January 11, 2018

G.R. No. 212448

AAA, Petitioner
vs.
BBB, Respondent

"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological

abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common."30 In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 made it a point to
encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of violence that may
be committed against women and their children:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against

women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate
or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed

against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to

cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse
of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful
or .unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman

financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

In Dinamling v. People,31 this Court already had occasion to enumerate the

elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as
follows:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime
of violence against women and their children is committed through any of
the following acts:
xxxx

1
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children
or access to the woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.]

No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows:

(1) The offended paiiy is a woma.J.1 and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a
woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living
within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional
anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation,

repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody
of minor children or access to the children or similar· such acts or omissions.
xxxx

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological

violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children. Other
forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic
violence, are addressed and penalized in other subparts of Section 5.
xxxx

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the

mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence
is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or
emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained
by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an
element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of
any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And
to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present
the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this
party. x x x.32 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262

criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological
violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise
stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law
seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the
various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover,
depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons,
the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional
anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the
victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the
offense.

2
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People,33 the
Court explained that:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.1âwphi1 It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court
has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 34 (Emphasis
in the original)

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As

correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed
where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. Which the psychological violence as the means employed by
the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally
essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is
personal to the complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is
analogous to the indispensable element of damage in a prosecution for
estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses

employed by the accused, as shown in the vouchers, might have been
perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the criminal
action in Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit and
damage are the basic elements of estafa. The estafa involved in this case
appears to be a transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed either in
Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person charged with a transitory
offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is in part
committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material
and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one
province and some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to
try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the
case will exclude the others x x x[.]35

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law
contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may
manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts
material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in
one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the
court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that
the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in
any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 36

3
It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive
conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to
Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, that
the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of
the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the present
scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are
residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City
may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the

information relates to BBB's marital infidelity must be proven by
probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband,
and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of
conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the
husband. What this case concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint
for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the
Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if
the alleged extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental and
emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a
prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine
courts.

Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004) requires the confidentiality of all records pertaining to
cases of violence against women and their children. Per said section, all
public officers and employees are prohibited from publishing or causing to be
published in any format the name and other identifying information of a
victim or an immediate family member. The penalty of one (I) year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon those who violate the provision.
Pursuant thereto, in the courts' promulgation of decisions, final resolutions
and/or final orders, the names of women and children victims shall be
replaced by fictitious initials, and their personal circumstances or any
information, which tend to identify them, shall likewise not be disclosed.
1
AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN,
PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING
PENAL TIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on March
8, 2004.
2
Rollo, pp. 19-45.
3
Rendered by Presiding Judge Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro; id. at 49-
52.
4
Id. at 53.
5
Id. at 4 and 26.
6
Id. at 57.
7
Id. at 57-58.
8
Id. at 58-59.
9
Id. at 26.
10
Id. at 27.
11
Id. at 49.
12
Id. at 50-51.
13
Id. at 154-160.
14
Id. at 3-6.
15
Id. at 17-A.
16
Id. at 15-17.
4
17
775 Phil. 192 (2015).
18
ld. at 215-216.
19
Morillo v. People, et al., supra.
20
Id. at 212, citing People v. Salico, 84 Phi I. 722, 732-733 (1949).
21
Id. at 211.
22
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, 749 Phil. 823, 832 (2014), citing Rep. of the
Phils., et al. v. Sunvar Realty Development Corp., 688 Phil. 616, 630(2012).
23
Id. at 832.
24
Morillo v. People, et al., supra.
25
Id. at 214.
31
761 Phil. 356 (2015).
32
Id. at 372-376.
33
680 Phil. 368 (2012).
34
id. at 380, citing Isip v. People, 552 Phil. 786, 801-802 (2007).
35
Tuzon v. Judge Cruz, 160 Phil. 925, 929 (1975).
36
Morillo v. People, supra note 17, at 206.

