Atlantic Council
EURASIA CENTER
ISSUE BRIEF
The Eurasia Center’s mission
is to enhance transatlantic
cooperation in promoting
stability, democratic values
and prosperity in Eurasia, from
Eastern Europe and Turkey in the
West to the Caucasus, Russia,
and Central Asia in the East.
The Population
of Russia, Today
and Tomorrow
JUNE 2019 GAIANE SAFAROVA
Introduction
L
ike every country, Russia has a very specific demographic foot-
print; its fertility, mortality, and migration rates, as well as its
age composition, all affect its performance domestically and on
the world stage. Russia’s current demographics were shaped by
its history, particularly crises like World War II, and its future will be
deeply affected by conditions like its dropping fertility rate and aging
population.
The objective of this paper is to briefly present Russia’s current demo-
graphic situation and future trends. Given the limited size of the mate-
rial, it is only possible to identify the main issues that should be touched
upon when talking about the country’s demographic situation.
This paper begins by presenting dynamics of total population size,
followed by a consideration of the main demographic processes: fer-
tility, mortality, and migration. Then changes in age composition are
analyzed and the most significant of them, population aging, is exam-
ined. Russia’s largely heterogenous demographic development—e.g., it
is characterized by a significant gender imbalance, rural/urban differ-
ences, and regional differentiation of demographic indicators—is also
touched upon. Finally, future potential trends of population size and
age structure are discussed.
This analysis uses census and vital statistics data provided by the
Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat),1 the Human Mortality
Database (HMD, a joint initiative of the University of California-
Berkeley and the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research), 2 UN
1 Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service, “Russia in figures,” http://www.gks.
ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/figures/population/.
2 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Population
Division, The Human Mortality Database, Human Mortality Database, https://www.
mortality.org/.
 ISSU E B RIEF The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow

World Population Prospects (WPP), 3 and UN World
Population Aging (WPA).4
Dynamics of the Total Population Size,
Russian Federation, Since 1990
Based on population size, the Russian Federation (RF)
is the ninth-largest country in the world, and is the
largest in Europe. 5 Table 1 shows its main demographic
indicators.
Table 1. Main Demographic Indicators,
Russian Federation, 2015
TOTAL POPULATION SIZE (million)
(January 1, 2016)
Total Fertility Rate*
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
Both Sexes
Average Male Life Expectancy at Birth
(years)
Figure 1 represents dynamics of the total population
size of the Russian population since 1990. According
to Rosstat estimates, the population of Russia at the
beginning of 2016 amounted to 146.5 million people,
including 2.3 million in the Crimean Federal District
(FD) formed in 2014.6 Even without taking into account
the Crimean FD, Russia’s population increased for six
consecutive years (2010-2015) after a long period of
population decline between 1995 and 2009. The popu-
lation was at its largest—148.6 million people—in 1993,
and by 2009 it had fallen to 142.7 million. Though mod-
erate growth took place in the following years, Russia’s
population has not yet fully rebounded.
It should be noted that Russia occupies the largest
146.5 land area in the world, with more than 17 million square
kilometers. However, the country’s population is dis-
persed extremely unevenly over that vast territory, and
1.78 the population density is very low—just 8.5 people per
square kilometer.7
71.4
Fertility, mortality, and migration are the main demo-
65.9 graphic processes that determine the changes in total
population, and are considered below.

Average Female Life Expectancy at 76.7

Birth (years)
Net Migration*** (per 1000 population) 1.7
* Total fertility rate: The average number of children born to a
woman during her lifetime.
** Life expectancy at birth: The average number of years a
newborn would live if subjected to the age-specific mortality
rates of a given period for his/her entire life.
*** Net migration: The difference between the number of people
entering a country or region and those leaving.
Source: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2017, Section 1, 2,
Rosstat.
Changes in the Total Fertility Rate, Russian
Federation, Since 1990
Total fertility rate (TFR) is an indicator that does not
depend on the population age structure. Its changes
(see Figure 2) indicate that, with the exception of
2005-2006, there was a steady increase in the inten-
sity of childbearing in Russia from 1999 to 2014.
According to the European Demographic Datasheet
2016, Russia’s 2014 TFR (1.75) was not among the top
five in Europe, though it exceeded the average European
level (1.57). For reference, the United States had a TFR
of 1.86 births per woman. All given values of TFR are
below replacement level, which is 2.1 births per woman.

