Circumvention Arms Sales

Neg – Circumvention – BFHR
NEG
Notes
This file isolates a few reasons why reducing FMS or DCS to a country or region would not result in a
decrease in the number of arms provided to that country/region by the US.
Circumvention is not a yes or no question. The negative should aim to win that the current political
landscape, alliance structures, security concerns, and the military-industrial-complex are so ardently
committed to the transfer of arms they will utilize any alternative means to provide the targeted
country/region with arms.
Those methods include:
Loans, leases, and aid

Section 1206 of the NDAA – a pool of DOD monies that allow the DOD to provide arms to foreign
military forces quickly to resolve a conflict
Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) -- BPC programs may provide defense articles and/or services for
building the capacity of partner nation security forces and enhancing their capability to conduct
counterterrorism, counter drug, and counterinsurgency operations, or to support U.S. military and
stability operations, multilateral peace operations, and other programs.
CCL The argument is Trump will move the weapon systems from the USML to the CCL so that they no
longer require the FMS or DCS programs to be exported. When on this list, weapons are subject to less
export regulations, so they can be exported more quickly.
Most of these sections begin with an individual notes page intended to help define the
program/mechanism used for circumvention and provide evidence distinguishing it from FMS or DCS
(the only programs the affirmative can topically reduce/fiat).
As most affs can/should fiat the USFG this file does not devote much in terms of Congress or Executive
circumvent the other.
Beg, Borrow, Steal
Notes
FMS and DCS are distinct from: FMSCR, leases, drawdown, FMF, and IMET
Sorenson, 9 - Professor of International Security Studies at the United States Air Force War College
(David, The Process and Politics of Defense Acquisition: A Reference Handbook, p. 133-134
In official Defense Department lexicon, foreign military sales is known as "security cooperation," which
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) defines as "those activities conducted with allies and
friendly nations to
• Build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests

• Build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations
• Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access"16
Security assistance is a subset of security cooperation but can also be thought of as a critical pillar of
security cooperation, as it provides what most recipient countries do not have: funding for expensive
weapons programs. There are a number of programs under security assistance, including the following:
• Foreign military sales (FMS)

• Direct commercial sales (DCS)
• Foreign military sales credit (FMSCR), a direct loan program to recipient countries that cannot
afford cash payments
• Long-term leases for military equipment
• Drawdown, the transfer of U.S. military equipment or services, usually for emergency purposes
• Foreign military financing (FMF) grants or loans
• International military education and training (IMET)
Transfers is the overall term but sales are distinct from aid or gifts
IM No Date – Index Mundi -- data portal that gathers facts and statistics from multiple sources and
turns them into easy to use visuals. (“Arms exports (SIPRI trend indicator values)”
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/the-rise-and-fall-of-global-arms-sales/ ) mba-alb
Definition: Arms transfers cover the supply of military weapons through sales, aid, gifts , and those made through
manufacturing licenses. Data cover major conventional weapons such as aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, and ships designed for military use. Excluded are transfers
of other military equipment such as small arms and light weapons, trucks, small artillery, ammunition, support equipment, technology transfers, and other services. Figures are SIPRI Trend
Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) prices. A '0' indicates that the value of deliveries is less than US$0.5m
SIPRI defines them differently

WEF 10-04-17 -- Geneva-based international organization that discusses issues concerning the global
political economy. (“The rise and fall of global arms sales”
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/the-rise-and-fall-of-global-arms-sales/) mba-alb
SIPRI data shows that transfers of major weapons between

Separately, in a report detailing Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2016,
countries between 2012–2016 reached their greatest volume for any five-year period since the end of
the Cold War. Transfers, which include arms sales, gifts and production licences, have grown
continually since 2004, and were up by 8.4% between 2007–11 and 2012–16.
1nc
The plan gets circumvented – the DOD has 49 programs from which it can fund
transfers – zero oversight
Lumpe 2010
Lora Lumpe is a consultant working for the Open Society Foundations on issues relating to the
intersection of military aid and human rights. Her books include Unmatched Power, Unmet Principles:
The Human Rights Dimensions of US Training of Foreign Military and Police Forces (New York: Amnesty
International USA, 2002), Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms (London: Zed Books,
2000), Small Arms Control (London: Ashgate, 1999), and The Arms Trade Revealed: A Guide for
Investigators and Activists (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 1998). “U.S. Military Aid
to Central Asia, 1999–2009: Security Priorities Trump Human Rights and Diplomacy” October 2010
Central Eurasia Project https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/f405dbbf-18c6-470e-a4fa-
505313014346/OPS-No-1-20101015_0.pdf//dmr
Gordon Adams, former associate director for international affairs and national security programs at the Office of Management and Budget,
estimated that 15 different Pentagon programs would provide $8.6 billion in military aid worldwide during 2009—outstripping the similar
programs that operate under State Department authority.36 It turns out he was undercounting. A
2009 DOD handbook on
“security cooperation” identifies at least 49 programs and authorities (read: pots of money) that the
DOD can now utilize to arm and train foreign forces .37 The military committees of Congress, acting at
the behest of the Pentagon, include in their annual DOD funding bills provisions that grant the Pentagon
the right to use certain amounts of DOD Operations and Maintenance funds for foreign military aid
programs.38 Many of the new DOD-funded programs that Congress has authorized in the past decade directly parallel State Department–
funded programs. But with these, the Pentagon is “the decider” (in President Bush’s words) about who gets aid, as well as the implementer.
While U.S. law caps these authorities at certain amounts, there
are no public reports on most of these programs, so
determining actual expenditure levels and programming is difficult.39 As a result, piecing together the
entire picture of U.S. military aid to, and involvement with, Central Asia is very complex and perhaps not even
possible. This opacity also means that such funds could be used when Congress directs
a cessation of other military aid accounts for a particular country. In addition to the
specific and constantly growing budgetary discretion that regional combatant commanders have
obtained in the past two decades, there are numerous nonspecific funds that they can use to reward
friends and allies and/or buy or maintain access to local ports, bases, and logistics depots. Because there
is no public reporting required on the expenditures of most of these funds, meaningful public oversight
is not possible, and even Congressional oversight is questionable.40 Congress has applied some human
rights provisions to the new military aid programs funded by the DOD laws and budget. Namely, since 1999,
Congress has included a version of the “Leahy Law” in each of the annual DOD appropriations acts. This provision requires that the Pentagon
have a process for background vetting that is intended to ensure that U.S. forces are not training any units of a foreign security force that have
been credibly alleged to have committed a gross violation of human rights. The
DOD, however, does not consider many of
the programs whereby it conveys skills, equipment, or resources to foreign militaries to be “assistance”
and, therefore, does not vet participants in those programs.41 Given the large number of DOD-funded programs and the
paucity of information about them, only brief descriptions of each military assistance channel and highlights of the relevance of the program for
Central Asia are possible. This listing includes only those DOD funding programs and initiatives that are known to have been, or are likely to be,
used in one or more Central Asian country.
2nc
Reducing sales fails – lots of ways to bypass – arms get loaned, leased, bartered or
given as aid
Holden 17 - historian and researcher. His previous books include Who Rules South Africa? (2012), The
Devil in the Detail: How the Arms Deal Changed Everything (2011) and The Arms Deal in Your Pocket
(2008). He was also lead researcher on Andrew Feinsteins book The Shadow World (2012) and on the
documentary feature of the same name released in 2016. He currently works as Director of
Investigations at Corruption Watch UK (Paul, “Indefensible: Seven Myths That Sustain The Global Arms
Trade,” p. 78-81)//dmr
BUT WHAT ABOUT THE ARMS TRADE TREATY? The fact that we have reached this point in the chapter without mentioning the much-discussed
Arms Trade Treaty is something of a give-away in itself: the ability of the treaty to seriously impact on the trade in weapons is minimal. The
treaty had auspicious and well-intentioned roots. It emerged out of a discussion between numerous NGOs: including Amnesty international and
Oxfam, which had campaigned for a full recognition of how the arms trade was fueling human rights abuses around the world. Flowing from a
list of initial principles, the treaty that emerged out of this group sought to put in serious controls over the arms trade, so as to stop the very
things that we have described so far in this chapter happening: arms being sold to repressive regimes, diverted to human rights abusers, and
generally fueling some of the world’s most intransigent conflicts. 85 As with many international agreements, the treaty became sucked into a
seemingly endless round of negotiations, as different states around the world attempted to modify its content to suit their ends. The treaty, as
it was passed in 2013 reflects this: it is riddled with bullet holes that will limit its ability to properly limit the trade. The noted campaign group,
Ceasefire, has pointed to five major problems:86 1. The treaty sets a threshold for stopping arms exports way too high. The treaty requires that
arms should not be exported to a state if there is an overriding risk" they are to be used in violating human rights. The use of the word
‘overriding’ is not only open to interpretation, but implies that the trade in weapons should only be stopped in exceptional circumstances.
Indeed, in the original drafts of the treaty, it stated that weapons should not be exported only if it was ‘likely’ that they would be used in ways
the treaty forbids. 2. The treaty doesn't have any major requirements regarding record keeping and reporting. One of the big selling points of
the early drafts of the treaty was that it would make the trade in weapons transparent by forcing states to properly report on their imports and
exports. However, the final version of the treaty only requires states to submit a horribly under-detailed list with minimal information to the UN
Secretariat, which the Secretariat doesn’t even publish. States are also allowed to leave out any information that is ‘commercially sensitive’ or
constitutes ‘national security information’. 3. The treaty does not include a whole raft of weapons. The treaty is applicable to eight categories of
conventional arms (such as battle tanks and attack helicopters). But the list is so circumscribed, and so out of date, that it is entirely unlikely to
be applicable to new and emerging categories of weapons (such as drones). Most importantly, while mentioning ammunition, the treaty
excludes the trade in ammunition from a whole host of its central provisions. 4. The treaty only covers sales. This is
distinct from
other forms of arms transfer we’ve discussed above, such as weapons that are loaned, leased, bartered
covering
or given as part of an aid package. The treaty also excludes arms transferred as part of a "defense cooperation
agreement’, that is, an arrangement where the militaries of two countries work together. It would be easy
for most states to simply claim that controversial weapons sales fall under the rubric of these sorts of
agreements and bypass the treaty altogether. 5. There is simply no international enforcement or assessment. Determining
whether there is an ‘overriding risk’ that arms will be used to violate human rights remains the responsibility of the exporting state. Is it realistic
to expect that exporting states, which want to transfer weapons in their own economic interests, will apply this rigorously? More to the point,
are states likely to really apply these provisions when there is no international review and there are no legal sanctions for violating the treaty. In
a legal sense, the treaty is a set of polite suggestions rather than iron-clad requirements. A lot of people who supported the Arms Trade Treaty
in civil society may baulk at such a blunt description of the Treaty; almost as if we’re saying that the treaty was a waste of effort and a failure on
their part. This is not true. The act of getting this issue on the agenda was brave in and of itself, and bringing the public’s attention to the issue
for the first time in decades was immensely necessary and powerfully done. Securing the attention of i million people who signed petitions in
support of regulating the trade has to be lauded and shows what can be achieved with effective campaigning. The weakness of the Arms Trade
Treaty is not a reflection on them; it is a further commentary on how states around the world, in particular those that are the biggest arms
producers, so effectively manipulate the international regulatory environment in the interests of arms manufacturers rather than global
citizens. Perhaps it is the beginning of a bigger debate, and the treaty can be radically revised over time. But as it stands, it will do little to limit
the worst parts of the arms trade.
Circumvention through non-commercial transfers is likely

Helena Whall et al 3-12-13 -- Helena Whall - currently working as a freelance research consultant. She
worked in Oxfam's Campaigns and Policy division from 2010 - 2013 as project coordinator of the website
armstreaty.org and then advocacy officer on the Arms Trade Treaty team. Deepayan BasuRay - Director
of Arms Control for the Centre for Armed Violence Reduction, where he helps governments to adopt
and implement arms control instruments around the world, providing capacity building, analysis of
current legislation and the support of civil society to reduce and prevent armed violence.. Previously, he
was ATT Monitor Coordinator for the Control Arms Secretariat, managing all aspects of the project,
including editing and preparing research, managing outreach and communications, and building and
maintaining research and advisory networks. Elizabeth Kirkham - Saferworld's Small Arms and Transfer
Controls Adviser, having joined the organisation in 1993. (“Getting It Right The pieces that matter for
the Arms Trade Treaty” https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/bp169-getting-it-right-
arms-trade-treaty-120313-en1.pdf) mba-alb
gifts, loans, and leases of arms The scope of the draft treaty is such that it could be viewed as excluding
4. Circumventing the ATT:
non-commercial transfers, within which category could fall loans, gifts, and military aid. This means that
States could donate or lend weapons to other countries irrespective of whether the recipient would
be likely to use them for serious violations of human rights, international humanitarian law, or in
supporting terrorist acts. While data relating to gifting, lending, and donating weapons by governments is not widely available, it is clear that these kinds of
transfers are a fact of life in the international arms trade. As the case study below illustrates, governments across the
world are routinely engaging in these types of transfers, with potentially serious implications for the
effectiveness of a future ATT.
It completely takes out the aff – transfers will continue

Sangeet Jain 2018 -- incoming research student at the University of Cambridge and earned her masters
in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. She has worked at the Indian Institute
of Advanced Studies and the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi previously. Her current research
focuses on India's booming development partnerships, with an emphasis on the Asian region. (“Why
India’s Position on the Arms Trade Treaty Endures” https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-indias-
position-arms-trade-treaty-endures) mba-alb
The treaty also contains some gaping loopholes which leaves options open for arms transfers such as
“gifts, loans, leases and aid “. Under any of these labels, exporting states could arm political allies
which would otherwise be barred under the treaty. This loophole , in this author’s opinion, nullifies the whole
rationale for the treaty itself . The treaty is also clearly not in tune with the times as it fails to cover
technology transfer – an increasingly crucial component of arms deals today. According to Max Mutschler of the Bonn
International Center for Conversion (Dorrie Peter, 2015), arms deals come with intellectual property which allows recipients to produce arms locally as well. Mutschler also argues that the
reporting requirements have fundamental lacunae such as the exclusion of ammunition and weapons parts and components.
BPC
Notes
FMS excludes Building Partner Capacity
Gilman, 14 - Derek Gilman, General Counsel Defense Security Cooperation Agency (“FOREIGN MILITARY
SALES” 9/30, https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/final-fms-dcs_30_sep.pdf LOR = Letter of
Request
In contrast to FMF and the FMS program are the various “Building Partner Capacity” (“BPC”) programs. These
programs authorized under a number of different authorities and are funded with U.S. Government appropriations.48 They are
executed through the FMS process, but they are not true FMS cases.49 To enable BPC program execution through the FMS
infrastructure, the DoD Implementing Agency (“IA”) develops a “pseudo LOA,” which is not signed by the foreign country, but serves to document the transfer of
articles and services to the U.S. Government organization that will ultimately provide the defense articles and services to the foreign country (often this will be the
Security Cooperation Office (“SCO”) in the U.S. Embassy in the foreign country). Further, rather than relying on an LOR ,
the BPC process is initiated
from the requesting agency, which is often the Geographic Combatant Command or the U.S. Embassy in
the foreign country. The requesting agency will provide a Memorandum of Request (“MOR”).50 The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(“OUSD(P)”) is responsible for oversight of DoD-funded BPC programs, although certain authorities (for example section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended) require concurrence by the U.S. Department of State.51 The SCO, if it is the recipient of the defense articles, will, after
inventory—and provided there are no sanctions prohibiting provision of assistance—transfer custody and responsibility of the defense articles and services to the
benefitting foreign country, and will begin end use monitoring (“EUM,” further discussed below), as applicable. BPC
programs may provide
defense articles and/or services for the purpose of building the capacity of partner nation security forces
and enhancing their capability to conduct counterterrorism, counter drug, and counterinsurgency operations, or to support U.S. military and stability operations,
multilateral peace operations, and other programs.
1nc
BPC provides arms via grant, loan, credit and lease – lack of congressional oversight
and budget transparency ensure circumvention
McInnis and Lucas 15 McInnis, Kathleen J, and Nathan J Lucas. “What Is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’
Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 18 Dec. 2015,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf Kathleen J. McInnis is International Security Analyst for the
Congressional Research Service and Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security, USA. Nathan J Lucas is a section research manager for the Congressional Research
Service, A former Country Director for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a former Division Manager
for the Defense Intelligence Agency, and a former Action Officer for Joint Staff on NATO Policy // ank
How DOD Executes BPC Strategies Programmatically speaking, within