G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN vs SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L.
TAN

Promulgated:

recently, in Ladonga v. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA
673. the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under
Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision
therein.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8

of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the
express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to
said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one
is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation
of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
Ladonga v. People, supra note 22; People v. Felipe, G.R. No. 142505, December
11, 2003, 418 SCRA 146, 176; People v. Julianda, Jr., G.R. No. 128886, November
23, 2001, 370 SCRA 448, 469; People v. Quinicio, G.R. No. 142430, September
13, 2001, 365 SCRA 252, 266.

5
 It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly
recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children may
be committed by an offender through another, thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:

xxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or

through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or
her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or

her child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to

animals or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis

supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued

under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing,

personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,

contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x
x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law,
thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the

protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
(Emphasis supplied)

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160528, October 9, 2006,
504 SCRA 90, 101; Eugenio v. Drilon, 322 Phil. 112 (1996); Philippine National

6
Bank v. Office of the President, 322 Phil. 6, 14 (1996); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86
Phil. 50, 57 (1950); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145-146 (1931).

and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the
express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal
construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to
its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est
exclusio alterius finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim
is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction. It is not of universal application.
Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering
legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to
defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. Coconut Oil Refiners
Association, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 47, 78;
Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 779, 792;
Primero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 48468-69, November 22, 1989, 179 SCRA
542, 548-549.

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the
attendance of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven
and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her.
However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed
out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present
petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. Superlines Transportation Company,
Inc. v. Philippine National Construction Company, G.R. No. 169596, March 28,
2007, 519 SCRA 432, 441; Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 85.

It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this

controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be
included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of
conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether
respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would
be an exercise in superfluity.

1
G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 673.
2
Ladonga v. People, supra note 22; People v. Felipe, G.R. No. 142505,
December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 146, 176; People v. Julianda, Jr., G.R. No. 128886,
November 23, 2001, 370 SCRA 448, 469; People v. Quinicio, G.R. No. 142430,
September 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 252, 266.

2
7
3
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No.
160528, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 90, 101; Eugenio v. Drilon, 322 Phil. 112
(1996); Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President, 322 Phil. 6, 14 (1996);
Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50, 57 (1950); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145-
146 (1931).
4
Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29,
2005, 465 SCRA 47, 78; Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991,
202 SCRA 779, 792; Primero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 48468-69, November
22, 1989, 179 SCRA 542, 548-549.
5
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. v. Philippine National Construction
Company, G.R. No. 169596, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 432, 441; Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004,
428 SCRA 79, 85.

G.R. No. 199522 , June 22, 2015

RICKY DINAMLING, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The law defines psychological violence as follows:

Section 3(a)
xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to

cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse
of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful
or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the

mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is
the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish
is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To
establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary
to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or
similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is
necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences
are personal to this party.30 All of this was complied with in the case at
bar. In the face of the strong and credible testimony of AAA, petitioner
Dinamling relies on a defense of denial and alibi. On the nights of March 14
and 20, 2007, he claimed that he was on duty at XXX Police Station. 31 He
denied seeing AAA on those dates.32 However, on cross examination, he
admitted that it takes only two to three minutes to go from the police station
to AAA's boarding house.33
3

5
8
Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal case, have
been consistently held as inherently weak34 and which, unless
supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the
positive declarations of the victim.35 In general, a plea of denial and alibi
is not given much weight relative to the affirmative testimony of the
offended party.36 The only exception to this rule is where there is no
effective identification, or where the identification of the accused has been
fatally tainted by irregularity and attendant inconsistencies. 37

It almost has no probative value and may be further discarded in the

absence of any evidence of ill motives on the part of the witness to impute
so grave a wrong against the accused.41 As for alibi, it is not given weight if
the accused failed to demonstrate that he was so far away and could not
have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed.42

In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the
actual physical violence done by the perpetrator are necessary to
prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i)
of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical
violence done by the accused is alleged to have caused the mental and
emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of physical violence must be
proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means of causing
mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual
bodily injury, the physical violence translates to psychological
violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or
emotional well-being. In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of
publicly punching, kicking and stripping AAA of her pants and underwear,
although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of
psychological violence since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in
AAA's public ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress. The
clear, unrebutted testimony of the victim AAA, as to the physical violence
done on her as well as to the mental and emotional suffering she
experienced as a result thereof, suffices to prove such facts.

