JULIETA B. NARAG, Complainant, v. ATTY. DOMINADOR M.
NARAG, On November 29, 2013, the respondent filed the instant petition for
Before this Court is a “Petition for Readmission” to the practice of law
filed by Dominador M. Narag (Respondent).
On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag (Julieta) filed an
administrative complaint for disbarment against her husband, herein
respondent, whom she accused of having violated Rule 1.011 in
relation to Canons 12 and 63 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She claimed that the respondent, who was then a
college instructor in St. Louis College of Tuguegarao and a member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan, maintained an amorous
relationship with a certain Gina Espita (Gina) – a 17–year old first year
college student. Julieta further claimed that the respondent had
already abandoned her and their children to live with Gina. The
respondent denied the charge against him, claiming that the
allegations set forth by Julieta were mere fabrications; that Julieta was
just extremely jealous, which made her concoct stories against him.
On June 29, 1998, the Court rendered a Decision, which directed the
disbarment of the respondent. The Court opined that the respondent
committed an act of gross immorality when he abandoned his family
in order to live with Gina. The Court pointed out that the respondent
had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members
of the legal profession.
A Motion for the Re–opening of the Administrative Investigation, or in
the Alternative, Reconsideration of the Decision was filed by the
respondent on August 25, 1998. He averred that he was denied due
process of law during the administrative investigation as he was
allegedly unjustly disallowed to testify in his behalf and adduce
additional vital documentary evidence. Finding no substantial
arguments to warrant the reversal of the questioned decision, the
Court denied the motion with finality in the Resolution dated
September 22, 1998.
reinstatement to the Bar. The respondent alleged that he has
expressed extreme repentance and remorse to his wife and their
children for his misgivings. He claimed that his wife Julieta and their
children had already forgiven him on June 10, 2010 at their residence
in Tuguegarao City. The respondent presented an undated affidavit
prepared by his son, Dominador, Jr., purportedly attesting to the truth
of the respondent’s claim.
The respondent averred that he has been disbarred for 15 years
already and that he has been punished enough. He alleged that he is
already 80 years old, weak and wracked with debilitating osteo–
arthritic pains. That he has very limited mobility due to his arthritis
and his right knee injury.
He further claimed that he enlisted in the Philippine Air Force Reserve
Command where he now holds the rank of Lieutenant Colonel; that as
member of the Reserve Command, he enlisted in various rescue, relief
and recovery missions. The respondent likewise submitted the various
recommendations, testimonials and affidavits in support of his
petition for readmission.4
“Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys
rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action
will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public
interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will
continue to be preserved even with the applicant’s reentry as a
counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to
the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character,
a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into
consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time
that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.”5
The extreme penalty of disbarment was meted on the respondent on
account of his having committed a grossly immoral conduct, i.e.,
abandoning his wife and children to live with his much younger
paramour. Indeed, nothing could be more reprehensible than
betraying one’s own family in order to satisfy an irrational and
insatiable desire to be with another woman. The respondent’s act was
plainly selfish and clearly evinces his inappropriateness to be part of
the noble legal profession.
More than 15 years after being disbarred, the respondent now
professes that he had already repented and expressed remorse over
the perfidy that he had brought upon his wife and their children. That
such repentance and remorse, the respondent asserts, together with
the long years that he had endured his penalty, is now sufficient to
enable him to be readmitted to the practice of law.
The respondent’s pleas, however, are mere words that are hollow and
bereft of any substance. The Court, in deciding whether the
respondent should indeed be readmitted to the practice of law, must
be convinced that he had indeed been reformed; that he had already
rid himself of any grossly immoral act which would make him inept for
the practice of law. However, it appears that the respondent, while
still legally married to Julieta, is still living with his paramour – the
woman for whose sake he abandoned his family. This only proves to
show that the respondent has not yet learned from his prior
misgivings.
