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La notion d'Intelligence (nous-noein) dans la Grèce antique
La notion d'Intelligence (nous-noein) dans la Grèce antique

The Intellect and the cosmos

The demiurge in the Timaeus

LUC BRISSON
Traduction de Michael Chase

Résumés
Français English
La figure complexe et même contradictoire du démiurge dans le Timée de Platon a suscité
plusieurs interprétations de l’Antiquité jusqu’à nos jours, même si habituellement le
démiurge est considéré comme un intellect   : intellect de l’âme du monde, activité
productrice des Formes, Premier Moteur, divinité réalisant un plan déterminée comme le
dieu de la Genèse, instrument du Bien. Le débat se poursuit, mais il est important d’insister
sur l’originalité du Timée : c’est la première cosmologie dans l’Antiquité, qui fait intervenir
un dieu qui travaille, et qui utilise les mathématiques comme instrument par excellent de la
mise en ordre du sensible.

The complex, and even contradictory character of the demiurge in Plato’s Timaeus has
given rise to multiple interpretations from Antiquity to our time, even if the demiurge is
usually considered as an intellect: intellect of the world soul, productive aspect of the
Forms, Prime Mover, divinity carrying out a plan like the God of Genesis, instrument of the
Good. The debate remains open, but it is important to note the originality of the Timaeus: it
is the only cosmogony of Antiquity that involves a divinity that works, and that imposes
mathematics as a privileged instrument of order.

Entrées d’index
Mots-clés : Platon, Timée, démiurge, travail, mathématiques
Keywords : Plato, Timaeus, demiurge, work, mathematics

Texte intégral

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1 The Timaeus is a dialogue that describes the origin of the world, of mankind,
and even of the city. In this dialogue, Plato adopts a contradictory position. On the
one hand, he describes the origin of the world with the help of a story that makes
him gravitate toward Hesiod's Theogony and involves a temporal dimension,
whereas, on the other, he proposes an explanation – the first one – with the help
of mathematics, in which time plays no role. The definition and the role of the
central character in this story, the demiurge, has given rise throughout history to
multiple interpretations, which are, however, always associated with his status as
“intellect”. This text consists of two parts. In the first, I set forth my way of viewing
the demiurge, and in the second I explain my objections to the other
interpretations proposed so far.

1
1. The demiurge is an intellect (noûs)
2 At the foundation of Platonic cosmogony is this presupposition : the sensible
things that surround us are mere images of genuine realities, the intelligible
forms. Because sensible things are images of intelligible forms, they must
resemble them. But the notion of resemblance is double-sided   : it implies
conformity and disparity. In the Timaeus, it is the intervention of the demiurge2
which, thanks to mathematics, ensures the conformity of sensible things to the
Forms in which particulars participate ; and it is the khóra or “spatial medium”
that accounts for their difference from the Forms : all the sensible things that are
in the khóra and made of the khóra, appear as multiple and distinct in it
(Timaeus   52c2-d1). If Timaeus can say that the khóra “participates in the
intelligible in a particularly disconcerting way”, this means not that there is an
intelligible form of the khóra, but that the khóra has several features that render it
akin to the intelligible : it is a principle, it is immutable, it is not perceptible to the
senses, etc. In the Timaeus, Plato thus distinguishes no longer two, but three
kinds, because, in addition to intelligible forms and sensible things, he evokes the
existence of the khóra, in which sensible things are present, and out of which they
are constituted (Timaeus 51e6-52c1)3. By introducing mathematics at the level of
the world soul and at the level of the world's body, the demiurge gives things
enough permanence and regularity so that virtuous behavior, associated with
adequate knowledge and language, becomes possible in this world.
3 To fashion the most beautiful world possible, the demiurge takes as his model
not the sensible, but the intelligible (Timaeus 29e-30c). Yet to perceive the
intelligible as such, the demiurge must be an intellect (noûs), the only faculty that
can grasp intelligible forms. The demiurge “reasons”, “calculates”, and “reflects”4 ;
he “takes into consideration”5 and “foresees”6. This is why he “speaks”7. The
sensible world is a living being that has as its model the complete Living Being
(Timaeus 31b1), whose unity is found in our world as well (Timaeus30c-31c).
There is, moreover, an intelligible form for each thing (Timaeus 51c3-4). This
allows Timaeus to recall this presupposition :

“Since these things are so, we must agree that that which keeps its own form
unchangingly, which has not been brought into being and is not destroyed,
which neither receives into itself anything else from anywhere else, not itself
enters into anything else anywhere, is one thing. It is invisible – it cannot be
perceived by the senses, at all – and it is the role of intellection (nóesis) to
grasp it. The second thing is that which shares the other’s name and
resembles it. This being can be perceived by the senses, and it has been
begotten. It is constantly borne along, now coming to be in a certain place
and then perishing out of it. It is apprehended by opinion which involves
sense perception.” (Timaeus 51e5-52a7, transl. D.J. Zeyl modified)