As earlier discussed, the focus of this particular criminal act is the

causation of non-physical suffering, that is, mental or emotional
distress, or even anxiety and social shame or dishonor on the
offended party, and not of direct bodily harm or property damage
which are covered by the other subsections of the law's provision.
The use of physical violence, whether or not it causes physical or property
harm to the victim, falls under Section 5(i) only if it is alleged and proven to
have caused mental or emotional anguish. Likewise, the physical injuries
suffered are similarly covered only if they lead to such psychological harm.
Otherwise, physical violence or injuries, with no allegation of mental or
emotional harm, are punishable under the other provisions of the law.

30
Proof of mental anguish as a component of moral damages is herein
applied by analogy.
Jurisprudence holds that mental anguish is proven by the testimony
of no other person than the victim because it is personal to him.
Mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other
emotional and mental suffering are proven only by the victim
9
himself/herself taking the witness stand and testifying. (Mahinay v.
Velasquez, 464 Phil. 146, 149 [2004]). There must be a clear testimony
on the anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails
to take the witness stand and testify as to his/her social humiliation,
wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be awarded. Kierulf v.
Court of Appeals,336 Phil. 414, 431-432 (1997).
31
Rollo, p. 15; TSN (Direct examination of Ricky Dinamling), March 5, 2009,
pp. 2, 4.
32
Id.; id. at 2-5.
33
Cross examination of Ricky Dinamling, id. at 6.
34
People v. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012, 680 SCRA 386,
421.
35
People v. Castillo,641 Phil. 570, 590 (2010).
36
People v. Rodrigo, 586 Phil. 515, 541-542 (2008).
37
Id.
38
Nerpio v. People,555 Phil. 87, 95 (2007).
39
People v. Agomo-o, 389 Phil. 617, 640 (2000).
40
People v. Madeo, 617 Phil. 638, 660 (2009).
41
People v. Ramos,358 Phil. 261, 285 (1998); Gulmatico v. People,562 Phil.
78, 89 (2007).
42
People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 185282, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 607,
623.

G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015

BBB,* Petitioner,
vs.
AAA,* Respondent.

It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly

prohibits compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence against
women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon,21 the Court declared that:

Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which

involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the
victim is somehow at fault. x x x.22 (Emphasis deleted) AM No. 10-4-16-
SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of all issues under
the Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody, visitation,
property relations and guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom
those covered by R.A. No. 9262.

In the above-quoted portions of the pleadings, BBB attempted to justify why

he sent the messages to AAA. However, in doing so, he, in effect, admitted
authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as evidence. It is likewise
noted that BBB did not deny ownership of the cellphone number from which
the text messages were sent.

Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility
of the text messages requires an interpretation of the rules of
evidence, this Court does not find the same to be necessary. While BBB had
admitted authorship of the text messages, he pleads for this Court to
consider those messages as inadmissible for allegedly being
unauthenticated. BBB’s arguments are unbearably self-contradictory and he

10
cannot be allowed to take refuge under technical rules of procedure to assail
what is already apparent.
21
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352.
22
Id. at 431, citing the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on
Domestic and Family Violence.
23
Re: Rule on Court-Annexed Family Mediation and Code of Ethical
Standards for Mediators, effective July 18, 2010.

G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017

STEVEN R. PAVLOW, Petitioner, v. CHERRY L. MENDENILLA,
Respondent.

The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at

determining the existence of facts for the purpose of deciding whether to
proceed with an administrative action. This process can be likened to a
public prosecutor's preliminary investigation, which entails a determination
of whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, and
whether a crime has been committed.

The ruling of this Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals is analogously

applicable to the case at bar. In that case, we ruled that the preliminary
investigation conducted by a public prosecutor was merely inquisitorial and
was definitely not a quasi-judicial proceeding:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different
from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined
as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature
which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-
making."

....

