Amba Tol Cases Part 1 Midterms PDF

ABSTRACT
This is a collection of case digests for Constitutional

Law 1: Philippine Political Law under Ambassador
Tolentino for the Academic Year 2016-2017 covering
chapters 1 to 6 and 18 of the book Philippine
Political Law authored by Associate Justice Isagani A.
PHILIPPINE
Cruz and Atty. Carlo L. Cruz.
Jerome Gonzales
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
POLITICAL LAW
Collated Case Digests: Part 1
Do a good turn daily.
Contents
Chapters 1, 2, & 18: Introduction, the Philippine Constitution & General Provisions ..................................................... 2
1 PIRMA v COMELEC ..................................................................................................................................................... 2
2 Santiago v COMELEC .................................................................................................................................................. 2
3 Tolentino v COMELEC................................................................................................................................................. 3
4 Javellana v Executive Sec. .......................................................................................................................................... 3
5 Aquino, Jr. v Enrile...................................................................................................................................................... 4
6 Imbong v COMELEC .................................................................................................................................................... 5
7 Gonzales v COMELEC ................................................................................................................................................. 5
8 Occeña v COMELEC .................................................................................................................................................... 6
Chapter 3: The State ......................................................................................................................................................... 7
9 Gov’t of P.I. v Monte de Piedad ................................................................................................................................. 7
10 Lawyers’ League v Aquino ........................................................................................................................................ 7
11 Co Kim Cham v Valdez Tan Keh ................................................................................................................................ 8
12 Alcantara v Director of Prisons ................................................................................................................................ 8
13 Ruffy v Chief of Staff ................................................................................................................................................ 9
14 People v Perfecto ..................................................................................................................................................... 9
Chapter 4: Sovereign Immunity ...................................................................................................................................... 10
15 Garcia v Chief of Staff ............................................................................................................................................. 10
16 Festejo v Fernando ................................................................................................................................................. 10
17 Holy See v Rosario .................................................................................................................................................. 11
18 Merritt v Government of Phil. Is. ........................................................................................................................... 12
19 Santiago v Republic ................................................................................................................................................ 12
20 USA v Judge Ruiz .................................................................................................................................................... 13
21 National Airports Corp. v Teodoro, Sr. ................................................................................................................... 14
22 Bureau of Printing v BOP Employees Assoc. .......................................................................................................... 15
Chapter 5: Fundamental Principles of the State ............................................................................................................. 16
23 Kuroda v Jalandoni ................................................................................................................................................. 16
24 Villavicencio v Lukban ............................................................................................................................................ 16
25 Ichong v Hernandez ............................................................................................................................................... 17
26 People v Lagman & de Sosa ................................................................................................................................... 18
27 DECS v San Diego.................................................................................................................................................... 18
Chapter 6: Separation of Powers .................................................................................................................................... 20
28 Pangasinan Bus Trans. Co. v Public Service Commission ....................................................................................... 20
29 Angara v Electoral Commission .............................................................................................................................. 20
30 Arnault v Balagtas .................................................................................................................................................. 21
31 Noblejas v Teehankee ............................................................................................................................................ 22
32 Phil. Bar Assoc. v COMELEC.................................................................................................................................... 23
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Chapters 1, 2, & 18: Introduction, the Philippine Constitution & General Provisions
1 PIRMA v COMELEC
GR2 129794. 23 Sep 1997.
DOCTRINE: PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE IS AN INOPERATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION LACKING AN ENABLING LAW.
FACTS: Petitioners claiming to represent 5,793,924 Filipino voters, roughly 16% of the total population then
with at least 3% from each legislative district, sought to nullify respondent’s resolution dismissing a
petition filed for people’s initiative to effect Charter changes on the following grounds; (1) respondent
allegedly acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by refusing
to act on the PIRMA petition, and; (2) the vote on the ruling in Santiago vs. COMELEC regarding the
validity of RA 6735 was unconstitutional and tied at 6.
ISSUES: Whether; (1) COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act on the PIRMA petition,
and; (2) the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC should be revisited.
HELD: The Court unanimously ruled on the first issue that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in refusing to act on the petition. All justices opined that respondent followed the ruling of
Santiago vs. COMELEC.
On the second issue, the justices were split 6-1-5 denying re-examination of the Santiago ruling.
Majority voted that there was no need to take up the issue. Justice Vitug opined that the case at bar
was not the proper vehicle for that purpose. The minority voted to revisit the ruling. Hence, the ruling
in Santiago v Comelec was upheld and the petition was dismissed.
2 Santiago v COMELEC
GR L-127325. 10 Jun 1997
DOCTRINE: RA 6735 IS INCOMPLETE, INADEQUATE, OR WANTING IN ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS
INSOFAR AS INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION IS CONCERNED.
FACTS: Atty. Delfin filed a petition with respondent to remove term limits of elective officials by People's
Initiative. Upon COMELEC hearing, the COMELEC directed the parties to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within 5 days.
Petitioners Santiago, et al. filed a special civil action for prohibition on these grounds; (1) Sec. 2 Art.
XVII of the Constitution providing for the right of the people to propose constitutional amendments
by way of initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress but no such law has
been passed; (2) Though RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative (on the Constitution, on
statutes, and on local legislation), it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution,
unlike the other modes of initiative; (3) RA 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication
in print media indicates that the Act covers only laws, not constitutional amendments as the latter
would take effect only upon ratification and not after publication; (4) COMELEC Res.2300 is ultra vires
in relation to initiatives on constitutional amendments since the power to legislate rules on People’s
Initiative resides in Congress; (5) The Initiative itself constitutes a revision of, not an amendment to,
the Constitution therefore beyond the power of the people's initiative, and; (6) the government has
yet to appropriate or realign funds for this initiative.
ISSUE: Whether RA 6735 is sufficient to institute rules on People’s Initiative to amend constitutional
provisions.
HELD: RA 6735 is insufficient. Sec. 2 Art. XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. Although the Act was
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution, it is not in full compliance
with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right.”
The Court cited the following deficiencies in the statute; (1) Sec. 2 of the Act did not suggest an
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initiative on amendments to the Constitution; (2) The Act did not provide for the contents of a petition
for initiative on the Constitution as Sec. 5 par. (c) Failed to expressly enumerate or specify the inclusion
of the Constitution as to be amended through the provisions thereof, and; (3) No subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. The following simply meant that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended RA 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle regarding People’s Initiative for constitutional amendments.
In the statute, it nominally included the word “Constitution” in Sec. 2, defined "initiative on the
Constitution" and included it in Sec. 3, defined plebiscite, rehashed the constitutional requirements
regarding the number of voters who should sign the petition, and provided for the effectivity date of
the approved proposition. There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or
the paramount system of initiative. Hence, it cannot be said that RA 6735 provides for rules regarding
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
3 Tolentino v COMELEC
GR L-34150. 16 Oct 1971.
DOCTRINE: ALL AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION ARE TO BE SUBMITTED IN JUST ONE ELECTION.
FACTS: 28 Sep 1971: the Constitutional Convention passed Res. No. 1 calling for a plebiscite on their first
constitutional amendment; lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. As the President had set
8 Nov 1971 as the plebiscite date, petitioners filed motion to restrain COMELEC from conducting the
plebiscite on the ground of its unconstitutionality, asserting that; (1) only Congress may call for an
election regarding constitutional amendments, and; (2) proposed amendments may not be presented
for ratiﬁcation separately from other future amendments to be proposed by the Convention.
Respondents argue in their defense that the manner of presenting the amendments, from the details
of the plebiscite up to submission of separate or joint amendments, is up to the discretion of the
Convention.
ISSUE: Whether the proposed amendment may already be submitted to the people at an election.
HELD: The proposed amendment should not yet be submitted to the people for ratification. In contrast to
the claims of respondents, the authority of the Convention is neither absolute nor inherent as it merely
derives its powers from the Constitution. Art. XV, 1935 Constitution states that there is a need for a
“majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
ratification.” The phrasing of the provision prescribes only one election for ratification of all
amendments. Furthermore, allowing respondent to do so may bar the People from having a clear
“frame of reference” as to how these individual amendments may comprise the new Constitution so
as to enable the People to compare the same to the existing Constitution.
4 Javellana v Executive Sec.