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4 There can be no doubt that the demiurge is an intellect, whose object is the
intelligible8.
5 According to Plato, the intellect that constituted our world and what it contains
can only be a divinity9. As a divinity, it must be immortal, insofar as nothing
indicates that it has been engendered by another entity, whereas the demiurge
himself engenders the other gods, whose immortality he ensures (Timaeus 41a-d).
Because he is a divinity, this being is good : “He was good and one who is good can
never become jealous or envious of anything. And so being free of jealous envy, he
wanted everything to become as much like himself as was possible” (Timaeus
29e1-3, transl. D.J. Zeyl)10 .The demiurge does not behave like a god of the Greek
pantheon, Zeus, for instance, who can feel jealous envy11 with regard to another
god12, and even with regard to a mortal who is too happy, too rich, or too
beautiful, and goes so far as to take vengeance on him for that reason. Since the
demiurge is good, he is not jealous or envious, and he will make the world that is
the best and the most beautiful possible.
6 Insofar as the intelligible forms and the khóra exist prior to his intervention,
and as “necessity” resists his action, in one way or another, the demiurge is not an
omnipotent divinity. This is why he can only carry out what is best insofar as is
possible13. This relative impotence of the demiurge is in accord with the
traditional representation of the divinity in Greek mythology. Indeed, in the Greek
pantheon, Zeus, the sovereign, like any other god, is only distinguished from a
mortal by two features : he does not experience death, even though he was born,
and he is more powerful, although this power is limited.
7 Nevertheless, the demiurge exercizes “will”14, which is why his responsibility is
engaged15. He has feelings16, and tries to persuade necessity17. By all these
features, it seems the demiurge must be assimilated to an individual ; however,
the mention of his assistants, and the sudden and unexpected passage from the
plural to the singular18 lead one to suppose that for Plato, the demiurge represents
above all a function, the productive function of the universe. What is more, the
demiurge's action is a one-time affair. He limits himself to “fashioning” that
which, in the sensible world, is apt to exhibit an eternal nature ; once this is done,
he withdraws (Timaeus 42 e), transmitting his power to his assistants for a while,
then leaving genuine autonomy to the universe and to man, contrary to what
happened under the reign of Kronos, according to traditional mythology19. After
the departure of the demiurge and his assistants, it is the world soul that takes
over, guaranteeing the maintenance of an order that is primarily mathematical in
the course of incessant change.
8 Another particularity must be added to this one. When he tries to describe what
a god is in the Phaedrus, Plato shows himself to be very prudent. He begins by
situating his discourse not on the level of the lógos, based on a well-argued
knowledge that lays claim to the truth, but on the level of mûthos, a story that
remains probable ; and he concludes with an appeal to the benevolence of the
divinity which assumes the form of a prayer :

“This composite structure of soul and body is called a living being, and is
further termed “mortal”: “immortal” is a term applied on no basis of
reasoned argument at all (oud' ex henòs lelogisménou), but our fancy
pictures (pláttontes) the god whom we have never seen, nor fully conceived
(oúte idóntes oúte noésantes hikanôs), as an immortal living being,
possessed of a soul and a body united for all time. Howbeit, let these
matters, and our account thereof, be as God pleases (hó pei tôi theôi
phílon).” (Phaedrus 246c5-d3, transl. R. Hackforth).

9 This definition is cautious, but will not vary : a god is an immortal living being
(athánatón ti zôion). In the Timaeus, however, it is impossible to find any

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information that the demiurge has a body, or even a soul ; he is a mere intellect,
and this is a singular feature that was to inspire the history of Platonism: as an
intellect, this god lacks any kind of body, including a body that cannot be
perceived by the senses, as is the case for all traditional gods,
10 As an intellect, he is a divinity who is good, but is not omnipotent, and to whom
it is hard to attribute a genuine identity. Yet what is the role of this divinity?
11 The first allusion to the identity of this personage who makes the world appear
is to be found in this phrase: “Now to find the maker and father of this universe is
hard enough, and even if one succeeded, to declare him to everyone is
impossible.” (Timaeus 28 c 3-4, transl. D.J. Zeyl modified). The qualifier “father”
corresponds to the context found in Hesiod's Theogony, where the gods engender
one another. It is this character who is qualified as “father of the world” a bit
farther on: “Now when the father who had begotten the universe observed it set in
motion and alive, a thing that had come to be as a shrine for the everlasting gods,
he was well pleased, and in his delight…” (Timaeus 37 c 6-7). The same holds true
for the other gods, whom he addresses in these terms: “O Gods, works divine
whose maker and father I am, whatever has come to be by my hands cannot be
undone but by my consent.” (Timaeus 41 a 6-8, transl. D.J. Zeyl). All these gods
are thus his offspring (Timaeus 42e6-7), and he has children who are his
assistants, particularly for fashioning human beings: “For those who had
fashioned us recalled their father’s instruction to make the mortal race as
excellent as possible…” (Timaeus 71d5-7, transl. D.J. Zeyl modified). Note that the
qualification “father” does not entail either an allusion to marriage or to sexual
intercourse.

1.1. A worker: technical and agricultural labor

12 It is, however, the term “demiurge” that is most often used to designate the
maker of the world in the Timaeus20. This decision gives rise to a large number of
metaphors and comparisons connected to work. The demiurge accomplishes a
series of operations that were typical of specific artisanal activities. When he
fashions the universe, the demiurge behaves like a metal-worker, a builder, and a
painter. He is a metal-worker and a blacksmith, as one can see if one follows
attentively the description (Timaeus 35a-40d) of the fashioning of the armillary
sphere to which the world soul is assimilated. The demiurge prepares and melts
the alloy that constitutes its material; he molds, fashions, and arranges the plates
that are used for constituting the circles along which the stars and the planets
move, etc. He is also a builder, whose main activity consists in assembling things,
either when he establishes a proportion between the elements that enter into the
composition of the body of the world (Timaeus 32 b), or when he places the world
soul in relation to its body (Timaeus 34 b, 36 d). Again, he is a painter, when he
arranges the signs of the zodiac on the celestial vault (Timaeus 55 c). When he
creates mankind, the demiurge behaves like a potter, a modeler of wax, and a
basket maker. He is a potter who prepares the clay of which the osseous substance
is constituted (Timaeus 73 e), who fashions it (Timaeus 73 e - 74 a) to make the
skull and the vertebrae, and fires it. He is a modeler in wax, when he arranges
flesh on this skeleton (Timaeus 74 c-d); and he is a basket-maker when he
fashions and adapts mankind's respiratory system. It should be noted, moreover,
that the demiurge is assimilated to a farmer when he sows the souls (Timaeus 41
e, 42 a, 73 b, c) and when he constitutes the circulatory system (Timaeus 77c),
which is akin to a networks of canals intended for irrigation. Finally, the demiurge
behaves like a peasant when he implants the three parts of the human soul in