the DOD context, BPC is most frequently associated
with security cooperation and security assistance programs administered by the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DCSA). 13 According to DOD Directive 5105.65, DSCA: Under the authority, direction and control of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) directs, administers and provides DOD-wide guidance to the DOD components and DOD
representatives to U.S. missions abroad for the execution of DOD security assistance and security cooperation programs over which DSCA has
responsibility.14 According to DSCA, security cooperation refers to those activities undertaken by the
Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States
to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security
establishments, including all DOD-administered security assistance programs that (1) build defense and
security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments
cooperation activities and security assistance activities; (2) develop allied and friendly military
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and (3) provide U.S. forces with peacetime
and contingency access to host nations.15 Security cooperation is a core aspect of DOD’s key planning
processes, to include the Guidance for the Employment of the Force and Guidance for the Development of the Force.16 Security
assistance, by contrast, is defined as a group of programs authorized by Title 22 of the U.S. Code, as
amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and
other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national
policies and objectives.17 Security assistance is a subset of security cooperation, 18 and BPC, in its
current formulation, appears to be associated with those security cooperation and assistance activities
designed to enable weakened or fragile states to manage their own security challenges. Although all DOD aspects of security
assistance programs are administered by DSCA, the agency is not responsible for the department’s
broader strategy and non-programmatic elements of security cooperation or building partner capacity.19
As with all federal agencies, DSCA allocates its resources according only to the authorities Congress has provided. The authorities associated
with security cooperation and security assistance are often described as a “patchwork” of authorities and programs, only some of which are
exclusively within DOD’s purview. Others are either (1) managed by the State Department, (2) managed by the State Department and executed
by DOD (such as Foreign Military Sales programs), or (3) jointly managed by the State Department and DOD, requiring both departments’
concurrence to authorize specific activities.
Table 2 depicts some of the key programs and authorities in the security
assistance toolkit, including from where each program derives its legal authority Examining Table 2, one could make two
observations. First, after the 9/11 attacks, the number of security assistance programs proliferated. Of the
31 programs listed above 17 were created after 9/11, suggesting that the United States government believed that its traditional, pre-9/11
security assistance portfolio was necessary but insufficient to meet the challenges of an increasingly interdependent and complex world.
Second, the majority of these programs established after 9/11 were additional authorities given to the
Department of Defense, suggesting that DOD plays a greater role in security cooperation today than
the one it historically played. The latter observation is borne out by the current manifestations of BPC
across the DOD’s activities. Although the programs and authorities listed above are the focus of most
analysis and discussion with respect to BPC, they do not capture the full extent of DOD’s activities and
expenditures in this area. This is because DOD has integrated BPC—in its various guises and
manifestations (security cooperation, assistance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, and
so on)—across a wide range of its operations and activities (see “DOD Activities That Build Partner Capacity”). In order
to do so, different DOD components utilize a variety of funding sources. For example, according to a 2013 RAND
study, rather than using DSCA earmarked funds for specific activities with partners, Most [BPC] programs
are funded by other, less narrow [funding] sources, such as operations and maintenance funds. Examples include exercises
overseen by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military-to-military contacts, which are often (but not always) funded by Traditional
COCOM Activity Authority.
In each of these cases, DoD uses a specific authority to use its operations and
maintenance funds for a given security cooperation activity. In some cases, these funds are then
reimbursed, but more often than not, the security cooperation activity comes at the expense of another
defense priority.20 DSCA, with its relatively narrow mandate, oversees only a smaller subset of DOD’s
overall BPC activities. This has financial oversight implications, as it is difficult to determine what,
specifically, DOD spends on non-DSCA BPC programs. BPC is also beginning to manifest in force structure. One example is
the U.S. Army’s initiative to build “Regionally Aligned” forces (i.e., augment its force structure to ensure that divisions and brigades both plan
and prepare for operations to support a designated geographic combatant commander). To prepare U.S. forces to support a Combatant
Commander’s area of responsibility, units are required to train and exercise with counterparts in the region and help build a partner’s capacity
in the process.21 The Regionally Aligned Force concept is to be paid for by using a variety of different “pots” of money, to include Title 22 funds,
Combatant Commander Funds, joint exercise funds, and special authorities such as the Global Security Contingency Fund.22 Looking forward,
the Department of the Army is planning for a 25% increase in its security cooperation budget, which, according to Army planners, will have to
be offset from elsewhere within the Army budget.23 The U.S. Army is also contemplating building new “Train, Advise and Assist” units within its
force structure, ostensibly to better prepare itself to accomplish BPC tasks. 24 DOD and Congressional Interpretations of BPC Comparing DOD
and legislative perspectives on partnership strategy, important conceptual distinctions seem to exist between how the two approach BPC. In
DOD, especially in the QDRs, BPC appears to be a strategic concept allowing the Department and the military
services to rationalize and make sense of a wide range of potential missions and tactics, including fixing
the security institutions of failed states, creating like-minded security partners, facilitating interagency
cooperation, and, recently, shoring up deficiencies in allies’ defense capabilities for deterrence and
defense purposes. DOD’s 2006 BPC execution roadmap, for example, places the “Strengthen Interagency Planning and Operations” task
above the “Enhance the Capabilities of, and Cooperation with, International Partners” task, stating that the QDR recognized that the
Department of Defense cannot meet many of today’s complex challenges alone. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the US
government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad.25 In
contrast, Congress, in legislation, has presented BPC as a narrower concept. The FY2006 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 109-163, §1206, gave the President limited authority to direct DOD to “conduct or
support a program to build the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces in order for that
country to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations; or (2) participate in or support military and stability
operations in which the United States Armed Forces are a participant.”26 Figure 2 illustrates the difference of
definitions between Congress and DOD when it comes to BPC. Congress tends to view BPC as a narrow set of programs (global train and equip
and so on, as outlined in Table 2), managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. This definition is depicted by the orange circle in the
middle. The white circle depicts DOD’s overall security cooperation activities that are led by DSCA - which include DSCA’s security, security
sector, and BPC activities; the white circle depicts how Congress tends to view DOD’s role in security cooperation and assistance. However, as
the Regionally Aligned Forces example demonstrates, in DOD’s view security cooperation, and by extension BPC, is much broader
than those programs DSCA manages. The green circle depicts the wide array of programs, activities, and even force structure
decisions designed to support the overarching rationale of building partner capacity. Essentially, DOD has infused BPC across its
activities and operations, not just in DSCA-managed programs and activities. DOD does not presently
capture the level of granularity necessary to identify the full scope of expenditure on BPC programs,
particularly those represented in the green circle. Thus, identifying how much money DOD actually spends on BPC
activities is nearly impossible at present. The final component of the diagram is the grey shaded circle in the background. This
represents the use of building partner capacity as a strategic rationale in its own right, and is used as a justification for many of the activities
captured in the other circles of the diagram. As the diagram suggests, the term BPC is used to represent a variety of different programs
activities, as well as the intellectual rationale for undertaking those activities. These varying
definitions—alternately using “BPC” to
describe ends, ways and means—add to the ambiguity surrounding BPC and therefore compounding the
oversight challenge associated with these programs. Views are mixed regarding the efficacy of the “patchwork” system of
security cooperation authorities. Some analysts argue that the ad-hoc manner in which these programs were formulated and executed created
overlaps in some areas and gaps in others, leading program managers to find multiple sources of funding for a single activity.27 Others, by
contrast, maintain that these overlaps create flexibility, allowing program managers to organize activities that are more tailored to their
individual requirements.28 Regardless, successive administrations have sought to bring greater coherence to security cooperation and BPC
efforts. Most recently, in 2013, the Obama Administration tried to make these programs and activities more coherent through Presidential
Policy Directive 23 (PPD 23), which instructs national security agencies to improve, streamline, and better organize all U.S. security assistance
and cooperation efforts.29
2nc
BPC is the go to for DOD arms transfers – continues to expand in scope and appeal
What Is “Building Partner Capacity”? The breadth and scope of the different activities and programs that fall under DOD’s catchall term
“Building Partner Capacity” (BPC) has made analyzing these programs—and their overall efficacy—difficult. This difficulty arises in part because
the term “building partner capacity,” based on recent DOD usage, has been used to capture DOD’s wide
variety of engagements with an extensive range of non-DOD actors. As a recent report from the Center for a New
American Security (CNAS) notes, “the term building partner capacity (BPC) has become a catchall for a wide array
of programs, only some of which actually pertain to enhancing the capabilities and capacity of a
partner’s military and civilian institutions.”4 Indeed, as a RAND study noted, BPC is more a “term of art” than a
specific program or capability. Moreover, like many other terms of art, BPC means different things to different people.5 Regardless
of how the term BPC is used, it is primarily associated with a fundamental assumption: that enhancing the
security capabilities of partners in less capable, weak, and/or failing states will ultimately advance U.S.
national security interests. DOD Activities That Build Partner Capacity Illustratively, in no particular order, BPC includes the
following activities: Establishing senior-level personal relationships between the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff or Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of Defense of other states. Holding bilateral
military exercises like the annual African Lion exercise conducted by the United States Marine Corps and
the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces. Conducting multilateral exercises such as NATO’s annual Combined
Endeavor communications interoperability exercises involving NATO Allies and Partnership for Peace
countries. Engaging in multilateral military planning and discussion of capabilities development, for
example as practiced by NATO allies and “Partnership for Peace” countries. Including foreign military
officers as students at U.S. military schools, as well as the participation of U.S. military officers as
students at foreign military schools such as the National Defense University of Pakistan. Training and
equipping of foreign military and security forces. Fostering specific capabilities in a country or given
region of the world, such as the maritime capability-focused Africa Partnership station. Preparing
foreign security forces to participate in multilateral military operations, such as training Burundian
battalions to support their deployment to Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia.
Embedding advisors into foreign military and security ministries, such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan (plans exist to send advisors to Yemen, Indonesia, Botswana, and Ukraine). BPC in National
Strategy6 The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (9/11 attacks) and the subsequent global war on terror provided the impetus for expanding
DOD’s security cooperation and assistance tools under the rubric of BPC. 7 The term “Building Partner Capacity” first came into use in the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which argued, Long-duration, complex operations involving the U.S. military, other government agencies
and international partners will be waged simultaneously in multiple countries around the world... Maintaining a long-term, low-visibility
presence in many areas of the world where U.S. forces do not traditionally operate will be required. Building and leveraging partner capacity
will also be an absolutely essential part of this approach, and the employment of surrogates will be a necessary method for achieving many
goals.8 According to the 2006 QDR, BPC was, in essence, a maximalist interpretation and employment of a concept normally executed by
Over time, BPC became a
Special Operations Forces when working with partner forces on the ground—“by, with and through.”9
preferred, if not primary, means by which the United States could secure its interests—as well as a
national security objective in its own right. As the argument goes, much like Afghanistan before 9/11, the collapse of fragile
states into conflict zones could ultimately create areas in which terrorist groups could plan and execute attacks against the United States and its
allies. As then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued, Building the governance and security capacity of other countries was a critical
element of our strategy in the Cold War. But it is even more urgent in a global security environment where, unlike the Cold War, the most likely
and lethal threats – an American city poisoned or reduced to rubble – will likely emanate from fractured or failing states, rather than aggressor
states.10 Gates went on to note that, “in these situations, the effectiveness and credibility of the United States will only be as good as the
effectiveness, credibility, and sustainability of our local partners… [BPC] is in many ways the ideological and security challenge of our time.”
Over time, BPC became primarily associated with DOD’s activities to enhance the capabilities of, and
cooperation with, international partners characterized by weakness, instability, or fragility. In the QDR reports
between 2006 and the current 2014 version, DOD seemed to emphasize BPC as a concept distinct from traditional security assistance and
security cooperation, with the latter more geared toward building linkages with U.S. allies. Together, the QDR reports could be interpreted to
BPC should help the United States maintain a long-term, low-
make the following distinctions regarding BPC:
visibility presence in parts of the world where U.S. forces do not traditionally operate (2006 QDR); BPC
should focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations (2006 QDR); BPC should deal with
threats that emanate from state weakness rather than state strength (2010 QDR); BPC authorities
apply in situations without a neat divide between defense, diplomacy, and development (2010 QDR);
Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations are an increasingly critical element of BPC (2010 QDR); and
BPC includes improving partners’ peacekeeping and counterterrorism capabilities and applies especially
in fragile states (2014 QDR). The 2010 QDR draws out the idea that the U.S. government widened its aperture when discussing when,
whether, and how to build partner capacity. Rather than using “traditional” security cooperation programs exclusively to help its allies, the
United States would help weaker states, thereby preventing conflicts stemming from non-state actors from becoming serious or even beginning
in the first place. This approach could be seen as using BPC as a state-building tool for partner countries. In the context of U.S. operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, though, perhaps the key phrase is using BPC to “reduce risk to U.S. forces and extend security to areas we cannot reach
alone.” Using this approach, this broadly conceptualized notion of BPC may be seen as a means of
achieving U.S. strategic objectives at a lower cost without necessarily using U.S. military forces to
achieve the same ends. Perhaps in response to events in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere, recent DOD strategy
documents appear to be re-expanding BPC’s aperture. The 2015 National Military Strategy appears to
link building partner capacity efforts both to counterterrorism (generally conducted in fragile states) and
alliance/coalition building (a task normally applied to more durable states and U.S. allies): As we look to the future, the U.S. military
and its allies and partners will continue to protect and promote shared interests. We will preserve our alliances, expand
partnerships, maintain a global stabilizing presence, and conduct training, exercises, security
cooperation activities, and military to military engagement. Such activities increase the capabilities and
capacity of partners, thereby enhancing our collective ability to deter aggression and defeat
extremists.11 Altogether, BPC appears to have moved from a post-9/11 counterterrorism strategy applied
to fragile states to a key means through which the United States seeks to accomplish “traditional” and
“non-traditional” national security objectives. Recently, some scholars have argued that this emphasis
on BPC constitutes a grand strategy in its own right—one of “sponsorship”—that counsels strategic
patience and working with partners to achieve mutual objectives. As their logic goes, “proponents of
sponsorship strategies recognized that they are likely to achieve acceptable results at a lower cost and
with greater long-term legitimacy to the policy being implemented.”12
Growing reliance on BPC provides the DOD with an alternative means to provide the
target country arms, equipment and training
A number of reasons underlie a growing Congressional interest in the complex national security policy area that has come to be labeled
“Building Partnership Capacity,” or “BPC.” First, since 2006
BPC has increased in prominence within U.S. strategy,
arguably becoming a central pillar of U.S. national security and foreign policy in recent years. Following the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001, successive U.S. and Department of Defense leaders concluded that the traditional set of security assistance and
security cooperation tools did not meet the needs of the changed strategic landscape. The term “Building Partnership Capacity” was coined in
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Since then, BPChas become a catchall phrase for a wide array of programs, 1
all underpinned by the assumption that strengthening foreign security institutions in weak and fragile
states will have tangible positive benefits for U.S. national security. Activities in which DOD engages toward those
ends include (but are not limited to): training, mentoring, advising, equipping, exercising, educating and planning with
foreign security forces, primarily in fragile and weak states. BPC is also used to describe a core element of recent U.S. military
campaigns—namely, training and equipping foreign security forces—in Iraq (2003-2011), Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq/Syria (2014-
present).
Pseudo-FMS circumvents – its quicker and the DOD already prioritizes it

GAO, 17 United States Government Accountability Office. The Government Accountability Office is a
legislative branch government agency that provides auditing, evaluation, and investigative services for
the United States Congress. It is the supreme audit institution of the federal government of the United
States. “FOREIGN MILITARY SALES: DOD Needs to Improve Its Use of Performance Information to
Manage the Program.” GAO, United States Government Accountability Office, Aug. 2017,
www.gao.gov/assets/690/686720.pdf. // ank
The United States provides military equipment and training to partner countries through a variety of programs. Foreign partners may pay the
U.S. government to administer the acquisition of materiel and services on their behalf through the FMS program. The United States also
provides grants to some foreign partners through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program to fund the partner’s purchase of materiel and
services through the process used for FMS. In recent years, Congress
has expanded the number of security cooperation
programs to include several new programs with funds appropriated to the Department of Defense
(DOD), as well as administered and implemented by DOD, that focus on building partner capacity. In this
report, we refer to these programs as “pseudo-FMS” cases. FMS and pseudo-FMS transactions follow the same process,
but the roles, responsibilities, and actors involved can differ. One important difference highlighted by DOD and Department of State (State)
officials is that with FMS, there is a much greater level of involvement on the part of the partner country in defining requirements and
developing the Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). As a result,
the amount of time it takes to develop FMS cases on
average will tend to exceed the time it takes for pseudo-FMS cases. According to DOD and State officials, there may
also be differences in the types of equipment that tend to be provided via FMS as opposed to pseudo-FMS cases. For example, pseudo-FMS is
not typically used to provide complex weapons systems with long production cycles such as advanced fighter aircraft. According
to DOD
and State officials, pseudo-FMS cases are often prioritized because the funds used for these programs generally are only
available for obligation for 1 or 2 years, depending on the program. These officials note that funds for traditional FMF programs do not have
such time constraints. As a result, pseudo-FMS cases are, on average, processed faster than FMS cases. Army and Air
Force officials noted that pseudo-FMS cases tend to be more labor intensive than FMS cases for several reasons. For example, according to Air
Force officials, pseudoFMS cases often involve items that frequently require a new contract because the item is not part of the Air Force
inventory. For that reason, Air Force officials noted that they cannot modify an existing contract to add additional items. Army officials said that
pseudo-FMS cases require more work because of the nature of expiring funds. This requires an acceleration of almost all their processes.
2nc – Israel Link
Status quo BPC efforts toward Israel ensure continued transfers
States. “Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and
Department of State Security Assistance Efforts.” GAO.gov, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 24
Mar. 2017, www.gao.gov/assets/690/683682.pdf. // ank
29. Intelligence Sharing: Exchange of mapping, charting, and geodetic data Engage in information exchanges with partner nations to improve
their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, interoperability, and defense-institutionbuilding capacity. 10 U.S.C. § 454,
Exchange of mapping, charting, and geodetic data with foreign countries, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and
academic institutions 30. Intelligence Sharing: Funds for Foreign Cryptologic Support Engage in information exchanges with partner nations to
improve their ISR capabilities and defense-institutionbuilding capacity. 10 U.S.C. § 421, Funds for foreign cryptologic support 31. Intelligence
Sharing: Imagery Intelligence and Geospatial Information Engage in information exchanges with partner nations to improve their ISR
capabilities, interoperability with U.S. forces, and defense-institution-building capacity. 10 U.S.C. § 443, Imagery intelligence and geospatial
information: support for foreign countries, regional organizations, and security alliances 32. Inter-American Air Forces Academy Provide
professional and technical training to students from partner nations eligible to receive security assistance, primarily students from the air forces
of Latin America and the Caribbean. 10 U.S.C. § 9415, Inter-American Air Forces Academy 33. International Counterproliferation Program
Provide equipment and training to partner nations to improve border security and counter weapons of mass destruction capabilities. 50 U.S.C.
§ 2334, Training program 50 U.S.C. § 2333, International border security 34. Israeli Cooperative Missile Defense Program:
Provide funds to the government of Israel to procure weapons systems, including the coproduction of
parts and components in the United States by U.S. industry. Pub. L. No. 114-92 (2015), § 1679, Israeli Cooperative Missile
Defense Program Codevelopment and Coproduction 35. Israeli Short-Range Rocket Defense System: Provide the
government of Israel assistance specifically for the production and procurement of the Iron Dome
defense system for purposes of intercepting short-range missiles, rockets, and projectiles launched
against Israel. Pub. L. No. 114-92 (2015), § 1678, Availability of Funds for Iron Dome Short-Range Rocket Defense
Strong congressional support to utilize BPC for Israeli weapons systems

House Committee on Armed Services 13 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES. The U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, commonly known as the House
Armed Services Committee, is a standing committee of the United States House of Representatives
“FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES TO MEET 21ST
CENTURY CHALLENGES .” GPO, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES , 14
Feb. 2013, www.hsdl.org/?view&did=750858. // ank
As we look to the future security environment, we recognize that BPC will need to address a broad range of security
challenges. In the wake of the Benghazi attack and increasing syndication of terrorist threats, we must make capacity building
for internal security forces and counterterrorism operations a clear priority. We must be able to work with partners
in the Persian Gulf to strengthen their ability to counter Iran's destabilizing activities, and advance collaborative efforts with
Israel to deploy systems like Iron Dome, which protects Israeli citizens against the threat of rockets. We
must invest in new capabilities with allies in Northeast Asia, such as missile defense, to counter North Korea. We will also work to strengthen
the maritime security and humanitarian assistance capabilities of key partners in the Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia. Currently, throughout
the year, SOF conducts engagements in more than 100 countrics worldwide. In close coordination with the State Department and in alignment
with our broader foreign policy goals, our special operations forces draw from their experiences in places like Colombia, Yemen, and East Africa
to build the capacity of partner forces through training, equipping, advising and assisting, and integrating civil affairs teams, military
information support teams, and even cultural support teams to ensure effective support capabilities. And we will strengthen NATO's
capabilities in missile defense, meet our Article 5 commitments, and ensure that we can conduct expeditionary operations with our European
allies. And we must ensure that they can assume a greater burden of the responsibility when we do engage.
More ev
House Committee on Armed Services 13 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES. The U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, commonly known as the House
Armed Services Committee, is a standing committee of the United States House of Representatives
“FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES TO MEET 21ST
CENTURY CHALLENGES .” GPO, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES , 14
Feb. 2013, www.hsdl.org/?view&did=750858. // ank
While the State Department has led for the Nation in matters of foreign affairs, the Department of Defense has provided a substantial
contribution to this effort. For instance, the Arizona Air National Guard’s 162nd Fighter Wing trains 25 of our allies on various aircraft. Through
this mission, they build relationships and understanding with our allies, service member to service member. As we continue to build partner
capacity and rely more heavily on partners and allies, the U.S. military by default plays a larger role in our Nation’s foreign relations. More to
the point, the U.S. military has the ability to foster positive international relations separate from the Department of State. However, the
Department of Defense relies on legislative authorities granted by this body to build partnership capacity. Ms. St. Laurent, what authorities
need to be amended or granted to allow the Department of Defense to better facilitate foreign relations? Ms. ST. LAURENT. The Department of
Defense (DOD) conducts its efforts to build the capacity of foreign partner nations under a variety of authorities, and GAO’s prior work has
found that additional congressional guidance for some programs could be provided to help clarify the scope of programs and DOD’s roles and
responsibilities in performing partner capacity building activities. For example, GAO’s 2012 report 1 on DOD’s humanitarian assistance efforts
found that the legislation guiding DOD’s humanitarian assistance efforts does not provide detailed guidance on the Department’s role in
performing these activities. Our report suggested that given the fiscally constrained environment and potential overlap in the types of
peacetime, humanitarian, and development assistance activities being performed by DOD, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for
International Development, DOD and other agencies involved in assistance efforts could benefit from additional direction from Congress.
Specifically, our report recommended that Congress consider amending the legislation that supports the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and
Civic Aid (OHDACA) program to more specifically define DOD’s role in humanitarian assistance, taking into account the roles and similar types of
efforts performed by the civilian agencies. In another example, our 2010 report 2 on DOD and the Department of State’s Section 1206 security
assistance program—used to build the capacity of foreign military forces in order to conduct counterterrorism operations or support U.S.
operations—found that there were uncertainties regarding what funds could be used to support sustainment of projects, which can affect the
long-term impact and effectiveness of projects. We therefore recommended that DOD, in consultation with Department of State, seek
additional guidance from Congress on what funding authorities could be used to sustain Section 1206 projects that DOD determines are
effective at addressing specific terrorist or stabilization threats in high priority countries when partner nation funds are unavailable. As of
December 2012, DOD had not obtained such guidance from Congress, according to officials from the Section 1206 program office. Mr. BARBER.
Ms. St. Laurent, in your testimony you cited the need in building partner capacity to equip, advise, and assist host
countries’ security forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and
protecting their resources and territories. You also state that building the security capacity of partner nations is a key mission
area for the Defense Department and a worldwide priority for the United States. A great example of this is the success of the
Iron Dome missile program in Israel. Developed with the Israelis and funded by the United States, just a few
months ago in the conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, this system showed its great promise and performed superbly. I believe it is
a critical investment that needs to be fully funded and opportunities for co-production explored, so that
we may continue our commitment and deliver a weapon system that will ensure the security, safety,
and prosperity of Israel. As the Defense Department continues to emphasize building partner capacity, do you agree that the need for
efficient and effective coordination with foreign partners, such as has been achieved thus far with Iron Dome, has become increasingly
important to our defense strategy? And do you believe that the United States should continue investing in mutually beneficial relationships
with our allies even in the face of our country’s fiscal challenges because of the long-term benefit to our global security?
AT – FMS k/
BPC can provide training, repair, maintenance, upgrades, and equipment
GAO 17 United States Government Accountability Office. The Government Accountability Office is a
States. United States Government Accountability Office. The Government Accountability Office is a
States. “Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and
Department of State Security Assistance Efforts.” GAO.gov, United States Government Accountability
Office, 24 Mar. 2017, www.gao.gov/assets/690/683682.pdf. // ank
22. Counternarcotics Law Enforcement Support ("1004") Provide support for the counternarcotics
activities of any other department or agency of the federal government or of any state, local, or foreign
law enforcement agency. This program allows DOD to work directly with the relevant law enforcement
agency of the partner government without going through the Ministry of Defense. The types of support
may include maintenance, repair, and upgrade of equipment; transportation of U.S. and foreign
personnel, supplies and equipment; counternarcoticsrelated training; and minor military construction. 10 U.S.C. § 374 note, Additional support for counter-drug activities and activities to
counter transnational organized crime 23. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA): Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Reduce the risks from WMD through initiatives that dismantle strategic weapons delivery systems and
infrastructure and enhance security and safety of WMD and fissile material during transportation and storage. This program also seeks to reduce bioterror attacks by consolidating and securing dangerous pathogens, enhancing
partner states' capacity to detect and report bioterror attacks, and facilitating biological research partnerships. 50 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq, Program Authorities 24. DTRA/CTR: Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) Assist in the
establishment of safe and secure chemical weapons destruction facilities in Russia to destroy nerveagent-filled artillery munitions. This program also provides equipment, supplies, construction, and information sharing. 50 U.S.C. §
3711 et seq, Program Authorities 25. DTRA/CTR: Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE) Enable the securing of especially dangerous pathogens at partner nations' laboratories or facilities to prevent these pathogens from
reaching actors (both state and nonstate) that may use them against the United States and its allies, and to fund research in the partner nations to improve their capacities to secure the pathogens. 50 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq, Program
Authorities 26. DTRA/CTR: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA): Global Nuclear Security (GNS) Enable the securing of vulnerable nuclear material and transitioning of sustainment responsibilities for physical security upgrades
to respective countries by providing training, equipment, supplies, and construction. This program augments security enhancements identified for Russia and expands nuclear security cooperation to countries and regions
consistent with legislation. 50 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq, Program Authorities 27. DTRA Small Arms/Light Weapons (SALW) Program Reduce proliferation of conventional weapons by assisting partner nations with the security, safety, and
management of state-controlled stockpiles of arms, ammunition, and explosives. Teams of SALW experts provide foreign governments with onsite assessments, technical advice, and orientation to international best practices for
physical security and stockpile management. By securing and managing these assets, the DTRA SALW branch helps diminish the availability of weapons and ammunition to terrorists and insurgents, reduce regional exposure to
destabilizing cross-border weapons transfers, and minimize the risk of catastrophic ammunition accidents. 50 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq, Program Authorities 10 U.S.C. § 407, Humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled
conventional munitions assistance: authority; limitations 28. DTRA/CTR: Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) Support the destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems and associated infrastructure in Russia and
Ukraine, including deployed warheads, deployed and nondeployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. 50 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq, Program Authorities 29. Defense Institution
Legal Capacity Building (conducted through the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) Provide professional legal education, training and democratic rule-of-law programs for international military and related
civilians globally. 10 U.S.C. § 168 note, Defense institution capacity building program 30. Defense Institution Reform Initiative Provide subject-matter experts to work with partner nations to assess organizational weaknesses and
share best practices for addressing shortfalls in support of defense institution building. 10 U.S.C. § 168 note, Defense institution capacity building program Pub. L. No. 114-113 (2015), Department of Defense Appropriations Act,
2016, Title IX, Operation and Maintenance, Operation & Maintenance Defense-Wide 31. Defense Personnel Exchange Program Overall authority for the exchange of military and civilian DOD personnel with allied and friendly
countries and international organizations. 10 U.S.C. § 168 note, Agreements for exchange of defense personnel between United States and foreign countries 10 U.S.C. § 168 note, Authority for nonreciprocal exchanges of defense
personnel between the United States and foreign countries 32. Defense Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Information Exchange Program Engage in information exchanges with partner nations to improve their
RDT&E capabilities. 10 U.S.C. § 2358, Research and development projects 10 U.S.C. § 2350a, Cooperative research & development agreements: NATO organizations; allied and friendly foreign countries 33. Demining: Humanitarian
Assistance Provide equipment, supplies, construction, and air and sealifts to partner nations to improve their demining and humanitarian assistancerelated capabilities. 10 U.S.C. § 2561, Humanitarian assistance 10 U.S.C. § 401,
Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations 10 U.S.C. § 404, Foreign disaster assistance 10 U.S.C. § 407, Humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance:
authority; limitations 10 U.S.C. § 2557, Excess nonlethal supplies: availability for humanitarian relief, domestic emergency assistance, and homeless veterans assistance 34. Demining: Humanitarian Demining Assistance and
Stockpiled Conventional Munitions Assistance Provide education, training, and technical assistance with respect to explosive safety; the detection and clearance of landmines and other explosive remnants of war; and the disposal,
demilitarization, physical security, and management of potentially dangerous stockpiles of explosive ordnance. 35. Demining: Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program Engage in research, procurement, and
other measures needed to eliminate the requirement for non-self-destructing antipersonnel landmines for training personnel engaged in demining and countermining operations and to defend the United States and its allies from
armed aggression across the Korean demilitarized zone. 10 U.S.C. § 407, Humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance: authority; limitations 22 U.S.C. § 2796d, Loan of materials, supplies, and
equipment for research and development purposes 36. Demining: Humanitarian Mine Action Program Provide training, equipment, and supplies to partner nations to improve their demining and humanitarian assistance
capabilities. 10 U.S.C. § 407, Humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance: authority; limitations 10 U.S.C. § 2561, Humanitarian assistance 37. Demining: Overseas Humanitarian Assistance
and Civic Aid Provide, among other things, training to host-nation personnel in demining techniques and awareness and provide training and access benefits to U.S. Special Operations Forces. 10 U.S.C. § 401, Humanitarian and civic
assistance provided in conjunction with military operations 10 U.S.C. § 402, Transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries 10 U.S.C. § 404, Foreign disaster assistance 10 U.S.C. § 407, Humanitarian demining
assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance: authority; limitations 10 U.S.C. § 2557, Excess nonlethal supplies: availability for humanitarian relief, domestic emergency assistance, and homeless veterans assistance
10 U.S.C. § 2561, Humanitarian assistance 38. Department of Defense Counternarcotics Assistance to Certain Countries ("1033") Provide nonlethal defense articles and services for counternarcotics purposes to foreign governments
specified in law. This is the only counternarcotics program that can provide equipment to a partner nation. This program also allows DOD to work directly with relevant law enforcement agencies of partner nations without going
39. Department of Defense