GR L-36142, L-36164-5, L-36236, L-36283. 31 Mar 1973.
DOCTRINES: THE 1973 CONSTITUTION WAS VALIDATED WITHOUT VALID RATIFICATION OR ACQUIESCENCE.
FACTS: 29 Nov 1972; The 1971 Constitutional Convention approved its final draft constitution. President
Marcos issued PD 73 scheduling a plebiscite on 15 Jan 1973. In lieu thereof, Proc. 1081 was temporarily
suspended on 17 Dec 1972. PD 86 created Citizens Assemblies on 1 Jan 1973 and Gen. Order 20 was
issued on 7 Jan postponing the plebiscite. Pursuant to PD 86, assemblies were asked several questions
between 10 to 15 Jan pertaining to several issues, among them the ratification of the draft constitution
and the need for a plebiscite. On 17 Jan, Proc. 1102 was issued proclaiming the ratification of the new
1973 Constitution.
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Petitioner filed a petition for injunction on the implementation of the 1973 Constitution based on the
following grounds; (1) Marcos lacked authority to create Citizen’s Assemblies; (2) Marcos lacked the
power to approve the Constitution; (3) the Assemblies lacked power to approve the Constitution, and;
(4) the elections held was not free.
Respondents contended that; (1) Court lacked Jurisdiction on the matter; (2) issue is a political
question; (3) Art. XV, 1935 Constitution was substantially complied with; (4) it was a free and honest
election, thus a proper submission; (5) Proc. 1102 is conclusive upon the Courts, and; (6) said Art. XV
is not exclusive of other modes.
ISSUES: Whether; (1) The issue presented upon the Court is Justiciable; (2) a valid ratification was present; (3)
the people acquiesced the draft Constitution; (4) Should petition be given due course, and; (5) the new
constitution is in force.
HELD: (1) On justiciability of the case: 6 Yes, 1 Qualified Yes, 3 No.

(2) On validity of the Votes: 6 invalid, 4 valid.
(3) On acquiescence by the People: 4 Yes, 2 No, 4 abstained.
(4) On giving the petition due course: 6 Dismiss, 4 Grant.
(5) ON VALIDITY OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION: 4 IN FORCE, 4 ABSTAIN, 2 INVALID.
From a legal perspective, majority of the justices held the opinion that the acquiescence by the People
of the new Constitution did not follow the paradigms set by Art. XV 1935 Constitution. Most cited the
lack of participation by COMELEC and the inclusion of persons disallowed by Law to vote. However,
the justices failed to reach a consensus regarding the acquiescence of the People, hence the Court had
reached a stalemate. However, the validity of the new Constitution was held to be in force through a
plurality vote.
5 Aquino, Jr. v Enrile

GR L-35546-73. 17 Sep 1974.
DOCTRINES: POLITICAL QUESTIONS ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON COURTS.
FACTS: The cases are several petitions for habeas corpus as petitioners Aquino et al. have been arrested and
detained by the military pursuant to General Order no. 3-A issued by virtue of Proc. 1081. Petitioner
Diokno withdrew his petition for release, claiming that he had lost faith in the Court to render him
justice. However, President Marcos released Diokno 6 days before the Court ruled on the petitions. Of
all the original petitioners, only Aquino was the last remaining detainee but charges have been filed
against him under the anti-subversion law.
ISSUES: Whether; (1) there is justiciability on the case; (2) Proc. 1081 is valid, and; (3) Writ of Habeas Corpus
has been suspended.
HELD: The Court failed to reach a consensus hence the case was merely a summary of diverse opinions of the
justices.
(1) Five justices opined the validity of Proc. 1081 posited a political question beyond court jurisdiction.
Four of the five concurring justices opined that the 1973 Constitution deliberately created a strong
presidency and concentrated powers to the executive during emergency which the Court must
respect. 4 Justices ruled on the justiciability, citing the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia. Justice Barredo
opined that political questions are not per se beyond court jurisdiction but the Court should refrain
from interfering with the Executive’s proclamation as a matter of policy implicit in the Constitution.
(2) Five justices held that the issues pertaining to the issuance of proc. 1081 was political, hence
conclusive. Other justices ruled on the contrary, placing the proclamation under judicial review, but
upheld the validity of the proclamation. Only Justice Teehankee suspended judgment.
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(3) On the third issue, the Court was divided. Justices Castro, Barredo, Fernandez, and Antonio opined
that the proclamation automatically suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Justice Fernando limited his
dissent, insisting on the availability of the writ during the imposition of martial law whilst refraining
from proceeding further in his dissention. Only Justice Palma dissented outright, insisting that
automatic suspension could only be justified by the collapse of civil courts.
6 Imbong v COMELEC
GR L-32432. 11 Sep 1970.
DOCTRINES: (1) CONGRESS ACTING AS A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IS DIFFERENT FROM CONGRESS ACTING AS A
LEGISLATIVE BODY.
(2) THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY MAY ONLY CALL FOR A CONVENTION IN GENERAL TERMS.
(3) CONGRESS CREATES AN IMPLEMENTING LAW FOR THE CALL FOR A CONVENTION BY THE
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.
FACTS: After Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly passed Res. 2 as amended by Res. 4 calling for an
election for a constitutional convention, RA 6132 was passed implementing the said resolutions.
Petitioner Gonzales assailed the enactment of RA 6132.
ISSUE: Whether RA 6132 was validly enacted by Congress.
HELD: The statute was validly enacted by Congress as a lawmaking body and not as a Constituent Assembly
on the following grounds; (1) Congress, as a Constituent Assembly, had proper authority to propose
amendments or call for a Constitutional Convention by a vote of three-fourths of each house in joint
session yet voting separately which was achieved in passing Res. 2 & 4; (2) By virtue of the doctrine of
necessary implication, the authority to call for a Convention included all necessary powers essential to
the exercise of the power granted such as fixing qualifications, apportionment of delegates, and
apportion of funds; (3) Although authority to call for a Convention emanates from Congress acting as
a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact implementing details for the convention are within the
competence of Congress as a legislative body and its actions are valid so long as they are not in contrast
with the Constitution, and; (4) As a legislative body, Congress may enact implementing legislation as
supplement to cover the gaps which the Constitutional Assembly omitted.
7 Gonzales v COMELEC
GR L-28916, 28224. 9 Nov 1967.
DOCTRINES: (1) CONGRESS ACTS AS A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WHEN PROPOSING AMENDMENTS
(2) AMENDMENTS MAY BE SUBMITTED TO THE PEOPLE SIMULTANEOUS WITH GENERAL ELECTIONS.
FACTS: Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) 1, 2, & 3 were passed on March 16, 1967. RBH 1 proposed that the
members of the Lower House be increased to 180. RBH 2 proposed that the elections for delegates to
the Constitutional Convention be held simultaneous with the 1971 General Glections. RBH 3 proposed
that Sec. 16 Art. VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize members of Congress, from both
Houses, to be delegates to the Convention without forfeiting their legislative seats. Thus, a bill passed
by Congress became RA 4913 proposing that amendments as proposed in RBH 1 & 3 are to be
submitted for approval by the Filipino people during the 1971 General Elections.
Petitioners assail the validity of the statute on the following grounds; (1) Members of Congress who
passed the statute are the same ones who made the resolution; (2) Congress may either call for a
convention or propose amendments but not both simultaneously; (3) elections to propose
amendments must be in a special, not in a general, election, and; (4) elections for proposals must be
held in conditions that give the People a reasonable chance to understand the nature and effects of
the amendments, which allegedly did not exist.
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ISSUE: Whether; (1) members of Congress acted beyond their jurisdiction in issuing RBH 1, 2, & 3 and enacting
RA 4913, and; (2) amendments may be submitted simultaneous with a general election.
HELD: (1) Members acted well within their mandate as the constitutional assembly in creating RBH 1, 2, & 3,
and as Congress in enacting RA 4913. The power to amend the Constitution is inherent in the People.
Members of Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, is allowed to propose amendments as the
Constitution expressly granted the Assembly, as composed by the members of Congress, power to do
so.
(2) As to the manner of submission, Chief Justice Concepcion wrote in his ponencia that Art. XV 1935
Constitution did not specify that the nature of the elections to which amendments are to be submitted
is "special". Prior experience in submitting constitutional amendments to the Filipino people was at
the discretion of Congress. It did not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections. Hence, petition was dismissed.
OBITER: Justices Sanchez and J.B.L. Reyes dissented, opining that deciding on amendments to the constitution
deserve undivided attention of the People. They must be afforded an opportunity to analyze the
differences between the original provisions and the amendment, likewise try to reach for a conclusion
free from other influences. This would constitute a free submission which can be achieved only if such
plebiscites were held on a special date.
8 Occeña v COMELEC
GR L-52265. 28 Jan 1980.
DOCTRINE: THE MAJORITY HELD IN GONZALES V COMELEC REGARDING ELECTIONS IS AFFIRMED.
FACTS: Petitioners sought to restrain the implementation of BP 51, 52, 53 and 54. BP 54 called for a plebiscite
on an amendment of Sec. 7 Art. X, 1973 Constitution extending the retirement of Judges from 65 to
70 years of age. The plebiscite was to be held simultaneous with the 1980 local elections.
ISSUES: Whether plebiscite for amendments may be held simultaneous with local elections.
HELD: The amendment in question is but a restoration of the former provision in the 1935 Constitution which
has been extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, likewise in mass media. Though the
plebiscite is to be held simultaneous with the general elections, the people are aware of the nature of
the amendment.
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Chapter 3: The State
9 Gov’t of P.I. v Monte de Piedad
GR 9959. 13 Dec 1916.
DOCTRINES: (1) CHANGE IN SOVEREIGNTY DOES NOT NECESSARILY ABSOLVE ONE FROM OBLIGATIONS TO THE
STATE.
(2) THE STATE HAS THE RIGHT AS PARENS PATRIAE TO FILE ACTIONS ON BEHALF OF ITS CITIZENS.
FACTS: Around $400,000.00 were paid to the Philippine Treasury by Spain, from small contributions, as relief
for the victims of the 1863 Earthquake. Respondent, who exhausted their funds on jewelry loans,
asked the Governor-General, and was granted by the same, a loan of $80,000.00 from the relief funds
on 1883. By 1893, Monte de Piedad refused to reimburse the Treasury. No further actions were taken
until 1912 when the Philippines was now under the sovereignty of the United States and under which
the Philippine Legislature passed Act 2109 empowering the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands to bring
suit against respondent for the recovery of the said amount with interest. Judgment was rendered in
favor of plaintiff hence defendant appealed on the ground, among others, that the change of
sovereignty waived the right of plaintiff to demand the amount which they assert was a donation.
Defendant also argued that the right to recover the amount was not specifically stated under the
Treaty of Paris.
ISSUE: Whether or not change in sovereignty dissolved the right to demand reimbursement for the loan.
HELD: Change in Sovereignty did not dissolve the right to demand reimbursement. Although there is total
abrogation of political relations between the Islands and the former sovereign, the municipal laws
which are not political in nature are still deemed to be valid unless changed by the new sovereign. It
is clear in the foregoing that the amount was a loan from funds collected from various persons for the
purpose of allocating the same to numerous victims and their heirs, and that the State has the
responsibility to protect its citizens by the use of its political authority. By virtue of Parens Patriae, the
right to pursue a trust conferred upon it has devolved to plaintiff through a legislative act.
10 Lawyers’ League v Aquino

