, 1985), impelling the gambler to try and
recoup his or her losses. Our framework does apply to
sequential decisions where desire evoked by the impul-
sive option(s) is the primary determinant of the decision
maker’s choice each time in the sequence, instead of
other criteria such as appetite, win-streaks or percep-
tions of sunk costs, etc. We now present several experi-
ments providing evidence for the SME, and why it
occurs.
Experiment 1
Method
One hundred thirty-two undergraduate students
participated in the study in exchange for course credit.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the single-
choice (N D 70) or the two-choices (N D 62) conditions.
Those in the single-choice condition responded to a
“gourmet sandwich” scenario alone, whereas those in
the two-choices condition completed a “sweater” sce-
nario Wrst, followed by the gourmet sandwich scenario.
These scenarios were selected based on high levels of
identiWcation with such situations reported by students
of both genders in prior pretests and research.
The sweater scenario reads as follows:
Sweater scenario. “Imagine that you have gone to the
mall to buy a few pairs of socks. As you are walking
through the mall, your eyes fall upon a fashionable and
attractive sweater. It happens to be in your size and
favorite color. The salesperson tells you that the piece on
display is the last one left, and they are unlikely to get
more of the sweaters in this particular style in the
future.”
Participants then responded to questions regarding
their desire to purchase the sweater and their likelihood
of doing so. Desire was measured with the item “My
desire for buying the sweater at that moment can be
described as”: and used a seven-point scale, labeled with
“No desire at all,” “Very weak desire,” “Weak desire,”
“Moderate desire,” “Strong desire,” “Very strong
desire,” and “Very very strong desire.” To measure like-
lihood of choosing impulsively, participants were asked,
 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
“Please indicate your likelihood of buying the sweater
on a scale of 0 to 100 where 0 D deWnitely will not buy,
and 100 D deWnitely will buy. The likelihood that I will
buy the sweater is (0–100): ____.”
The gourmet sandwich scenario was as follows:
Gourmet sandwich scenario. “Imagine that you have
gone to a cafeteria to get a healthy and nutritious salad
for lunch. As you are looking through the display case
while standing in line, you see a special gourmet sand-
wich.”
The participants’ desire and purchase likelihood for
the gourmet sandwich, measured in the same way as the
sweater scenario, were the dependent variables in the
experiment.
Results
Desire for gourmet sandwich
The participant’s desire for the gourmet sandwich
was submitted to a 2 Group (single-choice, two-choices)
ANOVA. Results showed that there was a statistically
signiWcant main eVect of Group (F (1, 127) D 4.86, p < .05,

2 D .04). As expected, participants who had responded
to the sweater scenario before (M D 4.14) expressed sig-
niWcantly lower desire for the gourmet sandwich when
compared to those who responded to the gourmet sand-
wich scenario alone (M D 4.70).
Furthermore, a paired-sample t test was carried out to
compare the desire levels for the sweater and the gour-
met sandwich expressed by two-choices participants.
Results showed that the average desire for the gourmet
sandwich (M D 4.14) was signiWcantly lower than the
average desire for the sweater (M D 5.08, t (58) D 3.53,
p < .001). 72.6% of participants in the two-choices condi-
tion expressed a lower desire for the sandwich than for
the sweater. This percentage is signiWcantly greater than
50% (2 (1) D 12.65, p < .001).
Overall, these results provide support for the “desire
as a limited-motivational-resource” proposition, by
showing that in the condition with two choices, respon-
dents expressed a signiWcantly reduced level of desire for
the second (focal) impulsive choice relative to the Wrst
one, and also when compared to the desire expressed for
this same choice by single-choice participants.
Purchase likelihood of gourmet sandwich
This dependent variable was submitted to a 2 Group
(single-choice, two-choices) ANOVA. Results showed
that there was a signiWcant main eVect of Group (F (1,
132) D 7.08, p < .01,
2 D .05). As expected, individuals
who had responded to the sweater scenario before indi-
cated a signiWcantly lower likelihood of purchasing a
gourmet sandwich, i.e., choosing the impulsive option
afterward (M D 44.5) when compared to those who had
not responded to any scenario before (M D 58.0).
185
InXuence of prior choice on subsequent choice
We examined whether the participant’s Wrst choice
itself may have inXuenced his or her subsequent choice,
as predicted by either highlighting or balancing strate-
gies (Dhar & Simonson, 1999). More speciWcally, partici-
pants could have systematically used a highlighting
strategy, manifested in a strong positive correlation
between the Wrst and the second choices. Alternatively,
they could systematically have used a balancing strategy
instead, leading to a signiWcant negative correlation
between the two choices.3
To determine if either of these strategies explained the
results, we examined the correlations between the desires
and purchase likelihoods for sweater and gourmet sand-
wich for participants in the two-choices condition. The
correlation between desires was .10, p > .40, and between
purchase likelihoods was .22, p > .11, suggesting that the
two-choices participants did not seem to be using either
the highlighting or the balancing strategy systematically.
