Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

Escalation of Force (EOF) Conference Packet

Carr Center for Human Rights and PKSOI Workshop, 26-27 Mar 07
 Topic A: Traffic Control Point Operations

This conference packet was prepared for discussion of traffic control point operations during the
Escalation of Force Conference.

This product examines the essential role that traffic control points (TCPs) play in ongoing
operations in Iraq today. TCPs are a critical control measure supporting a unit’s overall force
protection, movement control, and information operations. All established TCPs must meet
stringent force protection requirements, accomplish the mission, and minimize chances for
collateral damage against other coalition forces and friendly Iraqi citizens. Soldiers must balance
these requirements, while simultaneously maintaining an ability to effectively communicate and
interact with the sheer volume of traffic.

The Iraqi operational environment is complex and often ambiguous. Reports from theater clearly
validate that leader decisions and Soldier actions at TCPs can have both short and long term
effects. They may also have strategic and international repercussions. This packet discusses ways
to mitigate challenges in order to conduct successful TCP operations.

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 Introduction

“…In reference to conducting TCPs, you must shape situations to minimize the tough calls,
and train our leaders on how to react…this will reduce the number of Iraqi civilian injuries
and deaths.”

LTG Petraeus, Commanding General, Combined Arms Center, December, 2005

In the Iraqi theater of operations, a TCP is defined as any position established to control
movements into and out of an area where coalition forces (CF) will be in direct contact with
vehicles and passengers, to include the local populace. (For the purposes of this packet, the terms
traffic control point and vehicle checkpoint will be used interchangeably). TCP effects are
synchronized across the lines of operations with a unit’s higher headquarters and are
differentiated by both placement techniques and duration. TCPs are normally part of an inner
and/or outer security ring and are established to facilitate conducting vehicle searches (focusing
on weapons, explosives, and other contraband). TCPs also serve as an information collection
gathering post for CF and the civilian population.

Soldiers conducting TCP operations in Iraq today are routinely required to make split-second,
life-and-death decisions. TCP personnel must decide whether vehicles or pedestrians pose a
significant force protection threat. Soldiers, manning numerous TCPs across Iraq, face a tough
and dangerous mission and perform their duties admirably, 24/7. Commanders, at all levels,
know they must provide the required resources to empower Soldiers to do their best and make
the appropriate decisions.

Reports from the field verify that Iraqi responses vary widely at TCPs. The circumstances on the
ground can initially appear ambiguous and confusing. Vehicles may approach a TCP at a high
rate of speed or drive in an erratic or unpredictable manner. To conduct an effective TCP in Iraq
today, Soldiers must understand the person they are attempting to control.

Most Iraqis entering a TCP have no hostile intent and will be compliant, but they may also be
confused and in a hurry. Iraqis fitting this category usually recognize that security is important
for their future and acknowledge that Soldiers simply have a job to do. Properly trained and
patient Soldiers can keep interactions with the local populace calm and eliminate confusion at
the TCP with clear, consistent, and repeated instructions.

Some Iraqis may approach a location with no hostile intent but will be defiant. They simply may
not want to pull over for a variety of reasons. They may not respond well to directions from
non-Muslims and, in particular, to CF, who they may perceive as occupiers in their country.
Iraqis fitting this category see this stop as an unreasonable request and a waste of time because
they have no hostile intent and only want to proceed with their business. They may initially be
compliant, but they may also grow angry, and that anger can quickly escalate to evasiveness or
hostility. They may decide not to stop or may attempt to bypass or even turn around to avoid a
TCP. They may not understand or may pretend to not understand posted and verbal instructions
and warnings. This type of driver is the most difficult to assess when determining potential
hostile intent and the corresponding escalation of force (EOF) response. Properly trained and

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patient Soldiers can normally diffuse defiant, but non-hostile vehicle occupants with clear,
consistent, and repeated instructions. However, if the driver refuses to obey instructions and
warnings but has not yet displayed overt hostile intent, Soldiers must begin to consider
appropriate EOF measures. Leaders at all levels should teach and reinforce tactical restraint to all
Soldiers operating a TCP.

A driver approaching a TCP with hostile intent creates a serious and dangerous situation. This
event usually develops rapidly, and CF have limited reaction time. This scenario often develops
into actions on contact. A smart and inventive enemy will use a myriad of personnel,
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and small arms fire in an attempt to inflict
casualties at TCPs. Success hinges on properly trained and equipped Soldiers manning TCPs that
provide maximum force protection.

Establish TCPs to control traffic in order to shape the conditions for success. You must make it
the Iraqis’ decision to comply or not comply, and give the Soldier more time to react. You must
put the decision to comply squarely on the shoulders of the driver of the vehicle through a series
of control measures. Patterns picked up from theater clearly indicate that successful TCP designs
accomplish the following:

• Provide Iraqis with an earlier warning.

• Slow down traffic at the earliest opportunity.

• Firmly control the traffic flow.

• Establish a distinct vehicle search area with blast protection.

• Establish a clear warning line where Soldiers have an opportunity to regain compliance
from vehicles and assess EOF actions.
• Integrate latest available EOD capability.

• Have combat life savers and be able to quickly conduct medical evacuation, if
required.
• Prepare for detainee operations.

• Employ a defendable engagement area if lethal force is required.

• Effectively position TCP personnel.

• Leverage available barrier equipment

• Have capability to disseminate TCP operations intent/procedures to educate the local

population, mitigate problems, and secure local populace support/compliance.

TCPs are categorized by task, purpose, and employment duration and are either static or mobile.

• Permanent TCPs are deliberately established static positions determined to be an

ongoing fixed site requirement to control or monitor a specified location for a long

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 duration. They are normally established along main supply routes or at critical
intersections and are large, man-power intensive, hardened, well equipped, and
advertised to the local population.

• Snap (also referred to as flash or hasty) TCPs can be part of a predetermined plan or
established as an impact operation. They are often hastily erected and require less
manpower. Because of the quick set up time, they are not as hardened or
well-equipped as a permanent TCP. Depending on mission, enemy, terrain and
weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
(METT-TC) they may or may not be advertised in advance to the local population.
Snap TCPs are designed to control movements for a short duration (normally 30
minutes or less) and are established in reaction to actionable intelligence or as part of
displaying an impact security presence in an area. Staying too long at a given location
tends to draw the enemy to the snap TCP; therefore, their effectiveness degrades over
time.

• Rolling TCPs are set up in response to conditions on the roadway and/or enemy
activity or to facilitate unimpeded CF movements. Duration is METT-TC dependent.