through the Ministry of Defense. Pub. L. No. 105-85 (1997), § 1033, as amended, Authority to Provide Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities of Cert
Participation in European Program on Multilateral Exchange of Air Transportation and Air Refueling
Services (ATARES Program) Authorize participation in the Movement Coordination Centre Europe's ATARES
Program with the purpose of providing mutual airlift and in-flight refueling services to partner nations'
air forces. 10 U.S.C. § 2350c note, Department of Defense participation in European program on multilateral
exchange of air transportation and air refueling services 22. Counternarcotics Law Enforcement Support ("1004") Provide support for the counternarcotics
activities of any other department or agency of the federal government or of any state, local, or foreign law enforcement agency. This program allows DOD to work directly with the relevant law enforcement agency of the partner
government without going through the Ministry of Defense. The types of support may include maintenance, repair, and upgrade of equipment; transportation of U.S. and foreign personnel, supplies and equipment;
counternarcoticsrelated training; and minor military construction. 10 U.S.C. § 374 note, Additional support for counter-drug activities and activities to counter transnational organized crime 23. Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA): Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Reduce the risks from WMD through initiatives that dismantle strategic weapons delivery systems and infrastructure and enhance security and safety of WMD and fissile material during
transportation and storage. This program also seeks to reduce bioterror attacks by consolidating and securing dangerous pathogens, enhancing partner states' capacity to detect and report bioterror attacks, and facilitating
biological research partnerships. 50 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq, Program Authorities 24. DTRA/CTR: Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) Assist in the establishment of safe and secure chemical weapons destruction facilities in Russia to
destroy nerveagent-filled artillery munitions. This program also provides equipment, supplies, construction, and information sharing. 50 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq, Program Authorities 25. DTRA/CTR: Cooperative Biological Engagement
(CBE) Enable the securing of especially dangerous pathogens at partner nations' laboratories or facilities to prevent these pathogens from reaching actors (both state and nonstate) that may use them against the United States and
its allies, and to fund research in the partner nations to improve their capacities to secure the pathogens. 50 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq, Program Authorities 26. DTRA/CTR: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA): Global Nuclear
Security (GNS) Enable the securing of vulnerable nuclear material and transitioning of sustainment responsibilities for physical security upgrades to respective countries by providing training, equipment, supplies, and construction.
This program augments security enhancements identified for Russia and expands nuclear security cooperation to countries and regions consistent with legislation. 50 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq, Program Authorities 27. DTRA Small
Arms/Light Weapons (SALW) Program Reduce proliferation of conventional weapons by assisting partner nations with the security, safety, and management of state-controlled stockpiles of arms, ammunition, and explosives.
Teams of SALW experts provide foreign governments with onsite assessments, technical advice, and orientation to international best practices for physical security and stockpile management. By securing and managing these
assets, the DTRA SALW branch helps diminish the availability of weapons and ammunition to terrorists and insurgents, reduce regional exposure to destabilizing cross-border weapons transfers, and minimize the risk of catastrophic
ammunition accidents. 50 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq, Program Authorities 10 U.S.C. § 407, Humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance: authority; limitations 28. DTRA/CTR: Strategic Offensive
Arms Elimination (SOAE) Support the destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems and associated infrastructure in Russia and Ukraine, including deployed warheads, deployed and nondeployed intercontinental ballistic
missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. 50 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq, Program Authorities 29. Defense Institution Legal Capacity Building (conducted through the Defense Institute of International Legal
Studies (DIILS) Provide professional legal education, training and democratic rule-of-law programs for international military and related civilians globally. 10 U.S.C. § 168 note, Defense institution capacity building program 30.
Defense Institution Reform Initiative Provide subject-matter experts to work with partner nations to assess organizational weaknesses and share best practices for addressing shortfalls in support of defense institution building. 10
U.S.C. § 168 note, Defense institution capacity building program Pub. L. No. 114-113 (2015), Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2016, Title IX, Operation and Maintenance, Operation & Maintenance Defense-Wide 31.
Defense Personnel Exchange Program Overall authority for the exchange of military and civilian DOD personnel with allied and friendly countries and international organizations. 10 U.S.C. § 168 note, Agreements for exchange of
defense personnel between United States and foreign countries 10 U.S.C. § 168 note, Authority for nonreciprocal exchanges of defense personnel between the United States and foreign countries 32. Defense Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Information Exchange Program Engage in information exchanges with partner nations to improve their RDT&E capabilities. 10 U.S.C. § 2358, Research and development projects 10 U.S.C.
§ 2350a, Cooperative research & development agreements: NATO organizations; allied and friendly foreign countries 33. Demining: Humanitarian Assistance Provide equipment, supplies, construction, and air and sealifts to partner
nations to improve their demining and humanitarian assistancerelated capabilities. 10 U.S.C. § 2561, Humanitarian assistance 10 U.S.C. § 401, Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations 10
U.S.C. § 404, Foreign disaster assistance 10 U.S.C. § 407, Humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance: authority; limitations 10 U.S.C. § 2557, Excess nonlethal supplies: availability for
humanitarian relief, domestic emergency assistance, and homeless veterans assistance 34. Demining: Humanitarian Demining Assistance and Stockpiled Conventional Munitions Assistance Provide education, training, and technical
assistance with respect to explosive safety; the detection and clearance of landmines and other explosive remnants of war; and the disposal, demilitarization, physical security, and management of potentially dangerous stockpiles
of explosive ordnance. 35. Demining: Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program Engage in research, procurement, and other measures needed to eliminate the requirement for non-self-destructing antipersonnel
landmines for training personnel engaged in demining and countermining operations and to defend the United States and its allies from armed aggression across the Korean demilitarized zone. 10 U.S.C. § 407, Humanitarian
demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance: authority; limitations 22 U.S.C. § 2796d, Loan of materials, supplies, and equipment for research and development purposes 36. Demining: Humanitarian Mine
Action Program Provide training, equipment, and supplies to partner nations to improve their demining and humanitarian assistance capabilities. 10 U.S.C. § 407, Humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional
munitions assistance: authority; limitations 10 U.S.C. § 2561, Humanitarian assistance 37. Demining: Overseas Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Aid Provide, among other things, training to host-nation personnel in demining
techniques and awareness and provide training and access benefits to U.S. Special Operations Forces. 10 U.S.C. § 401, Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations 10 U.S.C. § 402,
Transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries 10 U.S.C. § 404, Foreign disaster assistance 10 U.S.C. § 407, Humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions assistance: authority;
limitations 10 U.S.C. § 2557, Excess nonlethal supplies: availability for humanitarian relief, domestic emergency assistance, and homeless veterans assistance 10 U.S.C. § 2561, Humanitarian assistance 38. Department of Defense
Counternarcotics Assistance to Certain Countries ("1033") Provide nonlethal defense articles and services for counternarcotics purposes to foreign governments specified in law. This is the only counternarcotics program that can
provide equipment to a partner nation. This program also allows DOD to work directly with relevant law enforcement agencies of partner nations without going through the Ministry of Defense. Pub. L. No. 105-85 (1997), § 1033, as
amended, Authority to Provide Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities of Cert 39. Department of Defense Participation in European Program on Multilateral Exchange of Air Transportation and Air Refueling Services (ATARES
Authorize participation in the Movement Coordination Centre Europe's ATARES Program with the
Program)
purpose of providing mutual airlift and in-flight refueling services to partner nations' air forces. 10 U.S.C. § 2350c
note, Department of Defense participation in European program on multilateral exchange of air transportation and air refueling services
CCL
Notes
FMS and DCS exclusively refer to the USML
Abramson, 19 - Jeff Abramson is a non-resident senior fellow for arms control and conventional arms
transfers at the Arms Control Association. He also manages the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor,
the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions, and
organizes the Forum on the Arms Trade. Prior to joining the Monitor, he served as a policy advisor and
director to the secretariat of Control Arms, the global civil society alliance that championed the adoption
of the Arms Trade Treaty that for the first time established global regulations for the trade in a wide
array of conventional weapons. He is also the former deputy director of the Arms Control Association
and former managing editor of their publication Arms Control Today. (“High School Policy Debate
Resources - 2019-2020” https://www.forumarmstrade.org/hspolicydebate.html
What are Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales?
The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program manages government-to-government purchases of U.S.
defense articles and defense services that are on the U.S. Munitions List (USML) for export to foreign
countries. The Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) program regulates U.S. companies' international sales of
U.S. defense articles and defense services that are on the USML. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 provide the primary legal basis for the FMS and DCS programs,
which require Congressional notification and other reporting steps.
At times, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is used in FMS and DCS transactions. Items transferred as
Excess Defense Articles (EDAs) typically are not counted as FMS and DCS, but may be included in some
data sources. Many other forms of security assistance, which often involve weapons transfers and/or
training/services, also exist outside of FMS and DCS.
Traditionally, items sold from the Commerce Control List (CCL), be they items with both commercial and
military applications (so-called "dual-use" goods), or military items now listed in the CCL 600 series, are
not considered DCS, although some sources create confusion on this issue.
1nc
The plan get’s circumvented – it’ll be folded into trump’s CCL effort to deregulate arm
sales
Jeff Abramson 2-20-19 -- nonresident senior fellow for arms control and conventional arms transfers at
the Arms Control Association. (“Congress should block rule changes for firearm exports”
https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2019-03-26/abramson-testimony-proposed-small-arms-transfers)
mba-alb
Trump administration is pushing forward with plans to

As the nation is reminded of the tragic consequences of gun violence with the one-year anniversary of the Parkland school shooting, the
expedite the export abroad of the same kind of military-style weapons used mass shootings in many of the that have taken
These are not the commodities that the United States should make easier to export.
place in recent years. Congress can and should
which would put the Department of Commerce in charge of regulating these exports, removing
stop the changes,
them from the State Department-led U.S. Munitions List (USML ). At the core of these proposed changes is the mistaken belief that firearms do not merit tighter scrutiny
, the changes would also make it easier for gun

under the State Department-led munitions control list because they are neither high-tech nor do they provide unique military advantages. Of course
manufacturers to sell and profit from these weapons transfers. In reality, these are some of the weapons that fuel criminal violence, civil conflict and facilitate human right
abuses by authoritarian governments around the world. In response, Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced the "Stopping the Traffic in Overseas Proliferation of Ghost Guns Act" that would prohibit the removal of firearms
from the State Department-led list. Menendez argues: "Every terrorist and criminal that wants to hijack an airplane with Americans on board will more easily be able to smuggle 3D-printed, virtually undetectable guns aboard. Every school, every government facility, every hospital, here
and abroad, will become even more vulnerable to gun violence through this change. This is madness.” Over in the House, Rep. Eliot L. Engel (D-N.Y.), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Rep. Norma Torres (D-Calif.) have introduced a similar measure, the "Prevent Crime and
We need proper congressional oversight so we can step in and make sure these weapons
Terrorism Act." They say: “ ,
aren’t sent to bad actors They are right , including terrorists, drug cartels, human rights abusers or violent criminals." . Under current State Department implementation, online plans for 3-D printed guns are traditionally
Putting the Commerce

deemed an export and therefore regulated. The administration's attempt last year to allow Defense Distributed to post 3-D printing plans led to public outrage and lawsuits that have thus far blocked this from changing.
Department in charge would be an end-around approach that effectively leads to deregulation, in part
because Commerce would not have incentive to protect copyrights when 3-D print advocates are
instead pushing to make their weapons designs freely available. Transfer of export control to Commerce
would also remove Congress from their current oversight role. Today, Congress is notified of potential
commercial sales of firearms under USML category I when they were valued at just $1 million, but no
such notifications exist for items on the Commerce Control List. A 30-day review period has started on the rules, started when the administration sent them to Congress on
If not halted or significantly

Feb. 4. Senator Menendez is expected to put a "hold" on the rule changes, but more permanent legislation, such as those acts now introduced in both chambers, is a better long-term approach.
changed, the new rules would risk the safety of people both at home and abroad and continue the
cynical approach of the Trump administration to treat weapons as any other trade commodity,
upsetting decades of more-responsible U.S. arms transfer policy.
2nc
It's a core priority – they’ll move whatever weapons they can
William D. Hartung 8-21-13 -- director of the Common Defense Campaign: Arms & Security Project at
the Center for International Policy. (“Risks of Loosening Arms Export Controls Far Outweigh Benefits”
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/risks-loosening-arms-export-controls-far-outweigh-
benefits)mba-alb
the administration
An Obama administration plan to loosen U.S. arms export controls could make it easier for weapons to find their way into the wrong hands—a risk that far outweighs the measure’s paltry economic benefits. In August 2009,
launched ECRI designed to streamline U.S. arms export controls,

the Export Control Reform Initiative ( ), The enhance national security, and grow the economy.
administration said it wanted to eliminate or reduce controls on items of limited national security
concern while increasing controls on more dangerous exports. The policy is being implemented in stages and the first round of changes will take effect in October. But the
The loosening of arms export

administration’s proposed reforms are unlikely to accomplish either goal, according to a report issued by the Center for International Policy, with support from the Open Society Foundations.
controls is being justified on the grounds that selling U.S.-made weapons and parts to America’s
potential military adversaries does not pose a significant security threat as long as the exports are nearly
obsolete or readily available. This narrow focus on controlling the flow of modern equipment ignores the danger of giving countries of concern access to less sophisticated weapons and components. Iran, for example, wants spare parts
to keep its aged American-made fighter jets and attack helicopters flying. China wants older technology that it can copy and manufacture. Other regimes want the means of daily repression, like low-tech guns and communications and surveillance equipment. Under the envisioned Obama
A central element of the administration’s new policy has been to move

reforms, none of these items would be kept behind the fence of U.S. export controls.
thousands of items from the United States Munitions List (USML)—a compendium of arms and arms-
related technologies monitored by the State Department—to the Commerce Control List (CCL), which
subjects equipment destined for export to less rigorous scrutiny. In fact, the White House has asserted
that it eventually intends to permit a significant percentage of the items that are now being transferred
off of the USML to be exported without a license. This means that oversight would be lifted from these
items. To promote the reform package, the administration is touting its economic benefits. A former
assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, Andrew Shapiro, has argued that the
administration’s export control reform would “have a real impact on our economy at a time when
competition is even more fierce and at a time when our manufacturing base could really use a boost.”
But neither the administration nor the arms and aerospace industries, the major supporters of the export reform effort, have provided credible evidence that loosening controls will have substantial economic benefits. In fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that export reform is
unlikely to significantly increase U.S. sales of military technology. The United States already accounts for nearly 80 percent of the global arms market. Even a radical reform of arms export controls is unlikely to push that figure much higher. As one business analyst has noted, the economic
benefits of arms export reform, if they exist at all, are likely to be “infinitesimal.” It is even possible that loosening restrictions on arms exports could reduce U.S. employment. Thomas Buffenbarger, president of the International Association of Machinists, the union which represents the
bulk of the workers in the arms and aerospace industries, has warned that “the less stringent controls provided under the CCL could lead to further transfers of technology or production from the U.S. to another country,” with potentially devastating consequences for U.S.-based
production and employment. A number of steps should be taken to ensure that the administration’s export control reform initiative does not undermine critical policy goals. First, there should be a moratorium on moving additional items from the USML to the CCL until strict safeguards
have been developed to prevent the transfer or retransfer of U.S. arms and arms technology to terrorists, human rights abusers, or countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Second, Congress and the administration should review the Export Control Reform Initiative’s impact on
stopping arms transfers to dictatorships and human rights abusers. They should strengthen those restrictions to ensure that items moved from the USML to the CCL receive the same level of human rights screening they currently undergo. These changes should be embedded in law, not
just left to the discretion of a given administration. Finally, the Department of Commerce should undertake a detailed analysis of the employment impacts that may result from transferring items from the USML to the CCL or from decontrolling them altogether. These economic effects
should then be used to help determine whether to ease controls on a given item.
The plan’s weapons will be shifted to CCL – that causes a net increase in sales
Colby Goodman 3-5-17 -- director of the Security Assistance Monitor where he leads research and
analysis on U.S. foreign security assistance around the world. (“Commerce Department Boosts U.S.
Arms Sales Deliveries to Record High” http://securityassistance.org/blog/commerce-department-boosts-
us-arms-sales-deliveries-record-high)mba-alb
U.S. arms sales deliveries jumped to more than $25 billion in FY 2015, increasing the total value of U.S. arms deliveries by at least $5 billion over recent years, according to latest data from several U.S.
government reports.The major increase in U.S. arms sales deliveries comes from a relatively new Commerce
Department program established in part to help U.S. companies export certain types of military
equipment more easily. Some arms industry associations are already urging the Trump administration to
further reduce controls on defense companies exporting arms, but it’s too early to tell what specific controls the administration would seek to reduce.
The new program was created as part of the Obama administration’s hardly noticed overhaul of U.S.
arms export control regulations called the Export Control Reform Initiative. Based on a White House determination that the U.S. export
system was undermining the competitiveness of defense industries key to U.S. national security with an overcomplicated structure that tries to control too much, the administration started to
reduce controls on arms of “lesser military significance” to the United States in January 2014. By the end of FY 2015, the
administration had moved oversight of tens of thousands of arms from the State Department’s more
strictly controlled Direct Commercial Sales program to the Commerce Department’s more loosely
controlled 600 Series program. The changes already appear to have ushered in significant increases in
U.S. commercial arms deliveries. The total value for all commercial arms sales deliveries in FY 2015 was
$9.3 billion, with the 600 Series program accounting for $4.5 billion and Direct Commercial Sales
program accounting for $4.8 billion. The total value of commercial arms sales deliveries was $5.2 billion in FY 2013 and $3.8 billion in FY 2012 when the State Department’s program was
operating as the only commercial arms sales program. The U.S. government also delivered $16.7 billion worth of arms abroad in FY 2015 through the government-to-government arms sales program called Foreign Military Sales.
The major jump in U.S. commercial arms sales deliveries from FY 2014 to FY 2015 comes in part from noticeable increases to the Asian countries of Australia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. In FY 2014, for instance, U.S.
companies delivered $8.8 million worth of arms to Taiwan through the Direct Commercial Sales program. In calendar year 2015, U.S. companies delivered a total of $127 million in arms to the country through the 600 Series
program, according to data released by the Commerce Department. U.S. companies also delivered relatively high-dollar amounts of arms through the 600 Series program to Germany, Israel, Iraq, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates in 2015. Among the 125 countries that received military equipment through the 600 Series program, the most popular military categories were military aircraft, military gas turbine
engines, military electronics, and ground vehicles. Although the bulk of the arms delivered under the military aircraft category are likely parts and components for a range of military aircraft such as the F-16, U.S. companies can
export fully assembled unarmed military cargo and observation aircraft as well as military helicopters that the State Department once considered “significant military equipment.” The Obama administration has kept closely
. One reason that U.S. companies may be increasingly

guarded U.S. military technology and firearms, artillery, and ammunition under the State Department’s control
using the 600 Series program is that they can export their products more quickly and with fewer
controls. Companies are able to export most of the arms under Commerce Department control to 36 countries closely allied to the United States, including Turkey, without U.S. pre-approval through the Strategic Trade
Authorization (STA) license exemption. They may also use eight other license exemptions or several license-free options to export without U.S. pre-approval. Based on Commerce Department data, U.S. companies exported about
companies are also pleased that they

$1.5 billion worth of arms in calendar year 2015 using one of these license exemptions available to them under the 600 Series program. Some U.S.
no longer have to be concerned about controls related defense services, broker licenses, registration,
and registration fees. Companies can also more easily export certain types of military equipment to countries such
as China and Venezuela that the State Department’s Direct Commercial Sales program often excluded from receiving arms. In 2015, for instance, U.S. companies exported $267,053 worth of military aircraft, military electronics, and
ground vehicles to China. Since FY 2010, U.S. companies only exported $17,700 worth of commercial arms sales to China using a presidential waiver. U.S. companies also exported $458,654 worth of military electronics to
Venezuela in 2015, but the country hasn’t received U.S. arms deliveries since FY 2009 through the other well-established U.S. arms sales programs. Given the extensive loosening of U.S. arms export controls under the Obama
Aerospace Industries Association told

administration, it’s somewhat surprising that defense industry associations are already asking for more reductions in U.S. arms export controls. Representatives of the
hope that the Trump administration continues to ease exports of military aircraft items,
Defense News that they
including potentially creating license exemptions for companies exporting and importing items
associated with F-35 fighter jets under State Department control. Defense industry representatives have also raised concerns about U.S. government
delays in approving certain arms exports. In a prominent firearms industry magazine, industry experts also indicated that moving U.S. government oversight of firearms exports from the State Department to the Commerce
Department is “ very doable” under the Trump administration. In support of reducing regulations, President Trump issued an executive order calling for the elimination of two U.S. regulations for every one regulation created. In
early February, the Trump administration also reportedly sought to remove Obama administration holds on U.S. exports precision-guided missiles to Saudi Arabia and F-16s to Bahrain over human rights concerns. U.S. arms export
compliance attorneys have also noted that Trump will likely honor Obama administration’s reduced sanctions on Iran and Sudan. Although the above actions make it possible that his administration will push for further arms export
control reductions, it’s hard to know what kinds of reduced controls the administration would support without key leadership positions filled within State and Commerce. Within the Commerce Department, it will be important to
Given the amount of commercial arms exports going through the

see who fills the post of assistant secretary for export administration.
Commerce Department with less oversight, it will also be critical to monitor arms sales and
enforcement actions through this new program to ensure that they match U.S. foreign policy
interests.
Trump is actively increasing the CCL list for “economic security” – increases sales and
risk of human rights abuse
Jeff Abramson 6-7-18 -- nonresident senior fellow for arms control and conventional arms transfers at
the Arms Control Association (“Trump Favors Arms Industry in Effort to Loosen Export Controls”
https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2018-06/trump-favors-arms-industry-effort-loosen-export-
controls) mba-alb
administration is pushing to make sweeping changes

The Trump in order to sell more weapons, in U.S. conventional arms export policies
more quickly, and typically with less transparency and oversight One reason given for these changes— .
advancing economic security the policies are dangerous, creating new risks that these
—is simply faulty. Worse still,
weapons end up in the hands of terrorists and international criminals and further undermining the
promotion of human rights norms that should be central to U.S. actions. In mid-April, the president issued a new conventional arms transfer policy, giving the
regulatory changes would transfer rifles