Discussion
Overall, these results support the SME, since both the
desire and the purchase likelihood for the gourmet sand-
wich were signiWcantly lower for the two-choices condi-
tion participants when compared to the single-choice
condition participants. They also show that two-choices
participants’ desire level in the second choice was
reduced signiWcantly relative to the Wrst choice, support-
ing the notion that desires may be consumed in the Wrst
task.
We designed and conducted a second experiment to
attempt a replication of the SME using diVerent study
materials. In particular, we made the following changes
to the materials. First, we replaced the gourmet sand-
wich scenario with a cheesecake scenario (described
below). Second, we used a third person format (i.e., the
situation happened to Ms. A) instead of a second person
“you” format of the Wrst Experiment. Third, using the
approach of Rook and Fisher (1995), we measured
choices by giving participants diVerent options that var-
ied progressively in their degree of impulsiveness.
3
Note that a strong positive correlation between the two choices im-
plies that individuals choosing more impulsively the Wrst time will also
choose more impulsively the next time and those choosing less impul-
sively the Wrst time will also do so the second time. This is consistent
with a “highlighting” strategy. Similarly, a strong negative correlation
between the two choices implies that individuals choosing more impul-
sively the Wrst time will choose less impulsively the second time and
those choosing less impulsively the Wrst time will choose more impul-
sively the second time. This is consistent with a “balancing” strategy.
In contrast to these two possibilities, the SME predicts that regardless
of how impulsively they chose the Wrst time, individuals should choose
less impulsively the second time, (a) when compared to their Wrst
choice, and (b) relative to other individuals who are making the same
choice, but who have not chosen impulsively before. This should be
manifested in a positive correlation between the two choices.
186 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
Experiment 2
Method
Seventy-six graduate students participated in the
study voluntarily. The procedure and the scenarios used
were substantively similar to Experiment 1, with a few
diVerences as noted above. The situations described
occurred to Ms. A and the participant was asked to put
him/herself in the protagonist’s place when responding.
Since the gourmet sandwich scenario of the Wrst experi-
ment was replaced with a cheesecake scenario, we pro-
vide it here:
“Ms. A is a 22-year-old college student. She enjoys exer-
cising and running and likes to eat health food, and gen-
erally eats a healthy salad for lunch. On a weekday, after
a busy and productive morning at work, she goes to the
mall with her friend, Ms. B, to buy a pair of socks. Walk-
ing through the mall, she passes Spizio’s, her favorite
deli, in the food-court. As she is looking through the dis-
play, she sees a mouth-watering tray of strawberry
cheesecake, her favorite dessert and feels a strong crav-
ing for it immediately.”
All participants then selected one of the following Wve
options, arranged in increasing order of impulsiveness:4
(1) buy the healthy and low-calorie salad for lunch, not
even think about the cheesecake, (2) buy the healthy and
low-calorie salad for lunch, want the cheesecake but not
buy it, (3) decide not to buy the salad and buy the
cheesecake instead, (4) buy both the salad and the
cheesecake, and (5) buy both the salad and the cheese-
cake plus a chicken sandwich to complete the meal.
Participants in the two-choices condition responded
to the sweater scenario Wrst which was similar to that in
the Wrst Experiment, but involved Ms. A here, and then
to the cheesecake scenario. Unlike the Wrst experiment,
to more closely simulate a real decision making situation
where some time might elapse between consecutive
choices, the two-choices condition participants
responded to an unrelated Wller task that consisted of
answering a 10-min survey. Single-choice participants
Wrst completed this survey and then responded to the
cheesecake scenario alone. The impulsiveness of partici-
pants’ choice in the cheesecake scenario is the dependent
variable in this experiment.
4 Experiment 3
We conducted a pretest with a diVerent sample of undergraduate
students (N D 261) from the same subject pool to determine the order-
ing of options for the cheesecake and the sweater scenarios based on
their perceived impulsiveness. In this pretest, we asked participants to
either rate the Wve options according to how impulsive they were using
seven-point scales, or to rank them from 1 to 5 in increasing order of
impulsiveness. Both methods yielded a consistent set of results, show-
ing that participants indeed viewed the impulsiveness of options to be
in the same order that we had expected, and are presented here. Details
of this pretest are available from the authors.
Results
Impulsiveness of choice in cheesecake scenario
A 2 Group (single-choice, two-choices) ANOVA
revealed a signiWcant main eVect of Group (F (1, 76) D 5.5,
p < .05,
2 D .07). As expected, those responding to the
cheesecake scenario Wrst (M D 3.08) chose more impul-
sively than those responding second (M D 2.51), replicat-
ing the main result of Experiment 1. This result helps
generalize the SME across diVerent study materials,
diVerent scenario formats, and diVerently constructed
dependent variables.
Discussion
In spite of these Wndings, two concerns with these
studies should also be pointed out. First, it could be that
some speciWc aspect(s) of the sweater scenario, versions
of which were used as the Wrst scenario in both studies,
is responsible for the subsequent mitigation of impul-
sive choice in the second task. More broadly, it is of
importance to generalize the SME to choose domains
other than those involving only purchase situations
(e.g., Rettinger & Hastie, 2001). We address this concern
in Experiment 3 by studying a diVerent (and non-pur-
chase) impulsive choice context: unplanned giving to
charity.