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accordance in the various locations of the body (Timaeus 69 e - 70 a, 70d-e).It

seems, however, that agricultural work must be added to artisanal labor.
13 The divine planter21 in Book X of the Republic seems to be another figure of the
demiurge, although this time he is linked to agricultural work. The god implants
the forms in the khóra.
14 This recourse to metaphors associated with labor (technical or agricultural) to
describe the origin of the world is absolutely original in the Greek world.
15 Plato thus collided, moreover, with social prejudices and theoretical objections.
Jean-Pierre Vernant22 gave a good description of the devaluing of work in ancient
Greece. Insofar as he works, the tradesman does not have the use of what he does.
His labor is thus alienated in its use value; it is therefore reduced to the service of
others and becomes akin to slavery. Hence, the opposition in Aristotle between
poíesis and prâxis23. Poíesis creates a work external to the tradesman, and foreign
to the activity that produced it24, whereas in the case of prâxis, the agent,
informing himself, produces a value of which he himself is the use. Aristotle was
to criticize the consequences of applying a technical model to the production of
the world, and would substitute for it a natural model. Nature is opposed to art or
to technique on the following two points: art or technique is not interested in the
end, but seeks to discover the means intended to make something whose principle
is in the producer come into being. The existence of an artisanal or technical
object, particularly the one constituted by the sensible world, is therefore not
necessary, but contingent, since, as such, it depends on a decision made within
time. It follows that the world has a temporal origin, and therefore that it can be
destroyed, since all that is born must die. Yet neither Aristotle nor Plato can
accept this consequence; in the Timaeus (41a-d), as we have seen, it is the
demiurge who guarantees the immortality of all he has fashioned. In short, it is
not plausible for a god to practice a trade.

1.2. The magistrate: persuasion and necessity

16 In Western Greece, however, the term “demiurge” also designates an important
magistrate. In the Timaeus, the demiurge assumes this role as well, for by
establishing the parts of the soul within the body, he appears as a colonizer, and
by trying to persuade khóra, he plays the part of a political orator25.
17 To understand the Timaeus, one, as has already been said, must suppose that
sensible things are mere images of intelligible forms. But an image must be
simultaneously similar to its model and different from it. To solve this problem,
Plato appeals to two fictions26  : the demiurge and the khóra, which must not be
identified with Aristotelian matter27. The khóra brings it about that sensible
things are distributed in space, for they are impenetrable. Nevertheless, the khóra
does not play any role in establishing order in the world, for it lacks all
characteristics. However, it is filled by the elements, in the form of traces or in
their fully developed form, which are animated by an erratic motion that the
demiurge will try to bring to order. Plato calls this motion without proportion or
measure, which the demiurge will try to set in order, anágke, that is, “necessity”.
The program is announced from the beginning of the dialogue:

“The God wanted everything to be good and nothing to be bad so far as that
was possible, and so he took over, all that was visible – not at rest but in
discordant and disorderly motion – and brought it from a state of disorder
to one of order, because he believed that order was in every way better than
disorder. Now it wasn’t permitted (nor it is now) that one who is supremely
good should do anything but what is best.” (Timaeus 30a2-7, transl. D.J.
Zeyl)

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18 The literary structure of the Timaeus, moreover, confirms this analysis:

Introduction (27c-29d)
Exposition (29c-92c)
What the intellect did (29c-47e)
The role of necessity (47e-69a)
The intellect's cooperation with necessity (69a-81e [81e-92c])
Conclusion (92c)
19 In the Timaeus, there is only one genuine cause, the intellect, which makes use
of necessity, which is described as an errant cause (planoméne), a cause that is
auxiliary (sunaítia) at 46c7, ancillary (summetaítia) at 46e6, and second (deútera
aitía) at 46e2.
20 Yet since necessity pertains to the visible, and hence to the sensible, the
demiurge, who is an intellect, can only use persuasion toward it28:

“Now in all but a brief part of the discourse I have just completed I have
presented what has been crafted by Intellect. But I need to match this
account by providing a comparable one concerning the things that have
come about by necessity. For this ordered world is of mixed birth: it is the
offspring of a union of necessity and intellect. Intellect prevailed over
necessity by persuading it to direct most of the things that come to be
towards what is best, and the result of this subjugation of necessity to wise
persuasion was the initial formation of this universe.” (Timaeus 47e3-48a5,
transl. D.J. Zeyl)

21 It should be noted that the intellect addresses necessity, which pertains not to
the intelligible, but to the sensible, by using rhetoric, the “demiurge of persuasion”
(Gorgias 453a2, 454a2).

2. The interpretations
22 As can be observed, the figure of the demiurge in the Timaeus is complex and
contradictory. He is an intellect, a good divinity who tries to fashion the best world
and the most beautiful possible by working. The difficulty attached to the
description of this figure explains the diversity of interpretations.

2.1. The demiurge, an independent divinity who

fashions the world
23 What is probably the most widespread interpretation considers that the
demiurge is an independent divinity who fashions the world more or less like the
God of Genesis. In this regard, Sarah Broadie makes an interesting distinction:

“According to one way, the eternal paradigm of the cosmos is an original of

which the Demiurge makes a copy or representation or reproduction in a
different medium. According to the other the paradigm is a recipe he
follows”29.

24 Filip Karfík30 maintains the former interpretation. For him, the demiurge
follows a plan (logismós); it is by contemplating the intelligible that he organizes
the body of the world in the khóra with the help of mathematics. For Sarah
Broadie, in contrast, the intelligible is not outside the intellect, as seems to be
indicated by the passages from the Timaeus quoted above, but is present within
him. In short, we are in the perspective of a god who takes himself as his object of
thought, and fashions the world according to a precise plan. This interpretation

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refers to a position clearly expressed in Alcinous :

“He is the Good, because he benefits all things according to their capacity,
being the cause of all good. (...) He is Father through being the cause of all
things (Timaeus 28c) and bestowing order on the heavenly Intellect and the
soul of the world in accordance with himself and his own thoughts.”
(Didaskalikos X, 164.36-42 Hermann, transl. J. Dillon, see 163.14-15)

25 One thus understands that the demiurge no longer contemplates the intelligible
in order to act, but implements a plan that organizes his thoughts in a reasonable
perspective, as is the view of M. Burnyeat31. In fact, all these interpretations seek
to render otiose any reference to intelligible forms that are located outside the
demiurgic intellect. We thus end up with an interpretation akin to that of Middle
Platonism, for which the intelligible forms become the thoughts of a god who
occupies the first rank.
26 This has the consequence of emphasizing the “mythical” aspect of the character
of the demiurge, and hence of making him akin to the God of Genesis; the
demiurge is separate from the world, which he fashions within time32. One can
therefore understand how David Sedley, whose position on the nature of the
Forms is not clear, makes Plato the ancestor of creationism and of the idea of
“intelligent design”33.

