19. [G.R. No. 149889.

December 2, 2003]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RUEL BACONGUIS y
INSON, appellant.
FACTS:
Lydia pointed Ruel Baconguis as the killer of her borther, Roberto. Ruel was also positive
for paraffin test. He was then, convicted of murder and was sentenced to death.
ISSUE: WON paraffin test can be considered as conclusive evidence?
HELD: NO.

[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive. While it
can establish the presence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not always indubitably show
that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by the discharge of firearm. The person tested may have
handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates
or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas,
beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his
hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco. The presence
of nitrates, therefore, should be taken only as an indication of a possibility but not of infallibility
that the person tested has fired a gun.

20. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT"

G.R. No. 150224 (428 SCRA 504); May 19, 2004
FACTS
Accused-appellant was sentenced to death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide,
and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim. Appellant was charged to have had carnal
knowledge of a certain Kathylyn Uba against her will, and with the use of a bladed weapon,
stabbed the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in her untimely demise.
In the instant case, appellant raises the issue of credibility of witnesses, specifically assigning as
error on the part of the trial court, the latter’s giving of much weight to the evidence presented by
the prosecution notwithstanding their doubtfulness.
ISSUE (1)
Whether appellant’s contentions as regards the witnesses’ credibility are meritorious.
HELD: NO.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a
reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better
and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct
and attitude. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s
assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest respect. Where there is nothing to
show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies
are entitled to full faith and credit.
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule
which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as
sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the
accused committed the crime.
ISSUE (2)
Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence
HELD: Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken
chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others,
is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence,
three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE (3)
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken
from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as
well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
Is the contention of appellant tenable?
HELD: NO.
The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The
right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of
the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is
not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is
the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood
and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde, where
immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the
presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination.
The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement
in an offense of which he is accused.
21. People vs. Tumimpad 235 SCRA 483
FACTS: Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and daughter of
Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-year old child, who still
needed to be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was limited and most of the time she expressed
herself by motions. Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis
Occidental. Four security men were assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel
Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad. It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra
complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo then brought her to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a
checkup. Medication was given to Sandra but her condition did not improve. Sandra became
irritable and moody. She felt sick and unhappy. The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw
Moreno Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen and told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan,
bastos." 2 Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr. Conol, the
examining physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist, conducted the
urinalysis. The result revealed that Sandra was pregnant. 3 During the trial, the accused moved
that a blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted on
the offended party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test conducted by the
Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type
"B," accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accused-appellant type "O."
ISSUE: W/N Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto are guilty of the crime of rape?
HELD: Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by
the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the
alleged father or any one of many others of the same blood type may have been the father of the
child. As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19 : Paternity ---- Science
has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged
father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child. But
group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts
in others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have
recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test, made in the
prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in
which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable
results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony
conflicting with the results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to
prove the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of
many others with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
22. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (plaintiff-appellee) vs. JOEL SARTAGODA y
BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUÑA y LAZARTE, VICENTE STA. ANA y GUTIERREZ
and JOHN DOE, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 97525; April 7, 1993

FACTS
 All the three accused-appellants were convicted by the Trial Court as the latter found all
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of Robbery with Rape, and
each sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the accessories provided
for by the law.
  On appeal:
 The accused-appellants fault the trial court of ignoring the fingerprint examination
report submitted by the Crime Laboratory of the PC/INP Camp Crame which
stated that none of the specimen latent fingerprints were found to be positive.
o It is their contention that since their fingerprints were not found in the
objects found in the scene of the crime they cannot be held guilty of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
 They claim that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascuña did not flee,
even when they had all the opportunities to do so, prove their innocence.

 When they were allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them during the
first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home and did not flee until
they were again required to appear at the police station for the second time. The
accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight
or the decision not to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence.

ISSUE (1): Whether the absence of fingerprints as accused-appellants posited, eliminates

possibility that accused could have been at the crime scene.

HELD: NO. The SC agrees that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great
significance, however, it cannot sustain their (accused-appellants) theory that from the negative
findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in the course of the investigation in the instant
case, it must be concluded that they could not have been at the scene of the crime.

Negative findings do not at all times lead to a valid conclusion for there may be logical
explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints other than their not being present
at the scene of the crime. Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for
purposes of comparison in a crime laboratory because prints left on rough surfaces result in
dotted lines or broken lines instead of complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen
cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint examination. The latent fingerprints are actually oily
substance adhering to the surfaces of objects that come in contact with the fingers. By their very
nature, oily substances easily spread such that when the fingers slide against the surface they
touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only smudges instead. Not all police investigators are
aware of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to be guided accordingly in deciding which
objects to submit for fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the interplay of many
circumstances involved in the successful lifting and identification of proper latent fingerprints in
a particular crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the possibility that
the accused-appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they had
not left any identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints
are involved. The findings in this particular fingerprint examination are not sufficient to case
even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime charged.

ISSUE (2): Whether police line-up is required by law for proper identification of the
accused.
HELD: NO. Face and body movement of assailant create lasting impression on victim. —
Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively identified
at the trial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. The
complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as her attackers cannot be doubted for she
had during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of the men who ravaged her. It is
the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces
of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often
the face of the assailant and body movement thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot
easily be erased from their memory.

