Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a
[G.R. No. 112483. October 8, 1999.]
ELOY IMPERIAL, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON,
ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON,
RICARDO VILLALON and ESTHER VILLALON, Respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. CV No. 31976 1 , affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Legazpi City 2 , which rendered inofficious the donation made by
Leoncio Imperial in favor of herein petitioner, to the extent that it
impairs the legitime of Victor Imperial, and ordering petitioner to convey
to herein private respondents, heirs of said Victor Imperial, that portion
of the donated land proportionate to Victor Imperial’s
legitime.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter
parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known
as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold
the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein,
who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into
several lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the
contract’s designation as one of "Absolute Sale", the transaction was in
fact a donation.
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a
complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as
Civil Case No. 1177, in the then Court of First Instance of Albay, on the
ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing the said
document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise
agreement, approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay on
November 3, 1961 3 , under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the
legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and
(2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of
the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the
convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncio’s death, it was agreed
that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to defray
burial costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment,
Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs — the herein petitioner, who is his
acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. On
March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-
mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment.
On March 15, 1962, the motion for execution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and
without issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who
was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, or on
September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two
children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
complaint for annulment of the donation with the Regional Trial Court
of Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646. Petitioner moved to
dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in
the same case, Civil Case No. 7646, for "Annulment of Documents,
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession" with the Regional Trial Court
of Legazpi City, seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
affecting the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and
inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that petitioner
caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of
the latter’s physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the
conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime
of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest. 4
In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had conveyed
sufficient property to Victor to cover his legitime, consisting of 563
hectares of agricultural land in Manito, Albay; (2) reiterated the defense
of res judicata, and (3) raised the additional defenses of prescription and
laches.
Plaintiff Cesar Villalon died on December 26, 1989, while the case was
pending in the Regional Trial Court, and was substituted in this action by
his sons, namely, Antonio, Roberto, Augusto, Ricardo and Cesar, Jr., all
surnamed Villalon, and his widow, Esther H. Villalon.
The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime
of Victor, on the basis of its finding that at the time of Leoncio’s death,
he left no property other than the 32,837-square meter parcel of land
which he had donated to petitioner. The RTC went on further to state
that petitioner’s allegation that other properties existed and were
inherited by Victor was not substantiated by the evidence. 5
The legitime of Victor was determined by the trial court in this
manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Considering that the property donated is 32,837 square meters, one half
of that or 16,418 square meters becomes the free portion of Leoncio
which could be absorbed in the donation to defendant. The other half,
which is also 16,418 square meters is where the legitime of the adopted
son Victor Imperial has to be taken.
The proportion of the legitime of the legitimate child (including the
adopted child) in relation to the acknowledged natural child (defendant)
is 10 is to 5[,] with the acknowledged natural child getting ½ of the
legitime of the legitimate (adopted) child, in accordance with Art. 895 of
the New Civil Code which provides:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of
the natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."cralaw
virtua1aw library
From the 16,418 square meters left (after the free portion has been
taken) plaintiffs are therefore entitled to 10,940 square meters while
defendant gets 5,420 square meters. 6
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30
years under Article 1141 of the Civil Code 7 , reckoned from March 15,
1962, when the writ of execution of the compromise judgment in Civil
Case 1177 was issued, and that the original complaint having been filed
in 1986, the action has not yet prescribed. In addition, the trial court
regarded the defense of prescription as having been waived, this not
being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision of December 13, 1990
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Deed of Absolute Sale otherwise
known as Doc. No. 8; Book No. 14; Page No. 1; Series of 1951 of the
Notarial file of Pompeyo B. Calleja which is considered a donation, is
hereby reduced proportionately insofar as it affected the legitime of the
late Victor Imperial, which share is inherited by the plaintiffs herein, to
the extent that plaintiffs are ordered to be given by defendant a portion
of 10,940 square meters thereof.
In order to avoid further conflict, the 10,940 share to be given to
plaintiffs should include the portion which they are presently occupying,
by virtue of the extended lease to their father Ricardo Villalon, where
the bungalow in question stands.
The remaining portion to be given to plaintiffs may come from any other
portion that may be agreed upon by the parties, otherwise, this court
will appoint a commissioner to undertake the partition.
The other 21,897 square meters should go to the defendant as part of
his legitime and by virtue of the reduced donation.
No pronouncement as to damages as they were not sufficiently proved.
SO ORDERED. 8 Only those who at the time of the donor’s death have a right to the
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
Before us, petitioner questions the following findings of respondent
court: (1) that there was no res judicata, there being no identity of
parties and cause of action between the instant case and Civil Case No.
1177; (2) that private respondents had a right to question the donation;
(3) that private respondents’ action is barred by prescription, laches and
estoppel; and (4) that the donation was inofficious and should be
reduced.
It is an indispensable requirement in res judicata that there be, between
the first and second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of
cause of action. 9 A perusal of the records leads us to conclude that there
is no identity of parties and of cause of action as between Civil Case No.
1177 and Civil Case No. 7646. Civil Case No. 1177 was instituted by
Leoncio in his capacity as donor of the questioned donation. While it is
true that upon his death, Victor was substituted as plaintiff of the action,
such does not alter the fact that Victor’s participation in the case was in
representation of the interests of the original plaintiff, Leoncio. The
purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is to ensure that the
deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal representative of the estate 10 , or his
heir, as in this case, for which no court appointment is required. 11
Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that there is substantial identity
between Leoncio and private respondents, being heirs and successors-
in-interest of Victor, is unavailing.
Moreover, Leoncio’s cause of action as donor of the property was fraud,
purportedly employed upon him by petitioner in the execution of the
donation. While the same circumstances of fraud and deceit are alleged
in private respondents’ complaint, it also raises the additional ground of
inofficiousness of donation.
Contrary to petitioner’s contentions, inofficiousness of donation does
not, and could not, form part of Leoncio’s cause of action in Civil Case
No. 1177. Inofficiousness as a cause of action may arise only upon the
death of the donor, as the value of the donation will then be contrasted
with the net value of the estate of the donor-deceased. 12
Consequently, while in Civil Case No. 1177, Leoncio sought the
revocation in full of the donation on ground of fraud, the instant case
actually has two alternative causes of action. First, for fraud and deceit,
under the same circumstances as alleged in Leoncio’s complaint, which
seeks the annulment in full of the donation, and which the trial court
correctly dismissed because the compromise agreement in Civil Case No.
1177 served as a ratification and waiver on the part of Leoncio of
whatever defects in voluntariness and consent may have been attendant
in the making of the donation. The second cause of action is the alleged
inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in the impairment of Victor’s
legitime, which seeks the annulment, not of the entire donation, but
only of that portion diminishing the legitime. 13 It is on the basis of this
second cause of action that private respondents prevailed in the lower
courts.
Petitioner next questions the right of private respondents to contest the
donation. Petitioner sources his argument from Article 772 of the Civil
Code, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the
reduction of inofficious donations. . .
As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was
only Victor who was entitled to question the donation. However, instead
of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted
as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even moved for execution of the
compromise judgment therein.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts.
It must be remembered that at the time of the substitution, the
judgment approving the compromise agreement has already been
rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise
judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit
repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part
of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic
instrument, or by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over
the testamentary or intestate proceedings.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
latter’s death, his act of moving for execution of the compromise
judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime.
He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently
seeking the reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor’s
heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is
expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in Article
1053:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the
inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his heirs.
Be that as it may, we find merit in petitioner’s other assignment of
errors. Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an
inofficious donation, we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is
thirty years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of both
courts that this case is a "real action over an immovable" allots undue
credence to private respondents’ description of their complaint, as one
for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of
Possession of Property", which suggests the action to be, in part, a real
action enforced by those with claim of title over the disputed land.
Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not
amount to a claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde v. Court of
Appeals 14 , we declared that what is brought to collation is not the
donated property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was
donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation
which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in
value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir
or donee. 15
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an
inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of
reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of
subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; 16 (2)
four years, for non-compliance with conditions of the donation; 17 and
(3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled
to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their
support. 18 Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, 19 the
reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime,
are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason
we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created
by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation
to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil
Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo v.
Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of
a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to
enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent.
Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained
and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate
this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
As for the trial court’s holding that the defense of prescription had been
waived, it not being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial, suffice it
to say that while the terms of the pre-trial order bind the parties as to
the matters to be taken up in trial, it would be the height of injustice for
us to adhere to this technicality when the fact of prescription is manifest
in the pleadings of the parties, as well as the findings of fact of the lower
courts. 20
A perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that not only has
prescription set in, private respondents are also guilty of estoppel by
laches. It may be recalled that Leoncio died on January 8, 1962. Fifteen
years later, Victor died, leaving as his sole heir Ricardo Villalon, who also
died four years later. While Victor was alive, he gave no indication of any
interest to contest the donation of his deceased father. As we have
discussed earlier, the fact that he actively participated in Civil Case No.
1177 did not amount to a renunciation of his inheritance and does not
preclude him from bringing an action to claim his legitime. These are
matters that Victor could not possibly be unaware of, considering that
he is a lawyer. 21 Ricardo Villalon was even a lessee of a portion of the
donated property, and could have instituted the action as sole heir of his
natural son, or at the very least, raised the matter of legitime by way of
counterclaim in an ejectment case 22 filed against him by petitioner in
1979. Neither does it help private respondents’ cause that five years
have elapsed since the death of Ricardo in 1981 before they filed their
complaint with the RTC.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that
the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it. 23 We find
the necessity for the application of the principle of estoppel by laches in
this case, in order to avoid an injustice.
A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the
donation to be inofficious because Leoncio had no other property at the
time of his death, the RTC computed the legitime of Victor based on the
area of the donated property. Hence, in its dispositive portion, it
awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as Victor’s
legitime. This was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal
share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must
be taken: (1) the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting all the payable obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value
of all donations subject to collation would be added to it. 24
Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the
property itself, which is brought to collation. Consequently, even when
the donation is found inofficious and reduced to the extent that it
impaired Victor’s legitime, private respondents will not receive a
corresponding share in the property donated. Thus, in this case where
the collatable property is an immovable, what may be received is: (1) an
equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same nature, class
and quality; 25 (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the
impaired legitime in cash or marketable securities; 26 or (3) in the
absence of cash or securities in the estate, so much of such other
property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction. 27
We believe this worth mentioning, even as we grant the petition on
grounds of prescription and laches.
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No.
31976, affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Case No. 7646, is reversed and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129505 January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 133359 January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official
Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA
PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr.
Arturo de Santos, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the
Thirteenth and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which
ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of the
estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering
that they involve the same parties and some of the issues raised are the
same.
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati
City, filed a petition for probate of his will1 in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr.
De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named
in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation,
Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value
of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the
custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes
Phillips. A copy of the will2 was annexed to the petition for probate.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati,
Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will.
The order reads:
On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the
hearing of the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30 o'clock
in the morning, copies of which were served to Arturo de
Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips
(Officer's Return, dated 04 September 1995 attached to the
records). When the case was called for hearing on the date set,
no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever
filed and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce
his evidence in support of the petition.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was
placed on the witness stand and was directly examined by the
Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give
this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the
petitioner when he executed the subject will. After the
examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of sound
and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and
undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last
Will and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that
he was neither forced nor influenced by any other person in
signing it.
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence
adduced that petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last Will
and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his
residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes
Park, Makati City; said Last Will and Testament was signed in
the presence of his three (3) witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr.
Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"),
Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10",
& "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-
13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of
the testator and in the presence of each and all of the
witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and duly
notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh.
"A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and
Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").
Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia
Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole
legatee and devisee of petitioner's properties, real and
personal, approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms.
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and to
serve as such without a bond.1âwphi1.nêt
From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner
has substantially established the material allegations
contained in his petition. The Last Will and Testament having
been executed and attested as required by law; that testator
at the time of the execution of the will was of sane mind
and/or not mentally incapable to make a Will; nor was it
executed under duress or under the influence of fear or
threats; that it was in writing and executed in the language
known and understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof
and attested and subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of another; that the testator
and all the attesting witnesses signed the Last Will and
Testament freely and voluntarily and that the testator has
intended that the instrument should be his Will at the time of
affixing his signature thereto.
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself)
the petition for the allowance of the Last Will and Testament
of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED and ALLOWED.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26,
1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for
intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's
sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew
and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a
creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration
of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of
administration in his name.
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the
designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent
moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was
required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that
said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.3
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the
other hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for
the issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for
the same purpose with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.
Upon private respondent's motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of
Branch 65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special
administrator of Dr. De Santos's estate.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343
and to set aside the appointment of private respondent as special
administrator. He reiterated that he was the sole and full blooded
nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to know of the
existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court
was still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of
the testator's estate; that private respondent was not fit to be the
special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be given
letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case
before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ."
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had
denied on August 26, 1996 petitioner's motion for intervention.
Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a
decision4 promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of
petitioner's motion for intervention.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996,
returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the
ground that there was a pending case involving the Estate of Decedent
Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The order reads:
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this
Court, transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the ground
that this case is related with a case before this Court, let this
case be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there
is no related case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO
DE SANTOS pending before this Branch.
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as
petitioner under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the
Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP. PROC.
NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996
and has become final.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became
final, herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a
MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY,
which was subsequently withdrawn after this Court, during the
hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted
as the subject matter involves a separate case under Rule 78
of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her motion and
filed this case (No. 4343).
Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR
INTERVENTION before Case No. M-4223 and this motion was
already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August 1996
likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate
case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot
be included in this case filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court.
It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation
of cases must be approved by the Presiding Judges of the
affected Branches.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,5 Judge Abad Santos
appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch
65) to hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering
that the probate proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus
ordered the transfer of the records back to the latter branch. However,
he later recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to
expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996,
he stated:
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of
Branch 61 to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the
fact that said branch began the probate proceedings of the
estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to
exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the
entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and
distributed as per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch
(Regional Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the
petition if only to expedite the proceedings, and under the
concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but one
court.
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice
and the Office of the Court Administrator, of the Supreme
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los Reyes
Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles, Intervenor.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner's motion
for intervention. Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but
her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997,
rendered a decision6 setting aside the trial court's order on the ground
that petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343.
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court —
Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the
probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the
will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court —
Makati, Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction over the petition for
issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late
Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the
respondent.
4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum
shopping in filing her petition for issuance of letters
testamentary with the Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch
65 knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving
the same restate estate of the decedent is still pending with
the Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61.
First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of
RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing
the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases of Santiesteban
v. Santiesteban7 and Tagle v. Manalo,8 he argues that the proceedings
must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs,
devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, §1 of the
Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could
not lawfully act upon private respondent's petition for issuance of letters
testamentary.
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of
the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e.,
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.9
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the
testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court
proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the
testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most
jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of
a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.10
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for
probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court
having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case,
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the
allowance of wills after the testator's death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of
Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on
petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either
during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.
Rule 76, §1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any
executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession
or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the
court for the allowance of his will.
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of
testator has been explained by the Code Commission thus:
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the
testamentary capacity of the testator or the formalities
adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few
cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary
dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the
mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his
death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized.
Furthermore, if a will does not comply with the requirements
prescribed by law, the same may be corrected at once. The
probate during the testator's life, therefore, will lessen the
number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during
the lifetime of the testator, the only questions that may
remain for the courts to decide after the testator's death will
refer to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions.
It is possible, of course, that even when the testator himself
asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under
duress or undue influence, but these are rare cases.
After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the
testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or
revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will,
it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession

before he has had a chance to present such petition, the
ordinary probate proceeding after the testator's death would
be in order.11
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16,
1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a
certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, §12 of the Rules
of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos
of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that —
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun
the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it
continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate
proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance
of a will but continues up to such time that the entire estate of
the testator had been partitioned and distributed.
the court over the subject matter "existed was fixed before
procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is
not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and
justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is
not exercised conformably with the provisions of the
procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it
loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not
amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction
over the person or that the judgment may thereby be
rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain
it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at
once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain
words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the
parties.

Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of

The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the
estates with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro
testator meant merely that the partition and distribution of
Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial
the estate was to be suspended until the latter's death. In
courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches
other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for
comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions
the issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed
independent of and incompatible with each other.14
a manifestation for the same purpose in the probate court.12

It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the venue

Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to
of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it
intervene, cites Rule 73, §1 which states:
does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. As held in
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent the leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote:15
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court
under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-
of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time
equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court of First
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the
Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
judges. And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge.
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
It is for this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
right or power to apportion the cases among the different
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the
appears on the record.
coordination of the work by the different branches of the same
court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does not
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First
of Appeals, it was held:13 Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any
branch or judge of the court.
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section
1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has
residence of the decedent, or of the location of the state," is jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule
indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the
and Processes." It could not have been intended to define the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent.
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal
He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator,
provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely
his interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling that petitioner
with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction
has no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-
over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of
Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:
7|Page
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under
the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a
compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest
collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the
latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a
will which has already been probated and disposes of all his
properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said
will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's estate is,
therefore, not direct or immediate.
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one,
having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the
opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the
records show, not supported by evidence.
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct
interest in the estate or the will, and the private respondent
has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the private
respondent's opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately
misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is not
relevant to the question of her competency to act as executor.
Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an
allegation of the probable value and character of the property
of the estate. The true value can be determined later on in the
course of the settlement of the estate.16
Rule 79, §1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous
petition for administration. — Any person interested in a will
may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary
should not issue to the persons named therein as executors,
or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall
pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at
the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the
will annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has
a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is
material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.17
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot
be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of
testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced
heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil
Code provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity
to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code
with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's —
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the
Civil Code.18
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may
have been preterited in the testator's will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings
based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the
testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon
the Court to respect the desires of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta
v. Pecson:19
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a
testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his
property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the
testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one
who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of
his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered a
curtailment of the right to dispose.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails
to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the
estate.20 None of these circumstances is present in this case.
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum
shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary
(Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-
4223) were still pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of
parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which
are founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res
judicata in the other.
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate
was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of
authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings
were terminated.1âwphi1.nêt
On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was
filed by private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos,
for the purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the
estate and put into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement
proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon
the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons
named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions,
8|Page
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
nor was the latter filed during the pendency of the former. There was,
consequently, no forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-65800. October 3, 1986.]
PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE TUPAS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BRANCH
XLII of the HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
respondent, and TUPAS FOUNDATION, INC., private Respondent-
Appellee.
Abraham D. Caña for Petitioner-Appellant.
Jose R. Edis for private Respondent-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; DONATION; LIMITATION ON PERSON’S PREROGATIVE TO
MAKE DONATION. — A person’s prerogative to make donations is a
subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by
donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). If he does,
so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is
deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such
excess, though without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor’s
lifetime or the donee’s appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art.
771, Civil Code).
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; COLLATION; PROPER IN CASE A DECEDENT’S
DONATION IS INOFFICIOUS. — Donation made in violation of Art, 752 of
the Civil Code is collationable, that is, its value is imputable into the
heredity estate of the donor at the time of his death for the purpose of
determining the lifetime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely
disposable portion of the estate. This is true as well of donations to
strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs, although the language of Article
1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collation to the latter class of
donations. And this has been held to be a long-established rule in Liguez
v. Honorable Court of Appeals, Et. Al. 102 Phil. 577, 586, where this Court
said: ". . . Hence, the force heirs are entitled to have the donation set
aside in so far as inofficious: i.e., in excess of the portion of free disposal
(Civil code of 1889, Articles 693, 645), computed as provided in Articles
818 and 819, and bearing in mind that collationable gifts’ under Article
818 should included gifts made not only in favor of the forced heirs, but
even those made in favor of strangers, as decided by the Supreme Court
of Spain in its decisions of 4 May 1899 and 16 June 1902. So that is
computing the legitimes, the value of the property donated to herein
appellant, Conchita Liguez, should be considered part of the donor’s
estate, Once again, only the court of origin has the requisite data to
determine whether the donation is inofficious or not."cralaw virtua1aw
library
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PREVENTED BY THE FACT THAT THE DONATED
PROPERTY NO LONGER ACTUALLY FORMED PART OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEDENT. — The fact, that the donated of the estate of the donor at
the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to
collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that collation
contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos.
4. ID.; ID.; NOT PREVENTED BY THE FACT THAT THE LAND DONATED
WERE CAPITAL OR SEPARATE PROPERTY OF DONOR. — The further fact
the lots property of the donor is of no moments, because a claim of
inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave was not his, but that
he gave more than what was within his power to give.
5. ID.; ID.; LEGITIMATE; ESTABLISHED RULES FOR THE DETERMINATION
THEREOF. — The rules established by the Civil Code for the
determination of the legitime and, by extension, of the disposable
portion. These rules are set forth in Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the
Code, on the basis of which the following step-by-step procedure has
been correctly outlined: (1) determination of the value of the property
which remains at the time of the testator’s death; (2) determination of
the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid out or
deducted from the value of the property thus left; (3) the determination
of the difference between the assets and the liabilities, giving rise to the
hereditary estate; (4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the
value, at the time they were made, of donations subject to cellation; and
(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimates by getting from
the total thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitimate
of each respective compulsory heirs. Deducting the legitimes the net
value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely disposable portion by
which the donation in question here must be measured. If the value of
the donation at the time it was made dose not exceed that difference,
then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inoficious
as to the excess and must reduced by the amount of said excess.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
Involved in this appeal is the question of whether or not a donation inter
vivos by a donor now deceased is inofficious and should be reduced at
the instance of the donor’s widow.
Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless,
leaving his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory
heir. He also left a will dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to
probate on September 30, 1980 in Special Proceedings No. 13994 of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Among the assets listed in
his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre,
admittedly his private capital. However, at the time of his death, these
lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them the year
before (on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had
thereafter obtained title to said lots.
Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any
inheritance, Tupas’ widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. in
the same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (docketed as Civil
Case No. 16089) to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it
prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible." . . by one-half or such
9|Page
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
proportion as . . . (might be deemed) justified . . ." and." . . the resulting
deduction . . ." restored and conveyed or delivered to her. The complaint
also prayed for attorney’s fees and such other relief as might be proper.
The Trial Court did not see things her way. Upon the facts above stated,
on which the parties stipulated, 1 said Court dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit, rejecting her claim on several grounds,
viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . (1) Article 900 relied upon by plaintiff is not applicable because the
properties which were disposed of by way of donation one year before
the death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate
at the time of his death on August 20, 1978; (2) the donation properties
were Epifanio’s capital or separate estate; and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc.
being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the donation inter vivos
made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art. 1061, C.C." 2
The Trial Court is in error on all counts and must be reversed.
A person’s prerogative to make donations is subject to certain
limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than
he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). 3 If he does, so much of what is
donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and
the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though without
prejudice to its taking effect in the donor’s lifetime or the donee’s
appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such
a donation is, moreover, collationable, that is, its value is in putable into
the hereditary estate of the donor at the time of his death for the
purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs
and the freely disposable portion of the estate. This is true as well of
donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs, although the
language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collation
to the latter class of donations. And this has been held to be a long-
established rule in Liguez v. Honorable Court of Appeals, Et Al., 4 where
this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set aside
in so far as inofficious: i.e., in excess of the portion of free disposal (Civil
Code of 1889, Articles 636, 645), computed as provided in Articles 818
and 819, and bearing in mind that `collationable gifts’ under Article 818
should include gifts made not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even
those made in favor of strangers, as decided by the Supreme Court of
Spain in its decision of 4 May 1899 and 16 June 1902. So that in
computing the legitimes, the value of the property donated to herein
appellant, Conchita Liguez, should be considered part of the donor’s
estate. Once again, only the court of origin has the requisite data to
determine whether the donation is inofficious or not." 5
The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed
part of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be
asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious
proposition that collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts
inter vivos. 6 The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly
capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a
claim of inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was
not his, but that he gave more than what was within his power to give.
Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that,
having been made to a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law 7 chargeable
to the freely disposable portion of the donor’s estate, to be reduced
insofar as inofficious, i.e., it exceeds said portion and thus impairs the
legitime of the compulsory heirs, in order to find out whether it is
inofficious or not, recourse must be had to the rules established by the
Civil Code for the determination of the legitime and, by extension, of the
disposable portion. These rules are set forth in Articles 908, 909 and 910
of the Code, on the basis of which the following step-by-step procedure
has been correctly outlined:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time
of the testator’s death;
(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to
be paid out or deducted from the value of the property thus left;
(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the
liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate;
(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time
they were made, of donations subject to collation; and
(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the
total thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each
respective compulsory heir. 8
Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate
leaves the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question
here must be measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was
made does not exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to stand.
But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be
reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be
shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the
sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.cralawnad
For obvious reasons, this determination cannot now be made, as it
requires appreciation of data not before this Court and may necessitate
the production of evidence in the Court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-appellant
Partenza Lucerna Vda. de Tupas is adjudged entitled to so much of the
donated property in question, as may be found in excess of the freely
disposable portion of the estate of Epifanio B. Tupas, determined in the
manner above-indicated. Let the case be remanded to the Trial Court for
further appropriate proceedings in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106401 September 29, 2000
SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-
ZARAGOZA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA
MORGAN, respondents.
DECISION
10 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks (1) the
reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March
27, 1992 in CA - G.R. CV No. 12587, which affirmed the decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 14178, except the dismissal of
private respondent's claim over lot 943; (2) the dismissal of the
complaint filed by private respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo;
and (3) the declaration of the deed of sale executed by Flavio Zaragoza
covering Lot 943 as valid.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals and on record are
as follows:
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land
situated at the Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara,
Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and
Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without
a will and was survived by his four children.
On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan
filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Spouses
Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance
share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She
claims that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of
the late Flavio. She further alleged that her father, in his lifetime,
partitioned the aforecited properties among his four children. The
shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way
of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which
consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of
sale then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an
American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines
except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of
conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots during her
father's lifetime.
Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private
respondent and the allegations on the properties of their father. They,
however, denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds
of sale to them by their father. They said that lot 871 is still registered in
their father's name, while lot 943 was sold by him to them for a valuable
consideration. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their
father to convey the cited lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his
failure to do so because she became an American citizen. They denied
that there was partitioning of the estate of their father during his
lifetime.
On November 23, 1983, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the
ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action and it failed to
implead indispensable parties. The resolution of said Motion was
deferred by the lower court until the case was tried on the merits.
On October 7, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo promulgated its
decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the above findings, judgment is hereby
rendered, adjudicating Lot 871 in the name of Flavio Zaragoza Cano to
plaintiff Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan as appertaining her share in his estate
and ordering defendants to vacate its premises and deliver immediately
the portion occupied by them to herein plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim against
defendants over Lot 943 is dismissed as well as claims for damages
interposed against each other.3
In the above decision, the RTC found that Flavio partitioned his
properties during his lifetime among his three children by deeds of sales;
that the conveyance of Lot 943 to petitioners was part of his plan to
distribute his properties among his children during his lifetime; and that
he intended Lot 871 to be the share of private respondent.4
Not satisfied with the above decision, both parties interposed an appeal
in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA -GR CV No. 12587.
On March 27, 1992, respondent court rendered the assailed decision,
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, WE reverse the decision appealed from, insofar as
defendant-appellants, spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda E.
Zaragoza, were adjudged owner of Lot 943. In all other respects, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.5
The appellate court gave weight to the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by private respondent to support its finding that
Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance share of private respondent.
Specifically, it noted the admission by petitioner in his letter in 1981 to
private respondent's counsel, that their father had given them their
inheritance.6 Further, public respondent found that the alleged sale of
lot 943 in favor of petitioner Florentino was fictitious and void. The
signature of Don Flavio in the said document was markedly different
from his other signatures appearing in other documents he signed from
January to February 1957.7 The Motion for Reconsideration was denied
in a Resolution8 dated June 26, 1992.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari,9 with a supplemental
petition, raising the following assigned errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOTS 871 AND 943
ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE DECEDENT FLAVIO ZARAGOZA
HAS NOT EXECUTED ANY WILL NOR ANY DOCUMENT GIVING THESE
TWO PROPERTIES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING WEIGHT
TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S WITNESSES TO THE
EFFECT THAT LOTS 871 AND 943 ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS TOLD TO THEM BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THESE TESTIMONIES ARE HEARSAY;
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEED OF
SALE EXECUTED BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER OVER
LOT 943 IS A FORGERY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. THE THEORY THAT THE AFORESAID DEED OF SALE WAS A
FORGERY WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE COMPLAINT NOR
ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE.
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
2. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS IN A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT.
3. NO WITNESSES WAS EVER PRESENTED TO ASSAIL THE
GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF FLAVIO ZARAGOZA.
4. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS EVEN WITNESSED BY HIS
OTHER DAUGHTER GLORIA ZARAGOZA NUÑEZ AND
NOTARIZED BY NOTARY PUBLIC ATTY. EDURESE.
D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WITH RESPECT TO LOT 943 WHEN THE
LATTER SUSTAINED THE GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF
PETITIONER'S FATHER FOUND IN EXH. I.
E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL, IGNORING THE FACT THAT IT IS THE LAW ON INTESTATE
SUCCESSION, AND THE CORRESPONDING RULES OF COURT ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE THAT IS APPLICABLE ON THIS CASE. 10
In their Supplemental Petition for Review dated October 29, 1992,
petitioners additionally raised:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION,
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT LOTS TRANSFERRED INTER VIVOS TO THE OTHER HEIRS
SHOULD HAVE BEEN COLLATED TO THE MASS OF THE ESTATE
OF THE DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
AS LAWFUL AND VALID ALL THE DISPOSITIONS MADE BY THE
DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO EXCEPT LOT # 943
DESPITE UTTER LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS FINDING
THAT THE SIGNATURE OF THE LATE FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y)
CANO IN EXH. "M-11-A" APPEARING IN THE DEED OF SALE
DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1957 (EXH. "1", FLORENTINO) WAS A
FORGERY.
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-35946 (EXHIBIT 2) COVERING LOT
943 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER CONCLUSIVELY EVIDENCES
THE LATTER'S OWNERSHIP THEREOF.11
Essentially, we are asked to resolve two issues: (1) whether the
partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties, which
include Lots 871 and 943, is valid; and (2) whether the validity of the
Deed of Sale and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot
943 registered in the name of the petitioners, can be a valid subject
matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of inheritance share.
On the first issue. It is the main contention of the petitioner that the
adjudication of Lots 943 and 871 in favor of private respondent, as her
inheritance share, has no legal basis since there is no will nor any
document that will support the transfer.
Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the
lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties
among his three children, excepting private respondent, through deeds
of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent
because she had become an American citizen and the Constitution
prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943 were
inheritance shares of the private respondent. These are factual
determinations of the Court of Appeals, based on documentary and
testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are bound by findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals.12 Was the partition done during the lifetime of Flavio
Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. It is basic in the law of succession that
a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not
prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this.13 The legitime of
compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article
1061:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original
petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the
other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed
without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the
indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their
respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the
partitioning inter vivos.
We now come to the second issue. Private respondent, in submitting her
petition for the delivery of inheritance share, was in effect questioning
the validity of the deed of sale covering Lot 943 in favor of petitioner and
consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latter's name.
Although the trial court, as an obiter, made a finding of validity of the
conveyance of Lot 943 in favor of petitioners, since according to it,
private respondent did not question the genuineness of the signature of
the deceased, nevertheless, when the case was elevated to the Court of
Appeals, the latter declared the sale to be fictitious because of finding of
marked differences in the signature of Flavio in the Deed of Sale vis-à-
vis signatures found in earlier documents. Could this be done? The
petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Sec. 48 of the
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, which provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It can not be altered, modified,
or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
We have reiterated this rule in the case of Halili vs. Court of Industrial
Relations,14 citing the earlier cases of Constantino vs. Espiritu15 and Co
vs. Court of Appeals.16 In Halili, we held that a certificate of title
accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the
exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence
of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or
diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession

Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. In Constantino,
the Court decided that the certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the
evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The
title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except
in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in
registered titles would be lost. And in Co, we stated that a Torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of title, i.e.,
whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose.
posited that it "may be considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner,
the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from
determining the validity of the donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated
property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of
the decedent's estate,[4] the probate court found the Deed of Donation
valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It
thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061
of the New Civil Code which reads:[5]

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant
petition for review. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
27, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12587, entitled Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan vs.
Spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda Enriquez-Zaragoza is VACATED
and SET ASIDE. The complaint for delivery of inheritance share in the
Regional Trial Court, for failure to implead indispensable parties, is also
DISMISSEDwithout prejudice to the institution of the proper
proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate
estate. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring that:

1. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the

Register of Deeds of Makati as part of the estate of
Angel N. Pascual;
[G.R. No. 189776 : December 15, 2010]
2. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, REPRESENTED BY HER DULY APPOINTED
subject to collation;
GUARDIANS, AGNES P. ARELLANO AND NONA P. ARELLANO,
PETITIONER, VS. FRANCISCO PASCUAL AND MIGUEL PASCUAL,
RESPONDENTS.BR 3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at
the mezzanine and the 3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay
St., Makati City form part of the estate of Angel N.
DECISION Pascual;

4. The following properties form part of the estate of

CARPIO MORALES, J.: Angel N. Pascual:

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by Tanay St., Rizal Village Makati TCT No.
her daughters[1] Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental income
respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.[2] thereon;

In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of
Letters of Administration," docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M- 271 square meters located at Tanay St.,
5034, filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT No. 119063;
Court (RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of
land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which
c. Agricultural land with an area of 3.8
was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the
hectares located at Puerta Galera Mindoro
validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as
covered by OCT No. P-2159;
an advance legitime" of petitioner.
d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation
Respondent's nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as
covered by the following Certificate
Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.[3]
Numbers: A0011036, A006144, A082906,
A006087, A065796, A11979, A049521,
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner
C86950, C63096, C55316, C54824,
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of
C120328, A011026, C12865, A10439,
Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event,

13 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239,
S40128, S58308, S69309;
e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp.
covered by the following Certificate
Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308,
S69309, A006708, 07680, A020786,
S18539, S14649;
f. ¼ share in Eduardo Pascual's shares in
Baguio Gold Mining Co.;
g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No.
2 014 12292 4 in the name of Nona
Arellano;
h. Property previously covered by TCT No.
119053 now covered by TCT No. 181889,
Register of Deeds of Makati City;
i. Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per
Order issued by Branch 64 of the Court on
November 17, 1995.
5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:
a. To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property
covered by TCT No. 181889;
b. To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel
N. Pascual-the real properties covered by
TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the
Register of Deeds of Makati City and the
property covered by OCT No. 2159, to be
divided equally between them up to the
extent that each of their share have been
equalized with the actual value of the
property in 5(a) at the time of donation,
the value of which shall be determined by
an independent appraiser to be
designated by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel
N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the
real properties are not sufficient to
equalize the shares, then Francisco's and
Miguel's shares may be satisfied from
either in cash property or shares of stocks,
at the rate of quotation. The remaining
properties shall be divided equally among
Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding
that
I the appellate court by Resolution[11] of October 7, 2009, the present
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL
ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF DECEASED
ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS ENTITLED TO
LEGITIMES.
xxxx
and
V
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL
JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.[6] (underscoring
supplied)
By Decision[7] of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioner's
appeal "partly meritorious." It sustained the probate court's ruling that
the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on
equality of division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter
vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be
considered a creditor of the decedent and we believe that under the
circumstances, the value of such immovable though not strictly in the
concept of advance legitime, should be deducted from her share in the
net hereditary estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible
error when it included the said property as forming part of the estate of
Angel N. Pascual.[8] (citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the
probate court, herein petitioner "was able to submit prima
facie evidence of shares of stocks owned by the [decedent] which have
not been included in the inventory submitted by the administrator."
Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of
properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as
the partition and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings
in accordance with the disquisitions herein.[9] (underscoring supplied)
Petitioner's Partial Motion for Reconsideration[10] having been denied by
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession

petition for review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring
appellate court its ruling compulsory heirs.[17]

I The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to
PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT THE petitioner, assuming that it was valid,[18] is deemed as donation made to
TIME OF HIS DEATH. a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate.[19] There
being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject
II to collation.

. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO On the second issue:

COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
The decedent's remaining estate should thus be
III partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein
petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED Code, viz:
BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
IV or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL, articles. (underscoring supplied)
JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL OR
INTESTATE HEIRS.[12] (underscoring supplied) Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring
Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to supplied)
petitioner is subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate
should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N.
On the first issue: Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.

The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch
mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made 135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct
by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what
the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever
title by the testator during his lifetime.[13] remains of it equally among the parties.

The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory SO ORDERED.
heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after
finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.[14]

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its
purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there
is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.[15]

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary,
or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings,
who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any
legitime - that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of
because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.[16] [G.R. No. L-46903. July 23, 1987.]