A second concern is that it is necessary to isolate the
SME as occurring only when the decision maker partici-
pates in an impulsive choice task beforehand, not in any
choice task. As such it is important to verify whether the
subsequent mitigation occurs even when the individual
makes prior non-impulsive choices. Showing that the
SME does not occur in such cases would strengthen our
proposition that it is a motivational contextual inXuence
on sequential decision making. It would also rule out the
possibility that the SME is driven by the decision
maker’s budget constraints, or what economists refer to
as “income eVects” (e.g., Deaton & Muellbauer, 1980)
i.e., the possibility that spending money in the Wrst choice
reduces the amount available to the decision maker for
the second choice, leading him or her to choose less
impulsively. We address these concerns in Experiment 4.
The method and results of these two experiments are
presented.
The objective of this experiment was to replicate the
results of the Wrst two experiments in a context not
involving purchases. In this case, the focal decision
involved unplanned giving to a charity upon receiving a
windfall (charity scenario), and the initial decision for
those making two choices involved an impulsive choice
to go out on a weekend evening (weekend scenario).
 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
Method
One hundred and eighty undergraduate students par-
ticipated in the experiment in exchange for course credit.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the single-
choice (charity scenario alone) or the two-choices
conditions (weekend scenario followed by the charity
scenario). The scenarios were as follows.
Weekend scenario. “Imagine that on a particular Friday,
you have planned to spend the evening relaxing and
catching up on chores. Around 7 p.m., your friend calls
and invites you to go out with a group of your friends.”
Charity scenario. “Imagine that you have received a tax
refund of $500 from the IRS (Internal Revenue Service).
A few days later, you unexpectedly get a letter from a
well-known charity that you have donated to in the past,
seeking contributions from you.”
Participants indicated their desires and likelihood for
choosing the impulsive option in each scenario using
measures identical to those used in Experiment 1. In the
charity scenario, participants were also asked “Please
indicate the amount of money that you would contribute
to the charity.” These three variables—desire, likelihood
of giving, and dollar amount contributed—constitute
the dependent variables in the analysis.
Results
Desire for giving to charity
The participant’s desire for giving to charity was sub-
mitted to a 2 Group (single-choice, two-choices)
ANOVA. Results showed that there was a statistically
signiWcant main eVect of Group (F (1, 176) D 4.30, p < .05,

2 D .03). As expected, and consistent with the Wrst two
experiments, when compared to those who had
responded to the weekend scenario before (M D 3.82),
participants who responded to the charity scenario alone
expressed greater desire to give to the charity (M D 4.20).
Furthermore, the results of a paired-sample t test car-
ried out for two-choices participants revealed a signiW-
cant decrement in the desire to give to charity (M D 3.82)
relative to the desire to go out (M D 5.00, t (88) D 5.9,
p < .001). 72.2% participants in the two-choices condition
expressed a lower desire in the charity scenario than the
weekend scenario, which is greater than 50%
(2 (1) D 17.78, p < .001). These results replicate the Wnd-
ings of Experiment 1, by showing that lower desire is
experienced by participants in the second choice than in
the Wrst one.
Likelihood of giving to charity
This dependent variable was submitted to a 2 Group (sin-
gle-choice, two-choices) ANOVA. Results showed that there
was a signiWcant main eVect of Group (F (1, 180) D 4.7,
187
p < .05,
2 D .03). As in the case of desire, and supportive
of the SME, individuals who had responded to the week-
end scenario before indicated a signiWcantly lower likeli-
hood of giving to charity afterward (M D 52.0) when
compared to those who had not responded to any sce-
nario beforehand (M D 60.3).
Dollar amount contributed to charity
In the case of this dependent variable, a 2 Group (sin-
gle-choice, two-choices) ANOVA revealed a marginally
signiWcant main eVect of Group (F (1, 179) D 3.7, p D .06,

2 D .02). Consistent with results for desire and likeli-
hood of giving, those who had participated in the week-
end scenario Wrst indicated that they would contribute a
lower amount (M D $98.7) when compared to those who
had not responded to this scenario (M D $124.9).
Taken together, these results help generalize the SME
to choice contexts not involving purchases of products.
Experiment 4
Prior impulsive decision making has been implicitly
assumed to be required for the SME to occur thus far.
However, establishing this condition as necessary
requires showing that the SME does not occur when the
individual participates in prior non-impulsive choices (as
opposed to no prior choices at all).5 Such a Wnding is not
only likely to provide greater conWdence in occurrence of
the SME, but also lend credence to our view of it as a
motivational contextual inXuence. It will also rule out
the possibility that this eVect occurs due to the decision
maker’s budget constraints. Experiment 4 was con-
ducted to examine this issue.
Method
One hundred and three undergraduate students par-
ticipated in the experiment in exchange for course
credit and were assigned randomly to one of the fol-
lowing three conditions. In the Wrst single-choice condi-
tion, participants responded to the sweater scenario
alone, which was the same as that in the Wrst experi-
ment. In the second impulsive-choice condition, partici-
pants responded to two other scenarios involving
impulsive choices Wrst, before responding to the
sweater scenario. The Wrst two impulsive-choice scenar-
ios were as follows:
Cheesecake scenario. “Imagine that you have gone to a
cafeteria to get a healthy and nutritious lunch. As you
are looking through the display case while standing in
line, you see a mouth-watering tray of cheesecake.”