2.2. The demiurge, intellect of the world soul

27 Many contemporary interpreters consider that the demiurge is immanent. H.
Cherniss34, who follows F. M. Cornford35, and G. R. Carone36 for book X of the
Laws, think that this demiurge could be identified with the world soul. This
interpretation is based on the following passage, which distinguishes between two
types of causes which, in the case of the Timaeus, correspond to the demiurge and
to necessity:

“Now all of the above are among the auxiliary causes (tôn sunaitíon)
employed in the service of the god as he does his utmost to bring to
completion the character of what is most excellent. But because they make
things cold or hot, compact or disperse them, and produce all sorts of
similar effects, most people regard them not as auxiliary causes (sunaítia),
but as the actual causes (aítia) of all things. Things like these, however, are
totally incapable of possessing any reason (lógos) or intellect (noûn) about
anything. We must pronounce the soul to be the only thing there is that
properly possesses intellect (noûn). The soul is an invisible thing, whereas
fire, water, earth and air have all come to be as visible bodies. So anyone
who is a lover of intellect and science (noû kaì epistémes) must of necessity
pursue as primary causes (aitías prótas) those which possess intellect (metà
noû) and secondary (deutéras) all those belonging to things that are moved
by others and that set still others in motion by necessity. We too, surely,
must do likewise: we must describe both types of causes distinguishing
those which possess understanding and thus fashion what is beautiful and
good, from those which, when deserted by intelligence (phronéseos),
produce only haphazard and disorderly effects every time.” (Timaeus 46c7-
e6, trans. D.J. Zeyl modified)

28 Yet this interpretation is untenable, simply because the world soul, whose
intellect is its highest activity, is fashioned by the demiurge. We would then have
to do with a case of self-fashioning, which would be strange, to say the least.
29 The only way to avoid this contradiction is to interpret the fashioning of the
world soul at Timaeus 35a-b in a non-literal way. This is why everything points
toward considering that the demiurge is an intellect separate from the world and

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hence independent, despite the multiple problems entailed by this position.

Francesco Fronterotta goes much further in this direction, for he wants to show
that the demiurge is not the intellect of the world soul, but the world soul itself,
which is nothing but intellect. This implies that the world soul is not totally
immanent, for a part of it remains in the intelligible, which it contemplates. This
position, inspired by Aristotle (Metaphysics A 9, 991a19-2337; De caelo I 10,
279b-280a), brings Francesco Fronterotta38 to consider that the fashioning of the
world is completely metaphorical, and does not imply being situated in time. This
interpretation of the Timaeus is compatible with the one according to which the
world is mathematized, but contradicts the one that recognizes the importance of
the narrative element.

2.3. The demiurge is the intelligible in its

productive aspect
30 Having noted that the demiurge is absent from this essential passage of the
Timaeus:

“For the moment, we need to keep in mind three types of things: that which
comes to be, that in which it comes to be, and that after which the thing
coming to be is modeled, and which is the source of its coming to be. It is in
fact appropriate to compare the receiving thing to a mother, the source to a
father, and the nature between them to their offspring.” (Timaeus 50 c7-d3,
transl. D.J. Zeyl)

31 whereas at the beginning of his exposition, Timaeus declares:

“Further, we maintain that, necessarily, that which comes to be must come

to be by the agency of some cause. Now to find the maker and father of the
universe, is hard enough, and even if one succeeded, to declare him to
everyone is impossible.” (Timaeus 28c2-5, transl. D.J. Zeyl modified)

32 Franco Ferrari39, who follows M. Baltes40 in particular, concludes, from this

discrepancy, that the demiurge is but “the active and productive aspect of being”,
that is, of the intelligible, since the world is the image of its model, the “Complete
Living Being”41. The absence of the demiurge in this tripartition could be
explained in many other ways: either the scene takes place before the demiurge's
work, if one thinks that the fashioning of the world takes place in time; or else the
demiurge's presence is implicit at this level of the exposition. The fundamental
objection against this interpretation is found in this passage:

“Rather, let us lay it down that the universe resembles more closely than
anything else that Living Being of which all other living beings are parts,
both individually and by kinds. For this Living Being comprehends within
itself all intelligible living beings, just as our world is made up of us and all
the other visible creatures. Since the god wanted nothing more than to make
the world like the best of the intelligible things, complete in every way, he
made it a single visible living being, which contains within itself all the living
things whose nature is to share its kind.” (Timaeus 30c5-31a1, transl. D.J.
Zeyl modified)

33 Here, it is impossible not to make a distinction between the demiurge, who

fashions our world, and his intelligible model, the complete living being (31b1).