That he was supposedly forgiven by his wife and their children would
likewise not be sufficient ground to grant respondent’s plea. It is
noted that only his son, Dominador, Jr., signed the affidavit which was
supposed to evidence the forgiveness bestowed upon the respondent.
Thus, with regard to Julieta and the six other children of the
respondent, the claim that they had likewise forgiven the respondent
is hearsay. In any case, that the family of the respondent had forgiven
him does not discount the fact that he is still committing a grossly
immoral conduct; he is still living with a woman other than his wife.
Likewise, that the respondent executed a holographic will wherein he
bequeaths all his properties to his wife and their children is quite
immaterial and would not be demonstrative that he had indeed
changed his ways. Verily, nothing would stop the respondent from
later on executing another last will and testament of a different tenor
once he had been readmitted to the legal profession.
In fine, the Court is not convinced that the respondent had shown
remorse over his transgressions and that he had already changed his
ways as would merit his reinstatement to the legal profession. Time
and again the Court has stressed that the practice of law is not a right
but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display
unassailable character.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition for
Reinstatement to the Bar filed by Dominador M. Narag is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
“But mercy is above this sceptred sway; It is enthroned in the hearts of
kings, It is an attribute to God himself; And earthly power doth then
show likest God’s When mercy seasons justice. “
– William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice (Act IV, Scene I)
Mercy tempers justice. It is mercy that assures that our institutions are
cloaked with humane compassion strengthening courts with a mantle
of respect and legitimacy.
I disagree with my esteemed colleagues that Dominador M. Narag’s
plea for judicial clemency (in the form of a petition for readmission to
the practice of law) should be denied. He has been disbarred and
unable to practice his chosen profession for 15 years. He presents an
affidavit to support his claim that his wife and children have forgiven
him. He alleges that during the time that he was unable to practice, he
volunteered his time and services to the community especially those
who were affected by disasters.
Dominador M. Narag is also already 80 years old.
He has suffered enough. I vote to grant his petition and, thus, allow
him judicial clemency.
Clemency is not unprecedented.
In Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,1 this court disbarred Atty. Ismael F. Mejia
for misappropriating and converting funds, falsifying documents, and
issuing insufficiently funded checks. Fifteen years after his disbarment,
then 71–year–old Atty. Mejia filed a petition for readmission to the
practice of law, “begging for [this court’s] forgiveness.” 2 According to
Atty. Mejia, “he ha[d] long repented'and x x x ha[d] suffered enough”
3 and that readmission to the practice of law would “redeem the
indignity that [his children had] suffered due to his disbarment.” 4
This court readmitted Atty. Mejia to the practice of law, taking into
account Atty. Mejia’s rehabilitation and that he was “already of
advanced years.” 5 This court said:
xxx While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during
which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole
measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes
cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in
1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has
shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this
experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while
the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it
also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has
already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are
imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.6
In In Re: Quinciano D. Vailoces,7 this court disbarred Atty. Vailoces for
acknowledging the execution of a forged last will and testament.
Twenty–one years after his disbarment, then 69–year–old Atty.
Vailoces filed a petition for readmission to the practice of law,
“[pledging] with all his honor xxx [that] he will surely and consistently
conduct himself honestly, uprightly and worthily.” 8 With favorable
endorsements from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, testimonials
from the provincial governor of Negros Oriental, and municipal and
barrio officials of Bindoy, Negros Oriental of his “active participation in
civic and social undertakings in [his] community,” 9 this court
readmitted Atty. Vailoces to the practice of law.