• Temporary halt TCPs are established due to exigent circumstances and collapse as
soon as the problem is fixed (e.g., combat logistics patrol maintenance stop).

TCPs are employed with the inherent ability to use deadly force, but should be built to maximize
the ability to use nonlethal methods to accomplish the mission. All control movements have the
potential to interact with the local population. Personnel conducting reconnaissance for potential
TCPs must pick locations that best balance force protection and traffic circulation control.
Always anticipate second and third order effects of the site location. When establishing TCPs,
leverage available road space with available resources to include nonlethal weapon/ammunition
and barrier equipment sets. TCPs are always employed with the inherent capability to conduct
lethal fire and should be oriented to defend in depth if penetrated. All TCPs operate under the
same rules of engagement (ROE) and EOF, but the application of graduated response must be
tailored to the physical environment, volume of traffic, and crowd control. Training and
rehearsals must be tailored for different TCP operations.

EOF Considerations

Graduated response measures are used to protect both CF and Iraqi citizens. EOF procedures are
fundamental considerations during any TCP incident. EOF must be an integral part of all training
scenarios and cannot be treated as a stand alone event. EOF vignettes addressing ambiguous
conditions are a powerful teaching tool (see Section III). Lessons learned from Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) reveal that the more control measures and barrier equipment at a TCP, the more
time a Soldier has to make an EOF decision. More time often results in enhanced situational
awareness, which may lessen the requirement to escalate to higher levels of force. Applying the
right response at the right time is vital to all operations in Iraq. Remember, the unnecessary use
of deadly force by CF on Iraqi civilians diminishes Iraqi support for the coalition and its
objectives. Inappropriate use of lethal force destroys the lives of innocent Iraqis and their
families, who could otherwise have played a vital role in the future of Iraq. Lethal force incidents
may foster future insurgent activity and can provide negative propaganda messages anti-Iraqi
forces can use to delay progress.

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 Section I: Leadership Challenges of Preparing Soldiers for
Traffic Control Point (TCP) Operations

This section addresses the significant leadership challenges of preparing Soldiers for TCP
operations, as recognized by experienced commanders currently serving in Iraq.

Reducing the number of deadly force incidents at TCPs is both a leadership challenge and a
training issue. Leaders naturally and rightfully tell their Soldiers to use caution and assess each
and every situation; however, successful leaders in OIF today realize they must shape the
situation at a TCP by using control measures and preparing Soldiers to respond.

Leaders understand that successful TCP operations begin with the Soldiers’ ability to better
communicate and more effectively interact with the Iraqi people. They know if Soldiers do this,
they are in a better position to respond with a measured EOF to control the situation and execute
their mission.

Leaders, at all levels, understand that Soldiers must use a combination of techniques to
communicate and control Iraqi drivers including verbal commands, hand and arm signals, signs,
light sets, and barriers. They also know these techniques are not an inherent ability, but trained
skills the Soldier must develop as he attains situational awareness (SA). Positive control at TCPs
is difficult to obtain and must be both planned and trained. Standard battle drill rehearsals must
transform behavior into instinct. Trained Soldiers can more easily differentiate between a vehicle
that is simply ignoring their warning and a vehicle that is displaying willful disobedience or
hostile intent. Trained teams who rehearse their anticipated responses are better prepared to deal
with all types of TCP incidents. Trained leaders and Soldiers know they must exhaust all
measures before using deadly force.

TCP operations are a team effort. Soldiers monitoring vehicle traffic at a TCP must quickly
establish SA and effectively communicate with one another. Soldiers must be aware of the
current situation and be able to predict future events based on their battle drill training. A rushed
and inappropriate response of a single Soldier cannot become the team’s response. Setting the
conditions and controlling the situation remain a chain of command issue and a leadership
challenge in a situation where events can happen or develop quickly. Rehearsed battle drills,
early warning, and barrier placement help to shape the environment for both optimum force
protection and traffic control.

Leaders must be clear on how to train, conduct, and equip Soldiers to properly set up and
execute TCP operations. The consequences of a Soldier making the wrong decision and
incorrectly applying EOF procedures within the defined ROE, could be death or injury to
noncombatants/civilians on the battlefield, CF, Iraqi Army (IA) /Iraqi Police Services (IPS),
and/or fellow Soldiers.

Collectively, a wrong tactical decision (or at least a public perception of wrongdoing) can also
have potentially long-term, strategic consequences, as evidenced by the shooting of a bodyguard
for an Italian reporter at a U.S. Army checkpoint. This type of unnecessary application of force
endangers our efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people and sustain the coalition.

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Leaders are challenged to have their units always at the ready, yet able to practice tactical
patience in order to let the situation develop before acting decisively. At the other end of the
spectrum, the failure or refusal of a Soldier to shoot at enemy targets could result in death or
injury to the Soldier and others manning the checkpoint.

Leaders know that battle drill training requires their personal involvement and that training must
be tailored to a specific TCP incident. OIF after-action reviews (AARs) and checkpoint
operations and battle stress-related information provide the following training tips:

• Soldiers must know that there is a complex and often ambiguous environment out
there.

• When establishing and conducting TCP operations:

º Give yourself early warning.

º Balance force protection and movement control.

º Do not “telegraph” your position unless that is your intent.

º Know how to employ hand and arm signals; signs; flares; lasers; and other
control measures, such as TCP equipment sets and nonlethal weapons and
ammunition.

• Cultural awareness is not merely customs training. You must know how Iraqi honor
shapes behavior.

• Deploy with a baseline of Iraqi command and control phrases and be able to
communicate with or without an interpreter.
• Know how to influence the person you are dealing with.

• Using an interpreter is a deliberate process and must be rehearsed. Soldiers and

interpreters must be a team. Effective interpreter teams are better able to diffuse
potential problems at TCPs.
• Apply the right response at the right time. Both ROE and EOF protect you and others,
while minimizing collateral damage.
• Leverage Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) (both IA and IPS) knowledge of the area to
mitigate potential threats to TCP location, to communicate your message to other
Iraqis, and to make positive identifications (PIDs) of insurgents. Lack of PID and
inadequate evidence collection procedures can lead to the release of a potential
insurgent from an Iraqi court.
• Maintain operational security. Leaks about any operation help the enemy.

• When permitted, let the local Iraqis know you are conducting TCPs for their security
and safety. Getting them to buy into and support the process is fundamental to winning
the “perceptions war.”