2.4. The demiurge is the Prime Mover, object of

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desire for all beings

34 Aristotle agrees with Plato's Timaeus on one fundamental issue: a mechanistic
explanation is not enough. But whereas Aristotle speaks of a Prime Mover, object
of desire of all beings, Plato introduces a demiurge, a craftsman, a technician, and
whereas Plato speaks of khóra and of necessity (anágke), Aristotle, who considers
this to be a failed prime matter, speaks of matter (húle). I have written on the
question of matter42, and here I am dealing with the demiurge. The demiurge is
good, because he is an intellect that contemplates the Forms, and in particular the
Good, which are separate from him and from the sensible things he fashions. In
contrast, the Prime Mover takes himself as an object, he who is, moreover, the
object of the desire of everything else. We therefore have to do with two different
interpretative universes.
35 The only way to bring the two into contact is to appeal to the Middle Platonic
interpretation. In the face of a Platonism that preached the suspension of
judgment, which Cicero knew and against which Numenius reacted violently, a
need was gradually felt among the Platonists for a more religious philosophy. This
was when Plato's thought reappeared as a means of acceding to another order of
realities: that of the divine, the intelligible, which only the soul could apprehend
by its intellect. Thus, there occurred among the Platonists the renaissance that
became known as Middle Platonism.
36 The most emblematic representatives of this trend were Atticus and Alcinous.
Of Atticus, only fragments subsist, most of which come from the Evangelical
Preparation by Eusebius of Caesarea. Alcinous, who wrote around the middle of
the second century of our era, and was closely attached to the branch of Middle
Platonism that interpreted Plato in the light of Aristotle, was the author of a
Didaskalikos. It has recently been established that this Alcinous must be
distinguished from Albinus, another Middle Platonic philosopher, author of a
brief Introduction to the dialogues of Plato, and whose classes the physician
Galen was said to have attended. Whereas Atticus defended Platonic orthodoxy
against Aristotelianism, Alcinous in his Didaskalikos proposes as Platonic a logic
that is simply Aristotelian. This attitude marks a decisive turning-point in the
history of the relations between Platonism and Aristotelianism.
37 The dialogues most often utilized by Atticus and Alcinous were the Timaeus and
the Republic. At least at first, these dialogues were not the subject of continuous
commentaries, but one sought to find in them views on the divinity, the world,
man, and society, in the context of a system articulated around three principles:
God, the Model, and Matter. This interpretation attributes the first place to God,
for the Model, that is, the Intelligible, becomes the thought of God, in order to
construct this new Platonic dogmatism.
38 For the Middle Platonists, god was to be identified with the Good of the
Republic and the demiurge of the Timaeus (Didaskalikos X, 164.36-42 Hermann).
And since this god was the very first god, the supreme principle, nothing could be
higher than he. Such supremacy determined the type of relation the god maintains
with the second principle, the model. The Middle Platonists were accustomed to
envisage the problem by recalling the passage from the Timaeus (29a6-7) in which
the demiurge is said to “have looked at the eternal model”. They derived from this
the conviction that in a certain way, the intelligible forms were the “thoughts” of
God (Didaskalikos IX, p. 164.32-34 Hermann, see 163.14-15, cited in section 2.1.),
which did not prevent the Forms from having an existence in themselves, outside
the intellect. The model thus corresponded to the intelligible, which, as the object
of thought of the first god, the Intellect, was external and inferior to him. For the
Middle Platonists, Plato limited himself to following the opinion of his

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predecessors, and following their example he accepted only four elements, from
which all the other bodies were formed as a result of transformations and
combinations according to definite proportions : they are earth, water, air, and
fire, which occupy determinate positions in space, by virtue of the very
constitution of the universe. These elements came forth from a unique,
homogenous, and undifferentiated matter. This is no doubt what Plato in the
Timaeus called the third kind, the errant cause, extension, or the receptacle. This
third kind was perceived as a corporeal and sensible reality, a kind of
undifferentiated chaos, in which all the elements of the universe were confounded.
39 The interest of the Middle Platonic interpretation derives from the fact that it
makes the demiurge of the Timaeus compatible with Aristotelian physics,
particularly on the question of the Prime Mover:

“Since intellect is superior to soul, and superior to potential intellect there is

actualized intellect, which cognizes everything simultaneously and eternally,
and finer than this again is the cause of this and whatever it is that has an
existence still prior to these, this is what would be the primal God, being the
cause of the eternal activity of the intellect of the whole heaven. It acts on
this while remaining itself unmoved, as does the sun on vision, when this is
directed towards it, and as the object of desire moves desire, while
remaining motionless itself. In just this way will this intellect move the
intellect of the whole heaven.” (Alkinous, Didaskalikos X, 164,18-27
Hermann, transl. J. Dillon)

40 One thus achieves a perfect agreement between Plato and Aristotle.

41 Yet this interpretation implies that the constitution of the world depends not on
technique, but on nature. The basic opposition is thus between nature, on the one
hand, and art and technique on the other, as Aristotle clearly saw:

“Every craft is concerned with coming to be, that is, with crafting things and
getting a theoretical grasp on how something may come to be that admits of
being and of not being and whose starting-point is in the producer and not
in the product. For things that are or come to be by necessity are not the
concern of craft, nor are things that are in accord with nature (since they
have their starting-point within themselves).” (Nicomachean Ethics VI 4,
1140a10-16, transl. C.D.C. Reeve).

42 In this text, Aristotle opposes art or technique to necessity and to nature.

43 For Aristotle, in the sensible world, the determining cause of action and
production is the final cause, which is not only the end of a process, but also its
goal, “that with a view to which” the process unfolds. This explains why at this
level, the final cause coincides with the form, which is the principle of internal
organization of each being, and why, more generally, all beings, because of their
dependence on an immobile prime mover, the ultimate good and final cause,
which moves all things as “an object of love” (Metaphysics L7, 1072b3), aim at
their proper good as their end. Nature is opposed to art or to technique. That is
why technique does not play a role in the process of the world's fashioning.
44 Anxious to avoid anachronism, contemporary interpreters make a distinction
between the “natural teleology”43 found in Aristotle, and the “unnatural
teleology”44 whose traces one sees in the Timaeus. The expression amounts to
assimilating the demiurge of Plato's Timaeus to Aristotle's Prime Mover45. This is
the interpretation of Thomas Johansen46, for whom the demiurge, who is the
guarantor of order in the sensible world, is merely the extension of his model, the
Living Being in Itself. This is also the reference point of the authors who
contributed to the second section, “God and related matters”, of the collective
volume One Book. The whole universe, Plato’s Timaeus today, ed. by Richard D.
Mohr and Barbara M. Sattler47. This amounts to interpreting the demiurge of the

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Timaeus on the basis on Aristotle's Prime Mover.

45 As such, this interpretation is anachronistic, even if it is pertains to the
currently dominant interpretive trend that reads Plato through an Aristotelian
lens. This Aristotelian reading comes close to what one finds in Book X of the
Laws, but it differs radically from what is found in the Timaeus, on three essential
points. The demiurge of the Timaeus cannot be situated either within or beside
the world, which he fashions; his benevolence is limited by the resistance of
necessity; and it is the soul of the world, which he fashions, that is the source of all
psychic and physical motion in the world.