In In Re: Atty. Tranquilino Rovero,10 this court disbarred Atty. Rovero
after he had been found guilty of smuggling under Section 2703 of the
Revised Administrative Code.11 Twenty–eight years after his
disbarment, then 71–year–old Atty. Rovero filed a petition for
readmission to the practice of law, “[asking] humbly and earnestly of
the Court to [reinstate him] in the Roll of Attorneys 'before crossing
the bar to the great beyond.'” 12 To prove his “moral rehabilitation
and reformation,” 13 he involved himself in civic and educational
organizations and “held high positions of trust in commercial
establishments.” 14 With testimonials of his good conduct from
members of his community and an absolute and unconditional pardon
for his crime granted by President Ramon Magsaysay,15 this court
readmitted Atty. Rovero to the practice of law. According to this court,
Atty. Rovero uha[d] been sufficiently punished and disciplined.” 16
In this case, 80–year–old Dominador M. Narag filed his petition for
readmission to the practice of law 15 years after his disbarment. In his
petition for readmission, he expressed remorse and asked for
complainant Julieta’s and their children’s forgiveness. He annexed to
his petition a copy of an affidavit executed by his son, Dominador, Jr.,
attesting that complainant Julieta and their children had forgiven him.
He also executed a holographic will in favor of complainant Julieta and
their children.
Dominador M. Narag enlisted in the Philippine Air Force Reserve
Command and joined in its rescue, relief, recovery, and other
humanitarian missions. He also submitted to this court favorable
recommendations, testimonials, and affidavits attesting to his moral
reformation. Among the testimonials given was one from Archbishop
Emeritus Diosdado A. Talamayan of Tuguegarao. In his letter dated
November 30, 2011, he testified that:
Due to my closeness to the couple, I had the opportunity to watch
closely their married life. They both worked for the education of their
children. All were happy. Dr. Narag was a concerned father and a
loving husband. He would bring his wife along to all important
religious, civic, cultural and social events. He made it a point to go with
her, regularly on vacations to other parts of the country.
But an indiscretion on his part led to a broken family. Many times I
was called to negotiate, as their spiritual father, in their family
disputes. The misdeed of Dr. Narag led Mrs. Julieta Narag to file
disbarment from Law Practice. On June 29, 1998, in an administrative
case No. 3405, Dr. Narag was disbarred.
For the past thirteen years, I have been a witness to the remorse,
repentance of Dr. Narag.
To my joy, on June 10, 2010, acting on the gesture of Dr. Narag to
bequeath to Mrs. Julieta Narag and children, all properties personal or
real, all belongings and realizing the sincerity of repentance, Mrs.
Narag and children totally forgave Dr. Dominador Narag.
I sincerely believe Dr. Narag has paid enough for his indiscretion;
meantime, for the past thirteen years of disbarment, he helped the
University of Perpetual Help System grow and develop.
As he is in the twilight of his life, now being 78 years and feeling he
can still be of service to people, I fully endorse his humble petition for
readmission to the Philippine Bar and the restoration of his name in
the Roll of Attorneys with the Supreme Court.17
I disagree with the majority that these manifestations are hollow. I
also disagree that the affidavit of Dominador M. Narag’s son and the
holographic will he presents are not sufficient to prove the forgiveness
that has been bestowed upon him by his family. They are the parties
that have been wronged and in so far as the State is concerned, he has
already suffered enough.
This, case does not deal with the question of whether we can impose
disciplinary action on acts of immorality by members of the
profession. Had it been at issue, I would think that the forgiveness
given by the parties that have been wronged should have great
bearing on our determination. After all, there are limits to the
government’s interference into arrangements of intimacies among
couples. I fail to grasp the alleged continuing gross immorality and
reprehensiveness committed by a remorseful 80–year–old man who
has been forgiven by those he has emotionally wronged. I do not
believe that the law should be read as being too callous and inflexible
so as to be unable to accommodate the unique realities in this case.
What is at issue in this case is whether Dominador M. Narag has
suffered enough from his acts. This court showed them compassion
and reinstated them as members of the legal profession in many
instances where those disbarred are of old age who suffered “the
ignominy of disbarment” 18 long enough, showed remorse, and
conducted themselves beyond reproach after their disbarment.
The legal order has had its pound of flesh from Dominador M. Narag.
He has committed a transgression, but we have exacted enough
retribution. The purpose of the penalty has already been achieved. He
is in the twilight of his years when he is at his best to reflect on what
his life has been. He is armed by the forgiveness of his family, and he is
visited by remorse. In my view, not granting him the mitigation he asks
for is a failure of human compassion.