State Department 60 days to submit an implementation plan. In May, the administration also started a 45-day public comment period on that the control of assault and other
to the Commerce Department

weapons of choice in armed violence . If the administration is serious about claims that these changes make for responsible policy, it should add much greater transparency into the arms transfer and
Congress, if it does not act to stop these new approaches, should make sure, at a minimum, that
monitoring process.
it maintains meaningful oversight to prevent abuses that undermine longstanding U.S. foreign policy
objectives designed to avoid fueling conflicts around the world and propping up regimes that do not
respect the basic human rights of their people . Background On April 19, Donald Trump issued a national security presidential memorandum replacing a January 2014 presidential policy directive that, like the
1995 iteration from the Clinton administration, included an unweighted list of criteria to guide decisions on U.S. conventional arms transfers. Common to these policies are goals to improve the security of the United States and its allies, prevent proliferation, and support relevant
Trump explicitly adds “economic security” as a factor in considering

multilateral agreements. With the backing of major arms producers, the approach
whether to approve arms exports It promises that “the executive branch will advocate strongly” on
.
behalf of U.S. companies and “maximize the ability” of U.S. industry “to grow and support allies and
partners The new
.” The memorandum retains many of the same provisions regarding human rights as the Obama-era conventional arms transfer policy, although consolidating their reference to a single section rather than reiterating them throughout.
policy does not explicitly say that past records on human rights will be a factor in decisions It does
, however, .
contain a new commitment to “facilitate” ally and partner efforts “to reduce the risk of national or
coalition operations causing civilian harm. ” Whether the implementation plan due soon from the Secretary of State explains how this will be done remains to be seen, but it is expected that training of forces will be
touted as a critical component. Such training was written into arms sales last year to Saudi Arabia and Nigeria. Proposed changes to the regulation of exports were announced May 14 and published in the Federal Register May 24, beginning a public comment period that ends in July.
Under the proposal,

Specifically, the rules relate to the first three categories of the United States Munitions List (USML) maintained under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), whose lead administrator is the Department of State.
many items would move from the USML to the Commerce Control List (CCL) to become part of the
Export Administration Regulations (EAR whose lead administrator is the Commerce Department. ), Most notably, non-
The primary rationale given for the change

automatic and semi-automatic firearms and their ammunition currently controlled under USML category I would move to new EAR 500-series classifications in the CCL.
is that these weapons no longer merit tight control The Department of State is engaged in . According to the State Department:
an effort to revise the U.S. Munitions List so that its scope is limited to those defense articles that
provide the United States with a critical military or intelligence advantage or, in the case of weapons,
are inherently for military end use. The articles now controlled by USML Categories I, II, and III that would be removed from the USML under this proposed rule do not meet this standard, including many items which are widely
available in retail outlets in the United States and abroad. The revisions were drafted during the previous administration’s export reform control initiative, which sought to build higher fences on fewer items. During Obama’s presidency, action was taken on 18 of the USML’s 21 categories,
but frequent mass shootings and an administration more supportive of gun control efforts contributed to the firearms categories going unpublished. Critics of President Trump, such as Senator Ben Cardin (D-Md.),have pointed to the
domestic U.S. gun lobby as the real driver behind these changes and called the decision to move forward “ politically tone deaf as our nation reckons with a gun violence
epidemic.” Adding in Transparency and Enabling Assessment As the Trump administration works to implement these changes, it should build in transparency and process changes that make it possible to assess whether U.S. arms exports are meeting the stated goals of the new policies.
administration has shown less restraint,

This would not only be good public policy, but such an approach has the potential to address rising congressional and international distress about an that
including by moving ahead with arms sales to Bahrain, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia that the previous
administration had held back on due to serious human rights concerns . As a start, a public accounting and evaluation of training that might go along with arms sales
is desperately needed, especially if it will be a cornerstone of an effort to protect civilians. With another round of controversial precision-guided munition sales expected soon to Saudi Arabia (as well as the UAE), it is imperative that much more is shared about how training is done, who
receives it, and whether it works. As the Saudi-led coalition continues to hit civilian areas and an invasion of the port of Hodeida looms that threatens to further exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, it is not enough to simply say training is important. It must make a difference.
Similarly, much greater transparency into the arms sales process at a public level is critical. Under current procedure Congress is notified of pot ential major arms sales whether through the foreign military sales (FMS) process or via direct commercial sales (DCS), starting a review period by
which it could block agreement to the sale. Unlike FMS notifications, DCS notifications are not posted on a publicly accessible website, giving the American people less time to inform their representatives of any concerns. If the administration wants to make it easier for companies to
negotiate their arms sales, it should also improve transparency into them. While Congress can block or amend an arms sale up until a weapon is delivered, those deliveries often occur years after notification. There is typically much less public attention on arms sales during this period. If
the administration wants to speed the time between agreement and delivery, it should agree to also make clear when a delivery is imminent, so as to create predictable moments for oversight. In 2014, Congress created a mechanism for receiving notification at least 30 days before
delivery when requested on select sales, but has only used the authority once. The administration should instead make this standard on all sales and make it public. Public reporting afterward, via the State Department’s so-called 655 report, also now has less detail than in the past. These
reports, as well as others on end-use monitoring, should provide information on the number of specific weapons involved and other data, rather than broad categorical details. Importantly, reports from the Commerce Department should also impr ove in detail, especially if the changes on
firearm exports are put into place that transfer oversight away from the State Department. Without these specifics, it becomes more difficult not only to assess these policy changes, but to further goals such as combating illicit trafficking and weapons flows to terrorists and other
unintended users. A recent report from the Center for Civilians in Conflict and Stimson Center offers an array of good suggestions that run the life of a weapon—from pre-transfer to end-use monitoring—with “trigger” mechanisms along the way that allow for reassessment as situations
change. Those recommendations, primarily focused on protecting civilians but also relevant to promoting human rights and international law, deserve strong co nsideration. The Value of Congressional Oversight In 2002 Congress amended its notification threshold so that it would be
informed of potential commercial sales of firearms under USML category I when they were valued at just $1 million, as opposed to $14 million for other major weapons sales. During a Sept. 26 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, then-ranking member Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.)
pointed to forestalling small arms sales to Turkey and the Philippines as recent examples of Congress’ needed role. In 2017, the administration notified Congress of more than $660 million of proposed firearms sales regulated under the USML, according to the Security Assistance Monitor.
No similar statutory requirement of congressional notification exists for most arms sales under the
CCL meaning Congress would lose its oversight role on these weapons
, . It could take steps to require that notification continues. In response to the new measures,
. Weakened Congressional oversight of international small arms

Cardin said May 15 For years, I advised both the Obama and Trump Administrations against this type of transfer
and munitions sales is extremely hazardous to global security. Small arms and light weapons are among the most lethal weapons that we and other countries export because these
are the weapons that are most likely to be used to commit atrocities and suppress human rights, either by individuals, non-state groups, or governmental security and para-military forces. While Congress does not have control over the president’s conventional arms transfer policy, it can
mandate the types of transparency recommended above, including an expansion on pre-delivery notifications. It could also pass legislation that retains the classification of firearms as military weapons and placement on the USML. The Administration’s Faulty “Economic Security” Excuse
According to the latest report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the United States remains the leading and expanding provider of major conventional weapons into a growing international arms market. Russia, long the number two arms exporter, is in
decline as Washington accounts for more than one-third of all major weapons deliveries. It begs credulity to argue that the United States needs a special push in order to compete in the international arms market. Linkages of U.S. jobs to international arms sales are also overblown as
arms deals frequently come with co-production agreements or other incentives that support jobs abroad rather than at home. At a more fundamental level, U.S. arms are not like any other commodity and should not be treated as such. These are first and foremost killing machines. The
If more weapons flow to countries with poor human rights

over-emphasis on economic security threatens to jeopardize higher priorities, including peace and security concerns.
records, norms around responsible weapons use and transfer will be harder to build and uphold . Regarding firearms,
these weapons are controlled because a significant amount of violence that occurs, including against U.S. military and law enforcement personnel, is inflicted by small arms. Research indicates that the types of weapons being transferred to Commerce control—AR-15s and AK-47 style
assault rifles and their ammunition—are “weapons of choice” of drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and other Latin American countries. Many can also be easi ly converted to fully automatic weapons, which will remain under USML control. U.S. military members often operate their
The transfer of firearms export control to the Department of Commerce

fully-automatic-capable weapons in a semi-automatic or less-than-automatic mode.
will also likely remove a number of brokering registration requirements, may open up license
exemptions that facilitate weapons ending up in the wrong hands, and limit legal or investigative
actions to stop such results Claiming that these weapons do not have military utility because they may
.
be commercially available, are somehow less dangerous,or do not merit stronger international control,
is wrong. In the end, these policies continue the wrong-minded approach of the Trump administration
to treat weapons as any other trade commodity, threatening to undermine long-term global security
and true U.S. national security interests.
And moving reduces transparency
ABA 1-14-13 -- voluntary bar association of lawyers and law students (“Proposals to Relax Export
Controls for Significant Military Equipment” https://bit.ly/2X2o4J6) mba-alb
By removing items from the USML, the Administration would also reduce the
VI. Implications for Reporting and Notification Requirements
transparency of U.S. participation in the international arms market equipment . First, no longer considered defense articles for the purposes of
would not be tracked

commercial export licensing by the State and Defense Department’s Section 655 Annual Military Assistance Reports, mandated by section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2415 (“Section 655 Report”). Section 655 of
the FAA requires annual reporting of the “aggregate dollar value and quantity of defense articles . . . authorized by the United States and of such articles . . . provided by the United States . . . to each foreign country and international organization.” 22 U.S.C. § 2415(b). The Section 655
Report must specify whether the defense article was licensed for export under section 38 of AECA or furnished as part of the Foreign Military Sales (“FMS”) program, 22 U.S.C. § 2311 et seq., including those defense articles furnished with the financial assistance of the United States
government, such as through the Foreign Military Financing (“FMF”) program. The State Department Section 655 Reports are limited to those defense articles and defense services licensed for export under AECA as direct commercial sales and do not cover defense articles provided via
the FMS program.26 For defense articles licensed for export under 22 U.S.C. § 2778, the State Department must specify “those defense articles that were exported during the fiscal year covered by the report . . . .” 22 U.S.C. § 2415(b)(3). Section 2415(c) requires the unclassified portion of
the Section 655 Report to be made available to the public via the Internet. Currently, only the State Department makes its reports available online.27 As noted above, the State Department’s Section 655 Reports are limited to those items licensed for export under section 38 of AECA; that
. If items are removed from the USML—and thus are no longer “defense articles” for
is, exports of defense articles on the USML
purposes of section 38 of AECA—then the State Department would no longer be required by the FAA
to include information on their export in its Section 655 Report Second, any items removed from the .
USML would no longer be included in notifications to Congress required from the President under
section 36(c) of AECA, 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c), for transfers of defense articles exceeding certain dollar
threshold amounts. Indeed, with respect to commercially licensed arms sales involving Category I
firearms valued at $1 million or more, the President currently must formally notify Congress thirty (30)
calendar days prior to the approval of the license The purpose of the notifications is to provide . 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c)(1).
Congress with an opportunity to review the transaction and, if it disagrees with it, to enact a joint
resolution to block or modify If firearms are removed from the USML, then they would no longer be
it.28
covered by section 36(c) of AECA. By de-listing items from the USML, the State Department would no
longer be required to report on the export of these items as part of its Section 655 Reports, which are
linked to exports under AECA, not to exports under the EAA Congress . To fully understand the degree of military assistance being provided by the Executive Branch,
must have such information at its disposal. In addition, by transferring items to the CCL, Congress will
no longer receive notifications regarding items exported under license under section 36(c) of AECA
and thus will not be given an opportunity to weigh in on transactions with potentially far-reaching
implications for U.S. foreign policy and national security The Administration’s plan to transfer items .
from the USML, would greatly reduce Congress’s visibility into a substantial portion of the
therefore,
international market for arms and thereby undermine one of AECA’s central purposes.
AT USML k/
It’s the same regulations
DOC – BIS ND – Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (“Control of Firearms, Guns,
Ammunition and Related Articles the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control under the
United States Munitions List (USML)” https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/pdfs/2207-05-4-
18-signed-commerce-firearms-proposed-rule-delivered-to-ofr-for-publication/file) mba-alb
Items
The EAR also includes well-established and well understood criteria for excluding certain information from the scope of what is “subject to the EAR.” (See part 734 of the EAR.)
that would move to the CCL would be subject to existing EAR concepts of jurisdiction and controls
related to “development” and “production,” as well operation, installation, and maintenance
“technology.” While controlling such “technology,” as well as other “technology” is important, the EAR includes criteria in part 734 that would exclude certain information and
software from control. For example, if a gun manufacturer posts a firearm’s operation and maintenance manual on the Internet, making it publicly available to anyone interested in accessing it
and without restrictions on further dissemination (i.e., unlimited distribution), the operation and maintenance information included in that published operation and maintenance manual
would no longer be “subject to the EAR.” (See §§ 734.3(b) and 734.7(a).) Nonproprietary system descriptions, including for firearms and related items, are another example of information that
would not be subject to the EAR. (See § 734.3(b)(3)(v).)
Defense services and assistance applies equally to the USML as it does to the CCL
DOD and DOS 2010 (“Section 1248 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public
Law 111 - 84)”
https://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/1248_Report_Space_Export_Control
.pdf) mba-alb
§120.9 Defense service (a) A defense service means: (1) The furnishing of assistance (including training) using
whether in the United States or abroad, in the design,
other than public domain data to foreign persons (see §120.16 of this subchapter),
development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, intermediate or depot level

repair or maintenance (see §120.38 of this subchapter), modification, demilitarization, destruction, or processing of
defense articles (see §120.6 of this subchapter); (2) The furnishing of assistance to foreign persons, whether in the
United States or abroad, for the integration of any item controlled on the U.S. Munitions List (USML)
(see §121.1 of this subchapter) or the Commerce Control List (see 15 CFR part 774) into an end item (see §121.8(a) of this subchapter) or component (see §121.8(b)
of this subchapter) that is controlled as a defense article on the USML, regardless of the origin;
Pseudo FMS
1nc
Pseudo-FMS doesn’t use the FMS process - it has a separate legal framework
Rowe, 13 - Judge Advocate, United States Air Force; Major (Derek, “FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS),
PSEUDO-FMS, AND A RESPONSE TO THE GAO--IS PSEUDO-FMS THE WAY FORWARD?” 69 A.F. L. Rev.
199, lexis)
Pseudo-FMS is the name of the process that uses the FMS procedural framework, but instead of selling
defense articles and services to a customer country, the United States funds the purchase and transfer
using appropriated funds. n79 Pseudo-FMS cases, in their present form, began after September 11,
2001. n80 In 2007, Senator Carl Levin, then-Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, visited
Iraq and found that FMS cases averaged 250 days in length from LOR to delivery. n81 Senator Levin
wrote that half that time (125 days) is "still too long," which may have prompted processing of Pseudo-
FMS cases in Iraq. n82 However, regardless of when Pseudo-FMS began, it is designed to arm U.S. allies
and friendly countries [*210] that may lack financial resources, and to do so more rapidly than through
traditional FMS procedures. n83
The funds used for Pseudo-FMS are generally found in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
and the Department of Defense Appropriations Act (DoDAA). n84 However, supplemental
appropriations that are currently being used to fund Pseudo-FMS cases include the Afghanistan Security
Forces Fund (ASFF), the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF), and
the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). n85
A. Pseudo-FMS Framework and Pseudo-FMS Players
Pseudo-FMS does not fit under the same AECA provisions that FMS does because it is not a sale to a
foreign country or authorized customer, n86 which may be why it is referred to as "Pseudo." n87 In
implementing the AECA, the ITAR addresses the FMS program at section 126.6(c), but even the most
current version dated April 1, 2011, fails to mention Pseudo-FMS. n88 Although Pseudo-FMS procedures
largely mirror FMS procedures, as prescribed by the SAMM, the statutory authority for Pseudo-FMS
falls under either the FAA, section 632(b), or a different AECA provision, section 38(b)(2). n89 This can
be a source of confusion for export licensing [*211] purposes because the ITAR, 126.6(c), exempts all
FMS cases from licensing requirements, while Pseudo-FMS cases are not exempt. n90
Although the administrative procedures are similar for Pseudo-FMS and FMS, the personnel typically
performing Pseudo-FMS procedures are more frequently active duty military. n91 The majority of funds
spent on Pseudo-FMS cases during the last fiscal year went through Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Iraq Security Assistance Mission (ISAM). n92 Both CSTC-A and
ISAM are under the control of United States Central Command (CENTCOM). n93 Additionally,
[t]he organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq can loosely be termed "pseudo-SCOs" for a variety of
reasons. First, their mission, including operational advice and training, exceeds that of a normal SCO
under U.S. law. Second, these organizations are part of operational commands, rather than U.S.
embassy country teams. As such, they do not report to the U.S. Ambassador, but to the GCC
[Geographic Combatant Commander] through [military] channels. n94
Thus, at CSTC-A and ISAM, where high volumes of Pseudo-FMS cases are processed, judge advocates
play an essential role. n95 As the number and value of Pseudo-FMS cases continues to rise, more judge
advocates who understand FMS and Pseudo-FMS will be necessary.
(footnotes)
n86 22 U.S.C. § 2751, 38(b)(2). The introductory language of the AECA specifically refers to approving
"sales," and items which are "sold" and "exported." Id. Credit for this observation, and for the remainder
of this subsection belongs to Lt Col John "Ricau" Heaton, DSCA Deputy Gen. Counsel, via e-mail (Nov. 1,
2011, 1608 EST) (on file with author).
n87 A pseudo-FMS transaction has the appearance of a FMS transaction, but is not actually one because
it is not a sale to a foreign customer. The author suggests that a more transparent name could be helpful
to those not generally familiar with FMS, such as Mlitary Assistance Program via FMS Procedures.
2nc
Pseudo-FMS transfers arms but doesn’t sell them
Rowe, 13 - Judge Advocate, United States Air Force; Major (Derek, “FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS),
PSEUDO-FMS, AND A RESPONSE TO THE GAO--IS PSEUDO-FMS THE WAY FORWARD?” 69 A.F. L. Rev.
199, lexis)
As these examples demonstrate, foreign military assistance is an important part of U.S. foreign policy.
n11 This fact is underlined by upward trends in U.S. arms export value. n12 The United States has been
the world's largest exporter of arms since 1992. n13 Since 2000, the United States sold defense articles
and services to over 100 countries. n14 The primary method, by dollar value, of arming U.S. allies and
friendly countries is Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
FMS reached $ 28 billion in sales in 1993, largely due to the Gulf War. n15 2008 FMS figures exceeded $
28 billion, and in 2009, FMS agreements reached $ 30.6 billion. n16 Pseudo-FMS is also a type of foreign
security cooperation in which the United States, instead of selling arms or services to a foreign country,
procures them from defense contractors using U.S.-appropriated funds and transfers the arms to allies
or friendly countries. n17 Pseudo-FMS agreements totaled an additional $ 6.5 billion in 2009. n18 Thus,
FMS and Pseudo-FMS transfers are big business in terms of dollars, and they can have even greater
foreign policy effects by shaping the outcome when armed conflicts erupt. n19
Pseudo-FMS circumvents – its quicker and the DOD already prioritizes it

The United States provides military equipment and training to partner countries through a variety of programs. Foreign partners may pay the
U.S. government to administer the acquisition of materiel and services on their behalf through the FMS program. The United States also
services through the process used for FMS. In recent years, Congress
has expanded the number of security cooperation
programs to include several new programs with funds appropriated to the Department of Defense
(DOD), as well as administered and implemented by DOD, that focus on building partner capacity. In this
report, we refer to these programs as “pseudo-FMS” cases. FMS and pseudo-FMS transactions follow the same process,
but the roles, responsibilities, and actors involved can differ. One important difference highlighted by DOD and Department of State (State)
officials is that with FMS, there is a much greater level of involvement on the part of the partner country in defining requirements and
developing the Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). As a result,
the amount of time it takes to develop FMS cases on
average will tend to exceed the time it takes for pseudo-FMS cases. According to DOD and State officials, there may
also be differences in the types of equipment that tend to be provided via FMS as opposed to pseudo-FMS cases. For example, pseudo-FMS is
not typically used to provide complex weapons systems with long production cycles such as advanced fighter aircraft. According to DOD
and State officials, pseudo-FMS cases are often prioritized because the funds used for these programs generally are only
available for obligation for 1 or 2 years, depending on the program. These officials note that funds for traditional FMF programs do not have
such time constraints. As a result, pseudo-FMS cases are, on average, processed faster than FMS cases. Army and Air
Force officials noted that pseudo-FMS cases tend to be more labor intensive than FMS cases for several reasons. For example, according to Air
Force officials, pseudoFMS cases often involve items that frequently require a new contract because the item is not part of the Air Force
inventory. For that reason, Air Force officials noted that they cannot modify an existing contract to add additional items. Army officials said that
pseudo-FMS cases require more work because of the nature of expiring funds. This requires an acceleration of almost all their processes.
1206
Notes
Note 1206 executed by pseudo FMS
DOD IG 2017
Inspector General for the Department of Defense, “Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Build
Counterterrorism and Stability Operations Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with Section 1206/2282
Funding” July 21, 2017 https://media.defense.gov/2017/Dec/19/2001858653/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2017-
099.PDF//dmr
https://media.defense.gov/2017/Dec/19/2001858653/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2017-099.PDF
Pseudo Foreign Military Sales Case Processes
DoD Instruction 5111.19 directed the DSCA to use “the foreign military sales (FMS) pseudo-case
process” to execute approved Section 1206 projects. The process is useful when the U.S. Government
uses its own funds, instead of a partner nation’s using its government funds, to purchase equipment,
services, or training. FMS processes, as well as FMS pseudo-case processes, help to ensure compliance
with important DoD national security safeguards, such as U.S. export restrictions and visibility at key
points in the procurement and transportation processes. Also, these procedures enhance the
accountability and control of U.S.-supplied equipment after delivery. However, in certain Section 1206
cases that we reviewed, the procurement and delivery processes used did not enable the DoD to fully
meet the needs of partner-nation security forces.
Findings
The FMS pseudo case procurement and delivery processes used for
Section 1206/2282 led to:
• the substitution of less compatible or inappropriate equipment
for the requested or required equipment; and
• delayed or unsynchronized delivery of some equipment, training,
and services.
1nc
The plan is quickly circumvented – DOD will shift to 1206
Serafino ’14 [Nina Serafino is a specialist in International Security Affairs, “Security Assistance Reform:
“Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, 12/8/14,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf]//a.bhaiji
Although the primary rationale for Section 1206 funding was that it would enable the U.S. government to
respond more quickly to emerging needs than possible under the FMF process, the delivery of Section 1206
equipment has not always proved as expeditious as originally expected. DOD stated in a FY2009 budget request document that Section 1206
authority “allows a response to urgent and emergent threats or opportunities in six months or less.”24 Especially in Section 1206’s first several
years, the actual delivery time for much equipment was considerably longer.25 By
continuously improving the delivery
process, DOD has reduced the timelines for delivery. A revised timeline calls for delivery within 18 months, and preferably
12 months, for routine deliveries, and 6 months when needed to meet surge requirements. DOD is now striving to deliver many articles in less
than six months from the end of the 15-day congressional notification period. Nevertheless, in comparison to other equipping programs, an
April 2010 GAO report cast Section 1206 response timeframes, overall, as an improvement. That report stated that Section 1206
funds
enabled DOD and State “to respond to urgent and emergent needs more quickly than they have been
able to do with FMF and other security assistance programs.” GAO found that these agencies “have often formulated
and begun implementing projects within 1 fiscal year, while FMF projects have usually required up to 3 years of planning.”26 More recently,
some analysts find that the
winding down of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan has also had a positive
effect on the timeliness and cost of deliveries. With demand down for their services, commercial
shippers are now competing for business, facilitating rapid delivery and reducing costs. Delays have multiple
causes, not all of which can be remedied. Delivering defense articles and services to U.S. representatives in multiple partner nations, with
national customs and import processes, presents unique challenges. According to DSCA, in FY2014 there were some 156 deliveries (with an
estimated value of more than $300 million) to 29 Section 1206 programs in more than 25 countries. These deliveries included aircraft, armored
vehicles, communications equipment, weapons, ammunition, and individual equipment. Over the years, programs have been held up because
of events in a recipient country. In other cases, however, the causes have been systemic processing problems at DSCA and at the military
services contracting offices that affect Section 1206 timelines. DOD and the State Department have worked arduously to overcome numerous
obstacles to timely delivery. Together, they developed processes to expedite proposal development and selection. The Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which administers the program, increased the amount of staff time and created new
procedures and mechanisms to expedite deliveries. In particular, DSCA has provided a dedicated staff to oversee the
delivery process,27 developed a computer-based delivery tracking tool, established a working partnership with the U.S. Transportation
Command, and instituted a centralized delivery system to expedite Section 1206 orders.28 These steps have provided greater accountability
and predictability, according to those interviewed on this topic. DSCA also created an online Security Cooperation Management Suite (SCMS) to
track funds, including Section 1206 funds, as well as a web portal to share Section 1206 data. Nevertheless, quick delivery of items in high
demand with a limited number of suppliers, such as night-vision goggles, remains difficult.
Yes Risk
General – Politics
The US has every incentive to use loopholes, vague language, and backdoors to
subvert the plan – arms lobbies and empirics prove
Wendela de Vries 4-23-13 -- co-ordinator of the Dutch campaign organization Stop Wapenhandel/Stop
Arms Trade (www.stoparmstrade.org) and an activist in the European Network Against Arms Trade. (We
have an Arms Trade Treaty - What difference does it make?” https://www.wri-
irg.org/en/story/2013/we-have-arms-trade-treaty-what-difference-does-it-make “) mba-alb
According to the Control Arms Coalition, which lobbied for a United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), we have reached “the dawn of a
new era” now that the UN General Assembly has adopted the treaty. With this treaty, “history has been made” and we “finally can end arms exports to human rights violators.” Critical voices are put aside as “the tiny
minority of sceptics who were intent on wrecking the process” and the blame for the initial failure to adopt the treaty is put on Iran, Syria and North Korea. UN Secretary-General called the treaty “a victory for the people of the
world”. With such oversimplified communication one cannot escape the impression that some people try to clamour down their own doubt. There is quite some gap between what the international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) really is
and what these press statements suggest it to be, and it is worthwhile to listen to the – often non-western – voices to understand this. That the treaty has been adopted in the General Assembly with “overwhelming majority” can
not conceal the fact that it was not just three pariah states that voted against the treaty. Twenty-three countries (representing half the world's population) abstained from voting , including Russia, China and India. Critique also
came from national campaigners against arms trade, who, from experience, did not expect much new from a UN treaty and even feared it might backlash on their campaigns. The critique can be summarized in three points: 1) An
international treaty is not the right instrument to stop arms trade 2) The treaty is reinforcing the power of western arms exporters and legitimizing their debatable policies 3) The treaty is not questioning arms production but on
the contrary facilitates the arms industry No big expectations The big achievement of the ATT is that “each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export.”
Under this control system, countries shall assess whether the arms could be used for human rights violations, diverted to the illegal market, undermine peace and security or seriously undermine socio-economic development of
the importing country. The interesting thing is that such a control system already exists in most of the dominant arms exporting countries: the United States, the European Union, and
several countries following EU regulations on arms trade. What can we learn from these existing systems? That arms continue to be exported to Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, Libya, Israel, Egypt, Bahrain, Colombia and Sri Lanka, to name
the rules are deliberately formulated in a way that leaves