3 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Population Division, “World Population Prospects 2018,” 2018, https://
population.un.org/wpp/.
4 United Nations, DESA,World Population Aging 2017, 2017, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/ageing/
WPA2017_Highlights.pdf.
5 European Demographic Data Sheet 2016, Vienna Institute of Demography (VID) and International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA), 2016, http://www.eurrep.org/wp-content/uploads/VID_DataSheet2016_printfile.pdf.
6 The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2017, Russian Federation, Federal State Statistics Service, http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc_2017/
demo17.pdf.
7 World Bank, “Population density (people per sq. km of land area): Russian Federation,” accessed February 4, 2019, https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST?locations=RU.

2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 142
141 95

The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow

*
0

8
2

16
10
90

14
94

96

98

12
ISSU E B RIEF

92

20
20

20

20
20

20

20

20

20
19

19

19

19

19
1.9

1.8

total size relative to 1990

1.7
Figure 1. Dynamics of the Total Population of the Russian Federation (Millions) and the Relative Size of the Total
Population of the Russian
1.6 Federation in Comparison to 1990, 1990-2015

1.5

Size of the Population Relative to 1990 (Percentage)

Total Population of the Russian Federation (Millions)

150 101
149 1.4
100
148
1.3

147 99
1.2
146
98
145 1.1

144 97
1
20 0

20 4

20 6

20 9
20 8
20 3

20 5
20 2

20 7
20 1

10
0

14
143
4

13

15
8

12
3

5
2

11
1

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0
9

9
9

9
9

9
9
9

9
9

20
20

20
20

20

20
19

19
19

19
19

19
19
19

19
19

96
142 RF TFR
141 95
92

12
98
96
94

14
90

10

*
2

8
6
4
0

16
0

0
0
0
0

20

20
20
19

19
19
19
19

20

20
20
20

20
20

Total Size Percentage of the Population Relative to 1990

Source: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2017, Rosstat; and the author’s own computations based on Rosstat data.

Figure 2. Total Fertility Rate, Russian Federation, 1990-2015 (Average Number of Births per Woman)

1.9

1.8
Number of Children per Household

1.7

1.6

1.5

1.4

1.3

1.2

1.1

1
90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

1
02

03

07

10

11

12

13

14

15
0

0
0

0
0

20
0

20

20

20
19

20
20

20
19
19

19

19

19

20
19

19

20
19

20

20

20
19

20

20
20
20

Total Fertility Rate of the Russian Federation

Source: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2017, Section 2, Rosstat.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3
 52
50

8
2

10

14
0

12
2

0
0

0
9
9

20
20
20

20

20

20

20

20
19
19

19

19

19
ISSU E B RIEF The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow
both sexes males females

Figure 3. Dynamics of Life Expectancy at Birth for Males, Females, and Both Sexes, in Years, Russian Federation,
1990–2015

84
82
80
78
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)

76
74
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
58
56
54
52
50
90

92

94

96

98

10

12

14
0

0
0
0
0

20

20
20
19

19
19

20
19

20
19

20
20
20

Average Life Expectancy Average Male Life Expectancy Average Female Life Expectancy

Source: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2017, Rosstat.

According to the annual demographic report Population
of Russia 2014, the increase in the number of poten-
tial mothers aged twenty-five and over, and in the in-
tensity of fertility at these ages, 8 led to an increase in
the number of births in 2000-2014. However, growth
in the number of potential mothers has since come to
an end, as the number of women in the twenty-five to
twenty-nine category peaked in 2012 and then began
to decline.9 By 2017, this number may have already de-
creased by more than one million, and even dropped
to a level lower than that seen in 2000.10 And for the
thirty to thirty-four age group, the turning point may
may have been in 2018. Given the steep reduction in
the number of potential Russian mothers, maintaining
the current level of births seems unlikely, and this is a
challenge to the country’s demographic security.11
Like Russia, all developed countries are experiencing a
low fertility rate, and it is perceived as a challenge ev-
erywhere. Though the TFR in some countries is slightly
higher or lower than in Russia, there is no fundamen-
tal difference in this respect between Russia and
European countries, the United States, Canada, Japan,
or South Korea; in none of these countries does the

8 Sergei V. Zakharov, The Modest Demographic Results Of Pronatalist Policy Against The Background Of The Long-Term Evolution Of Fertility
In Russia, Demographic Review: Saint Petersburg State University School of Higher Economics, 2016, https://demreview.hse.ru/article/
view/7310/8182.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.