2.5. The demiurge is the Good. The question of

teleology
46 There remains the question of the identification of the demiurge with the Good,
the summit of the Intelligible, as was made by A.-J. Festugière48, and especially, in
a completely different context, by the proponents of an esotericist interpretation
of Plato. However, two problems then arise as far as the cause of the fashioning of
the world is concerned: is the Good the cause of the origin of the world in the
Timaeus, and is this causality compatible with the intervention of technique?
47 It must be noted that in Plato, one should distinguish between two senses of the
term “cause”, as does Michael Frede: “1) the agent responsible for a state of affairs,
and 2) that in virtue of which the agent is responsible for a state of affairs”49. The
demiurge is qualified as “good”, but he is never identified with the Good. What is
more, in the Timaeus the Good is never considered as the Good, responsible for
the world's setting in order; the demiurge plays this role.
48 But since the demiurge is a god, he is good and it follows that he cannot be held
responsible for any evil (42d-e, 87e). As such, he is bereft of jealous envy. He is the
best of causes (29a6), for he wishes that what he fashions should be as beautiful as
possible. Thus he makes the world a perfect living being (33a6), endowed with a
body, and a soul that has an intellect (30b4-c1). We find the same intention with
the motion of the fixed stars (40b4) and the planets (38d7). Vision (47a2, b 6) is
given to man so that he may admire the celestial motions, and from astronomy he
moves on to philosophy, so that he may master the motions of the circles of his
soul (46e-47c). The same holds true of the constitution of the human body,
whether it be the growth of the hair (76c6) or the nails (76d7). The demiurge takes
into account the absence of the void to make breathing (79a6, c1) and swallowing
(80e1) possible, and he is concerned for the health of human beings (87c2). Thus,
the demiurge cannot be identified with the Good, for all that can be said is that he
is good, and that his intentions are good.
49 It should be noted, moreover, that in Festugière and in the context of an
esotericist interpretation of Plato, we are in a neoplatonic, and in particular a
Plotinian context. In this context, the first principle is the One-Good, from which
there emanates the Intellect, inseparable from the Intelligible, that is, the Forms.
In the Intellect, all knowledge is simultaneous and immediate, whereas in the
Soul, there is change (metábasis) from one element to another, with the reasoning
process moving from premise to conclusion. The Intellect is characterized by
eternity, whereas the Soul is associated with time, which is engendered
simultaneously with the soul: a paradoxical situation, insofar as like the Intellect,
the Soul is an eternal reality. The Soul contains in succession and partition all that
is found in a simultaneous and compact way in the Intellect, which Plotinus
expresses by speaking of “reasons” (lógoi)50, which, in the soul, are equivalent to
the Forms. More clearly, the lógoi are the Forms on the level of the Soul. The Soul

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depends causally on the Intellect, because it is through the intermediary of the

Intellect that the One produces the Soul, with the effect always being different
from the cause. Similarly, the Intellect, which, in a way, is responsible for the
production of the sensible world, cannot be held responsible for the control
exercized over it by the Soul. At this level, we no longer have to do with the Soul
considered as a hypostasis, but with the souls that are in the sensible world, the
World Soul and the souls of individuals51. For although Plotinus insists on the
unity of the Soul, the world soul and those of individuals are not parts of the Soul
that is situated above them; they are images of it. The World Soul differs from the
soul of an individual in that the body it produces and animates is better than the
human body, and especially because it is not subject to the problems that come to
trouble the soul of human beings, and even those of human beings – although
Plotinus, who believes in metempsychosis52, is also interested in that kind of
souls. Lower than bodies, of which it represents as it were the constitutive
foundation, one finds matter, which, it seems, it emanates from the lower part of
the soul53. For the neoplatonists, the true demiurge is the Intellect-Intelligible,
which however subsists in eternity and can only think itself. It must delegate the
fashioning of the world to the Soul, which contains the Forms in the mode of
“reasons”. The lower part of the Soul, the world soul, which corresponds to nature,
produces matter, in which it implants the quantity and qualities corresponding to
the “reasons”. In this gigantic system, the One-Good is thus the cause of
everything else, but in a mediate way, with the demiurge appearing first of all as
the Intellect that contemplates, then as the soul that does that actual fashioning.
50 In the Timaeus, the god who fashions the world is a divine intellect, who takes
the intelligible as the model of the sensible world; with this goal in mind, he works
as an artisan or as a farmer, trying moreover, like a magistrate, to persuade
necessity; and using mathematics. The complex, and even contradictory character
of the demiurge has given rise to multiple interpretations from Antiquity to our
time, even if the demiurge is essentially still considered as an intellect: intellect of
the world soul, productive aspect of the intelligible, Prime Mover, divinity carrying
out a plan like the God of Genesis, the Good as causal principle. The debate
remains open, but it is important to note the originality of the Timaeus: it is the
only cosmogony of Antiquity that involves a divinity that works, and that imposes
mathematics as a privileged instrument of order.

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Notes
1 I have used the following system of translitteration: êta = e; oméga = o; dzèta = z; thèta =
th; xi = x; phi = ph; khi = kh; psi = ps. Iota subscript is adscribed (for instance ei); and
when in is an alpha, that alpha is long = ai). Rough breathing is noted h, while soft
breathing is not noted. All accents are noted. All translations of Plato's dialogues come from
Plato, Complete Works, edited, with introduction and notes by John M. Cooper and D.S.
Hutchinson, associate editor, Indianapolis / Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company
1997.

