Mirabel, Christie Faith Anne F.

2016-166461 | JD-3B

AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCOSO

G.R. No. L-21438. September 28, 1966.

FACTS: Air France issued to Carrascoso a first class roundtrip ticket from Manila to
Rome through its authorized agent, Philippine Airlines. Carrascoso travelled from
Manila to Bangkok in a first class seat, but in Bangkok, the Manager forced him to
vacate his first class seat because a certain ‘white man’ has a better right to the said
seat. A commotion was ensued but Carrascoso reluctantly gave up his seat to the
white man in the end.
Carrasco then filed an action for damages against the CFI. CFI rendered
judgment in favor of Carrasco awarding him moral damages. The CA affirmed CFI’s
decision. Now, Air France assails the court's award of moral damages.
Air France draws our attention to Carrascoso's testimony when he told that
purser told him, 'I have recorded the incident in my notebook.' He read it and
translated it to me—because it was recorded in French—'First class passenger was
forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene.' The counsel of Air France move to strike out the last part of the
testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be the notes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the best evidence would be the notes.

HELD: No. The court should not grant the motion to strike out. The Best Evidence
rule applies when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document. In the case
at bar, the subject of the inquiry are not the contents of the notebook, but the
purser’s statement to Carrascaso. Otherwise put the best evidence rule applies only
to documentary evidence but not to testimonial evidence.
The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on
the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible.
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue
happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be
felt. The excitement had not as yet died down, Statements then, in this environment,
are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous
excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It
thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines and, by an
employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have
contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was
made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is
admissible in evidence.

ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO

G.R. No. 117221. April 13, 1999

FACTS: Estrada won the Presidential election in 1998 election. However, in 2000, he
was charged before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee of corruption and receiving
millions from the jueteng lords. Some moved to impeach Estrada while others asked
him to resign.
Impeachment trial ensued but put to a halt after some prosecutors tendered
their resignation letters. Then EDSA 2 commenced prompting the Supreme Court to
render a decision declaring the position for Presidency vacant since it is deemed
that Estrada constructively resigned from his post. Presented in support of the
contention that Estrada resigned were the excerpts from the diary of Angara in
which Estrada stated, “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado ng masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, sa intriga. I just want to clear my name, then
I wll go.”
Now, Estrada filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Supreme Court. In his motion, Estrada devotes a large part of his arguments on the
alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of
the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his
resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.
During the trial, Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez extensively used the
excerpts from the diary in his oral arguments. However petitioner had all the
opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
Estrada objected to the introduction of the excerpts on the ground that the
Best Evidence is the Angara diary itself.

ISSUE:

1. Whether he is deemed resigned or should be considered resigned as of

January 20, 2001
 2. Whether or not ANGARA DIARY is inadmissible for being violative of the
following rules on evidence: hearsay, best evidence, authentication,
admissions and res inter alios acta;
3. Whether or not reliance on newspaper acounts is violative of the hearsay
rule

HELD: No. The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the contention of Estrada. To
begin with, the Angara Diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is
part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. He cannot complain he was not furnished a
copy of the Angara Diary nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the
said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. It is true that
the Court relied not upon the original but only a copy of the Angara Diary as
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the
Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on
evidence, states that:
“Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the
case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other
useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
xxxI
“In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain
documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one
and deserves universal adoption (post, see. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used
unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it.”
Furthermore, Estrada had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of
the Angara Diary when he filed his Memorandum, Reply Memorandum,
Supplemental Memorandum, and Second Supplemental Memorandum. He was
therefore not denied due process. In the words of Wigmore, supra, petitioner had
“been given an opportunity to inspect” the Angara Diary but did not object to its
admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise his objections in an Omnibus
Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered
partly on the basis thereof.

PEOPLE vs. BAGO

G.R. No. 122290. April 6, 2000

FACTS: Bago was an employee of Azkcon Metal Industries (Azkcon). When the crime
was committed, he served as team leader at the cutting department under the
supervision of Material Comptroller WILLIAM HILO who kept track of all the
materials coming in and going out of the company’s plant in Kalookan City.
Azkcon has a business arrangement with Power Construction Supply
Company whereby Azkcon buys cold rolled sheets from the latter. These cold rolled
sheets are also cut by Power Construction for a fee and Azkcon converts them into
drums or containers. Bago’s job was to go to Power Construction’s establishment in
Quezon City to oversee the cutting of the cold rolled sheets and ensure their delivery
to Azkcon using the trucks sent by Hilo.
Bago and his co-workers went to Power Construction and loaded two cold
rolled sheets in a truck owned by Azkcon. Before entering the premises of Azkcon,
Bago presented to security guard MANANGAN two receipts covering the cold rolled
sheets from Power Construction. Manangan inspected the contents of the truck. As
everything was accounted for, Manangan stamped on the two receipts covering the
materials. Bago then presented a third receipt for stamping which was likewise
stamped by Manangan. As the third receipt bore a different date, Manangan asked
Bago if the materials covered by said receipt were in the truck. Bago replied that the
materials had long been delivered. Manangan did not investigate further but later
reported the incident to the Chief of Security Department, Ong. Ong checked the
third receipt and when he failed to find the materials listed thereon, he reported to
Hilo.
Upon receipt of the report, Hilo discreetly conducted a more in-depth
investigation. He found out that the materials covered by the third receipt, were not
delivered to Azkcon. He checked the third receipt and the gate pass of Power
Construction—the date of the questioned transaction—and discovered that the
truck used by appellant on said date did not belong to Azkcon.
RTC convicted Bago of qualified theft. He moved for reconsideration of the
trial court’s decision but the motion was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal.
In Bago’s Appellant brief, he contended that the prosecution failed to prove
even by circumstantial evidence that he asported the cold rolled sheets in question
and that the best evidence that the material was delivered to Azkcon was the receipt
duly stamped by the guard on duty and not the latter’s testimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to Manangan’s
testimony despite, the receipt.