5
We thank a reviewer for suggesting this possibility and credit him/
her with the idea underlying this experiment.
188 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
MP3 player scenario. “Imagine that you have gone to a
website to buy a music CD. As you are surWng through
the website, you come across a newly introduced MP3
player, which you do not currently own. It has a lot of
useful features such as a 20 gigabyte storage capacity,
12 h battery life, and a one-year warranty.”
After each scenario, participants responded to ques-
tions regarding their desires and their likelihood of pur-
chase of the items (for cheesecake, MP3 player, and
sweater, respectively).
In the third non-impulsive-choice condition, partici-
pants completed the following two scenarios instead,
before responding to the same sweater scenario as in the
other two conditions:
Cheesecake scenario. “Imagine that you have gone to a
cafeteria for lunch and see the following two desserts in
the display case:
Dessert A: Slice of Strawberry Cheesecake
Dessert B: Slice of Key-Lime Pie
Assume that you decide to buy one of the desserts.
Which of the desserts will you buy?”
MP3 player scenario. “Imagine that you are surWng on a
website, and you come across the following two MP3
players:
MP3 player A: 15 gigabyte storage capacity, 12 h bat-
tery life, 12 month warranty, $225 price
MP3 player B: 20 gigabyte storage capacity, 10 h bat-
tery life, 6 month warranty, $250 price
Assume that you decide to buy one of the MP3 players.
Which of the MP3 players will you buy?”
Note that these two scenarios involve non-impulsive
choices since participants simply have to choose between
one of two options given to them, without any element
of deviation from prior choice or plan. The dependent
variables in this experiment were the desire and purchase
likelihood provided by respondents for the sweater sce-
nario in the three conditions, as well as desires for the
three scenarios in the impulsive-choice condition.
Results
Desire for sweater
The participant’s desire for the sweater was submitted
to a 3 Group (single-choice, impulsive-choice, and non-
impulsive-choice) ANOVA. Results showed that there
was a signiWcant main eVect of Group (F (2, 103) D 9.35,
p < .001,
2 D .16). As expected, those who had made two
impulsive choices before indicated signiWcantly lower
desire for the sweater (M D 4.4), when compared to those
who had not made any prior choices before (M D 5.7,
p < .001), and to those who had made two prior non-
impulsive choices (M D 5.5, p < .01). Interestingly, the
diVerence between the single-choice and the non-impul-
sive-choice conditions was not statistically signiWcant,
indicating that making prior non-impulsive choices did
not result in a decrement in the desire for the sweater for
participants.
Purchase likelihood of sweater
This dependent variable was submitted to a 3 Group
(single-choice, impulsive-choice, and non-impulsive-
choice) ANOVA. Results revealed a signiWcant main eVect
of Group (F (2, 103) D 15.7, p < .001,
2 D .24). As in the
case of desires, when participants responded to the
sweater scenario after responding to two impulsive-choice
scenarios before, they indicated a signiWcantly lower likeli-
hood of purchasing the sweater (M D 51.9), relative to the
condition where they did not respond to any scenarios at
all (M D 78.6, p < .001), and to the condition where they
responded to two non-impulsive-choice scenarios before
(M D 74.6, p < .001). Again, the diVerence between these
latter two conditions was not statistically signiWcant.
Desire experience in sequential choices
We also examined the average desire levels expressed
by impulsive-choice condition participants in the Wrst
(cheesecake), second (MP3 player), and third (sweater)
impulsive-choice scenarios to test our “desire as a lim-
ited-motivational-resource” hypothesis. Paired-sample t
tests showed that when compared to cheesecake
(M D 5.71), the desire for the MP3 player was signiW-
cantly lower (M D 3.63, t (34) D 6.34, p < .001). However,
when compared to the MP3 player, the desire for the
sweater (M D 4.37) was not signiWcantly diVerent
(t (34) D ¡1.55, p > .13). The diVerence between cheese-
cake and sweater, however, was signiWcantly diVerent
(t (34) D 3.96, p < .001). These results show a signiWcant
decrement in participants’ desire experience from the Wrst
to the second (and third) choices, but no statistical diVer-
ence in desire levels between the second and third choices.
Discussion
The results of this experiment provide evidence that
participating in prior impulsive choice is required for the
SME to occur. When participants engaged in prior non-
impulsive choices, i.e., simply choosing between one of the
two options given to them, neither the mitigation in desires
nor that of purchase likelihood for the impulsive option
was observed afterward. This Wnding is supportive of the
proposition that the SME is a motivational contextual
inXuence on decision makers making sequential impulsive
choices. It also rules out the possibility that this eVect
occurs due to monetary constraints of the decision maker.
Further, in three of the experiments thus far (Experi-
ments 1, 3, and 4), we measured the individual’s desires
 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
for the impulsive choice(s). In all the three experiments,
we consistently found support for the “desire as a lim-
ited-motivational-resource” proposition since desire lev-
els were reduced in the second choice relative to the Wrst
one, and respondents’ intensities of expressed desires for
the focal choice were lower if they had participated in
impulsive choices before than if they had not partici-
pated in any choices before (Experiments 1, 3, and 4), or
had participated in prior non-impulsive choices (Experi-
ment 4).