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2 On the demiurge in the Timaeus, see Luc Brisson (19952, 19983), Le même et l’autre dans
la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon. Un commentaire systématique du Timée de
Platon [1974], Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag.
3 See my translation : Platon, Timée / Critias, traduction inédite, introduction et notes par
Luc Brisson [avec la collaboration de Michel Patillon pour la traduction], Collection GF
618, Paris, Flammarion, 1992.
4 Logismós, at Timaeus 30 b, 34 a, 52 d, 55 c.
5 Nomízein,at Timaeus 33 b.
6 Prónoia, at Timaeus 30 c, 73 a.
7 For instance, at Timaeus 41 a, d, e.
8 Timaeus 36d8, 39e7, 46d7-e4, 47e4, 48e1.
9 Timaeus 30a2, 30d3, 31b8, 32b4, 34c1, 38c7, 39b4, 42a1, 46c7, 46e8, 53b4, 53d6, 55c5,
68d4, 69b3, 71e3, 73b8, 74d6, 75d1, 78b2.80e1, 90a4, 92c7.
10 By giving the demiurge this attribute, Plato shows himself to be coherent with himself.
In the third book of the Republic (380 c, 387 c), Socrates maintains that the founder of a
city must impose upon poets a series of orders concerning his production, and in particular
this one : god is good (379 b), and consequently he can only be the cause of what is good.
11 On this important feeling, see Luc Brisson (1989), «   La notion de phthónos chez
Platon », reprinted in Lectures de Platon, Paris, Vrin, 2000, p. 219-234.
12 The way Critias insists on recalling that the division of the world among the gods took
place without dispute (Critias 109 b) gives a good illustration of the importance Plato gave
to this idea, which opposed traditional mythology.
13 This attenuation is formulated in various forms at Timaeus 30 a, c, 32 b, 37 d, 38 c, 42 e,
53 c, 65 c, 71 d, 89 d.
14 In the Timaeus, one finds the verbs ethélein (Timaeus 41 a) and boúlesthai (Timaeus 30
a, d, 41 b) in connection with the demiurge.
15 An-aitios is attested at Timaeus 42 d.
16 Cf. Timaeus 37 c.
17 Timaeus 48a-c.
18 For instance, Timaeus 44 e, 71 b, e, 73 b, 75 b etc., where the singular is surprising.
However, one might think of a distribution of tasks.
19 Cf. the myth of the Statesman (268 d - 275 a) and Laws IV (713 a - e). See Luc Brisson
(2005), « La critique de la tradition religieuse par Platon, et son usage dans la République
et dans les Lois », in Eugénie Vegleris (éd.), Cosmos et Psychè. Mélanges offerts à Jean
Frère, Hildesheim / Zürich / New York, Georg Olms Verlag) p. 67-81.
20 Timaeus 28a6, 29a7, 31a4, 40c1, 41a7, 41e4, 42e8, 46e4, 47e4, 59a5, 68e2, 69c3.69c4,
75b8, 76d6, 80e4.
21 Luc Brisson (2002), « Le divin planteur (phutourgós) », Kairos 19, p. 31-48. For a
critique, see Francesco Fronterotta (2007, 2013), « Phutourgós, demiorugós, mimetés   :
who does what in Resp. 10, 596a-597e ? », in Mario Vegetti, Franco Ferrari, and Tosca
Lynch (eds.), The painter of Constitutions, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, p. 300-320.
22 Here, I refer to the fourth section of Jean-Pierre Vernant (1955, 1965, 1990), Mythe et
pensée chez les Grecs, Textes à l’appui, Paris, La Découverte, where four articles are
reprinted: « Prométhée et la fonction technique » [1952], p. 263-273 ; « Travail et nature
dans la Grèce ancienne » [1955], p. 274-294; « Aspects psychologiques du travail dans la
Grèce ancienne » [1956], p. 295-301 ; « Remarques sur les formes et les limites de la pensée
technique chez les Grecs » [1957], p. 303-322.
23 An opposition that already appears in the Charmides 163b-d, attributed to the “Sophist”
Critias, cf. « Remarques sur les formes et les limites de la pensée technique chez les Grecs »
[1957], p. 303-304.
24 On this point, Jean-Pierre Vernant invokes Euthydemus 289c ff., Republic X 601c.
25 In the Gorgias, the definition or rhetoric is: a demiurge of persuasion (πειθοῦς
δηµιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική,) » (453a2) See also G.R. Morrow (1954), « The demiurge in
politics. The Timaeus and the Laws », Proceedings and addresses of the American
philosophical Association 27, p. 5-23.
26 “Fiction” need not be understood in a derogatory sense. The social contract which
Rousseau made the foundation of democracy is a fiction, but is at the origin of the French
Revolution, and allows the foundations of this political organization to appear clearly.