For these reasons, I vote to grant him his plea and to reinstate him as
a lawyer in good standing.
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA,
respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959,
complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J.
Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly
committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon
requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all
the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred.
On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the
case with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently
removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll
of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia
Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went
down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she"
(complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house
the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly
he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand
dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie
down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened
her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the
floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her
panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue
her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to
report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all
the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left
until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on
the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8,
21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been
heard by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone
because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still
frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes
when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and
received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when
respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his
house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine
(pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the
complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that
after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil
Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the
office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the
administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with
the complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their
clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents,
but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he
limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue
before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first
sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen,
and the second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took
place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual
intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in
his house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry
her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster
parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we
cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and
even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their
relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the
affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something
she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25, 1960).
xxx xxx xxx
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of
the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him
under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the
undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed
not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour
before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a
sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned
cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The
respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long
after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the
spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows
that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous
relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia
Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17
or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child,
on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of
confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he
could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her
husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took
advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina
Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult
to see why she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed
a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of
good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court
permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first
Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he
represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has
continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose
husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman
and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified
him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the
Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the
bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office
as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from admission
to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a
married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be
sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a
double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar
and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
xxx xxx xxx
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due
hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from
his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was
guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another
complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent
of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to
the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living
adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit
relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus
rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to
manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court
render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent
... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from
the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special
defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes
of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the
original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the
necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for
additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators
to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for
hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29,
1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was
granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the
following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no
act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of
perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent
when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the
respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met
respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She
and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by
the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines)
at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur
(t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24)
as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him
she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to
stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26).
Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk
about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married
(to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as
'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry
him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister
Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not
go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good
understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and
went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent
was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for
her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her
legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife,
named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti
(in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29).
Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact,
she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court
Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at
a later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on
December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the
following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the
complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and
his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when
she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the
time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love
for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he
courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter
accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in
his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan
with the other evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the
present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law
husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to
marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her
husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive
Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he
urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that
in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga,
and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his
expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that
Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she
cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's
father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to
molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another
woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again;
that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954,
he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the
fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles);
that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in
the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be
stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man
of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General
that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury
or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8,
March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding
that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage
by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by
committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal
liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by
continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became
a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the
truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar
examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation
with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The
investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or
alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on
respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for
hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to
file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and
the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had
sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a
consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he
likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous
manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the
complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with
Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the
respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment
notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has
not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true
that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or
adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the
disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by
Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be
disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not
exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and
unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary
incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised
without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless
positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in
any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair
opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698,
citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that
the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making
power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require
disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely
regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such
statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over
attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for
other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States,
where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued
possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the
practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify
that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an
attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his
professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The
tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the
conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the
rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar,
the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His
pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth
birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as
not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that he
limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her
tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his
knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the
complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he
enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her
uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of
his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis
(Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her
inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to
see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission
of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to
be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the
same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these
acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a
member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may
constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we
have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this
Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of
the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan.
398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between
attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the
statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly
require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter
upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential
during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way
directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit
and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to
his acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor General puts it —
recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to
the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the
lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his
simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not
disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court
would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential
prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and
close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of
the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that
even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for
disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as
to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive
action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession
of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he
continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she
helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of
propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her
after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation,
are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he
employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the
predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and
maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more
revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The
noblest means he could have employed was to have married the
complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining
adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously
maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral
perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore
renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal
profession. As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom
whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded
his authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction,
adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different
from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for
rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules
of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence
adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient
ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to
the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion,
whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court
orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent.
