CHAPTER IX CADASTRAL REGISTRATION

G.R. No. 123780. September 24, 2002.*

IN RE: PETITION SEEKING FOR CLARIFICATION AS TO THE VALIDITY AND FORCEFUL
EFFECT OF TWO (2) FINAL AND EXECUTORY BUT CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
GROUP COMMANDER, INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY GROUP, PHILIPPINE ARMY,
represented by Colonel PEDRO R. CABUAY, JR., petitioner, vs. DR. POTENCIANO MALVAR
and MARCELINO LOPEZ, respondents. HEIRS OF ELINO ADIA, represented by JULIANA ADIA,
intervenors.
Civil Law; Property; Possession; The mere lapse of the statutory period of 30 years of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of disposable public land automatically transforms the
same into private property and vests title on the possessor.—To be more precise, the property
became the private property of Hermogenes Lopez as early as 1950, or after the lapse of 30 years of
continued possession by Hermogenes and his father Fermin Lopez that began in 1920. This is so
because jurisprudence consistently declares that the mere lapse of the statutory period of 30 years of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of disposable public land automatically transforms the
same into private property and vests title on the possessor.
Remedial Law; Judgments; Decision of the Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 90380 is the law
of the case binding upon the LMB and the Court of Appeals and is beyond their authority to
reverse.—We stress that the Decision of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 90380 is the law of the
case binding upon the LMB and the Court of Appeals and is beyond their authority to reverse. We,
therefore, rule that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in affirming the LMB decision in
B.L. Claim 653 and ignoring the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 90380. The Third Division of this
Court was misled, so to speak, in resolving in G.R. 110900 that “no reversible error was committed by
the Appellate Court.”
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable.[1]
This is a fundamental and immutable legal principle. For (j)ust as a losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality
of the resolution of his case[2] by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the life of
the law.[3] Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the
fruit of his victory, must immediately be struck down.[4]
For resolution is the motion for reconsideration filed by Dr. Potenciano Malvar and Marcelino Lopez,
respondents, of the Decision of this Court[5] in the instant case clarifying that the ruling of the Third
Division of this Court in G.R. No. 110900[6] prevails over the Decision rendered by the First Division
in G.R. No. 90380.[7]
The heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, the heirs of Elino Adia, Ambrosio Aguilar and Eduardo V. Santos
were engaged in a legal tug-of-war over the ownership of a parcel of land located in Barrio De la Paz,
Antipolo City with an area of 19 hectares, 48 ares and 88 centares more or less, described and
delineated in Plan H-138612.[8]
I
Records show that as early as 1920, Fermin Lopez was in possession of the land. He had it declared
in his name for taxation purposes and in 1928, filed a homestead application therefor. After his death
in 1943, his son Hermogenes Lopez continued occupying and cultivating the land. In the early part of
1936, Hermogenes inquired from the Bureau of Lands about the status of his late fathers homestead
application. He learned that it was not acted upon. He then filed his homestead application over the
same land, docketed as Homestead Application No. 138612. After he had shown full compliance with
the requirements of the Public Land Act, the Director of Lands, on February 7, 1939, approved Plan
No. H-138612 in the name of Hermogenes Lopez. Thereafter, the Director of Lands ordered the
issuance of the corresponding patent to him.[9] Hermogenes continued to occupy the land as its
recognized owner until he transferred his rights thereto in favor of Ambrosio Aguilar through a deed of
sale executed on July 31, 1959.[10]
Records also show that on August 24, 1944, the land was registered in the name of Fernando
Gorospe under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 537, pursuant to Free Patent No. 54072 based
on the same Homestead Application No. 138612 (of Hermogenes Lopez) but in Gorospes name.[11]
Gorospe, in turn, sold the land to spouses Salvador and Rosario de Tagle. Thus, OCT No. 537 was
cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 46580 was issued in their names
on August 17, 1944.[12] On December 9, 1947, spouses Tagle sold the land to Antonio de
Zuzuarregui, Sr., who was then issued TCT No. 7375 after TCT No. 46580 was cancelled. Upon
Zuzuarreguis death, the property was adjudicated to his widow, Beatriz de Zuzuarregui, who, on
December 17, 1959, obtained TCT No. 72438 upon cancellation of TCT No. 7375. On December 16,
1959, the widow sold the land to Eduardo Santos. Thus, TCT No. 72438 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, TCT No. 72439 was issued in his name.[13]
Since no certificate of title was yet issued to Hermogenes Lopez, on July 16, 1959, he filed with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal an application for registration of the land, docketed as
General Land Registration Commission Records No. 2531. This was opposed by Beatriz de
Zuzuarregui and Eduardo Santos, claiming that the land was already registered under TCT No. 7375
in the name of Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.. Thus, the proceedings were suspended.[14]
On December 21, 1959, Hermogenes Lopez filed with the CFI of Rizal a complaint for annulment of
OCT 537 and all TCTs derived therefrom against Fernando Gorospe, spouses Tagle, Beatriz de
Zuzuarregui and Eduardo Santos. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5957. However, the CFI
dismissed the complaint on the ground that Hermogenes Lopez was not the real party-in-interest
since he had sold the property to Ambrosio Aguilar in December of 1959.[15] This prompted
Ambrosio Aguilar to file with the same CFI a similar action against the same defendants, including the
Director of Lands, docketed as Civil Case No. 24873. On April 15, 1981, the court rendered judgment
in favor of Ambrosio Aguilar, declaring him the true and lawful owner of the land in question and
nullifying, for being void ab initio, OCT No. 537 in the name of Fernando Gorospe and all subsequent
Transfer Certificates of Title emanating therefrom.[16]
On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07475, the Court of Appeals, affirmed in toto the trial courts
judgment and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration.[17]
Eduardo Santos then filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
90380. In a Decision[18] dated September 13, 1990, this Court (First Division) denied the petition and
affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision. Speaking through Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, with Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Jutices Isagani A. Cruz, Carolina C. Grio-Aquino and Leo D.
Medialdea,[19] concurring, this Court ruled that Ambrosio Aguilar, successor-in-interest of
Hermogenes Lopez, is the lawful owner of the property and that with respect to Eduardo Santos,
successor-in-interest of Fernando Gorospe, the land in dispute was not brought within the operation
of the Land Registration Act, thus:
1. Records do not indicate that Fernando Gorospe (Eduardo Santos predecessor-in-interest) filed any
application for the parcel of land in question.[20] No evidence was submitted to prove that the
registration in Gorospes name was made pursuant to a satisfactory showing of his compliance with
the requirements for homestead application under the Public Land Act, i.e., that Gorospe took
possession and began to work on the property, introduced improvements thereon, and cultivated the
same, etc..
2. Formidable pieces of evidence[21] were presented to support the claim of ownership of
Hermogenes Lopez, Ambrosio Aguilars predecessor-in-interest, over the property, to wit: (a) the
original tracing cloth of Plan H-138612 (Exhibit A-3) which was surveyed for Hermogenes Lopez; (b)
the Microfilm of Plan H-138612 bearing the corresponding Accession No. 103378 (Exhibit D-1); (c)
the Whiteprint of Plan H-138612, also bearing the same Accession No. 103378 (Exhibit D); (d) the
Inventory Book prepared in the year 1951 by the Bureau of Lands (Exhibit XX) containing a list of
salvaged plans, among which was Plan H-138612 as surveyed for Hermogenes Lopez; (e) the Index
Card of the Bureau of Lands (Exhibit XX-2) showing that Plan H-138612 is one of the salvaged plans
and that the same is in the name of Hermogenes Lopez; (f) the consolidated Plan AP-6450 (Exhibit
X) prepared by the Bureau of Lands which shows that Hermogenes Lopez is the owner of the parcel
of land covered by Plan H-138612; (g) Plans H-147383, Psu-146727 and F 1543 showing the
boundary of the land owned by Hermogenes Lopez; and (h) testimonies of persons in the Bureau of
Lands which proved that Hermogenes Lopez filed a homestead application bearing No. H-138612
covering the property and that the same was duly processed by the Bureau after he had complied
with all the requirements of the law.
3. Contrary to Eduardo Santos claim, he cannot be considered an innocent purchaser in good faith
and for value. He made admissions indicating previous knowledge of the status of the property.
Neither he nor his predecessor-in-interest, Fernando Gorospe, had been in possession of the
property. He also admitted his prior conviction for illegal construction for fencing the property and
constructing a hut thereon. Most telling was his opposition to the application for registration of
Hermogenes Lopez in General Land Registration Commission Records No. 2531 filed with the then
CFI of Rizal on July 16, 1959. In other words, Eduardo Santos already knew of the existence of
Hermogenes claim on the property and yet, he persisted in acquiring the same.
4. As an applicant-possessor who complied with all the necessary requirements for the grant by the
Government under the Public Land Act through actual, open, continuous and public possession,
Hermogenes Lopez, predecessor-in-interest of Ambrosio Aguilar, is deemed to have already acquired
by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but the grant itself by the government for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title be issued to Hermogenes in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts - an application therefor being sufficient under the law.
5. There were some irregularities in the issuance of OCT No. 537 in Fernando Gorospes name, to
wit: (a) although it appears on the very face of OCT No. 537 that it was issued because of Homestead
Plan H-138612, approved in the name of Hermogenes Lopez, the form used for OCT No. 537 is for a
free patent and not for a homestead patent; and (b) OCT No. 537 was issued on August 24, 1944,
while TCT No. 46580 derived therefrom, in the names of spouses Tagle who bought the property
from Fernando Gorospe, appears to have been issued ahead, or on August 17, 1944, which means
that OCT No. 537 was cancelled even before it was issued.
The above Decision in G.R. No. 90380 (rendered by the First Division) became final and executory on
November 29, 1990.[22]
III
It appears that the heirs of the late Elino Adia began pursuing their adverse claim of ownership over
the same property only in the early part of the 1980s.
In 1983, the Adia heirs filed protests with the Bureau of Lands, now known as Lands Management
Bureau (LMB), questioning the authenticity of the approved homestead patent of Hermogenes Lopez.
The then Regional Director Rodolfo A. Paelmo dismissed the protests,[23] prompting the Adia heirs to
charge him before the Tanodbayan with grave misconduct, abuse of discretion and violation of
Republic Act No. 3019. On February 14, 1983, these charges were dismissed by the
Tanodbayan.[24]
For their part, the Lopez heirs, on July 16, 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71,
Antipolo City, a complaint for cancellation of the 1959 deed of sale executed between their
predecessor-in-interest, Hermogenes Lopez, and Ambrosio Aguilar over the property, docketed as
Civil Case No. 463-A. The Lopez heirs alleged that the sale was made by Hermogenes Lopez who
was unsufficiently educated.[25] After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision (a) declaring void
ab initio the 1959 Lopez-Aguilar deed of sale, (b) decreeing the Lopez heirs as the true and Absolute
owners of the said parcel of land, and (c) restoring to the Lopez heirs possession thereof.[26] The trial
court found that Hermogenes sold the land to Aguilar before the issuance of the corresponding
homestead patent or title in his name. Ambrosio Aguilar interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 06242. During the pendency of this appeal, the Appellate Court issued
an order of execution pending appeal in favor of the Lopez heirs. On August 18, 1987, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC assailed decision.[27]
On March 28, 1985, the Adia heirs filed with the same RTC a separate action for partial quashal of
the writ of execution with application for preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 613-A,
against the Lopez heirs.
When the trial court did not take any action on their application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the
Adia heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 05942.
In a Decision dated July 15, 1985, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that:
3. More importantly, the filing of the instant petition appears to be a last-ditched effort on petitioners
(Adia) part to prevent execution of two judgments confirming the validity of the ownership of private
respondents, through their predecessors-in-interest.
The due approval of the homestead application of Hermogenes Lopez in 1939 (in reiteration of the
application of his father Fermin) was confirmed in Civil Case No. 24873. Later, the alleged sale of the
property by the uneducated Hermogenes to the Aguilars was set aside in Civil Case No. 463-A. In
fine, it is now beyond dispute that private respondents (Heirs of Lopez) are the judicially
acknowledged and recognized owners of the property.
But this is not all. The authenticity of the title based on the homestead application of Hermogenes
Lopez was the subject of protests filed by herein petitioners with the Bureau of Lands. These protests
were, however, dismissed by Regional Director Rodolfo A. Paelmo, and for such action the poor
Director was even charged by petitioners before the Tanodbayan for grave misconduct, abuse of
discretion and violation of Republic Act No. 3019. The complaint was dismissed on February 14, 1983
with the Tanodbayan observing that the action of Director Paelmo was in consonance with the
decision in Civil Case No. 25875 wherein Ambrosio Aguilar was declared the owner of the property
on the basis of the approved application and decree in favor of Hermogenes Lopez, and also in view
of the documents presented by Director Paelmo consisting of the approved plan in the name of
Hermogenes Lopez.[28]
On July 8, 1985, the Adia heirs filed another protest with the LMB, docketed as B.L. Claim 653,
assailing Plan H-138612 issued to Hermogenes Lopez and praying that the property be titled in their
names.
On December 10, 1990, then LMB Director Abelardo Palad rendered a decision in B.L. Claim 653
totally at variance with and virtually disregarding the final Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 90380.
Director Palad dismissed the claim of Hermogenes Lopez and those claiming rights under him, and
ordered the reconstitution of the homestead application of Elino Adia, or in lieu thereof, the filing of a
new application by his heirs, thus:
WHEREFORE, Plan H-138612 appearing in the records of this Office in the name of the heirs of
Hermogenes Lopez is hereby as it is, corrected and amended, in that it shall thereafter be considered
to be recorded in the name of Elino Adia, now his heirs, represented by Emiliano and Juliana Adia.
The claims of Hermogenes Lopez and all those claiming under him, Francisco R. Cruz and the
Overlooking Storeowners and Planters Association, Inc. are hereby dismissed and this case dropped
from the records. The homestead application of Elino Adia, covering plan H-138612 shall be
reconstituted or in lieu thereof, a new application may be filed by the Heirs of Elino Adia, which shall
thereafter be given due course. Within the period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this order, the O.S.
& P.A. shall vacate and remove whatever improvements they have in the premises.[29]
On January 23, 1991, the Lopez heirs filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the LMB decision,
contending that the LMB has no more jurisdiction to entertain, investigate and decide questions of
ownership over the property considering this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 90380 declaring
Hermogenes Lopez and his heirs the lawful owners of the land.
Meanwhile, on February 8, 1991, the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, pursuant to the Decision of
this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 90380, issued TCT No. 196256 in favor of the Lopez heirs. The
following annotation appears at the back of said title:
Entry No. 252049/T. No. 196256 ORDER by virtue of an order issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71 in Civil Case No. 463-A, the 2nd par. On the face of this certificate of title
has been cancelled and superseded in view of the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 537
and all titles emanating therefrom up to Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117266. This certificate of title
is hereby amended as Issued by virtue of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 90380 on