GR 73748. 22 May 1986.
DOCTRINES: POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE RENDERED THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT OF MRS. AQUINO AS THE
LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
FACTS: On 25 Feb 1986, after the three-day revolution in EDSA, respondent issued Proc. 1 announcing that
she and Salvador Laurel have taken control as President and Vice President of the Philippines. On 25
March 1986, respondent issued Proc. 3 declaring that “a government was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines." Petitioners assail the legitimacy of her government as it was not established pursuant to
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Mrs. Aquino is a legitimate government.
HELD: Petition lacks merit. Aside from the lack of personality to sue and course of action on the part of
petitioners, the issues involved are a matter of a political question and the Filipino people have clearly
made their judgment as they have accepted the government of President Corazon Aquino who has
effective control of the country hence making her government both de facto and de jure. Moreover,
community of nations recognize the legitimacy of the present government and all 11 justices of the
Court have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. Therefore,
the government of Mrs. Aquino is legitimate.
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11 Co Kim Cham v Valdez Tan Keh
GR L-5a. 16 Nov 1945.
DOCTRINES: (1) THERE ARE THREE TYPES OF DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS; USURPATION OF THE LEGAL
GOVERNMENT, ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT FROM INSURRECTION, AND A
GOVERNMENT UNDER BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION.
(2) BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION MAY NOT IMPEDE ON CIVIL PROCEEDINGS.
FACTS: Petitioner had a pending civil case in CFI Manila during the Japanese occupation. On 23 October 1944,
Gen. MacArthur issued a proclamation annulling all laws, regulations, and processes during the
occupation. Hence, the judge refused to take action on the said civil case.
ISSUES: Whether; (1) the existing government in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was a de facto
government; (2) court proceedings by a de facto government are valid, and; (3) the issued
proclamation can invalidate court proceedings.
HELD: (1) The government was de facto. There are three kinds of de facto governments; (a) one that acquires
or usurps rightful legal government; (b) one created and maintained by military occupants during war,
and; (c) one established by insurgents uprising against the parent state. The government established
then was of the second kind.
(2) Court proceedings during the occupation are valid. Under the Laws of War, municipal and private
laws executed by a de facto government under belligerent occupation are valid until such are changed
by the conqueror. Furthermore, belligerent occupants have the duty to ensure that Courts are still
functioning as it ensures public safety and order and the continuation of civil life for the benefit of
non-belligerents. Furthermore, the continued use of established courts is legitimate since the de facto
government has the capacity to enforce laws in the absence of the government de jure.
(3) The term processes should not be construed as to include court proceedings since doing so would
be prejudicial to the conquered inhabitants. Upon liberation from a belligerent occupant, only
judgment for crimes that are of political complexion may be reversed. However, the laws involved in
the case are apolitical in nature hence respondent had no valid reason as not to hear the case.
Therefore, the case was remanded to respondent for proper proceedings.
12 Alcantara v Director of Prisons

GR L-6. 29 Nov 1945.
DOCTRINES: (1) COURT DECISIONS DURING BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION ARE VALID SO LONG AS THEY ARE FREE
FROM POLITICAL COMPLEXION.
(2) POLITICAL COMPLEXION IS THE CREATION OR MODIFICATION OF POLITICAL STATUTES IN ORDER
TO AID THE CONTROL OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPANT OVER CIVILIANS WITHIN OCCUPIED TERRITORY.
FACTS: During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals was reorganized to have
district jurisdictions to decide on cases raised upon appeal by their respective lower courts. Petition
for habeas corpus arose from a judgment by the CA North Luzon, holding sessions in Baguio, rending
the defendant guilty of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Petitioner
questions the validity of the ruling as it was allegedly a creation of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines and Philippine Executive Commission unauthorized by Commonwealth Act 3 to hold
sessions in Baguio.
ISSUE: Whether the ruling of the lower court was valid
HELD: The ruling stands on its own merit. Judicial acts rendered by the courts during belligerent occupation
remain to be good and valid even upon restoration of the Commonwealth, with the exception of those
rendered with political complexion. The reorganized District Court of Appeals which operated during
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the occupation was the substantially the same court in operation prior thereto. Political complexion
arises when a new act, or acts previously penalized as a crime against the legitimate government are
penalized anew as offenses committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and
necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. As
defendant was found guilty of a crime wherein political complexion is absent, the ruling by the lower
court stands.
13 Ruffy v Chief of Staff