4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 ISSU E B RIEF The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow
TFR ensure the replacement of previous generations.
This indicates a profound condition of low fertility at
the present stage of development of all urban, indus-
trial, and postindustrial societies—including Russia.12
Mortality and Life Expectancy, Russian
Federation, Since 1990
Life expectancy at birth is an integral characteristic of
mortality that does not depend on the population’s age
structure. Figure 3 depicts dynamics of life expectancy
at birth (LE 0) for males, females, and both sexes.
After 2003, there was a steady increase in life expec-
tancy at birth for males, females, and both sexes. It
should be noted that more than 70 percent of the in-
crease in life expectancy is owed to a decrease in male
mortality between the ages of twenty and sixty-four
years, and in female mortality from fifty years of age
and up.13
The annual demographic report Population of Russia
2012 attempted to determine the main factors behind
the decade-long increase in Russia’s population size
and life expectancy. The overall increase in life expec-
tancy at birth was presumed to be the the result of a
combination of three main factors: a decrease in mor-
tality linked to the reduced consumption of alcohol;
success in the fight against cardiovascular diseases,
the modern stage of which has been called the “car-
diovascular revolution”; and a less defined but overall
positive trend in living conditions and public health.14
The goal for future years should be to maintain these
favorable trends.
However, the level of life expectancy at birth in Russia
is still very low compared to developed countries. It
lags behind most developed countries, even exceeding
ten years for men.
According to European Demographic Datasheet 2016,
LE 0 in Russia is one of the lowest in Europe (see Figures
4 and 5). This lag leads to huge human and economic
12 A. G. Vishnevsky, et al., “Demographic Challenges of Russia,” Demoscope Weekly 751-752 (2017), 1-21, http://www.demoscope.ru/
weekly/2017/0751/demoscope751.pdf.
13 A. G. Vishnevsky, Population Report 2012, Publishing House of the Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Institue of
Demography, 2014, accessed February 4, 2019 via http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/knigi/ns_r12/akrobat/nr12.pdf.
14 Ibid, 262.
15 Vishnevsky, et al., “Demographic Challenges of Russia,” 20.
16 Ibid.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Table 2. Russia’s Lag in Life Expectancy at Birth
Compared to the United States and the EU-28, in
Years, 2014
Compared to For Males For Females
EU-28 12.8 6.9
USA 11.2 4.6
Source: European Demographic Datasheet 2016, Austrian
Academy of Sciences.
losses, and indicates the inadequacy of the Russian so-
cial welfare system. It is a matter not only of quantita-
tive gaps but also qualitative differences.
This disparity is great, and overcoming it will require
a qualitative breakthrough—which cannot be achieved
if Russia continues to underfund its entire health-
care system. High life exptectancy is expensive, and
even countries that are not very rich spend more of
their gross domestic product (GDP) on this goal than
Russia does. Public expenditures on healthcare in
Russia amount to 3.5 percent of GDP; by comparison,
the same figure expenditure is 8.1 percent of GDP in
the United States.15 With Russia spending so little on
healthcare, it is impossible to respond to the challenge
of high mortality.16
It should be stressed that life expectancy figures for
Russia highlight a significant gender imbalance (see
Figure 6). High male mortality compared to that of
women is typical, to some extent, for all economically
developed countries, and is heavily influenced by ex-
cessive mortality of men at working ages due to exter-
nal causes of death (accidents, poisoning, and injuries).
But it is particularly high for Russia. The difference in
LE 0 between women and men, which was 11.2 years in
2014, is the greatest in Europe (see Figure 7). This phe-
nomenon has been studied in detail (see, for example,
Andreev E., 2003).
5
 ISSU E B RIEF The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow

Figures 4 and 5. Ranking of European Countries According to Life Expectancy at Birth

Male Life Expectancy at Birth Female Life Expectancy at Birth

2014 (Years) 2014 (Years)
Switzerland 81.1 Spain 86.2
Cyprus 80.9 Italy 85.6
Italy 80.7 France 85.4
Spain 80.4 Switzerland 85.4
Sweden 80.4 Luxembourg 85.2

EU-28 78.1 EU-28 86.3

Latvia 69.1 Belarus 78.0

Belarus 67.3 Macedonia, FYR 77.5
Ukraine 66.2 Russia 76.5
Russia 65.3 Ukraine 76.4
Moldova 64.9 Moldova 73.7
Ranking based on 40 countries with populations above 500,000.