On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not

determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare
his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused
is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be
said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass
judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. (Emphases supplied)
This principle is further highlighted in MERALCO v. Atilano, in which this
Court clearly reiterated that a public prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary
investigation, is not exercising a quasi-judicial function. In a preliminary
investigation, the public prosecutor inspects the records and premises,
investigates the activities of persons or entities coming under the formers'
jurisdiction, or secures or requires the disclosure of information by means of
accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, and
production of documents. In contrast, judicial adjudication signifies the
exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations
of concerned parties, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
11
This is reiterated in our ruling in Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals,
Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, where we pointed out that a
preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is
not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it
reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of
probable cause. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions
when its awards determine the rights of parties, and its decisions have the
same effect as a judgment of a court. [This] is not the case when a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause
to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or
when the Secretary of Justice [reviews] the former's order[s] or resolutions
on determination of probable cause.

In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public prosecutor conducts

preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial
powers. Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the powers of an
administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the
activities of persons or entities coming under his jurisdiction, or to secure, or
to require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records,
reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of documents.
This power is distinguished from judicial adjudication which signifies the
exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations
of concerned parties. Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory powers which
sets a public prosecutor apart from the court. (Emphasis supplied) 61
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

53
Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, (2004).

54
Trinidad v. Marcelo, 564 Phil. 382, 389 (2007) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En
Banc].

55
Encinas v. Agustin, 709 Phil. 236, 257 (2013) [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].

56
Id.

57
Apolinario v. Flores, 541 Phil. 108, 118 (2007) [Per J. Carpio, Second
Division].

58
City of Taguig v. City of Makati, G.R. No. 208393, June 15, 2016 [Per J.
Leonen, Second Division].

59
Id.

60
Encinas v. Agustin, 709 Phil. 236 (2013) [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].

61
Id. at 254-260.

62
Trinidad v. Marcelo, 564 Phil. 382 (2007) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

63
Id. at 389.

64
G.R. No. 183681, July 27, 2015 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

65
Id. at 4-5.
12
66
Rollo, p. 84. The Assistant City Prosecutor's name was mistakenly typed as
"Rommel Ordonio."

67
Id. at 181 and 81.

68
Id. at 29.

69
Id. at 27-30.

70
Cano-Guttierez v. Guttierez, 395 Phil. 903, 910 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan,
First Division]; Guanzon v. Arradaza, 539 Phil. 367, 374 (2006) [Per J.
Chico-Nazario, First Division].

71
Umandap v. Sabio, 393 Phil. 657, 663 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third
Division]. Cf. actions in rem or quasi in rem where what is imperative is
jurisdiction over the res. In these actions, service of summons upon the
defendant primarily serves the interest of due process, and not so much the
purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over his or her person.

72
Rep. Act No. 9262, sec. 8.

73
Rep. Act No. 9262, sec. 15.

74
Rollo, p. 81.

75
Id. at 181-182.

76
131 Phil. 154 (1968) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc].

77
Id. at 162-165.

G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA versus ABAD, and PEREZ, JJ.THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that violence against women x x x

refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against
a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual
relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above
defines dating relationship while Section 3(f) defines sexual
relations. The latter refers to a single sexual act which may or may
not result in the bearing of a common child. The dating relationship
that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a
sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.

PROBABLE CAUSE

13
Jurisprudence has established rules on the determination of probable cause.

In Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao),6 G.R. No. 166797, July

10, 2007, 527 SCRA 190, 204.
the Court held:

[A] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing

that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is
enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of
guilt.
The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
x x x. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there
is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. (Italics in the original.)

G.R. No. 197522, September 11, 2013

ELISEO V. AGUILAR versus DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PO1 LEO T.

DANGUPON, 1ST LT. PHILIP FORTUNO, CPL. EDILBERTO ABORDO,
SPO3 GREGARDRO A. VILLAR, SPO1 RAMON M. LARA, SPO1 ALEX L.
ACAYLAR, and PO1 JOVANNIE C. BALICOL

A. General principles; judicial

review of a prosecutor’s
probable cause determination.