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27 Luc Brisson (2011), « La “matière” chez Platon et dans la tradition platonicienne »,
Materia XIII Colloquio Internazionale [Roma, 7-8-9 gennaio 2010], Atti a cura di Delfina
Giovannozzi e Marco Veneziani, Firenze, Leo S. Olschki editore, p.   1-40. [Lessico
Intellettuale Europeo].
28 Timaeus 47e7, 48a2, 48a4, 48c7, 51e2, 51e4, 70a7, 91b5.
29 Sarah Broadie (2012), Nature and divinity in Plato’s Timaeus, Cambridge / New York,
CUP, p. 62.
30 Filip Karfík (2007), «   Que fait et qui est le demiurge dans le Timée ?   », Études
platoniciennes 4, p. 129-150.
31 Myles F. Burnyeat (2005), « Eikos muthos », Rhizai 2, p. 143-165. See the reply by Luc
Brisson, « Why is the Timaeus called an eikôs muthos and an eikôs logos? », in Catherine
Collobert, Pierre Destrée, Francisco J. Gonzalez (eds.), Plato and Myth. Studies in the use
and status of Platonic myths, Leiden, Boston, Brill, p. 369-391.
32 Sarah Broadie (2012), Nature and divinity in Plato’s Timaeus, p. 196.
33 David Sedley (2007), Creationism, and its critics in Antiquity, Berkeley (Calif.),
University of California Press (Sather classical lectures 66), p 105.
34 H. F. Cherniss (1944), Aristotle’s criticism of Plato and the Academy, New York, Russell
& Russell, Appendix XI, 602-610.
35 F. M. Cornford (1937), Plato’s cosmology, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 187.
36 Gabriela Roxana Carone (1994-1995), « Teleology and evil in Laws 10 », Review of
Metaphysics 48, p. 275-298.
37 For an interpretation of this passage, see Francesco Fronterotta (2010), « La critica
aristotelica alla funzione causale delle idee platoniche : Metaph. A 9, 991a8-b9 », Atti del
Convegno Internazionale – Lecce 11-13 may 2006,
38 Francesco Fronterotta (2010), «   Ἀρχὴ τοῦ κόσµου and ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου. A new
hypothesis on the beginning of the world in Plato’s Timaeus », in Antoni Bosch-Veciana
and Josep Monserrat-Molas (eds), Philosophy and dialogue. Sudies onPlato’s dialogues,
Barcelone, Barcelonesa d’Edicions, vol. II, p. 141-155.
39 Franco Ferrari (2003), « Causa paradigmatica e causa efficiente. Il ruolo delle idee nel
Timeo », in Plato Physicus. Cosmologia e antropologia nel Timeo, a cura di Carlo Natali e
Stefano Maso, Amsterdam, Hakkert, p. 83-96.
40 Matthias Baltes (1996), « Gégonen (Platon, Tim. 28b7). Ist die Welt real entstanden
oder nicht ? », in K. Algra, P.W. Van der Horst and D. Runia (eds.), Polyhistor. Studies in
the history of ancient philosophy, presented to Jaap Mansfeld, Leiden, New York, Köln,
Brill, 1996, p. 88.
41 A position that had been anticipated by Jens Halfwassen (2009), « Der Demiurg : seine
Stellung in der Philosophie Platons und seine Deutung im antiken Platonismus », in Ada
Neschke-Hentschke (ed.), Le Timée de Platon. Contribution à l’histoire de saréception,
Paris, Peeters, p. 39-62; and by John Dillon (1997), « The riddle of the Timaeus: is Plato
sowing clues ? », in Mark Joyal (ed.), Studies in Plato and the Platonic tradition, Essays
presented to John Whittaker, Aldershot-Brookfield-Singagore-Sidney, Ahsgate, p. 24-42.
42 Luc Brisson (1997, 2000), « Aristote, Physique IV 2 » [1997], reprinted in Lectures de
Platon, Paris, Vrin, 2000, p. 99-110.
43 John M. Cooper (1982), « Aristotle on natural teleology », in M. Schofield and M. C.
Nussbaum (eds.), Language and logos. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy presented to
G.E. L. Owen, Cambridge, p. 197-222.
44 James Lennox (1985), « Plato's unnatural teleology », Platonic investigations, ed. by
Dominic J. O’Meara, Washington, The Catholic University of America, p. 195-218.
45 Stephen Menn, first in « Aristotle and Plato on God and Nous and as the Good », The
Review of Metaphysics 45, 1991-1992, p. 543-574; then in Plato on God as Nous,
Carbondale (Il.), Southern Illinois University Press, 1995. The Journal of the History of
Philosophy Monograph Series]. See also, R. Hackforth ([1936], 1965), « Plato’s theism »,
Studies in Plato’s metaphysics, ed. by R.E. Allen, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
439-447; C. H. Chen (1961), « Plato's theistic teleology », Anglican Theological. Review 43,
p. 71-87.
46 This is the interpretation suggested by Thomas K. Johansen (2004), Plato's natural
philosophy. A study of theTimaeus-Critias, Cambridge, New York, CUP.
47 Anthony A. Long (2010), « Cosmic craftsmanship in Plato and Stoicism », in One book,
the whole universe: Plato's Timaeus today, Richard Daniel Mohr and Barbara M. Sattler
(eds.), Las Vegas (Nev.), Parmenides Publications, p. 37-53; Allan Silverman (2010),

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The Intellect and the cosmos https://journals.openedition.org/methodos/4463

«   Philosopher-kings and craftsman-gods   », in One book, the whole universe: Plato's

Timaeus today, p. 55-67; Charles S. Kahn (2010), « The place of cosmology in Plato’s later
dialogues », in One book, the whole universe: Plato's Timaeus today, p. 69-77; Matthias
Vorwerk (2010), « Maker or father? The demiurge from Plutarch to Plotinus », in One
book, the whole universe: Plato's Timaeus today, p. 79-100; Thomas M. Robinson (2010),
«   Plato on (just about) everything. Some observations on the Timaeus and other
dialogues », in One book, the whole universe: Plato's Timaeus today, p. 101-115.
48 A.-J. Festugière (1936), Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon, Paris, Vrin, p.
204-205; 265-266.
49 Michael Frede (1980), «   The original notion of cause   », in Doubt and dogmatism:
Studies in hellenistic epistemology, ed. By M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat and J. Barnes,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 217-249; esp. p. 222-223.
50 This is how I wish to translate lógos when what is at issue is not the faculty, but the
power that organizes the sensible among the Stoics and in Plotinus. For a justification, see
my article   : «   Logos et logoi chez Plotin. Leur nature et leur rôle   », Les Cahiers
Philosophique de Strasbourg, vol. 8, 1999, p. 87-108.
51 The souls of the gods, of the demons, of human beings, of animals, and even of plants
must be classified within this group.
52 On this topic, see Werner Deuse (1983), Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und
neuplatonischen Seelenlehre, Mainz. Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur 3,
Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1983.
53 Controversy persists on this topic. Denis O'Brien (1991) thinks there is emanation of
matter, and vigorously expresses his positions in the following two books: Plotinus on the
origin of matter. An exercice in the interpretation of the Enneads, Elenchos supp. 22,
Napoli, Bibliopolis); (1993), Théodicée plotinienne et théodicée gnostique, Philosophia
antiqua 57, Leiden, Brill. Jean-Marc Narbonne maintains a much more nuanced position in
(1993), Plotin, Les deux matières (Ennéade II 4 [12]), introd. texte grec, trad. et comm.,
Histoire des Doctrines de l'Antiquité classique 17, Paris, Vrin.

Pour citer cet article

Référence électronique
Luc Brisson, « The Intellect and the cosmos », Methodos [En ligne], 16 | 2016, mis en ligne
le 16 février 2016, consulté le 09 mai 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org
/methodos/4463 ; DOI : 10.4000/methodos.4463

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CNRS, Paris

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