Source: European Demographic Data Sheet 2016, Austrian Academy of Sciences.

Figure 6. Difference in Life Expectancy at Birth Between Women and Men in the Russian Federation, 1990-2015

14.0
Difference in Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)

13.5

13.0 Difference in Life Expectancy at Birth

Women – Men, 2014 (Years)
12.5
Russia 11.2
12.0
Lithuania 10.9
11.5 Belarus 10.7
11.0 Latvia 10.3

10.5 Uktaine 10.2

10.0 EU-28 5.5

0

8
2

10
90

14
94

96

98

12
92

0
20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

Albania 3.9
19

19

19

19

19

Cyprus 3.8 women-men

Source: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2017, Rosstat.
Sweden 3.8
United Kingdom 3.7
6 Netherlands 3.5 ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Ranking based on 40 countries with populations above 500,000.

 Ranking based on 40 countries with populations above 500,000.

ISSU E B RIEF The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow

Figure 7. Ranking of European Countries According Figure 8 shows the dynamics of Russia’s net migration
to Gender Differences in Life Expectancy at Birth and migration rates.

In the beginning of the period under consideration,

Difference in Life Expectancy at Birth
both net migration and natural population increase
Women – Men, 2014 (Years) were positive, and net migration accounted for about
Russia 11.2 half of the total increase in population size.17 Then, for
fifteen years (1993–2008, with the exception of 1994),
Lithuania 10.9 both total increase and natural increase were negative,
Belarus 10.7 and positive net migration only partially compensated
for the negative natural increase. Since 2009, total pop-
Latvia 10.3 ulation has increased, due to net migration that com-
Uktaine 10.2 pensated for negative natural increase. In 2013–2014,
both natural increase and net migration were positive,
EU-28 5.5 but natural increase was far less than net migration: in
2014, an increase due to migration (270,000) was 88.5
Albania 3.9 percent of the 305,000 total increase, while natural in-
crease (35,000) was 11.5 percent.
Cyprus 3.8
Sweden 3.8 The majority of migrants to Russia are labor migrants
from CIS countries. However, the instability of political
United Kingdom 3.7 and economic approaches to migration regulation—
Netherlands 3.5 along with frequent and sharp changes in require-
ments and rules—often disorients both employers and
Ranking based on 40 countries with populations above 500,000. migrants.

Source: European Demographic Data Sheet 2016, Austrian
Academy of Sciences.
Migration in the Russian Federation, Since
1990
In low-fertility countries, migration becomes an im-
portant factor for population growth. Demographic
processes are hard to change quickly and, among
them, migration is recognized as the easiest to regu-
late. Migration is not only one of the main components
of population growth but it is also the phenomenon
that most transforms a country’s demographic dynam-
ics, structure, and behavior.
Russia’s main migration partners are Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) countries, which represent
about 90 percent of the country’s migration growth.
In connection with migration, the following should be
noted. United Nations (UN) publications rank Russia
second, after the United States, among countries with
the largest number of migrants residing within their
borders; in Russia, that number is between 11 and 12
million people. However, UN reports specifically indi-
cate that in the case of the former Soviet Union, their
estimates refer to people who were internal migrants
and turned into international migrants without leaving
the country, solely as a result of new borders that were
formed when the Soviet Union dissolved.
Changes in the Population Age-Sex
Composition
Changes in the main demographic processes affect
population age structure. Age-sex structure is another
fundamental characteristic of a population. Along with
fertility, “age structure is the demographic “engine”
that drives or diminishes population growth” because

17 The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2017, 15-19.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 7
 19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20

20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

2
2

2
2
2
2
net. migr. migr. rate

ISSU E B RIEF The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow

Figure 8. Dynamics of Net Migration (Thousands)

6
850

Rate of Migration to the Russian Federation,

5.5
Net Migration to the Russian Federation,

1993-2015 (Percentage of Population

750 5
4.5
1993-2015 (Thousands)

650
4

per 1,000 Citizens)

550 3.5
3
450
2.5
350 2

250 1.5
1
150
0.5
50 0
1

10
9

14
0
94

5
96

99

4
98

13

15
6

12
93

95

8
97

11
2

7
0

0
0

20
20

20

20

20

20

20
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20
20

20

20

20

20

20

20
net. migr. migr. rate

Source: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2017, Rosstat.