GR L-553. 20 Aug 1946.
DOCTRINES: THE SUSPENSION OF POLITICAL LAWS DO NOT APPLY TO ENEMY COMBATANTS.
FACTS: Upon the arrival of the Japanese in Mindoro during World War 2, Petitioners-members of the
Philippine Constabulary retreated to the mountains and formed part of the Mindoro Bolo Area guerilla
unit recognized as part of the 6th Military District during World War 2. They were charged of violating
93D of the Articles of War in a court martial for the murder of Lt. Col. Jurado. Petitioners assert that,
being members of the Constabulary, they are under the jurisdiction of civil courts and not of military
tribunals. They likewise contend that the laws governing the Philippine Army, being political in nature,
were repealed upon surrender or rendered as inexistent during a belligerent occupation.
ISSUES: Whether; (1) contentions by petitioners are meritorious, and; (2) petitioners may seek relief from the
Court.
HELD: (1) The petition lacks merit. The doctrine which petitioners are raising for this issue is intended for civil
inhabitants of occupied territories, not enemies in arms. By their recognition as part of a military
district, they have virtually become a part of the Philippine Army. During belligerent occupation, the
officers of the Philippine army did not cease to be fully in service. The only times when a person may
be considered to be excluded from military jurisdiction is either when they are not in active duty, when
they are in leave of absence, or when they are held as prisoners of war. (2) Likewise, petitioners may
not seek relief from the Court as courts martial are agencies of executive character “attached to the
constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation”. Unlike
courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary.
14 People v Perfecto
GR 18463. 4 Oct 1922.
DOCTRINES: CHANGE IN SOVEREIGNTY ABROGATES POLITICAL CRIMES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF
THE NEW SOVEREIGN.
FACTS: Philippine Senate Secretary Fernando M. Guerrero discovered the absence of several documents from
his office. La Nacion, as edited by respondent, published a scathing article on the matter on 7 Sep
1920. In response thereto, the Senate filed a complaint for violation of Art. 256 of the Codigo Penal
punishing “Any person who, by … writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or
other person in authority”.
ISSUE: Whether respondent may be held liable for violating Art. 256 of the Codigo Penal.
HELD: Defendant may not be held liable for violating Art. 256 as that law has been abrogated by change of
sovereignty. Political laws inconsistent with the principles of the new sovereign are invalidated. In this
case, the law seeks to penalize acts lèse-majesté which are deemed to be in contrast with the
democratic principles of the new sovereign upon signing of the Treaty of Paris.
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Chapter 4: Sovereign Immunity
15 Garcia v Chief of Staff
GR L-20213. 31 JAN 1966.
DOCTRINE: ACTIONS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS MAY NOT PROSPER, AS PER DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY
IMPLICATION, WHEN THE STATE IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.
FACTS: In 1948, Garcia sustained injuries causing permanent blindness during training in Camp Floridablanca,
Pampanga. Pursuant to Commonwealth Act 400, he filed his claim for pension sometime in 1957. His
claim was denied by respondent-Adjutant General who reasoned that RA 610, enacted on 1 Jan 1950,
had allegedly repealed CA 400. By 1961 plaintiff hence filed in CFI Pangasinan an action to collect
money against respondents (AFP Chief of Staff, AFP Adjutant-General, Philippine Veterans’ Board
Chairman, and/or Auditor General).
Respondents PVB Chairman and AFP Chief filed motions to dismiss on the following grounds; (1) the
court had no jurisdiction over the matter; (2) plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
before filing for a judicial action; (3) complaint failed to state a cause of action, and; (4) cause of action
is barred by statute of limitations.
The lower court dismissed the case on the ground of prescription on the part of plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether the court validly dismissed the case.
HELD: The Supreme Court opined that the lower court validly dismissed the case but it should have been for
the simple reason that the subject matter was beyond the jurisdiction of the courts as the case was a
money claim against the government, hence in violation of Commonwealth Act 327. The statute
directed claims against the government which involved monetary recovery to the Auditor-General, not
with courts, as the state cannot be sued without its consent. In the foregoing facts, plaintiff likewise
failed to establish that he had exhausted all possible administrative remedies before seeking relief
from the courts. Hence, the case was dismissed.
16 Festejo v Fernando
GR L-5156. 11 Mar 1954.
DOCTRINE: IMMUNITY MAY NOT BE INVOKED BY A PUBLIC OFFICIAL FOR ACTIONS ARISING FROM DAMAGES
DONE IN EXCESS OF HIS OFFICIAL JURISDICTION. DAMAGES THEREFROM ARE PERSONALLY ENDURED
BY THE SAME AND UNIMPUTABLE TO THE STATE.
FACTS: On or about February 1951, respondent Fernando, Director of Public Works, constructed an irrigation
canal on a portion of the sugar fields owned by Carmen Festejo. Respondent allegedly did not secure
authority from CFI Ilocos Sur, a right of way, neither the consent of plaintiff and contrariwise went on
with the work against her objections. Hence, plaintiff filed for an action for recovery and damages.
Fernando filed motion to dismiss on the ground of the wanting jurisdiction of the Court as proceeding
with the case would tantamount to rendering judgment against the State in violation of its immunity
from suit.
The lower court dismissed the case. On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the lower court committed an
error in considering that her case was against the State.
ISSUES: Whether; (1) the lower court was correct in rendering judgment over the case; (2) Respondent may
enjoy immunity from suit, and (3) Respondent may be held liable for his actions.
HELD: (1) The majority ruled that the lower court erred in rendering judgment. (2) Though the State may not
be sued without its consent and this immunity is extended towards its public officials, their
personalities may not be sued so as it correlates to their official functions, not of their personalities as
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private individuals. (3) In this case, the action was brought against the personal capacity of defendant,
and not of his official functions as Public Works Director. Furthermore, Art. 32(6) of the Civil Code
made respondent liable for damages as his actions deprived plaintiff of her right to property without
due process.
OBITER: Justice Concepcion dissented since Fernando was referred in the pleading as well as in par. 4 and 5 of
the complaint as Director of Public Works—hence he was being sued on his official capacity. Moreover
plaintiff, praying for the return of the land to its prior condition, is consequently seeking to remove
the Government of its possession of the land, which lead to a conclusion that the Government is the
real party in interest for this case. Justice Bengzon concurred.
17 Holy See v Rosario

GR 101949. 1 Dec 1994.
DOCTRINES: (1) THE DETERMINATION BY THE EXECUTIVE THAT A FOREIGN STATE IS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY IS
CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS.
(2) ACTS OF FOREIGN STATES THAT ARE GOVERNMENTAL IN CHARACTER (JURE IMPERII) ARE COVERED
BY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.
FACTS: Petition arose from a parcel of land in Parañaque donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to Petitioner
for the relocation of the Papal Nunciature. As the property had squatters who refused to leave,
petitioner decided to sell the lot to Licup with co-petitioner Msgr. Cirilos acting as intermediary.
Several conditions were set, including payment of Php 100,000.00 as earnest money and the eviction
of squatters by the seller. After paying, Licup assigned his property rights to respondent Starbright
Sales Enterprises. As petitioners failed to evict the squatters, the conditions were renegotiated leading
to petitioner returning the earnest money to Starbright. As the corporation sent the earnest money
back to Msgr. Cirilos, it was discovered that said lots have been sold to a different buyer.
Hence, respondent filed a case praying, among others, the specific performance of the obligation and
damages. The Holy See invoked immunity from suit. The lower court dismissed the motion after finding
that its immunity was waived upon entering into a commercial contract. As the lower court directed
petitioner to file an answer, the Holy See filed for certiorari. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
likewise intervened in behalf of the Holy See.
ISSUES: Whether; (1) Petitioner qualifies as a foreign state under Philippine Law, and; (2) Petitioner may invoke
Sovereign Immunity as defense
HELD: (1) Petitioner is a foreign state established by the Lateran Treaty. Although there are disputes as to
which sovereign did the treaty create—either Vatican City, Holy See, or both—the Philippines has
accorded the Holy See the status of foreign sovereign as it has established diplomatic relations since
1957 and according such status appears to be the international practice. Moreover, the executive has
intervened through the DFA acknowledging the foreign sovereign status of petitioner. Such
determination of the Executive that a state is entitled to sovereign immunity renders the issue as a
political question conclusive upon the courts so as not to embarrass the executive in conducting
foreign relations with other states.
(2) There are 2 conflicting theories regarding foreign sovereignty; classical or absolute, and modern or
restrictive. Absolute theory is self-explanatory. Restrictive theory, however, qualifies the acts of the
foreign sovereign. Immunity may be granted for acts jure imperii (right government) or acts done in
relation to their governmental functions but not for acts jure gestionis (right management) or
commercial acts.
As there is no implementing law for determining what acts may be considered as jure gestionis, the
Court created a test for such. Mere entering to contract is the start of the inquiry. Hence, the following
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issues have to be determined; the activity of the foreign state in conducting regular commercial
transactions within the Philippines and the nature of the particular transaction.
In this case, petitioner had the right to acquire necessary property for the creation and maintenance
of its diplomatic mission as stated in Arts. 20-22, 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Likewise, Art. 31 of the Convention grants immunity to a diplomatic envoy from any civil or
administrative jurisdiction or actions arising from immovable property on the receiving state which
the envoy holds for the purposes of the mission. If the envoy can afford such immunity, what more
the foreign state itself.
Wherefore, the disposal of the lot was as act Jure Imperii as the purpose of doing so was not for gain
but because the stubborn refusal of the squatters to leave the area made the relocation of the Papal
Nunciature impossible. Being an act Jure Imperii, petitioner has the right to invoke sovereign immunity.
But the Court had not needed to go through these lengths to prove such since the intervention of the
executive through DFA rendered the issue moot and academic.
18 Merritt v Government of Phil. Is.