September 13, 1990 (in relation to the Decision in Civil Case No. 463-A as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 06242 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 81092) which declared that
Hermogenes Lopez, now his heirs, as the true and rightful owner by virtue of Homestead Patent
Application No. 138612 and the corresponding homestead patent issued in his favor in June 1939,
after complying with the requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act.[30] (Emphasis supplied)
Going back to the Adia heirs protest before the LMB, it appears that on January 29, 1992, then LMB
Director Palad denied the Lopez heirss urgent motion for reconsideration of the LMBs decision in
favor of the Adia heirs. Forthwith, the Lopez heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27602) assailing the LMBs decision and the order denying
their motion for reconsideration.
Surprisingly, on February 26, 1993, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27602, rendered
judgment denying the petition of the Lopez heirs and affirming the LMBs decision. It held that this
Courts Decision in G.R. No. 90380 did not bind the government, thus:
1. Other than the Lopez heirs claim that they are the heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, there is no concrete
evidence that the property ceased to become part of the public domain;
2. The Supreme Court Decision in G.R. No. 90380 did not bind the government, particularly the LMB,
since the latter agency was not impleaded as a party in Civil Case No. 2473 (Ambrosio Aguilar vs.
Fernando Gorospe, et al.) for annulment of OCT No. 537 and all titles emanating therefrom, which
case eventually reached the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 90380;
3. The principle of res judicata is inapplicable; and
4. The Lopez heirs failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
From this adverse judgment, the Lopez heirs filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 110900. The Third Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated August 11,
1993, denied the petition on two (2) grounds: (a) petitioners failed to attach to the petition a duplicate
original or certified true copy of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision, as required by this Courts
Revised Circular 1-88 (which took effect on July 1, 1991); and (b) even if there was no violation of the
Circular, no reversible error was committed by the appellate court. In effect, this Court (Third Division)
recognized the Adia heirs claim over the land as valid and, therefore, dismissed the claim of the
Lopez heirs. By this ruling, the Third Division reversed and set aside the previous Decision of the First
Division in G. R. No. 90380 declaring Hermogenes Lopez and his heirs the lawful owners of the land.
Thus, on December 27, 1994, the OIC of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer
of Antipolo City issued eight (8) free patents, in the names of all the Adia heirs. On January 26, 1995,
the Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding eight (8) Original Certificates of Title,
also in their names.
IV
On October 6, 1995, the Lopez heirs, joined by Dr. Potenciano Malvar, who, on April 20, 1995,
bought a portion of the land from the former, filed with the trial court (RTC, Branch 71, Antipolo City) a
motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 463-A pursuant
to the Decision of this Court in G. R. No. 90380 in favor of the Lopez heirs. It must be remembered
that in Civil Case No. 463-A, the said trial court annulled the 1959 sale between Hermogenes Lopez
and Ambrosio Aguilar and restored to the Lopez heirs possession of the property.
On December 11, 1995, the RTC granted the motion and issued a writ of execution which would call
for the demolition of the communication facilities and other structures belonging to the Intelligence
and Security Group (ISG) of the Philippine Army which also purchased a portion of the property from
the Adia heirs. This prompted Col. Pedro R. Cabuay, Jr., Group Commander of the ISG, to file with
this Court on February 27, 1996 the present Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity and
Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final and Exceutory but Conflicting Decisions (in G.R. No. 90380 and G.R.
110900) of the Honorable Supreme Court. The petition was assigned to the Third Division of this
Court.
In a Resolution dated January 20, 1997, the Third Division dismissed Col. Cabuay, Jr.s Petition for
Clarification as it does not raise any justiciable issue. Forthwith, Col. Pedro R. Cabuay, Jr. and the
Adia heirs (intervenors) filed separate motions for reconsideration.
The case remained dormant for over two (2) years. On June 9, 1999, acting upon the said motions,
the Third Division issued a Resolution treating the Petition for Clarification as a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The issue raised, therefore, is
whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the LMB
decision in B.L. Claim 653 and disregarding the Decision of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No.
90380.
Six (6) months after, or on December 17, 1999, the Third Division rendered the instant Decision
holding, in effect, that the Court of Appeals did not act with grave abuse of discretion; and clarifying
that the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 110900 issued by the Third Division prevails over the
Decision in G.R. No. 90380[31] rendered by the First Division and declaring that the Adia heirs titles
are valid, while those of the Lopez heirs are void. The dispositive portion of the instant Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, 1. The validity of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-819, P-820, P-821, P-822, P-
823, P-824, P-825 and P-826, registered in the name of Heirs of Elino Adia, represented by Juliana
Adia, is UPHELD;
2. All certificates of title issued to the Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez and successors-in-interest, and all
titles originating from any of the certificates of title so issued to the Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez,
including Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 207990, 207991, 207992, 207993, 207994, 207995,
207996, 207997, 207998, 207999, 208000, 208001, 208002, 208358, over subject tract of land, as
well as TCT No. 216876 issued to Primex Corporation, and any other title derived therefrom are
declared null and void;
3. The Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez and all persons claiming any right under them, including but not
limited to Primex Corporation, and Dr. Potenciano Malvar, as well as all members of the Overlooking
Storeowners and Planters Association, Inc., their assignees and successors-in-interest, are ordered
to remove all their improvements on the areas covered by the Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-819
to P-826 aforementioned and to surrender possession thereof to the Heirs of Elino Adia, represented
by Juliana Adia; and
4. The writ of demolition, issued by Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City, in Civil Case
No. 463-A, is SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[32]
The above Decision was penned by Justice Fidel P. Purisima.
Thereupon, Dr. Potenciano Malvar and Marcelino Lopez seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Alternative Prayer for Referral to the Court En Banc.
The Adia heirs filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
On August 15, 2000, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the present case which was referred to it
en consulta by the Third Division.
On May 24, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its comment on the motion for
reconsideration. The OSG submits that the right of the Lopezes over the land in question is superior
to that of the Adias.[33]
V\Considering the conflicting rulings rendered by the First and Third Divisions, the Court En Banc,
therefore, has to break the impasse and must now resolve, once and for all, this basic issue: As
between the Lopez heirs and the Adia heirs, who lawfully own the subject property?
THE EN BANC RULING
The weight of evidence and jurisprudence shows that the Lopez heirs are the lawful owners of the
land in controversy.
To recall, G.R. No. 90380 rendered by the First Division, through Justice Emilio A. Gancayco,
recognizes the right of ownership of Hermogenes Lopez (predecessor-in-interest of the Lopez heirs)
over the property by reason of his continuous possession since 1920 and his full compliance with the
requirements by the Public Land Act for the issuance of a homestead patent. Upon the other hand,
G.R. No. 110900 of the Third Division affirmed, in a Resolution, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 27602 sustaining the LMB decision in B.L. CLAIM 653 dismissing Hermogenes Lopez
claim over the property and ordering the reconstitution of the homestead application of the Adia heirs
predecessor-in-interest, Elino Adia, or in lieu thereof, the filing of a new application by the heirs of
Elino Adia.
In justifying the adjudication of the property to the Adia heirs, the Court of Appeals held:
Now, while it is true that Hermogenes Lopez had filed an application for a Homestead Patent over the
subject land, and his application was determined as superior to the claims of other persons by the
courts, such determination in the cases that finally reached the Supreme Court did not bind the
government, particularly the Lands Management Bureau. The cases cited by petitioners as having
declared the subject land as private property because the homestead patent thereon was confirmed
by the Supreme Court did not bind the LMB for two reasons: (1) it was not, and was not impleaded
as, a party to said cases, and (2) the cases were in personam in nature, in which while the subject
thereof was a right over a piece of land, the controversy was in essence between different persons
asserting conflicting claims.
The subject property being part of the public domain is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Lands
Management Bureau. It is not only mandated by the Public Land Act but the Supreme Court itself has
decreed it to be so x x x.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, the reason why the Court of Appeals set aside the claim of the Lopez heirs is because they did
not implead the Director of Lands in their case challenging the validity of the Adia heirs titles.
It appears from the very caption of the complaint in Civil Case No. 24873[35] the case that reached
this Court as G.R. No. 90380 that the Director of Lands was impleaded as co-defendant by plaintiff
Ambrosio Aguilar (successor-in-interest of Hermogenes Lopez) who sought the nullification of OCT
No. 537 in the name of Fernando Gorospe (the Adia heirs predecessor-in-interest) and all TCTs
emanating therefrom. The Director of Lands even filed his ANSWER[36] through his Counsel and
Special Attorney, Irineo C. Alday. In fact, the decision of the trial court in the same Civil Case No.
24873 also mentioned that the Director of Lands filed his ANSWER.[37]
The participation of the Director of Lands in Civil Case No. 24873 having been incontrovertibly
established, the Government and the Adia heirs are bound by the decision therein. We reiterate that
this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07475 and by this Court in
G.R. No. 90380, holding that Hermogenes Lopez complied with the requirements of the Public Land
Act. Having been issued the corresponding Homestead Patent, he is recognized as the owner of the
land, thus:
In the early part of 1936, Hermogenes Lopez went to the Bureau of Lands and inquired about his
fathers homestead application. He was informed that said application was still unacted upon and was
advised to apply in his own name. He complied and his application was docketed as homestead
application No. 138612. Subsequently, he was able to prove compliance with the requirements of the
Public Land Act and, as a matter of course, the land was surveyed by a government surveyor and on
7 February 1939 the resulting plan H-138612 was approved by the Director of Lands. The latter
thereafter ordered the issuance of the corresponding patent in the name of Hermogenes Lopez (page
33, Rollo). He has been in actual and continuous possession thereof and was recognized as its
owner until he transferred his rights to Ambrosio Aguilar, private respondent herein, on 31 July
1959.[38] (Emphasis supplied)
With the ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 90380 that Hermogenes Lopez is the lawful owner, LMB
Director Abelardo Palad should have refrained from adjudicating the property to the Adia heirs since it
ceased to be of the public domain and beyond his authority to dispose of.
To be more precise, the property became the private property of Hermogenes Lopez as early as
1950, or after the lapse of 30 years of continued possession by Hermogenes and his father Fermin
Lopez that began in 1920. This is so because jurisprudence consistently declares that the mere lapse
of the statutory period of 30 years of open, continuous and exclusive possession of disposable public
land automatically transforms the same into private property and vests title on the possessor. Thus:
x x x [U]nder the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioners case, with the latters proven occupation and cultivation for more than
30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on
petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. x x x.
As interpreted in several cases (Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424 [1925]; Mesina vs. Pineda Vda.
De Sonza, G.R. No. L-14722, [May 25, 1960]), when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to
a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceased to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent.[39]
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant
from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act) that the
possessor(s) x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x. No proof being admissible to
overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a
title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land,
but only to confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the
required period of possession became complete. x x x[40]
[A]lienable public land by a possessor, personally or through his predecessor-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso
jure.[41]
In the Acme decision, this Court upheld the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession
of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property.[42]
[O]pen, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure
converts the same to private property (Director of Lands vs. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]). This means
that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land (NPC vs.
Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).[43]
To be sure, the LMB, beginning 1950, no longer had the authority to dispose of the area in favor of
the Adia heirs. The same had been segregated from the mass of public land in that year and
converted to Hermogenes Lopez private property over which the government had lost jurisdiction. We
advert to a few more pertinent pronouncements by this Court, thus:
Under the provisions of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of private respondents predecessor-
in-interest was issued, the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no
authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private
ownership, and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from
the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The jurisdiction of the
Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands privately owned. The
purpose of the Legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act, Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its
application to lands of the public domain, and lands held in private ownership are not included therein
and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or free title, or of
private ownership, constitutes no part of the public domain and cannot possibly come within the
purview of said Act No.2874, inasmuch as the subject of such freehold or private land is not
embraced in any manner in the title of the Act and the same are excluded from the provisions or text
thereof.[44]
Following the Susi doctrine (48 Phil. 424), therefore, private respondents are deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to grant, but also a grant of the Government over the
controversial land. By such grant, the property in litigation is segregated from the public domain; and
becomes private property, over which necessarily, the Director of Lands no longer has jurisdiction.
x x x x x x x x x.
Private ownership of land (as when there is prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered
possessory information) is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because
the Public Land Act applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority
to grant to another a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to
private ownership.[45]
Another reason why the Lopez heirs claim of ownership must be upheld is the applicability of the law
of the case doctrine. We explained this doctrine as follows:
It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all
legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of
that particular case. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts, and hence
beyond their power and authority to alter or modify.[46]
xxxxxxxxx
Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the interests of litigants,
as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final
judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no question that such
reasons apply with greater force on final judgments of the highest Court of the land.[47]

