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Amar SinghAdvanced Search@ Sapna

vs Smt. Kamla Disclaimer
Panthi on 28 March, 2019 Mobile View
Cites 11 docs - [View All]
The Code Of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005
Shahada Khatoon And Ors. vs Amjad Ali And Ors. on 7 April, 1999
Allapichai Ravuthar vs Mohidin Bibi on 21 September, 1896
Smt. Kuldip Kaur vs Surinder Singh And Anr on 3 November, 1988
Rajesh Dubey vs Smt. Rachna Tiwari on 21 March, 2018

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Madhya Pradesh High Court

Amar Singh vs Smt. Kamla @ Sapna Panthi on 28 March, 2019

:: 1 ::
CRR-5630-2018

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH : GWALIOR

DIVISION BENCH
PRESENT:
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY YADAV
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK AGARWAL

Criminal Revision No.5630/2018

Amar Singh
Versus
Smt. Kamla alias Sapna Panthi & Others
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Shri R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel with Shri V.K. Agrawal,

learned counsel appears as amicus curiae.

Shri Amit Lahoti, learned counsel for the applicant.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether approved for reporting : Yes/No
ORDER

(28/03/2019) Per Justice Sanjay Yadav Single Bench presided over by Hon'ble Shri Justice Sheel Nagu
in Criminal Revision No.5630/2018 having expressed difference of opinion with the opinion expressed
by Hon'ble Shri Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia in Criminal Revision No. 1257/2018 (Rajesh Dubey
vs. Smt. Rachna Tiwari and Another) decided on 21/03/2018 on the :: 2 ::

CRR-5630-2018 issue of sentencing under Sub-section (3) of Section 125 of Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973(hereinafter referred as to "Cr.PC"), the matter has been referred to the Division Bench.

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 6/28/2019
2. We Amar SinghofvsShri
place on record our appreciation for able assistance Smt.R.K.
KamlaSharma,
@ Sapnalearned
Panthi onSenior
28 March, 2019
Counsel
with Shri V.K. Agrawal, who readily agreed to assist the Court as an amicus curie, and of Shri Amit
Lahoti, learned counsel for the Applicant.

3. In the case at hand, the relevant fact is not in dispute that the husband having failed to abide by the
order passed by the Court to pay an amount of Rs.1,000/- per month to each of three children as
ordered on 15/06/2016 under Sub-section (1) of Section 125 of Cr.P.C., led the Court direct the
husband to suffer civil jail for a period of 11 months in exercise of its jurisdiction under Sub-section
(3) of Section 125 of Cr.P.C.

4. Similar fact situation has arisen in Rajesh Dubey (supra) wherein relying on the decision by the
Supreme Court in Poongodi & Another vs. Thangavel:[(2013) 10 SCC 618], the order of sentencing
for more than one month has been upheld. Whereas, in the case at hand, learned Single Judge has
expressed his reservation for the said view on the basis of another decision by the Supreme Court in
Shahada Khatoon and Others vs. Amjad Ali & Others:[(1999) 5 SCC(Cri) 1029].

:: 3 ::

CRR-5630-2018

5. Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. which comprises of four Sections, viz, 125, 126, 127 and 128 makes
provisions regarding maintenance of wives, children and parents. Section 125 envisages order for
maintenance of wives, children and parents. Section 126 provides for the procedure. Section 127
makes provision regarding alteration in allowance; and Section 128 lays down provision regarding
enforcement of order of maintenance.

6. Pertinent it is to note that the provisions contained in Section 128 of Cr.P.C. only lays down the
mode of enforcing recovery of maintenance allowance, stipulating therein that the order of
maintenance may be enforced by any Magistrate in any place where the person against whom it is
made may be. In case if the order of maintenance put to enforcement is not complied with, Section 128
Cr.P.C. has no answer as to how the order be actually effected. The answer lays in Sub-section (3) of
Section 125 of Cr.P.C. which stipulates:

"(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any
such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount
due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole
or any part of each month's allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and
expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the
warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may made:

:: 4 ::

CRR-5630-2018 Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount
due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a
period of one year from the date on which it became due.''