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 • At many checkpoints, Iraqis fail to understand the hand signals commonly used by
U.S. military personnel, and Soldiers must draw their weapons to force a driver to stop.

• Remove sunglasses, when appropriate. Iraqis feel that the “eyes are the windows into
the soul,” and they do not really trust someone if they cannot see their eyes.

• To decrease the possible loss of life at checkpoints and vehicular contact locations, be
familiar with Iraqi body language and commonly used Iraq-specific hand signals.

• Heightened cultural awareness enhances force protection.

TCPs on the asymmetrical battlefield are combat operations. Leaders at all levels understand that
TCPs are critical missions. Reactions from the local populace at TCPs are often confrontational
and potentially hostile and can become militarily and politically sensitive operations. Although
only a limited number of Soldiers conduct TCP operations, they are often the most exposed to
hostile fire outside the unit’s forward operations base (FOB). TCP personnel are the ones
responsible for controlling the congested traffic, interacting with the local population, assessing
potential threats, and defeating an often faceless enemy while applying the appropriate measured
response.

Leaders have learned and are stressing to Soldiers that they will often operate checkpoints in
congested areas under ambiguous circumstances. Numerous unit AARs state that nothing should
be treated as routine when conducting checkpoint operations. Soldiers and junior leaders
manning TCPs must remain vigilant and suspicious. Treat each vehicle as if it were the most
important one coming through the checkpoint. Soldiers are at the “tip of the spear” during these
operations, and their actions support shaping the overall tactical situation. Use the following
guidelines during TCP operations:

• Design, equip, erect, and position checkpoints to make the vehicle going through the
barrier plan display non-hostile or hostile intent; well-designed checkpoints facilitate
early warning and enable Soldiers to be more active than reactive, and consequently,
they have more time to make EOF decisions.
• Anticipate consequence management of all decisions against the information
operations and media (public affairs) campaign.
• Synchronize TCPs as part of the overall security and movement control plans.

Observer/Controller Training Observation from Combat Training Centers (CTCs):

Rotational units should conduct TCP operations until they are comfortable, and they understand
the required intelligence reads, set-up, and operational procedures. TCP operations are integrated
into the overall rotational unit’s training. Most units will train this task during cordons and
searches or snap checkpoints as nested into the rotational training unit’s plan. Over the past year,
many fixed site and checkpoint security requirements have transitioned to host nation forces. As
a result, more of these missions are being incorporated into current rotational scenarios. The
search and attack and combat patrol lanes create an excellent opportunity for units to train this
task. Still everything depends on the unit’s priority to incorporate TCPs into the plan. When
TCPs are conducted, O/Cs provide on-going coaching and feedback during AAR discussions.

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Units are coached to employ snap TCPs that are driven by the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance process. There are two benefits from this approach: The snap TCP is active, and
it does not inherently create a pattern. Units are also coached to continue their analysis to ensure
they are not establishing patterns.

Risk-Mitigation Recommendations

The following analyses/recommendations for training and leader development are intended to
reduce risk, enhance force protection, limit collateral damage, assist leaders and Soldiers in
applying EOF at TCPs, and enhance combat to training integration.

Training

• Units must conduct checkpoint operations at home stations, CTCs, and mobilization
training centers prior to deployment to a combat theater.

• Commanders issue guidance, based on standing operating procedures, for checkpoint

operations. The below list is not all inclusive, but represents some of the essential
elements required for checkpoints:

º Number of personnel required (based on intelligence preparation of the

battlefield, area of operations, and METT-TC) for different types of
checkpoints.

º Snap TCP equipment list and pre-configured sets and vehicle load plans
incorporated into the unit standing operating procedure (SOP).

º Required training that includes interrogation procedures.

º ROE/EOF.

º Local/English language signs (to include sign dimensions, distance intervals

before checkpoint, etc.).
º Interpreters/Linguists interface.

º Detainee processing checklist.

º Properly developed checklists are codified in SOP; standards via plans (include
branches and sequels) and orders (operations orders and fragmentary orders)
are enforced.
• Junior leaders (noncommissioned officers [NCOs] and company grade commissioned
officers) must conduct rigorous, routine precombat checks, precombat inspections, and
rehearsals (troop leading procedures [TLP]).
• Once the checkpoint rehearsal is completed, conduct a thorough AAR to discuss what
went right (sustain) and areas that need improvement. Rehearse again; repetition
increases proficiency in the tasks that must be completed. If Soldiers are well
rehearsed on the required tasks associated with checkpoint operations, it increases the
likelihood for successful mission accomplishment in combat operations.

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 • Incorporate EOF into annual individual training requirements.

• Continue to incorporate all aspects of EOF scenarios into collective training at

home-station training (field training exercises), mobilization centers, CTCs, mission
rehearsal exercises prior to deploying to a combat theater, and during the unit’s relief
in place/transfer of authority validation program.

Leader Development

• Incorporate EOF and EOF consequence management training into Basic Officer
Leader Course and NCO leadership courses.

• Leaders must recognize the signs of combat stress and how it affects Soldiers at EOF
incidents. Leaders must take pro-active measures such as counseling; appropriate
medical consultation; and relief (rest period), when possible, to help alleviate the
pressures of combat. Soldiers must strive to maintain their reasoning faculties when
under extreme duress in often ambiguous combat situations.

Summary

Soldiers and junior leaders at TCPs face multiple, potentially violent situations with every
vehicle encountered. They must simultaneously orchestrate the important issues of ensuring
force protection; interdicting, disrupting, and detecting possible insurgents and contraband; and
protecting civilians from harm, without unnecessarily impeding traffic movement. Experience in
OIF indicates more must be done to train all Soldiers and leaders on how to shape the situation
and react to complex situations. These skills require all Soldiers and leaders to be ever vigilant
and apply TLP and well rehearsed TTP. Everyone assigned to a TCP must maintain SA, know
the ROE/EOF procedures, maintain an aggressive but controlled combat posture, and know how
to report or to bring additional forces and support to bear if required.

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 Section II: Rules of Engagement (ROE)

The following SOP examples were adapted from a unit in OIF and are an expansion of
Multi-National Coalition Forces-Iraq (MNC-I) ROE developed by a commander for Soldiers in
his command.

This SOP establishes standard ROE for all elements of the command. These rules are for initial
planning. These rules may be changed or modified for a specific operation or phase of an
operation. Commanders and leaders at all echelons are responsible for keeping all Soldiers aware
of the current ROE.