HELD: No. The contention of Bago is untenable. His argument that the receipt is the
best evidence and should be given more credence than Manangan’s testimony is
bereft of merit for Manangan’s testimony is corroborated by another witness,
William Hilo, Material Comptroller of Azkcon who kept track of all materials coming
in and going out of Azkcon’s plant.

Bago cannot rely on the best evidence rule because rule cannot be invoked
unless the content of a writing is the subject of judicial inquiry, in which case, the
best evidence is the original writing itself. The rule pertains to the admissibility of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of a document. In the case at bar, no
secondary evidence is offered to prove the content of a document. What is being
questioned by appellant is the weight given by the trial court to the testimony of
Manangan over the receipt which on its face shows that the materials in question
were delivered to Azkcon’s premises. Clearly, the best evidence rule finds no
application on this issue.

Also the fact of non-delivery of the subject materials to Azkcon was

established through the testimony of two other witnesses, namely, William Hilo and
the Chief Security Officer Aflor Ong.

TIMBOL vs. MANALO

G.R. No. 2696. May 5, 1906

FACTS: Atty. Adolfo Garcia Feijoo, a notary public of the town of San Fernando,
Pampanga, was called to the house of Sixto Timbol for the purpose of taking the
acknowledgment of Cesarea Manalo y Manalo, a resident of Angeles, and the mother
of Sixto Timbol, to her last will and testament which contained an inventory of the
property belonging to the testatrix and wherein she named the said Sixto Timbol as
one of her heirs. Timbol was also appointed as executor of the said will, without
bond, and given full power to do all things necessary in connection with the
execution of its provisions, the testatrix declaring that any prior or subsequent will
executed by her which did not comply with the legal requirements should be
considered null and void.
The will in question was attested by the witnesses Eugenio Ayuyao, Ignacio
Sugay, and Pablo Torres. Sugay interpreted the will into Pampango and Torres
signed the will at the request of the testatrix who could not write.
A copy of the aforesaid will was presented to the CFI of Pampanga for
probate. Counsel for Januaria, Alejandra, Lino Lacson, and Sinforoso Manalo
objected to its being admitted to probate.
After the witnesses to the said will were duly examined; the evidence was
taken in the presence of the appellants and the court rendered its decision declaring
that the will in question had been duly executed in accordance with the law and
admitted the same to probate as the last will and testament of the deceased and
issued letters of administration to Timbol, executor under the will.
Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said will should be disallowed

HELD: No. It having been conclusively shown that the will in question was duly
executed in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code, and it not appearing
that the same has been revoked in any manner authorized by article 737 et seq. of
the Civil Code, or by the provisions of section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it
should be admitted to probate in accordance with the provisions of the latter code.
Aside from the fact that the due execution of the will in question was proved
fully and satisfactorily, the copy thereof herein presented is the best evidence of its
existence. The law does not require a certified copy. The copy in question contains a
literal recital of the original which was lost. It bears every evidence of authenticity
and legitimacy. Its execution has been further confirmed by the testimony of the
three attesting witnesses who were present at the time the will was being drawn
and who signed the same. (Secs. 321 and 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure.)
The value of a copy of an instrument as evidence depends upon whether the
original instrument has been lost or not, whatever the cause of the loss might have
been. It will be sufficient to show either by a statement or a certificate to that effect
from the official who had the custody of the protocol or by any other accepted
means of proof that the original was lost.
In the case at bar, it was proved that the protocols and archives of the notary
public of Pampanga were lost. We must, therefore, give legal force to the copy of the
said will presented by the executor which, although not as old as that contemplated
in paragraph 5 of article 1221 of the Civil Code, appears to be, however, an
authenticated copy of its original, certified to by the same notary before whom the
will was executed, the said copy bearing the notary's official seal. It has not been
shown that the copy in question is inexact or not authentic, and, as written evidence,
corroborated as it is by the uniform testimony of the attesting witnesses who
testified as to the correctness and authenticity of the said copy and of the notary's
signature, it furnishes the most complete proof of the fact that Cesarea Manalo
executed the will in the terms set forth in the said copy, those who opposed the
probate of the will having failed to show that the testatrix was unable to execute the
same or that the copy submitted to the court as aforesaid was not authentic.
Where the loss of the protocols and records of a notary public has been
proved beyond doubt, a copy of the original will, issued by the same notary before
whom it was executed, bearing his official seal, although such copy may not appear
to be 30 or more years old, may be admitted as written evidence; which together
with the testimony of the three attesting witnesses as to the authenticity of such a
copy and of the notary's signature, is the most complete and conclusive proof of the
genuineness of the will. The loss or disappearance of an original will having been
duly proved, section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the proving of its
contents by a copy of the same and by the recollection of those who witnessed and
signed the original will.
LIMJOCO vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
G.R. No. 30528. October 25, 1929

