“Actus me invito factus, non est meus actus.

~ An act done by me against my

will, is not my act.

Probable cause is a reasonable ground for presuming that a matter is or

may be well-founded on such state of facts in the prosecutor's mind as
would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe — or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion — that it is so. The term does not
mean "actual and positive cause"; neither does it import absolute certainty.
It is based merely on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. It is enough that the act or the omission
complained of is believed to constitute the offense charged. Precisely, there
is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for the prosecution in support of
the charge.

What is the willful blindness doctrine?

Willful blindness under the tax law...the corporation aware to the facts
made by their accountants escaping tax liability which claim as their
defense knowing that the computation was intentionally made
Willful blindness is a term used in criminal law to refer to the acts of a
person who intentionally fails to be informed about matters that would make
the person criminally liable. (sometimes called ignorance of
law, willful ignorance or contrived ignorance or Nelsonian knowledge)

B, while transacting inside the city hall of City X, was badly injured
when the chandelier at the lobby was detached from the ceiling and
directly hit him. An investigation was conducted and was found out
that the chandelier was loosely pinned and was too heavy which
caused it to fall. B filed a claim for damages against City X. City X
raised as defense that being an agency of the State it is immune
from suit, and therefore, no suit can be filed against it without its
consent. 1. Will B's action for damages prosper? 2. Is City X's
contention tenable?

Yes. The case for damages against City X will prosper. The doctrine of non-
suability of the state without its consent cannot be raised as a defense
following the express provision of the Civil Code that LGUs shall be liable
to any defective construction or building under its control and supervision.

ABC Company is the operator of Heaven Bus Lines, a PUV engaged in

transporting passengers. One of its drivers, Big Boy, has an ill feelings
against its employer because of the delay in their salary. Due to his so
much hatred, Big Boy, while driving his passengers to their destination,
wilfully bumped the bus to a big tree in order to rebel against his employer.
Girlie, one of the passengers got injured because of the incident. Thus, a
claim for damages was filed against ABC Company. The latter insists that it
cannot be held liable because the driver acted beyond the scope of its
assigned task. Q1. What is the degree of diligence required to be observed
by ABC Company? Q2. Is the defense tenable?
1. Extraordinary diligence

2. Common carriers are bound by the acts of its employees although said
acts were made beyond the latter's authority or against their employer's
orders

In case of doubt, tax laws must be construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the taxpayer because taxes, as burdens which must be
endured by the taxpayer, should not be presumed to go beyond what the
law expressly and clearly declares. (Lincoln Philippine Life Insurance
Company, Inc., etc., v. Court of Appeals, et al., 293 SCRA 92, 99)
Strict interpretation of tax exemption.
Taxes are what civilized people pay for civilized society. They are the
lifeblood of the nation. Thus, statutes granting tax exemptions are
construed stricissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the
taxing authority.
A claim of tax exemption must be clearly shown and based on language in
law too plain to be mistaken. Otherwise stated, taxation is the rule,
exemption is the exception. (Quezon City, et al., v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, G. R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008 citing Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Marcos, G.R. No. 120082, September 11,
1996, 261 SCRA 667, 680)
The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming the exemption to prove
that it is in fact covered by the exemption so claimed. (Quezon City, supra
citing Agpalo, R.E., Statutory Construction, 2003 ed., p. 301)

If A and B executed a pre-nup agreement stating that they will follow

Conjugal Partnership of Gains as their regime then next day got married in
the Mayor's office but it was his assistant who officiated and mayor just
signed it later because he was busy campaigning for his re-election. Then
later A & B converted to Islam & got married in the mosque. The question
is: "Since the marriage at the Mayor's office is null from the beginning, shall
their property regime to be followed is Complete Separation of Property?

The prenuptial agreement remains valid so long as all elements

therein are present. These elements are: the agreement are in writing and
signed by the parties; and it was executed before the celebration of their
marriage. This is because marriage between A and B may be valid for they
are in good faith. However, the mayor can be prosecuted civilly, criminally,
and administratively for his act. Hence, the regime of property stated in
prenuptial agreement shall be followed.

For non compliance of formal requisite of marriage-authority of the

solemnizing officer, does not invalidate the marriage, at most, it is merely
voidable and the officer may be subject to an appropriate administrative
sanctions and pursuant to art.40 of the FC as amended, it needs the court's
pronouncement to make the marriage void.
 How to transfer shares of stock from one person to another?Can
thumbark of the shareholder in the stock certificate be a valid claim for
transfer?