GR 11154. 21 Mar 1916.
DOCTRINES: (1) A LEGISLATIVE ACT IS AN EXPRESS CONSENT TO BE SUED.
(2) STATE SUITABILITY DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY EQUATE TO LIABILITY.
(3) THE STATE MAY ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR ACTIONS DONE BY ITS SPECIAL AGENTS.
FACTS: Petitioner Merritt was hit by an ambulance of the General Hospital driven by a contracted chauffeur.
In response, Act 2457 specifically authorized Merritt to bring an action against the Government for
damages. The lower court ruled in favor of Merritt. Upon appeal, the Attorney-General contested the
ruling where the Government was held liable for damages sustained as result of the collision, even the
collision was due to the negligence of the driver.
ISSUES: Whether (1) Act 2457 is a valid consent by the state to waive its immunity from suit, and (2) the
Government may be held liable for damages.
HELD: (1) Act 2457 validly waived state immunity from suit as the statue expressly gave petitioner the right
to bring action against the State through the courts.
(2) However, the Government may not be held liable for damages. The waiver of immunity by the state from suits did
not tantamount to creation of liability on the part of the state unless it is clearly expressed in the act.
Liability of the state is limited to, under Par. 5 Art. 1903 of the Codigo Civil, acts of public officers,
employees and the like as special agents of the state. In the foregoing facts, a contracted chauffeur
was not acting as a special agent of the state. Hence, the State may not be held liable for the damage
caused to petitioner.
19 Santiago v Republic
GR L-48214. 19 Dec 1978.
DOCTRINES: (1) IMPLIED CONSENT MAY TAKE ON A FORM OF A CONTRACT.
(2) NON-SUITABILITY MAY NOT DEFEAT JUST COMPENSATION FOLLOWING A LAWFUL TAKING BY THE
GOVERNMENT.
FACTS: In 1971, petitioner executed a deed of donation of a property to respondent—Bureau of Plant Industry
on the conditions that the Bureau will install lighting facilities and water system on the property and
shall build an office building and parking space for the property on or before 7 Dec 1974. As the Bureau
failed to do so, petitioner filed suit for the revocation of the deed alleging that the Bureau failed to
abide by the given conditions. Respondent moved to dismiss, invoking state immunity from suit as
espoused in the 1973 Constitution. The lower court sustained the motion, hence, this present action
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further alleging that allowing respondent immunity from suit would create a retroactive effect on the
constitutional provision.
ISSUE: Whether; (1) respondents may enjoy immunity from suit provided the inexistence of the provision
prior to the donation; (2) respondent did not give consent to be sued; (3) the doctrine of immunity
from suit was validly applied by the lower court in this case, hence validating its dismissal thereof.
HELD: (1) Respondent-bureau may still enjoy immunity from suit and is not a retroactive application of the
law as the right has already been recognized prior to the enactment of the 1973 Constitution. The
existence of the immunity can be seen in Philippine Jurisprudence from as early as the acquisition of
sovereignty over the country by the United States.
(2) However, respondent did give consent to be sued. Although not explicitly, the deed of donation
was an implied consent by the Bureau to be sued. As the government ordinarily benefited by the taking
of the land, there should not be a bar to an ordinary action for the collection of the just compensation
due. Furthermore, there is no money claim by petitioner in this instance, hence he is not covered by
CA 327. Petitioner has the right to be heard, and non-suitability should not perpetuate inequity that
can possibly lead to an erosion of trust by the people towards their government. Hence, the lower
court was directed to proceed with the case.
20 USA v Judge Ruiz

GR 35645. 22 May 1985
DOCTRINES: (1) A CONTRACT IS NOT AN AUTOMATIC WAIVER OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.
(2) WAIVER OF IMMUNITY BY A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN MUST BE DEDUCED FROM THE LEGAL NATURE
OF AN ACT
FACTS: Petitioner-state subjected the repairs for their wharves in the US Naval Station, Subic Bay for bidding
in which co-respondent corporation (Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc.) won. However, petitioner refused
to award the contract as the company allegedly had a previous unsatisfactory performance ratings for
a previous repair of a seawall in the same naval station. Hence respondent filed action to allow the
performance of the obligation and, if no longer possible, for defendants to pay damages. Likewise, a
writ of preliminary injunction was asked by the company against defendants from entering into
contracts with third parties.
Defendants entered a special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the lower court over
defendants as agents of a foreign sovereign who did not give consent to be sued. Respondent-Judge
denied their motion to dismiss and issued the writ, opining that the contract was not entered into by
petitioners as a governmental function. Hence, an instant petition was raised to restrain the
proceedings of respondents for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES: Whether (1) petitioner may invoke immunity for his acts; (2) respondent-judge has jurisdiction over
the defendant, and; (3) respondents may proceed with the case.
HELD: (1) On the matter of immunity, respondent-judge was correct in applying the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity. However, restrictive application is proper only when the proceedings arise from
the commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign (jure gestionis) and not for transactions
characterized as part of governmental functions of the sovereign (jure imperii). Contracts do not
automatically waive non-suitability of the foreign sovereign, as the waiver must be deduced from the
legal nature of the act. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines. Hence, it is indisputable that the action is
governmental in character classified as an act jure imperii.
(2) As the contracts were for jure imperii, it is deemed that the state did not implicitly waived its
immunity from suit when it allowed respondent to win in the bidding for the project. Thus,
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respondent-judge never acquired jurisdiction over the personality of the defendant. (3) as respondent-
judge did not have jurisdiction, respondents are barred from proceeding with the case.
OBITER: Justice Makasiar opined that a contract has been established upon acceptance of bid by respondent-
corporation. He criticized the majority opinion for creating a bad precedence for future decisions
likewise fostering economic imperialism and foreign political ascendancy as it undermines the national
dignity and Filipino sovereignty which extends over the bases. As it is presumed that contracts will be
complied with in good faith, petitioners failed to establish that respondents violated the performance
of the obligation but instead the majority opinion appeared to honor the breach thereof.
21 National Airports Corp. v Teodoro, Sr.