Figure 9. Dynamics of Major Russian Age-Group between Russia, 1990–2015. Including: Children and Youth
(0-14), Working-Age Population (15-59), and Elderly and Retirement Age (60+)

80
Percentage of the Population of the Russian Federation

70

60

50

40

30

20

10
0

8
2

10
0

14
4

98

12
2

0
0
9

20

20

20

20

20

20

20
20
19

19

19

19

19

0 - 14 15 - 59 60+

Source: Author’s own computation, based on Human Mortality Database data.

8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 ISSU E B RIEF The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow

“in many developing countries, large proportions of Figure 10. Comparison of the Population of Russia,
young people virtually guarantee that the population 1897 - 2017
will continue to grow even during periods of declining
100+
fertility and for quite some time after fertility drops to
95 – 99
replacement level.” 18
90 – 94 Males Females
85 – 89
Russia’s population is characterized by several defor-
80 – 84
mations of age structure throughout history, due to
75 – 79
numerous crisis events in the country’s history (e.g.,
70 – 74
the social perturbations of the 1930s, World War II).
65 – 69
These deformations have a considerable effect on the
60 – 64
process of population aging in the country.
55 – 59
50 – 54
Figure 9 depicts the dynamics of three major age
45 – 49
groups: children (under the age of fifteen), the work-
40 – 44
ing-age population (fifteen to fifty-nine), and the el- 35 – 39
derly (sixty and older). 30 – 34
25 – 29
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the pro- 20 – 24
portion of those sixty and over (prop. 60+) declined, 15 – 19
reflecting the consequences of World War II. In the 10 – 14
middle of its first decade, however, that proportion be- 5–9
gan to grow. In general, for one-quarter of a century, 0–4
the proportion of those sixty and over increased, from 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

15.8 percent in 1990 to 19.9 percent in 2015, while the
share of children declined from 23.0 percent in 1990
to 16.75 percent in 2015. Before 2000, the proportion
of children exceeded the proportion of the elderly; af-
ter 2000, an inverse inequality took place. It should
be noted that an increase in the proportion of children
began in the middle of the first decade of the twen-
ty-first century, indicating a fertility increase. Against
the backdrop of growth in the proportions of children
and the elderly, the proportion of the working-age
population has declined since the middle of the first
decade of the twenty-first century.
Population pyramids serve as illustrations of a country’s
demographic history.19 Figure 10, for instance, serves
as an example of demographic transition in Russia.
This pyramid shows dramatic changes in Russia’a age
composition between the year the first Russian census
was conducted, 1897, and 2017. From 1897 to 2017, the
Russia 1897 Russia 2017
Source: Human Mortality Database and Demoscope Weekly.
proportion of children in Russia decreased from 37.7
percent to 17.4 percent, while the proportion of the el-
derly increased from 7.3 percent to 20.8 percent in the
same time frame. The pyramid representing Russia in
1897 “is typical of a population before the beginning of
demographic transition; it has a broad base and a nar-
row vertex.”20 Figure 10 also illustrates both “age-struc-
ture deformations (i.e., sharp disproportions between
sizes of adjacent age groups) due to crisis events in
the country’s history” and gender imbalances. For in-
stance, due to circumstances related to World War II,
“there are sharp decreases in the size of the age group
between seventy and seventy-four years old in 2017”

18 Arthur Haupt, Thomas T. Kane, and Carl Haub, PRB’s Population Handbook, 6th Edition, Population Refernce Bureau, 2011, https://www.clake.
org/view/343.pdf.
19 Gaiane Safarova, “Population Ageing In Russia: Gender Dimension,” United Nations ESCAP, Subregional Meeting on Enhancing Long-Term
Care and Social Participation of Older Persons in East and North East Asia (presentation, Incheon, Republic of Korea, November 3-4, 2011),
https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Gayane_Safarova_1.pdf.
20 Ibid.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 9
 ISSU E B RIEF The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow

Figure 11. Comparison of the Population of Russia, The world population is experiencing a historical
1990-2015 shift in its age distribution, from the mostly young
age structures of the past, towards larger pro-
100+
portions of middle-aged and older persons in the
95 – 99
present and future decades. This shift is driven
90 – 94 Males Females
by the demographic transition from high to lower
85 – 89
levels of both fertility and mortality. The social
80 – 84
and economic consequences of these changes
75 – 79
70 – 74
vary greatly across regions and countries. 22
65 – 69
60 – 64
Aging, and its impact on nearly every other sphere of
55 – 59
life, is a challenge that all countries face, especially in
50 – 54 terms of the “labor market and the sustainability of
45 – 49 social security systems” because, “globally, the size
40 – 44 of the elderly is growing faster than the size of other
35 – 39 age groups” and this kind of “rapid growth will require
30 – 34 far-reaching economic and social adjustments in most
25 – 29 countries.”23
20 – 24
15 – 19 For Russia, issues related to aging are of the utmost
10 – 14 importance—the country’s total population size has
5–9 decreased for more than fifteen years, starting in the
0–4 early 1990s, while its age structure has become pro-
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
gressively older. As a result, the country’s population is
Russia 1990 Russia 2015 relatively old, even by Western standards.
Source: Human Mortality Database.
That observation is borne out using conventional de-
mographic tools to measure population. Traditional
measures of characterizing population aging represent
and there are distinctly smaller numbers of older men ratios of various aggregated age groups, including
in that age group. 21 children, the working-age population, and the elderly.
They usually include:
By comparison, Figure 11 shows changes in Russia’s • prop. 60+ or prop. 65+ (proportion of the elderly);
population age structure over a shorter period, from • an aging index (the number of people aged sixty
1990 to 2015. These two graphs are far more similar and over per one hundred children younger than fif-
than the preceding ones, with the primary difference teen); and
being a contraction in the number of children being • the old-age dependency rate (OADR, the relative
born in 2015. size of the old-age population sixty or sixty-five and
over to the working-age population aged fifteen to
fifty-nine or sixty-four).
Aging Russian Population
At a United Nations expert group meeting on For Russia in 2015, prop. 60+ was equal to 19.9 percent;
Changing Population Age Structures and Sustainable the aging index was 119 people aged sixty and over per
Development, presenters stated that one hundred children; and the OADR was thirty-one

21 Ibid.
22 United Nations, DESA, Population Division, “United Nations expert group meeting on ‘Changing Population Age Structures and Sustainable
Development’,” October 2016, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/expert-group/25/index.asp.
23 Carles Simo Noguera, Salvador Mendez Martinez, and Gaiane Safarova, “Regional differences in population ageing in Spain (the case of the
Valencian Community),” Paper prepared for the European Population Conference 2014, Princeton University, last updated June 28, 2014,
https://epc2014.princeton.edu/papers/140432.