7. Sub-section (3) of Section 125 Cr.P.C. thus provides for a mechanism to effect actual recovery of
maintenance amount.

8. Dwelling on said aspect, it is held in Smt. Kuldip Kaur vs. Surinder Singh & Others:[AIR 1989 SC
232]:

"6. A distinction has to be drawn between a mode of enforcing recovery on the one hand
and effecting actual recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in
arrears on the other. Sentencing a person to jail is a 'mode of enforcement'. It is not a 'mode
of satisfaction' of the liability. The liability can be satisfied only by making actual payment
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 6/28/2019
of the arrears. The whole purpose of sending Amar
toSingh vs to
jail is Smt. Kamlaa@person
oblige Sapna Panthi
liable on
to 28 March,
pay the 2019
monthly allowance who refuses to comply with the order without sufficient cause, to obey
the order and to make the payment. The purpose of sending him to jail is not to wipe out
the liability which he has refused to discharge. Be it also realised that a person ordered to
pay monthly allowance can be sent to jail only if he fails to pay monthly allowance
'without sufficient cause' to comply with the order. It would indeed be strange to hold that a
person who 'without reasonable cause' refuses to comply with the order of the Court to
maintain his neglected wife or child would be absolved of his liability merely because he
prefers to go to jail. A sentence of jail is no substitute for the recovery of the amount of
monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears. Monthly allowance is paid in order to
enable the wife and child to live by providing :: 5 ::

CRR-5630-2018 with the essential economic wherewithal. Neither the neglected wife nor
the neglected child can live without funds for purchasing food and the essential articles to
enable them to live. Instead of providing them with the funds, no useful purpose would be
served by sending the husband to jail. Sentencing to jail is the means for achieving the end
of enforcing the order by recovering the amount of arrears. It is not a mode of discharging
liability.

The section does not say so. The Parliament in its wisdom has not said so. Commonsense does not
support such a construction. From where does the Court draw inspiration for persuading itself that the
liability arising under the order for maintenance would stand discharged upon an effort being made to
recover it? The order for monthly allowance can be discharged only upon the monthly allowance being
recovered. The liability cannot be taken to have been discharged by sending the person liable to pay the
monthly allowance, to jail. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that it is only a mode or method of
recovery and not a substitute for recovery. No other view is possible. That is the reason why we set
aside the order under appeal and passed an order in the following terms:

"Heard both the sides.

The appeal is allowed. The order passed by the learned Magistrate as confirmed by the
High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to the effect that the amount of monthly
allowance payable under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wiped out and
is not recoverable any more by reason of the fact that respondent No.1, Surinder Singh,
was sent to jail in exercise of the powers under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is set aside. In our :: 6 ::

CRR-5630-2018 opinion, respondent No.1, husband of appellant, is not absolved from his
liability to pay the monthly allowance by reason of his undergoing a sentence of jail and
the amount is still recoverable notwithstanding the fact that the respondent No.1 husband
who is liable to pay the monthly allowance has undergone a sentence of jail for failure to
pay the same. Our reasons for reaching this conclusion will follow.

So far as the amount of monthly allowance awarded in this particular case is concerned, by consent of
parties, we pass the following order in regard to future payments with effect from 15th August, 1986.

We direct that Respondent No 1, Surinder Singh shall pay Rs.275 (Rs.200 for the wife and Rs 75 for
the child) as and by way of maintenance to the appellant Smt. Kuldip Kaur commencing from August
15, 1986. The amount of Rs.275 shall be paid by the 15th of every succeeding month. On failure to pay
any monthly allowance for any month hereafter on the part of respondent No.1, Surinder Singh, the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate shall issue a warrant for his arrest, cause him to be arrested and put in
jail for his failure to comply with this Court's order and he shall not be released till he makes the
payment. With regard to the arrears which have become due till August 15, 1986, learned counsel for
the appellant states that having regard to the fact that respondent No.1, has agreed to the aforesaid
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 6/28/2019
consent order, the appellant will not apply for theAmar Singh vs being
respondent Smt. Kamla
sent @
to Sapna Panthi
jail under on 28 March,
Section 125 of2019
the
Code of Criminal Procedure but will reserve :: 7 ::

CRR-5630-2018 the liberty to realize the said amount (Rs.5090 plus the difference between the amount
that became due and the amount actually paid under the interim order) under the law except by seeking
an order for sending respondent No.1 to jail. The appeal will stand disposed of accordingly."