The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, BUHAY DE ROMA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda de
precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate Roma, Respondents.
children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary
compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the
primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary SYLLABUS
compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who
succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs;

15 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; DONATION; THE FACT OF ITS IRREVOCABLE
CHARACTER DOES NOT EXEMPT PROPERTY FROM COLLATION. — We
agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above
provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties.
As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as
"irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition
against collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not
necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required
under Article 1061.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; COLLATION; INTENTION TO EXEMPT PROPERTY
FROM COLLATION SHOULD BE EXPRESSED PLAINLY AND
UNEQUIVOCABLY. — Anything less than such express prohibition will not
suffice under the clear language of Article 1062. The suggestion that
there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were
imputable to the free portion of the decedent’s estate merits little
consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that
the disputed donation is officious. The sole issue is whether or not there
was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none. The intention to
exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as
an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such
a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the
rule, which is categorical enough.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; MAXIMUM PERIOD WITHIN
WHICH TO DECIDE A CASE, MERELY DIRECTORY. — There is no need to
dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the
decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-
month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973
Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz, the said provision was
merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the
corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid. It
is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been
reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also
impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the
need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging
their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now
being taken by the Court to meet that need.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma
and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and
administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was
appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate.
This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties
earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not
been included. 1 Disposicion."
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land
worth P10,297.50. 2 There is no dispute regarding their valuation; what
the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to
collation. The private respondent vigorously argues that it is,
conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing
Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the
decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or
right which he may have received from the decedent during the lifetime
of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each
heir, and in the account of the partition."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if
the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donee should
repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as
inofficious."cralaw virtua1aw library
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court, *
which held that the decedent, when she made the donation in favor of
Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not
impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be
accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of
Candelaria’s estate. 3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent
court ** holding that the deed of donation contained no express
prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it
ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent,
including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and
Rosalinda. 4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
"IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi
sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella
Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at
naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San Pablo sa
pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusangloob kong ibinibigay,
ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang
mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa
ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay
ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja
declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa’t
samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga
mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
"IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa
sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang
legitima ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga
lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagi ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may
layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre
5
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above
provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties.
As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as
16 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
"irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition
against collation. 6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not
necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required
under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion"
in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may
also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation
being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of
the document, that he would have included therein an express
prohibition to collate if that had been the donor’s intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the
clear language of Article 1062. The suggestion that there was an implied
prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free
portion of the decedent’s estate merits little consideration. Imputation
is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is
officious. The sole issue is whether or not there was an express
prohibition to collate, and we see none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and
unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article
1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the
exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the
petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent
court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1)
of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz, 7 the said
provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not
deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions
invalid.
It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been
reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also
impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the
need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging
their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now
being taken by the Court to meet that need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
[G.R. No. 119730. September 2, 1999.]
RODOLFO NOCEDA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA
ARBIZO DIRECTO, Respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeks to reverse the decision dated March 31, 1995 of the respondent
Court of Appeals 1 in CA GR CV No. 38126, affirming with modification
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, of Iba, Zambales, 2 in
an action by private respondent against petitioner for recovery of
possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of
donation.chanrobles law library : red
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent Court are as
follows: 3
"On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda,
and Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of
the late Celestino Arbizo, who died in 1956, extrajudicially settled a
parcel of land, Lot 1121, located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan,
Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,530 square meters.
Plaintiff Directo’s share was 11,426 square meters, defendant Noceda
got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters
went to Maria Arbizo (Exhibit G). On the same date, plaintiff Directo
donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, who is
her nephew being the son of her deceased sister, Carolina (Exhibit D).
However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement-partition
of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and
Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while
plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said
extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-
0032 over Lot 1121 in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said
parcel of land was said to have an area of only 29,845 square meters
(Exhibit C). Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house
on the land donated to him by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced
the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the
donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985,
defendant Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff
Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of
plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from
defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused. Hence,
plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of
possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation,
against defendant Noceda before the lower court. During the trial, the
lower court ordered that a relocation survey of Lot 1121 be conducted
by Engr. Edilberto Quejada of the Bureau of Lands. After the survey of
Lot 1121 in the presence of both parties, Engr. Edilberto Quejada
reported that the area of Lot 1121 stated in the extrajudicial settlement-
partition of August 17, 1981 was smaller than the actual area of Lot 1121
which is 127,298 square meters. Engr. Quejada subdivided Lot 1121,
excluding the portions occupied by third persons, known as Lot 8, the
salvage zone and the road lot, on the basis of the actual occupancy of
Lot 1121 by the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo and the extrajudicial
settlement-partition of August 17, 1981. The portion denominated as
Lot A, with an area of 12,957 square meters was the share of defendant
Noceda; Lot C, with the same area as that of Lot A, was the share of
plaintiff Directo, a portion of which was donated to defendant Noceda;
and Lot B, with an area of 38,872 square meters, went to Maria Arbizo
(Exhibit E)." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On November 6, 1991, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, of Iba,
Zambales rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows: 4
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby
renders judgment:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition dated August 19,
1981, valid;
17 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession

a motion/compliance where she suggested that Geodetic Engineer

(b) Declaring the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981, revoked; Edilberto V. Quejada of the Bureau of Lands, Iba, Zambales be
commissioned to undertake the survey 8 said motion was also sent to
(c) Ordering the defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated portion defendant’s counsel, Atty. Eufracio Pagunuran for Comment, 9 but Atty.
of Lot 2, Lot 1121 subject of the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981 to Pagunuran however failed to file his Comment within the given period.
the plaintiff or her heirs or assigns; Thus the trial court designated Engineer Quejada to undertake the
survey of Lot 1121. 10 Petitioner Noceda through counsel belatedly filed
(d) Ordering the defendant to remove the house built inside the donated his Comment without any opposition to the appointment of Engineer
portion at the defendant’s expense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00 Quejada but proposed that the latter be tasked to solely (a) re-survey,
Philippine Currency; determine and identify the metes and bounds of the lot covered by Tax
Declaration No. 16-0032; (b) to identify the areas occupied by the parties
(e) Ordering the defendant to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of therein; and (c) to conduct the re-survey with notice and in the presence
P5,000.00; and of the parties therein and their respective counsels. 11 The Comment
was not, however, acted upon by the trial court in view of its earlier
(f) To pay the cost."cralaw virtua1aw library Order directing Engineer Quejada to undertake the survey of the land.
12 Engr. Quejada conducted the survey with the conformity and in the
Rodolfo Nocedo appealed to the respondent Court which affirmed the presence of both parties, taking into consideration the extrajudicial
trial court as follows: 5 partition dated August 17, 1981, deed of donation dated June 1, 1981
executed by plaintiff Aurora Directo in favor of defendant Rodolfo
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ORDERING defendant Noceda and the actual area occupied by the parties, 13 as well as the
Rodolfo Noceda to VACATE the portion known as Lot "C" of Lot 1121 per sketch plan 14 and the technical description of Lot 1121 taken from the
Exhibit E, which was allotted to plaintiff Aurora Arbizo Directo. Except Records Section of the Bureau of Lands, Manila. 15 The report and the
for this modification, the Decision, dated November 6, 1991, of the RTC- survey plan submitted by Engr. Quejada were approved by the Trial
Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, is hereby Court in an Order dated December 7, 1987. 16 These circumstances
AFFIRMED in all other respects. Costs against defendant Rodolfo show that the lower court ordered the re-survey of the lot to determine
Noceda."cralaw virtua1aw library the actual area of Lot 1121 and such survey was done with the
conformity and in the presence of both parties. The actual land area
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with the based on the survey plan which was conducted in the presence of both
following assignment of errors: 6 parties, showed a much bigger area than the area declared in the tax
declaration but such differences are not uncommon as early tax
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT declarations are, more often than not, based on approximation or
PROPERTY IDENTIFIED AS LOT 1121 CONTAINS AN AREA IN EXCESS OF estimation rather than on computation. 17 We hold that the respondent
THAT STATED IN ITS TAX DECLARATION. court did not err in sustaining the trial court’s findings that the actual
area of Lot 1121 is 127,289 square meters.cralawnad
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOT 1121 SHOULD BE
PARTITIONED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT Petitioner also contends that said judicial determination improperly
DATED 17 AUGUST 1981. encroaches on the rights and claims of third persons who were never
impleaded below; that the subject lot was also declared in the name of
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADJUDICATING AND ALLOTTING LOT one Cecilia Obispo and a Free Patent over the said lot was also issued in
"C" AS APPEARING IN THE SURVEY PLAN PREPARED BY GEODETIC her name and that there are several residential houses constructed and
ENGINEER EDILBERTO QUEJADA TO THE RESPONDENT. existing on Lot 8 of lot 1121, thus these possessors/occupants of Lot 8
should be joined as defendants for their non-inclusion would be fatal to
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER respondent’s cause of action.
USURPED AN AREA ADJUDICATED TO THE RESPONDENT.
We find no merit in this argument. The respondent Court correctly
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVOKING THE DEED OF DONATION ratiocinated on this issue as follows: 18
DATED 1 JUNE 1981.
"The fact that Cecilia Obispo has tax declarations in her name over Lot
The first issue raised refers to the actual area of the subject lot known as 1121 and several persons occupied a portion thereof did not make them
Lot 1121, which was registered under Tax Declaration No. 16-0032 under indispensable parties in the present case. Defendant Noceda merely
the name of the late Celestino Arbizo. Petitioner claims that Tax presented the tax declarations in the name of Cecilia Obispo without the
Declaration No. 16-0032 contains only an area of 29,845 sq. meter; thus alleged free patent in her name. Moreover, no evidence was presented
the respondent Court exceeded its judicial authority when it sustained showing that Cecilia Obispo possessed or claimed possession of Lot
the lower court’s findings that the subject property actually contains an 1121. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are
area of 127,289 square meters. not conclusive evidence of ownership of property (Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 224 SCRA 285).
We find the argument unmeritorious. The records disclose that the trial
court in an Order dated June 8, 1987 gave both parties to this case the It was not necessary that the occupants of a portion of Lot 1121,
chance to have the subject property re-surveyed by a licensed surveyor designated as Lot 8, be impleaded in the present case. Lot 8, though part
to determine the actual area of Lot 1121. 7 Plaintiff Aurora Directo filed of Lot 1121, was excluded by Engr. Quejada in determining the