We stress that the Decision of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 90380 is the law of the case
binding upon the LMB and the Court of Appeals and is beyond their authority to reverse.

We, therefore, rule that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in affirming the LMB
decision in B.L. Claim 653 and ignoring the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 90380. The Third
Division of this Court was misled, so to speak, in resolving in G.R. 110900 that no reversible error
was committed by the Appellate Court.
Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
x x x no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the (Supreme) Court en banc or its Divisions may be
modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.
A Decision rendered by a Division of this Court in violation of the above constitutional provision would
be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid.[48]
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED and the instant Decision is
RECONSIDERED. The Resolution dated August 11, 1993 of the Third Division in G.R. No. 110900
upholding the validity of the land titles in the names of the Adia heirs is SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated September 13, 1990 of the First Division in G.R. No. 90380 declaring the LOPEZ HEIRS the
lawful owners of the land in question is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA and SATURNINA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE

PADACA, oppositors-appellants, vs. ANGEL ALBANO, ARSENIO ALBANO, ENCARNACION
ALBANO, ROSALIA ALBANO, assisted by her husband, JUANITO ALBANO, ROSITA ALBANO,
assisted by her husband, ALFREDO RAMIREZ, MIGUEL ALBANO, CHARITO ALBANO, and
PEDRO ALBANO, petitioners-appellees. RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, in his capacity as Judge of
Sala I, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, respondent.Case Nature : APPEAL from the orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte and Laoag City. Navarro, J.
Syllabi Class : Civil Law|LandRegistration|Property|Writ of Possession|Judgment|Res Judicata
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Land Registration; Property; Writ of Possession; A party in whose favor a decree of
registration is issued by a cadastral court in accordance with the Torrens Act, or his successors-in-
interest, has “a perfect right not only to the title of the land, but also to its possession.”-
On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court in Manlapas, et al. v. Llorente, etc.,
et al., ruling that: (1) a party in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a cadastral court in
accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. 496), or his successor-in-interest, has “a perfect right not
only to the title of the land, but also to its possession;” (2) he has the right, too, under Section 17 of
the same Act, to a writ of possession as against any “party to the registration proceeding and who is
directly and personally affected and reached by the decree” (or “who had been served with process
therein but had not appeared nor answered); and (3) his right to obtain a writ of possession is not
subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding execution of judgments, since the
decree “is to exist forever
2. Civil Law; Land Registration; Property; Writ of Possession; A writ of possession can be issued
not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives and
successors-in-interest but also against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at
anytime before and up to the issuance of the final decree; Neither laches nor the statute of limitations
applies in case at bar.-
“The fundamental rule,” the Court said some forty-three years later, “is that a writ of possession can
be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives
and successors-in-interest, but also against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at
anytime before and up to the issuance of the final decree.” It also pointed out that neither laches nor
the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case, citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, et
al.
3. Civil Law; Land Registration; Property; Writ of Possession; If the writ of possession issued in
a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant,
a writ of demolition must also issue.-
The Court restated those same principles of Lucero v. Loot some months later and took occasion to
stress that in Marcelo v. Mencias, decided in 1960, the Court had gone “so far as to hold that ‘if the
writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the
land to the successful litigant therein, ... a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially
considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition,
would be ineffective.’”
4. Civil Law; Land Registration; Judgment; Res Judicata; Suit for recovery of title to a lot barred
by prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding.-
The correctness of this judgment cannot be gainsaid in light of the recorded facts. The familiar
doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of success of Barroga’s and Padaca’s suit for
recovery of title Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior judgment in the cadastral
proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino’s ownership over the property, and in which proceeding the
former’s predecessor-in-interest, RupertaPascual, had taken part as oppositor but had been declared
in default.
5. Civil Law; Land Registration; Judgment; Res Judicata; Judgment of the cadastral court which
was against a specific thing was a judgment in rem and binding upon the whole world.-
The judgment of the cadastral court was one “against a specific thing” and therefore “conclusive upon
the title to the thing.” It was a judgment in rem, binding generally upon the whole world, inclusive of
persons not parties thereto, and particularly upon those who had actually taken part in the proceeding
(like the appellants’ predecessor, RupertaPascual, who had intervened therein as an oppositor) as
well as “their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.”
6. Civil Law; Land Registration; Judgment; Res Judicata; Petitioners-appellees are entitled to the
writ of possession over the lot despite the lapse of many years, their rights thereto being
imprescriptible at least as against the persons who were parties in the cadastral case or their
successors-in-interest.-
The inevitable verdict should by now be apparent. Conformably with the established axioms set out in
the opening paragraphs of this opinion, the appellees, Angel Albano, et al. must be declared to be
entitled to a writ of possession over Lot No. 9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration and
vindication of the title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q. Aquino; the writ may
correctly be enforced against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-interest of
RupertaPascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which resulted in the declaration of
Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof; and the appellees are entitled to said writ
of possession, despite the lapse of many, many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least
as against the persons who were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. The
appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long enough. They should
no longer be allowed to continue doing so.

Docket Number: No. L-43445

NARVASA, J.:

On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court in Manlapas, et al. v. Llorente, etc.,
et al., 1 ruling that: (1) a party in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a cadastral court in
accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. 496), or his successor-in-interest, has "a perfect right not
only to the title of the land, but also to its possession;" (2) he has the right, too, under Section 17 of
the same Act, to a writ of possession as against any "party to the registration proceeding and who is
directly and personally affected and reached by the decree" (or who had been served with process
therein but had not appeared nor answered); 2 and (3) his right to obtain a writ of possession is not
subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding execution of judgments, 3since the
decree "is to exist forever." These doctrines have since been reiterated and reaffirmed.

