POLITENESS VIEWPOINT

Arranged by Group
Devi Winda Sari
Maysarah Manik
Nurul Aulia Amin
Putri Safira

Politeness, in this broad sense, is a form of communicative behavior found very generally in
human languages and among human cultures; indeed, it has been claimed as a universal
phenomenon of human society.1 What it means to be polite, I will argue, is to speak or behave in
such a way as to (appear to) give benefit or value not to yourself but to the other person(s),
especially the person(s) you are conversing with.

Eight Characteristics of Politeness

1. A first point—a fairly obvious one—is that politeness is not obligatory. People can be
nonpolite: they normally will not behave politely unless there is a reason to be polite (even
if the reason is somewhat vague, such as following convention)
2. A second point about politeness is that there are varying gradations of polite and impolite
behavior. This can be illustrated in a highly conventionalized form in our example of the
violin performance. A bow is a gesture of lowering oneself physically, and hence
socially—and the deeper the bow, the more self-lowering and polite it is deemed to be.
3. Third, notice, further, that there is often a sense of what is normal,3 recognized by members
of society, as to how polite to be for a particular occasion
4. Fourth, how far politeness will occur, or whether it will occur at all, depends on the
situation
5. Fifth, there is a reciprocal asymmetry in polite behavior between two parties, A and B (in
this case we will consider A to be the audience and B to be the soloist). Whatever is felt to
be polite in A’s behavior (in attributing high value to B) would be felt to convey the reverse
of politeness if observed—on the same occasion—in B’s behavior. A’s behavior (clapping
and cheering) in this case is meant to attribute high value to B and B’s performance. B’s
behavior (bowing) is meant to attribute low value to B and B’s performance. To give high
 value to the other party or to attribute low value to oneself is felt to be polite; to do the
opposite—to give high value to oneself or low value to the other person—is felt to be
impolite
6. A sixth, and rather bizarre, aspect of politeness is that it can manifest itself in repetitive
behavior, which is to a lesser or greater degree ritualized.
7. Seventh, it is fairly central to politeness that it involves the passing of some kind of
transaction of value9 between the speaker and the other party
8. An eighth characteristic of politeness is its tendency to preserve a balance10 of value
between the participants A and B. This is particularly clear in the cases of thanks and
apologies, two speech acts that may be described as remedial, because they seek to rectify
the sense of debt that one participant has to the other.

Here Geoffrey Leech is presuming a pre-theoretical everyday understanding of what

politeness is. In general, pragmatics aims to explain phenomena of language use in context,
especially contextually determined interpersonal meanings. One prominent theme here is the
problem of indirectness: of accounting for the commonly indirect relation between what people
say and how their utterances are (meant to be) interpreted. To this, we may add the need to explain
why certain forms of expression (and their associated meanings) are to a greater or lesser extent
favored and others disfavored or avoided. This can also address frequency: some utterances are
less likely to occur in a given (type of) context than others, and are seen as (in some degree) marked
or dispreferred.

 Indirectness
The gap between (explicit) sense and (implicit) force, and the relation between them is not
exclusively an issue of politeness. But, to a considerable extent, it is. Weneed to explain why it is
that people, in communicating with one another, so often “beat about the bush”—say something
different from what they mean. Also, it is necessary to explain degrees of indirectness and how
these correlate, in many cases, with degrees of politeness.

 Reciprocal asymmetry
The asymmetry of self-reference vs. other-reference in politeness needs to be explained.
Why is an acceptable thing for S to say about H not acceptable thing for S to say about S? Similarly,
why is an acceptable thing for S to say about S not an acceptable thing for H to say about S?
For example:
(1) You’re such a wonderful cook! (2) ?You’re such a lousy cook!
(1a) ?I’m such a wonderful cook! (2a) I’m such a lousy cook!

 Gradations of politeness.
Gradations of politeness—such that it can be generally (if not invariably) agreed that, in a
given situation, X would have been a less/ more polite thing to say than Y, and Y would have been
a less/more polite thing to say than Z. Speakers of a language routinely have to weigh degrees of
politeness in everyday communication, and hearers likewise.

 Opposite interpretations of elliptical expressions.

Good luck means that S wishes H to have good luck. Bad luck (or Tough luck) means that
S is sorry, and commiserates with H about H’s bad luck. Why is it that Bad luck means “I’m sorry
about your bad luck” and cannot mean I wish you bad luck? and that Good luck means “I’m glad
about your good luck” and cannot mean I am sorry about your good luck? A theory of politeness
is needed to explain this anomaly. These expressions, incidentally, are both illustrations of the
Sympathy Maxim—see 4.3.1 (M9)—which applies both to good wishes and to condolences (see
7.5.2, 7.5.3). Essentially, the principle at work is that it is preferable to attribute favorable
meanings to H (i.e., meanings that give value to H) rather than unfavorable meanings.
 Preference and dispreference.
Conversational analysts have noted that in exchanges known as adjacency pairs, where a
particular kind of turn spoken by speaker A is typically followed by a response turn spoken by
A’s interlocutor B, there is often a preference for one kind of response rather than its opposite (see
Levinson 1983: 332–345). For example, in response to a request, the preferred second turn is to
indicate compliance, while the dispreferred one is to indicate refusal. Another way to handle this
imbalance between one response and another is to use the terms unmarked and marked familiar
in syntax and morphology. The preferred option is felt to be unmarked, in the sense that it is
normal and expected, whereas the dispreferred option is felt to be marked, less usual. As a sign
of this, it is the dispreferred option that is often accompanied by indications that it is somehow
 unexpected and exceptional. As Levinson (1983: 334) points out, signs of dispreference in turn
taking include:
(a) Delays: notably a pause, or a time gap, before the responder replies to the
preceding turn.