18 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
respective portions of Lot 1121 occupied by plaintiff Directo, defendant
Noceda and Maria Arbizo pursuant to the extrajudicial settlement which
they executed on August 17, 1981. The result of the present suit shall
not in any way affect the occupants of Lot 8, since the issues involved in
the present case are the usurpation by defendant Noceda of the land
adjudicated to plaintiff Directo and the propriety of the cancellation of
the deed of donation in favor of defendant Noceda due to his ingratitude
to plaintiff Directo."cralaw virtua1aw library
Notably, defendant’s counsel requested for the appearance of Cecilia
Obispo and despite notice to her to appear in court and bring with her
the alleged free patent in her name, 19 she failed to appear and even
failed to intervene to protect whatever interest and right she has over
the subject lot. As to the other possessors of residential houses in Lot 8
of Lot 1121, they are not considered as indispensable parties to this case.
A party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy
or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other
parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does
complete justice to the parties in court. 20 Private respondent is not
claiming the entire area of Lot 1121 but only a portion thereof which was
adjudicated to her based on the August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement
and which was denominated in the survey plan as Lot C of Lot 1121; thus
there was no need to implead the occupants of Lot 8.
Petitioner further claims that the subject property could not be
partitioned based on the extrajudicial settlement-partition dated August
17, 1981, since the distributive share of the heirs of the late Celestino
Arbizo and the area of Lot 1121 stated therein were different from the
extrajudicial settlement executed on June 1, 1981; that the
discrepancies between the two deeds of partition with respect to the
area of Lot 1121 and the respective share of the parties therein indicated
that they never intended that any of the deeds to be the final
determination of the portions of Lot 1121 allotted to them; that the
extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17, 1981 could not
effectively subdivide Lot 1121 because it partitioned only 29,845 square
meters, and not its actual area of 127,298 square meters.
We see no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent Court
as follows: 21
The discrepancies between the extrajudicial settlements executed by
plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, 1981
and August 17, 1981 only meant that the latter was intended to
supersede the former. The signature of defendant Noceda in the
extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 would show his conformity
to the new apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of the late
Celestino Arbizo. The fact that defendant Noceda occupied the portion
allotted to him in the extrajudicial settlement, as well as the donated
portion of the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes his knowledge of
the extent of boundaries of the portion of Lot 1121 allotted to him.
Moreover, the statement in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17,
1981 with respect to the area of Lot 1121, which was 29,845 square
meters, is not conclusive because it was found out, after the relocation
survey was conducted on Lot 1121, that the parties therein occupied an
area larger than what they were supposed to possess per the
extrajudicial settlement- partition of August 17, 1981.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
Although in the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981 the heirs
of Celestino Arbizo partitioned only a 29,845 square meter lot to
conform with the area declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the
heirs were each actually occupying a bigger portion the total area of
which exceeded 29,845 square meters. This was confirmed by Geodetic
Engineer Quejada in his report submitted to the trial court where he
stated among other things: 22
7. that upon computation of actual survey, it is informed (sic) that the
area dated (sic) as per extrajudicial settlement-partition in the name of
Celestino Arbizo was smaller than the computed lots of their actual
occupancy as per survey on the ground;
8. The Lot A, Lot B, and Lot C as appearing on prepared plan for ready
reference was subdivided, base (sic) on stated sharing as per EXTRA
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT-PARTITION base (sic) on actual occupancy.
The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the actual
areas being occupied by the heirs taking into account the percentage
proportion adjudicated to each heir on the basis of their August 17, 1981
extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioner further alleges that the said partition tries to vest in favor of a
third person, Maria Arbizo, a right over the said property
notwithstanding the absence of evidence establishing that she is an heir
of the late Celestino Arbizo since Maria Arbizo was never impleaded as
a party in this case and her interest over Lot 1121 was not established.
Such contention deserves scant consideration. We find no compelling
basis to disturb the finding of the trial court on this factual issue, as
follows: 23
In effect, the defendant denies the allegation of the plaintiff that Maria
Arbizo was the third wife of Celestino Arbizo and Agripina is her half
sister with a common father. On this point, the Court believes the
version of the plaintiff. The Court observes that in the "Extra-Judicial
Settlement-Partition" (Exhibit "C"), Maria Arbizo is named one of the co-
heirs of the defendant, being the widow of his grandfather, Celestino
Arbizo. The names of Anacleto and Agripina do not also appear in the
Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition because according to the plaintiff,
they had sold their shares to Maria Arbizo. And the defendant is one of
the signatories to the said Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement-Partition
acknowledged before Notary Public Artemio Maranon. Under the
circumstances, the Court is convinced that the defendant knew that
Maria Arbizo was the widow of Celestino Arbizo and he knew of the sale
of the share of Anacleto Arbizo his share, as well as that of Agripina.
When the defendant signed the Extra-Judicial Settlement, he was
already an adult since when he testified in 1989, he gave his age as 50
years old. So that in 1981, he was already 41 years old. If he did not know
all of these, the defendant would have not agreed to the sharing and
signed this document and acknowledged it before the Notary Public. And
who could have a better knowledge of the relationship of Agripina and
Maria Arbizo to Celestino Arbizo than the latter’s daughter? Besides, at
the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition by
the plaintiff and defendant, they were still in good terms. There was no
reason for the plaintiff to favor Maria Arbizo and Agripina Arbizo over
the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant had failed to support his
allegation that when his grandfather died he had no wife and
child.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
We likewise find unmeritorious petitioner’s claim that there exist no
factual and legal basis for the adjudication of Lot C of Lot 1121 to private
19 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
respondent Aurora Directo. It bears stress that the relocation survey
plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Quejada was based on the
extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981, and the actual
possession by the parties and the technical description of Lot 1121. It
was established by the survey plan that based on the actual possession
of the parties, and the extrajudicial settlement among the heirs the
portion denominated as Lot C of Lot 1121 of the survey plan was being
occupied by private respondent Aurora Directo and it was also shown
that it is in Lot C where the 625 square meter area donated by private
respondent Directo to petitioner is located. There is no obstacle to
adjudicate Lot C to private respondent as her rightful share allotted to
her in the extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioner argues that he did not usurp the property of respondent
Directo since, to date, the metes and bounds of the parcel of land left by
their predecessor in interest, Celestino Arbizo, are still undetermined
since no final determination as to the exact areas properly pertaining to
the parties herein; hence they are still considered as co-owners thereof.
We do not agree.
In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate
succession. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs subject
to the payment of debts of the deceased. 24 Partition, in general, is the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong 25 The purpose of partition is to put an
end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of
each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and
giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or
interference from the other. 26 And one way of effecting a partition of
the decedent’s estate is by the heirs themselves extrajudicially. The heirs
of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A. Directo
(private respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner) entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate on August 17, 1981 and agreed to
adjudicate among themselves the property left by their predecessor-in-
interest in the following manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
To Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion containing
an area of 5,989 sq. meters;
To Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5) portion;
and . . . To Aurora Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth (1/5) portion. 27
In the survey plan submitted by Engineer Quejada, the portions
indicated by red lines and numbered alphabetically were based on the
percentage proportion in the extrajudicial settlement and the actual
occupancy of each heir which resulted to these divisions as follows: 28
Lot A; the area is 2,957 sq.m. — goes to Rodolfo A. Noceda (1/5)
Lot B; 38,872 sq.m. Maria Arbizo (3/5)chanrobles law library : red
Lot C 12,957 sq.m. Aurora Arbizo (1/5)
Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated in
the survey plan. There is no co-ownership where portion owned is
concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically
described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the same
certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or
identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion
over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. 29 A
partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of
the property adjudicated to him. 30
We also find unmeritorious petitioner’s argument that since there was
no effective and real partition of the subject lot there exists no basis for
the charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis for finding
ingratitude against him. It was established that petitioner Noceda
occupied not only the portion donated to him by private respondent
Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which
belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner’s act of occupying
the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latter’s
knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense
against the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude
of a donee against the donor. 31
The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the
offense be proved in the action for revocation. 32
Finally, petitioner contends that granting revocation is proper, the right
to enforce the same had already prescribed since as admitted by private
respondent, petitioner usurped her property in the first week of
September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was filed on
September 16, 1986, thus more than one (1) year had passed from the
alleged usurpation by petitioner of private respondent’s share in Lot
1121. We are not persuaded. The respondent Court rejected such
argument in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: "The action granted to the
donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This
action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor
had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the
action." As expressly stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his
donation within one year from the time he had knowledge of the
ingratitude of the donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for
the donor to institute the said action within the same period. The
concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by defendant
Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant Noceda failed to
do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence
of the usurpation of the property of plaintiff Directo in the first week of
September, 1985, and not from the time the latter had the knowledge
of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to prove that at
the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was
possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for revocation of her
donation." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1)
year to be counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the
fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these
two conditions in order that the one (1) year period for bringing the
action be considered to have already prescribed. No competent proof
was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil Cases, the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence. 33 He who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. 34
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial
20 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
evidence on record are final and conclusive on the parties and carry even
more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of
the trial court; 35 for it is not the function of this Court to re-examine all
over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties
unless the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by
the evidence on record or the judgment is based on the
misapprehension of facts. 36 The jurisdiction of this court is thus limited
to reviewing errors of law unless there is a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are
so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. 37
We find no such showing in this case.
We find that both the trial court and the respondent Court had carefully
considered the questions of fact raised below and the respondent
Court‘s conclusions are based on the evidence on record. No cogent
reason exists for disturbing such findings. 38 We also note that
petitioner in this petition merely rehashed the same issues and
arguments raised in the respondent Court in whose decision we find no
reversible error. Clearly, petitioner failed to present any substantial
argument to justify a reversal of the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. Costs
against Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 109963. October 13, 1999.]
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES: RICARDO TEVES, ARCADIA TEVES,TOMAS
ZAMORA, FELICIA TEVES, HELEN TEVES, ALFREDO OSMEÑA, ROBERTO
TEVES, JOAQUIN TEVES, III, PETER TEVES, MILDRED TEVES, WILSON
MABILOG, LEONILO PATIGAYON, EDUARDO PATIGAYON, ALEXANDER
PATIGAYON, ALDRIN PATIGAYON, NOEL PATIGAYON, VICTOR
PATIGAYON, MA. TEVES PATERNO OCHOTORENA, EXEQUILA TEVES,
EMILIO JO, EMILIANA TEVES, MILAGROS TEVES, EDSEL PINILI, VICENTE
TEVES, EMILIANA ISO, ALBERTO TEVES, ERLINDA TEVES, DIOSDADO
TEVES, VICTORIA TEVES AND VIVENCIO NARCISO, Petitioners, v.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ASUNCION IT-IT NAMELY: ELISA IT-IT,
SUSANA IT-IT, NORBERTO IT-IT, ISA-AC IT-IT, JR., JAIME IT-IT, FELICITAS
IT-IT, TERESITA IT-IT, ANTONIO NODADO, CORAZON IT-IT, JIMMY LERO,
DANILO IT-IT, EDITA GAMORA, PACITA VAILOCES, CRIS VAILOCES,
CECILIA CIMAFRANCA and CECILIA FLOR
CIMAFRANCA, Respondents.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals which was promulgated on August 18, 1992
affirming the July 11, 1991 decision. 2 of Branch 38 of the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Oriental in favor of defendants-appellees.
The facts, as culled from the pleadings of the parties herein and the
decision of the lower courts, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children, namely
Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano,
Arcadia and Maria. Andres, however, predeceased both his parents and
died without issue. After Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died,
intestate and without debts, in 1943 and 1953, respectively, their
children executed extrajudicial settlements purporting to adjudicate
unto themselves the ownership over two parcels of land belonging to
their deceased parents and to alienate their shares thereto in favor of
their sister Asuncion Teves. The validity of these settlements executed
pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the primary issue
in the present case.
On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo and Arcadia Teves filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental for the
partition and reconveyance of two parcels of land located in Dumaguete,
designated as Lots 769-A and 6409, against the heirs of Asuncion Teves.
The complaint was subsequently amended to include Maria Teves and
the heirs of Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, and Gorgonio Teves as plaintiffs and
the spouses Lucresio Baylosis and Pacita Nocete, and Cecilia Cimafranca-
Gamos and Cecilia Flor Cimafranca as defendants. 3 Plaintiffs-appellants
alleged that defendants-appellees, without any justifiable reason,
refused to partition the said parcels of land and to convey to plaintiffs
their rightful shares. 4
Lot 769, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4682-A, 5 is
registered in the names of Urbana Cimafranca, one-fourth (1/4) share,
Marcelina Cimafranca, the wife of Joaquin Teves, one-fourth (1/4) share,
Domingo Villahermosa, one-eight (1/8) share, Antero Villahermosa, one-
eight (1/8) share, Cecilia Cimafranca, one-eight (1/8) share and Julio
Cimafranca, one-eight (1/8) share. The present controversy involves only
Marcelina Cimafranca’s one-fourth (1/4) share in the land, designated as
Lot 769-A.
On June 13, 1956, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Asuncion, Gorgonio and
Arcadia Teves executed a document entitled "Settlement of Estate and
Sale," 6 adjudicating unto themselves, in equal shares, Lot 769-A and
conveying their shares, interests and participations over the same in
favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of P425.00. A similar deed
denominated "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" 7 was signed by Maria
Teves on April 21, 1959. Under such deed, Maria conveys her own share
over Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of
P80.00. The two settlements were denounced by the plaintiffs as
spurious. The trial court summarized the claims of the plaintiffs, viz —
. . . Maria Teves Ochotorena herself, denied having executed this
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale over her share or interest in Lot 769
claiming that her signature in said document is a forgery. She disowns
her signature declaring that as a married woman she always signs a
document in her husband’s family name. Further, she declared that on
the date she purportedly signed said document in Dumaguete City
before the notary public, she was in her home in Katipunan, Zamboanga
del Norte.
On Exhibit "G" which is likewise offered as Exhibit "3" for the defendants,
plaintiffs hold that said document is spurious claiming that the
signatures of Pedro Teves, Felicia Teves and Gorgonio Teves are all
forgeries. To support this allegation, Helen T. Osmena, daughter of
Felicia Teves and Erlinda Teves, daughter of Gorgonio Teves were
21 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