"The fundamental rule," the Court said some forty-three years later, 4 "is that a writ of possession can
be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives
and successors-in-interest, but also against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at
any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree." It also pointed out that neither laches nor
the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case, citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, et
al. 5 to the following effect:

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant. ... except insofar as it supports his theory that
after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of
a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment. ... (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a
land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same
within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established.
After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceedings to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding
the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession
by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing
party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for
perfecting an appeal. ...

... There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree.
The reason is ... that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be
asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial
duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to
issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or
the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.

The Court restated those same principles in Lucero v. Loot 6 some months later and took occasion to
stress that in Marcelo v. Mencias, decided in 1960, the Court had gone "so far as to hold that if the
writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the
land to the successful litigant therein, ... a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially
considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition,
would be ineffective."

The appeal at bar entails nothing more than the application of these established jurisprudential
precepts to the undisputed facts.
In Cadastral Proceeding No. 44 (LRC Rec. No. 1203) of the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte, a decision was rendered on July 31, 1941 adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot No. 9821
in favor of Delfina Aquino. 7One of the oppositors was RupertaPascual, who was declared in
default. 8 However, for reasons not disclosed by the record, but as to which no sinister or prejudicial
character is imputed by the appellants, the decree of registration did not issue except until after the
lapse of fourteen (14) years or so, or on October 14, 1955; and it was only after twenty-four (24)
years had passed, or on November 17, 1979, that an original certificate of title (No. C-2185) was
issued in Delfina Aquino's name. 9
On August 11, 1970, after the decree of registration had been handed down but before title issued in
Delfina Aquino's favor, the children and heirs of RupertaPascual — appellants EufemiaBarroga and
SaturninaPadaca-brought suit in the same Court of First Instance against the children and heirs of
Delfina Aquino — appellees Angel Albano, et al. 10 Said appellants alleged that they, and their
mother, RupertaPascual, had been in possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners
thereof; and they prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled, that the defendants be
commanded to reconvey the land to them, and that a new title be made out in their names. 11
It appears, parenthetically, that Delfina Aquino's title encroached upon a 4-square-meter portion of an
adjoining lot, No. 9822, belonging to a Cesar Castro. So, Castro filed, with leave of court, a complaint
in intervention on February 22, 1987 for the recovery thereof.
After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered dismissing the Barroga's and Padaca's complaint,
and declaring intervenor Castro owner of the 4-square-meter portion overlapped by Delfina Aquino's
title. 12
The correctness of this judgment cannot be gainsaid in light of the recorded facts. The familiar
doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of success of Barroga's and Padaca's suit for
recovery of title Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior judgment in the cadastral
proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino's ownership over the property, and in which proceeding the
former's predecessor-in-interest, RupertaPascual, had taken part as oppositor but had been declared
in default. The judgment of the cadastral court was one "against a specific thing" and therefore
"conclusive upon the title to the thing." 13 It was a judgment in rem, binding generally upon the whole
world, inclusive of persons not parties thereto, 14 and particularly upon those who had actually taken
part in the proceeding (like the appellants' predecessor, RupertaPascual, who had intervened therein
as an oppositor) as well as "their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of
the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity. 15

The judgment became final and executory, the appeal taken therefrom to the Court of appeals by
Barroga and Padaca having been dismissed because of their failure to file brief, and this Court having
thereafter refused to set aside that dismissal on certiorari. Thereafter, at the instance of defendants
Angel Albano, et al., the Court of First Instance ordered execution of the judgment on December 6,
1973. Plaintiffs Barroga and Padaca - moved to quash the writ of execution, on December 22, 1973.
They argued that there was nothing to execute since the verdict was simply one of dismiss of the
complaint; they moreover invoked Section 11, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court. 16 But here the matter
apparently ended. No further development anent this case appears in the record.

What the record does show is that on August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an Order in
Case No. 44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of possession
as regards Lot No. 9821; and pursuant thereto, a writ of possession dated August 28, 1975 was
issued. Again Barroga and Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition of possession by Angel Albano, et
al. They filed a "Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of Execution Issued and to Revoke Writ of
Possession Issued" under date of September 23, 1975. 17 Their argument was that as possessors of
the lot in question, they could not be ejected therefrom by a mere motion for writ of possession.

The motion was heard on October 24, 1975, at which time the parties and their counsel stipulated
upon the following facts, to wit:
1. That the claimants-petitioners Angel Albano, Arsenio Albano, Encarnacion Albano, Rosalia Albano,
Rosita Albano, Miguel Albano, Jr., Charito Albano, Federico Albano, Jr. and Pedrito Albano are the
children-heirs and successors of Delfina Aquino, who is the registered owner of Lot No. 9821 covered
by O.C.T. No. 0-2185, which decree was issued on July 31, 1941, marked Exh. A for the petitioners-
claimants;
2. That movants-oppositorsEufemia Villanueva de Barroga and SaturninaVda. de Pacada are the
children-heirs and successors of RupertaPascual, who was an oppositor in Lot No. 9821, Cad. Case
No. 44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, and who was defaulted in said cadastral case, and decided on July 31,
1941 as follows:
Lote No. 9821 — Porincomparecenciainjustificada de la opositoraRupertaPascual, se
desestimasucontestacion. Se adjudicaestelote No. 9821, con las mejorasen el existentes, ennombre
de Delfina Q. Aquino, filipina, major de edad, viuda y residents del municipio de Lauag de la provincia
de Ilocos Norte.
3. That the heirs of RupertaPascual, namely, Eufemia Villanueva de Barroga and SaturninaVda. de
Padaca , are in possession of the lot in question since 1941 up to the present time. 18
The motion was thereafter denied by the Court a quo, by Order dated September 22, 1975. The Court
stated that the writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period of time
that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree, since the right to the same does not
prescribe pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar and Lucero v. Loot, 19 It
also declared that the segregation of the 4-square meter portion from Lot 9821 and its restoration as
integral part of Lot 9822, had no effect whatever on the Albanos' right to the writ of possession, which
was the appropriate process for the enforcement of the judgment in the cadastral case. Barroga and
Padaca moved for reconsideration. When this proved unavailing, they appealed to this Court.
The inevitable verdict should by now be apparent. Conformably with the established axioms set out in
the opening paragraphs of this opinion, the appellees, Angel Albano, et al. must be declared to be
entitled to a writ of possession over Lot No. 9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration and
vindication of the title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q. Aquino; the writ may
correctly be enforced against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-interest of
RupertaPascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which resulted in the declaration of
Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof; and the appellees are entitled to said writ
of possession, despite the lapse of many, many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least
as against the persons who were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. 20 The
appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long enough. They should
no longer be allowed to continue doing so.

WHEREFORE, the appeal taken by appellants Eufemia Villanueva Vda. de Barroga and Saturnina
Villanueva Vda. de Padaca is DISMISSED, and the Orders of the Court a quo dated August 8, 1975,
September 22, 1975 and March 17, 1976 are AFFIRMED, as being in accord with the facts and the
law. This decision is immediately executory, and no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration will be entertained.

FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ANDRES
B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, and
VICENCIO CAYABA, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the
Court of First Instance of Isabela, Br. II. Plan, J.
Syllabi Class : Land Registration|Actions|Practice&Pleadings|Judgments
Syllabi:
1. Land Registration; Actions; Practice Pleadings; In land registration cases, an opposition
partakes of the nature of an answer with counterclaim and a motion to dismiss the opposition is not
unauthorized as Rules of Court are merely suppletory to such proceedings.-
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 4961 does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to
a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules
contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicable
and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran
v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein appellants
upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court a
quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be registered in appellants’ name had
previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To have allowed the registration
proceeding to ran its usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same
consideration applies to the case at bar.
2. Land Registration; Actions; Practice Pleadings; Same.-
It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In
ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this time with the original
defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim
may either then answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the
same. The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier said,
such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners
complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration cases,
and not from it being unauthorized.
3. Land Registration; Actions; Judgments; The doctrine in Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, needs
re-evaluation; A final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining ownership of a certain land is res
judicata in the kind registration case where the parties and the property are identical including the
addition of a party in the registration case where he claims co-ownership.-
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said principle to
apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d]
there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause
of action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The decision in C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R is a final
judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. There is, between the registration case under consideration and the previous civil action for
recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The inclusion of private
respondent Cayaba’s co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not
result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court
the interests of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition,
p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land in question, he
was doing so in behalf of the co-ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he
presented to prove ownership was the deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano in
his and Bienvenido Noriega’s favor. With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that
the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same parcels of land being sought to be
registered in Cayaba’s and Noriega’s names.
4. Land Registration; Actions; Same, Caption of the complaint, as action to recover possession,
does not control where same is really an accionreinvidicatoria.-
While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the
prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an
accionreinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two
cases there is identity of causes of action because in accionreinvidicatoria, possession is sought on
the basis of ownership and the same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in one’s name is
based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from
ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is
directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed against
the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais v.
Court of First Instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of
an action to recover title, as real rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which is
different. “But the employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to escape the
operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.”
Docket Number: No. L-55152