just a few questionable destinations. Because not only are there no sanctions on ignoring the rules,
plenty of room for interpretation. It all depends on the foreign policy of the exporting state. Under the ATT, countries have to assess whether
there is an “overriding risk” that arms will end up in wrong hands or at wrong places. Fifteen years of experience with European Union arms export regulation has taught , that, notably in
cases of big commercial or strategical interest, the outcome of such an assessment tends to be that risks
are just not 'overriding'. Yes, the importing country might be a human rights violator, but this specific
weapon will probably not be used to violate human rights. Or yes the country is involved in armed
conflict, but at present there is pause in the fighting so no problem in exporting. Yes, the country is
extremely poor, but it really needs an expensive weapon system because of its “legitimate security
needs”. Assessment done, obligations met, export is legitimised. In this way, arms exporting regulations are
more effective in 'green washing' arms exports than in seriously limiting the risk of exports to nasty
destinations. That the ATT is unlikely to change this has been exposed by the British Campaign Against Arms Trade, which published some illustrative examples. Libya has announced to allocate $4.7 billion, about
10% of its national budget, to acquire advanced weapons systems. Libya thinks it has to 'catch up' after having been under embargo for many years. At the very moment the ATT was agreed on in New York British ministers were in
Libya – aboard a warship – to promote British arms. The British are in a hurry because Libya is also looking at Chinese and Russian arms offers. To the previous ATT negotiations in New York, last summer, the British government – a
leading advocate of the ATT – only sent a junior minister. The Prime Minister at that time led a delegation of 15 of his ministers, most of them with an arms sales brief, at the 2012 Farnborough Airshow. How effective is a piece of
Defence cooperation agreements by States Parties are excluded from the ATT, so it will have no
paper?
effect on the extensive military transfers from the US under the Foreign Military Sales program. The US is giving an annual $1.3 billion
military aid to Egypt despite the increasing intolerance of the Morsi regime. Another $3.1 billion is going
to Israel every year. Other countries receiving US arms include Pakistan and Iraq. But who really ever expected the US to give up
strategically important and profitable arms exports over a UN treaty? The Iranian delegate had a point when he said the ATT made
arms trade subject to the “extremely subjective assessment of the exporting states.” That Russia and China (together with
the US and the EU responsible for most of the world's arms export) do not support the treaty, makes it easy to frame them as the bad guys and put the blame of human rights violations and conflicts on them. This is convenient to
please the western public opinion. But the real difference is not in their different arms export policies – all based on national self-interest – but in the fact that
public opinion in western countries does matter. Therefore western countries need pieces of paper like an ATT, to express their good intentions against the critical public opinion on arms trade. Russia and China have other, more
brutal methods to deal with dissent. Then what will the ATT be, if not just another piece of paper full of good intentions? Probably
the ATT will make a difference for the arms trade between smaller countries. The ATT might help some countries to set up a control system. It might help create international funds for such a control system. This is one of the
reasons many African countries voted in favour of the treaty. The hope is that this may also help the fight against the illicit arms trade. This is a good thing, although one should remember that a lot of illicit arms trade started with
legitimate arms trade from the big arms exporting countries, something the ATT will not change. And would it not have been more effective to just set up a program to help African and other states protect their borders against
arms smugglers? One does not need an ATT for that. Arms trade is essential for military superiority The whole campaign for an ATT starts from the presumption that an
international treaty is an effective instrument to regulate the international arms trade, and that without an ATT we do not have an instrument to limit the arms trade. Both presumptions are wrong. Ever since we have had the
Declaration of Human Rights (and please remember that human rights include the right to food, clothing, housing and medical care), we have an instrument to question arms trade to human rights abusers, conflict zones and poor
countries. A new international treaty only makes this more specific, but as long as this treaty is as unenforceable as the Declaration of Human Rights, we are not creating a substantially new instrument. Although the ATT is a
juridical binding document states cannot be brought to court when arms are exported to a human rights violator. Even if all member states of the United Nations would ratify the ATT (50 ratifications are needed for the treaty to
enter into force), it will be the decision of individual states if they live up to the treaty or not. They will have a moral obligation, but there are no legal sanctions when states ignore the ATT. Actually, arms exporting states would
ms trade is an important element to create military partnerships and

never have agreed to an ATT if there had been sanctions included. Ar
dependencies. It is an essential instrument of foreign policy and military dominance. The arms exporting military powers will never hand over
their autonomy on arms trade to any international treaty or body. They want to arm their allies as they like, whatever the
poverty, war or human rights records of these allies. No limitations, just rules The ATT is a treaty to regulate, not to
restrict the arms trade. It is definitely not a disarmament treaty. When the Control Arms Coalition claims that there are too many arms floating freely over the world one can only agree, but it is the free
flow, not the amount that is the object of the ATT. As it says in Article 1 of the ATT: “The object of this Treaty is to establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the
international trade in conventional arms; and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion to the illicit market, or unauthorized end use, including to individuals or groups who would
treaty “pays no attention whatsoever to restricting and stream lining

commit terrorist acts.” Indian journalist Seema Sengupta notes that the
arms manufacturing” and for this blames “the powerful lobby of manufacturers and exporting nations.”
She definitely has a point. Many western arms companies were added as advisors to government delegations to the ATT negotiations. They made sure their interests were
secured in the treaty. As a consequence the ATT “recognizes the legitimate political, security, economic and commercial interests of States in the international trade in conventional arms”. With this text
the treaty goes much further in legitimizing arms trade than does Article 51 of the UN charter which attributes to states the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” . It recognises the right to make profit from war. A
arms deliveries to non-state actors do not fall under the treaty.

Bolivian diplomat called the treaty “the product of a death industry”. Interestingly,
But what is a terrorist and what is a non-state actor? This is up to the exporting country to decide. The 'non-
state actors' were left out because the UK wanted to send arms to the Free Syrian Army, which, at present at least, are considered freedom fighters. Arming Hamas in Palestine of course will not count as support for freedom
fighting but as support for terrorism. The ATT leaves the decision open to point of view, not to objective standards.
There’s a huge incentive for avoidance – they’ll do whatever they can

Ted Bromund 7-27-12 -- senior research fellow in The Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, at the
Washington-based think tank, The Heritage Foundation (“The meme of the ‘weak’ Arms Trade Treaty”
http://www.thecommentator.com/article/1458/the_meme_of_the_weak_arms_trade_treaty) mba-alb
This conference, like the U.N., is based on sovereign states. And when those states submitted their
Let’s get this clear:
views on the ATT, they wanted one thing out of it. Not higher standards on arms exports, and not
respect for human rights. They wanted the ATT to recognize their national right to buy, sell, and transfer
arms. That is not my interpretation. It is what the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research found in 2007 when it analyzed
all the views that had been submitted. So when Control Arms complains that one flaw in the current draft is that it
allows states to “make their own judgements irrespective of the criteria” in the treaty, what they are
really complaining about is something that has been inherent in the treaty from Day One: far from
stopping the worst aspects of the arms trade, the treaty will tend to legitimize them. You can include
as many human rights standards as you wish, but in a world of sovereign states, a national right to
buy, sell, and transfer means the bad actors will not be restrained, because they will pocket the right
you have conceded them and ignore the standards you are trying to impose.
loopholes exist – congressional attempts at regulation empirically fail

Elizabeth Powers 2008 -- law clerk for the Honorable Kristine DeMay. She received a B.A. in political
science and international relations from the University of Minnesota-Duluth in 2004 and a J.D. from
William Mitchell College of Law in 2007. (“Greed, Guns And Grist: U.S. Military Assistance And Arms
Transfers To Developing Countries”
https://law.und.edu/_files/docs/ndlr/pdf/issues/84/2/84ndlr383.pdf) mba-alb
II. THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFER SCHEMA The Congo Conflict is not a machete massacre.17 Millions of SA/LW units and conventional weaponry continue
to wreak havoc within DR Congo’s borders.18 The United States provided several forms of military assistance to the DR Congo before the Congo Conflict.19 Military assistance, given to DR Congo and other developing countries is governed by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).20 Forms of
military assistance include International Military Education and Training (IMET)21 and the provision of Excess Defense Articles (EDA).22 Congress has codified parameters for the provision of IMET.23 The President may provide IMET to military and related civilian personnel of friendly
foreign countries.24 IMET training and education is largely provided via foreign military members’ attendance at U.S. operated military facilities.25 Congress’ ostensible purpose in providing IMET is to encourage beneficial relations and understanding between the United States and
foreign countries, to further international peace and security,26 to improve the ability of foreign countries to utilize their resources and become selfreliant,27 and to increase recipient countries’ awareness of human rights.28 In 2002, Congress imposed a requirement that th e Secretary of
State track IMET participants’ human rights records.29 Congress has also placed restrictions on presidential discretion in the provision of EDA.30 The President may transfer EDA if such transfers are proposed to Congress in one of three ways .31 First, the President may justify the transfer
in his or her annual congressional presentation documents for military assistance programs (Presidential Justifications).32 Second, he or she may show that the transfer falls under another permissible provision of the FAA.33 Third, if the President did not justify the transfer in his or her
annual Justifications, he or she may separately authorize it within the same calendar year of the desired transfer.34 The President’s Justifications must explain the purp oses of the transfer, its value, and whether the transfer was on a grant or sale basis.35 The President is limited to EDA
transfers which are drawn from existing Department of Defense stocks,36 and which do not require Department of Defense funds for shipping.37 The President’s Justifications must show that the transfer will not affect U.S. military preparedness,38 that the foreign policy benefits of a
sale as opposed to a grant have been weighed,39 and that the sale will not adversely affect U.S. business interests.40 The President is required to notify Congress thirty days in advance of a transfer in excess of $7 million or of a designated defense article.41 Cumulative transfers may not
exceed $425 million annually.42 EDA transfers or an IMET allotment made on grant basis for over $3 million requires the President to find that the recipient country complies with the United Nations Charter and that the recipient will only use the defense articles for self-defense.43 In
Military assistance,
addition to the Presidential Justifications, each year the Department of State submits Budget Justifications for the next fiscal year to fund EDA and IMET programs on a country-bycountry, program-by-program basis.44
however, is merely one piece in the large mosaic of arms transfers. In the private sphere, U.S. weapons
manufacturers considerably outsell their competitors Private sales to the DR Congo during the Cold War .
and afterwards were commonplace. 45 Private sales are governed by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).46 By Executive Order No. 11958,47 the President delegated authority to enforce private arms sales regulations under
the AECA to the Secretary of State.48 The State Department issued the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to implement this authority.49 Pursuant to the AECA, the President must provide Congress with a classified report of all sales eligible for approval during the calendar
year greater than $7 million.50 Similar to FAA requirements, the President must provide additional information to Congress if so requested.51 Under the AECA, the President is required to notify Congress of any offer to sell more than $25 million in defense goods or services to a foreign
client.52 Congress may block the proposed sale by a joint resolution disapproving the sale, which is subject to a presidential veto.53 The AECA further provides that defense articles and services on the President’s United States Munitions List (Munitions List)54 are subject to registration
and licensing requirements.55 The Munitions List has twentyone categories, which range from items solely for military use to items that have civil application.56 The AECA targets private individuals engaged in the manufacture, export, import, or the brokering of items on the Munitions
Despite substantial regulation, criticism has been

List.57 Individuals who willfully violate the AECA may be subject to criminal penalties.58 The AECA and ITAR do not apply extraterritorially.59
levied at the State Department’s export licensing procedures, which often involve lost applications,
inconsistent licensing decisions, and processing delays .60 The U.S. system of dual jurisdiction between the State Department and the Commerce Department has likewise been ridiculed.61
Although arms assistance and SA/LW sales and transfers are highly regulated, loopholes exist. The
Department of Defense engages in largely unmonitored Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET ).62 The JCET programs
The JCET programs do not have the same level of congressional

are similar to IMET in that military personnel from other countries participate in military training.63 , however,
oversight as IMET programs JCET programs have recently come under considerable
, nor do they require similar Presidential Justifications.64
scrutiny G A O Report
.65 In 1999, a found that the D
eneral o D had not accurately accounted for the
ccounting ffice to Congress epartment f efense number
costs
of JCET programs or their .66 To correct the problem the International Military Training Transparency and Accountability Act (Transparency and Accountability Act) was introduced the same year.67 The Transparency and Accountability Act would essentially close the JCET
Where
loophole and prohibit all forms of military training and services to countries that are ineligible for IMET.68 The Transparency and Accountability Act was referred to the House International Relations Committee where it has languished for almost eight years.69
Congress took action, for example, on sales to sub-Saharan African countries oversight has been lax.70 ,
Sales may be viewed in light of 2773 Section 2773 states Congress’ preference
to countries who participated in the Congo Conflict 22 U.S.C. § .71
against selling military articles Section 2773 does not bind the President; rather it puts
and defense services to Sub-Saharan Africa.72
him or her on notice that Congress may bind him or her at a later date if he or she does not act
consistently with Congress’ preferences Despite Congress’ preference against arms transfers to Sub- .73
Saharan Africa, U.S. manufactured arms continued to pour across borders throughout the Congo
Conflict The abundance of U.S. manufactured and supplied arms in conflict
, as well as the civil wars in Liberia, Angola, and Sierra Leone.74
zones was largely the result of applicants indicating the arms were for end-user sales, which would
pass muster under ITAR In 1996, Congress recognized the difficulties
.75 These applicants later sold the articles to countries or groups under embargos.76
presented by end-user sales to parties under an embargo by amending Section 2785 The of the AECA.77
amendment requires the D o D to monitor end-user sales epartment f efense with the objective of providing “reasonable assurances that . . . the recipient is complying with the requirements
The program,
imposed . . . with respect to the use, transfers, and security of defense articles and defense services.”78 The end-use monitoring program has been deemed critical for maintaining physical accountability and security for weapons.79 however,
has had only limited success as sales are still permitted to end-users in developing countries that abut
,
conflict zones Other attempts for reform have similarly been unsuccessful In 1999, the
.80 . McKinney-Rohrabacher Code
Code of Conduct) was introduced

of Conduct on Arms Transfers ( .81 Essentially, the Code of Conduct requires presidential certification to Congress that the recipient country of U.S. military assistance and arms transfers is
Like the Transparency and Accountability Act, the

democratic, respects human rights, is not engaged in acts of armed aggression, and fully participates in the UN register of conventional arms.82
Code of Conduct died quietly and has awaited an Executive Comment since 1999 An example of the .83
present inconsistencies in U.S. policy regarding military assistance and arms transfers are the Cameroon
provisions . In 2006, the United States provided $236,000 in foreign military assistance to Cameroon.84 In the 2007 Budget Justifications,85 the State Department acknowledged that Cameroon’s “democratic institutions are weak, corruption remains a real problem, and
human rights abuses by Cameroon’s police and gendarmes forces are a concern.”86 According to the 2007 Budget Justifications, IMET funds were to be used “for professional military development courses stressing resource management, [and] civilian-military relations.”87 The 2007
Budget Justifications also highlight Cameroon’s eligibility to receive EDA on a grant basis pursuant Section 516 of the FAA.88 The 2007 Budget Justifications state that the material would be used by the government of Cameroon for internal security, counter-narcotic activities,
peacekeeping deployments, and military modernization efforts.89 The Human Rights Country Report for Cameroon also published by the State ,
Department, highlights several human rights violations.90 Violations by Cameroon’s security forces include “numerous unlawful killings by security forces[,] regular torture, beatings, and other abuses of persons . . . by security forces[,] impunity among the security forces[,] severe limits
Yet the 2007 Budget Justifications noted that “Cameroon is

on citizens’ ability to change their government[,] restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association.”91
a stable country in which the government has been effective in managing ethnic and linguistic diversity .”92
A possible explanation for the inconsistencies between the Country Report and the Budget
Justifications is a possible bureaucratic wall within the State Department The present loopholes and .93
proscribed nature of the FAA and AECA and implementing procedures promulgated by the State
Department reflect the need to correct problems arising from the provision of military assistance and
unregulated arms sales to developing countries . Examining the disastrous effect that the combination of weapons sales, military assistance, cold war tensions, and corrupt politics had in DR Congo,
evidences a compelling need for further revision of the FAA and AECA.
There’s an incentive and ability to cirucumvent

Neil Cooper 1-24-07 -- Director of the School of Peace and Conflict Studies at Kent State. (“What's the
point of arms transfer controls?” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260600603188)
mba-alb
NBC and Conventional Arms Control: Explaining Relative Success and Failure I should first note the exceptions to the proposition that current arms transfer controls are mostly acts of tokenism . In
particular, despite the current concern about NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical weapons) proliferation to states such as Ira n or North Korea, the existing non-proliferation instruments for NBC technology have been relatively successful. This is particularly the case with respect to the
Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). As Cirincione has noted, for instance, ‘the number of prospective nuclear nations has shrunk dramatically over the past twenty years, not increased; there are thousands fewer ballistic missiles in the world today than fifteen years ago; and there are
far fewer countries possessing any weapons of mass destruction than there were twenty, thirty, or forty years ago’.1 However, three factors have made nuclear non-proliferation in particular reasonably effective. First, there is the existence of relatively high technological barriers to entry
and the scarce availability of key materials. Second, the disciplinary mechanisms developed to constrain proliferation are both severe and, crucially, enforced with a relative degree of rigour. These mechanisms now range from pre-emptive (pre-crime?) invasion, through to sanctions,
what is notable
relatively rigorous implementation of existing control regimes and diplomatic isolation. Third, formal control initiatives have been underpinned by a powerful (and almost universal) norm against NBC proliferation and use. Of course, particularly
about arms transfer control

conventional is the marked lack of political will to develop
compared with restraints on NBC technology
meaningful controls and to enforce those that have been developed . There is thus a profound asymmetry that exists between the disciplinary mechanisms deployed to
, the
prevent NBC proliferation and those deployed to prevent the spread of conventional weapons. This is in spite of the fact that it has been conventional arms that have been the principal tools of war, internal conflict and genocide in the post-Cold War era. For example
imposition of UN embargoes on the trade in arms and, more recently, the trade in conflict goods (civil goods that are
are now an established element in the armoury of the international

traded from a conflict zone to generate funds for the prosecution of war – e.g. conflict diamonds)
community Despite this, however, many conflicts do not become the subject of such
when faced with a conflict or an odious regime.
restrictions – whether as a function of neglect or of the political interests of the major powers on the
Security Council. Where embargoes are
Thus, whilst there were 19 major armed conflicts in 2004 there were just nine UN arms embargoes in force in the same year (one of which was non-mandatory).2
imposed the record of