Based on these Wndings, how might occurrence of the
SME be mitigated? We examined the role played by one
variable: the decision maker’s sensitivity to positive and
negative outcomes in the second choice task (Carver &
White, 1994; Higgins, 1999). This also allowed us
another distinct opportunity to test our proposition that
the basis of the SME may be motivational.
A considerable body of research on self-regulatory
focus (e.g., Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1999; Shah
& Higgins, 1997) has shown that individuals having a
positive outcome sensitivity, called a promotion focus,
have higher motivation levels, when compared to those
with a negative outcome sensitivity or a prevention
focus. As examples, such a diVerence manifests itself in
the selection of more diYcult goals or tasks (e.g., Brendl
& Higgins, 1996), greater persistence in diYcult tasks
(e.g., Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995), and a propensity to
choose self-regulatory strategies favoring action as
opposed to thought (e.g., Freitas et al., 2002) by decision
makers with a positive outcome sensitivity relative to
those with a negative outcome sensitivity.
For the present research, these Wndings raise the pos-
sibility that decision makers having sensitivity to posi-
tive outcomes should be able to counteract at least some
of the dissipative motivational eVects of desire for impul-
sive options being consumed in the Wrst choice task. As a
result, such individuals should be likely to choose more
impulsively in the second choice, thereby attenuating the
SME. In contrast, we expect that decision makers with a
negative outcome sensitivity will be subject to a persis-
tent SME.
We conducted Experiment 5 in which the outcome
sensitivity was conceptualized as a dispositional charac-
teristic of the decision maker, and was measured. An
instrument from the motivation psychology literature
evaluating participants’ chronic sensitivities to positive
and negative outcomes (the BIS/BAS scale; Carver &
White, 1994) was used to do so.6
6
We also conducted another experiment in which participants’ sen-
sitivity to positive or negative outcomes was temporarily increased by
emphasizing either positive or negative consequences of choosing the
impulsive option. Since a pattern of results obtained in this case was
substantively similar to that of Experiment 5, this study is not reported
here, given space constraints. Details regarding this experiment are
available from the authors.
189
Experiment 5
Motivational research has shown that decision mak-
ers can be chronically more sensitive to either positive or
negative outcomes stemming from their choices. Adopt-
ing an individual diVerence lens, and corroborated by
considerable evidence from the physiology of neurobio-
logical functioning (see Carver & Scheier, 1998, pp. 167–
170 for a review), Gray (1990) has proposed that two
motivational systems underlie emotions and behaviors
of individuals. The behavioral activation system (BAS)
controls appetitive motivation, and is responsive to posi-
tive outcomes, whereas the behavioral inhibition system
(BIS) controls aversive motivation with a sensitivity to
negative outcomes.
Carver and White (1994) developed the BIS/BAS
scales to measure Gray’s (1990) two motivational sys-
tems, which we adopted to operationalize the decision
maker’s chronic sensitivities to positive and negative
outcomes in this experiment. Existing research attests to
the psychometric adequacy of these scales (Carver &
White, 1994; Heubeck, Wilkinson, & Cologon, 1998).
Sensitivity to the BIS and BAS is viewed as stable predi-
lections with chronic diVerences in strength between
individuals (Carver & White, 1994).
Because these foci represent distinct systems in the
nervous system from a physiological standpoint, their
sensitivities are presumed to be orthogonal (Quay, 1993).
Decision makers may display any combination of low
and high BIS and BAS. We classiWed participants with
high BAS and low BIS (a predominant BAS sensitivity)
as having a chronic sensitivity to positive outcomes, and
those with low BAS and high BIS (a predominant BIS
sensitivity) as having a chronic sensitivity to negative
outcomes.
Method
Data were collected through kiosk-based computer
systems, dedicated to commercial marketing research,
and positioned in high-traYc areas in prominent malls in
six US cities: Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles,
Miami, and St. Louis. Participants were mall shoppers
who participated in the study in exchange for a small
gift, by answering questions through touching the com-
puter screen to select their desired responses. The kiosks
were manned by attendants who solicited participants,
answered any questions regarding the procedure, and
gave participants an inexpensive (<$5) gift upon comple-
tion of the study. A total of 1025 mall shoppers (54.3%
male) participated in the study. Participants ranged in
age from 187 to 69 years old and had an annual house-
hold income from less than $10,000 to over $100,000.
7
As a screening condition, we required participants to be at least 18
years of age in order to participate in the experiment.
190 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions: (1) sweater scenario Wrst, then the cheesecake
scenario, (2) cheesecake scenario Wrst, then the sweater
scenario, (3) cheesecake scenario only, and (4) sweater
scenario only. All participants also completed a set of
measures (described below), in between the two scenar-
ios for those answering both, and before the scenario for
those answering just one scenario. On starting the sur-
vey, participants were asked their gender Wrst. They then
received gender-congruent versions of the scenarios.
