G.R. No.

L-18403 September 30, 1961

IN RE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF PASCUAL VILLANUEVA. MAURICIA G. DE VILLANUEVA

vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

FACTS:

Atty. Teodulo R. Ricaforte was appointed as administrator for the estate the deceased Pascual
Villanueve. Notice to creditors was issued by the clerk of court containing the usual order for
publication, once a week for three consecutive weeks which was effected thru the Morning Times of
City, a newspaper of general circulation, on Nov. 16, 23 and 30, 1950, which expired on November 16,
1951. On July 20, 1953, the Philippine National Bank filed a Creditor's Claim in the total amount of
Php1,347.45 and that said obligation has been due demandable since Dec. 20, 1940.

The administrator, opposed the claim alleging that the indebtedness has already been paid; that the
action for recovery is barred by the statute of limitations, for more than ten (10) Years have elapsed
since the cause of action accrued up to present time and failure of the Bank to present on time its claim
was due its own fault , hence inexcusable negligence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the claim of the Philippine National Bank is barred.

HELD:

The period fixed in the notice lapsed on November 16, 1951 and the claim was filed on July 20, 1953 or
about 1 year and 8 months late. The petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to Creditors
were duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning Times, respectively, which was a full
compliance with the requirements of the Rules. The lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of
appellant and its employees had been belied by uncontested evidence, consisting of a deposit of an
amount of money by the administrator of the estate in said Bank . While the Courts can extend the
period within which to present claims against the estate, even after the period limited has elapsed, such
extension should be granted under special circumstances. No justifiable reason to give the extension
and for one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had elapsed.
G.R. No. L-20914 December 24, 1965

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, ENGRACIO GULIGADO, JR. MRS. DINTOY
TAN SUAREZ VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Sulu, granted the adoption of the minor Engracio Guligado, Jr.,
and declared that the latter shall be known as Engracio Tan Suarez. Appellant opposed the
decision on the grounds that: 1) there was no competent proof of the consent of the natural
parents of said minor; and 2) the minor cannot bear the surname of adopter as a married
woman since her husband has not joined in the adoption. Shortly after his birth, the minor was
left by his natural parents to petitioner with whom the child had lived continuously and
regarded as his mother, who, in turn, has treated him as such, and supported him, as well as
sent him to school. The lower court considered and proved the fact that the natural parents of
the minor had given their written consent to the adoption which was duly authenticated by a
Notary Public.

ISSUE: Whether or not the minor may bear the surname of petitioner’s husband.

The minor cannot bear petitioner's surname as a married woman, for her husband has not
joined in this petition for adoption and cannot join it, because he has children by a previous
marriage. Since the adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were
a legitimate child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much confusion would result, if
the minor child were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not join in the
adoption.

This would mislead the public into believing that she has also been adopted by the husband,
which is not the case. And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the husband's
consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he has actually joined in the
adoption. To forestall befuddling situations that may arise in the future, the provision of the
Civil Code to the effect that an adopted child use the surname of the adopter himself or herself,
and not that which is acquired by marriage, be strictly applied.

The adoption is granted with the modification that the minor shall be known as Engracio Tan.
G.R. No. L-18971 January 29, 1968

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF ABUNDIO ROTAQUIO.

ABUNDIO ROTAQUIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Abundio Rotaquio filed a petition for a change of his surname to "Rota", alleging that his family
name (Rotaquio) sounds like a Christian name and sometimes creates confusion among his
friends and acquaintances; that the use of the family name "Rotaquio" by him and his two
other children sometimes evoke unfavorable comments causing him embarrassment; and
finally, that said family name has always been a handicap in his social, business and official
dealings. The CFI granted the petition. The Government contended that there is no proper and
reasonable cause for allowing petitioner to change his family name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of name is proper and reasonable.

HELD:
The State has an interest in the name borne and used by individuals for purposes of
identification, and that the change of name is a mere privilege and not a matter of right, but it
is likewise true that the authority may be granted by the courts if there is sufficient reason
therefor: as when the change is necessary to avoid confusion.