, however, changing odious behaviour on the ground is, in reality, poor
sanctions in cutting off arms supplies and
to non-existent. 3 UN embargoes may increase the cost and difficulty of arms acquisition by forcing actors onto the black market, but the reality is that most actors in conflicts experience little difficulty in sourcing arms from the international market-place. A
telling, and typical, indictment of the effectiveness of sanctions was provided by the UN Experts Panel on Liberia when it noted: Despite nine years of an embargo on arms and military equipment to Liberia, a steady supply of weapons has reached the country. Indeed, in their
conversations with the panel, the Liberian authorities appeared not bothered about the embargo and never complained about it.4 Partly, this reflects the sophistication of globalized illicit supply networks (see below), but it also reflects the international community’s ultimate disinterest
in developing the means to make sanctions more effective. Consequently, even where sanctions are enacted by the UN, actual implementation remains ineffective. In the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for instance, there was an eight month delay between the
imposition of an arms embargo on armed groups operating in North and South Kivu and the creation of a Committee to actually monitor compliance with the embargo.5 Similarly, funds for the provision of sanctions monitors on the ground, or to provide capacity building support for
neighbouring states to better implement sanctions, are usually notable by their absence. Nor is the provision of compensation for the economic impact of arms or commodity embargoes imposed by the UN an automatic feature of such embargoes. Thus, the economic incentive for
neighbours to breach embargoes is often strong, whilst the risk of detection remains small. This is the international equivalent of passing a law against murder and then failing to provide funds for the creation of a homicide unit. Moreover, even where sanctions
violators are revealed, the consequences for them are often negligible . Violating states rarely receive more than a diplomatic fingerwagging. There is no direct and automatic financial
defence-industrial champions often

penalty on a scale that might make serial recidivists pause for thought. As will be noted below, this contrasts sharply with many other areas of international regulation. Similarly, national
benefit from the benevolence of their governments whose greater concern is to keep the national ,
champion ticking over rather than to address wrongdoing on the part of what is constructed as the
legitimate side of the arms market ( see David Mutimer in this volume). Even some of the most well known operators in the illicit market have, however, managed to function with relative impunity. For instance, since the
early 1990s the notorious arms dealer Victor Bout has been implicated in sanctions busting arms supplies to a variety of conflicts using a network of over 50 aircraft and several airline companies operating in different parts of the world. However, although Interpol ultimately issued an
international arrest warrant for Bout, he still felt confident enough to give a live interview to CNN at its Moscow bureau.6 A similar picture is evident when one examines the network of national or regional arms export criteria. Thus, despite the British Labour government’s apparent
commitment to an ethical arms sales policy, the export criteria it developed on coming to power looked little different from the permissive policy of its predecessor, and implementation has been even more disappointing.7 The same applies to the EU’s much-vaunted Code of Conduct on
Arms Exports (CoC). Consequently, whilst the Code has brought some increase in transparency and has served as a vehicle for EU co-operation on the regulation of arms exports, it is still best described as a form of weak regulatory tokenism – part of a broader process by which all but the
most dubious of arms transfers (and sometimes not even those) are provided with a formal veneer of legitimacy. As one report by EU NGOs noted in 2004, ‘it remains a moot point as to whether the CoC has actually led to increased restraint in EU arms exporting’.8 Thus, neither British
nor EU policy has prevented a succession of export scandals from turning Labour’s ethical arms sales policy into a n international embarrassment. These include: the decision to continue the sale of Hawk jets to Indonesia, and successive sca ndals over ‘arms to Africa’ (Sierra Leone); over
the supply of Hawk spares to Zimbabwe; over Tony Blair’s drum-beating for British arms exports to India at a time of heightened tension with Pakistan over Kashmir; over the revelation of alleged sweeteners paid by British Aerospace (BAe) to Qatar and corresponding accusations of
government pressure to abandon the investigation into these issues; over the use of British equipment by both Israel and Indonesia in offensive operations that breached end-user assurances; over the sale of unnecessary and uneconomic defence equipment to both South Africa and
Tanzania; and over the continued primacy of the Al Yamamah contract with Saudi Arabia and its corrupting influence on British domestic and foreign policy.9 Similarly, the EU code has not prevented Italian small arms sales to a variety of countries experiencing conflict or engaged in
The record is of fine-sounding words,

human rights abuse, including Colombia, Eritrea, Indonesia, India, Israel, Kazakhstan and Nigeria, or reports that France has exported defence equipment to Sudan.10
which are then undermined by loopholeridden lowest common denominator regulations. Indeed, this
is the record in the better performing states . In the case of the worst offenders, the very leadership of the state systematically profits from the trade in arms or conflict goods – either through the receipt of
bribes from arms sellers or by profiting from sales. For instance, successive reports from the UN and from the NGO Global Witness have highlighted the personal pecuniary interest of the former Liberian leader, Charles Taylor, in the trade in arms and conflict diamonds to and from Sierra
Leone,11 and the way in which top-level officials from the former Zaire, Burkina Faso and Togo facilitated arms transfers to UNITA in exchange for diamonds or a proportion of the arms.12 It is also the case that both UN arms embargoes and national/regional export criteria remain highly
either in construction or in implementation, global arms transfer controls tend to be

selective in their application. Thus,
deployed as selective instruments of punishment against those (currently) deemed strategic enemies or
political pariahs, rather than as a universal and impartial control mechanism . For example, in the wake of 9/11 the EU reinterpreted its arms embargo on
Afghanistan so that it only applied to Taliban controlled areas, thus exempting the Northern Alliance – an initiative which brought the EU into line with the existing UN embargo imposed in December 2000.13 Liberia has been subject to embargoes on diamonds, timber and arms for
supporting the predatory activities of the RUF in Sierra Leone, yet the governments of Uganda and Rwanda have remained free of international sanctions despite similar involvement in conflict in a neighbouring state. Indeed, in 2003 the US actually lifted a national embargo on Rwanda
despite continuing evidence of arms trafficking to rebel groups in the DRC.14 Similarly, the Wassenaar Arrangement for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is essentially directed against a limited number of ‘rogue’ states and has been much more active o n the issue
attempts to
of NBC transfers than on conventional weapons.15 One of the few exceptions to this rule has been action under the rubric of Wassenaar (and also the G8) to control the supply of Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).16 However,
control this specific trade reflect the priorities of the war on terror rather than any principled concern
about the trade in such weapons per se. Indicative of this is the way in which the US now finds itself in
the rather contradictory position of supporting restrictions on the supply of MANPADS to non-state
actors whilst simultaneously resisting attempts to impose such restrictions on small arms and light
weapons more generally.17 At least the same accusations of hypocrisy could not be directed at the UN
Arms Register, which is not even supported by a grand ambition to directly limit the arms trade . The commitment to
shedding transparency on the arms trade might well be useful in the context of a broader system of control that was meaningful and effective. In the absence of such a system, the UN’s development of a voluntary register of arms exports and imports only contributes yet another form of
In part at least, the weakness of global controls on the conventional arms

tokenism to the global architecture of arms transfer regulation.18
trade stems from the fact that the most influential states in the international system – those with the
power to effect real change in the global governance of armaments, are the self-same states that have
the largest defence sectors and benefit the most from global arms sales US now accounts for . Thus, the
virtually half of global military expenditure

(47 per cent) , NATO countries for 70 per cent and OECD states 78 per cent.19 In the period 2000 – 2004 the US accounted for 31 per cent of global supplies of major
conventional weapons, NATO countries for 57 per cent and the permanent five of the UN Security Council for 77 per cent.20 This is not to say that these states are necessarily the worst offenders when it comes to observing arms export regulations. Rather, it is that there is
a clear conflict between their commercial interest in maximizing arms sales profits and their
strategic/ethical interest in developing a control architecture that minimizes proliferation. Thus, the rogues and the terror
groups, as well as the mafia dons and the drug cartels that participate in the more egregious examples of conventional arms proliferation, merely exploit the collateral benefit they receive from a regulatory system designed to retain freedom of operation for the major players. Current
and Emerging Challenges to Supply-Side Controls Of course, it might be argued that my critique of the record of current arms transfer controls is unduly pessimistic. Even if this is the case, however, a further, and perhaps more pertinent question is whether traditional control strategies
will remain relevant in the light of contemporary trends in the arms market. Is it the case instead that current trends will require a new architecture of arms transfer control? l would argue for the latter position. Indeed, there are a number of trends that, when combined together, present
significant challenges to the effectiveness of current mechanisms for arms transfer control. None of these are novel developments, rather it is that individually and collectively they are beginning to reach a scale and intensity that will require a response beyond the parameters of
traditional control mechanisms. The first challenge is that presented by the simultaneous concentration and globalized integration of the major weapons industry in a largely Western dominated hub and spoke model.21 Thus, in 1990 the five largest defence companies accounted for 22
increased concentration might well facilitate better

per cent of arms production by the top 100 defence companies, by 2002 this figure had risen to 40 per cent.22 In some respects
oversight of the arms industry. However, this process is also characterized by the erosion of defence
industrial national identities and increased intra-firm
(the British defence firm BAE Systems now sells more to the US Department of Defense than to the UK Ministry of Defence)
movement of technology, knowledge and personnel . For instance, multinational corporations in the civil sector regularly increase productivity by transferring design problems over the internet to
, the ability of states to encourage strict

teams working in another time-zone. Globalized defence companies have, and will have, strong incentives to exploit similar efficiencies Consequently
adherence to national export controls by appealing to national loyalty or to national strategic interest is
likely to be eroded as they increasingly face essentially stateless defence companies. At the same time,
the ability of states to sanction offenders by refusing to source from monopoly suppliers still presenting
themselves as national/regional champions will be commensurately reduced . And the proliferation of licensed production and more generalized
technology transfer to subsidiaries or market partners will permit evasion of national export control whether by design or by default. Heckler and Koch, for example, license small arms production in 14 countries including Burma, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.23
Executive
Executive override of congressional block of weapons sales makes Congress
functionally useless
Gehrke 5/24/19 [Joel is a foreign affairs reporter for the Washington Examiner. He previously was on
the congressional beat at National Review Online and prior to that was a commentary writer for the
Examiner, “Pompeo authorizes emergency arms sale to Mideast allies in challenge to Congress”, The
Washington Examiner, 5/24/19, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-
security/pompeo-authorizes-emergency-arms-sale-to-mideast-allies-in-challenge-to-congress]//a.bhaiji
President Trump authorized arms sales to Middle Eastern allies Friday despite congressional attempts
to block recent weapons deals with Saudi Arabia. The administration announced the authorization on an emergency basis
Friday. “Today’s action will quickly augment our partners’ capacity to provide for their own self-defense
and reinforce recent changes to U.S. posture in the region to deter Iran,” Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo said. That announcement put him on a collision course with lawmakers in both parties, who are
motivated to block the deals due to a litany of controversies. Pompeo sidestepped their opposition by
invoking a provision of federal law that allows him to complete the sales without congressional
approval. Pompeo warned that delaying the shipment could lead to maintenance issues for U.S. partners in the region that could lead to
degraded systems and equipment that isn't airworthy. “These national security concerns have been exacerbated by
many months of congressional delay in addressing these critical requirements, and have called into
doubt our reliability as a provider of defense capabilities, opening opportunities for U.S. adversaries to
exploit,” he said. The weapons are intended for three countries — Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The deals cover
aircraft support maintenance, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, munitions, and other supplies, Pompeo’s statement noted. Those
armaments are especially important to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the leaders of an Arab coalition that has intervened in
Yemen’s civil war to fight Houthi rebels who are backed by Iran. U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition is controversial even among lawmakers
worried about Iranian aggression, because the Arab states have shown little regard for civilian casualties in the conflict. And congressional
frustration with Saudi Arabia in particular skyrocketed after the October murder of Washington Post
columnist Jamal Khashoggi, who was killed in a Saudi diplomatic facility in Istanbul. “President Trump is
only using this loophole because he knows Congress would disapprove of this sale,” said Sen. Chris Murphy,
D-Conn., who sits on the Foreign Relations Committee, which oversees the State Department. “There is no new ‘emergency’
reason to sell bombs to the Saudis to drop in Yemen, and doing so only perpetuates the humanitarian crisis there.” […]
Saudi Arabia
Trump will circumvent – empirics and MIC
Gary Leupp 5-27-19 -- Professor of History at Tufts University, and author of numerous works on
Japanese history. (“An “Emergency” to Send Billions in Weapons to the Saudis”
https://www.globalresearch.ca/send-billions-weapons-saudis/5678677) mba-alb
Trump has declared an “emergency” to circumvent Congressional oversight of arms

So law shipments to other countries. By
Congress by law is given 30 days advance before before such sales are completed, and it can obstruct
them But a loophole
. allows the president to authorize sales in an emergency
in the Arms Control Act . One must ask what emergency causes the president
What emergency confronts

to allow sale of $ 8 billion in arms manufactured by Boeing, Lockheed, Raytheon, and GE to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan. (Britain’s BAE and Europe’s Airbus will also profit handso mely from this decision.)
any of these recipient countries ? The murderous regime of Jared Kushner pal Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, savagely murders journalists who criticize it, crushes dissent in neighboring Bahrain, kidnaps the Lebanese prime
minister, applies the strictest interpretations of Sharia law within the kingdom and wages war on Yemen, killing tens of thousands of civilians with U.S. support. Where’s the problem? Is the criminal Saudi effort in Yemen failing so badly the Saudis need more arms to kill more Yemenis to
stave off defeat? What is the emergency in the UAE? They are allied with the Saudis in the effort to crush the Houthis of Yemen, who because of their Shiite Islam in a generally Sunni region are both despised for religious reasons by Gulf monarchs, and consequently smeared with Iranian
associations, not because substantial political and military ties exist between Iran and the Houthis (as they do between Lebanon’s Hizbollah and Iran) but because they hate Shiites in general. Perhaps in this emergency situation they need more U.S. bombs to drop the Arab world’s
Presumably the State Department and Pentagon will suggest that

poorest, most miserable country? What emergency does the Kingdom of Jordan face?
“recent Iranian threats” to U.S. forces in the Middle East–which were justified as the Pentagon indicated
that 120,000 troops would be sent , adjusted down to 10,000, then 1,200-1,500 for some reason (I suspect because the Pentagon balked at the larger figures, noting that there was in fact no new real Iranian threat to U.S. forces
constitute an “emergency” justifying the sales

in the region)– Fake news is . (The British and Germans perceive no elevated threat from Iran and have pooh-poohed U.S. saber-rattling.)
being deployed to rationalize sending more forces Trump himself to the region, thus ratcheting up tensions with an Iran that has in fact been cautiously defensive.
may rationalize it as he always has: arms sales to Saudi Arabia create jobs! ( Trump has repeatedly said that the $ 110 billion in arms deals he’s signed
This is more Fake News

with Saudi Arabia means “500,000 jobs.” It’s not so much ; the number is a tiny fraction of that. But clearly Trump is a prime example of Marx’s dictum that “The soul of the capitalist is capital.”
about creating jobs anyway but creating obscene profits from arms sales for the captains of the
military-industrial complex .) We can’t allow the hack-saw murder of Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Istanbul consulate to affect our strong ties to the Saudi arms market! U.S. national security is at stake! Kushner reportedly told MbS that this
crisis about the Khashoggi murder in Oct. 2018 would “blow over.” (The prince has told intimates that he has Jared “in my pocket.” It appears that Jared supplied him with the names of Saudi dissidents, subsequently detained, in return for something.) Indeed, the cordial U.S. -Saudi
relationship seems unaffected by the murder. Meanwhile UNCHR, the UN Refugee Agency, has proclaimed a “Yemen Emergency”—which is to say, a real emergency in the real world. This is due principally to the U.S./U.K.-backed Saudi-led campaign to subdue Yemen and turn it into a
We have an emergency in this country

Saudi satrapy. The civilian casualties, the refugee figures, the deaths from war-related famine alone are horrific. And the Saudis block aid. , this imperialist country–an urgent need
to stop Trump, Pompeo and Bolton from starting another war-based-on-lies egged on by the beastly SbM and the murderous Binyamin Netanyahu, family
friend of the Kushners. (Surely you know he once borrowed Jared’s bed in a sleepover at the Kusher home? They’re that close. Google search it. And then realize that the 38-year-old Kushner is Trump’s “senior advisor” on the Israel-Palestinian problem, facilitator of the corrupt Israeli-
Saudi anti-Iranian alignment.) Final thought: One real offense that should be truly impeachable is authorizing the sale of fighter jets and bombs used to kill children to a regime led by a prince U.S. intelligence services hold responsible for a journalist’s murder, sidelining Congress in doing
so.
Presidents routinely but heads with congress about Saudi Arabia arms restrictions
Jennifer Spindel 5-30-19 -- assistant professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma
and the associate director of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center. (“Yes, Trump can override
Congress and sell weapons to Saudi Arabia -- even over Republican objections”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/30/yes-trump-can-override-congress-sell-weapons-
saudi-arabia-even-over-republican-objections/) mba-alb
Trump
The announced it will declare an emergency to allow U.S. companies to sell arms to Saudi
administration last week that
Arabia That emergency circumvents Congress and the usual bureaucratic process for
and the United Arab Emirates.
approving U.S. arms sales Trump advances his view of Saudi Arabia as
. By selling about $8 billion worth of precision-guided munitions and combat aircraft, President
a "great ally" Trump's move is legal Under Ar E C A the State Department authorizes
of the United States. . the 1976 ms xport ontrol ct,
arms sales the administration has invoked the act's

(or doesn't). As I explain below, Congress usually allows decisions to be implemented without objection. But this time,
provision that allows presidents to sidestep congressional review it is if they believe a national security emergency requires the arms to be sold. In doing so,
ignoring the bipartisan resolution Congress passed in April to halt U.S. military support for the Saudi war in Yemen. While no one is surprised that Democratic senators are voicing outrage, what is
unusual is that Republicans are forcefully objecting, too. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) called circumventing Congress a "big mistake," and Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.) said, "I don't support arms sales," and criticized Trump for "doing business as usual" with Saudi Arabia. Why is the
. 1. It's not easy for Congress to block arms

administration working so hard to avoid Congress? Here's what you need to know about the administration's controversial move to authorize the new arms sales
sales. The State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs oversees most of the arms-sale process ,
The State Department has wide latitude to negotiate the types of weapons
evaluating whether a given sale to a particular government is in the U.S. interest.
and the terms of sale. The 1976 Arms Export Control Act requires the president to notify Congress of any arms sale greater than $14 million, and it empowers Congress to block or modify an arms sale at any point before delivery by adopting a
"resolution of disapproval." Because the law prevents senators from filibustering the disapproval resolution, the Senate can adopt it by a simple majority vote. But the law also allows the president to veto the resolution. To block an arms sale, congressional opponents need a two-thirds
Members of Congress have tried in the past to pass objections to proposed arms
majority in both chambers to override a president's veto.
sales. That succeeded only once , in 1986, when a Republican Senate and a Democratic House voted to block the proposed sale of Sidewinder, Harpoon and Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia. Although President Ronald Reagan vetoed
Other congressional attempts to block arms

the resolution, congressional opposition led the administration to alter the deal. Saudi Arabia ultimately received only Sidewinder and Harpoon missiles.
sales proposed by the president have failed . Congress also has informal tools to influence administration decisions. In April 2018, Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) slowed down this particular sale to Saudi Arabia by
refusing to consent to the congressional notification process until the Trump administration provided more information about the deal. Menendez feared the arms would be used in Yemen. His continued refusal to consent is what has led Trump to invoke the emergency provision.
Members of Congress are best able to block arms transfers when they and the executive branch agree about U.S. foreign policy. In 2013, for example, President Barack Obama and the State Department decided to review military sales to Egypt after its elected government was
. 2. There's a loophole
overthrown. Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), expressing the views of Congress, agreed that military aid needed to end. With the support of Congress, the Obama administration suspended arms sales to Egypt in October 2013
for emergencies. But the president can bypass congressional approval

This time, House and Senate majorities clearly oppose additional arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
if he concludes "an emergency exists which requires the proposed sale in the national security interest
of the United States." According to the law, such a declaration requires the president to detail his justification, describing the emergency circumstances and explaining the national security interests involved. While the administration has not
Pompeo says the emergency declaration will be based on a "heightened threat

submitted this document, Secretary of State Mike
against American interests in the region from Iran." Presidents do not often invoke the 1976 act's emergency provision, but they do often override Congress's concerns about U.S. arms sales.
3. This isn't the first

Previous presidents have vetoed congressional resolutions of disapproval or otherwise ignored congressional advice. Since 1986, presidents have approved at least $145 billion worth of weapons sales without congressional approval.
battle over U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia When Congress and the president disagree about arms .
sales, it's almost always about selling to Saudi Arabia . That's been true for decades, as lawmakers have raised concerns about human rights and the regional balance of power. U.S. arms sales
to Saudi Arabia worry Israel and arouse American anti-Arab sentiments. For instance, in 1981, the House voted not to approve the sale of Airborne Warning and Control System planes (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia, but the Senate failed to pass the resolution, and Saudi Arabia received the first
AWACS in 1986. In October 1990, Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) introduced a resolution to block $7.3 billion worth of tanks, helicopters and missiles, but the resolution never made it to the floor. In April, Congress invoked the 1973 War Powers Resolution for the first time, with the goal of
stopping the administration from supporting the Saudi war in Yemen. Behind the congressional resolution lay the worsening humanitarian crisis in Yemen and the CIA's conclusion that Saudi Arabia's crown prince ordered the assassination of Washington Post contributing columnist Jamal
Khashoggi. Trump vetoed the resolution on April 17. Assuming Trump follows through and uses the emergency provision in the 1976 act, he will authorize the sale of preci sion-guided munitions and fighter jets to Saudi Arabia over congressional objections, driving a bigger wedge between
himself and congressional Republicans on U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia. But unless Congress can include a clause blocking the arms sale i n a must-pass spending bill -- or use informal influence -- the arms sale is likely to go forward, in line with existing U.S. law and practices.
Circumvention is guaranteed – lobbying