9. In Shahada Khatoon & Others vs. Amjad Ali & Otherss:

[1999 SCC(Cri.) 1029], a bench of equal strength interpreting Sub-

section 3 of Section 125 ot the Cr.PC. observed:

"The short question that arises for consideration is whether the learned Single Judge of the
Patna High Court correctly interpreted Sub-section (3) of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. by
directing that the Magistrate can only sentence for a period of one month or until payment,
if sooner made. The learned Counsel for the appellants contends that the liability of the
husband arising out of an order passed under Section 125 to make payment of maintenance
is a continuing one and on account of non- payment there has been a breach of the order
and therefore the Magistrate would be entitled to impose sentence on such a person
continuing him in custody until payment is made. We are unable to accept this contention
of the learned counsel for the appellants. The language of Sub- section (3) of Section 125 is
quite clear and it circumscribes the power of the Magistrate to impose imprisonment for a
term which may extend to one month or until the payment, if sooner made. This power of
the Magistrate cannot be enlarged and therefore the only remedy would be after expiry of
one month. For breach or non-compliance with the order of the Magistrate the wife can
approach the Magistrate again for similar relief. By no stretch of imagination can the the
Magistrate be permitted :: 8 ::

CRR-5630-2018 to impose sentence for more than one month. In that view of the matter
the High Court was fully justified in passing the impugned order and we see no infirmity in
the said order to be interfered with by this Court. The appeal accordingly fails and is
dismissed "

10. Evidently, the observation in Smt. Kuldip Kaur (supra) was not taken note.

11. Later, in Shantha alias Ushadevi & Another vs. B.G.

Shivananjappa:[2005 SCC (Cri.) 1089], another bench of equal strength expressed the following view:

"8. We are, therefore, of the view that in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the bar
under Section 125(3) cannot be applied and the High Court has erred in reversing the order
of Sessions Judge. It must be borne in mind that Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure of social
legislation and it has to be construed liberally for the welfare and benefit of the wife and
daughter. It is unreasonable to insist on filing successive applications when the liability to
pay the maintenance as per the order passed under Section 125(1) is a continuing liability."

12. Evidently, the decision in Smt. Kuldip Kaur (supra) and Shahada Khatoon & Others (supra) was
not noticed. These two decisions were, however, taken note of in Poongodi & Another vs. Thangavel:
[(2013) 10 SCC 618] wherein dwelling on the aspect as to entitlement of wife to claim arrears
maintenance, it has been held:

"4. A reading of the order dated 21.4.2004 passed by the High Court would go to show that
the proviso to Section :: 9 ::

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 6/28/2019
CRR-5630-2018 Amar Singh
125(3) CrPC has been construed byvsthe
Smt. Kamla
High @ Sapna
Court Panthi
to be on 28on
a fetter March,
the 2019
entitlement of the claimants to receive arrears of maintenance beyond a period of one year
preceding the date of filing of the application under Section 125(3) CrPC. Having
considered the said provision of the Code we do not find that the same creates a bar or in
any way affects the entitlement of a claimant to arrears of maintenance. What the proviso
contemplates is that the procedure for recovery of maintenance under Section 125(3) CrPC,
namely, by construing the same to be a levy of a fine and the detention of the defaulter in
custody would not be available to a claimant who had slept over his/her rights and has not
approached the court within a period of one year commencing from the date on which the
entitlement to receive maintenance has accrued.

However, in such a situation the ordinary remedy to recover the amount of maintenance, namely, a
civil action would still be available.

5. The decision of this Court in Kuldip Kaur v.Surinder Singh and Anr.[AIR 1989 SC 232] may be
usefully recalled wherein this Court has held the provision of sentencing under Section 125(3) to be a
"mode of enforcement" as distinguished from the "mode of satisfaction" of the liability which can only
be by means of actual payment. Para 6 of the Report to the above effect, namely, that the mode of
enforcement i.e. sentencing to custody does not extinguish the liability may be extracted below: (SCC
p.409, para 6) "6. A distinction has to be drawn between a mode of enforcing recovery on the one hand
and effecting actual recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears on the
other. Sentencing a person to jail is a 'mode of enforcement'. It is not a 'mode of satisfaction' of the
liability. The liability :: 10 ::