GR L-5122. 30 Apr 1952.
DOCTRINES: (1) STATUTES PERTAINING TO THE CREATION OF AND CONSIGNATION OF POWERS TO A
GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS THE BASIS IN DETERMINING THE NATURE THEREOF.
(2) UNINCORPORATED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ENGAGED IN PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS ARE
VULNERABLE TO SUIT.
FACTS: Petitioner-corporation (NAC) was organized under RA 224 as a corporation. Philippine Airlines, In.
(PAL) paid fees for using Bacolod Airport 2 on 31 Jul 1948. The land where the airport stood, however,
was owned by Capitol Subdivision, Inc. (Capitol) who failed to receive the fees. Petitioner was
abolished by EO 365 on 10 Nov 1950 and subsequently replaced by Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA) which; (1) had the power to execute contracts, purchase property and grant concession rights
(Sec. 3); charge landing fees, charge royalties on gasoline, accessories and supplies sales to aircrafts
and charge rentals for use of properties under CAA management (Sec. 4), and; to assume all existing
obligations and rights that were previously conferred to NAC (Sec. 7).
In 1951, Capitol filed an action for recovery against PAL who countered with a third-party complaint
against petitioner. Petitioner, as represented by the solicitor-general, motioned to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction since; (1) petitioner lost juridical
personality, and; (2) CAA is an unincorporated government agency, hence immune from suit.
ISSUES: Whether; (1) action against petitioner-corporation may not proceed as the former lost juridical
capacity, and (2) CAA, being an unincorporated government agency, is immune from suit.
HELD: (1) Petitioner’s defense of citing that NAC and not CAA is the actual party to the case does not stand.
Though NAC lost juridical capacity, CAA essentially absorbed all the functions, rights, and obligations
of the defunct corporation under par. 7 EO 365. Simply stated, for all legal intents and purposes, NAC
is dead and CAA is its heir or legal representative. Hence, the error assigned to the petition is merely
procedural in character and can be rectified immediately.
(2) Likewise, Secs. 3 and 4 confers upon CAA can be construed as powers to transact business. The
power to sue and be sued can be implied from the power to transact business. Although petitioner is
now an unincorporated government agency, the immunity from suits which petitioner invoked is
determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. CAA was organized as
a private business entity even if its primary objective is not revenue generation but promotion of travel
and convenience of the travelling public. Furthermore, the government did not intend the creation of
CAA to perpetuate injustice against the creditors, as can be seen under Sec. 7 EO 365.
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22 Bureau of Printing v BOP Employees Assoc.
GR L-15751. 28 Jan 1961.
DOCTRINES: (1) IN DETERMINING THE NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY, THE ACT PERTAINING TO THE
CREATION AND CONSIGNATION OF POWERS THEREOF IS THE PROPER BASIS.
(2) UNINCORPORATED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ENGAGED IN GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS ARE
IMMUNE FROM SUIT.
FACTS: Petitioner, a government bureau created by Act 2657 (1916 Administrative Code) tasked with
executing all required printing by the National Government and under the supervision of the Executive
Secretary (Sec. 1644 Act 2657), was alleged to have engaged in unfair labor practices aiming to
discourage pursuance of union activities. Specifically, both the acting Secretary for Department of
General Services and the Bureau director interfered on the affairs of respondent-Employees
Association (BOPEA) and discriminated in hiring and tenure of employment.
Respondents moved to dismiss the charges on the following grounds; (1) some of respondents were
suspended pending result of administrative investigation for breach in Civil Service rules and
regulations on insubordination, grave misconduct, and acts prejudicial to public service; (2) BOP had
no personality to be sued as it was not a for-profit business but a government agency dedicated to
governmental functions. The Court of Industrial Relations (now NLRC) sustained jurisdiction over the
issue, finding that the Bureau was engaged in proprietary functions. Hence, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUES: Whether; (1) the Court validly held that petitioner is a government agency engaged in proprietary
functions; (2) petitioner is barred from invoking immunity from suit, and; (3) action brought against
petitioner may proceed.
HELD: (1) The Court erred in holding that petitioner had a proprietary function. Provisions of the
Administrative Code did not assign powers where the Bureau may act as a corporate entity. Though
petitioner may receive outside jobs, such may not justify what respondents assert as an “exclusive
proprietary character” of petitioner as other provisions of the Administrative Code deny this. Overtime
work in the Bureau is done only when the interest of service requires (Sec. 566), and the work done in
private capacity are only as allowed by the requirements of government work (Sec. 1654) and subject
to fixed terms by the Bureau director upon approval by the Department Head (Sec. 1665). Other
factual evidences of its governmental character is its sole reliance on the General Appropriations Act
for its financial existence, the nature of the private work which involves the use of certain government
seals and stamps that only petitioner is allowed to print, and the miniscule volume of private work
requested and never solicited as compared to the volume of government printing required annually.
With all the foregoing, it can be concluded that petitioner is primarily a service Bureau.
(2) Consequently, being a service bureau would mean that petitioner is a government agency engaged
in governmental functions. Without having a corporate charter, petitioner lacks juridical capacity
required in order to be sued (Sec. 1 Rule 3, Parties to Civil Actions under Rules of Court). Hence,
petitioner may invoke immunity from suit.
(3) Lastly, aside from the fact that petitioner did not give consent to be sued, for the Industrial Court
to proceed with the determination of alleged labor malpractices would tantamount to interference
with the exclusive governmental functions of petitioners regarding the subordinates’ discipline as the
complaint arose from filing administrative charges against the Bureau. Hence, the writ for prohibition
was granted.
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Chapter 5: Fundamental Principles of the State
23 Kuroda v Jalandoni
GR L-2662. 26 Mar 1949.
DOCTRINE: INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND PRINCIPLES FORM PART OF THE LAW OF OUR NATION EVEN IF THE
PHILIPPINES WAS NOT A SIGNATORY TO THE CONVENTIONS EMBODYING THEM, FOR OUR
CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN DELIBERATELY GENERAL AND EXTENSIVE IN ITS SCOPE.
FACTS: Executive Order No. 68 issued by the President on 29 Jul 1948 established a National War Crimes Office
and prescribed rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Former Japanese
Imperial Army Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda, Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines, is charged for war crimes before a Military Commission. He assailed the legality of EO 68
and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioner.
Petitioner contended that EO 68 is unconstitutional for it violates not only the provisions of our
constitutional law but also our local laws as the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and, therefore, the alleged crimes
charged against petitioner has neither local not international legal basis
ISSUE: Whether EO 68 is unconstitutional on the ground that the Philippines is not a signatory of the
mentioned conventions.
HELD: EO 68 is valid. It cannot be denied that the Conventions form part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by
the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two
Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and
principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory. Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly
committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally
bound together with the United States and with Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the
treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our
assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our independence entitles us to enforce our own right to try
and punish those who committed atrocities against our People.
Sec. 3 Art. 2 1935 Constitution provides that — "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the nation.”
24 Villavicencio v Lukban
GR 14639. 25 Mar 1919.
DOCTRINE: THE LAW IS THE ONLY SUPREME POWER IN OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS
ARE BOUND TO SUBMIT TO THAT SUPREMACY AND LIKEWISE TO OBSERVE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED
UPON THE EXERCISE OF THE AUTHORITY WHICH THE LAW GIVES.
FACTS: Manila Mayor Justo Lukban, aiming to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for prostitutes
in the city closed. Between 16 and 25 Oct 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the
district by the police. About midnight of 25 Oct, the police, pursuant to orders from the chief of police
and the Mayor, rounded up the women without investigation or an opportunity to prepare their
belongings and were sent to steamers bound for Davao, without knowledge or consent of the women.
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Counsel for petitioners as represented by their relatives and friends filed for Habeas Corpus and
alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by respondents. Respondents, through
their counsel, contended that the women were under no restraint in Davao where the City of Manila
does not have jurisdiction, among others.
ISSUE: Whether the writ may be granted even if the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no
restraint.
HELD: The writ may be granted. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint
of liberty. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these
women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited
them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they
had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without money or personal belongings prevented the women
from exercising the liberty of travel. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Had the Court accepted the defense, it would tantamount to allowing any mayor to forcibly and
illegally abduct a person and technically put him in exile. If respondents, beyond the authority granted
by law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily
have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of
process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty with impunity.
Government of Laws. Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts
are the forum which function to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. The
law is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to
observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives. The very
idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country
where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.
25 Ichong v Hernandez
GR L-7995. 31 May 1957.
DOCTRINES: INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ARE SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATIONS UNDER MUNICIPAL LAW.
FACTS: The enactment of RA 1180 aimed to regulate the retail business in the Philippines through means such
as; (1) prohibiting foreigners from engaging in the trade with the exception of U.S. citizens or entities;
(2) phasing out those who have been engaging since 15 May 1954 for 10 years or upon death or
revocation of license; (3) provisions prohibiting the opening of new retail stores owned by aliens and
requiring the same to present verified statement of assets and liabilities, and; (4) in case of death,
retail operation shall be allowed to extend for 6 months for liquidation purposes.
As petitioner is a Chinese national engaged in retail business in the Philippines, he assailed the
constitutionality of the act on various grounds including its alleged violation of international treaties
entered into by the State, specifically; (1) the United Nations Charter; (2) Declaration of Human Rights,
and; (3) 1947 Amity Treaty between the State and Republic of China, hence contrary to Sec. 3 Art. 2 of
the 1935 Constitution (Sec. 2 Art. 2, 1987 Constitution).
ISSUE: Whether the statute violated international treaties, hence unconstitutional.
HELD: RA 1180 did not violate any international treaty. The Charter did not impose any strict legal obligations
on states, and the Declaration of Human Rights are mere recommendations whose acquiescence is
solely dependent on the sovereign will of states. The 1947 Amity Treaty merely guarantees equal
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treatment for Chinese nationals as well as other foreign nationals in the country. But RA 1180 does
not discriminate as all nationals are barred from engaging in retail trade with the exception of the U.S.
who were granted special rights under the Constitution. Regardless, international treaties are
subjected to qualifications under municipal law.
26 People v Lagman & de Sosa