10 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 ISSU E B RIEF The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow
persons aged sixty and over, per one hundred per-
sons aged fifteen to fifty-nine. This data demonstrates,
again, that the proportion of the elderly in Russia was
remarkably high in 2015.
And, in general, population aging in Russia is pro-
gressing. Over the period in question, all of the aging
characteristics under consideration increased, though
the pace of increase varied: due to the irregularities of
Russia’s population pyramid, aging indicators changed
unevenly. The aging index shows the highest and most
consistent increase, while the increase in the OADR
was rather small.
In 2015, the UN’s World Population Aging (WPA) report
ranked 201 countries with at least 90,000 inhabitants
according to the estimated and projected percentage
of their population aged sixty and over for 2000, 2015,
2030, and 2050. In 2000, Russia ranked twenty-ninth,
with 18.4 percent of its population sixty or older (for
comparison, the United States ranked forty-first, with
16.2 percent of its population aged sixty or older) and
in 2015, Russia ranked forty-fourth, with 20.0 percent
(the United States was thirty-seventh, with 20.7 per-
cent). In 2030, Russia is projected to rank sixty-first,
with 24 percent, while the United States is projected to
rank forty-sixth, with 26.1 percent. By 2050, Russia is
projected to fall to sixty-eighth, with 28.8 percent, and
the United States is projected to fall to seventy-sixth,
with 27.9 percent.
Often, alarmist statements suggest that population
aging has a negative impact on Russia’s development
and security. With this in mind, it is worth considering a
new approach to the measurement of age and aging—
one that takes into account remaining years of life.
The argument for this approach is the idea that a per-
son’s behavior in many spheres of life depends not only
on his or her chronological age but also on the num-
ber of years of life ahead. 24 Therefore, in addition to
traditional measures of aging, some new ones, called
prospective measures, have been introduced that take
these remaining years of life into account. With these
prospective aging measures in mind, claims about the
24 Warren C. Sanderson and Sergei Scherbov, “A New Perspective on Population Aging,” Demographic Research, 2007, https://www.
demographic-research.org/volumes/vol16/2/16-2.pdf.
25 Government of the Russian Federation, “The Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation N 164-r,” February 5, 2016, http://gov.
garant.ru/SESSION/PILOT/main.htm.
26 The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2017, 20.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
negative impact of population aging on the economy
and other spheres of a country’s life that are based on
only traditional indicators of population aging should
be examined with a critical eye.
Having a proportion of the elderly that is not simply
high but also growing, requires large-scale, effective,
and versatile actions. In Russia, the elderly are often
considered dependents, people who are a burden on
the state and present a threat to the country’s pension
system—though it is acknowledged that if old people
remain in good health, they are a resource for society.
The Russian government views aging as an issue of ma-
jor concern. Special attention is given to the “Strategy
of Action in the Interests of Citizens of the Older
Generations up to the Year 2025,” which Russia ad-
opted in 2016. 25 The strategy stipulates national policy
goals, principles, tasks, and priorities aimed at steadily
increasing older people’s longevity and quality of life.
Heterogeneity of Russian Demographic
Development
As Figure 11 clearly shows, modern Russia’s age struc-
ture is characterized by a significant gender imbal-
ance. Additionally, about a quarter of the country’s
population lives in rural areas where lifestyles and
living conditions differ greatly from those in urban ar-
eas. Additionally, Russia posesses the largest territory
in the world and it is populated by numerous ethnic
groups with different demographic behaviors. Thus,
consideration of demographic development in Russia
is incomplete if it ignores the country’s heterogeneity
in all these dimensions.
Demographic development in Russia is characterized
by a significant difference in mortality and life expec-
tancy by sex (see Figures 3 and 6) and a significant
imbalance between the number of males and females
in the population. In Russia, the percentage of elderly
(sixty and older) members of the female population
since 1990 has been about twice that of the male pop-
ulation. Thus, aging indicators have greater values for
the female population. 26
11
 ISSU E B RIEF The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow

Figure 12. Proportions of Russians (right scale) and the Next Ten Most Numerous Nationalities (left scale), 2010
All-Russian Population Census, Percentage

4 85
Minorities in the Russian Federation
(Percentage of Total Population)

(Percentage of total population)

Proportion of the Largest Ethnic

3.5

Proportion of Ethnic Russians

83
3

2.5 81
2

1.5 79

1
77
0.5

0 75

rs
rs

sh

hs
s
irs

ns

s
s

s
en

va
ta

ni
an

an
va

ak
ia
hk
Ta

ja
A
ch
ni

vi
en
hu

az

ai
as

he
ai

do

rb
K
rm
C
B
kr

or

ze
A
U

A
Population Identifying as a Member of the Russian Federation's 10 Largest Ethnic Minorities

Population Identifying as Ethnic Russians

Source: Socio-Demographic Portrait of Russia: According to the 2010 All-Russian Population Census, Statistics of Russia.

For urban and rural populations, fertility and mortality As of January 1, 2015, there were eighty-five regions
indicators have markedly different values. According in the Russian Federation, arranged into nine federal
to the Rosstat data, the total fertility rate for the urban districts (FD). There are wide regional differences be-
population (1.59) is lower than that for the rural popula- tween them in regard to characteristics such as fertility,
tion (2.32). The inverse is true for life expectancy (LE). mortality, and migration. In 2015, the highest TFR (3.39)
LE at birth for men is 65.8 years (76.8 for women) for was observed in the Republic of Tuva in the Siberian
the urban population and 64.1 years (75.4 for women) FD, and the lowest (1.29) in the Leningrad region in the
for the rural population. 27 Northwest FD. 28 In 2015, the Republic of Ingushetia in
the South FD had the highest LE (75.6 years for males
In modern Russia, rural areas have both fertility and and 83 years for females), while the Republic of Tuva
mortality rates higher than those in urban areas, but, had the lowest (58.1 years for males and 68.3 years for
due to migration outflows from rural to urban areas, females)—a difference of 18.4 and 14.4 years, respec-
this does not result in higher proportions of the elderly tively. 29 These differences in demographic character-
among the urban population. Thus, the share of the el- istics lead to age-structural differences, which in turn
derly in the rural population has been higher than that result in regional differentiation in the aging process.
in the urban population. These differences have nu-
merous socioeconomic consequences, and has raised More than 150 nationalities inhabit Russia. According
questions about how to provide transportation and ac- to the 2010 All-Russian Population Census, ethnic
cess to social and health care and deal with issues of Russians are the most numerous (80.9 percent), with
loneliness in rural areas. a proportion twenty times higher than that of the next