presented as witnesses. Being allegedly familiar with the style and
character of the handwriting of their parents these witnesses declared
unequivocally that the signatures of their parents appearing on the
document are forgeries.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In sum, plaintiffs argue that these fraudulent documents which
defendants rely in claiming ownership to the disputed properties are all
nullities and have no force in law and could not be used as basis for any
legal title. Consequently, in their view, they are entitled to the reliefs
demanded particularly, to their respective shares of the disputed
properties. 8 x
The other property in dispute is Lot 6409 which was originally covered
by OCT No. 9091 9 and was registered in the name of Joaquin Teves and
his two sisters, Matea and Candida Teves. However, Matea and Candida
died without issue, causing the entire property to pass to Joaquin Teves.
On December 14, 1971, Lot 6409 was adjudicated and divided in equal
shares in a "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale" 10 executed by
Joaquin Teves’ children — Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia
and Maria Teves. In the same deed, the shares of these same heirs in Lot
6409 were sold to Asuncion Teves for P100.00. Asuncion Teves took
possession of the land and acquired title. 11 over the same on March 22,
1972. After her death in 1981, her children, defendants-appellees It-it
herein, extrajudicially settled Asuncion Teves’ property, adjudicating
unto themselves Lot 6409. 12 On July 20, 1983 a new transfer certificate
of title. 13 was issued in the names of Asuncion Teves’ children, namely
Elisa, Susana, Norberto, Isaac, Jaime, Felicitas, Teresita, Corazon, and
Danilo, all surnamed It-it. On July 2, 1984, the It-its sold Lot 6409 to
defendants-appellees Lucrecio Baylosis, Sr. and Pacita Nocete-Baylosis
for P20,000.00. 14 and a transfer certificate of title. 15 was issued in the
name of the Baylosis couple.
Plaintiffs-appellants claim that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement &
Sale covering Lot 6409 is also spurious. Their arguments were discussed
in the trial court’s decision as follows — Settlement and Sale executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and
Presented as Exhibit "D" and "1" for both the plaintiffs and defendants
respectively, is a document denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement
and Sale" executed on December 4, 1971 by and among the heirs of
Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca. This document which gave
birth to TCT No. 5761 over Lot 6409 registered in the name of Asuncion
Teves It-it is questioned by the plaintiffs as spurious for the following
reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Erasure of the word "quitclaim" is superimposed with the word "sale"
in handwriting.
2. The consideration of "One peso" stated in the document is
intercalated with the word "hundred" in handwriting.
3. The signature of Maria Teves Ochotorena, Pedro Teves and Felicia
Teves are forgeries.
4. The thumbmark imposed on the name of Gorgonio Teves does not
actually belong to Gorgonio Teves who was an educated man and skilled
in writing according to his daughter.
Aside from these defects which would make said document null and
void, Arcadia Teves who is one of the living sisters of the mother of the
principal defendants although confirming the authenticity of her
signature averred that in reality no consideration was ever given to her
and that her impression of the said document was that she was only
giving her consent to sell her share of the land.
Plaintiffs likewise contend that as regards the share of Ricardo Teves,
son of Crescenciano Teves who predeceased Joaquin and Marcelina, it
was not at all affected in that extrajudicial settlement and sale since
neither Crescenciano Teves nor his son Ricardo Teves participated in its
execution.
x x
Likewise, plaintiffs offered TCT No. 5761 for Lot 6409 registered in the
name of Asuncion Teves It-it as Exhibit "B" as proof that said property
was later titled in trust for all the heirs of Joaquin Teves and which was
used later as basis in effecting a deed of sale in favor of co-defendant
Lucresio Baylosis. In this light, the plaintiffs argue that the sale of said
property is a nullity for it was not only attended with bad faith on the
part of both the vendor and the vendee but primarily the vendor had no
right at all to part with said property which is legally owned by others.
16
In answer to plaintiffs-appellants’ charges of fraud, defendants-
appellees maintained that the assailed documents were executed with
all the formalities required by law and are therefore binding and legally
effective as bases for acquiring ownership or legal title over the lots in
question. Furthermore, it is contended that plaintiffs-appellants have
slept on their rights and should now be deemed to have abandoned such
rights. 17
The trial court ruled in favor of defendants-appellees and rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiffs-
appellants. As regards Lot 6409, the court declared that the Extrajudicial
Marcelina Cimafranca was duly executed with all the formalities
required by law, thus, validly conveying Lot 6409 in favor of Asuncion
Teves. Moreover, it stated that, even granting the truth of the imputed
infirmities in the deed, the right of plaintiffs-appellants to bring an action
for partition and reconveyance was already barred by prescription. An
action for the annulment of a partition must be brought within four
years from the discovery of the fraud, while an action for the
reconveyance of land based upon an implied or constructive trust
prescribes after ten years from the registration of the deed or from the
issuance of the title. The complaint in this case was filed on May 9, 1984,
exactly 12 years, 1 month and 17 days after the issuance of the transfer
certificate of title in the name of Asuncion Teves on March 22, 1972.
Thus, ownership over Lot 6409 rightfully belonged to defendants-
appellees It-it.
Moreover, the trial court held that the extrajudicial settlements over
both Lots 6409 and 769, having been prepared and acknowledged
before a notary public, are public documents, vested with public
interest, the sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless
overwhelmed by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence presented
by the plaintiffs to support their charges of forgery was considered by
the court insufficient to rebut the legal presumption of validity accorded
to such documents. 18
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision affirming the
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
validity of the extrajudicial statements, with a slight modification. It
disposed of the case, thus — The extrajudicial settlement of a decedent’s estate is authorized by
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the modification in that herein defendant-appellees are
hereby ORDERED to partition Lot 769-A and deliver to plaintiff-appellant
Ricardo Teves one-eight (sic) (1/8) portion thereof corresponding to the
share of his deceased father Cresenciano Teves. No costs.
The appellate court said that plaintiffs-appellants’ biased and interested
testimonial evidence consisting of mere denials of their signatures in the
disputed instruments is insufficient to prove the alleged forgery and to
overcome the evidentiary force of the notarial documents. It also ruled
that the plaintiffs-appellants’ claim over Lot 6409 was barred by
prescription after the lapse of ten years from the issuance of title in favor
of Asuncion Teves, while their claim over Lot 769-A is barred by laches
since more than 25 years has intervened between the sale to Asuncion
Teves and the filing of the present case in 1984.
The appellate court noted that the conveyance of Lot 769-A in favor of
Asuncion Teves did not affect the share of Cresenciano Teves as he was
not a signatory to the settlements. It also found that Ricardo Teves,
Cresenciano’s heir, is in possession of a portion of Lot 769-A and that
defendants-appellees do no not claim ownership over such portion.
Thus, the defendants-appellees It-it were ordered to partition and
convey to Ricardo Teves his one-eight share over Lot 769-A.
As regards the extrajudicial settlement involving Lot 6409, although it
was found by the appellate court that Cresenciano Teves was also not a
signatory thereto, it held that it could not order the reconveyance of the
latter’s share in such land in favor of his heir Ricardo Teves because
Cresenciano had predeceased Joaqin Teves. Moreover, Ricardo Teves,
by a deed simply denominated as "Agreement" executed on September
13, 1955 wherein he was represented by his mother, authorized the
heirs of Joaquin Teves to sell his share in Lot 6409. 19
Plaintiffs-appellants assailed the appellate court’s decision upon the
following grounds — convincing evidence necessary to overcome the positive value of the
I. IN CONSIDERING RICARDO TEVES AS BOUND BY THE SIGNATURE OF
HIS MOTHER, INSPITE OF DEATH OF CRESENCIANO TEVES IN 1944; AND
UNDER THE OLD CIVIL CODE THE SPOUSE CANNOT INHERIT EXCEPT THE
USUFRUCT;
II. IN UPHOLDING SWEEPINGLY THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF
NOTARIZED DEED, DESPITE CLEAR, CONVINCING, SUBSTANTIAL AND
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT MARIA OCHOTORENA WAS IN MINDANAO;
THE NOTARY PUBLIC DID NOT KNOW MARIA OCHOTORENA AND THE
SIGNATURES OF THE OTHER HEIRS IN THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENT ARE
BELIED BY COMPARISON WITH THE GENUINE SIGNATURE IN EXH. "E" ;
III. IN VALIDATING THE ONE PESO CONSIDERATION, INSPITE OF NO
OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, THE SUPERIMPOSED P100 WAS
UNILATERALLY INSERTED, SHOWING FICTITIOUS AND SIMULATED
CONSIDERATION; AND
IV. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT START FROM A VOID CONTRACT. 20
We affirm that the extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of
Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding.
section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which provides in pertinent
part that —
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
...
x x x
Thus, for a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the
following conditions must concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the
decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3)
the heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented
by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was
made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the
Register of Deeds. 21
We uphold, finding no cogent reason to reverse, the trial and appellate
courts’ factual finding that the evidence presented by plaintiffs-
appellants is insufficient to overcome the evidentiary value of the
extrajudicial settlements. The deeds are public documents and it has
been held by this Court that a public document executed with all the
legal formalities is entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals
contained therein. 22 In order to overthrow a certificate of a notary
public to the effect that the grantor executed a certain document and
acknowledged the fact of its execution before him, mere preponderance
of evidence will not suffice. Rather, the evidence must be so clear, strong
and convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute as to the falsity of
the certificate. When the evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be
upheld. 23 The appellate court’s ruling that the evidence presented by
plaintiffs-appellants does not constitute the clear, strong, and
extrajudicial settlements executed by the parties, all of which are public
documents, being essentially a finding of fact, is entitled to great respect
by the appellate court and should not be disturbed on appeal. 24
It is noted that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot
6409 purports to divide Joaquin Teves’ estate among only six of his heirs,
namely Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria Teves.
25 It does not mention nor bear the signatures of either Pedro or
Cresenciano Teves although they are both intestate heirs of Joaquin
Teves and as such, are entitled to a proportionate share of the
decedent’s estate. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, the fact
that Cresenciano predeceased Joaquin Teves does not mean that he or,
more accurately, his heirs, lose the right to share in the partition of the
property for this is a proper case for representation, wherein the
representative is raised to the place and degree of the person
represented and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he
were living. 26
However, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the settlement, the
action which Pedro and Cresenciano might have brought for the
reconveyance of their shares in the property has already prescribed. An
action for reconveyance based upon an implied trust pursuant to article
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
1456 of the Civil Code prescribes in ten years from the registration of the
deed or from the issuance of the title. 27 Asuncion Teves acquired title
over Lot 6409 in 1972, but the present case was only filed by plaintiffs-
appellants in 1984, which is more than 10 years from the issuance of
title. 28
The division of Lot 769-A, on the other hand, was embodied in two
deeds. The first extrajudicial settlement was entered into by Teotimo,
Felicia, Pedro, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Asuncion Teves in 1956 29 , while
the second deed was executed in 1959 by Maria Teves. 30 Cresenciano
was not a signatory to either settlement. However, in contrast to the
extrajudicial settlement covering Lot 6409, the two extrajudicial
settlements involving Lot 769-A do not purport to exclude Cresenciano
from his participation in Lot 769-A or to cede his share therein in favor
of Asuncion. The settlement clearly adjudicated the property in equal
shares in favor of the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Moreover, the
deeds were intended to convey to Asuncion Teves only the shares of
those heirs who affixed their signatures in the two documents. The
pertinent portions of the extrajudicial settlement executed in 1956, of
which substantively identical provisions are included in the 1959 deed,
provide —
x x x agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from
5. That by virtue of the right of succession the eight heirs above
mentioned inherit and adjudicate unto themselves in equal shares Lot
No. 769-A and our title thereto is evidenced by the O.C. of Title No. 4682-
A of the Land Records of Negros Oriental.
THAT FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of FOUR HUNDRED
TWENTY-FIVE (P425.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency which we have
received from ASUNCION TEVES; WE, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Gorgonio
and Arcadia, all surnamed Teves, do hereby sell, transfer and convey
unto Asuncion Teves, married to Isaac Itit, Filipino, of legal age and
resident of and with postal address in the City of Dumaguete, all our
shares, interests and participations over Lot 769-A of the subdivision
plan, Psd, being a portion of Lot No. 769 of the Cadastral Survey of
Dumaguete, her heirs, successors and assigns, together with all the
improvements thereon.
x x x defensible cause of action, they are barred from pursuing the same by
It has even been admitted by both parties that Ricardo Teves is in
possession of an undetermined portion of Lot 769-A and defendants-
appellees It-it do not claim ownership over his share in the land. 31 Thus,
contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, there is no basis for an action for
reconveyance of Ricardo Teves’ share since, in the first place, there has
been no conveyance. Ricardo Teves is entitled to the ownership and
possession of one-eight of Lot 769-A.
Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to demand partition of Lot 769-
A because the two extrajudicial settlements have already effectively
partitioned such property. Every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. 32 The extrajudicial settlements
executed in 1956 and 1959 adjudicated Lot 769-A in equal shares unto
the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Such a partition, which was
legally made, confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him. 33 Although Cresenciano, Ricardo’s
predecessor-in-interest, was not a signatory to the extrajudicial
settlements, the partition of Lot 769-A among the heirs was made in
accordance with their intestate shares under the law. 34
With regards to the requisite of registration of extrajudicial settlements,
it is noted that the extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were
never registered. However, in the case of Vda. de Reyes v. CA, 35 the
Court, interpreting section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, upheld the
validity of an oral partition of the decedent’s estate and declared that
the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its
intrinsic validity. It was held in this case that —
[t]he requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same
time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It
follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no
creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights
are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
those provided by law.
Thus, despite its non-registration, the extrajudicial settlements involving
Lot 769-A are legally effective and binding among the heirs of Marcelina
Cimafranca since their mother had no creditors at the time of her death.
Except for the portion of Lot 769-A occupied by Ricardo Teves, both
parcels of land have been and continue to be in the possession of
Asuncion Teves and her successors-in-interest. 36 Despite this, no
explanation was offered by plaintiffs-appellants as to why they instituted
the present action questioning the extrajudicial settlements only in
1984, which is more than 25 years after the assailed conveyance of Lot
769-A and more than 10 years after the issuance of a transfer certificate
of title over Lot 6409, both in favor of Asuncion Teves. Such tardiness
indubitably constitutes laches, which is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. 37 Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs-appellants had a
reason of their long and inexcusable inaction.
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched
doctrine that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of a
contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned out
to be a foolish or unwise investment. 38 Therefore, although plaintiffs-
appellants may regret having alienated their hereditary shares in favor
of their sister Asuncion, they must now be considered bound by their
own contractual acts.
WHEREFORE, the August 18, 1992 decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
[G.R. No. 135602. April 28, 2000.]
HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND PURIFICACION R.
SERASPI, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND SIMEON
RECASA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals,
dated May 15, 1998, reversing the decision of Branch 1 of the Regional
Trial Court, Kalibo, Aklan and dismissing, on the ground of prescription,
the complaint filed by petitioners for the recovery of possession and
ownership of two parcels of land in Banga, Aklan.
The facts are as follows:chanrobles.com : chanrobles.com.ph
Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land described as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
PARCEL I: A parcel of cocal land located at Barangay Lapnag, Banga,
Aklan, with an area of 770 square meters, more or less; bounded North
by Lazaro Navarra, now Flocerfina Ibit; South by Celsa Retis; East by
Banga-Libacao Provincial Road; and West by Aklan River, which parcel of
land declared in the name of Marcelino Recasa under Tax Declaration
No. 3721, Series of 1984, with an assessed value of P2,440.00;
PARCEL II: A parcel of cocal land with an area of 3,648 square meters,
more or less, located in Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan; bounded North