FERNAN, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order are two [2] orders
issued by respondent judge in Land Registration Case No. Branch 11-N-204 of the then Court of First
Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, entitled, "Application for Registration of Title, Vicencio Q.
Cayaba, Applicant, vs. FlordelizaValisno and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors," the order dated July 2,
1980, dismissing the opposition filed by petitioners on the ground of res judicata, and the order dated
September 19, 1980, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and HonorioValisno purchased from the legal
heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, namely, Guillermo, Guillermo, Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all surnamed
Blanco, two parcels of land, particularly described as follows:
[a] a tract of land situated at SitioSisim Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of
Isabela, having an area of Five Thousand (5,000) square meters or fifty (50) meters facing the
Provincial Road by one hundred (100) meters long; bounded on the North by Pedro del Rosario, on
the South by Alberto Tungangui, on the East by the Provincial Road; and on the West, by Terreno del
Estado, now Matias del Rosario;
and,
[c] a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Six
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (6,250) square meters or fifty (50) meters at the east side by one
hundred twenty-five (125) meters at the North and South; bounded on the north by Matias del
Rosario, on the south by Alberto Tungangui, on the east by Agapita Blanco and on the west by
Cauayan Diversion Road and Matias del Rosario. [Annex "B", Petition, pp. 41-42, Rollo.]
Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of land in their name for taxation
purposes and exercised exclusive possession thereof in the concept of owners by installing as
caretaker one Fermin Lozano, who had his house built thereon.
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the land in
question by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and one Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on June
30, 1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, ousted Fermin Lozano from possession of the land.
He subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land.
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela a
complaint against private respondent for recovery of possession of said parcels of land. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-895, was in due time resolved in favor of petitioners who were
declared owners thereof. On appeal, however, by private respondent to the then Court of Appeals,
the appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, the appellate court in a decision promulgated on
January 19, 1978, reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the complaint of petitioners
on a finding that:
Firstly, the 'land in question described in the complaint and sketched in Exhibit C ... by Dr. Guillermo
Blanco,' is completely different from the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the appelles
appellant, their respective area and boundaries being completely dissimilar.
Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence of the appellees showing that their property
encroaches, much less covers that of the property presently occupied by the appellant, except the
self-serving sketch prepared by the appellees' own witness, Dr. Blanco. We refuse to give any weight
to this piece of evidence because it was prepared by someone who' has an incentive to exaggerate or
give false color to his statement or to suppress or prevent the truth or to state what is false. [Deering
v. Wisona Harvester Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 238]
Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has not been successfully Identified with that
described in the complaint, the instant action should have been dismissed outright, in view of the
provision of Article 434 of the New Civil Code which reads.
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be Identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim' as well as the doctrine
enunciated in a long line of decision [sic] starting from Lim vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 343.
Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is the present occupant of the land since he purchased
the same from Tomasita F. Verano on June 30, 1967, having constructed a six-door apartment in the
premises which he lets to both transients and residents of the locality. Being the actual possessor of
the property, he, therefore, possesses it with a just title and he need not show or prove why he is
possessing the same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil Code].
Finally, between the evidence of the appellees and that of the appellant, We unhesitatingly choose
the latter in the matter of Identifying the property in question because it is a vicinity plan [Exhibit "8"]
showing the position of the land in relation not only to the properties adjoining the same but also with
known boundaries and landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the appellees' evidence, particularly
the description in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is unreliable, since the area and boundaries of the
property are mere estimations, reached thru pure guess-work. [Smith Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands,
50 Phil. 8791]. Expressing the same sentiment, one noted authority states:
The proposition that in Identifying a particular piece of land its boundaries and not the area are the
main factors to be considered holds true only when the boundaries given are sufficiently certain and
the Identity of the land proved by the boundaries clearly indicates that an erroneous statement
concerning the area can be disregarded.' [Bilog, Effective Judicial Implementation of Land and
Forestry Laws, Fourth Advanced Course for Municipal Courts (1971), cit. Paterno v. Salud, L-15620,
September 30, 19631. (Annex "C-l," Petition, pp. 5355, Rollo.]
A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by petitioners before this Court was denied due
course.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed before the Court of First Instance of
Isabela an application for registration in his name of the title of the lands in question, basing his
entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of sale as well as the decision of the appellate court
in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, [Annex "A", Petition, pp. 32-40, Rollo).
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41, Rollo]
Private respondent, however, moved for the dismissal of said opposition on the ground that the same
is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Despite the
opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court issued the first of the assailed
orders dismissing the petitioner's opposition on the ground of res judicata. [Annex "E", Petition, p. 83,
Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed the instant petition, raising
as grounds therefor the following:
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, WHICH IS HIGHLY IRREGULAR
IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT OF ABELLERA
VS. FAROL THAT RES JUDICATA CANNOT BE SET UP IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES
JUDICATA EXIST IN THE CASE AT BAR, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A MOTION TO DISMISS
OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE, AND THAT RES JUDICATA MAYBE
RAISED IN SAID MOTION TO DISMISS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN OF THEIR DAY
IN COURT, SPECIALLY IN THE FACE OF STRONG INDICATIONS, ALREADY IN THE RECORD,
THAT RESPONDENT CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYING TO SECURE TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN
THE LAND OF THE PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS ORDERS OF JULY 2,1980 [ANNEX "E"] AND
SEPTEMBER 19, 1980 [ANNEX "H"]. (pp. 18-19, Rollo)
On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their briefs.
Petitioners did so on August 26, 1981. Private respondent, on the other hand, failed to file his brief
within the given period which expired on October 9, 1981. Thus, the case was consider submitted for
decision without the brief of private respondent.
On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to amend application filed by Bienvenido G.
Noriega, Sr., thru counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. II-N-204, praying that he be included as co-applicant
to the land sought to be registered.
In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We observe that the situation obtaining in the
case at bar, i.e., a motion to dismiss the opposition having been filed and more importantly, granted,
is indeed unique and peculiar. But while this may be so, it is not highly irregular as petitioners would
characterize it.

Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to
a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules
contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicable
and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran
v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein appellants
upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court a
quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be registered in appellants' name had
previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To have allowed the registration
proceeding to run its usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same
consideration applies to the case at bar.

It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In
ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this time with the original
defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim
may either then answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the
same. The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier said,
such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners
complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration cases,
and not from it being unauthorize.

The case of Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, heavily relied upon by petitioners needs re-evaluation. In
said case, Mr. Justice Bocobo, speaking for the Court, ruled that "while in a cadastral case, res
judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant,
nevertheless, prior judgment can not be set up in a motion to dismiss. " Concurring in said opinion
were then Chief Justice Yulo and Associate Justices Moran and Ozaeta. Mr. Justice Paras dissented,
saying "in my opinion, Rule 132 in connection with Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, instead of prohibiting
expressly authorizes the lower court in land registration or cadastral proceedings to entertain a
motion for dismissal on the ground of res judicata or prescription. Of course, the dismissal of
petitioner's claim will not necessarily or automatically mean adjudication of title to the individual
respondents but it will certainly facilitate the consideration of their claims which cease to be
contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is the main purpose of said rules. Let there be no
retrogression in the application of sound rules and doctrines." [Ibid, pp. 286-287) In support of his
opinion, Justice Paras cited the cases of Menor v. Quintana, 56 Phil. 657, Versoza v. Nicolas, 29 Phil.
425 and Santiago v. Santos, 54 Phil. 619, wherein the Court invariably ruled that a "final judgment in
an ordinary civil case determining the ownership of certain land is res judicata in a registration case
when the parties and the property are the same as in the former case. " [Menor v. Quintana, supra.]

There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said principle to
apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d]
there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause
of action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The decision in CA-G. R. No. 60142-R is a final
judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. There is, between the registration case under consideration and the previous civil action for
recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The inclusion of private
respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not
result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court
the interests of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition,
p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land in question, he
was doing so in behalf of the co-ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he
presented to prove ownership was the deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is
his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.

With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be recovered by
petitioners are the very same parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's
names.

While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the
prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an
accionreinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two
cases there is identity of causes of action because in accionreinvidicatoria, possession is sought on
the basis of ownership and the same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in one's name is
based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from
ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is
directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed against
the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais v.
Court of First Instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of
an action to recover title, as real rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which is
different. "But the employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to escape the
operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated."
[Yusingco v. Ong HingLian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases cited therein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26
SCRA 76; Aguilar v. Tuason Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411; Sumarariz v.
Development Bank of the Phil., 21 SCRA 1378; Abes, et al. v. Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et
al. v. Cruz et al., 106 Phil. 68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v. Go Pay, 81 Phil. 258; San Diego v.
Cardona, et al., 70 Phil. 281].

It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction, while the second
case is being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is enough that the
court which decided the first case on the merits had validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res
judicata.

If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that res judicata can be set up by a claimant to defeat the alleged
right of another claimant, what useful purpose would be served by allowing a party to present
evidence of ownership over the land sought to be registered when the final result would necessarily
be in favor of the claimant who had set up the defense of res judicata? And supposing the land
registration court finds that the party against whom the principle of res judicata operates does have a
better right or title to the land, what happens to the principle of res judicata? Can a court sitting as a
land registration court in effect, annul a final judgment of another court of general jurisdiction?

To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the
dismissal of either the application for registration or the opposition thereto, once it has been
indubitably shown, as in the case at bar, that one or the other is barred by a prior judgment. The
ruling in the Abellera case, should therefore be, as it is, hereby abandoned.
Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition, respondent court had denied them their day
in court. It is well to remind petitioners that they had their day in court in Civil Case No. Branch II-895
as well as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, where their claim over the land in question was fully aired and
ventilated.

The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent Cayaba [in behalf of the co-ownership] with
respect to the land under consideration had been put to rest in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Said decision
having attained finality, the same remains the law of the case between the parties.

Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing petitioners' opposition,
such dismissal must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

TRINIDAD GABRIEL, ANDREA GABRIEL, ISABEL GABRIEL, ESTER GABRIEL, BENJAMIM

GABRIEL, SALUD GABRIEL, VICTORIA GABRIEL, RIZALINA GABRIEL AND ANDRES
GABRIEL, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PETRITA PASCUAL and
RUDYARDO SANTIAGO, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals. Esguerra, J.
Syllabi Class : Land Registration|Courts|CadastralProceedings|Laches
Syllabi:
1. Land Registration; Courts; Cadastral Proceedings; In cadastral cases, the jurisdiction of the
court over registered lands is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description
of the land.-
It has long been settled that in cadastral cases the jurisdiction of the court over lands already
registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands,
provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such
jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title.
2. Land Registration; Courts; Cadastral Proceedings; Court has the power to determine the
priority of overlapping or over-laying registered titles.-
In a later case. such power of the court was further clarified and amplified to the effect that the above
proposition does not exclude from the jurisdiction of the court the power to determine the priority of
over-lapping or over-lying registered titles. There is nothing in this proposition which militates against
allowing the court in a cadastral case to determine which one of several conflicting registered titles
shall prevail. This power is necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land, which is the
express purpose of cadastral proceedings and must therefore, be considered as within the jurisdiction
of the courts in such proceedings. Furthermore, it was stressed that in such proceedings no final
decree or registration was reopened or set aside.
3. Land Registration; Courts; Cadastral Proceedings; Action of the lower court in correcting the
error in the technical description appearing in Plan Psu-9742 Amd. is well within its jurisdiction.-
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that the lower court did not order the reopening of the
decree of registration for the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 in the name of
Potenciano Gabriel. Neither did the lower court decree a new registration in favor of the estate of
Eligio Naval because said estate has a title that embraces actually the portion in dispute, although it
is also included in the Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 of Potenciano Gabriel. What the lower
court did was merely to correct the error in the technical description appearing in Plan Psu-9742 Amd.
so as to make it conform to the areas and technical description of Lot No. 557 of the Hermosa
Cadastre and Lot No, 363 of OraniCadastre which lots embody the correct technical description
thereof. Thus, the respondent appellate court stressed that this is not a reopening of the decree of
registration for the land covered by the certificate of title of Potenciano Gabriel because that title
stands and its existence remains unaffected. The action therefore of the trial court is well within its
jurisdiction.
4. Land Registration; Courts; Cadastral Proceedings; Title and possession of registered owners
cannot be defeated by oral evidence which can easily be fabricated and contradicted.-
The fact that the portion of land in question is not a part of the property of the late Potenciano Gabriel,
is established not only by the Hermosa and OraniCadastre but by the behavior of Potenciano Gabriel
himself, who is the original owner. He did not take the necessary action to recover said lot during his
lifetime but after the discovery of its occupation in March, 1933, by the late Eligio Naval, he allowed
instead the continued use and occupation of the same, In fact, there is no dispute that Eligio Naval
and his successorsin-interest have always been in possession of said property since that date. As
previously stated, petitioners’ claim that such occupation was by virtue of a loan or accommodation,
was not suported by evidence. As held by this court, title and possession of registered owners,
cannot be defeated by oral evidence which can easily be fabricated and contradicted.
5. Land Registration; Courts; Cadastral Proceedings; Laches; For failure to prosecute their
claims for twenty (20) years, petitioners have lost by laches their right to recover their property.-
Finally as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners for failing to prosecute their claims for
twenty (20) years have lost by laches their right to recover their property, In a similar case, this Court
ruled that failure of the deceased or his predecessors-in-interest to take steps to assert any rights
over the disputed land for 20 years from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of action
ground of laches.
Docket Number: No, L-26348