27 The Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2017, 45-46.

28 Russian Demographic Datasheet 2016, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), Russian
Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), and International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 2016, http://www.populationrussia.
ru/data/RussianDemographicDataSheet2016_web.pdf.
29 Ibid.

12 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 ISSU E B RIEF The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow
largest nationality, the Tatars. 30 Figure 12 shows the
proportions of ethnic Russians and the next ten most
numerous nationalities; combined, their population is
92.4 percent of the country’s total population. 31
Future Trends of Population Size and
Structure
Various institutions have made countless population
projections rooted in different approaches, including
both deterministic and probabilistic projections, but
this paper will not touch on probabilistic projections.
Those considered, including from WPP, are based on a
scenario approach.
Although it is not possible to predict with certainty
which of these trajectories will be realized, possible
scenarios for changes in the three key demographic
processes—fertility, mortality, and migration, as well
as various combinations of these scenarios—allow us
to outline the range within which the most probable
trajectories of demographic development can be con-
tained. Usually, this involves considering low, medium,
high, and constant scenarios of assumed changes of
main demographic indicators.
Table 3 shows projections of Russia’s total population
size in 2030 and in 2035–36, given different scenarios
and using projections of Rosstat and WPP 2017:
The twentieth annual demographic report Population
of Russia 2012 considered three variants of fertility
changes, three of life-expectancy changes, and four of
changes in net migration (thirty-six scenarios in total).
Per those scenarios, Russia’s total projected popula-
tion size in 2030 varies from 128.8 to 153 million, indi-
cating that total size could either decrease or increase.
Conclusions
Russia’s demographic development faces challenges
from its main demographic processes and population
age-sex structure. Although the country’s total size is
increasing in the second decade of the twenty-first
century, many projections show that it may decline
in the medium term. In any case, very low population
density will aggravate the situation.
30 Socio-Demographic Portrait of Russia: According to the 2010 All-Russian Population Census, Statistics of Russia, 2012, http://www.gks.ru/
free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/Documents/portret-russia.pdf.
31 Ibid., 72-73.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Table 3. Future Scenarios
Scenario 2030 2035
High 145.6 145.0
Medium 140.5 138.1
Low 135.5 131.2
Constant fertility 138.4 136.6
Source: World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key
Findings and Advance Tables, United Nations, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.
The country’s demographic security is challenged by
the diminishing number of women who are at ages
associated with high fertility. Also, in spite of the ob-
served increase in Russian life expectancy, it is still
low compared to other developed countries. Russia
spends too little on healthcare to effectively respond
to the challenge of high mortality.
The Russian population is aging, and population aging
requires large-scale, effective, and versatile actions.
Demographically, Russia is not among countries con-
sidered to be very old—in terms of the percentage of
the population sixty and over, between 2000–2015 and
2015–2030, Russia ranks near the middle of the 201 coun-
tries studied. Thus, it is important not to overdramatize
the possible negative consequences of population aging.
Russia’s demographic development is heterogeneous
in several dimensions (e.g., gender imbalance, rural/
urban differences, regional differentiation, and ethnic
differences). To be effective, all population-related pol-
icies should take this heterogeneity into account.
Understanding the challenges discussed in this report
is key to developing effective responses.
Dr. Gaiane Safarova
Leading Research Scientist; Head of the Laboratory of
Analysis and Modeling Socio-Demographic Processes,
Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg Institute for
Economics and Mathematics
13
 ISSU E B RIEF The Population of Russia, Today and Tomorrow
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ATLANTIC COUNCIL
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