GR 45892-3. 13 Jul 1938.
DOCTRINE: IT IS WELL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS TO CALL UPON ITS CITIZENS TO DEFEND
THE STATE IN WHATEVER MEANS AS DEEMED NECESSARY BY THE STATE.
FACTS: Petitioners are charged with violation of CA 1 or National Defense Law as they refused to appear
before the Acceptance Board between 1 and 7 Apr 1936 despite compulsory nature of the military
service. Respondent Primitivo de Sosa, in his defense, cited his fatherless status and lack of support
for his mother and 8 year old brother. Respondent Tranquilino Lagman likewise stated that he has a
father to support, that he lacked military leanings, and that he wished not to kill or be killed as defense.
Court of First Instance sentenced respondents to 1 month and a day in prison with costs against them.
Hence, this appeal assailing the constitutionality of CA 1.
ISSUES: Whether CA 1 is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Act is constitutional for CA 1 is in faithful compliance with Sec. 2 Art. 2 of the 1935 Constitution
(Sec. 4 Art. 2 of the 1987 Constitution). The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens
would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein. Their defenses do not hold ground against the criminal case as they can
ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary
allowance to attend to these family responsibilities under the same statute. Hence, the appealed
judgment is affirmed with costs against respondents.
27 DECS v San Diego

GR 89572. 21 Dec 1989.
DOCTRINES: (1) ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS NOT ABSOLUTE.
(2) THE STATE MAY EXERCISE POLICE POWER TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN
ADMITTANCE FOR CERTAIN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION IMBUED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST.
FACTS: “The issue before us is mediocrity.” –Justice Isagani Cruz.
Roberto Rey C. San Diego, a zoology graduate from University of the East, consistently failed the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) for four times. As he applied to take the fifth exam, alleging
that he only took the exam three times and failed the same, petitioner did not allow him to do so in
compliance with MECS Order 12 S. 1972 where a person is barred from taking the NMAT after three
successive failures in taking the test. Invoking his right to academic freedom and quality education,
San Diego filed a petition for mandamus against the Education Department (DECS).
Respondent was allowed to take the test for the fifth time upon agreement of the parties which he,
yet again, failed. The lower court, however, ruled in favor of San Diego and held that the rule was an
arbitrary exercise of police power impairing his constitutional right to pursue a medical education.
ISSUES: Whether; (1) there was valid exercise of police power, and; (2) right to academic freedom was violated.
HELD: (1) In the matter of police power, it is validy exercised if there is a lawful subject of public interest
needed to be interfered upon and a lawful method addressing the former. In the case at bar, police
power was validly exercised by the state as a profession with public interest like the pursuit of
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medicinal education “is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health”. Likewise, means employed by petitioner is neither irrelevant to its legal purpose nor
oppressive.
(2) The right to quality education is not absolute. Art. 14 Sec 5(3) of the Constitution qualifies academic
freedom in stating that “Every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject
to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements”. Invoking the constitutional
right is wanting as the person must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and
promise. If persons who passed NMAT cannot be accommodated by crowded medical schools, what
more a person who failed the same for five times. “While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the
least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love”. However, it does not mean that a person who
failed NMAT is an absolute incompetent unﬁt for any work or occupation. The only inference is that
he is a probably better for another calling that has not excited his interest.
Hence, the petition was granted reversing decision of the lower court, with costs against respondent.
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Chapter 6: Separation of Powers
28 Pangasinan Bus Trans. Co. v Public Service Commission
GR 72915. 7 Jan 1986.
DOCTRINES: (1) SEPARATION OF POWERS IS TO SECURE ACTION, TO FORESTALL OVERACTION, TO PREVENT
DESPOTISM, AND TO OBTAIN EFFICIENCY.
(2) THE KEYNOTE CONDUCT OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES UNDER SEPARATION OF POWERS IS
INTERDEPENDENCE, NOT INDEPENDENCE.
FACTS: Petitioner applied for certification of public convenience to operate 10 additional vehicles which
respondent-Commission granted subject to two conditions that are to be applicable against their
existing business. As petitioner did not agree to these conditions, petitioner assailed the validity of the
provision through certiorari. Respondent claimed in their defense that sec. 1 CA 454 gave the
Commission delegated powers to do such actions against petitioner.
ISSUES: Whether the legislative power granted constituted undue delegation of power.
HELD: The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same
time to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and
thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which
narrows the range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain devices. As a
general rule, only the Legislature can exercise legislative powers. One thing, however, is apparent in
the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non
potest delegari (what has already been delegated cannot be further delegated) which is adapted by
modern governments, hence the adoption of the principle of "subordinate legislation," with certain
limits. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval
of the practice by the court.
Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by
the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence
after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.
Moreover, CA 146 as amended by CA 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public Service
Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility company operating or seeking to operate a
franchise" in the Philippines, as it is a business imbued with public interest. Being imbued with public
interest, the state reserves the right to exert police power over petitioner through issuance, review,
and/or revocation of certificates of public convenience. Certificate of public convenience is neither a
franchise nor contract, confers no property right, and is mere license or privilege.
However, the case was remanded to respondent as the imposition of new conditions were done
without proper notice and hearing.
29 Angara v Electoral Commission