A public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause – that is, one made

for the purpose of filing an information in court – is essentially an executive
function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.
The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the
extraordinary writ of certiorari . It is fundamental that the concept of grave
abuse of discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it properly pertains
to a jurisdictional aberration. While defying precise definition, grave abuse of
discretion generally refers to a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Corollary, the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.31 To note, the underlying principle behind the courts’
power to review a public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause is to
ensure that the latter acts within the permissible bounds of his authority or
does not gravely abuse the same. This manner of judicial review is a
constitutionally-enshrined form of check and balance which underpins the
very core of our system of government. As aptly edified in the recent case of

Alberto v. CA:32

6
14
It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings
of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such
findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the
principle of separation of powers, dictating that the determination of
probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an
executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of
checks and balances, whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of
certiorari , has been tasked by the present Constitution " to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

In the foregoing context, the Court observes that grave abuse of discretion
taints a public prosecutor’s resolution if he arbitrarily disregards the
jurisprudential parameters of probable cause. In particular, case law states
that probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists
when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It
does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. Rather, it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief and, as
such, does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.33 As pronounced in Reyes v.
Pearl bank Securities, Inc.:34

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing

that more likely than not a crime has been committed by the
suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common
sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed ,
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction.35 (Emphasis supplied)

Apropos thereto, for the public prosecutor to determine if there exists a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the suspect is
probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all
reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every
crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most,
no criminal offense.36

With these precepts in mind, the Court proceeds to assess the specific
incidents in this case.

B. Existence of probable cause on

the part of Dangupon.

15
Records bear out that Dangupon admitted that he was the one who shot
Tetet which eventually caused the latter’s death. The Provincial Prosecutor,
however, relieved him from indictment based mainly on the finding that the
aforesaid act was done either in self-defense, defense of a stranger or in the
performance of a lawful duty or exercise of a right of office, respectively
pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 5, Article 1137 of the RPC. The DOJ
affirmed the Provincial Prosecutor’s finding, adding further that Dangupon,
as well as the other respondents, enjoys the constitutional presumption of
innocence.

These findings are patently and grossly erroneous.

Records bear out facts and circumstances which show that the elements of
murder – namely: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed
him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 24838 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide
or infanticide39 – are, in all reasonable likelihood, present in Dangupon’s
case. As to the first and second elements, Dangupon himself admitted that
he shot and killed Tetet.1âwphi1 Anent the third element, there lies
sufficient basis to suppose that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
attended Tetet’s killing in view of the undisputed fact that he was restrained
by respondents and thereby, rendered defenseless.40 Finally, with respect to
the fourth element, Tetet’s killing can neither be considered as parricide nor
infanticide as the evidence is bereft of any indication that Tetet is related to
Dangupon.

At this juncture, it must be noted that Dangupon’s theories of self-

defense/defense of a stranger and performance of an official duty are not
clear and convincing enough to exculpate him at this stage of the
proceedings considering the following circumstances: (a) petitioner’s version
of the facts was corroborated by witnesses Adelaida Samillano and Rolando
Corcotchea who stated, among others, that they saw Tetet raise his hands
as a sign of surrender but was still mauled by armed persons 41 (hence, the
presence of unlawful aggression on the part of Tetet and the lack of any
sufficient provocation on the part of Dangupon, 42 the actual motive of Tetet’s
companions,43 and the lawfulness of the act44 are put into question);(b) it
was determined that Tetet was handcuffed45 when he was boarded on the
military jeep (hence, the supposition that Tetet was actually restrained of his
movement begs the questions as to how he could have, in this state,
possibly stole the grenade from Abordo); and (c) petitioner’s evidence show
that Tetet suffered from lacerations and multiple gunshot wounds, 46 the
shots causing which having been fired at a close distance 47 (hence, the
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel 48 Tetet’s
supposed unlawful aggression, and whether the injury committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right49 are, among others, also put into question). Given the
foregoing, Dangupon’s defenses are better off scrutinized within the confines
of a criminal trial.