by Concepcion Navarra; South by Diosdado Navarra; East by Gabriel
Reloj; and West by National Road; covered by Tax Declaration No. 11079
in the name of Purificacion Seraspi, Series of 1984, and having an
assessed value of P1,650.00.
During his lifetime, Marcelino contracted three (3) marriages. At the
time of his death in 1943, he had fifteen (15) children from his three
marriages. In 1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into three parts
by his heirs, each part corresponding to the share of the heirs in each
marriage.
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs of the first
marriage, sold the share of the heirs in the estate to Dominador Recasa,
an heir of the second marriage. On June 15, 1950, Dominador,
representing the heirs of the second marriage, in turn sold the share of
the heirs to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are the present
petitioners. Included in this sale was the property sold by Patronicio to
Dominador.
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc.
(KRBI) on the security of the lands in question to finance improvements
on the lands. However, they failed to pay the loan for which reason the
mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were sold to KRBI as the highest
bidder. Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to Manuel Rata,
brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. It appears that Rata, as owner of the
property, allowed Quirico Seraspi to administer the property.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelino’s child by his
third wife, taking advantage of the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who had
been paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question
and took possession thereof.
In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and
afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery of
possession of the lands.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that they had
acquired the property through a sale and acquisitive prescription.
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that
the action of the Seraspis was barred by the statute of limitations.
Hence, this petition filed by Quirico Seraspi who, in the meantime, had
passed away and was thus substituted by his heirs.
Two issues are presented: (1) whether petitioners’ action is barred by
extinctive prescription; and (2) whether private respondent Simeon
Recasa acquired ownership of the properties in question through
acquisitive prescription.
We rule, for Petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, while ruling that petitioners were able to establish
the identity of the property as well as the credibility of their title ¾ the
elements required to prove one’s claim for recovery of property 2 ¾
nonetheless held that the action was barred by prescription. Citing
Arradaza v. Court of Appeals, 3 it held that an action for recovery of title
or possession of real property or an interest therein can only be brought
within ten (10) years after the cause of action has accrued. Since the
action for recovery of possession and ownership was filed by petitioners
only on April 12, 1987, i.e., thirteen (13) years after their predecessor-
in-interest had been allegedly deprived of the possession of the property
by private respondent, it was held that the action had prescribed.
Arradaza involves acquisitive, not extinctive, prescription. What is more,
the facts in that case arose before the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, what was applied was §41 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which provides that title by prescription is acquired after ten (10) years,
in whatever manner possession may have been commenced or
continued, and regardless of good faith or with just title. On the other
hand, what is involved here is extinctive prescription, and the applicable
law is Art. 1141 of the Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the
acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.
The question, therefore, is whether private respondent has acquired the
ownership of the two lands by prescription. On this point, the Civil Code
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ARTICLE 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights
may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good
faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
25 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
ARTICLE 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property
are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
ARTICLE 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith.chanrobles virtua| |aw
|ibrary
Thus, acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary, depending on whether the property is
possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. 4
Private respondent contends that he acquired the ownership of the
questioned property by ordinary prescription through adverse
possession for ten (10) years.
The contention has no merit, because he has neither just title nor good
faith. As Art. 1129 provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights,
but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the
property through any of the modes recognized by the Civil Code, to wit:
(1) occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5)
succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and (7)
prescription. 5 [G.R. NO. 141882 : March 11, 2005]
Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the
property through occupation since, under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, the
ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation. Nor can
he base his ownership on succession for the property was not part of
those distributed to the heirs of the third marriage, to which private
respondent belongs. It must be remembered that in the partition of the
intestate estate of Marcelino Recasa, the properties were divided into
three parts, each part being reserved for each group of heirs belonging
to one of the three marriages Marcelino entered into. Since the
contested parcels of land were adjudicated to the heirs of the first and
second marriages, it follows that private respondent, as heir of the third
marriage, has no right over the parcels of land. While, as heir to the
intestate estate of his father, private respondent was co-owner of all of
his father’s properties, such co-ownership rights were effectively
dissolved by the partition agreed upon by the heirs of Marcelino Recasa.
Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. Good faith
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the
possessor received the thing was its owner but could not transmit the
ownership thereof. 6 Private respondent entered the property without
the consent of the previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a
mere usurper.
Like private respondent, petitioners have not acquired the property
through any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership. The basis of petitioners’ claim of ownership is the contract
of sale they had with Rata, but this by itself is insufficient to make them
owners of the property. For while a contract of sale is perfected by the
meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and
upon the price, 7 the ownership of the thing sold is not transferred to
the vendee until actual or constructive delivery of the property. 8 Hence,
the maxim non nudis pactis, sed traditione dominia dominica rerum
transferuntur (not mere agreements but tradition transfers the
ownership of things).
Consequently, petitioners are not the owners of the property since it has
not been delivered to them. At the time they bought the property from
Rata in 1983, the property was in the possession of private Respondent.
However, this does not give private respondent a right to remain in
possession of the property. Petitioners’ title to the property prevails
over private respondents’ possession in fact but without basis in law. As
held in Waite v. Peterson, 9 when the property belonging to a person is
unlawfully taken by another, the former has the right of action against
the latter for the recovery of the property. Such right may be transferred
by the sale or assignment of the property, and the transferee can
maintain such action against the wrongdoer.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED, and private respondent Simeon Recasa is ordered to return
the possession of the contested parcels of land to petitioners as heirs of
Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi.
SO ORDERED.chanrobles.com : red
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L.
TEVES, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA
CADAYDAY, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Once again, the Court is faced with the perennial conflict of property
claims between two sets of heirs, a conflict ironically made grievous by
the fact that the decedent in this case had resorted to great lengths to
allocate which properties should go to which set of heirs.
This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the Decision1 dated 30 September
1999 of the Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision2 dated 7 May
1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, of Bais City, Negros
Oriental.
The factual antecedents follow.
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with
Antonia Baena (Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves
(Milagros Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely:
Josefa Teves Escaño (Josefa) and Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four
(4) children with Milagros Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn Donio Teves
(Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes
Teves (Milagros Reyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro).3
26 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred
and fifty-four (954) square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais
Cadastre, which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal
partnership of Don Julian and Antonia under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of Deeds of Bais City. When Antonia died,
the land was among the properties involved in an action for partition
and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 entitled "Josefa Teves
Escaño v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al."4 Milagros Donio, the
second wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the
parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement5 which
embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District,
rendered a Decision6 dated 31 January 1964. The CFI decision declared a
tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned
in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage.
The property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don
Julian.7 Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other properties at Bais,
including the electric plant, the "movie property," the commercial areas,
and the house where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the
properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present
dispute, lays down the effect of the eventual death of Don Julian vis - à-
vishis heirs:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties
hereinafter adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaňo and Emilio B. Teves,
(excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa
together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as
including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their
mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would
correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.
Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to
Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicatedto the wife in second
marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros
Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes
Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria
Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of
Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities8 in favor of J.L.T.
Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and
Emilio also executed an instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of
Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental
Deed)9 dated 31 July 1973. This instrument which constitutes a
supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred ownership
over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner. 10 On 14
April 1974, Don Julian died intestate.
On the strength of the SupplementalDeed in its favor, petitioner sought
the registration of the subject lot in its name. A court, so it appeared,
issued an order11cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the name of spouses Don
Julian and Antonia on 12 November 1979, and on the same date TCT No.
T-375 was issued in the name of petitioner.12 Since then, petitioner has
been paying taxes assessed on the subject lot.13
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken
possession over the subject lot after the execution of the Compromise
Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with
spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday, respondents
herein.14 On Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily established their home
and constructed a lumber yard. Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her
children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate15 dated
18 March 1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to
Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino.
Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name of
petitioner in 1979, respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio
as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate16 dated 9
November 1983.
At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute
sale, respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name
of petitioner. Thus, they failed to register the deed.17
Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the RTC
Branch 45 of Bais City, seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation
of TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title
to Lot No. 63 in their names, plus damages.18
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, this
Court finds judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff,
and thus hereby orders:
(1) That complaint be dismissed;
(2) That plaintiffs vacate the subject land, particularly identified as Lot
No. 63 registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375;
(3) That plaintiffs pay costs.
Finding no basis on the counterclaim by defendant, the same is hereby
ordered dismissed.19
The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on
the interpretation of paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement.20 It
added that the direct adjudication of the properties listed in
the Compromise Agreement was only in favor of Don Julian and his two
children by the first marriage, Josefa and Emilio.21 Paragraph 13 served
only as an amplification of the terms of the adjudication in favor of Don
Julian and his two children by the first marriage.
According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa
and Emilio comprised their shares in the estate of their deceased mother
Antonia, as well as their potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon
the latter's death. Thus, upon Don Julian's death, Josefa and Emilio could
not claim any share in his estate, except their proper share in the
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa which was adjudicated in favor of Don
Julian in the Compromise Agreement. As such, the properties
adjudicated in favor of Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa,
were free from the forced legitimary rights of Josefa and Emilio, and Don
27 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
Julian was under no impediment to allocate the subject lot, among his
other properties, to Milagros Donio and her four (4) children.22
The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words "shall be,"
the adjudication in favor of Milagros Donio and her four (4) children was
not final and operative, as the lot was still subject to future disposition
by Don Julian during his lifetime.23 It cited paragraph 1424 of
the Compromise Agreement in support of his conclusion.25 With Lot No.
63 being the conjugal property of Don Julian and Antonia, the trial court
also declared that Milagros Donio and her children had no hereditary
rights thereto except as to the conjugal share of Don Julian, which they
could claim only upon the death of the latter.26
The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julian's death on 14 April
1974, Lot No. 63 was no longer a part of his estate since he had earlier
assigned it to petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not
be a proper subject of extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio and her
children, and not being the owners they could not have sold it. Had
respondents exercised prudence before buying the subject lot by
investigating the registration of the same with the Registry of Deeds,
they would have discovered that five (5) years earlier, OCT No. 5203 had
already been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-375 in the name of
petitioner, the trial court added.27
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court's decision. The
decretal part of the appellate decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375 registered in the name of J.L.T.
Agro, Inc. as null and void.
With costs against defendant J.L.T. Agro, Inc. represented by its
Manager, Julian L. Teves.
SO ORDERED.28
Per the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement incorporated in CFI
decision dated 31 January 1964, particularly paragraph 13 thereof,
determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don Julian's two sets of heirs
their future legitimes in his estate except as regards his (Don Julian's)
share in Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.29 The two sets of heirs acquired
full ownership and possession of the properties respectively adjudicated
to them in the CFI decision and Don Julian himself could no longer
dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the CFI
decision constitutes res judicata.30 Don Julian could have disposed of
only his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.31
The appellate court likewise emphasized that nobody in his right
judgment would preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a document
like the Supplemental Deed which practically covers all properties which
Don Julian had reserved in favor of his heirs from the second marriage.
It also found out that the blanks reserved for the Book No. and Page No.
at the upper right corner of TCT No. T-375, "to identify the exact location
where the said title was registered or transferred," were not filled up,
thereby indicating that the TCT is "spurious and of dubious origin."32
Aggrieved by the appellate court's decision, petitioner elevated it to this
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising pure questions of
law.
Before this Court, petitioner assigns as errors the following rulings of the
appellate court, to wit: (a) that future legitime can be determined,
adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian; (b) that Don
Julian had no right to dispose of or assign Lot No. 63 to petitioner
because he reserved the same for his heirs from the second marriage
pursuant to the Compromise Agreement; (c) that the Supplemental
Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second
marriage; and (d) that TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner is spurious
for not containing entries on the Book No. and Page No.33
While most of petitioner's legal arguments have merit, the application
of the appropriate provisions of law to the facts borne out by the
evidence on record nonetheless warrants the affirmance of the result
reached by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents.
Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the Compromise