CRR-5630-2018 can be satisfied only by making actual payment of the arrears. The whole purpose of
sending to jail is to oblige a person liable to pay the monthly allowance who refuses to comply with the
order without sufficient cause, to obey the order and to make the payment. The purpose of sending him
to jail is not to wipe out the liability which he has refused to discharge. Be it also realised that a person
ordered to pay monthly allowance can be sent to jail only if he fails to pay monthly allowance 'without
sufficient cause' to comply with the order. It would indeed be strange to hold that a person who
'without reasonable cause' refuses to comply with the order of the Court to maintain his neglected wife
or child would be absolved of his liability merely because he prefers to go to jail. A sentence of jail is
no substitute for the recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears. Monthly
allowance is paid in order to enable the wife and child to live by providing with the essential economic
wherewithal. Neither the neglected wife nor the neglected child can live without funds for purchasing
food and the essential articles to enable them to live. Instead of providing them with the funds, no
useful purpose would be served by sending the husband to jail. Sentencing to jail is the means for
achieving the end of enforcing the order by recovering the amount of arrears. It is not a mode of
discharging liability. The section does not say so. The Parliament in its wisdom has not said so.
Commonsense does not support such a construction. From where does the Court draw inspiration for
persuading itself that the liability arising under the order for maintenance would stand :: 11 ::

CRR-5630-2018 discharged upon an effort being made to recover it? The order for monthly allowance
can be discharged only upon the monthly allowance being recovered. The liability cannot be taken to
have been discharged by sending the person liable to pay the monthly allowance, to jail. At the cost of
repetition it may be stated that it is only a mode or method of recovery and not a substitute for
recovery. No other view is possible. That is the reason why we set aside the order under appeal and
passed an order in the following terms......"

6. In another decision of this Court in Shantha alias Ushadevi and Another v. B.G. Shivananjappa:
[2005 SCC (Cri.) 1089] it has been held that the liability to pay maintenance under Section 125 CrPC
is in the nature of a continuing liability. The nature of the right to receive maintenance and the
concomitant liability to pay was also noticed in a decision of this Court in Shahada Khatoon & Ors. v.
Amjad Ali & Ors:[1999 SC(Cri.) 1029]. Though in a slightly different context, the remedy to approach
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/126327194/ 5/9
the 6/28/2019 AmarSection
court by means of successive applications under Singh vs 125(3)
Smt. Kamla
CrPC@ Sapna Panthi onthe
highlighting 28 March, 2019
subsequent
defaults in payment of maintenance was acknowledged by this Court in Shahada Khatoon (supra)."

7. The ratio of the decisions in the aforesaid cases squarely apply to the present case. The application
dated 5-2-2002 filed by the appellants under Section 125(3) was in continuation of the earlier
applications and for subsequent periods of default on the part of the respondent. The first proviso to
Section 125(3), therefore did not extinguish or limit the entitlement of the appellants to the
maintenance granted by the learned trial court, as has been held by the High Court."

13. In Poongodi (supra), Their Lordships were pleased to take note :: 12 ::

CRR-5630-2018 of slightly different context in which Shahada Khatoon (supra) was decided which
may be noticed from the argument advanced by learned counsel in the said case [i.e. Shahada Khatoon
(supra)]. The contentions advanced in Shahada Khatoon (supra) was the "liability of husband arising
out of an order passed under Section 125 to make payment of maintenance is a continuing one and on
account of non-

payment, there would be entitled to impose sentence on such a person continuing him in custody until
payment is made." The submissions thus suggested that, Magistrate can keep or sentence the person
until said person makes up the payment. These submissions glossed over the language of Sub-section
(3) of Section 125 which contemplates a punishment of imprisonment which may extend to one month
or until payment, if, sooner made. Therefore, the contentions raised were negatived holding that the
"power of the Magistrate cannot be enlarged and therefore the only remedy would be after expiry of
one month. For breach or non-compliance with the order of the Magistrate the wife can approach the
Magistrate again for similar relief. By no stretch of imagination can the the Magistrate be permitted to
impose sentence for more than one month.

14. Thus, the issue was not as in the present case where the arrears of maintenance has been claimed
and despite issuance of warrant, there is non-compliance. Thus, on facts the decision in Shahada :: 13 ::

CRR-5630-2018 Khatoon (supra) is distinguishable.