Gender-speciWc versions of the cheesecake and
sweater scenarios similar to those used in Experiment 2,
but abbreviated slightly to Wt a single computer screen
and to suit the computer-based data-collection proce-
dure, were presented to participants. After participants
had completed the study, they were immediately given
their gift for participation and thanked by the kiosk
attendant.
Measures
Because of this method of data collection, and speciW-
cally due to stipulations made by the kiosk operator, we
were restricted in the total number of measures that we
could administer to participants in this study. With this
constraint in mind, we chose three key items each from
the BIS and BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994) to mea-
sure the participant’s chronic outcome sensitivities.
Negative outcome sensitivity
Three items from the BIS scale were used to measure
the participant’s sensitivity to negative outcomes. The
Wrst item sought the participant’s response to the state-
ment, “If I think something unpleasant is going to hap-
pen, I get pretty ‘worked up.”’ The second item was “I
feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know that
somebody is angry at me.” The third item stated “I
worry about making mistakes.” All three items used Wve-
point scales, labeled with “does not describe me at all,”
“describes me a little,” “describes me moderately well,”
“describes me very well,” and “describes me totally.”
The reliability (Cronbach ) of this three-item scale was
.73 for the entire sample.
Positive outcome sensitivity
The participant’s sensitivity to positive outcomes was
measured with three items from the BAS scale. The Wrst
item was “When I get something I want, I feel excited
and energized.” The second one stated, “When I am
doing well at something, I love to keep at it,” while the
third one was “When I see an opportunity for something
I like, I get excited right away.” In this case, too, Wve-
point scales, labeled with “does not describe me at all,”
“describes me a little,” “describes me moderately well,”
“describes me very well,” and “describes me totally”
were used for all three measures. The reliability of this
three-item scale was .71.
Participants were classiWed as high or low in each of
BIS and BAS as determined by median splits on their
responses to the BIS and BAS items, respectively. Further,
those who were found to be high in BIS and low in BAS
were classiWed as having a negative outcome sensitivity,
and those who were low in BIS and high in BAS were
classiWed as having a positive outcome sensitivity. After
using this procedure, 311 participants were classiWed as
having a chronic negative and 244 participants were clas-
siWed as having a chronic positive outcome sensitivity.
Results
The data were submitted to a 2 Group (single-choice,
two-choices) £ 2 Product (Cheesecake, Sweater) £ 2 Out-
come Sensitivity (positive, negative) ANOVA with the
participant’s choice in the focal scenario as the dependent
variable. Results showed that the main eVects of all three
factors, Group (F(1, 555) D 6.00, p < .05,
2 D .02), Product
(F(1, 555) D 3.8, p D .05,
2 D .01), and Outcome Sensitivity
(F(1, 555) D 10.4, p < .01,
2 D .02), were signiWcant. Fur-
ther, and importantly, the Group £ Outcome Sensitivity
two-way interaction was also signiWcant (F (1, 555) D 7.60,
p < .01,
2 D .02). None of the other two-way interactions
or the three-way interaction was signiWcant.
The results of planned contrasts yielded insights into
the main eVects. First, comparing average impulsiveness
levels of focal choices across the two products, we found
that those responding to the cheesecake scenario
responded at (marginally) signiWcantly higher levels of
impulsiveness (M D 2.9) when compared to those
responding to the sweater scenario (M D 2.7). Second,
and more importantly, those with a positive outcome
sensitivity responded signiWcantly more impulsively
(M D 3.0) relative to those with a negative outcome sen-
sitivity (M D 2.6). Finally, and replicating the results of
the previous experiments, those responding to scenario
second (M D 2.7) showed signiWcantly lower levels of
impulsive choice when compared to those responding to
scenario Wrst (M D 3.0).
Examining the signiWcant two-way interaction
between Group and Outcome Sensitivity, pooled across
products, showed that positive outcome sensitivity par-
ticipants made relatively similar levels of impulsive
choice regardless of whether they responded Wrst
(M D 3.0) or second (M D 3.1, F (1, 244) D .04, p > .80). On
the other hand, those with chronic negative outcome
sensitivity showed a marked SME. Here, the single-
choice participants reported signiWcantly higher levels of
impulsive choice (M D 3.0) when compared to those in
the two-choices condition (M D 2.4, F (1, 311) D 15.7,
p < .001,
2 D .05). Fig. 1 summarizes these results.
 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
Fig. 1. Average impulsiveness of focal choice by group and outcome sensitivity pooled across products, Experiment 5.
It is useful to note here that substantively similar
results were obtained when these analyses were repeated
separately by product (see Table 1).
Discussion
In addition to replicating the results of the Wrst four
experiments, the results of Experiment 5 identify an
important boundary condition to the SME: the decision
maker’s sensitivity to positive and negative outcomes. As
in the earlier experiments, the SME was observed for
participants as a whole. Furthermore, we found that the
SME was moderated by outcome sensitivity, such that it
was attenuated (and in fact, disappeared) for those with
a dispositional sensitivity to positive outcomes, but
occurred strongly for participants having chronic nega-
tive outcome sensitivity. Moreover, the results general-
ized across products, with similar patterns obtained for
both cheesecake and sweater when these scenarios were
the focal (second) choices, respectively. Since positive
outcome sensitivity corresponds to a heightened appeti-
tive motivation (high in BAS, low in BIS), these results
also provide further support for our proposition that the
SME has a motivational basis, by showing that individu-
als with a heightened appetitive motivation are able to
counteract the dissipative eVects on desire in the second
choice.