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse: (a) the Decision 1 of respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 31, 1966 in CA-G.R. No. 25418-R affirming the Decision 2 of the then
Court of First Instance of Bataan in Civil Case No. 2283 which dismissed the complaint for recovery
of land clue to, laches and prescription and required complainants herein petitioners) to surrender
their certificates of title, and b) the Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals dated July 7, 1966 denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
As found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court.. the factual background of this case is as follows:
On April 12, 1909, a survey was made for Santiago Quimson of a parcel of land located in Barrio
Totopiac, Orani, Bataan, containing an area of 687,360 square meters, more or less, the survey plan
being designated as 1-1 054. This parcel of land was registered on September 18, 1909, and Original
Certificate of Title No, 46 of the Registry of Deeds of Bataan was issued in favor of Quimson.
Subsequently, a cadastral survey was made from February, 1919 to March, 1920 which resulted in
the increase of the area of the land by 17,053 square meters and the designation of the land as Lot
No. 363 of OraniCadastre with an area of 704,413 square meters. After hearing, the Cadastral Court
confirmed the title of Quimson and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 723 was issued in lieu of Original
Certificate of Title No. 46. The lot was subdivided into Lot No. 363-A with an area of 209,250 square
meters for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 760 was issued, and Lot No. 363-B with an area of
495,163 square meters for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 759 was issued. Lot No. 363-B was
subsequently acquired by Eligio Naval and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 787 was issued in his
name on July 6,1926.
In December, 1916, a parcel of land located in Barrio Bagumbayan, Hermoso, Bataan was surveyed
for Potenciano Gabriel. Survey Plan Psu- 9742 was prepared and approved by the Director of Lands,
with an area of 2,729,712 square meters. This plan was subsequently amended because it was found
that certain portions of the land covered by Plan I-1054 in the name of Quimson and later transferred
to Naval were included. The undivided portions were excluded by order of the Court and so Plan Psu-
9742 was amended (Plan Psu-9742-Amd) with an area of 2,436,280 or a reduction of 293,432 square
meters. The Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 issued in the name of Potenciano Gabriel on
November 1, 1918 contained the reduced area.
A cadastral survey was also made of the Municipality of Hermosa, Bataan and the land of Potenciano
Gabriel, covered by Plan Psu-9742 Amd. became Lot No. 557 with a reduced area of 2,096,433
square meters, or a further reduction by 339,847 square meters. No new certificate of title was issued
for Cadastral Lot No. 557 showing the reduced area so that Original Certificate of Title No. 1264
subsisted with an area of 2,436,280 square meters under Plan Psu-9742 Amd. Accordingly the
partition of the estate of Potenciano Gabriel by his heirs on August 28, 1947 was based on plan Psu-
9742 Amd. under Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 with an area of 2,436,280 square meters,
instead of Lot No. 557 with a smaller area of 2,096,433 square meters.
Petitioners who are the heirs of the late Potenciano Gabriel and alleged joint co-owners of 1,196
square meters of a fishpond situated in Hermoso, Bataan by virtue of an agreement of partition of the
estate of Don Potenciano, flied a complaint, Civil Case No. 2283 at the Court of First Instance of
Bataan against PetritaPascual and Rudyardo Santiago, joint administratrix and administrator of the
estate of Eligio Naval, a son-in-law of Don Potenciano.
They claim that said land was usurped by the late Eligio Naval who was also an adjoining owner; that
said land was only loaned to the latter for dike and water control purposes of the latter's fishpond and
that after the death of Don Potenciano on February 17, 1943, private respondents continued to
possess, occupy and use said property and notwithstanding repeated demands refused to vacate and
to return the possession thereof, to the petitioners.
Hence, it was prayed that the defendants, private respondents herein, be ordered to vacate the
premises described in the complaint and to pay damages (Rollo, pp. 18-20; Record on Appeal, p. 96).
The records show that the portion of 1,196 square meters sought to be recovered by petitioners is
included in Lot No. 363-B of the OraniCadastre and in amended plan Psu-9742, mentioned above,
which shall hereafter be referred to as Psu-9742 Amd. After the cadastral survey of Orani, said
portion always remained in the possession of the late Eligio Naval because as above stated, it was
included in Lot 363, which was subdivided into Lot 363-A and Lot 363-B. The latter, acquired by
Naval with TCT No. 787 in his name, embraces the portion in question (Rollo, pp, 22-23).
There appears to be no controversy that aforesaid lot had always been in the possession of Naval in
the concept of owner, as petitioners' claim that the same was merely loaned to Naval, was not
properly supported by evidence, as found both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
After trial, the court rendered its decision on August 29, 1958 dismissing the complaint on the ground
that the right of the plaintiffs to the land in question, if any, was lost by prescription, and that the
plaintiff are also guilty of laches in failing to prosecute their claim within a reasonable time.
Specifically, the dispositive portion of said judgment reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders judgment:
(1) Dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs;
(2) Ordering the plaintiffs to surrender the owners' copies of the certificates of title issued
pursuant to the subdivision of Plan Psu-9742-Amd. to the Register of Deeds for safekeeping until
the plaintiffs could submit a new subdivision plan based on the technical description of Lot No.
557 of the HermosoCadastre; and
(3) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Balanga, Bataan, August 29, 1958.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 127 -1 28; Rollo, p. 11 3)
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court in its Decision promulgated on May 31,
1966, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with
costs against the appellants. (Rollo, pp. 18-31).
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied on July 7, 1966.
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of December 19, 1966, the petition for review on certiorari was given due course
(Rollo, p. 166). In the notice of January 5, 1967 (Rollo, p. 169) petitioners were required to file brief
Meanwhile, private respondent PetritaPascual in a manifestation and motion dated January 10, 1967
(Rollo, p. 170) informed this Court that the property in litigation was transferred by absolute sale to
the spouses Morencio Lucio and ConchitaGandan and she prayed that said spouses be substituted in
this action in her capacity of PetritaPascual in her capacity as co-administratrix.
In the resolution of January 23, 1967 (Rollo, p. 1 72), petitioners were required to comment on
aforesaid motion for substitution of parties. Said comment was filed by the petitioners on February 8,
1967 (Rollo, p. 176) opposing said motion as improper and praying instead that said parties be joined
as additional respondents. Thus in the resolution of March 7, 1967 (Rollo, p. 184), this court
authorized the inclusion of new parties, Florencio Lucio and Constancio Lucio. Petitioners submitted
their Brief (Rollo, p. 177) on February 9, 1967 while respondents PetritaPascual, Florencio Lucio and
Constancio Lucio submitted their Brief on May 2,1967 (Reno, p. 195). For failure to file petitioner's
Reply Brief, the court considered the case submitted for decision without the Reply Brief on
November 8, 1968 (Rollo, p. 211).
The grounds relied upon for the petition are as follows:
1. PLAN PSU-9742-AMD. COVERED BY ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 1264 WITH AN
AREA OF 2,436,280 SQUARE METERS, WHICH AREA WAS REDUCED BY THE CADASTRAL
SURVEY OF ORANI AND FURTHER REDUCED BY THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF HERMOSA
OR A LOSS OF 336,901 SQUARE METERS TO CONFORM WITH LOT 557 OF THE CADASTRAL
SURVEY OF HERMOSA IMPAIRS GRAVELY THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE REGISTERED
OWNER AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH AND CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES AND
DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT, NOTABLY THE DECISIONS IN THE CASES
ENTITLED P.I. VS. ARIAS, CABALLERO, 34 PHIL. 541.
2. THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED IN THE LOWER COURT, AN ACTION PUBLICIANA OR TO
RECOVER POSSESSION OF A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND WITHHELD FROM PLAINTIFFS'
POSSESSION, IS IT NOT A GRAVE ERROR FOR THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE TO HAVE
THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REGISTERED PROPERTY CORRECTED SO AS TO
CONFORM TO CADASTRAL LOT AND, THEREFORE, A COMPOUNDED GRAVE ERROR FOR
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO SUSTAIN SUCH CORRECTION?
3. IS IT NOT THAT PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POSSESSION OF A REGISTERED OWNER UNDER
THE PROVISION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION ACT ARE IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER THE
PROVISION OF SECTION 46 OF ACT NO. 496 AS AMENDED? (Rollo pp. 8-9).
The main issue in this case is whether or not courts have the authority to order the necessary
correction of an erroneous technical description and make it conform to the correct area.
Petitioners contend that in ordering that OCT No. 1264 be made to conform with the land covered by
Cadastral Lot No. 557 which contains an area very much less than that covered by said title, the trial
court and later the Court of Appeals deprived them of their property as registered owners. Such act,
petitioners insist, would amount to a reopening of a decree of title after the lapse of the one-year
statutory period, or the granting of an entirely new decree to a land already registered under act 496,
now P.D. 1529. Furthermore, such procedure is tantamount to a collateral attack on the title.
This contention is untenable.
It has long been settled that in cadastral cases the jurisdiction of the court over lands already
registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands,
provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such
jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. (Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43
Phil. 561 [1922]).
In a later case, such power of the court was further clarified and amplified to the effect that the above
proposition does not exclude from the jurisdiction of the court the power to determine the priority of
over-lapping or over- lying registered titles. There is nothing in this proposition which militates against
allowing the court in a cadastral case to determine which one of several conflicting registered titles
shall prevail. This power is necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land, which is the
express purpose of cadastral proceedings and must therefore, be considered as within the jurisdiction
of the courts in such proceedings. Furthermore, it was stressed that in such proceedings no final
decree or registration was reopened or set aside (Timbol v. Diaz, 44 Phil. 589-590 [1932]).
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that the lower court did not order the reopening of the
decree of registration for the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 in the name of
Potenciano Gabriel. Neither did the lower court decree a new registration in favor of the estate of
Eligio Naval because said estate has a title that embraces actually the portion in dispute, although it
is also included in the Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 of Potenciano Gabriel. What the lower
court did was merely to correct the error in the technical description appearing in Plan Psu-9742 Amd.
so as to make it conform to the areas and technical description of Lot No. 557 of the
HermosoCadastre and Lot No. 363 of OraniCadastre which lots embody the correct technical
description thereof. Thus, the respondent appellate court stressed that this is not a reopening of the
decree of registration for the land covered by the certificate of title of Potenciano Gabriel because that
title stands and its existence remains unaffected. The action therefore of the trial court is well within
its jurisdiction (Reno, pp. 40-41).
The fact that the portion of land in question is not a part of the property of the late Potenciano Gabriel,
is established not only by the Hermoso and OraniCadastre but by the behavior of Potenciano Gabriel
himself, who is the original owner. He did not take the necessary action to recover said lot during his
lifetime but after the discovery of its occupation in March, 1933, by the late Eligio Naval, he allowed
instead the continued use and occupation of the same. In fact, there is no dispute that Eligio Naval
and his successors-in-interest have always been in possession of said property since that date. As
previously stated, petitioners' claim that such occupation was by virtue of a loan or accommodation,
was not supported by evidence. As held by this court, title and possession of registered owners,
cannot be defeated by oral evidence which can easily be fabricated and contradicted Sinoan v.
Sorongan, 136 SCRA 407 [1985]).
As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, both parties were in occupation of their
respective properties within the correct areas and boundaries sought to be adjusted in this case.
More than that, it was also found that there is no impairment of substantial right or the deprivation of
the title of a registered owner, sought to be guarded against. The heirs of Potenciano Gabriel are not
deprived of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1264, nor are they unjustly deprived of
the portion in question because on the basis of the correct technical description, that portion is not a
part of their property but a part of the property of the late Eligio Naval under TCT No. 797. Hence, this
Court has held that the Land Registration Act and the Cadastral Act do not give anybody who resorts
to the provisions thereof a better title than what he really and lawfully has. More specifically the
decision reads:
... The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in
good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or
that one should enrich himself at the expense of another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442;
Angelo vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 838). The above- stated Acts do not give anybody, who
resorts to the provisions thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to
obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the prejudice of Ms neighbor, more land than he really owns,
with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of title, which may have been issued to him
under the circumstances, may and should be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). This is permitted by section 112 of Act. No. 496, which is applicable to the
Cadastral Act because it is so provided expressly by the provisions of Section 11 of the latter Act.
It cannot be otherwise because, as stated in the case of Domingo vs. Santos, Ongsiako, Lim y
Cia. (55 Phil 361), errors in the plans of lands sought to be registered in the registry and
reproduced in the certificate of title issued later, do not annul the decree of registration on the
ground that it is not the plan but the land itself which is registered in the registry. ... (Angeles v.
Samia, 66 Phil. pp. 449450 [1938]).
Finally as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners for failing to prosecute their claims for
twenty (20) years have lost by laches their right to recover their property. In a similar case, this Court
ruled that failure of the deceased or his predecessors-in-interest to take steps to assert any rights
over the disputed land for 20 years from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of action
ground of laches (Layno v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 718 [1984]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF CORNELIO LABRADA represented by NATIVIDAD L. DIOCTON, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE SINFORIANO A. MONSANTO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch XXVII, Catbalogan, Samar, and the HEIRS OF ISABEL YBOA, represented by
Tito V. Tizon, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION to review the order of the Regional Trial Court,
Br. XXVII, Catbalogan, Samar. Monsanto, J.
Syllabi Class : Appeals|
1. Appeals; Appeals from cadastral proceedings may be taken by a simple notice of appeal within 15
days under the Interim Rules and Guidelines of the Supreme Court relative to the implementation of
the 1981 Judiciary Reorganization Act.-
The appeal sought to be taken in the petition at bar concerning conflicting claims of the parties to a
specific lot clearly falls under this general rule. Therefore, petitioners’ appeal must be given due
course and the issuance of a decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title were
prematurely and baselessly ordered by respondent court and must be set aside. All that respondent
trial court had to do was to transmit the original record consisting of the pleadings of the parties and
its decision and orders, which petitioners have in effect so elevated with their petition at bar as per
Annexes “A” to “I” of their petition, together with the transcripts and exhibits.
2. Appeals; Objective of mere simple procedure in the appeal of certain cases.-
It must not be lost sight of that the basic objective of this innovative Rule which dispenses with the
filing of a record on appeal and the filing of an appeal bond was and is to simplify appellate court
procedure by doing away with the tedious and expensive requirement of reproducing practically the
entire original record of the case in the record on appeal in the trial court. This old requirement of a
record on appeal by itself laid the appellate procedure open to a number of dilatory and vexing
questions of clerical errors and claims of omitted pleadings and orders which in turn required the filing
of an amended record on appeal. Such record on appeal under the Rules still had to be printed,
mimeographed or typed in 12 copies resulting many times in typographical errors and adding
needless expense and additional burden on litigants. Thus, have the legislators and the Court sought
to simplify the Rules to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive determination
of every court case, as well as decongesting judicial dockets.
3. Appeals; The exceptions under the Interim Rules for appeal wherein a record of appeal to be filed
within 30 days is still required must be strictly construed. They cover only cases under Rule 109
wherein multiple appeals in different stages of a special proceedings is allowed and, therefore, case
record still has to remain with the trial court.-
The exceptions must be strictly construed. The Court provided for specific exceptions with respect to
“appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court,” wherein multiple
appeals at different stages of the case are allowed such as when the order or judgment on appeal
refers to. (a) the allowance or disallowance of a will; (b) determination of the lawful heirs of a
deceased person or their distributive shares in the estate; (c) the allowance or disallowance, in whole
or in part, of any claim against the estate or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a
claim against it; (d) the settlement of the accounts of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing in proceedings relating
to settlement of the estate of a deceased person or the administration of a trustee or guardian; and (f)
the final order or judgment rendered in the case. In these cases, therefore, since the original record
has to remain with the probate court in connection with the other various pending matters, a party
appealing from a specific order is required to file the corresponding record on appeal.
4. Appeals; Appeals from cadastral proceedings require a simple notice of appeal filed within 15
days even if there are several contested lots involves. A separate record for each contested lot could
be kept.-
This is not the case in cadastral proceedings. Cadastral proceedings involve contest over specific lots
which may be claimed by parties who have timely filed their respective answers, failing which the land
is declared to belong to the State. In all such cases of contested lots, records may readily be kept of
each lot or lots so contested by the same parties and the State, and given a separate subnumber
corresponding to each contested lot. Upon the trial court’s rendering of its judgment as to such
specific lot(s), then the original records pertaining to such lot(s) may be readily elevated, leaving with
the lower court the records or pleadings referring to disputed lots not covered by said court’s
adjudication. In this particular cadastral proceeding, as stated by respondent court itself in its
questioned order, there remain only “around 8 contested ones [lots] which have not yet been
adjudicated not counting the 180 lots which were ‘archived’ by a predecessor of the presiding judge.”
This readily shows the lack of any difficulty to keep separate records for specific lots claimed by
conflicting parties, and elevating only the particular record for the specific lot, subject of judgment and
appeal.