To add, neither can the dismissal of the murder charge against Dangupon be
sustained in view of his presumption of innocence. Jurisprudence holds that
when the accused admits killing the victim, but invokes a justifying
circumstance, the constitutional presumption of innocence is effectively
waived and the burden of proving the existence of such circumstance shifts
16
to the accused.50 The rule regarding an accused’s admission of the victim’s
killing has been articulated in Ortega v. Sandiganbayan, to wit: 51
Well settled is the rule that where the accused had admitted that he is the
author of the death of the victim and his defense anchored on self-defense,
it is incumbent upon him to prove this justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court. To do so, he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for the accused
himself had admitted the killing. The burden is upon the accused to prove
clearly and sufficiently the elements of self-defense, being an affirmative
allegation, otherwise the conviction of the accused is inescapable. 52
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Therefore, due to the ostensible
presence of the crime charged and considering that Dangupon’s theories of
self-defense/defense of a stranger and lawful performance of one’s duty and
the argument on presumption of innocence are, under the circumstances,
not compelling enough to over come a finding of probable cause, the Court
finds that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case
against Dangupon. Consequently, the reversal of the CA ruling with respect
to the latter is in order.

C. Existence of probable cause on

the part of Fortuno and
Abordo.

In similar regard, the Court also finds that grave abuse of discretion tainted
the dismissal of the charges of murder against Fortuno and Abordo.
To elucidate, while petitioner has failed to detail the exact participation of
Fortuno and Abordo in the death of Tetet, it must be noted that the peculiar
nature of an extralegal killing negates the former an opportunity to proffer
the same. It is of judicial notice that extralegal killings are ordinarily
executed in a clandestine manner, and, as such, its commission is largely
concealed from the public view of any witnesses. Notably, unlike in rape
cases wherein the victim – albeit ravaged in the dark – may choose to
testify, and whose testimony is, in turn, given great weight and credence
sufficient enough for a conviction,53 the victim of an extralegal killing is
silenced by death and therefore, the actual participation of his assailants is
hardly disclosed. As these legal realities generally mire extralegal killing
cases, the Court observes that such cases should be resolved with a more
circumspect analysis of the incidental factors surrounding the same, take for
instance the actual or likely presence of the persons charged at the place
and time when the killing was committed, the manner in which the victim
was executed (of which the location of the place and the time in which the
killing was done may be taken into consideration), or the possibility that the
victim would have been easily overpowered by his assailants (of which the
superior number of the persons detaining the victim and their ability to wield
weapons may be taken into consideration).
In the present case, the existence of probable cause against Fortuno and
Abordo is justified by the circumstances on record which, if threaded
together, would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
they were also probably guilty of the crime charged. These circumstances
are as follows: (a) Fortuno and Abordo were with Dangupon during the time
the latter killed Tetet54 in an undisclosed place along the Viga River; (b)Tetet
was apprehended, taken into custody and boarded on a military jeep by the
group of armed elements of which Fortuno and Abordo belonged to; 55 (c) as
earlier mentioned, Tetet was handcuffed56 when he was boarded on the
17
military jeep and, in effect, restrained of his movement when he supposedly
stole the grenade from Abordo; and (d) also, as previously mentioned, Tetet
suffered from lacerations and multiple gunshot wounds, 57 and that the shots
causing the same were fired at a close distance.58 Evidently, the confluence
of the above-stated circumstances and legal realities point out to the
presence of probable cause for the crime of murder against Fortuno and
Abordo. Hence, the dismissal of the charges against them was – similar to
Dangupon – improper. As such, the CA’s ruling must also be reversed with
respect to Fortuno and Abordo.
D. Lack of probable cause on the
part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar,
and Balicol.
The Court, however, maintains a contrary view with respect to the
determination of lack of probable cause on the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar
and Balicol.
Records are bereft of any showing that the aforementioned respondents – as
opposed to Dangupon, Fortuno, and Abordo – directly participated in the
killing of Tetet at the Viga River. As observed by the DOJ, Villar, Lara,
Acaylar, and Balicol were not with Tetet at the time he was shot; thus, they
could not have been responsible for his killing. Neither could they be said to
have acted in conspiracy with the other respondents since it was not
demonstrated how they concurred in or, in any way, participated towards
the unified purpose of consummating the same act. It is well-settled that
conspiracy exists when one concurs with the criminal design of another,
indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime
committed.59 Therefore, finding no direct participation or conspiracy on the
part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol, the Court holds that the DOJ did not
gravely abuse its discretion in affirming the Provincial Prosecutor’s dismissal
of the charges against them. In this respect, the CA’s Decision must stand.
As a final word, the Court can only bewail the loss of a family member
through the unfortunate course of an extralegal killing. The historical
prevalence of this deplorable practice has even led to the inception and
eventual adoption of the Rules on Amparo60 to better protect the sacrosanct
right of every person to his life and liberty and not to be deprived of such
without due process of law. Despite the poignancy natural to every case
advanced as an extralegal killing, the Court, as in all courts of law, is
mandated to operate on institutional impartiality – that is, its every ruling,
notwithstanding the sensitivity of the issue involved, must be borne only out
of the facts of the case and scrutinized under the lens of the law. It is
pursuant to this overarching principle that the Court has dealt with the
killing of Tetet and partly grants the present petition. In fine, the case
against Dangupon, Fortuno, and Abordo must proceed and stand the muster
of a criminal trial. On the other hand, the dismissal of the charges against
Villar,Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol is sustained.