In the present case, as petitioner contends, his true surname gives rise to confusion because
people often take it as his Christian name. The change thereof, cannot be considered as
arbitrary or whimsical, especially there being in this case no claim that petitioner seeks the
change to achieve some unlawful purpose.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Cynthia Vicencio
G.R. No. 88202 December 14, 1998

FACTS :
The petitioner was born to parents Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres.
After a marital disagreement, Vicencio left their conjugal home and never returned nor gave
support to his family. Upon the approval of the court after filing the necessary petitions,
Leabres later on married Ernesto Yu. Evidence was established that the petitioner had not
remembered much her real father, and that in his absence, it was Ernesto Yu who had taken
Vicencio’s place. Although petitioner uses the surname Vicencio in her school and other related
activities, she contends that in such situations, confusion arose as to her parentage leading to
inquiries as to why she is using Vicencio as surname ; causing much embarrassment on her part.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that there was no valid cause for the denial of
the petition and that the court cannot compel the stepfather of the petitioner to consider
adoption , failure to observe the process should not be a cause for disallowing petitioner to
legally change her name, in addition to the opportunity of the respondent to improve her
personality and welfare under a socially recognized surname, that of her stepfather. The
Regional Trial Court granted Cynthia Vicencio’s petition for change of surname from Vicencio
to Yu. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals

ISSUE :
Whether or not the change in private respondent’s surname to that of her stepfather’s
surname be allowed.

HELD:
SALIVIO, Yani N. and the REPUBLIC vs. MARCOS
G.R. No. L-31065, February 15, 1990

FACTS:
Private respondent Pang Cha Quen, acitizen of Nationalist China, is the mother of May Sia alias
Manman Huang. Respondent registered her child as Mary Pang, bearing the
maternal surname, because the child’s biological father allegedly abandoned them. Later, she
married Alfredo de la Cruz, a Filipino citizen. Pang Cha Quen filed a petition for change of name
of her daughter on the grounds that her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and
recognize Alfredo as her own father and, to afford the child a feeling of security. Moreover,
Alfredo agrees to the petition and signified his conformity. Respondent Judge Marcos granted
the petition for change of name. The Solicitor General argued that the court's order is contrary
to law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be granted.

RULING:
The following are valid grounds for a change of name:(1) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the change results as a
legal consequence, as in legitimation; (3) when the change will avoid confusion); (4) having
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unawareof his alien); or
(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage all in good faith
and not to prejudice anybody.

The grounds of petitioner are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned to love
andrecognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father"; (2)to afford her daughter a feeling of
security; and (3)that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity.
These are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a change of name
should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where
none actually exists. Our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a
person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who
is not their father, can result in confusion of their paternity.

The State has an interest in the name borne by each individual for purposes of identification
and the same should not be changed for trivial reasons like the instant. A change of name is a
mere privilege and not a matter of right. The petition to change the name of the minor May Sia
is not supported by weighty reasons.
G.R. No. 147145 January 31, 2005

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE vs. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL
ABELLAR

FACTS:

Abada died sometime in May 1940.4 His widow Paula Toray died sometime in September 1943. Both
died without legitimate children. Aipio C. Abaja filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for the
probate of the last will and testament of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his
natural children Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio. Nicanor Caponong
opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when he died in 1940, hence the probate
should be disallowed. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
The RTC admitted to probate the will of Toray and Abada . Petitioners contended that the Will of Abada
did not contain an attestation clause as required by law. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the Will of Abada should be admitted to probate.

HELD:

This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance. The facts and circumstances of record are to
be considered in the application of any given rule such that the same point to a regular execution of the
will, and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance with the
requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or
fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the document may suffer from some
imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect.

An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts
attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses,
or other casualty, they may still be proved. A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its
attestation clause serves the purpose of the law.

Abada’s will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to
conclude that there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is
answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde.