Self defense

Nothing limits the right of individuals and units or a commander’s inherent authority and
obligation to use all necessary means to defend themselves, their units, and others in the vicinity.
Use of force proportional to a threat, to include deadly force, is authorized in defense of yourself,
your unit, other U.S. Soldiers, and other persons in your vicinity and in defense of property
specifically designated by your commander. Use only necessary and proportional force.
Minimize collateral damage.

Definitions

• Collateral damage is the unintended loss of civilian or noncombatant life, injury to

civilians, or damage to civilian property incident to the legitimate use of military force

• Dual-use facilities are infrastructures, facilities, structures, or systems used by or

reasonably expected to be used by both hostile forces and the local civilian populace.
Examples include public works such as power stations, water systems and storage, and
major roads and bridges.
• Hostile acts are attacks or other use of force against the U.S., U.S. forces, ISF, or Iraqi
civilians. A hostile act is also force used to preclude or impede the mission and/or
duties of U.S. forces.
• Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force against the U.S., U.S. forces, or
friendly forces. It includes threats against civilians or property specifically designated
as under U.S. protection.
• Military necessity requires attacks on legitimate military targets using only that force
necessary to achieve U.S. goals, unless such force is prohibited by the Law of War.
• Populated areas are cities, towns, villages, built-up areas, and/or those areas designated
on operational overlays as populated areas.
• Proportional force is force that is reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to
the perceived or demonstrated threat based on all facts known to the commander at the
time.
• Self defense is the minimum amount of force necessary to decisively counter hostile
acts or demonstrated hostile intent and ensure the continued safety of U.S. forces or
other protected persons and property.

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Lawful targets

The following types of targets may be engaged with all lawful means subject to the restrictions
contained in these ROE.

• Hostile forces. A hostile force includes all conventional and unconventional units
declared hostile within the unit's area of operations (AO). Hostile forces may be
engaged with all lawful means, up to and including deadly force, subject to the
following restriction: Do not engage anyone who has surrendered or is out of the
battle due to sickness or wounds.

• Hostile aircraft/vessels. Declared hostile forces’ military aircraft/vessels will be

considered hostile and may be engaged with all lawful means, up to and including
deadly force, subject to the following restriction: Do not engage aircrew personnel
descending by parachute from a disabled aircraft or shipwrecked personnel.

• Military objectives. All military objectives may be engaged, including those in cities
and populated areas, subject to these ROE limitations. Apply proportionality and
minimize collateral damage.

Protection of civilians and civilian property

• Civilians are protected persons entitled to respect of both their person and property. Do
not engage civilians unless in self-defense, defense of others, or defense of designated
property in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Report
engagements of protected persons to the staff judge advocate.

• Civilians exhibiting hostile intent are not considered protected persons.

• It is permissible to engage combatants posing as civilians and civilians who decide to

harm friendly forces.
• When attacking military forces, military targets, or returning fire inside populated
areas, the loss of life and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the
military advantage to be gained. Use reasonable force that is proportionate to the
threat.
• Do not seize civilian property without approval of a company-level commander and
only for stated military purposes. If the property is occupied when seized, provide the
owner with a receipt describing the condition of the property. Keep a copy.
• Except as authorized above, do not seize, commandeer, appropriate, or liberate private
or public property unless authorized or directed by a battalion/task force commander.
• Protect livestock, crops, trees, wells, and water sources from unnecessary harm.

Civilian restraint and movement restriction

• Civilians may be restrained (arrest, detention, interrogation, disarmed, etc.) only when
required to protect lives, property, or the security of operational facilities and areas and
when all other means have failed.

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 • Civilian movement may be restricted when required by military necessity. Civilians
failing to comply with movement restrictions in areas under unit control may be
stopped and required to show identification and/or apprehended and detained
(including their means of transportation) using the minimum amount of force
necessary.

• Generally, civilians are denied access to secure areas/facilities (airfields, tactical

operation centers, support areas, communication centers, etc.). Those attempting
unauthorized access will be challenged, identified, and informed of access restrictions.
Those gaining unauthorized access will be apprehended using the minimum force
necessary and detained until it is determined if further action is warranted.

• Follow published rules for the search and treatment of detained personnel.

Protected places/properties

Hospitals, churches, shrines, schools, temples, museums, and national monuments and other
historical, cultural, or religious sites are protected places. You may not engage a protected place
unless it is being used for a military purpose and your mission or defense requires its
engagement.

Search and seizure

As a force protection measure, battalion/task force-level commanders may authorize probable

cause searches of any persons, vehicles, and/or places when there are reasonable grounds to
suspect the presence of weapons or ordnance, and they may seize those weapons or ordnance.
When possible, coordinate searches with local civilian authorities. Absent any hostile or criminal
acts, persons relinquishing weapons or ordnance to U.S. forces will be released. Others should be
turned over to local civilian authorities as soon as possible.

Fire support

All fire missions directed against known or suspected targets in populated areas must minimize
collateral damage.

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 Section III: Escalation of Force (EOF)

“All MNC-I troopers and leaders at all levels understand and apply the identified EOF
procedures in order to prevent unnecessary deadly force engagements toward Iraqi citizens…”

Commanding General, Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), December, 2005

In OIF, current pressing issues include the application of appropriate rules of interaction/ROE
and using EOF commensurate with the level of threat the Soldier faces, while limiting collateral
damage to civilians on the battlefield. Iraqis perceive that CF engage in indiscriminate killing at
TCPs. Soldier actions outside the authorized EOF procedures undermine the unit’s mission and
have potential to negatively affect CF information operations and public affairs operations
campaigns.

Most Iraqi vehicles navigate through checkpoints without incident. Throughout the Iraqi theater
of operation, there are many varied elements (vehicular traffic, dismounted personnel, contracted
workers, personal security detachments) that must be quickly identified at TCPs. Without PID,
these vehicles present a perceived threat to CF force protection. EOF procedures provide
alternatives to the use of lethal force for forces conducting ground operations in the Iraqi theater
of operation.

Definitions:
• EOF is defined as sequential actions which begin with nonlethal force measures (visual
signals to include flags, spot lights, lasers, and pyrotechnics) and graduate to lethal
measures (direct action) to include warning, disabling, or deadly shots in order to
defeat a threat and protect the force.

• Defensive actions are defined as EOF procedures that terminate with successful
employment of nonlethal means (hand/arm signals, colored flags, spot-lights,
pyrotechnics, or any other available resource).
• An EOF incident is defined as the employment of lethal force that results in weapons
discharge, where the purpose or intent of the weapons discharge is to warn or employ
in self-defense of an individual or unit.