WHEREFORE , the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated June 30,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110110 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE . The Resolution dated March 10, 2003 of the Provincial
Prosecutor and the Resolution dated November 27, 2008 of the Department
of Justice in I.S. No. 2002-414 are NULLIFIED insofar as respondents PO1
Leo T. Dangupon, 1st Lt. Philip Fortuno, and Cpl. Edilberto Aborado are
concerned. Accordingly, the Department of Justice is DIRECTED to issue the
proper resolution in order to charge the above-mentioned respondents in
accordance with this Decision.
18
SO ORDERED.

31
De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 506, 514-
515.
32
G.R. Nos. 182130 and 182132, June 19, 2013.
33
Id. (Citation omitted)
34
G.R. No. 171435, July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 518.
35
Id. at 534-535.
36
Ang-Abaya v. Ang, G.R. No. 178511, December 4, 2008, 573 SCRA 129,
143.
37
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or
sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and
second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present,
and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.
xxxx
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right or office.
xxxx
38
Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a
vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste
and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding
paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,
epidemic, or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of
the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
39
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 188353, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 738,
746.
40
In any case, if the said circumstance or any of the qualifying
circumstances stated in Article 248 of the RPC are not established during
trial, Dangupon may still be convicted for the lesser offense of homicide as
its elements are necessarily included in the crime of murder. (See SSgt.
Pacoy v. Hon. Cajigal, 560 Phil. 598, 614 [2007].)
19
41
Rollo, p. 39.
42
"x x x For self-defense to prevail, three (3) requisites must concur, to wit:
(1) unlawful aggression;(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself." (People v. De Gracia , 332 Phil. 226, 235
[1996].)
43
"x x x The elements of defense of stranger are: (1) unlawful aggression;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other
evil motive." (Masipequiña v. CA , 257 Phil. 710, 719 [1989].)
44
"x x x The x x x case would have fallen under No. 5 of Article 11 of the
RPC, i.e., the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office if the two conditions there for, viz. : (1) that the
accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office and (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office, concurred." (Lacanilao v. CA ,G.R. No. L-34940 June 27,
1988, 162 SCRA 563, 566.)
45
Rollo, p. 41.
46
See id. at 68. Based on the medical certificate dated February 4, 2002
issued by Dr. Gamilla of the San Sebastian District Hospital, Tetet was found
to have sustained two lacerated wounds at the frontal area, a linear abrasion
in the anterior chest and five gunshot wounds in different parts of his body.
47
See id. at 67. Dangupon himself admitted that the shots were fired at a
distance of, more or less, one yard ("isang dipa").
48
See People v. De Gracia, supra note 42.
49
See Lacanilao v. CA, supra note 44.
50
See People v. Spo2. Magnabe, Jr. , 435 Phil. 374, 391 (2002).
51
G.R. No. 57664 February 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 38.
52
Id. at 42.
53
"Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except
in dark or deserted and secluded places away from prying eyes, and the
crime usually commences solely upon the word of the offended woman
herself and conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the
prosecution’s single witness of the actual occurrence." (People v. Molleda,
462 Phil. 461, 468 [2003].)
54
Rollo, p. 96.
55
Id. at 73.
56
Id. at 41.
57
See id. at 68.
58
See id. at 67.
59
Bahilidad v. People, G.R. No. 185195, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 597,
605.
60
A historical exegesis of the present Amparo rules is found in the landmark
case of Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (G.R. No. 180906, October
7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1, 38-39), the pertinent portions of which read:
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of
the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances." It was an
exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules
to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of
the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances,"
its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
20
threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due
process of law, i.e. , without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On
the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law."