The liberal rule does not offer any difficulty, nor open the door to serious consequences. The rule only
permits a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to
determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear limitation eliminates
uncertainty and any fear of dire results.
G.R. No. L-18407 June 26, 1963

ELAINE A. MOORE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

FACTS:

Petitioner is an American citizen formerly married to Joseph P. Velarde, also an American citizen, out of
whose wedlock a child by the name of William Michael Velarde was born. This child is now 14 years old.

The marriage of petitioner to Velarde was subsequently dissolved by a decree of divorce issued by the
Superior Court of the State of California. Petitioner contracted a second marriage with Don C. Moore
and thereafter the minor lived continuously with the spouses up to the present time being supported
by Moore who has always treated him with love and affection as if he were his true father. In view of
this harmonious relation it is petitioner's desire that the minor be able to use the name Moore after his
family name Velarde. The government opposes the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not under our laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second
husband of his mother.

HELD:

Article 364 of Civil Code specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of
their father and that in case of annulment of avoidable marriage the children conceived before the
annulment she principally use the surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect of a
decree of divorce, it concluded that the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be
understood as carrying the surname of the real father, which, in this case, is Velarde.

To allow the child to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband
die or be separated by a decree of divorce, may result into a confusion to his real paternity and in the
long run may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.

Moreover, the child concerned is still a minor who for the present cannot fathom what would be his
feeling when he comes to mature age. He may decide the matter for himself and take such action as our
law may permit when the right time comes. For the present we deem the action taken by petitioner
premature.
G.R. No. 139758. January 31, 2000

LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA vs. HON. RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, Commissioner on Immigration, COL.
ANGELITO Q. TAN, Chief Intelligence Division, Any Guard and ENRICO PANER, Jail Warden

FACTS:
Petitioner is a French national who was ordered by the Bureau of Immigration to leave the
country for violating immigration laws. He was deported but was able to reenter the country.
He was arrested and was charged with violation of Section 45(d) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940. He filed a petition for habeas corpus but the Regional Trial Court, after finding
legal basis for the detention, denied the petition. Petitioner abandoned his appeal before the
CA and filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court which the latter dismissed.
Petitioner filed another petition insisting that the second petition is not barred by res judicata
since the previous case was dismissed not on the merits but on technicalities involving arrest
by immigration agents, the while the present petition involves his continued detention.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second petition is barred by res judicata; habeas corpus may be issued.

HELD:

There is res judicata when (1) a judgment had become final; (2) such judgment was rendered on
the merits; (3) such judgment was rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
and parties; and (4) there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action in the
previous and subsequent actions.

The petition filed before the RTC and the present petition reveals the same matters and raises
the same issues. The parties and the causes of action are the same. As a rule there is identity of
causes of action when there is identity of the facts essential to the maintenance of the two
actions, or when the same evidence would support and establish said causes of action such as
the present case.

The writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is charged with an offense in the Philippines. Petitioner is charged with violation of Section
45(d) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
G.R. No. L-16187 February 27, 1963

TRUSTEESHIP OF THE MINORS BENIGNO, ANGELA & ANTONIO, all surnamed PEREZ Y TUASON,

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. ANTONIO PEREZ,

FACTS:

In Special Proceedings No. Q-73, the CFI resolved the issues according to a compromise made by the
parties: That the trustee shall file his bill for services rendered by him as such trustee, and the measure
of his fees as agreed upon between him and Attys. Lichauco and Brady shall be that which this Court
adopted and approved in the other case entitled "Trusteeship of Minors Augusto Barretto y Tuason, et
al., Sp. Proc. No. Q-74"; and That Atty. Araneta is allowed to collect by way of attorney's fees in the
certiorari incident which reached the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. L-6182 the sum of Fifteen
Thousand (Pl5,000.00) Pesos.

The guardian of the minors Perez y Tuason seeked to reduce the fees at par with the rates of trust
companies to about 5% of the gross income; and that the trustee should be declared as having been
overpaid, and that the excess be ordered credited to the trust estate. The petition was denied by the
lower court and was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the fees agreed upon may be modified.