— If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against
the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation,
with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the
clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction
to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the
foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his
complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed
by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that
should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against
the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The
Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the
respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the
investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to
take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion
and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral
character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own
approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral
character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to
objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not
what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran
observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show
good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and
professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to
practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them
to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes
at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
[1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v.
Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People
v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a
good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar.
He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that
people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did
not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment
that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not
fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein
respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant, vs.ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO,
respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a disbarment proceedings under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.
On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn
complaint in the form of a letter alleging that she is the wife of Jesus
B. Toledo, a member of the Bar;1 that they were married on 27
December 1946 while he was still a second year student of law; that
she supported him and spent for his studies; that after passing the bar
examination and becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar he
abandoned her; that he is at present employed in the Bureau of
Mines2 and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City; and that he is
cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three children.
She prayed that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.
On 11, July 1956, this Court directed the respondent to answer the
complaint within ten days from receipt of notice and a copy of the
complaint.3 The respondent mailed his answer in the form of a letter,
which was received in this Court on 4, October 1956, averring that the
complaint was not in due form because "It does not set out distinctly,
clearly and concisely the legal causes for the suspension or disbarment
of a member of the Philippine Bar as provided in the Rules of Court
hence his "answer could not be made in the logical sequence of a
formal pleading;" that there seems to be an irregularity in the filing of
the complaint because while the letter-complaint was dated 25, June
1956, and received at the Docket Section of this Court on 2, July 1956,
by an employee whose initials are "A.L."4 It was subscribed and sworn
to before a notary public on a later date, 5 July 1956; and the alleged
information furnished by Esperanza D. Almonte that the respondent
was cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three
children is not true because her very informant, whose true name is
Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an affidavit to the effect that the
respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands, not in the Bureau of
Mines, and that the three children referred to by the complainant
were the children of Mr. and Mrs. Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the
respondent was boarding. Attached to his answer are the affidavit of
Leoncia D. Almonte and a copy of his answer to a complaint filed by
the complainant with the Director of Lands for abandonment and
immorality. In 9 October 1956, this Court referred the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation and on
11 October 1956 the record of the case was received by the Office of
the Solicitor General. On 19 November 1956, 10 December 1956, 7, 8,
14, and 15 February 1957, 18 March 1957 and 5 August 1957, the
office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings during which the
complainant presented her evidence both oral and documentary and
the respondent, who appeared in his own behalf, cross-examined her
witnesses. The respondent did not present evidence in his behalf but
reserved the right to present it under the provisions of Section 6, Rule
128. After finding that there is sufficient ground to proceed against
the respondent, on 24 July 1958 the Solicitor General filed a complaint
in this Court charging the respondent with abandonment of his wife
and immorality for cohabiting with another woman by whom he has a
child, and praying that he be disbarred or suspended from the practice
of law. On 30 July 1958 the Clerk of Court sent to the respondent by
mail a copy of the complaint filed by the Solicitor General and directed
him to answer the same within 15 days from receipt thereof, pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August 1958 the respondent filed in this
Court a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground "that the
charges contained therein are not based on and supported by the
facts and evidence adduced at the investigation conducted by the
Office of the Solicitor General." On 2 September 1958 this Court set
the case for hearing on 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the
morning. On 13 September 1958 the respondent filed a motion
praying that his motion to dismiss filed on 28 August 1958 be first
resolved or, that, should it be denied, he be given a period of ten days
within which to file an answer; that upon receipt of his answer the
case be returned to the Solicitor General for reception of his evidence
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing of the case set
for 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning be held in
abeyance pending resolution of his motion. At the hearing of the case
on 17 September 1958, counsel for the respondent appeared and was
given a period of 15 days within which to submit a written
memorandum in lieu of oral argument, and the Solicitor General the
same period of time from receipt of a copy of the respondent's
memorandum within which to reply. On 22 October 1958, within the
extension of time previously granted, the respondent filed his
memorandum and on 17 November 1958, also within the extension of
time previously granted, the Solicitor General, his memorandum in
reply.