15. In the context which we are dwelling, decision under Section 488 the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1882 which is pari materia Section 125(3) of 1973 Act can be taken note of. Sections 488 of Cr.PC
1882 stipulates: "The Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the
amount due in the manner hereinbefore provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person for
the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant,
to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month."

16. In Emperor vs. Beni:[AIR 1938 Allahabad 386], a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court while
deciding on the sentence by the Magistrate for a period of six months by issuing one warrant for
recovery of the maintenance of the amount of 21 months observed:

"......... We are satisfied after a consideration of the terms of the section that the intention of
the Legislature was to empower the Magistrate after execution of one warrant only to
sentence a person, who has defaulted in the payment of maintenance ordered under Section
488, Criminal P.C., to imprisonment for a period of one month in respect of each month's
default and that the section does not enjoin that there should be a separate warrant in
respect of each term of imprisonment for one month. In other words, where arrears have
been allowed to accumulate, the Court can issue one warrant and impose a cumulative
sentence of imprisonment. We would observe :: 14 ::

CRR-5630-2018 that the decision in Allapichai Ravuthar v. Mohidin Bibi [(1897) 20 Mad.
3] has been followed in a number of other cases in Bhiku Khan v. Zahuran:[(1898) 25 Cal.
291], Emperor v. Sardar Muhammad:[(1935) 22 A.I.R. Lah. 758] and Emperor v. Budhu
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/126327194/ 6/9
 6/28/2019
Ram:[(1919) 6 A.I.R. Lah. 50]. We would Amar Singh
remark vs Smt.
further Kamla
that the @ Sapna of
warrant Panthi on 28 March, 2019
imprisonment
under Section 488, Criminal P.C., the form of which is to be found in Schedule 5, No. XL,
contemplates a sentence of more than one month's rigorous imprisonment in the case of a
person who has defaulted in payment for more than one month. The warrant runs:

......and whereas it has been further proved that the said (name) in wilful disregard of the
said order has failed to pay rupees being the amount of the allowance for the month (or
months) of.... And thereupon an order was made adjudging him to undergo simple (or
rigorous) imprisonment in the said jail for the period of...."

We therefore hold that in the case of a default in payment directed by an order under
Section 488, Criminal P.C., the Magistrate seised with the case may issue one warrant and
thereafter pass a sentence of imprisonment of one month in respect of each month or part
of a month for which there has been default in payment. In the result we reject the
reference and direct that the record be returned."

17. In Karson Ramji Chawda vs. State of Bombay: AIR 1958 Bom. 99], a full bench of Bombay High
Court observed:

"2.This sentence has been challenged on the ground that in passing the sentence for two
months, the Magistrate exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon him under Section 488
(3). The matter came up before Mr. Justice :: 15 ::

CRR-5630-2018 Bavde-kar and Mr. Justice Desai and they referred it to a Full Bench, as
they felt that they were bound by an unveported decision of a Division Bench of this Court
reported in Queen Empress v. Pandu Mahadu, 1885 Rat Un. Cr. C. 801 (A). The contention
urged by Mr. Kotwal on behalf of the applicant is that in respect of one warrant issued, the
sentence which can be inflicted by the Magistrate can only be one month and not exceeding
one month. Now turning to the sub-section.

"if any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate
may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due hereinbefore provided
for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's allowance
remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to
one month or until payment if sooner made." Therefore, this sub-section confers upon the Magistrate
two independent powers; one to issue a warrant which has to be executed in the manner laid down in
the sub-section and the other to sentence the person also in the manner laid down in the sub-section.
The fallacy underlying Mr. Kotwal's argument is that the sentence follows upon the issue of a warrant.
That is not the section. The power of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant is not dependent upon the
issue of the warrant, or in other words the issue of the warrant is not a condition precedent to the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant. Therefore, if we read the provision with regard
to the power of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant independently of the power to issue the
warrant, it is clear that the power to sentence is for the whole or any part of each month's allowance
remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant to imprisonment for a term which :: 16 ::