Procedures to employ during EOF incidents:

• Use audible warning to warn (horn, air horn, loudspeaker, flash/bang device, siren).

• Use visual aids (lights, laser pointers, flares, colored flags, signs).

• Show weapon and demonstrate intent to use it.

• Attempt nonlethal means (stop strips, physical barrier, vehicle, visual/audio signal,
signs).
• Fire warning shots (in vicinity of threat).

• Use disabling fire (tires, engine block, windows).

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 • Use deadly force (proportional to threat).

Contributing factors which have led to unnecessary deadly force engagements toward Iraq
citizens:

• Predeployment training did not use current in-theater EOF policy and procedures.

• Training scenarios did not replicate the complex and often ambiguous environment in
Iraq.

• Training did not include “what if” vignette drills to train best and worst case scenarios.

• Higher headquarters did not provide detailed EOF guidance to lower units.

• Leaders did not enforce EOF standards.

• Leaders did not talk to Soldiers; Soldiers did not talk to each other.

• Units did not make EOF part of mission analysis before establishing a TCP.

• Units did not adjust their SOPs or battle drills to prevent excessive use of force
incidents.

• Units did not integrate EOF into precombat inspections/checks, actions on contact,
battle drills, and AARs.

• Units did not meet local Iraqi leaders to make them aware of EOF procedures, which
resulted in a lack of local community understanding of TCP operations.

• Units did not interact with the Iraqi population.

• Soldiers were not aware of Iraqi significant calendar events (religious holidays, etc.)
that could significantly increase vehicle traffic.
• Soldiers were not aware of local business locations and operating hours in the vicinity
of their TCP area of operations.
• Soldiers did not exercise positive control or “muzzle awareness” on weapon systems.

• Units did not consistently report EOF incidents in a timely manner.

• Units did not conduct constant reviews of EOF procedures.

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 Section IV: Snap Traffic Control Point (TCP) Operations

Planners must assume that TCPs will encounter enemy attempts to inflict casualties and battle
damage and disrupt movement.

Snap TCPs are quickly erected, operate for a short duration, and achieve a specific purpose. Snap
TCPs are often conducted under a time-compressed military decision-making process and serve
as both a security and a movement control check. Because of their mobility, snap TCPs can
cover multiple locations in a relatively short amount of time. Units have learned to position snap
TCPs, leveraging the natural/man-made terrain and existing roadway features to canalize traffic
and prevent the ability of insurgents to seek bypass.

Purpose of a snap TCP:

• Quickly controls traffic and maintains the ability to search for enemy contraband or
individuals (insurgents).

• Provides commanders with an ability to immediately have a security presence and

influence an area of operations.

• Enhances force protection and establishes an engagement area for the application of
graduated response measures if required.

• Deters, disrupts, and interdicts enemy freedom of movement; denies terrain; and
facilitates capture of individuals (insurgents)/equipment based on actionable
intelligence.

• Employs vehicle control measures to allow Soldiers more time to determine hostile
intent of drivers negotiating a snap TCP.
• Shows Iraqi people that their security is important enough to commit Soldiers to these
positions.

Recommended EOF procedures at snap TCPs.

If time and circumstances permit, use graduated response measures (“5 S”):

1. SHOUT warnings to stop (Arabic: "Kiff-Armik).

2. SHOW weapon.

3. SHOVE, restrain, or detain.

4. SHOOT warning shot.

5. SHOOT to eliminate threat.

Note: You do not have to go through each step if the situation does not safely allow for it.

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Use these steps to develop a better understanding of threatening situations. If the threat level
becomes imminent and deadly, apply lethal force to neutralize the threat. Warning shots should
be used in situations where force, up to and including deadly (lethal) force, would be authorized
in accordance with standing ROE/EOF. The above “5 S” principles for graduated EOF are not
just applicable when responding to threats to persons, but also to threats to certain property.

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 Topic B: Escalation of Force

The focus of a counterinsurgency (COIN) is the people, and nothing moves the population
against one side or another as much as the use of force. Force may be unavoidable, but through
planning, preparation, and training, the number of incidents can be decreased and the lethality of
the incidents reduced. Force must be perceived by the people as judicious, appropriate, and
proportional to the threat, while still protecting our Soldiers. This last point is important. Nothing
interferes with a Soldier’s inherent right of self-defense.

Leaders must do all they can to increase the time a Soldier has to make and implement an EOF
decision. Increased reaction time begins with recognizing situations likely to lead to an EOF
event. Shaping the environment, anticipating follow-on effects of decisions, and developing
contingencies all facilitate the right response to a given situation. Rigorous, realistic, and
innovative EOF predeployment training integrated into mission planning and execution will
better prepare units to visualize upcoming challenges in a complex and often ambiguous COIN
environment.

Key Lessons
• Plan for both lethal and nonlethal means during the intelligence assessment
process.

• Soldiers and leaders must know and rehearse EOF/ROE procedures.

• Detailed and innovative planning can extend reaction time.

• Develop contingencies for even routine missions.

• Battle staff planning and oversight can de-escalate situations.

• Cultural sensitivities affect setup and operation of TCPs, cordon and search, and
convoys.

• Plan for and employ force protection equipment to help increase reaction time
and reduce unnecessary casualties.

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Introduction

19
Figure Intro

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 Section I: Mission Planning

Predeployment training to support EOF planning must be rigorous, realistic, and innovative.
Results of well-thought-out EOF-integrated training will help prepare small units for the
complex challenges they will face in COIN operations. Detailed and innovative planning, battle
staff oversight, and strong troop-leading procedures (TLP) can extend EOF reaction time,
allowing Soldiers to mitigate potentially volatile engagements. During intelligence preparation
of the battlefield, both lethal and nonlethal means of force must be incorporated into mission
planning, and follow-on effects must be weighed and adjusted during execution. Soldiers and
leaders must know and rehearse ROE and EOF procedures, and units should develop
contingencies for even routine missions. Planning for the emplacement of force protection
equipment enhances security and is a proactive measure to increase Soldier reaction time at
potential EOF event areas.

EOF Mission Planning Considerations

Leaders at all levels should strive to constantly stay current on the area of operations (AO) and
area of responsibility (AOR). Leaders gain and maintain situational understanding by using
digital and analog communications to leverage information gathered from higher, lower, and
adjacent units. Other sources of information include maps, intelligence summaries, situation
reports, and reports from the local populace. The eight steps of TLP are the framework for small
unit EOF mission planning considerations. Integrate EOF into the eight TLP steps:

1. Receive mission. Units must consider the ROE/EOF implications of the mission.

2. Issue warning order. Leaders must allocate time to integrate EOF procedures into preparation,
to include precombat checks, precombat inspections, rehearsals, and movement.