ISSUE (3) – Rule 128, subsequent circumstance: Whether non-flight can be considered a
proof of innonce.

HELD: NON-FLIGHT NOT PROOF OF INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. — They claim

that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascuña did not flee, even when they had all the
opportunities to do so, prove their innocence. The accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight
is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is
a sign of innocence. The SC does not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight
indicates guilt, it does not necessarily follow that absence thereof proves innocence,
specially so when there is overwhelming evidence to establish their guilt.

Disposition: Appealed decision AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-
appellants are held jointly and severally liable to indemnify Vilma de Belen for multiple rape and
that none of the accused is required to recognize the offspring

23. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME CARPO, OSCAR

IBAO, WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE IBAO, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

Ruben Meriales testified that in the evening of 25 August 1996, he saw Jaime Carpo together
with Warlito Ibao and his son Roche all looking in the direction of Florentino Dulay’s house
which was about a meter to the south from where he was. He also saw Oscar Ibao, another son of
Warlito, striding towards Dulay’s hut. As soon as he reached the hut Oscar lifted the sawali mat
near the wall and hurled something inside. Oscar then scurried off towards the nearby creek with
Roche following him. Seconds later, a loud explosion shook the entire neighborhood and Teresita
Dulay’s screams broke into the night.

Ruben rushed outside and ran towards Florentino’s hut where he saw the bloodied Florentino,
Norwela and Nissan lying side by side, both doused in blood, and a motionless Norma whose
head was oozing with blood.

On their way to the hospital, Norwela who had injuries on her chest and lower appendage died.
Nissan who was five years old, also died later. Noemi luckily survived.
The trial Court gave full credit to the testimony of Ruben and convicted Carpo et al. It accepted
his straightforward testimony. Accordingly, in accordance with Sec. 6, RA 7659, and Art. 48
of The RPC the trial court imposed upon all of the accused the supreme penalty of death and
ordered them to solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased.

The accused however, have favorable results of their lie detector tests with the NBI and filed that
it be admitted into the records.
Issue: WON POLYGRAPH TESTS OR LIE DETECTOR TEST BE ADMISSIBLE?
HELD: A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual will undergo physiological
changes, capable of being monitored by sensors attached to his body, when he is not telling the
truth. The Court does not put credit and faith on the result of a lie detector test inasmuch as it has
not been accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of ascertaining truth or
deception.
24. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs.RODRIGO SALAFRANCA
G.R. No. 173476
February 22, 2012
FACTS
Johnny Bolanon (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca (Salafranca) on the night of July
31, 1993, after the said incident, the assailant ran away. Bolanon still being able to walk, went to
his uncle, Rodolfo B. Estaño to seek help. After having known of the incident, Estaño then
brought Bolanon to PGH. On their way to the hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon confided to
Estaño about the incident and told him that it was Salafranca who stabbed him and a certain
Augusto Mendoza witnessed the said incident. At around 2:30am, despite receiving medical
attention, Bolanon succumbed to death.
ISSUE
Whether the utterance of Bolanonis qualified as a dying declaration or part of the res gestae?
RULING
Such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae, the Court
has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the
incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae.
Generally, dying declaration is inadmissible as evidence being hearsay, however, it may be
admitted when the following requisites concur:
(a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death;
(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death;
(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and
 (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which
the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met. Bolanon communicated his statements, identifying Salafranca as the
person who had stabbed him; that at the time of his declaration, he was conscious of his
impending death. Bolanon died in the emergency room a few minutes after admission, which
occurred under three hours after the incident.
Furthermore, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence when
the following requisites concur:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
The requisites for admissibility as part of the res gestae concur herein. That when he gave
the identity of the assailant, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, and had no time to
contrive his identification. His utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to such
startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the
perpetrator.
Hence, such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae for
having borne the requisites of the both principles.
25. G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. CA
FACTS:
SCC Chemicals Corporation through its chairman, private respondent DaniloArrieta and
vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc
(hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30%
plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal upon non-
payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan, DaniloArrieta and
private respondent LeopoldoHalili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding
themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date.
SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC,
Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.
SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment
against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the
promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding
effect for lack or failure of consideration.
 The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an
effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of
facts was agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and
that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the
defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even date which were
both received by the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo
executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with
maturity date on January 12, 1984.
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were
liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was
postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was
calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite
notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the
witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the testimony of private respondent’s witness is hearsay.
2. Whether the promissory note was genuine and genuinely executed as required
by law.
3. Whether the “best evidence rule” should be applied.
RULING:
1. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness
as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule,
hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an
exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.The
rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled
that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by
a witness are hearsay.However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure
of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was
afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's witness.
Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus
committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had
waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late for petitioner to
be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
2. Petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through private
respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of
signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it
must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section, 4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a
judicial admission requires no proof.
3. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was
already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and
receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity.
Its admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation.
Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of
extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court
when it held petitioner liable on its obligation