(b) Prefaces: pause-filling utterance initiators like Well . . . and Uh . . . , which

suggest that the responder is finding the dialogue situation problematic and
wishes to temporize before replying.
(c) The use of “appreciations” if relevant (e.g., following offers, invitations,
advice), for example, Oh, that’s very kind of you, but . . . or That’s a very good
question, but . . .
(d) The use of qualifications such as I don’t know for sure, but . . .
(e) Hesitations during the turn, including filled pauses such as um and er
(f) Accounts (also called grounders): “carefully formulated explanations of why the
dispreferred act is being done” (Levinson 1983: 334), e.g., No, I’m sorry, I
can’t, cuz I’ve got an appointment with the dentist at 11.15.

An Overview of Theories or Models of Politeness

 GEOFFREY LEECH
Politeness is defined by Geoffrey Leech1 as “a form of behavior that establishes and
maintains comity.” In another words, politeness is referring to the ability of the people in a social
interaction to engage in communication with relative harmony. Politeness is a form of social
interaction conditioned by socio-cultural norms of the particular society, which can be expressed
through communication and communicative acts.2
Another key notion related to politeness is the ‘face.’ Face is the notion that represents the
individual self-esteem, which is something being emotionally invested, can be lost, maintained,
and enhanced that constantly attended the interaction. The notion was initially introduced by

1
Geoffrey Leech. 1983. Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman
2
Alfattah, M. H. A., Pragmatic Analysis of Politeness Theory, Language in India, Vol. 10 2010, pp. 133-157.
Goffman3 as a metaphor of a mask of a person that changes according to the audience and the kinds
of social interaction that the person engaged in.
The theory of politeness suggest the strategies in social interaction by which a person can
use to save the hearer’s face upon the effect of face-threatening acts or FTAs.8 Face threatening
acts (FTA) are described by Brown and Levinson as the acts that infringe the hearer’s need of
maintaining his/her self-esteem and be respected. In this light, face maintenance is considered as
a condition rather than the goal of interaction. Brown and Levinson argues that anthropologist
would possibly use the notion of face respected as norms or values subscribed to by the members
of the society. However, instead, they suggest face as wants. Brown and Levinson identify two
types of face, they are: negative face and positive face.
 ROBIN T. LAKOFF
Robin T. Lakoff, called by Eelen “the mother of modern politeness theory,” began the
modern study of politeness from a pragmatic point of view in Lakoff (1973), taking a broadly
Gricean perspective (see Appendix, A1.2), and proposing three politeness rules: “Don’t impose,”
“Give options,” and “Make A feel good—be friendly.” In a later publication (1990: 35) she came
up with three rather differen rules—“Distance,” “Deference,” and “Camaraderie”—stating that
these may have different degrees of importance according to the culture. Lakoff’s account was not
worked out in detail, but it set people thinking about the pragmatic impact of politeness on
linguistic behavior and convention.4
 BROWN AND LEVINSON
Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]) developed, as already mentioned, a more clearly
articulated model, which, although it was built on a Gricean foundation, took into account a
broader view of social behavior, in particular developing the concept of face, influentially
introduced into Western social theorizing by Goffman (1967), as the key to the study of politeness.
 YUEGUO GU
Yueguo Gu also follows a Gricean approach but argues that the Gricean politeness theory,
as presented by B&L and Leech for example, needs to be modified to account for the traditions
and practices of politeness in Chinese. For Chinese, the PP is regarded as a “sanctioned belief that
an individual’s behavior ought to live up to the expectations of respectfulness, modesty, attitudinal

3
Rahmat Yusny. Jurnal Ilmiah DIDAKTIKA Agustus 2013 VOL. XIV NO.1, 176-189.
4
Geoffrey Leech. 2014. The Pragmatics of Politeness. New York : Oxford University Press
warmth and refinement” (Gu 1990: 245). Gu mentions four politeness maxims (Self-denigration,
Address, Tact, and Generosity) and also proposes a “Balance Principle” by which the favors done
by A to B are balanced by the favors done by B to A—so that the PP in effect has the function of
maintaining social equilibrium.