Editing the General Information Sheet and Deed of sale

Certificate of stock through endorsement coupled with delivery

Deed of assignment is only valid while the certificate of stock has not
been issued. Once issued, endorsement and delivery are required.

A made libelous statements against B which were published. A eventually

apologized to B. B told A that he would forgive the latter if he would comply
with certain conditions. A perceived these conditions as outrageous.
Q: Does A have a cause of action against B for the latter's outrageous
conditions?

No, for cause of action to exists, the following must be present:

a) act or b) omission by which a party violates a right of another.

Under the situation, the alleged outrageous conditions which yet to be

fulfilled, would not be the basis to have a cause of action, since there is no
act or omission which violates the right of another party.

Moreover in relation to Art.21 of the Revised Penal Code which explicitly

provides, that there is no crime if there is no law punishing an act or
omission.

Penal law is not presumed; there must be a clear provision punishing the
same to have a cause of action.

No. The law provides that parties may agree on the terms of a contract
provided any such agreement is not contrary to law or public policy. Here,
the conditions set are neither contrast to law nor to public policy. (Tulfo vs.
Bautista
Taxation Laws - Rules in Computing VAT
...
VAT Exclusive - Multiply by 12%
VAT Inclusive - Divide by 9.33333333 (instead of multiplying by 112/12)
...
Instances whether VAT is Exclusive:
(1) Net of VAT,
(2) VAT not included,
(3) Per accounting record,
(4) Excluding VAT,
(5) Exclusive of VAT,
(6) Other instances of exclusivity.
...
Instances whether VAT is Inclusive:
(1) Gross of VAT,
(2) VAT included,
(3) Per invoice/official receipts,
(4) Including VAT,
(5) Inclusive of VAT,
(6) Other instances of inclusivity.

If a subway system would be installed or constructed in Metro Manila,

would it need permissions on the land owners in that area even if it is
underground? And would the owners be paid for the usage of their Land
even if it is underground.

Yes. The owners are entitled to just compensation for the value of their
property as provided by law.

Article 3 section 9 of 1987 Constitution private property shall not be taken

for public use without just compensation

So long that the owner cannot anymore use the land in its original function
or benefits, it is already considered as taking, and taking necessitate just
compensation. US V CAUSBY.

If the owner is deprived of the normal beneficial use of the land, there
should be just compensation. Read NPC vs Sangkay for clarification.
Our government has the power of eminent domain which means acquiring
private property for public use is justifiable under our Constitution. Likewise,
land owners will be compensated based on the property value at the time
of acquisition.

Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment
to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot
complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.

The government will be negotiating for the "permanent" right of way, hence,
it will not be for land leasing / rent. As stated in paragraph (b) of Section 2
of RA 10752 which states that when it is necessary to build, construct, or
install on the subsurface or subterranean portion of private and government
lands owned, occupied, or leased by other persons, such infrastructure as
subways, tunnels, underpasses, waterways, floodways, or utility facilities as
part of the government’s infrastructure and development project, the
government or any of its authorized representatives shall not be prevented
from entry into and use of the subsurface or subterranean portions of such
private and government lands by surface owners or occupants, if such
entry and use are made more than fifty (50) meters from the surface" .
NAPOCOR vs. Heirs of Sangkay finds application. In constructing an
underground tunnel, there is full taking even if the owner is not completely
and actually dispossessed.

CASE: Felizardo S. Obando and the Estates of Jose Figueras and

Doña Alegria Figueras vs. Eduardo F. Figueras and Amigo Realty
Corp. (G.R. No. 134854 January 18, 2000)

PONENTE: Panganiban, J.:

SUBJECT: (Rule 138 Sec. 26)Change of Attorney of Record; (Rule
16) Motion to Dismiss
FACTS: In the settlement of the estates of spouses Don Jose and
Doña Alegria Figueras, Eduardo (stepson of Doña Alegria) assumed
administration thereof. During the settlement proceedings Eduardo
was served a Petition for Probate of what purported to be Doña
Alegria’s Last Will and Testament, filed by Felizardo S. Obando
(Obando), a nephew of Doña Alegria.

The alleged Will bequeathed to Obando and several other members of

the Obando clan properties left by the Figueras couple. When the
probate case was consolidated with the intestate proceedings,
Obando was appointed as Eduardo’s co-administrator of the estates.