Docket Number: No. L-66242

TEEHANKEE, Acting C.J.:
The procedural issue at bar is whether an appeal by a conflicting claimant to a specific lot of cadastral
survey proceedings from the adverse decision of the regional trial court in favor of another conflicting
claimant may be taken by filing a simple notice of appeal within the reglementary 15-day period, as
provided in the Interim Rules and Guidelines relative to the implementation of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1981 (Batas PambansaBlg. 129), adopted by the Supreme Court on January
11, 1983. Or does such appeal fall within the exception provided by the same interim rules for special
proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed, in which case an appeal must still be filed by the filing of a record on appeal within a period
of 30 days provided for the purpose. The Court rules that appeals in cadastral proceedings may be
taken by a simple notice of appeal.
The lot involved is Lot No. 1910 of the Catbalogan Cadastral Survey. It is contested by the claimants,
petitioners-heirs of Cornelio Labrada, on one hand, and by respondents-heirs of Isabel Yboa on the
other. Said predecessors-in-interest had filed their respective answers in the cadastral proceedings in
June, 1932.
Petitioners thus state their claim to the lot, as follows: "Cornelio Labrada who had previously
deforested the area which is now the disputed Lot No. 1910, had already been in continuous
possession of said lot for more than forty-three (43) years when he filed his answer in 1932, or at
least from 1894; and that he continued his possession until 1943 when he died. His son, Meliton,
succeeded in possessing the land. Immediately after his demise, MelitonLabrada was succeeded in
the possession of said land until he himself died sometime in 1976; and that subsequent thereto,
possession of the property in issue passed to Meliton's direct heirs, who until the present are still in
possession thereof, (Decision, p.1 ). None of the heirs of Isabel Iboa is in possession of any portion of
the questioned lot." 1 Petitioners had moved in 1973 for the case to be heard by the now defunct
Court of First Instance of Samar. The conflicting parties presented both their oral and documentary
evidence in support of their respective claims over the lot. On July 11, 1983, the respondent regional
trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondents-claimants. Within 2 days from receipt of the
adverse decision, petitioners filed their appeal on August 6, 1983 by filing a notice of appeal with a
prayer that the records be elevated to the Intermediate Appellate Court, pursuant to the new Interim
Rules of Court. Over a month later, on September 14, 1983, respondents-claimants filed their motion
for the issuance of a decree contending that petitioners had failed to perfect their appeal because
they failed to file a record on appeal. Respondent court granted respondents' motion for the issuance
of a decree on the theory that an appeal taken in a cadastral case involves "multiple appeals," for
which the filing of the record on appeal was required. The decree for the registration was accordingly
ordered by respondent court. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having failed, they have now filed
the petition at bar for the setting aside of respondent court's questioned orders denying due course to
their appeal and ordering the issuance of a decree of registration on the lot in question in favor of
respondents.
The pertinent provisions of Appellate Procedure on appeals are contained in sections 18 and 19 of
the Interim Rules and Guidelines, as follows:
18. Elimination of record on appeal and appeal bond. — The filing of a record on appeal shall be
dispensed with, except in the cases referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 19 hereof.
No appeal bond shall be required for an appeal.
19. Period of Appeal. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases referred to in paragraph (b) hereof,
must be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or award
appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other
cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of
appeal being required.
These rules were issued pursuant to the provisions of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, particularly section
39 thereof which provides for a 15-day period within which to take an appeal and expressly abolished
the need of a record on appeal, as follows:
SEC. 39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen days counted from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu therefor, the entire original record
shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of
the contents thereof.
The appeal sought to be taken in the petition at bar concerning conflicting claims of the parties to a
specific lot clearly falls under this general rule. Therefore, petitioners' appeal must be given due
course and the issuance of a decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title were
prematurely and baselessly ordered by respondent court and must be set aside. All that respondent
trial court had to do was to transmit the original record consisting of the pleadings of the parties and
its decision and orders, which petitioners have in effect so elevated with their petition at bar as per
Annexes "A" to "I" of their petition, 2 together with the transcripts and exhibits. 3
It must not be lost sight of that the basic objective of this innovative Rule which dispenses with the
filing of a record on appeal and the filing of an appeal bond was and is to simplify appellate court
procedure by doing away with the tedious and expensive requirement of reproducing practically the
entire original record of the case in the record on appeal in the trial court. This old requirement of a
record on appeal by itself laid the appellate procedure open to a number of dilatory and vexing
questions of clerical errors and claims of omitted pleadings and orders which in tum required the filing
of an amended record on appeal. Such record on appeal under the Rules still had to be printed,
mimeographed or typed in 12 copies resulting many times in typographical errors 4 and adding
needless expense and additional burden on litigants. Thus, have the legislators and the Court sought
to simplify the rules to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive determination
of every court case, as well as decongesting judicial dockets.
The exceptions must be strictly construed. The Court provided for specific exceptions with respect to
"appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court," wherein multiple
appeals at different stages of the case are allowed such as when the order or judgment on appeal
refers to: (a) the allowance or disallowance of a will, (b) determination of the lawful heirs of a
deceased person or their distributive shares in the estate; (c) the allowance or disallowance, in whole
or in part, of any claim against the estate or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a
claim against it; (d) the settlement of the accounts of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing in proceedings relating
to settlement of the estate of a deceased person or the administration of a trustee or guardian; and (f)
the final order or judgment rendered in the case. In these cases, therefore, since the original record
has to remain with the probate court in connection with the other various pending matters, a party
appealing from a specific order is required to file the corresponding record on appeal.
This is not the case in cadastral proceedings. Cadastral proceedings involve contest over specific lots
which may be claimed by parties who have timely filed their respective answers, failing which the land
is declared to belong to the State. In all such cases of contested lots, records may readily be kept of
each lot or lots so contested by the same parties and the State, and given a separate sub-number
corresponding to each contested lot. Upon the trial court's rendering of its judgment as to such
specific lot(s), then the original records pertaining to such lot(s) may be readily elevated, leaving with
the lower court the records or pleadings referring to disputed lots not covered by said court's
adjudication. In this particular cadastral proceeding, as stated by respondent court itself in its
questioned order, there remain only "around 8 contested ones [lots] which have not yet been
adjudicated not counting the 180 lots which were 'archived' by a predecessor of the presiding
judge." 5 This readily shows the lack of any difficulty to keep separate records for specific lots claimed
by conflicting parties, and elevating only the particular record for the specific lot, subject of judgment
and appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. Dispensing with briefs or memoranda, judgment is hereby
rendered (a) setting aside the questioned orders which denied due course to petitioners' appeal and
ordered the issuance of a decree of registration; (b) annulling any certificate of title which may have
been issued to respondents pursuant thereto; and (c) ordering respondent court to give due course to
petitioners' appeal from its decision of July 11, 1983 and to transmit to the Intermediate Appellate
Court the records of the case pertaining to the disputed Lot No. 1910 of the Catbalogan Cadastral
survey, together with the oral and documentary evidence as hereinabove indicated. No costs.