3. Make a tentative plan.

• Assess your training, equipment, and force protection capabilities (including nonlethal
means) to counter threats.
• Consider current and review past EOF incidents and locations in your AO/AOR.

• Determine/assess if the civilian population is pro, anti, or neutral toward CF.

• Incorporate enemy pattern analysis into EOF planning.

• Consider enemy composition, disposition, strength, recent activities, ability to

reinforce, and possible enemy courses of action, to include using civilians as cover.
• Assess the size, capabilities, and potential tactics within and outside the AO.

4. Initiate movement. Be prepared to execute preplanned and rehearsed ROE/EOF procedures,

including the effects of integrating enablers: fire support, explosive ordnance disposal, attack
aviation, quick reaction forces, medical evacuation, and force protection equipment.

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5. Reconnoiter. Civil considerations that can affect ROE/EOF employment are:

• Areas: urban or rural

• Structures: built up, battle damaged, religious, etc.

• Local population disposition

• Local leaders (tribal, religious, and civic) allegiance to CF and influence on local
population

6. Complete the plan.

• Provide clear ROE/EOF guidance in commander’s intent; develop contingencies that

are adaptive to changing battlefield conditions.

• Include information operations to get the message out, mitigate local population
misunderstanding of events, and de-escalate volatile situations.

7. Issue the operations order.

• Include mission, risk management/safety considerations, and current ROE/EOF

policies/procedures.

• Adjust the plan based on updated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;

troops-to-tasks; and available force protection equipment.

• Make final coordination with adjacent units, ready-reaction forces, and higher
headquarters prior to issuing the order.
• Conduct an updated combined mission, safety, ROE/EOF briefing, and backbrief to
commander/designated representative.

8. Supervise. Leaders at all echelons must keep the higher headquarters’ command post informed
of the unit’s status, tactical situation, and force protection posture. Leaders and Soldiers enforce
ROE/EOF procedures during operations and report incidents.

Each EOF incident is unique and requires assessment. Soldiers and innocent civilian lives
depend on the ability to be mentally and physically prepared to deal with each conceivable EOF
situation that may arise. The mission comes first; however, judicious use of force is a proven
combat multiplier supporting mission accomplishment. Lack of planning and rehearsing EOF
integrated scenarios during training may result in unnecessary casualties in operations. Effective
EOF integration into predeployment training, mission planning, and execution reinforces CF
force protection, limits casualties, and helps set conditions for future success.

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 Section II: Training

The purpose of EOF training is to improve leader and Soldier awareness when planning,
preparing, and executing EOF methods to prevent unnecessary deaths of Soldiers and civilians.
The desired end state is for Soldiers and leaders at all levels to understand and apply EOF
procedures in order to lengthen response time and prevent unnecessary lethal force engagements.
The following EOF-related tasks should be integrated into training:

• Soldiers at every level must understand EOF procedures before, during, and after an
EOF event to include the possible second- and third-order effects and/or the strategic
impact of EOF incidents, which can lead to misperceptions by the local populace.

• Soldiers must continually train and rehearse EOF procedures at home station, during
mobilization training and mission rehearsal exercises, and while deployed to a
designated theater of operation.

• All Soldiers must understand EOF in order to prevent hesitation or second guessing
when making a decision to apply force.

• Units should be resourced with the correct force protection equipment in order to
increase reaction time, reduce unnecessary EOF incidents resulting in the use of lethal
force, and reduce casualties.

If these important EOF-related tasks are successfully integrated into training and Soldiers and
leaders adhere to the training principles, unnecessary lethal force engagements can be reduced or
eliminated. Adhering to EOF-trained principles also supports the goal of enhancing the
partnership with local governments by reinforcing a positive image of CF.

• EOF-trained Soldiers are able to make the right decision on what is a legitimate target.

• EOF training lengthens the preparation time to positively identify targets and apply
force commensurate with the level of threat.
• EOF never limits a Soldier’s inherent right to self-defense.

Training Scenarios

Scenario #1: Securing incident site

Your squad/team is providing security in a built-up area when a vehicle explodes, killing two
civilians and wounding several others. Civilians are trying to surround the vehicle while your
squad/team tries to keep them back. People are observed moving on the rooftops (dense, urban
environment). Shots are fired. Your squad/team reacts to the situation while still providing
security.

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Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• Weapons observed in crowd or on top of roof.

• Suspicious personnel in crowd.

• Hostile and/or curious crowd.

• Crowd responds to instruction or does not respond favorably.

• Shots fired at CF.

Scenario #2: Cordon and search

U.S. and CF receive an intelligence report that suspected enemy has bomb-building devices in an
apartment building. There is an extended family living there. Your squad/team task is to search
and clear the building. You could receive light to heavy resistance when you enter the building.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• Personnel with weapons in rooms.

• Discovery of bomb-building material.

• Separate and search occupants.

Scenario #3: Mobile/hasty TCP

Your squad/team is part of a security force in an improvised explosive device (IED) clearing
operation. A vehicle in your convoy is hit by an IED. You take immediate action by employing
the “5Cs” — confirm, clear, check, cordon, and control.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• Unmarked vehicles approaching the area (unable to identify occupants).

• Unmarked vehicle approaches your position and does not heed warnings.

• Shots are fired at the convoy by an unknown assailant.

Note: Scenarios 4 through 14 apply to convoy movement/combat logistics patrols scenarios.

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Scenario #4

Your convoy/patrol reports a vehicle approaching at a high rate of speed from the rear. You use
hand and arm signals to wave the vehicle off, but the vehicle continues. You fire a warning shot
(nonlethal or lethal), and the vehicle stops. The two civilians in the vehicle jump out.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• Vehicle’s high speed approach.

• Driver does not respond to warnings.

• The occupants’ reaction (threatening or non-threatening posture) after vehicle stops.

• Trigger point: safe separation.

Scenario #5

You are the lead vehicle in a 20-vehicle northbound convoy on a busy road. Your convoy has
slowed to 10 miles per hour (mph) due to traffic and road conditions. You see a civilian vehicle
driving southbound at a high rate of speed in the northbound lanes about 150 meters (m) away.
You attempt to wave the vehicle off, but it continues to approach. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• You must maintain and increase situational awareness since civilian drivers often
disregard traffic laws.