Mashal Hashem and James Allen 5-16-19 Mashal Hashem is a research associate with the Foreign
Influence Transparency Initiative at the Center for International Policy. James Allen is a research
associate with the Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative at the Center for International Policy.
(“How to Lobby Washington to Death” https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/05/16/how-
lobby-washington-death) mba-alb
A springtime wedding in Northern Yemen’s Al-Raqah village took place in April 2018, a moment of reprieve from the turmoil and devastation of that war-torn country, a moment to celebrate life, love, and the birth of a new family. From the tents constructed for the event, music flooded
into the village and, as at any good wedding, exuberant dancing was a central part of the festivities. Unbeknownst to the guests, the music masked the buzzing of a warplane overhead. Suddenly, in a horrific turn of events, Saudi-led forces launched a deadly airstrike and 20-year-old
groom Yahya Ja’afar’s wedding was transformed into a scene of carnage. Deafened by the explosion, guests fearfully searched f or loved ones in a sea of confusion and body parts. In a telling photo, the flowery wreaths worn by celebrants lie atop a landscape of rubble. At least 20
wedding-goers lost their lives to the Saudi-led coalition’s now four-year-old brutal campaign in that country. Shortly thereafter, media reports identified the bomb as American-made -- a GBU-12 Paveway II linked to Raytheon, one of the Pentagon’s largest defense contractors. Tragedies
like this, however, didn’t stop President Trump from exercising his veto power on April 16th to reject a resolution passed by Congress to end American involvement in the Yemeni conflict. Nor did they sway most Republicans in Congress to use their override power to kill the veto on May
for many of Washington’s actors, such tragedies, while devastating, are part of a remarkably
2nd. After all,
lucrative business model this is the case for the American defense companies that have been
. Obviously,
supplying weapons and equipment of all sorts to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in their ongoing war. But it’s no less so for the little-publicized lobbying
groups that represent them. In 2018, more than a dozen such firms were working on behalf of the Saudis or the Emiratis, while also providing their services to defense contractors whose weapons are being used in the conflict. Two prominent examples of lobbying firms with significant
Both firms have cleverly managed to represent both the most powerful
stakes in the Yemen War are the McKeon Group and American Defense International (ADI).
U.S. arms manufacturers and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This lobbying model, which
allows them to satisfy multiple clients at the same time has -- contractors eager to secure arms deals and foreign powers that depend on American political and military support --
played a significant role in keeping the United States rooted in the Yemen conflict . A Lobbying Model for Profiting from Yemen Yahya
Ja’afar’s wedding illustrates a disturbing pattern. Reports indicate that, at the sites of many Saudi-UAE coalition airstrikes in Yemen, evidence of munitions produced by the big four American defense contractors -- Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics, and Raytheon -- can be
Their arsenal of lobbyists works

found. These four companies represent the largest suppliers of weapons to the Saudi and UAE coalition and have spent millions of dollars on lobbying efforts to retain political support in Washington.
tenaciously on the Hill, securing meetings with top officials on key congressional committees to
advocate and push for increased arms sales . In 2018, according to the Lobbying Disclosure Act website, which provides information on such firms and their domestic clients, Boeing spent $15 million on lobbyists,
Lockheed Martin $13.2 million, General Dynamics $11.9 million, and Raytheon $4.4 million. While this may seem like an exorbitant amount of money, such expenses have yielded an extraordi nary return on investment via arms sales to the Saudis and Emiratis. A report published by the
Center for International Policy last year documented that such companies and others like them sold $4.5 billion worth of weapons to Saudi Arabia and $1.2 billion to the United Arab Emirates in 2018 alone. And at the heart of this web of money are firms like ADI and the McKeon Group
that make their profits off both the weapon-makers and the war makers. Led by former Republican congressman and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Howard “Buck” McKeon, the McKeon Group has double-dipped in this “forgotten war” for three years now.
After all, the firm represents many of the top sellers of arms and munitions, including Lockheed Martin,
Northrop Grumman, Orbital ATK, MBDA, and L3 Technologies, as well as Saudi Arabia. In other words,
the McKeon Group lobbies Washington’s political machine for both the sellers and the buyer . From his earliest days in the
House, Buck McKeon has had ties to the U.S. defense industry. His trajectory into and out of Congress offers, in fact, a perfect example of what Washington’s military-industrial “revolving door” looks like. From 1991 to 2014, years when he held California’s 25th Congressional district seat,
McKeon received campaign contributions totaling $192,900 from Lockheed Martin and $190,200 from Northrop Grumman. Those two companies were then his top campaign contributors and are now his current clients. In return, he advanced their interests inside Congress, especially as
the powerful chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and now does the same from the outside as a major lobbyist. His firm receives an annual retainer of $190,000 from Lockheed Martin and $110,000 from Northrop Grumman for its efforts on the Hill. In 2018 a lone, in fact, the firm
took in a whopping $1,697,000 from 10 of the largest defense contractors to, among other objectives, continue the flow of arms to Saudi Arabia. At the same time, McKeon and his firm also work directly for Saudi Arabia, which just happens to be one of the biggest foreign buyers of
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman weaponry. The records of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) reveal that, last year, the McKeon Group was paid $920,148.21 by the Kingdom and engaged in aggressive political lobbying in Congress against bills that would have adversely
affected the U.S. arms trade with the Saudis. Above all, there was S.J. 54, the Yemen Resolution jointly sponsored by Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), meant to end American involvement in that war. FARA filings indicate that the firm made numerous phone
calls and sent multiple emails to members of the Senate and House as key votes approached. Most notably, on November 14, 2018, exactly two weeks before a vote on the resolution was to take place, the McKeon Group contacted Oklahoma Republican Senator Jim Inhofe, the current
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, on behalf of the Saudis. Inhofe’s congressional office was called in “regards to the KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia]” and again on November 29th, the day after the vote, “regarding S.J. Res. 54.” On the 14th, the firm also gav e a $1,000 donation
to the Senator. Ultimately, Inhofe voted in favor of continuing military support for the Saudis, undeterred by the thousands of civilian deaths the war has caused. When the McKeon Group succeeds in advancing the agenda of the Saudis and the giant weapons makers in Washington, it
proves its value and receives significant compensation. And nothing, including the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul or continued reports on the country’s brutal war and blockade in Yemen, which has left significant numbers of
Yemenis dead of, or at the edge of, starvation, has stopped Buck McKeon and his firm from continuing to ramp up their lobbying activities. As for American Defense International, it has similarly double-dipped in the Yemen war. It, too, represents an impressive list of defense contractors,
including Raytheon, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, L3 Technologies, and General Atomics -- and also the United Arab Emirates, the Saudi-war coalition member that often slides under the media radar. At a moment filled with harrowing reports of death, starvation, and
devastation in Yemen, ADI’s lobbyists spent their days aggressively advancing the interests of their Emirati and defense contractor clients. For instance, FARA reports reveal that, in September 2018, ADI called the office of New Mexico Democratic Senator Martin Heinrich, a member of the
Armed Services Committee, on behalf of the UAE embassy in Washington. The discussion, according to FARA, focused on the “situation in Yemen” and the “Paveway sale to the UAE” -- in other words, on the sale of the very kind of Raytheon bomb that turned Yahya Ja’afar’s wedding into
the scene of a deadly airstrike. FARA filings also indicate, for example, that during the same month, ADI met with the policy adviser for Louisiana Republican Congressman Steve Scalise to lobby against the congressional resolution on Yemen. For these and similar efforts, the UAE
continued to pump $45,000 a month into ADI. At the same time, such lobbying efforts clearly benefited another client of the firm: Raytheon. The manufacturer of Paveway bombs paid ADI $120,000 in 2018. For firms like American Defense International and the McKeon Group, war is a
President Trump’s veto of the resolution to end American support for the
matter of profits and clients and little else. The Uncertain Future of Yemen
Saudi-UAE coalition in Yemen and Congress’s inability to override have left it (against the wishes of much of the American public) , for the moment,
lobbying outfits like the McKeon Group and ADI in the driver’s seat That veto, after all, made it clear .
that, for Donald Trump and many congressional Republicans the well-being of the Saudi royals and of ,
defense contractors matters more than a bus carrying school children destroyed by a laser-guided MK-
82 bomb made by Lockheed Martin that the wellbeing of Raytheon is of far greater importance than a ;
family traveling in their car hit by a GBU-12 laser-guided bomb made by that very company; that the
profits of such defense contractors are so much more important than the lives of the men, women, and
children who were in a marketplace in Yemen on a quiet afternoon in March 2016, when another MK-82
bomb took the lives of at least 80 of them . In addition to being used repeatedly in air strikes that have killed civilians, American munitions have also evidently made it into the hands of terrorist organizations in
Yemen. Reports indicate that the very weapons that companies like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are selling to the Saudis and Emiratis have, in some instances, been stolen or even sold to organizations linked to al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, arms that could someday even be used
against U.S. military personnel. Today, with the President’s veto and Congress’s failure to override it, the Saudi-UAE coalition, U.S. defense contractors, and their American lobbyists have, in essence, been given a green light to proceed with a business model that counts innocent Yemenis'
deaths as the cost of doing business. Still, though yet another battle has been lost in that war at home, opposition to it may not yet be relegated to the dustbin of history. Certain members of Congress are still looking for new ways of tackling the issue, including the possibility of defunding
American involvement in the war and the human rights violations that go with it. Clearly, there are still opportunities to send a message that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates can no longer simply write checks to lobbying firms like the McKeon Group and ADI to purchase
influence and ensure that American politicians look the other way. Someday perhaps the United States will no longer allow its elf to be implicated in tragedies like Yahya Ja’afar’s wedding that end with a landscape of rubble and the remnants of an American bomb.
Israel
There’s way too much of a cemented interest in arm sales for the aff to solve it
Anna Badillo 4-9-19 -- research analyst at Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East based in
Montreal, Quebec. She holds an M.Phil from Trinity College Dublin, in International Peace Studies.(“The
US-Israel ‘special relationship’ subsidizes American military industry and Israeli colonialism”
https://thedefensepost.com/2019/04/09/us-israel-arms-sales-opinion/) mba-alb
to fully conceptualize the U.S.-Israel special relationship we need to unpack the the preferential arms
But
trade agreements U.S. ‘military

that allows for this relationship to continue at the expense of the indigenous population in the occupied territories. Max Ajl, a PhD candidate in development sociology at Cornell University, writes: “
assistance,’ more accurately understood as a circular flow through which U.S. weapons firms profit off the
Israeli destabilization of the surrounding states, is a long-term structuring element of the

colonization of Palestinian land and
U.S.-Israel ‘special relationship .’” U.S. military loans started arriving in Israel in November 1971, when the Nixon administration signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Israel to build up its domestic industrial-arms sector
through technical and manufacturing assistance. Grants started to replace loans in 1974. The U.S. government shortly afterwards started to permit Israel to spend 26% of the annual military grant on purchases in Israel – a unique arrangement, since by U.S. law recipient countries must
U.S.
spend all of their foreign military financing in the U.S. According to Ajl, “the Israeli military industry often relies on U.S. technological inputs, and the U.S. forbids Israel from manufacturing crucial heavy weaponry, such as fighter jets, in order to maintain control over Israel.”
military grants to Israel were often quid pro quo, as Israel increasingly took on the work for which the
U.S. could not publicly take responsibility, given popular unease in the States over aid to fascist
dictatorships . As the International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network noted in their report, Israel’s Worldwide Role in Repression, in the 1970s, Israel armed the brutal military regime of the Argentinian junta that imposed seven years of state terrorism on the population.
Israel also provided most of the arms that Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio “Tachito” Somoza used in the
last year of his dictatorship to oppose the revolution, a conflict that killed tens of thousands of
Nicaraguans in the 1970s . By the 2000s, the Israeli military-industrial complex had produced an industry capable of competing in small-arms and high-end security technology on a worldwide scale. Israel started to export arms that have been
refined through high-technology colonial policing of the Palestinian population, especially in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In recent years, Israel has risen to one of the top 10 arms exporters in the world. Last May Haaretz reported, “Israel’s defense-related exports in 2017 totalled
$9.2 billion, an all-time record and whooping 40% increase over 2016 – when defense-related transactions totaled $6.5 billion.” The Obama administration adjustments to Israel’s military aid package came amidst a shifting geopolitical environment, both within the U.S. and Israel. There
was a shift in original MOU that would slowly phase out the provisions through which Israel could spend up to 26% of its funding package within Israel, to Israel spending more of this funding on the advanced military capabilities that only the United States can provide – as much as $1.2
billion per year, according to Ajl. In addition, this MOU locked in $500 million annually for missile defense.The MOU mandates Israel update its fighter aircraft fleet, which is a direct investment into the U.S. military-industrial complex, given that fighter-jet factories are exclusively based in
The firm establishment of Israel’s

the United States. Not only does U.S. foreign policy and Israeli-settler colonialism shape what happens across historic Palestine, it also shapes what happens across the Middle East region.
military defense industry also provides an excuse to sell ever-more-sophisticated weapons to other
regional U.S. allies, especially Saudi Arabia As long as Israel has the latest U.S. technology, other .
countries can buy older models, again to the great profit of the U.S. defense industry. Israel thus is the
spark plug for an entire region-wide weapons bazaar , while also providing such countries the means to destroy and dismantle even poorer countries like Yemen. This keeps the entire region
aflame, oppressed and desperate, and thus unlikely to upset hierarchical regional and internati onal social structures. Ajl suggests that one of reasons the United States pushed through this MOU before Obama left office is the rising discontent within the U.S. population over ongoing
that a major barrier to any shift in American

support for Israeli colonization of historic Palestine and the surrounding region. Frida Berrigan, author of Made in the U.S.A.: American Military Aid to Israel, writes
policy towards Palestine-Israel is “financial pressures from a U.S military industrial complex
accustomed to billions of dollars in sales to Israel and other Middle Eastern nations locked in a
seemingly perpetual arms race with each other by all buying American and using Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) to pay the bills .” The United States is the primary source of Israel’s far superior arsenal. Israel’s dependence on the U.S. for aid and arms means that the Israeli military relies on spare parts and technical assistance
from the U.S. to maintain optimum performance in battle. During the Bush administration, from 2001 to 2005, Israel had actually received more in U.S. military aid than it has in U.S. arms deliveries. Over this time period, Israel received $10.5 billion in FMF – the Pentagon’s biggest
military aid program – and $6.3 billion in U.S. arms deliveries. According to Berrigan, the most prominent of those deals was a $4.5 billion sale of 102 Lockheed Martin F-16s to Israel. Unlike other countries, Israel receives its Economic Support Funds in one lump sum early in the fiscal year
rather than in four quarterly installments. While other countries primarily deal with the Department of Defense when arranging to purchase military hardware from U.S. companies, Israel deals directly with U.S. companies for the vast majority of its military purchases in the United States.
Other countries have a $100,000 minimum purchase amount per contract, but Israel is allowed to
purchase military items for far less, according to Berrigan. Today, Israel has been the beneficiary of approximately $125 billion in U.S. aid. An unimaginable sum, more than any other country since World War II. U.S. aid is
projected to further increase to $165 billion by the end of the new 10-year package, in 2029, according to Charles D. Freilich, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser. U.S. aid constitutes some 3% of Israel’s total state budget and about 1% of its GDP, a highly significant sum.
Moreover, U.S. aid constitutes some 20% of the total defense budget, 40% of the budget of the Israel Defense Forces, and almost the entire procurement budget, according to Freilich. Israel’s dependence on the U.S. is not limited to financial aid and weapons sales. According to Freilich,
the U.S. provides technologies for the development of unique weapons systems that Israel needs, such as the Iron Dome and the Arrow rocket and missile defense systems. It mans the radar deployed in Israel, which is linked to the global American satellite system. Fredilich writes, “There
is simply no alternative to American weapons, and our dependence on the United States is almost complete; the bitter truth is that without the United States, the IDF would be an empty shell.” The United States is Israel’s largest trading partner, at least partially due to their bilateral free
The U.S.-Israel special relationship is rooted in preferential arms trade

trade agreement, the first the United States signed with any country.
agreements as a way to subsidize the U.S. military industry This special relationship is and reinforce support for Israeli colonialism.
locked into an arms trade cycle where both the Israeli and American elite class benefits , at the expense of the indigenous
population. The U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over occupied territories provides a boost for Israeli colonialism. We must ask ourselves, “If Trump has consented to Israeli illegal seizure of the Golan Heights and Jerusalem, why not also the West Bank?” Prime Minister Netanyahu
has vowed to annex Israeli settlements in the West Bank if he is re-elected, which will likely be considered as the final blow to the so called possibility of a two-state solution. The Trump administration is expected to announce his “ultimate deal” following the Israeli elections and after a
new government is formed. It is only a matter of time till the Trump administration decides to follow suit and recognize Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, which will drive the final nail into the coffin of the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations and solidify Israeli apartheid.
ATs
AT Conditions Solve
If they prove there is a condition it gets circumvented – intentionally vague language
Lumpe 2010
505313014346/OPS-No-1-20101015_0.pdf//dmr
Historically, Congress has funded military assistance in the annual State Department/ Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act. The State Department presents an annual detailed budget request to
Congress, and in response Congress’ foreign aid subcommittees draft a law to appropriate this aid for
the coming fiscal year, setting parameters in some cases on which countries may receive how much and
which types of weapons aid and training. The State Department allocates the appropriated funding, and
the DOD implements the actual military aid or training programs. (The Departments of Justice and
Homeland Security implement some of the police and border control programs.) As Table 7 (p. 34)
demonstrates, State Department–funded programs no longer constitute the bulk of military assistance
to Central Asian countries—by a long shot. However, much more information is available about these
programs than is available about DOD funded programs, including projected and actual expenditures
(disaggregated by country), rationales, and plans. The four State Department funding accounts that
underwrite military or police aid to countries in the region are:
• Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
• International Military Education and Training (IMET)
• Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)
• Freedom Support Act (FSA, renamed by the Obama Administration to Assistance for
Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia)
These programs are authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended annually by Congress). Among other relevant
provisions, this permanent law includes generic restrictions on weapons aid and training to any government that
commits gross human rights abuses (section 502B), a requirement for background vetting of particular foreign military units
receiving U.S. military aid to ensure that such aid is not going to units credibly alleged to have committed serious human rights violations with
impunity (the “Leahy Law,” section 620J), and various reporting requirements to provide some transparency around these programs. In
addition, through annual laws (State Department/Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts), Congress imposes conditions and restrictions on
military aid to particular countries. In
2002, Congress first legislated conditions on Uzbekistan’s FMF, requiring a
certification of progress in human rights and democratization before military assistance could go
forward. The language was sufficiently vague that the secretary of state felt able to make the
certification. In the years that followed, subsequent State/Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts tightened and extended the language to
Kazakhstan and to all programs funded by that act (i.e., FMF, IMET, NADR, and FSA). Congress included a waiver for Kazakhstan, which the Bush
Administration used, but did not include one for military aid to Uzbekistan. As a result of the administration’s inability since mid-2004 to certify
adequate progress by Uzbekistan in human rights and democracy, military and police aid for Uzbekistan has largely been cut off since 2005.
DOD work arounds mean any restrictions are obviated – DOD establishes separate
classified budgets and provide overseas personnel the ability to distribute classified
Lumpe 2010
505313014346/OPS-No-1-20101015_0.pdf//dmr
This briefing paper tracks the evolution of, and trends in, U.S. military and police aid to Central Asian countries pre- and post-9/11.* In
particular, it seeks to identify assistance associated with agreements with countries in the region to provide base and transit access to United
States and allied militaries for the war in Afghanistan. While the United States does not pay “rent” for military bases, this report includes a
primer on the relevant U.S. military aid programs (both traditional and new) that are used as compensation for basing and other access rights,
including for Central Asian participation in the recently launched Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a land-based supply route for U.S. and
allied forces that runs through Central Asia to Afghanistan. The
U.S. government has no comprehensive budget for the
assistance it provides to the police, militaries, and other Central Asian security forces; however, in the fullest
accounting available to date, this report documents that the United States provided at least $145 million in military aid through 19 different
budgets and programs in one year (fiscal year 2007). This amount is nearly half of the total of $329 million that the U.S. government gave to
Central Asian governments in 2007, and it is six times the amount the U.S. government spent to promote rule of law, democratic governance,
and respect for fundamental human rights in that same year. The
report references efforts by Congress to legislate
restrictions on aid over the past decade, due to the level of political repression practiced by Central Asian governments, and
it notes executive branch policies and responses that work around the legislated restrictions . Namely, it
shows that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established many new military and police assistance programs
and that it now provides more military aid to Central Asia than the Department of State (DOS), the traditional budgetary source of U.S. military
assistance. Moreover, the
DOD enjoys unusual autonomy in distributing this aid: U.S. military commanders
are able to dispense training and equipment almost at their discretion, and the U.S. military is not
required to make budgets for several of its aid programs public. The paper extrapolates from these realities to suggest
that the U.S. military has acquired an oversized impact on U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia.
AT Oversight Solves
DOD work arounds mean any restrictions are obviated – DOD establishes separate
classified budgets and provide overseas personnel the ability to distribute classified
Lumpe 2010
505313014346/OPS-No-1-20101015_0.pdf//dmr
This briefing paper tracks the evolution of, and trends in, U.S. military and police aid to Central Asian countries pre- and post-9/11.* In
particular, it seeks to identify assistance associated with agreements with countries in the region to provide base and transit access to United
States and allied militaries for the war in Afghanistan. While the United States does not pay “rent” for military bases, this report includes a
primer on the relevant U.S. military aid programs (both traditional and new) that are used as compensation for basing and other access rights,
including for Central Asian participation in the recently launched Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a land-based supply route for U.S. and
allied forces that runs through Central Asia to Afghanistan. The
U.S. government has no comprehensive budget for the
assistance it provides to the police, militaries, and other Central Asian security forces; however, in the fullest
accounting available to date, this report documents that the United States provided at least $145 million in military aid through 19 different
budgets and programs in one year (fiscal year 2007). This amount is nearly half of the total of $329 million that the U.S. government gave to
Central Asian governments in 2007, and it is six times the amount the U.S. government spent to promote rule of law, democratic governance,
and respect for fundamental human rights in that same year. The
report references efforts by Congress to legislate
restrictions on aid over the past decade, due to the level of political repression practiced by Central Asian governments, and
it notes executive branch policies and responses that work around the legislated restrictions . Namely, it
shows that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established many new military and police assistance programs
and that it now provides more military aid to Central Asia than the Department of State (DOS), the traditional budgetary source of U.S. military
assistance. Moreover, the
DOD enjoys unusual autonomy in distributing this aid: U.S. military commanders
are able to dispense training and equipment almost at their discretion, and the U.S. military is not
required to make budgets for several of its aid programs public. The paper extrapolates from these realities to suggest
that the U.S. military has acquired an oversized impact on U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia.
AFF
AT General C/V
2ac
Trump is the “arms-dealer in chief” he won’t give stuff away
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen 3-22-18 -- Non-resident Senior Fellow at Arab Center Washington DC (ACW),
and a Baker Institute Fellow for the Middle East at Rice University. (“Trump’s Transactional Relationship
with Saudi Arabia” http://arabcenterdc.org/viewpoint/trumps-transactional-relationship-with-saudi-
arabia/) mba-alb
press conference between

The March 21, 2018 Trump an MBS US President Donald d Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ( ) must rank among the most surreal encounters between two world leaders,
did little to dispel the notion that Trump is a transactional president

and it he with little regard for diplomatic niceties. This was evident in July 2017, when
bragged that he had made his visit to Saudi Arabia conditional on the announcement
to the Christian Broadcasting Network May 2017
of billions in commercial agreements and arms sales claiming “I said, you have to do that, otherwise , ,
I’m not going .” In his meeting with MBS this week, ten months after that visit, Trump produced a cardboard cutout of planned Saudi arms purchases and started reeling off the figures in front of the crown prince, who seemed both embarrassed and amused at the
spectacle. At one point, however, MBS shook his head vigorously when the president turned to one sale and said, “…But if you look, in terms of dollars, $3 billion, $533 million, $525 million––that’s peanuts for you. You should have increased it.” Saudi officials have celebrated the
“renaissance” of a bilateral relationship that soured badly during the Obama Administration, with Arab News headlining their coverage of the White House visit with the phrase “United States” (just as the crown prince’s visit to London earlier in March was tagged “United Kingdoms”). In
Saudi investment and support were pivotal to the president’s

the same spirit, Arab News editor Faisal Abbas referred to “The Art of the Deal” and suggested that
“America First” strategy and the creation of new skilled jobs for American workers . While there is much merit to these arguments, President
he treated his Saudi visitors as merely a source of money and