GR 45081. 15 Jul 1936.
DOCTRINES: (1) BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT HAVE EXCLUSIVE SUPREMACY IN THEIR OWN MATTERS.
(2) JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IS THE ACT UPHOLDING THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH
MEDIATING CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES OR INVALIDATING ACTS RUNNING CONTRARY THERETO.
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Angara won against respondents Ynsua et al. in the elections held on 17 Sep 1935 for
the First District of Tayabas in the National Assembly. On 3 Dec, the Assembly confirmed the winners
of the elections through promulgating Res. 8. On 8 Dec, Ynsua filed a protest against Angara to the
Electoral Commission to which Angara, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss. On 9 Dec, the Commission
20 | P a g e
adopted a resolution setting the deadline for filing protests on the same day. Subsequently, the
Commission denied the motion to dismiss.
Hence, Angara raised the matter to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the commission can
regulate its proceedings only if the Assembly had not availed of its power to do so and since Res. 8 is
an act regulating the proceedings, respondent is barred from acting upon the protests.
The Solicitor-General, in appearing as defense for the Commission, assailed the jurisdiction of the
Court over the matter and asserted that Res. 8, a body invested with quasi-judicial functions created
by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative, did not deprive respondent to take
cognizance of the case.
Yasua, in his defense, premised that; (1) No law fixing the period of filing protests were created by the
Assembly; (2) the protest was filed before the deadline set by the Commission; (3) the Commission
acquired jurisdiction over the case; (4) Res. 8 is useless as neither statutes nor the Constitution,
required confirmation of Assemblymen; (5) decisions of the Commission are final and barred from
appeal, and; (6) the Court may not issue prohibition on the acts of the Commission.
ISSUE: Whether; (1) the Supreme Court can exercise jurisdiction over the Commission and the subject matter,
and; (2) the Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
HELD: (1) The Court held that it can exercise jurisdiction over the Commission and the subject matter.
Separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government obtained by actual
division in our Constitution wherein each department has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does mean that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of various
departments of government. As the Philippines followed an American type of constitutional
government, the Courts have been accorded “Judicial Supremacy”; the power to determine the scope
and extent of government powers under the Constitution. It does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. Avoidance of the issue at hand would have rendered an ambiguity
in the entire government framework, the Court declared that it can exercise jurisdiction over the
Commission and the case.
(2) However, the Court held that the Commission acted well within its jurisdiction. Tracing the
historical development of the concept of an electoral commission, the Court determined that the
Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction over electoral contests and qualifications of
Assemblymen. Although it is closely related to the Legislature, the operations of the Commission are
intended to be independent. By doctrine of necessary implication, promulgation of rules pertaining to
its proceedings are to be solely determined by the same Commission and not by anybody else, not
even the Legislature. Likewise, the confirmation of the Assembly cannot bar the Commission from
performing its tasks. Hence, the petition was denied.
30 Arnault v Balagtas
GR L-6749. 30 Jul 1955.
DOCTRINES: (1) COURTS MAY NOT ENCROACH UPON THE LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE TO CITE A PERSON IN
CONTEMPT.
(2) JUDICIAL INTERVENTION MAY ONLY BE INVOKED WHEN CONSTITUTIONAL INHIBITION HAS BEEN
VIOLATED OR LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION HAS BEEN ARBITRARILY EXERCISED.
FACTS: On 27 Feb 1950, Senate adopted Res. 8 creating a senate committee investigating the purchase of
Tambobong Estate by the Government that amounted to Php 5,000,000.00. On 15 May 1950,
petitioner James Arnault, attorney-in-fact of a party in the sale negotiations, refused to state where
the unaccounted Php 440,000.00 went. Hence he was detained for contempt until he divulged the
21 | P a g e
identity of the person. His detention has been the subject of a denied petition for certiorari (GR L-
3280). Petitioner was still confined in Bilibid on Dec 1951 when he filed an affidavit finally disclosing a
certain J.D.S. as the person who claimed the money. On 8 Nov 1952, Senate Resolution 114 was
adopted approving the committee report for the investigation and directing the continued detention
of petitioner until he has purged contempt of the Senate.
Arnault filed for Habeas Corpus alleging; (1) the acquisition of the estate has been beneficial to the
government; (2) he has been detained beyond proper limitations (arresto mayor under Art. 150
Revised Penal Code); (3) his affidavit in corroboration with the Senate committee has purged senate
contempt and that his continued detention is unjustifiable, if not then the legislative intent for the
resolution has been achieved.
ISSUES: Whether; (1) the Court may review the findings of the Senate Committee, and; (2) the continued
confinement for inciting contempt of Senate is valid.
HELD: (1) The judiciary has no authority to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of their
legislative function or interfere with legislative process for that would be in direct conflict with the
fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. Judicial intervention
may lawfully be invoked only when; (a) constitutional inhibition has been violated, or (b) legislative
discretion has been arbitrarily exercised. But so long as the contempt is related to the exercise of
legislative power and in aid of legislation, its exercise is not subject to judicial interference.
(2) In the present case, the petitioner gave the name, J.D.S., as that of the person who received the
sum. But no person guilty of contempt may purge himself by another falsehood for that repeats the
offense. As the Senate Committee refused to believe, the petitioner has been considered to have
continued the original contempt, or reiterated it. Hence, the Senate resolution of legislative power or
an arbitrary exercise of legislative discretion.
31 Noblejas v Teehankee
GR L-28790. 29 Apr 1968.
DOCTRINES: COURTS MAY NOT TAKE INITIAL JURISDICTION OVER ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST AN OFFICIAL OF THE EXECUTIVE.
FACTS: In his reply to an inquiry by Justice Secretary Teehankee, Petitioner-Land Registration Commissioner
Noblejas cited Sec. 2 RA 1511 giving his position rank and privileges of a judge of a Court of First
Instance, hence he may only be investigated in the manner as prescribed for the same under the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 10 days after his reply, Noblejas was informed of his suspension
pending investigation through a letter signed by the Executive Secretary.
Thus, petitioner filed for a writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction against respondent claiming
lack of jurisdiction. Respondents contended that petitioner exercised functions in the nature of an
executive rather than judiciary and that the legislative may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial
functions or duties, unless they are reasonably incidental to fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would
run contrary to separation of powers.
ISSUE: Whether the initial jurisdiction for investigating petitioner would fall under the judiciary under the law.
HELD: The judiciary has no initial jurisdiction over petitioner. The cited statutes and their proposed
interpretation are either unresponsive to the question of jurisdiction over the petitioner or would run
contrary to the Constitution. Sec. 67 never mentioned Land Registration Commissioners being under
the judiciary. Likewise, the presented interpretation of Sec. 2 RA 1511 regarding privileges of Land
Registration Commissioners would curtail constitutional power of the president to discipline
appointed presidential officials (Sec. 10, Art. 7, 1987 Constitution). The Judiciary may not impede on
the internal affairs of a co-equal department so long as its actions are lawful. Hence, the court ruled
22 | P a g e
that respondent was correct in exercising its initial jurisdiction over petitioner and the petition was
thus denied.
32 Phil. Bar Assoc. v COMELEC

GR 72915. 7 Jan 1986.
DOCTRINES: COURTS DO NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER POLITICAL QUESTIONS.
FACTS: Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 was approved calling for snap elections on 7 Feb 1986. By 3 Dec 1985, 11
petitioners contend the legality of the act on the ground that the vacancy required under Sec. 9 Art. 7
of the 1973 Constitution in calling for an election was not met as President Marcos called for the
elections whilst signing a conditional “resignation” letter to the Batasang Pambansa. The letter stated
that Marcos would irrevocably vacate the presidency and after the winner of the elections would take
his oath of office 10 days after proclamation. However, the accompanying motion to restrain the
enforcement of the act failed to reach a majority vote, hence the United Opposition was able to field
candidates—Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel as president and vice president respectively, and
campaign without insisting Marcos to resign so long as elections would be held in a clean, fair, and
honest matter.
ISSUE: Whether; (1) the Court may take cognizance of the case, and; (2) BP 883 is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court has no jurisdiction over the matter. Initially, it would seem that the issue is the legality of
the Act, however the supervening facts during the pendency of the petition has transformed the issue
to a political question which can only be truly decided by the people in their sovereign capacity through
a fair, clean and honest election.
The events that have transpired since December 3rd, as the Court did not issue any restraining order,
have turned the issue into a political question which can be truly decided only by the people in their
sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, which hopefully will be clean, fair and honest. The Court
cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent
president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
23 | P a g e

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ABSTRACT

This is a collection of case digests for Constitutional

4 Javellana v Executive Sec.

HELD: (1) On justiciability of the case: 6 Yes, 1 Qualified Yes, 3 No.

5 Aquino, Jr. v Enrile

ISSUE: Whether RA 6132 was validly enacted by Congress.

10 Lawyers’ League v Aquino

ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Mrs. Aquino is a legitimate government.

12 Alcantara v Director of Prisons

ISSUE: Whether the ruling of the lower court was valid

13 Ruffy v Chief of Staff

ISSUE: Whether the court validly dismissed the case.

17 Holy See v Rosario

18 Merritt v Government of Phil. Is.

20 USA v Judge Ruiz

21 National Airports Corp. v Teodoro, Sr.

ISSUE: Whether the statute violated international treaties, hence unconstitutional.

26 People v Lagman & de Sosa

ISSUES: Whether CA 1 is unconstitutional.

27 DECS v San Diego

FACTS: “The issue before us is mediocrity.” –Justice Isagani Cruz.

29 Angara v Electoral Commission

32 Phil. Bar Assoc. v COMELEC

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