Section 6, Rule 128, provides:
The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation may be considered, by the Supreme Court in the final
decision of the case, if the respondent had an opportunity to object
and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no statement is
made as to any intention of introducing additional evidence, the case
shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing of such answer or upon
the expiration of the time to file the same. (Emphasis supplied)
The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the respondent
in disbarment or suspension proceedings from the practice of law to
file an answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General after
investigation and, should he desire to present evidence in his behalf,
to expressly say so in the answer. Instead of doing what the rule
requires, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss without stating that
he intended to present evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his
right. The fact that at the close of the hearing conducted by the
Solicitor General, he made of record his desire to present evidence in
his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for
him to make known his intention is by and in the answer seasonably
filed in this Court.
The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she, a
dentist by profession, and the respondent, then a second year law
student, were married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the Justice of the
Peace (Exhibit A). For a period of two weeks after their wedding, they
lived in the house of her parents at No. 76 General del Pilar street in
Camiling. After two weeks, the respondent went to Manila to resume
his studies at the Far Eastern University,5 and she remained in
Camiling to practice her profession. While the respondent was still
studying, he either returned to Camiling once a week or she came to
Manila twice a week to visit with each other. Sometimes the
respondent stayed with her in Camiling for a week, and when she
came to Manila to buy dental materials she slept with him at his
boarding house or at the house on Economia street where he on lived
with his brother Cleto and Aniceto and cousin Felisa Bacera, who
cooked their meals for them. They were in good terms until about
three or four months before his graduation. On the day of his
graduation, he showed her indifference and humiliated and
embarrassed her by calling her a "provinciana" and telling her that she
was a nuisance whenever she came to see him. Nevertheless, being
his wife, she continued to see him while he was reviewing for the bar
examinations. She specifically mentioned that three days before the
last examination, she came to see him. A week after the bar
examinations, she again came to see him. Since then they became
actually separated and she never saw him again until the hearing of
the case. Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, she learned that the
respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed at
Cagayan de Oro City. The respondent never wrote to her and asked
her to follow him at his place of work and she did not care to either.
Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February to 3
June 1955 she lived and worked as maid, laundress and cook for the
respondent, his family composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon Toledo and
their child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The respondent and Corazon
Toledo lived as husband and wife, and have a child named Angie who
was less than a year old at the time she lived with them. The couple
slept together in the same room with their daughter Angie and ate
their meals together although sometimes Corazon ate alone when the
respondent was out somewhere. The respondent used to call Corazon
"Honey" and Corazon used to call the respondent "Jess". Corazon
Toledo is not the same person as the complainant.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed as
operator-mechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, and has resided there since 1952. He knows the respondent
because he headed a survey party that surveyed public lands in
Malaybalay for distribution to the landless. Sometime in March 1955
he went to the respondent's place of residence and office at Moreno
street, where his friend Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also resided to apply for
a parcel of public land, and about ten times he went to the
respondent's place of residence and office. Among those who lived
with the respondent were Mrs. Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a maid and
Mr. Abad (the latter only slept at the place whenever he was in town).
He knew that Corazon Toledo, who is not the same person as Paz
Arellano Toledo, was the wife of the respondent. At the respondent's
place of residence and office, he saw a room where the respondent,
Corazon and a baby slept and where man's pajamas and shirts were
hung. One day at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while the
respondent and his (the witness') friend Mr. Abad were repairing the
front mudguard and seats of a station wagon behind the respondent's
place of residence and office, his friend Mr. Abad introduced him to
the respondent. He helped Abad place the seats of the station wagon
in their proper places and while he was helping Abad, he heard the
respondent address Corazon as "Mama" and ask her for money to buy
cigarettes. His friends Nieva and Abad used to address Corazon as
"Mrs. Toledo."