Trump’s demeanor and tone during the public portion of his meeting with MBS appeared as if
opportunity . For a president who, three years before he took office in 2017, tweeted, “Tell Saudi Arabia and others that we want (demand) free oil for the next ten years or we will not protect their private Boeing 747s. Pay up!,” this ought to be neither new nor a
surprise. For decades, the bedrock of the United States’ relations with its political and security partners in the Gulf evolved far beyond a simple “oil-for-security” equation, to which the media sometimes reduces it. The basis for bilateral ties with all six Gulf states has become
institutionalized since the 1980s and—ironically, in view of Gulf rulers’ poor personal chemistry with President Obama—the Obama Administration did more than its predecessors to complement bilateral US links with individual Gulf states with stronger US ties to the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) as a bloc. In March 2012, the Obama Administration created a GCC-US Strategic Cooperation Forum and at its 2013 ministerial meeting launched a joint US-GCC Security Committee to address issues of common interest such as counterterrorism. A further breakthrough
came in December 2013 when President Obama issued a presidential determination that made it possible, for the first time, for the United States to sell arms to the GCC as a bloc. Ironically, then, for all their denunciations of the Obama Administration—to which Trump himself alluded in
his Oval Office comments—Obama did at least make efforts to work collectively with the GCC rather than just bilaterally with each individual state. The GCC has, of course, been weakened considerably by the ten-month standoff between three Gulf States—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE)—and Qatar, which erupted two days after Trump’s visit to Riyadh in May last year. Rumors that the United States is set to establish a trilateral security committee with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to work on countering Iran add weight to perceptions that the
policy-making focus of Trump’s White House aligns more closely with Saudi and Emirati interests in the region, especially after the nomination of CIA Director Mike Pompeo to replace Rex Tillerson as secretary of state. At present, US hopes for a sequential effort to mediate in the Gulf
Policy-making under the Trump Administration is clearly going

crisis, in advance of a planned Camp David summit that would seal a reconciliation deal, are now on hold.
to be highly transactional at the best of times . Although a bilateral relationship stripped of “values,” such as concerns for good governance or human rights, undoubtedly removes points of friction, the
corollary is that President Trump is so unpredictable that he could one day turn against the Saudis or Emiratis just as he turned against the Qataris last summer. The weakening of the institutional bases of the US relationship leaves it more vulnerable to the whims of personality, and
rational heads watching Trump’s behavior during the public portion of his meeting with MBS may not find it at all reassuring. Nor will Saudis necessarily be comfortable with the notion that large sums of state money—dismissed casually as “peanuts” by the president—will go to projects
that provide jobs for American workers rather than in Saudi Arabia, where job creation is sorely needed to take the strain off the public sector and enable MBS to deliver on his Vision 2030 promises.
Growing Congressional opposition to sales stops circumvention -- Congress is

increasing oversight and undermining support for sales broadly
Ahmed 2018
Akbar, foreign affairs reporter based in the D.C. bureau of HuffPost, “Democrats Are Planning To Target
The Arms Sales Trump Loves,” Huffington Post, November 18, 2018
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/house-democrats-arms-sales_n_5bf08cade4b0b84243e2d0da
WASHINGTON ― Top Democrats are discussing how to use their upcoming control of the House of Representatives
to more tightly regulate U.S. weapons sales abroad ― a move that would shore up the party’s antiwar
credentials and make it harder for President Donald Trump to continue his high-profile arms deals with
countries accused of human rights violations like Saudi Arabia. A final plan has not yet been crafted, but
conversations are underway, a Democratic aide and an activist in regular contact with lawmakers told HuffPost. The final decision
rests with leadership: the speaker, likely Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), and a handful of figures like Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass.), who will chair
the powerful House Rules Committee and who publicly supports greater debate over the arms trade.
Trump’s executive branch is already required to inform key congressional committees of any major
weapons sale 30 days before U.S. and foreign officials finalize terms. Capitol Hill can use legislation to
block the deal within that period. Such a bill, even if successful, would likely be vetoed by the president and
then might not win over a veto-proof majority of lawmakers ― but the general consensus is that simply initiating such a
spectacle makes it harder for a sale to continue and creates pressure for it to be abandoned instead. If
there’s no bill, the process automatically moves forward. What some House members and outside groups skeptical of the defense industry
want to fix is a discrepancy between the two chambers. In the
Senate, any member can force the full body to vote on
legislation disapproving of a sale 10 days after a notification comes to Congress if the foreign relations committee
has not acted on it. Democrats have used that power repeatedly in dramatic votes over U.S. weapons
shipments for a controversial Saudi military campaign in Yemen, and Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) has deployed it to force
debates that draw attention to his libertarian views on foreign policy. But in the House, members who introduce similar bills could see them get
referred to the foreign affairs committee and then simply never make it to a full floor vote. Critics of the arms trade say this lets lawmakers
avoid accountability for deals that can allow weapons buyers to commit war crimes, and that allow the defense industry to reap huge profits off
research largely funded by the U.S. taxpayer. “I’m for any more oversight we can add to this process to make sure that the
American people’s interests are being represented,” said Dan Grazier of the Project on Government Oversight, which endorsed a
September proposal from McGovern and Rep. Ted Lieu (D-Calif.) that would recreate the Senate procedure in the House. Such a bill has almost
no chance of becoming law under Trump and the GOP-controlled Senate, but it signaled a desire among Democrats that party leaders can act
on by enshrining, in their rules for the new House session, the right of any member to demand a floor debate on an arms deal. Opposition
to arms sales is generally seen as a human rights issue, but Grazier pointed to another concern he wants to see
raised if there are more debates over such deals: the waivers often involved that effectively mean the trade is
subsidized by U.S. taxpayers.
Absent sales production costs are unsustainable – can’t give away weapons we can’t
afford to manufacture
Eugene Gholz 2019 -- associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame. He was
awarded the US Department of Defense Exceptional Public Service Medal for his service as senior
advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
(2010–2012). He earned a doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“Conventional
Arms Transfers and US Economic Security”
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13_Issue-1/Gholz.pdf) mba-alb
weapon systems tend to stay in the US military inventory for so

CATs have a clearer, direct effect on economic security via their effect on US defense manufacturing. Because
long, they often require spare parts for maintenance years after the initial production run is complete. DOD needs to pay the
overhead cost of maintaining the production capacity for those spare parts, even when the production
rate for spares is much slower than the initial production rate during original manufacture of the
defense system. That slower rate tends to drive the unit cost of spare parts dramatically upward. In some cases, demand for spare parts
drops below the minimum technical sustaining rate, meaning that the workers lose the ability to
maintain quality standards even when the buyer is willing to pay very high unit costs. In other cases,
the government does not realize how much the cost of production has risen over time and does not
invest enough to keep the supplier interested or able to produce the part profitably, so production
drops below the minimum economic sustaining rate. These situations create potentially very costly Diminishing Manufacturing Sources or
Material Shortage (DMSMS) problems.20 Arms exports and the expanded demand for future spare parts business that they create can help reduce the unit cost of spares
production by keeping up production rates, maintaining workers’ skills, and ameliorating the risk of DMSMS by bolstering revenue for critical
and fragile niches in the supply chain. These effects have been observed in recent years in export sales of M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley infantry fighting
vehicles, among others. Assessing these manufacturing effects of arms sales requires detailed knowledge of the defense supply chain, including the technical characteristics of the components
that suppliers make, the financial status of each of those suppliers, and the business strategy of the executives at each supplier—knowledge that is not often available to the government or
defense industry prime contractors.
AT BPC
C/V good – “sales” bad
Decreasing focus on sales improves bpc and security cooperation efforts
Caverley 2018
Jonathan D. Caverley is Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research
Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the Department of
Defense, or any other branch or agency of the U.S. Government. “AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY:
SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME” APRIL 6, 2018 https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-
arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home///dmr
Partner Capacity Building Should Build Capacity Finally, overemphasis on weapons sales of threatens to undermine
America’s most important security initiatives. Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has continued to
increase its “partner capacity building” efforts to improve the ability of other states, particularly less
developed ones, to provide security for themselves and to contribute to joint operations. Newly arrived
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis made this one of his top three priorities with his first policy statement, and he has since pushed the Pentagon
towards “Threat-Based Security Cooperation.” Asking embassies and even the military to play a role in selling weapons
is not new, but pursuing this single-mindedly would undermine these Security Cooperation Offices’ central mission.
Improving foreign security forces is a complicated task that includes, according to the Congressional Research Service, “training, mentoring,
advising, equipping, exercising, educating and planning with foreign security forces, primarily in fragile and weak states.” Shifting
focus
from the countries facing the most important mutual threats to ones most likely to buy lots of weapons
will worsen these effects. One of the key lessons of security cooperation is that trying to build American-
style militaries within developing states is often a terrible idea. The United States does not produce many
weapons smaller states need. South Korea’s quite successful T-50 Golden Eagle multi-role jet — bought by Iraq, Thailand, and the
Philippines — is a more appropriate counterinsurgency weapon than anything currently in the U.S. arsenal. A Brazilian Embraer Super Tucano
— which an American firm builds under license for transfer to Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Nigeria — is better still. Any
effort to increase
U.S. arms sales should acknowledge this limitation. Turning Security Cooperation Officers in U.S.
embassies and on regional combatant command staffs into “salesmen” will undermine these
professionals’ status as valuable advisors working towards mutual security interests. The result will be less
capable allies and, if this causes growing mistrust in American intentions, long-term damage to America’s ability to supply
weapons.
No c/v – Restrictions
BPC doesn’t cover repairs, refueling, or transport
Navin 10 Major Kathryn M. Navin Judge Advocate, U.S. Marine Corps Herding Cats II: Disposal of DoD Personal Property . APRIL 2010 •
THE ARMY LAWYER • DA PAM 27-50-443, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/04-2010.pdf
Foreign countries must agree to certain restrictions prior to physical transfer of defense articles. In
accordance with the FAA and AECA, purchasers must agree to use defense articles only for their furnished purpose.122 The DSCA includes this
restriction in all LOAs. In addition to the LOA, all grant EDA recipients must sign a blanket end-use, security, and retransfer assurances
document.123 Once the EDA is transferred, the U.S. Government will scrutinize the recipient’s use of the defense
articles through an end-use monitoring program.124 Additionally, unlike FMS purchases, where new defense articles
are sold under a total package approach,125 EDA are transferred at reduced or no cost to the recipient and are offered to the
foreign country on an “as is, where is” basis.126 Once foreign countries accept EDA, the United States is
no longer responsible for any maintenance, training, or service associated with the defense article.127 If
a recipient wants to purchase training or other sustainment packages associated with a defense article, they
must submit a separate LOR, which is processed as an FMS case.128 Furthermore, Congress prohibited the
use of DoD funds for the logistics—crating, packing, handling and transportation—of all EDA transfers.129
The President, however, may grant an exception in accordance with section 516(e)(2).130 Additionally, recipients can pay the United States to
arrange the logistics of a transfer.131 As a result, expenses incurred transporting defense articles can be a limiting factor affecting a country’s
ability—and decision— to purchase a defense article. In Iraq, the logistics burden is less of a concern because most eligible defense articles are
already physically located in Iraq and the majority of EDA transfers are in-place transfers.132
AT CCL
No c/v – Logistics
No transfer – takes too much bureaucratic time and energy
Andrea Stricker and David Albright May 2017 -- Andrea Stricker is a security policy analyst specialized in
nuclear non-proliferation. David Albright is the president and founder of the Institute for Science and
International Security (ISIS). (U.S. Export Control Reform: Impacts And Implications For Controlling The
Export Of Proliferation-Sensitive Goods And Technologies https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-
reports/documents/Export_Control_Reform_Initiative_Review_and_Recommendations_May_2017_Fin
al.docx) alb
Highlights of the ECR Initiative and Recommendations Transfers of Goods from the United States Munitions List to the Commerce Control List The ECR Initiative involved the transfer of thousands
of items from the United States Munitions List ( USML to
) under the Arms Export Control Act’s (AECA) International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and administered by the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC),
the CCL
Commerce Control List ( ) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which is administered by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The EAR is maintained by the president’s annual renewal of the state of emergency under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) following the expiration in 2001 of the Export Administration Act (EAA). The CCL allows for the more flexible export of former USML items that the government deemed to be not worthy of the strictest control. The EAR also allows for
the unlicensed export of certain categories of goods to country groups, whereas the ITAR does not specify this ability. The ITAR as administered by the State Department usefully allows the Secretary of State to weigh in on transfers of the most sensitive military items as to their impact on
A substantial part of the ECR Initiative involved an elaborate bureaucratic and time
foreign policy and national security objectives.
intensive process of reviewing and moving individual goods from the USML to the CCL. This process
was thorough, technically rigorous, and involved what is often pointed to as unprecedented
interagency collaboration. The effort required the entirety of six years of the reforms, or from 2010 to
2016.
No c/v – Oversight
Spurs congressional blocking
Jim McShane 3-5-19 - Sr. Consultant, Trade Compliance for Export Solutions -- a full-service consulting
firm specializing in ITAR and EAR regulations. (“Will firearms (finally) change under Export Control
Reform?” https://www.exportsolutionsinc.com/resources/blog/firearms-export-control-reform/) alb
the Departments of State and Commerce published proposed revisions to

On May 24, 2018, USML U.S. Munitions List ( ) Categories I, II, and III in the
These three categories would be the last USML categories to be revised under the Export Control
Federal Register.
Reform Initiative – a process that began more than nine years ago and that we first blogged about here. Public Comments to the proposed revisions were solicited and
required to be submitted within 45 days. From that point forward, once the final language of the revisions were accepted and approved, the President would notify Congress and the Final Rule outlining the changes would be published. So what has happened since then? Rumors have
abounded. Some in the trade community believed the end of 2018 was a target date for publication. Others thought the announcement would be made in January 2019. Some even believed the administration might implement the changes to coincide with the Shot Show – one of the
There have been two

firearm industry’s largest trade shows (which occurred this year from January 22-25). None of these things occurred. In the meantime, Congress is not waiting to be notified by the President on the Final Rule.
legislative initiatives to stop the transition of items from the USML to the CCL: “Stopping the Traffic in
Overseas Proliferation of Ghost Guns Act” ( no H.R. number assigned yet) Specifically, this legislation would: Prohibit the transfer of small arms/light weapons, and the technical manufacturing information related
e
to them (including 3D printed guns), to the Department of Commerce; Maintain the statutory restriction on publishing 3D printed gun information, including over the internet; Prohibit the ability of the State Department to susp nd the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
Prevent Crime and Terrorism Act of 2018

without 30-day prior notice to Congress. “ This bill would amend the Arms Export ” (H.R.4765)
Control Act to prohibit the President from removing any of the following items under USML Categories I,
II, or III ( ) in order to transfer them to the Commerce Control List:
firearms, armament, ammunition Significant Military Equipment or their components, parts, or accessories;
a senior Senator has blocked the proposed Final Rule,

Flame throwers designed or modified for military application; or Devices for launching or delivering ordnance. More recently,
citing that the transition of these designated items would deny Congress oversight on export
transactions meeting certain levels and increase the risk of military-grade weapons falling into the hands
of terrorists it will establish another area of confrontation between the
. The proposal to block the proposed Final Rule is not legally binding, but
President and Congress if the President decides to proceed with the publication of the Final Rule and
the notification to Congress the date for the transition of items currently classified as ITAR
. At this point,
controlled is mere guesswork. That said, increased Congressional activities over the past few weeks
would indicate action is either not far off, or will be delayed for some time.
They can’t put significant military equipment on the list

ABA 1-14-13 -- voluntary bar association of lawyers and law students (“Proposals to Relax Export
Controls for Significant Military Equipment” https://bit.ly/2X2o4J6) mba-alb
While the Administration has authority to determine what constitutes a defense article, the Congress
clearly intended for “significant military equipment” that has “substantial military utility” to be subject
to the special controls of the AECA rifles have substantial military utility. It is
.12 Semi-automatic that can fire up to 60 rounds per minute clearly
therefore inconsistent with the AECA to transfer such items from the USML where they will no longer
be subject to the special controls of that Congress has established statute. Contrary to the Administration’s assertion in these proposed rulemakings,
constraints on the Executive Branch that go beyond AECA’s notice requirements , Congress did not . Indeed
intend to give the President unfettered discretion in determining which items should be placed on the
USML rather made clear that certain defense articles considered to be “significant military
, but
equipment” must be more closely controlled ITAR has long identified SME as those defense articles “for .
which special export controls are warranted because of their capacity for substantial military utility or
capability, and has clearly distinguished those items on the USML
” 22 C.F.R. § 120.19(a) (1984), 22 C.F.R. § 120.7(a) (1997), . Congress, in its 1996 revisions to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq., and AECA, amended AECA to include a definition for SME, which had previously only been defined in ITAR. See Pub. L. No. 104-164, § 144, 110 Stat. 1421, 1434 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2794(9)). Congress’s definition, however, merely
copied the definition of SME from ITAR—SME are defense articles “for which special export controls are warranted because of the capacity of such articles for substa ntial military utility or capability” and “identified on the [USML].” 22 U.S.C. § 2794(9)(A)–(B) (see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-
519, pt. 1, at 10 (1996)) (stating that “Section 144 amends the Arms Export Control Act to provide a definition of significant military equipment as defined in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)”).
Requires congressional notification
CRS 4-5-19 – Congressional Research Service (“The U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control
Reform Initiative” https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41916.pdf) mba-alb
The Administration’s blueprint envisioned that these changes would be implemented in three phases,
with the final phase requiring legislative action. Phase I would undertake preparatory work to
harmonize the Commerce Control List (CCL) with the U.S. Munitions List (USML). This phase would also develop standardized licensing
processes among the control agencies; it would also create an “Enforcement Fusion Center” to synchronize enforcement, along with a single electronic gateway to access the licensing system. Phase II would
implement a harmonized licensing system with two identically-structured tiered control lists, potentially
allowing for a reduction in the amount of licenses required by the system. This phase would include
moving certain items from the USML to the CCL, for which congressional notification would be
required;17 examining unilateral controls on certain items; and undertaking consultations with multilateral control regime partners to add or remove multilateral controls on certain items. Under the proposal, the new
export control system would debut in Phase III, which would establish a single licensing agency; merge the two harmonized, tiered control lists, with mechanisms for review and updating; merge the two primary export control
enforcement agencies, OEE and ICE; and operationalize a single IT system for licensing and enforcement. Changes in agency structure would require legislation.
AT Pseudo-FMS
Fiat Solves
Pseudo-FMS is funded through FMS
The United States provides military equipment and training to partner countries through a variety of security cooperation and assistance
programs authorized under Title 22 and Title 10 of the U.S. Code as well as various public laws.10 When foreign partners choose to use the FMS
program, they pay the U.S. Government to administer the acquisition of materiel and services on their behalf.11 The United States also
services through the process used for FMS. DOD administers a number of security cooperation programs that focus on building partner capacity
with appropriated funds. The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and the authority to build the capacity of foreign security forces are examples of
such security cooperation programs.12 The security assistance services provided through these programs use the same workforce to manage
and acquire military equipment and services as the FMS program and are referred to as pseudo-FMS. Both
FMS and pseudo-FMS
program administrative costs are funded through FMS case surcharges that are administered through
the FMS Trust Fund. Figure 1 shows an F-15 Eagle fighter, which is an example of an item that has been procured under FMS.
AT 1206
No c/v – Oversight
Congressional notification and human rights conditions prevent circumvention
Section 1206 of the FY2006 NDAA requires that programs conducted under its authority observe and
respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the “legitimate civilian authority within that
country.” The authority may not be used to provide any type of assistance that is otherwise prohibited
by any provision of law. It also may not be used to provide assistance to any country that is otherwise
prohibited from receiving such assistance under any other provision of law. The legislation also requires
a 15-day advance notification to the congressional defense, foreign affairs, and appropriations
committees before initiating each program. This notification must specify, among other things, the program country,
budget, and completion date, as well as the source and planned expenditure of funds.
No c/v – Logistics
Long delays mean we solve before circumvention
Still, a 2013 RAND report indicates that some geographic Combatant Commands may regard timeliness
as a continuing problem, but perhaps as much because the approval process is sometimes perceived as
too long as because the delivery process is perceived as too slow. RAND found from information
gathered from the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) that while “processes had improved ... it still takes
a long time to get [Section 1206] projects approved and resources allocated” and from the U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM) that “sometimes funding comes too late.... ”29 Some analysts point to the
continuing temporary status of Section 1206 as one impediment to developing a more efficient and
timely delivery system. If Section 1206 were codified, as proposed by SASC, making it a permanent
program, these analysts argue that it would become a higher priority for DOD, leading to the allocation
of more resources for planning and implementing Section 1206 programs.
No 1206 circumvention – no funds, contract rigidity, and missing critical parts

DOD IG 2017
Inspector General for the Department of Defense, “Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Build
Counterterrorism and Stability Operations Capacity of Foreign Military Forces with Section 1206/2282
Funding” July 21, 2017 https://media.defense.gov/2017/Dec/19/2001858653/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2017-
099.PDF//dmr
No where near the funds to circumvent – plan’s cuts are beyond sufficient
Total funding FY2006-FY2014 is some $2.2 billion. (For a breakdown by country of FY2012- FY2014
funding, see below.) During this period, Section 1206 funding supported bilateral programs in over 40
countries, several multilateral programs, and an associated global human rights program. Initially, virtually
all 1206 funding was provided for counterterrorism purposes. Since FY2010, Section 1206 has provided substantial
assistance to train and equip Eastern and Central European forces to participate in NATO’s ISAF coalition
operations. The largest recipient has been Yemen,11 with some $400 million. Among the other largest recipients
over time have been Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Philippines, but of these only Lebanon received funding in FY2013–FY2014. Pakistan
ceased to receive Section 1206 funding after special counterinsurgency funds dedicated to that country
were created. The Philippines received Section 1206 assistance every fiscal year from FY2007 through FY2012. In the past few years,
programs in Africa have increased substantially. Kenya, Mauritania, Niger, Uganda, and Burundi have become large recipients, part of a trend
that has seen Section 1206 assistance to Africa increase significantly to support counterterrorism operations against the Lord’s Resistance
Army, al-Shabaab, al-Qa’ida, and Al Qa’ida affiliates, as well as to prepare African troops to support the African Union peacekeeping missions in
Somalia (AMISOM).12 Countries
in the Asia-Pacific region, which received substantial assistance through
FY2010, have received no funding in FY2013 and FY2014

Circumvention Arms Sales

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Neg – Circumvention – BFHR

Those methods include:

Loans, leases, and aid

• Build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests

• Foreign military sales (FMS)

SIPRI defines them differently

SIPRI data shows that transfers of major weapons between

Circumvention through non-commercial transfers is likely

It completely takes out the aff – transfers will continue

How DOD Executes BPC Strategies Programmatically speaking, within

Pseudo-FMS circumvents – its quicker and the DOD already prioritizes it

Strong congressional support to utilize BPC for Israeli weapons systems

39. Department of Defense

Trump administration is pushing forward with plans to

, the changes would also make it easier for gun

Putting the Commerce

If not halted or significantly

launched ECRI designed to streamline U.S. arms export controls,

The loosening of arms export

A central element of the administration’s new policy has been to move

. One reason that U.S. companies may be increasingly

companies are also pleased that they

Aerospace Industries Association told

Given the amount of commercial arms exports going through the

administration is pushing to make sweeping changes

regulatory changes would transfer rifles

to the Commerce Department

Trump explicitly adds “economic security” as a factor in considering

Under the proposal,

The primary rationale given for the change

administration has shown less restraint,

. Weakened Congressional oversight of international small arms

If more weapons flow to countries with poor human rights

The transfer of firearms export control to the Department of Commerce

would not be tracked

development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, intermediate or depot level

Pseudo-FMS circumvents – its quicker and the DOD already prioritizes it

the rules are deliberately formulated in a way that leaves

ms trade is an important element to create military partnerships and

treaty “pays no attention whatsoever to restricting and stream lining

arms deliveries to non-state actors do not fall under the treaty.

There’s a huge incentive for avoidance – they’ll do whatever they can

loopholes exist – congressional attempts at regulation empirically fail

Despite substantial regulation, criticism has been

The JCET programs do not have the same level of congressional

Code of Conduct) was introduced

Like the Transparency and Accountability Act, the

Yet the 2007 Budget Justifications noted that “Cameroon is

There’s an incentive and ability to cirucumvent

about arms transfer control

are now an established element in the armoury of the international

imposed the record of

defence-industrial champions often

The record is of fine-sounding words,

either in construction or in implementation, global arms transfer controls tend to be

In part at least, the weakness of global controls on the conventional arms

virtually half of global military expenditure

increased concentration might well facilitate better

, the ability of states to encourage strict

Trump has declared an “emergency” to circumvent Congressional oversight of arms

What emergency confronts

Presumably the State Department and Pentagon will suggest that

constitute an “emergency” justifying the sales

This is more Fake News