CRR-5630-2018 may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made. Now these words clearly
lay down the power of the Magistrate. The power of the Magistrate is in respect of whole or any part of
each month's allowance remaining unpaid to sentence the applicant for a term not exceeding one
month. Now, the view taken in this unreported judgment was based, with respect, on the assumption
with which we have just dealt that a separate warrant should issue for each separate monthly default
and when that is done, the maximum punishment can be one month's imprisonment. This view
proceeds on the basis that whenever there is a default, a warrant has to be issued and the Magistrate
must proceed to sentence the applicant alter the warrant has been issued. With respect, there is no
warrant for this view and this decision was based on a judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported
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 6/28/2019
in Queen- Empress v. Narain, ILR 9 All 240 (B).Amar
The Singh vs Smt.High
Allahabad KamlaCourt
@ Sapna Panthi
since thenonin28a March, 2019
Full Bench
has come to a contrary conclusion: see Emperor v. Beni, ILR (1938) All 750:(AIR 1938 All 386) (C).
Mr. Chandrachud has also drawn our attention to the judgments in Allapichai Ravuthar v. Mohidin
Bibi, ILR 20 Mad 3 (D), and in King Emperor v. Budhoo Mandal, which have also taken the same
view and, according to the Allahabad High Court, presumably the decision in Bhiku Khan v. Zahu-ran,
ILR 25 Cal 291 (F), is also to the same effect. It may also be pointed out that the history of this section
also supports the view that we have taken. In the Code of 1861, the section ran in the following terms:

"The Magistrate may, for every breach of the order by warrant, direct the amount due to be levied in
the manner provided for levying fines; or may order such person to be imprisoned with or without hard
labour for any term not exceeding one month."

:: 17 ::

CRR-5630-2018

18. In Gorakshnath Khandu Bagal vs. State of Maharashtra & Others:[2005 Cri.L.J. 3158],
a Division Bench of Bombay High Court had the occasion to dwell upon the issue as
presently involved in the case at hand, held:

"9. ...... taking into consideration facts of the present case and also by making reference to
the language of Section 125(3) and the proviso referred thereto and also from form of
warrant provided under Schedule-II in Form No.18, we record our finding that the
Magistrate can impose a punishment for default of each month or a part of each month's
default in payment of maintenance, by awarding imprisonment for a period of one month
or till the payment is made, which ever is sooner. If there are arrears for more than one
month then the imprisonment exceeding for a period of one month can be imposed.
However, what we find that the proviso contemplates application within 12 months and
thereby at the most, in one application 12 defaults can be clubbed together and after every
12 defaults, a separate application will have to be filed. However, in that eventuality in
each application, as there are maximum 12 defaults, the Magistrate may impose
imprisonment extending upto a period of 12 months, but that is outer limit. The lesser
imprisonment can be imposed and such imprisonment will be followed until the payment is
made, that means, if the amount is paid during the period of imprisonment, the person will
have to be released immediately. In short, we find that there is no substance in this revision
petition and the revision petition is accordingly rejected."

19. In view whereof, the order making reference i.e. order dated :: 18 ::

CRR-5630-2018 13/12/2018 passed in Criminal Revision No.5630/2018 when tested on

the anvil of above analysis cannot be upheld. The view taken by learned Single Judge in
Rajesh Dubey (supra) that the Magistrate can impose a sentence for default of each month
or a part of each months default in payment of maintenance, by awarding punishment for a
period of one month till payment is made, whichever is sooner. If there are arrears for more
than one month then the imprisonment exceeding for a period of one month can be
imposed is uphold.

20. The reference is answered accordingly.

21. The matter is referred back to learned Single Judge for consideration of Criminal Revision
No.5630/2018 on merit in terms of above decision.

22. Office is directed to place the order passed today on the record of Criminal Revision No.1257/2018
and Criminal Revision No.5630/2018.

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6/28/2019 Amar Singh vs Smt. Kamla @ Sapna Panthi on 28 March, 2019
(SANJAY YADAV) (VIVEK AGARWAL)
JUDGE JUDGE
pwn*
Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR

PAWAN
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH BENCH
GWALIOR, postalCode=474011,
st=Madhya Pradesh,

KUMAR
2.5.4.20=baa18e83a2af7a1611e0b
b9811a10869c6907cfbb375a7a236
a25ad39f3a2027, cn=PAWAN
KUMAR
Date: 2019.03.28 17:59:45 +05'30'

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