CIPRIANO VERASTIGUE, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN

VERDAGUER, EMILIO VILLASIN, ET AL., respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Land registration|Cadastralproceedings|Due Process|Procedural due process|Appeal
Syllabi:
1. Land registration; Cadastral proceedings; Cadastral court may issue a writ of possession.-
In Abellera vs. De Guzman (85 Phil. 738), the Supreme Court left no doubt about the power of the
cadastral court to issue a writ of possession. Thus: “After hearing, the cadastral court may declare the
plaintiff the owner of the lots and entitled .to their possession and may issue a writ directing the sheriff
to put him in possession thereof, but it cannot award damages to the plaintiff.” As a matter of fact, the
Abellera doctrine has its roots in the opinion of the Supreme Court rendered 22 years earlier in 1928
in Director of Lands vs. Court of First Instance of Tarlac (51 Phil. 805). The Court of First Instance,
sitting as a land registration court, has jurisdiction to order, as a consequence of the writ of
possession issued by it, the demolition of improvements introduced by the successor-in-interest of a
defeated oppositor in the land registration case. (Marcelo vs. Mencias, 58 O.G. 3349.)
2. Land registration; Due process; Procedural due process; Requirements of.-
A plea of denial of procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting of an absence of
notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party having had the opportunity to
be heard on a motion for reconsideration. “What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous
notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.”
3. Land registration; Appeal; Factual question should be raised in the Court of Appeals, not in the
Supreme Court.-
The third point raised by petitioners to the effect that a writ of possession cannot affect parties who
enter the land after ,the issuance of a decree of registration is equally devoid of merit. This is a factual
matter, the determination of which was properly within the cognizance of the Court of Appeals. It
should there have been raised. Apparently, petitioners did not do so. The invocation of this particular
issue at this stage cannot be characterized as other than a last-ditch attempt of petitioners to impute
an aspect of vulnerability to the decision now on appeal, when in reality there is none.
Docket Number: No. L-23973
f or mandamus and certiorari, is affirmed. With costs against petitioners.

FERNANDO, J.:

A point of jurisdiction as to the power of a court of first instance sitting as a cadastral court to issue a
writ of possession was raised and an issue of due process invoked in this petition for the review of a
decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing a special civil action for mandamus and certiorari. As will
hereafter be made apparent, neither is sufficiently persuasive to call for a reversal. We affirm.
The principal question raised in the Court of Appeals according to the decision sought to be reviewed
"is whether as claimed by the petitioners, 'the respondent Court has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in trying the oft-stated cadastral case for
re-opening and review, on account of its special and limited jurisdiction, because of the pendency of
Civil Case No. 211-G before it, between the same parties and over the same land, where the issue of
ownership and possession is involved.'" 1
The question was disposed of in the Court of Appeals decision thus: "Upon careful consideration, we
arrived at the conclusion that said question should be answered in the negative. Inasmuch as it was
the respondent Court, sitting as Cadastral Court, that handed down the decision sought to be
reviewed in the Petition for Review abovementioned, it is unquestionable that said Court did not act
without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it entertained said petition for review based upon the
ground that said Court did not have legal authority to award and adjudicate privately owned lands
already covered by Torrens Title. We are satisfied, under the facts hereinabove mentioned, that the
respondent Court was right in reconsidering and setting aside its said decision and declaring null and
void the decrees as well as the certificates of title issued in accordance therewith, it appearing that
although given a chance to do so, the herein petitioners had not presented evidence to show, or had
not succeeded in showing, that Certificate of Title No. 75 issued in favor of Andres Villasin of Parafina
on September 15, 1914 did not include Lot No. 5387. In view hereof, it would appear that the appeal
sought to be taken by the herein petitioners from the aforementioned orders of the Cadastral Court,
even granting that the steps towards that end were taken within the reglementary period, would not
serve any benefit." 2
Petitioners thus disputed the right of respondents to the aforementioned lot, but without success.
They ought to have taken the proper steps to appeal; they failed to do so within the reglementary
period. They would then rely on the special civil action for mandamus and certiorari as a substitute
measure, having lost the right to appeal. The Court of Appeals saw through their scheme and
dismissed their petition.
More specifically, insofar as the issue of the writ of possession is concerned, the version in the brief
of petitioners t follows: "After the appeal was dismissed the private respondents moved for the
issuance of a Writ of Possession to place them in possession of the land in controversy. The said
Motion was heard on 27 March, 1961 and was, with, undue haste, granted on the same day but a
copy thereof was received by the undersigned only on 28 March 1961, or the following day after it
had heard and granted. After their Motion to reconsider the Order of 27 March 1961, granting the
issuance of a Writ of Possession, was denied in the Order of 27 September 1961, the Trial Court
issued such writ. (Actually the herein petitioners, however, still remain in possession of the land.)
Thus, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which was dismissed by the principal respondent." 3
It is in the light of the above facts thus presented that they would raise the aforementioned
jurisdictional and due process questions. Their contention, as set forth in their lone assignment of
error is that the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring null and void the aforesaid orders with
particular emphasis on the writ of possession thereafter issued. In their effort to lend substance to the
above allegation, petitioners stressed the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court of first instance
acting as a cadastral court to issue a writ of possession and the alleged denial of procedural due
process.
As already indicated, their plea is futile and unavailing, running counter as it does to controlling
decisions of this Court. The court of first instance sitting as a cadastral court was empowered to issue
a writ of possession. Nor was there a failure to accord petitioners procedural due process.
1. In Abellera v. De Guzman, 4 we left no doubt about the power of the cadastral court to issue a writ
of possession. Thus: "After hearing, the cadastral court may declare the plaintiff the owner of the lots
and entitled to their possession and may issue a writ directing the sheriff to put him in possession
thereof, but it cannot award damages to the plaintiff." As a matter of fact, the Abellera doctrine has its
roots in our opinion rendered 22 years earlier in 1928 in Director of Lands v. Court of First Instance of
Tarlac. 5 The language used by Justice Laurel in Corders v. Court of First Instance of Laguna, 6 a
1939 decision, would, if carefully analyzed, likewise yield an affirmative answer to the question of
whether or not a cadastral court may issue a writ of possession.
In a recent decision, less than three years ago, where the party adversely affected did not even
bother to assail the legality of an order of a writ of possession coming from a cadastral court, we
pointed out, in an opinion through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, how broad and extensive is the scope of such
an authority. Thus: "Neither do respondents dispute the propriety and validity of the order of the
cadastral court, granting the writ of possession in favor of petitioners as well as its enforcement.
Under these circumstances, we hold that the Order, dated March 20, 1962, of the cadastral court,
granting petitioners' motion to compel respondents to remove their respective houses from the
disputed lot, is valid and enforceable against respondents. In the case of Marcelo v. Mencias, etc., et
al., L-15609, April 29, 1960, 58 O.G. 3349, this Court had already upheld the jurisdiction or authority
of the court of first instance, sitting as a land registration court, to order, as a consequence of the writ
of possession issued by it, the demolition of improvements introduced by the successor-in-interest of
a defeated oppositor in the land registration case." 7 The confidence with which therefore petitioners
asserted such lack of jurisdiction in a cadastral court to issue a writ of possession is clearly
unjustified.
2. The due process question is just as easily disposed of. Petitioners in their brief would argue thus:
"The herein petitioners had no chance to object to the private respondents' Motion for Writ of
Possession because, as hereinbefore discussed, they received a copy thereof only on 28 March
1961, or on the following day that it was heard and granted by the Court on 27 March 1961." 8
In an earlier page of their brief, they did admit, that they had a motion to reconsider such order of
March 27, 1961 which was denied in an order of September 27 of the same year. Only then, as
admitted by them likewise, did the lower court issue such a writ of possession. Where then is the
denial of due process?
Our ruling in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Cadiao 9 would dispel any doubt that the answer
to the above due process question must be in the negative. Thus: "While it is true then that the order
of November 2, 1967 was issued ex parte, it is equally true that whatever objections could have been
raised by petitioner were in fact set forth in its petition to set aside and to reconsider and were
inquired into in a hearing held on January 24, 1968. As far back as 1935, it has already been a settled
doctrine that a plea of denial of procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting of an
absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party having had the
opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration. 'What the law prohibits is not the absence
of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.' There is
then no occasion to impute deprivation of property without due process where the adverse party was
heard on a motion for reconsideration constituting as it does 'sufficient opportunity' for him to inform
the Tribunal concerned of his side of the controversy. As was stated in a recent decision, what 'due
process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it requires is fairness or justice, the
substance rather than the form being paramount', the conclusion being that the hearing on a motion
for reconsideration meets the strict requirement of due process."
3. The third point raised by petitioners to the effect that a writ of possession cannot affect parties who
enter the land after the issuance of a decree of registration is equally devoid of merit. This is a factual
matter, the determination of which was properly within the cognizance of the Court of Appeals. It
should there have been raised. Apparently, petitioners did not do so. The invocation of this particular
issue at this stage cannot be characterized as other than a last-ditch attempt of petitioners to impute
an aspect of vulnerability to the decision now on appeal, when in reality there is none.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of August 28, 1964, dismissing the petition
for mandamus and certiorari, is affirmed. With costs against petitioners.