As Eduardo insisted that the alleged Will was a forgery, the document
was submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
examination. The NBI found that the Will was indeed a forgery. This
led to the conviction of Obando for estafa through falsification of a
public document.

Meanwhile, Eduardo filed a motion for authority to sell two parcels of

land owned by Don Jose and Doña Alegria but the probate court
denied the same. Despite such denial, Eduardo sold the lots to Amigo
Realty Corporation.

Obando, in his capacity as co-administrator, filed a civil case before

the RTC against Eduardo and Amigo Realty for the nullification of the
sale.
However, in the settlement proceedings, the probate court removed
Obando from his office as co-administrator of the estate of the
Figueras spouses. Consequently, in the civil case, Eduardo, thorugh
Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
Obando lost his legal standing to pursue the case. The trial court
granted the Motion and dismissed the civil case filed by Obando.

When the case reached the Supreme Court, Obando raised the
following issues:

The motion to dismiss should not be acted upon by the trial court
since Atty. Joaquin Yuseco was no longer the counsel of Eduardo, as
shown by Eduardo’s Manifestation and Motion dated January 8, 1998,
dispensing with said counsel’s services.

The Rules provide that a motion to dismiss may be submitted only

before the filing of a responsive pleading. Thus, Obando complain that
it was already too late for Eduardo to file a Motion to Dismiss after
Obando had finished presenting his evidence.

Obando also aver that it was premature for the trial court to dismiss
the civil case because Obando’s conviction for estafa through
falsification was still on appeal.

ISSUES:
(A) Whether the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who
was allegedly no longer Eduardo’s counsel of record;

(B) Whether a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings

were already made can still be granted;

(C) Whether the conviction of Obando for estafa through falsification

and the revocation of his appointment as administrator, both of which
are on appeal, constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss the civil case;

RULING:

(A) Representation continues until the court dispenses with the

services of counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Counsel may be validly substituted only if the following
requisites are complied with: (1) new counsel files a written application
for Substitution; (2) the client’s written consent is obtained; and (3) the
written consent of the lawyer to be substituted is secured, if it can still
be; if the written consent can no longer be obtained, then the
application for substitution must carry proof that notice of the motion
has been served on the attorney to be substituted in the manner
required by the Rules.

In this case, we are convinced that Eduardo did not dismiss Attorney
Yuseco. Besides, an attorney who has already been dismissed by
the client is allowed to intervene in a case in order to protect the
client’s rights. In the present case, had there been any irregularity, it
should have been raised by the Eduardo, not Obando.

(B) The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the

circumstances of the case. Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed within the
reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading.

However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed
a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1)
lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia, (3) lack of cause of action,
and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a
ground for dismissal. Except for lack of cause of action or lack of
jurisdiction, the grounds under Section 1 of Rule 16 may be waived. If
a particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss
is filed at all within the reglementary period, it is generally considered
waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules.
Applying this principle to the case at bar, Eduardo did not waive his
right to move for the dismissal of the civil case based on Obando’s
lack of legal capacity. It must be pointed out that it was only after
he had been convicted of estafa through falsification that the
probate court divested him of his representation of the Figueras
estates. It was only then that this ground became available to
Eduardo.Hence, it could not be said that he waived it by raising it in a
Motion to Dismiss filed after his Answer was submitted. Verily, if the
plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case, as
in the present controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file a
motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the reglementary period for
filing a responsive pleading.

(C) Obando derived his power to represent the estate of the

deceased couple from his appointment as co-administrator. When the
probate court removed him from office, he lost that authority.
Since he lacked the legal capacity to sue on behalf of the Figueras
estates, he could not continue prosecuting the civil case. Thus the trial
court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss on this ground. Whether
a final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is necessary to
remove him from his administration is not a proper issue in this
Petition. He should raise the matter in his appeal of the Decision
removing him from administration of the Figueras estates.

————————————————-

THINGS DECIDED:

(A) Representation continues until the court dispenses with the

services of counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Counsel may be validly substituted only if the following
requisites are complied with: (1) new counsel files a written application
for Substitution; (2) the client’s written consent is obtained; and (3) the
written consent of the lawyer to be substituted is secured, if it can still
be; if the written consent can no longer be obtained, then the
application for substitution must carry proof that notice of the motion
has been served on the attorney to be substituted in the manner
required by the Rules.

B) The Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on

the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia, (3)
lack of cause of action, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence
that would constitute a ground for dismissal.
Verily, if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of
the case, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss,
even after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a responsive
pleading.