• A vehicle passing a convoy is not by itself a hostile act or demonstration of hostile

intent. However, the vehicle is traveling in the wrong direction and has disregarded
your attempts to wave it off. At this point the graduated use of force is authorized.
Shout will likely not have any effect. If you have other methods available to you, such
as green light lasers or flare pens, use them. Show Weapons. What other measures can
get the driver’s attention?
• When you are reasonably certain that the driver’s intent is hostile, engage to disable
the vehicle and, if necessary, apply lethal force to kill the driver.

Scenario #6

You are a gunner in a 10-vehicle night convoy. You are in an area where there have been several
attacks in the last few weeks. You see several flashes to the right, but you do not hear any
gunshots. What do you do?

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Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• You must have PID prior to engaging any target.

• You cannot engage the flashes of light at this point. The flashes could be anything
from nonhostile civilian activity, to lateral friendly forces, to an attack.

• Report the incident to higher headquarters.

• You must get eyes on the target prior to engaging.

• You should also have been briefed if there are any friendly forces in the area.

• Maintain and increase your situational awareness as it could be an attack.

Scenario #7

Assume the same facts as the above scenario, but now you have confirmed that you are being
engaged. You can see and hear the rounds impacting. You can identify the general direction from
where they are originating, but you have not yet fixed the point of origin. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• You should not engage the target until you acquire PID.

• You must get a fix on the source of fire before you can engage the target. In this
circumstance, you may engage the origin of the muzzle flashes.

Scenario #8

You are a gunner in a convoy heading southbound through a village. You are passing an outdoor
market. There are visible CF in the area, as well as a number of local nationals in the market.
You observe a number of young men with weapons who begin to fire at your convoy. You can
clearly identify them, but they are surrounded by a number of civilians who do not appear to be
supporting them. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• You clearly have hostile acts and PID.

• Under the ROE you can engage the target.

• In this scenario, the risk of collateral damage to both local national and CF might be
too great to justify engaging the targets, especially if you have the ability to egress
safely.
• Your response should be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude but still
defeat the threat.
• Shoot? Maybe.

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 • Move? Definitely.

• Communicate? Absolutely.

Scenario #9

Assume the same facts are the same as the above scenario; however, two of the individuals are
armed with rocket-propelled grenades. Does this make a difference in whether you engage?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• The lethality of the enemy threat is significantly higher than when facing small arms
fire.

• Take well-aimed shots intended to kill the hostile actors.

• Noncombatants should never be targeted.

• Use the amount of force necessary to defeat the threat and then cease fire.

Scenario #10

You are the gunner in the rear gun truck of a convoy passing through an urban area. You receive
word that a young adult male is throwing softball-size rocks at your convoy from an upcoming
overpass. As you approach the overpass, you spot a young man on the overpass with what
appears to be a large rock. There are six to eight civilians walking in the same area as the
rock-thrower. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• You clearly have hostile acts and PID.

• Consider the following:

º You have an uparmored HMMWV. Is there a threat?

º You have a vehicle with an open top and personnel exposed to the
rock-thrower. Is there a threat?
º Consider the risk of collateral damage. Can the target be engaged while
minimizing damage to the surrounding noncombatants?
º What is the level of threat? If your armor can protect you from the rocks, is
there a threat? Is engagement with lethal force required to defeat the threat?

Scenario #11

Your convoy is on the outskirts of a city approaching an overpass. A crowd is gathering in the
area just beneath the overpass. You see a man running in an alley toward the overpass with an
AK-47. What do you do?

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Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• Increase the aggressiveness of your posture.

• Use EOF to negate the potential threat.

• Remember that locals may legally have small arms for the protection of their homes.

• Attempt to identify the individual with the weapon.

• Do not engage unless there are further indications of hostile intent or a hostile act.

Scenario #12

You are in the lead armored vehicle escorting a four-vehicle convoy along a highway. There is a
flash behind you, followed by a loud explosion as one of the nontactical vehicles in the convoy
disappears in a cloud of dust and smoke. You then see two males 200 m away from you mount a
motorcycle and speed away. You also see an orange sedan back out of a driveway 150 m south
of your position and speed away. Three males standing 100 m up the road run into a nearby
house. You start taking small arms fire from a different house 150 m west of your position. What
do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• You should respond to the hostile fire coming from the house with deadly force.

• You should not engage the motorcycle, car, or people running away from the attack, as
there is no evidence to conclude that they possess hostile intent, have committed a
hostile act, or are linked to the attack. They may be fleeing for their own safety.
• You may detain people fleeing in order to gather/collect intelligence.

Scenario #13

You are in a convoy on the outskirts of a city when the convoy suffers an IED attack. As you
focus your attention on the location of the IED, you notice two individuals in civilian clothes and
no weapons jump up out of hiding about 80 m away from where the IED exploded and run away
from you. You quickly ascertain the individuals were within command-detonation range of the
IED. Command-detonation is a common method of detonation. What can you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• You may engage the individuals with the necessary force, including deadly force, to
prevent their escape if you are reasonably certain that they command-detonated the
IED.
• Whether you can engage depends on all of the circumstances and whether you are
reasonably certain that the fleeing individuals detonated the IED and are attempting to
evade capture. If so, these individuals have committed an act of war against CF, and
you may use necessary and proportional force.

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Scenario #14

You are conducting a cordon and search of a neighborhood when you see an individual acting
suspiciously. The on-scene commander decides to stop and temporarily detain the individual for
tactical questioning. The individual flees from the patrol.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• The individual is not demonstrating hostile intent because there is no imminent threat
of force against the unit. The unit does, however, have the authority to detain the
individual based on the circumstances. The unit may at this point use proportionate
force (give chase, tackle the individual, restrain him) to stop the individual.

• Under these circumstances, lethal force would not be authorized under the ROE
because it would not be proportionate to the threat the individual poses to the unit. If
lethal force is not authorized, then a warning shot would not be authorized.

Scenario #15: Dismounted patrol

You are in a dismounted patrol, and your unit sees an individual digging on the side of a route
frequently traveled by the unit. The individual sees the patrol approaching and flees from the
patrol.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• You have reasonable grounds to detain the individual for questioning. However,
although the digging may seem suspicious, the activity of digging a hole by itself is not
a demonstration of hostile intent. It is possible that there could be additional facts, such
as digging holes in a known red zone where U.S. forces are attacked with IEDs, that
would make the patrol believe the man is actually a threat to your unit.