G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017

LIZA L. MAZA, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASIÑO, AND
RAFAEL V. MARIANO, Petitioners, v. HON. EVELYN A. TURLA, IN HER
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PALAYAN CITY, BRANCH 40, FLORO F. FLORENDO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS OFFICER-IN-CHARGE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, ANTONIO LL.
LAPUS, JR., EDISON V. RAFANAN, AND EDDIE C. GUTIERREZ,IN
THEIR CAPACITY AS MEMBERS OF THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING
PROSECUTORS, AND RAUL M. GONZALEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, Respondents.

The admissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary

investigation.

In a preliminary investigation,
...the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence
beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged; they
merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.83chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To emphasize, "a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial[;]

[i]t is not a trial on the merits."84 Since "it cannot be expected that upon the
filing of the information in court the prosecutor would have already
presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the
accused,"85 the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence cannot be ruled
upon in a preliminary investigation.

83
People v. Castillo, 607 Phil. 754, 767 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
Division].

84
De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/209330.pdf> 17 [Per J. Leonen,
Second Division].

85
De Los Santos-Dio v. Court of Appeals, 712 Phil. 288, 309 (2013) [Per J.
Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

G.R. No. 180165, April 7, 2009

21
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY versus HON. SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES, OLIVER T. YAO and DIANA T. YAO

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter
is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence
to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is
so. Yu v. Sandiganbayan, 410 Phil. 619, 627 (2001).

The term does not mean actual or positive cause nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that
it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge. Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
101978, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 349, 360.

To determine the existence of probable cause, there is need to conduct

preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic
judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Villanueva v. Ople, G.R. No.
165125, 18 November 2005, 475 SCRA 539, 553.

Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been

committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof. Gonzalez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation, G.R. No. 164904, 19 October 2007, 537 SCRA 255, 269.
It is a means of discovering which person or persons may be reasonably
charged with a crime.

The conduct of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. The Court

may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the
public prosecutors function unless there is a showing of grave abuse of
discretion or manifest error in his findings. Ang v. Lucero, G.R. No.
143169, 21 January 2005, 449 SCRA 157, 168.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Soria v. Desierto,
G.R. Nos. 153524-25, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 339, 345.

The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or a despotic

manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must have been so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Id.

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In the present case, the abuse of discretion is patent in the act of the
Secretary of Justice holding that the contractual relationship forged by the
parties was a simple loan, for in so doing, the Secretary of Justice assumed
the function of the trial judge of calibrating the evidence on record, done
only after a full-blown trial on the merits. The fact of existence or non-
existence of a trust receipt transaction is evidentiary in nature, the veracity
of which can best be passed upon after trial on the merits, for it is virtually
impossible to ascertain the real nature of the transaction involved based
solely on the self-serving allegations contained in the opposing parties
pleadings. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice is not in a competent position to
pass judgment on substantive matters. The bases of a partys accusation and
defenses are better ventilated at the trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation.

We need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the

public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable
cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not
present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of
the parties evidence. Ang v. Lucero, , G.R. No. 143169, 21 January 2005,
449 SCRA 157, 168.

Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties
to substantiate their respective claims.

Prescinding from the foregoing, we conclude that there is ample evidence on

record to warrant a finding that there is a probable cause to warrant the
prosecution of private respondents for estafa. It must be once again stressed
that probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

All told, the evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal
charges has been reduced and liberalized to a mere probable cause.
As implied by the words themselves, probable cause is concerned
with probability, not absolute or moral certainty. Galario v. Office of
the Ombudsman (Mindanao), G.R. No. 166797, 10 July 2007, 527 SCRA
190, 204.

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