Agreement has to be quoted again:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein
adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaño and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the
properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all
its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only
their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the
legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them
of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves. In other words,
the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not
including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively
be adjudicatedto the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his
four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two
acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes
Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and
Jose Catalino Donio Teves."(Emphasis supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage
became automatically operative upon the approval of the Compromise
Agreement, thereby vesting on them the right to validly dispose of Lot
No. 63 in favor of respondents.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future
legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death
of Don Julian. The Court agrees. Our declaration in Blas v. Santos34 is
relevant, where we defined future inheritance as any property or
right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the
contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. Article
1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:
ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which
are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law.
28 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are
not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The
exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition inter
vivos referred to in Article 1080.35
For the inheritance to be considered "future," the succession must not
have been opened at the time of the contract.36 A contract may be
classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the
second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance;
andcralawlibrary
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of
a right which is purely hereditary in nature.37
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the
exception and therefore aligns with the general rule on future things,
reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
....
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the
opinion that if the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities
are prescribed by the Article.38 The partition will of course be effective
only after death. It does not necessarily require the formalities of a will
for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership.
Neither will the formalities of a donation be required since donation will
not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no
will has been made it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate
succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the physical
determination of the part to be given to each heir.39
The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article
105640 of the old Civil Code. The only change in the provision is that
Article 1080 now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old
law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos. This was intended to
abrogate the then prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his
estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the
formalities provided by law.41
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator
to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs,
and this partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but
an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is revocable at
any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a
conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the
heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property,
limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the
forced heirs.42
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly
valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would
become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of
his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him
under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a
bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the
prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate.
It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was
at the time nonexistent and might never exist.43
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment
covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner
of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to
his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the
owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to
dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by
Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been
adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had
validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The
lower court ruled that he had done so through the Supplemental Deed.
The appellate court disagreed, holding that the Supplemental Deed is
not valid, containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don Julian's
heirs from the second marriage. Petitioner contends that the ruling of
the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is well-founded.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the
omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while
mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without
disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the
properties.44 It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct
line from inheritance.45 It consists in the silence of the testator with
regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by
not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned
in the will in the latter case.46 But there is no preterition where the
testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since
there was no total omission of a forced heir.47
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he
resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by
the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not
irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the
absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are
other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit
from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in
the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julian's desire along
this line.48 Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian's
heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is
hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
Despite the debunking of respondents' argument on preterition, still the
petition would ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid
transfer effected by Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was
also the president and director of petitioner, and his daughter from the
first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no
legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet close
scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such transfer would
remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her children
could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title which
necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive
and detailed examination.
Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein.49 A certificate of title accumulates in one
document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee
held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence
of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.50
To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title establishes,
a sufficient and convincing quantum of evidence on the defect of the
title must be adduced to overcome the predisposition in law in favor of
a holder of a Torrens title. Thus, contrary to the appellate court's ruling,
the appearance of a mere thumbmark of Don Julian instead of his
signature in the Supplemental Deed would not affect the validity of
petitioner's title for this Court has ruled that a thumbmark is a
recognized mode of signature.51
The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name
of Julian by T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a grave irregularity which is also
an illegality, as it contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal
process established by law. And, worse still, the illegality is reflected on
the face of both titles. Where, as in this case, the transferee relies on a
voluntary instrument to secure the issuance of a new title in his name
such instrument has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds. This is
evident from Sections 53 and 57 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529
or the Property Registration Decree. The sections read, thus:
SEC. 53. Presentation of owner's duplicate upon entry of new certificate.
'No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds
unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented with such
instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in this Decree or upon
order of the court, for cause shown. (Emphasis supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
....
SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. 'An owner desiring to
convey his registered land in fee simple shall execute and register a deed
of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall
thereafter make out in the registration book a new certificate of title to
the grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an owner's duplicate
certificate. The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and
duplicate certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the
registration book in which the new certificate is registered and a
reference by number to the last preceding certificate. The original and
the owner's duplicate of the grantor's certificate shall be stamped
"cancelled." The deed of conveyance shall be filed and endorsed with
the number and the place of registration of the certificate of title of the
land conveyed. (Emphasis supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental
Deed, it should have presented it to the Register of Deeds to secure the
transfer of the title in its name. Apparently, it had not done so. There is
nothing on OCT No. 5203 or on the succeeding TCT No. T-375 either
which shows that it had presented the Supplemental Deed. In fact, there
is absolutely no mention of a reference to said document in the original
and transfer certificates of title. It is in this regard that the finding of the
Court of Appeals concerning the absence of entries on the blanks
intended for the Book No. and Page No. gains significant relevance.
Indeed, this aspect fortifies the conclusion that the cancellation of OCT
No. 5203 and the consequent issuance of TCT No. T-375 in its place are
not predicated on a valid transaction.
What appears instead on OCT No. 5203 is the following pertinent entry:
Entry No. 1374: Kind: Order: Executed in favor of J.L.T. AGRO, INC.
CONDITIONS: Lost owner's duplicate is hereby cancelled, and null and
void and a new Certificate of Title No. 375 is issued per Order of the
Court of First Instance on file in this office.
Date of Instrument: November 12, 1979
Date of Inscription: Nov. 12, 1979 4:00 P.M.
(SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA
Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II
(Emphasis supplied)52
What the entry indicates is that the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 5203
was lost, a petition for the reconstitution of the said owner's duplicate
was filed in court, and the court issued an order for the reconstitution of
the owner's duplicate and its replacement with a new one. But if the
entry is to be believed, the court concerned (CFI, according to the entry)
issued an order for the issuance of a new title which is TCT No. T-375
although the original of OCT No. 5203 on file with the Registry of Deeds
had not been lost.
Going by the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution
court may order the reconstitution and replacement of the lost title only,
nothing else. Since what was lost is the owner's copy of OCT No. 5203,
only that owner's copy could be ordered replaced. Thus, the Register of
Deeds exceeded his authority in issuing not just a reconstituted owner's
copy of the original certificate of title but a new transfer certificate of
title in place of the original certificate of title. But if the court order, as
the entry intimates, directed the issuance of a new transfer certificate of
title even designating the very number of the new transfer certificate of
title itself the order would be patently unlawful. A court cannot legally
order the cancellation and replacement of the original of the O.C.T.
which has not been lost,53 as the petition for reconstitution is premised
on the loss merely of the owner's duplicate of the OCT
Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a convenient
contrivance to effect the transfer of title to the subject lot in its name,
30 | P a g e
Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession
instead of the Supplemental Deed which should be its proper course of
action. It was so constrained to do because the Supplemental Deed does
not constitute a deed of conveyance of the "registered land in fee
simple" "in a form sufficient in law," as required by Section 57 of P.D. No.
1529.
A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental
Deeddiscloses that the assignment is not supported by any
consideration. The provision reads:
....
WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of
Liabilities executed by Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T.
Escaño at Dumaguete City on 16th day of November 1972 and ratified in
the City of Dumaguete before Notary Public Lenin Victoriano, and
entered in the latter's notarial register as Doc. No. 367; Page No. 17;
Book No. V; series of 1972, Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T.
Escaño, transferred, conveyed and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all its
assets and liabilities as reflected in the Balance Sheet of the former as of
December 31, 1971.
WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the Decision
made in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial
District Branch II, on Dec. 31, 1964 pertaining to Civil Case No. 3443 the
following properties were adjudicated to Don Julian L. Teves. We quote.
From the properties at Bais
Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves
....
Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of Title No. 5203, together with
all improvements. Assessed value - P2,720.00
....
WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties herein in
order to effect the registration of the transfer of the above corporation.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises the
ASSIGNOR hereby transfers, conveys, and assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC.,
the above described parcel of land[s] with a fair market value of
EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P84,000.00), Philippine Currency, and
which transfer, conveyance and assignment shall become absolute upon
signing.54 (Emphasis supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion of the
instrument does not represent the consideration for the assignment
made by Don Julian. Rather, it is a mere statement of the fair market
value of all the nineteen (19) properties enumerated in the instrument,
of which Lot No. 63 is just one, that were transferred by Don Julian in
favor of petitioner. Consequently, the testimony55of petitioner's
accountant that the assignment is supported by consideration cannot
prevail over the clear provision to the contrary in the Supplemental
Deed.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently considered the
1948 mortgage which is annotated on the back of the TCT No. T-375 as
the consideration for the assignment.56 However, the said
annotation57 shows that the mortgage was actually executed in favor of
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, not of petitioner.58 Clearly, said
mortgage, executed as it was in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation and there being no showing that petitioner itself paid off
the mortgate obligation, could not have been the consideration for the
assignment to petitioner.
Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid
contract, namely: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object
certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) Causeof the
obligation which is established.
Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with
unlawful cause produce no effect whatsoever. Those contracts lack an
essential element and they are not only voidable but void or inexistent
pursuant to Article 1409, paragraph (2).59 The absence of the usual
recital of consideration in a transaction which normally should be
supported by a consideration such as the assignment made by Don Julian
of all nineteen (19) lots he still had at the time, coupled with the fact that
the assignee is a corporation of which Don Julian himself was also the
President and Director, forecloses the application of the presumption of
existence of consideration established by law.60
Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation.
Article 749 of the New Civil Code is clear on the point, thus:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it
must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done
during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments.
In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al.,61 this Court declared that title to
immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by
virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a
public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance
may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance
does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another.
Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the
formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either
not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in
the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public
document,62 the absence of acceptance by the donee in the same deed
or even in a separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.
One final note. From the substantive and procedural standpoints, the
cardinal objectives to write finis to a protracted litigation and avoid
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Articles 1051-1080, Wills and Succession

multiplicity of suits are worth pursuing at all times.63 Thus, this Court has
ruled that appellate courts have ample authority to rule on specific
matters not assigned as errors or otherwise not raised in an appeal, if
these are indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the
pleaded issues.64Specifically, matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but consideration of which are necessary in arriving at a just decision and
complete resolution of the case, or to serve the interest of justice or to
avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.65

In the instant case, the correct characterization of the Supplemental

Deed, i.e., whether it is valid or void, is unmistakably determinative of
the underlying controversy. In other words, the issue of validity or nullity
of the instrument which is at the core of the controversy is interwoven
with the issues adopted by the parties and the rulings of the trial court
and the appellate court.66Thus, this Court is also resolute in striking
down the alleged deed in this case, especially as it appears on its face to
be a blatant nullity.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30

September 1999 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

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