It is important to note one issue with the participants
in Experiment 5. Since they were actual mall shoppers, it
is possible that some of them could have engaged in
actual impulsive choices prior to participation in the
study. Because of random assignment of participants to
conditions, this is unlikely to have systematically inXu-
enced the results in any manner. Instead, since such prior
participation would actually mitigate the desire, and
therefore the impulsive choice expressed by the partici-
191
pants in the study according to the SME, the fact that we
still found the pattern of inter-group diVerences consis-
tent with our expectations is a conservative result. To the
extent that participants had engaged in prior impulsive
choices, the eVects found here would be expected to be
even stronger in the absence of such prior participation.
General discussion
Contribution
The contribution of this research can be appreciated
by considering our understanding of how earlier choices
inXuence subsequent ones in studies done prior to this
research. A large body of earlier research had provided
evidence of various cognitive contextual inXuences on
the decision maker such as the background context
eVect, highlighting, balancing, and inherent rule variabil-
ity, when making consecutive decisions. Research had
also uncovered motivational eVects such as inaction
inertia, stemming from the anticipation of regret.
Despite the rich understanding of sequential decision
making provided by these studies, relatively little was
known regarding sequential choices which are impulsive
and driven by desires for available options, instead of
thoughtful and deliberate information processing by the
decision maker.
Yet decisions of this type are quite common in many
everyday situations (e.g., Loewenstein, 1996; Naylor
et al., 1980; Rook, 1987). We proposed a framework
applicable to such situations, where individuals make
sequential impulsive choices across diVerent categories.
In our framework, rather than the interdependence of
attributes or decision rules used, the common element
between the choices is the intensity of desire that the
192 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
decision maker experiences for the impulsive option(s),
and how that changes from the Wrst choice to the second.
In such cases, we proposed and provided evidence that
prior choices inXuence subsequent ones through inXuenc-
ing the decision maker’s experience of desire for impulsive
option(s). SpeciWcally, by functioning as a limited moti-
vational resource, the experience of desire for the impul-
sive option in the Wrst choice seems to deplete this
resource, reducing the intensity of its experience in the
subsequent choice task. As a result, the likelihood of
choosing impulsively again is mitigated on account of
having participated (and experienced desire) in the Wrst
choice. Note that while this seems to be the most plausi-
ble explanation for our Wndings and we took care to rule
out some other alternative explanations (e.g., Study 4),
we acknowledge that more research is needed to conWrm
that other (non-motivational) explanations do not
account for the SME.
Table 1 summarizes the results of all Wve experiments
reported herein. In the Wrst three experiments, we pro-
vided evidence of this Sequential Mitigation EVect in
various contexts such as choosing a gourmet sandwich
(Experiment 1) or choosing cheesecake (Experiment 2)
instead of an originally planned healthy salad for lunch,
and giving money to a well-known charity after unex-
pectedly receiving a solicitation from it (Experiment 3).
In all the three experiments, when participants had
responded to an unrelated impulsive choice before, they
became less likely to choose impulsively, and in two of
the experiments (1 and 3), they expressed signiWcantly
lower desire for the impulsive option, when compared to
participants who had not responded to any choice
beforehand. They also reported signiWcantly lower desire
levels for the second choice than for the Wrst choice.
In Experiment 4, we examined whether the SME
occurs when decision makers participate in any choice
beforehand, rather than an impulsive choice. SpeciW-
cally, in addition to the two conditions of the earlier
experiments, we added a third condition wherein partici-
pants made non-impulsive choices Wrst, choosing
between two options, and then responded to the impul-
sive-choice scenario. We found that such individuals did
not show any mitigation of either desires or likelihood of
choosing the impulsive option, reporting similar levels of
both dependent measures as the single-choice condition
participants that had not responded to any scenarios
beforehand. It seems that prior impulsive choices are
required for the SME to occur. These Wndings strengthen
our proposition that the SME has a motivational basis.
In Experiment 5, we identiWed a moderator to the
SME: the decision maker’s chronic sensitivity to positive
and negative outcomes, by measuring it as a disposi-
tional characteristic using Carver and White’s (1994)
BIS/BAS scales in a Weld setting. We found that decision
makers sensitive to negative outcomes demonstrated the
SME, but those who were chronically sensitive to posi-
tive outcomes did not demonstrate the SME. Since ear-
lier research has shown that these later individuals have
a pronounced appetitive motivation, these results pro-
vide further support for a motivational explanation for
the SME. As such, they show that the diminished
strength of desires in the second task seemed to be coun-
teracted by the decision maker’s chronic sensitivity to
positive outcomes. Overall, in Table 1, across diVerent
scenarios and measurement formats, we Wnd a consistent
pattern of results that support the SME, and appear to
support our “desire as a limited motivational resource”
explanation for why it occurs.