• You should not use deadly force unless you feel the individual poses a threat. You can
give chase and physically restrain the man, but you should not fire warning shots to
stop the man or shoot at the individual unless there is a threat action against your unit.

Scenario #16: Mounted patrol

During a patrol, your unit sees two men digging on the side of a road frequently traveled by U.S.
forces. You know there have been multiple attacks with buried IEDs on this stretch of road
within the last two weeks, and the S2 has templated this particular area for possible IED attacks
in the next 72 hours. You also know that farmers in this area do not dig at this particular time of
day. The men see the patrol and flee.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• A determination of hostile intent is based on all the available facts and evidence. The
threat may not be immediate or instantaneous. The facts known to the patrol make it
reasonable to believe the individuals should be detained. There is also reason to
believe the men pose a hostile threat to the patrol.

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 • You should use EOF measures, to include warning shots and, if necessary, deadly
force. If circumstances allow for it, less than lethal force should be used; however, you
may immediately use the full range of EOF measures, to include lethal force.

Scenario #17: Mounted or dismounted patrol

During a patrol, you see two adult men digging a hole beside a well-traveled route. You see one
of them has an AK-47 and the other a bundle of wires. Your patrol attempts to stop the men, who
flee at the sight of the patrol.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• Given the facts, there are reasonable grounds to detain the men for tactical questioning.
Furthermore, there is evidence that the men are demonstrating a hostile intent. Under
the standing ROE definition of imminent use of force, the use of force does not
necessarily have to be immediate, and based on all the facts, you could reasonably
conclude U.S. forces were threatened with force.

• You may use force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the men from
escaping. You should, if possible, use EOF measures, to include firing warning shots.
If at any time you feel a threat to your patrol’s safety (for example, one of the men
turns and points the AK-47 in the patrol's direction), you may immediately engage the
men with deadly force.

EOF at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs)

In recognition of the importance of EOF training and to reinforce the intent to reduce EOF
incidents in Iraq, CTCs make EOF training a priority objective for rotational training units
during mission rehearsal exercises (MREs). CTCs continue to refine EOF training, and
observer/controllers (O/Cs) are well suited for this critical task.

Use and Adapt the Basics

In approaching the EOF issue, CTCs emphasize adapting basics to the operational environment.
The Army has always taught the principles needed to win the EOF fight. The CTCs focus on the
individual Soldier who makes the life and death decision to shoot or not to shoot. Leaders and
O/Cs fully understand that training Soldiers in EOF is a monumental responsibility requiring
extraordinary guidance and supervision from leaders at every level.

Returning to basics offers a way to approach the complexities of EOF. Consider a defense.
Leaders do not put Soldiers into positions without guidance. As the engagement area is defined,
leaders must draw the trigger lines from nonlethal to lethal for their Soldiers. Those same leaders
must rehearse their Soldiers. This approach frames how the CTCs implement and train rotational
units on EOF issues.

At the CTCs, training units to investigate collateral damage of civilians on the battlefield is as
important as reporting friendly fire incidents. CTCs interject a full program of EOF play into
exercises. The integration of EOF training occurs at all phases of the exercise.

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Pre-rotation contacts and training

CTCs use the current unclassified Soldier-level ROE and EOF cards. The O/Cs pass this
information on to rotational units.

Situational training exercise (STX) and EOF

Command emphasis on EOF continues in the MRE, as critical changes are made to the training
scenario. O/Cs require units to integrate EOF rehearsals during troop-leading procedures. O/Cs
also discuss EOF during the unit AARs.

Live-fire EOF incidents

O/Cs integrate the requirement to establish a snap TCP during company convoy live-fire
training. The units are presented with two targets: one vehicle poses no threat, while the other
attempts to bypass the checkpoint. In each case, Soldiers are required to execute appropriate
EOF procedures.

Applying the effects of EOF incidents

During the force-on-force portion of the MRE, the Soldiers’ use of the EOF procedures during
an EOF incident drives the role-player interaction with the unit. Role-player attitudes adjust, and
the village trends reflect actions taken by the rotational unit. CTCs manage this process through
a daily synchronization meeting that reviews and adjusts to unit interactions and
consequence-management efforts.

Scripted or planned events for a rotational unit forward operations base, such as a pregnant
woman or injured local, present opportunities to train the unit on EOF as O/Cs gather data on the
results. O/C divisions also report all planned and hasty TCP locations so role-play personnel and
vehicle traffic can be directed to those locations. These hasty TCP afford an opportunity to
facilitate EOF training. Data from these reports is used in the commanding general’s daily
situational update. The information is also provided to the unit as part of the brigade combat
team (BCT) AAR.

Asking Soldiers about EOF

Next, O/Cs survey the BCT on EOF and ROE questions. This survey roughly encompasses five
percent of the BCT and provides BCT leaders with general observations and feedback on their
Soldiers’ comprehension of EOF procedures and the ROE. This information is coupled with
rotational EOF incident vignettes and is discussed in the final brigade AAR to help the unit
identify training strengths and weaknesses.

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Combat camera

To provide Soldiers with a more holistic view of their actions at a TCP, the opposing forces
(OPFOR) have mounted dashboard cameras to a small number of vehicles used during the
force-on-force portion of the rotation. These cameras depict the OPFOR point of view as they
attempt to engage the rotational unit. These visuals allow Soldiers to learn positive lessons on
how to halt an attack and protect themselves and prevent future attacks.

EOF Training is Fundamental to Victory

CTCs remain focused on cogent training of Soldiers in EOF procedures and are committed to
changing training, when necessary, to ensure Soldiers grasp their importance. More importantly,
CTCs are committed to ensuring Soldiers understand their inherent right to self-defense so that
they are better trained to protect themselves, their fellow Soldiers, and the citizens of the host
nation, which creates a positive image of CF.

Summary

EOF procedures integrated into training are intended to replicate the operational environment
that Soldiers face every day. EOF training has the primary goal of improving both leader and
Soldier reactions when graduated response is necessary.

Demonstrating appropriate EOF procedures begins with a mindset that balances offensive and
defensive operations. The ultimate benefit of EOF training is the prevention of unnecessary loss
of life and injuries to Soldiers and noncombatants. The presence of perceived hostile action or
demonstrated hostile intent only creates the necessity to act or respond. The guidelines for
proportionality mandate that the action or response be reasonable in intensity, duration, and
magnitude, based on the totality of circumstances. Lethal force cannot be the default option.
Other options, including military nonlethal weapons/capabilities, must be available and used
when appropriate.

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