HELD:

The fees of the trustee set in the compromise between him and the appellant-guardian were approved
by the court and virtually confirmed by the Supreme Court. Said fees may no longer be disturbed. The
time to determine the reasonableness of the future fees of the trustee is when he filed a claim for the
same. Reasonableness of the fees cannot be decided in advance, since reasonableness depends upon
variable circumstances, such as "(1) the character and powers of the trusteeship; (2) the risk and
responsibility; (3) time; and (4) labor and skill required in the administration of the trust", as well as the
care and management of the estate (54 Am. Jur., 410). For this very reason, the court may not set in
advance that the trustee's fees may exceed that charged by trust companies, unless equality of
circumstances is proved. Moreover, trust companies, which are fully dedicated to the professional
management of trust estates, cannot be equated with individuals who are only occasionally charged
with trusteeships.

For obvious reasons, any attempt to disturb such order, affirmed by the Supreme Court, must be firmly
rejected, the parties being bound thereby, not only as to the points actually adjudicated, but also as to
any claim or issue that could have been raised prior to the adjudication. The allegation of overpayment
should be denied.
G.R. No. 130277 May 9, 2002

MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN
ELEOSIDA
vs.
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON

FACTS:

Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, seeking to correct the
entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should
be changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and
third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E.
Borbon." Petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock ; that she and the
boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is therefore illegitimate and
should follow the mother's surname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City
and Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents.

The RTC ruled that the petition cannot be granted on the grounds that only CLERICAL ERRORS
OF A HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name, occupation of the parents,
etc., may be the subject of a judicial order ( Article 412 of the New Civil Code), authorizing
changes or corrections and: NOT as may affect the CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP
OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition may be granted.

HELD:

The changes will ultimately affect the CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES CHRISTIAN, as to substitute
ELEOSIDA, with that of BORBON; to delete the information respecting the date and place of
marriage of parents, on the ground that she was never married to respondent CARLOS VILLENA
BORBON and amend the information respecting the name of the informant, from MA. LOURDES
E. BORBON to MA. LOURDES B. ELEOSIDA, is indicative of petitioner's intention and device to
establish that CHARLES CHRISTIAN's civil status as ILLEGITIMATE.

With the petition's ultimate purpose on the part of petitioner to secure judicial order, which
would authorize a change in the civil status of CHARLES CHRISTIAN, the action is improper. The
changes do not fall under the ambit of the words 'clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature.'
G.R. No. L-14662 January 30, 1962

GENOVEVA BELTRAN, ET AL. vs. CORAZON AYSON and FABIAN JEMINEZ

FACTS:

The late Macario Beltran owns a parcel of land with a certificate of title. Plaintiffs are the nephews and
nieces of Macario while defendant is his widow. Plaintiffs alleged that they were not aware of the
extrajudicial partition between the defendants until shortly before the filing of the complaint. The RTC
ordered defendants to reconvey and cause the issuance of a certificate of title to plaintiffs. Defendants
interposed the defense of bar by the statute of limitations.

The defendants ,appealed directly to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action is barred.

HELD:

Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition is
applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied
with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or
are represented by themselves or through guardians.

The origin of Section 4, Rule 74, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190, does not show clearly a statute of
limitations and a bar of action against third persons. It is only a bar against the parties who had taken
part in the extrajudicial proceedings, but not against third persons not parties thereto. The statute of
limitations is contained in a different chapter of the Act, and if it had been meant to be a statute of
limitations, it would naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the statute.

In the instant case, both requirements were not complied with, because not all the interested heirs have
participated in the extrajudicial settlement and it does not appear that the four-year period have
elapsed when the action was instituted. The appellees became aware of the extrajudicial partition only
shortly before the filing of their complaint for annulment, and consequently, the prescriptive period of
four years should counted from the date that they became aware of the extrajudicial partition.