Limitations and future research
Our conceptualization of desire for impulsive options
functioning as a limited motivational resource, and the
initial Wndings reported here, raise several interesting
questions warranting future attention. One issue pertains
to the role played by time in the occurrence of the SME.
In all of our experiments, as well implicitly so in our con-
ceptualization, participants made the subsequent deci-
sion immediately after the Wrst decision. However, we
did not explicitly consider the role played by time in
SME’s occurrence even though it seems that temporal
contiguity between the sequential impulsive choices is
another requirement for the SME to occur. Indeed,
research on self-control (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000)
also supports such a role of time, showing that the
resource of self-control is replenished as time passes. An
important contribution to the present Wndings would be
to develop a better understanding regarding how much
time is necessary for desire strength to be replenished
and for the SME to be attenuated for a subsequent
impulsive choice. It could be that individual diVerences
such as outcome sensitivity play an important role in
how quickly replenishment occurs.
It is also important to understand the occurrence of
the SME vis-à-vis highlighting and balancing eVects that
govern sequential decision making (Dhar & Simonson,
1999). We believe that in contrast to the SME, highlight-
ing and balancing both require the decision maker to
explicitly frame a particular decision making episode at
the outset as one in which he/she will trade oV between a
goal and a resource or one in which he/she will try to
achieve two competing goals. Then depending on which
frame the decision maker adopts, sequential choices will
be subject to highlighting and balancing eVects, respec-
tively. But we acknowledge that in the present research,
we were not able to examine boundary conditions or
moderators of either highlighting or balancing eVects.
Another issue pertains to considering the role of self-
control in impulsive choices in more detail, jointly with
desire. Whereas we studied primarily desire-driven
impulsive choices, in many choices, both desires and
self-control play important roles in governing the
 U.M. Dholakia et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 (2005) 179–194
decision maker’s actions. In particular, this is the case
when an impulsive option is not merely unplanned or
out of the ordinary, but is also clearly in conXict with
other existing goals and values of the decision maker.
For instance, impulsively deciding to spend an after-
noon in a leisurely activity may conXict with the goal of
completing a project at work, or one of studying for an
examination.
In such cases, studying the relative importance of
desires and self-control in sequential impulsive choices
may be fruitful. The impulsive choices that we studied
here generally had mostly positive outcomes for the deci-
sion maker, such as buying a gourmet sandwich, a slice
of cheesecake or giving to a well-known charity upon
receiving an IRS refund, without accompanying nega-
tive outcomes or conXict. In making choices such as
these, self-control is of little relevance, as the choice is
likely to be driven by the level of desire that the decision
maker feels for the impulsive option (see also Loewen-
stein, 1996). Many everyday impulsive choices are of this
type, driven by what Baron (1996) has called “value-con-
gruent desires” (p. 294).
On the other hand, studies examining only self-con-
trol have examined generally negative tasks with minor
(if any) positive outcomes (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998). In
such cases, because desires are “value-alien” (Baron,
1996), self-control is likely to be more inXuential in how
the decision maker chooses with desire playing a small, if
any, role. As a result, the predictions made by these stud-
ies, and their Wndings have been one-sided, being driven
by either desires (in the present research) or by self-con-
trol (e.g., Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). Studying the
joint eVects of desires and self-control together for
sequential impulsive choices will likely be of great value
in obtaining a fuller understanding of the interdepen-
dence between tasks in sequential impulsive choices, and
the role of the decision maker’s motivational state in
making such choices.
Furthermore, while we found the SME to be attenu-
ated for those with positive outcome sensitivity in
Experiment 5, we were not able to pinpoint the speciWc
psychological processes underlying this attenuation. At
least two possibilities are evident in explaining this
result. First, it could be that decision makers who are
sensitive to positive outcomes dispositionally have a
larger reserve of desire for impulsive options than those
who are negative outcome focused. As a result, enough
desire depletion may not occur for the former type from
a single impulsive choice to cause a signiWcant decrement
in desire for the second impulsive choice. A second
explanation is that an emphasis on positive outcomes
could have a cognitive eVect, counteracting desire deple-
tion through increasing accessibility of the positive
aspects of choosing impulsively in the second choice
task. It is important to test these and other explanations
through further research.
193
In conclusion, this research shines light on the need to
conceptualize and consider how choices are inXuenced
by motivational factors more broadly. The study of how
prior choices inXuence subsequent ones has, by and
large, been conducted from an information processing
perspective, emphasizing the role of task attributes,
choice strategies, and even the decision maker’s cogni-
tive orientation in the prior choice. In contrast, this
study as well as other emerging research suggest that at
least some such inXuences may instead be the result of
the consumer’s motivational state, such as the degree of
desire experienced for the option(s). The consideration
of how motivational factors interact with cognitive vari-
ables oVers yet another interesting opportunity to extend
the research reported herein.
Acknowledgments
We Sangwon Lee, R. Sukumar, Sudhakar Vissa, and
the folks at MindSearch for their help with data collec-
tion, Itamar Simonson and Partha Krishnamurthy for
their helpful comments, and Scott Baggett for his sug-
gestions regarding data analysis. We are grateful to the
associate editor and three reviewers for helping to clarify
and strengthen the contribution of this research.
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