 SACHIKO IDE
Sachiko Ide (1982, 1989, 1993) is another influential figure from the East, writing from a
Japanese viewpoint; she is critical of B&L and Leech for their Western bias in favor of “strategic”
interaction, where politeness is used in pursuit of individual goals. In her description of politeness
in Japanese she draws a distinction between two kinds of politeness, to which she attaches the
terms volition and discernment, the latter being the kind of politeness particularly associated with
Japanese culture. Unlike the “volitional” politeness described by B&L, motivated by an
individual’s wants, “discernment” (wakimae in Japanese) concerns the role and obligations of the
individual as member of a closely knit group within a hierarchical society. Once again, this
distinction recalls the collectivist versus individualist contrast between Western and Eastern
societies (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005). On the other hand, it meshes with the distinction (drawn
in 1.2.1) between bivalent and trivalent conceptions of politeness, of which the former (having a
social indexing function) belongs more to sociolinguistics than to pragmatics, and the latter
belongs more to pragmatics, being concerned with ongoing interaction motivated by speaker and
hearer goals.
 HORST ARNDT AND RICHARD JANNEY
Horst Arndt and Richard Janney (1979, 1983, also Janney and Arndt 1992) locate
politeness within a more general model of “emotive” interactional behavior. They reject the idea
of conventional rules of appropriateness along the lines of Fraser and Nolen. They place emphasis
on the holistic behavior and responses of individuals, rather than on the linguistic channel of
communication between them. For them, the notion of politeness equates with “interpersonal
supportiveness,” which may be manifest not only in language but in paralinguistic and kinesic
features: vocal quality, intonation, gesture, eye contact, and the like.

 BRUCE FRASER AND WILLIAM NOLEN

 Bruce Fraser and William Nolen (1981) put forward a “conversational contract” (CC) account
of politeness. In this account, everyone who enters into a conversation brings to it a set of rights
and obligations, which they mutually recognize. However, the terms of the “contract” are capable
of developing in the course of the conversation by change of context or by renegotiation. Politeness
is a matter of observing the CC, which establishes norms of behavior (including less centrally
linguistic phenomena such as turn-taking conventions and loudness of voice in interaction).
Politeness is not seen as “strategic” or “rhetorical” but simply as “getting on with the task in hand
in light of the terms and conditions of the CC” (Fraser 1990: 233). Politeness according to Fraser
and Nolen is attributed to the speaker, rather than to the utterance, whereas the judgment of
politeness is entirely in the hands of the addressee

 RICHARD J. WATTS

Richard J. Watts (1989, 1992, 2003) has championed a postmodernist, discoursal approach to
politeness, most fully developed on his book Politeness in 2003. Watts et al. (1992) drew a
distinction between first-order and second-order politeness, a distinction taken up by Eelen (1999,
2001) as politeness1 and politeness2. Politeness1 is politeness as a layperson’s concept, something
that individuals talk about in everyday situations— and have an everyday understanding of.

Watts also regards it as impossible to make definitive statements about politeness, as politeness
is variable according to context, and what is polite or impolite is unavoidably confined to the
perceptions of the interactants. As a result, it seems that the Watts model can make only weak
claims about politeness in reality: ”The model I wish to develop does not claim that a particular
utterance is a realization of polite behavior nor to explain why. It tries to offer ways of recognising
when a linguistic utterance might be open to interpretation by interlocutors as “(im)polite.”

DISSECTING POLITENESS

In semantic terms, “politeness” is essentially a manner-adverbial notion, an attribute whereby

a predicate is modified. That is, it is actions, human behaviors, etc., that are characterized as
“polite,” this being in practice restricted to communicative behavior—not necessarily linguistic
behavior, but typically so.

DOES POLITENESS LIE IN THE MIND OF THE SPEAKER, THE HEARER, OR BOTH?
 This leads us on to a vexed question on which there can be fundamental differences of
opinion. It has been suggested (Eelen 2001: 96–98) that pragmatic politeness. theorists have
favored a speaker-oriented bias, whereas Mills (2003) and Watts (2003) claim that the judgment
of what is polite is made by the addressee (or an observer) and is purely subjective. This latter
stance, like the former, means incidentally that politeness is a subjective matter: politeness lies in
the mind of the speaker, or alternatively in the mind of the hearer

KINDS OF EVIDENCE FOR POLITENESS

A theory of politeness should be answerable to evidence, and there are three main observable
factors to be considered here. First, there is evidence of what people say, or—less authentically—
what they believe they would say (or someone else would say) in a certain situation. Second, there
is the evidence of what context the words or utterances are spoken in;: this is a very broad domain,
varying from the immediate situation of a given conversational encounter to the cultural
characteristics of the society in which it takes place. Third, there is a set of judgments about the
degree of politeness involved; the judge in this case may be the person interacting in a dialogue
(either S or H) or one or more third persons acting as analyst-observer. Ideally these three factors
have to be studied in association with one another: for a given scenario, one needs to know (1) what
was said, (2) in what context it was said (including the identity of S and H/O), and (3) what the
degree of (im)politeness was judged to be. It need hardly be said that there are considerable
difficulties in identifying data under these three headings.

CONCLUTION

Politeness is the practical application of good manners or etiquqe. It is a culturally defined

phenomenon, and therefore what is considered polite in one culture can sometimes be quite rude
or simply eccentric in another culture context.

While the goal of politeness is to make all of the parties relaxed and comfortable with one
another, these culturally defined standards at times may be manipulated to inflict shame on a
designated party.