The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p. 14,
t.s.n.).The fact that he is cohabiting with another woman who had
borne him a child has been established by the testimony of Marina
Payot and Lino Domingo, whose sincerity and truthfulness have been
put to a severe and searching test by the investigating Solicitor in the
presence of the respondent who appeared in his own behalf and
cross-examined the witnesses during the investigation. Asked by the
investigating Solicitor how she came to testify at the investigation, or
whether anybody taught or coached her on what to testify or whether
she testified because of any promise of reward or consideration,
Marina Payot without hesitation and in a straight forward manner
answered that the complainant, Mr. Domingo and Mr. Reyes (the
latter is the complainant's counsel) spoke to her and told her to tell
nothing but the truth about the respondent's affair with his paramour
in Malaybalay; that nobody taught or coached her on what to testify
at the investigation; and that she was not promised anything by way
of reward or consideration or given money for testifying. Going
further in his investigation, the Solicitor asked the witness how she
was treated by the respondent to find out if she harbors any ill-feeling
or grudge against him and his alleged paramour, which could be a
motive for falsely testifying against them, and she answered that she
was well treated by the Toledos; that they considered her a sister; that
they paid regularly her salary of P15 a month; that they bought her a
dress during the town fiesta on May 15; that Corazon never scolded
her for she was a woman of few words, was kind and did not know
how to get angry; and that the reason she left them was because she
just felt lonesome for her parents. Further testing her credibility, the
Solicitor asked how the respondent's paramour looked, and she
described her as a woman of fair complexion. Comparing her
(Corazon) to the complainant, she said that the complainant was more
beautiful but Corazon was not ugly and that the latter had a nicer
figure, because she was stouter and taller than the complainant. To
find out if it was another and not the respondent who lived with
Corazon, the Solicitor asked her if she had not seen Teodoro Nieva,
who lived with the respondent and Corazon in the same house, kiss or
embrace Corazon, and she replied that she had not.
Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating Solicitor
asked him whether he was related to Claudio Arellano, brother of the
complainant, and Lino readily answered that he is his brother-in-law
and added that he (Lino) is the cousin of the wife of Claudio. Asked if
he had been asked by the complainant to testify at the hearing, he
frankly answered in the affirmative. Questioned as to the description
of the respondent's paramour, the witness stated that Corazon is fair
in complexion, five feet tall; that she is taller and fairer in complexion,
more beautiful and has a nicer figure than the complainant.
The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence. Marina
Payot is a simple girl of eighteen years, a mere maid, scant in
education, and understands little English. She did not even finish the
sixth grade of the elementary course. The sharp and incisive questions
propounded to her by the investigating Solicitor and the lengthy cross-
examination to which she was subjected by the respondent himself
would have revealed herself if she was lying. The apparent
inconsistencies in her answers may be attributed to her innocence and
simple-mindedness and her failure to understand the questions
propounded to her. Moreover, she could not be expected to
remember the dates asked of her in the same way that a person of
more than average intelligence would. Add to this the fact that she
was subjected to a thorough examination by three lawyers and her
confusion was compounded. Lino Domingo's frank and ready answers
to the questions propounded by the Solicitor show sincerity and do
not reveal any intention to pervert the truth. And even if his testimony
be discarded, still the testimony of Marina Payot stands unrebutted.
The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot be
taken into consideration for they were not properly introduced in
evidence during the investigation.
The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with
another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the
Bar.6
THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant, vs.GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR.,
respondent.Roger Castuciano for complainant.Roemo J. Callejo for
respondent.
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her
husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly
immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with
Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a widow.
They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on
November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso
came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting
or undissolved.
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972,
Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage
was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C
and C-1)
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street,
Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the evening of April 13,
1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked
permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a
vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has
never returned to the conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much
patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was
living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A
Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to
that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was
corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios
Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors
staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits,
Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced
himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name
is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the
owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She
Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan
appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was
terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to
time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of
giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes,
the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the
plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared that he
did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress
Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the
conjugal home because he could not endure the nagging of his wife,
their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she
allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her
interference with his professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He
filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did
not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of additional
evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has
sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of
her and his adulterous relations with a married woman separated
from her own husband.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he
was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and
resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman,
fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs.
Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. He failed
to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a
member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).
WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
–
ROMANA R. MALIGSA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ARSENIO FER
CABANTING, Respondent.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING is charged by Romana R. Maligsa in a
verified affidavit-complaint for disbarment with conduct unbecoming
a lawyer for certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated 5 May
19921 over a piece of property subject of a pending civil case before
the Regional Trial Court Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, docketed as
Civil Case No. U-5434.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 11 March 1996 we required respondent to comment on the
complaint. He failed to comply despite service upon him of our
Resolution together with copy of the complaint.
On 22 October 1996 we considered the failure of respondent Atty.
Arsenio Fer Cabanting to file his comment as waiver of his right to do
so and directed the case submitted for decision.
On the basis of the complaint and the supporting documents, this
Court finds sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against
respondent for making it appear in the Acknowledgment of the Deed
of Quitclaim in question that the affiant therein signed the document
and acknowledged the contents thereof before him as Notary Public
on 5 May 1992 when in truth and in fact the affiant did not and could
not have done so.
The evidence clearly discloses that on 5 May 1992 a Deed of Quitclaim
was purportedly executed by one Irene Maligsa in favor of Juanito V.
Abaoag over a parcel of land located in Cablong, Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan.3 The subject document was notarized by respondent on
the same date. The document was apparently used as evidence
against complainant in a pending civil case for annulment of OCT No.
P-31297, quieting of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order plus
damages.
The complainant alleges that the Deed of Quitclaim could not have
been executed and notarized on 5 May 1992 because the affiant Irene
Maligsa died on 21 April 1992 or sixteen (16) days earlier.4 Moreover,
Irene Maligsa could not have signed the document because she "never
knew how to write as she uses the thumb mark in every transaction
she entered." 5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 6 provides
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments
of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The
notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify
that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known
to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate
shall be made under the official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Furthermore, the Acknowledgment contained in the questioned
document specifically provides "BEFORE ME personally appeared
IRENE MALIGSA x x x x" 7 Clearly, the party acknowledging must
personally appear before the Notary Public or any other person
authorized to take such acknowledgment of instruments or
documents.
In the case before us, it would have been physically and legally
impossible for the affiant Irene Maligsa to have executed the alleged
Deed of Quitclaim on 5 May 1992 and to have personally subscribed
to its authenticity and validity before respondent notary public on the
same date, affiant having died on 21 April 1992. Also, it behooves
respondent as a notary public to require the personal appearance of
the person executing a document to enable the former to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the affiant.
Quite importantly, this is not the first time that respondent has been
involved in an act of malpractice in violation of his oath as a lawyer
and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting,8 the
Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6)
months from the practice of law. In those cases respondent purchased
his client's property which was still the subject of a pending certiorari
proceeding contrary to the prohibition stated in Art. 1491 of the New
Civil Code and Art. II of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Under the
circumstances, a recollection of the basic principles of professional
ethics in the practice of law is apropos.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings
honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a
member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which
might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.
9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public
interest in a substantial degree and protection of the interest requires
preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries
public from imposing upon the public and the courts and the
administrative offices generally.10 Notarization of a private document
converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated
to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties
being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an
oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such
responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he
must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional
indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or spurious
document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath
in an Acknowledgment.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent ATTY. ARSENIO FER
CABANTING guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of his
continued membership in the legal profession; consequently, he is
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as
well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima Jr., Panganiban,
and Torres Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., is on leave.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether

in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting
in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 11 Considering the
serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior
misconduct hereinbefore mentioned for which he was penalized with
a six (6) month suspension from the practice of law, with a warning
that repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case
which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the
imposition of a much graver penalty.