FACTS: The spouses Limjoco filed an application for registration of a land which was
opposed by the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry. After the parties have
adduced the evidence, the judge rendered judgment denying the application and
ordering the dismissal of this proceeding for insufficiency of evidence.
The spouses filed a motion for reconsideration and later on a motion for new
trial praying that the court will reopen the case for further evidence. The court
granted the motion for new trial and overruled the opposition by the Director of
Lands and Director of Forestry. The land in question was adjudicated in favor of the
spouses. The provincial fiscal of Pampanga, in behalf of the Director of Lands,
appealed from the judgment of the court to the Supreme Court contending that the
trial court erred: (a) In failing to hold that the applicants have not proved the
identity of the land they allege belongs to them and which they seek to register; (b)
in holding that the applicants have sufficient right to warrant the registration and
adjudication of the land described in their application in their favor; (c) in holding
that the applicants are entitled to the benefits of paragraph 4, section 54 of Chapter
VI, Act No. 926; and (d) in overruling the oppositions filed by the Director of Lands.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding the applicants sufficiently
entitled to the registration and adjudication of the land described in the application.

HELD: The Supreme Court gone over the record and find that the evidence supports
this conclusion of the trial court. The land in question is described in plan Exhibit A,
and represents the eastern part of the land described in Exhibit C, which we shall
discuss later on. The witnesses for the applicants identified the land in question, and
the difference in the western boundary is due to the fact that the application is
confined to the portion of land to the east of the Pamicatigan creek. The difference in
area between the land described as the second parcel in Exhibit C, containing some
800 hectares, and the land, the registration of Which is here sought, containing
about 400 hectares, is explained by the fact that the application for registration
refers only to the eastern portion which is approximately one-half of the land
described as the second parcel in the document Exhibit C.
Exhibit C is a public document, executed before the notary public, D. Pedro
Garcia Enrico, and noted in the book called "Libro de Anotaciones de Hipoteca de la
Ciudad de Manila," on December 10, 1886. By virtue of said deed, Isabel Gatbonton,
its maker, mortgaged eight parcels of land described therein. It must be noted that
the notary who authorized it states the following: "Which parcels of land are her
(Isabel Gatbonton's) exclusive property, as proved by her composition titles issued
by the 'Dirección General de Administración Civil' on the nineteenth of last July,
which, together with other documents dealing with said estates, consisting of
sixteen pages in all, were exhibited to me, and, upon being read and signed by me,
shall be attached to a copy hereof."
Failure to present the title of composition with the State cannot prejudice the
applicants' right, for, the loss of said document having been proved, its contents
could be proved by secondary evidence, or by the recital thereof made in some
authentic document, or by the recollection of a witness (sec. 321, Code of Civ. Proc.)
and in the instant case, the authentic document Exhibit C quite evidently contains a
recital of the contents of said title.

PEOPLE vs. ENOJAS

G.R. No. 204894. March 10, 2014

FACTS: Enojas et. al was charged with murder before the RTC of Las Piñas. During
the trial PO2 Gregorio testified that he and PO2 Pangilinan approached the taxi
which was suspiciously parked and asked the driver, Enojas, for his documents.
Having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they
asked him to come with them to the police station in their mobile car for further
questioning. Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi behind.
On reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang Road, PO2
Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached the store’s door,
he came upon two suspected robbers. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit
the other who still managed to escape, but someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing
his death.
PO2 Gregorio came around but the men were able to take a taxi and escape
and later realized that accused Enojas had fled.
Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in the
attempted robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone
that Enojas left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Cambi to monitor its incoming
messages.
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in
Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused.
They then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of Enojas
and his co-accused.
The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages
between Enojas and some of his co-accused.
The accused did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in the case, the
accused opted to instead file a trial memorandum for their defense. They pointed
out that they were entitled to an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and
since the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.
RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified by
evident premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms.
CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the conviction of the accused.
The CA, however, found the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution
failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime before committing it.
Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the text messages were inadmissible.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the text messages are admissible as
evidence. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in
conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic
Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3
Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other
accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages
sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
The SC modified the decision of CA and convicted Enojas et. al of a lesser
crime of homicide.

IBM Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 117221. April 13, 1999

FACTS: IBM Philippines, Inc. (IBM) is a domestic corporation engaged in the

business of selling computers and computer services. Israel was employed for
already 16 years in the company wherein he received numerous awards, and
represented the company in various seminars and conferences in and out of the
country. In 1990, he was assigned to the team supervised by Reyes, a ranking officer
of IBM during the period pertinent to this case. In 1991, Reyes handed a letter to
Israel informing him that his employment in the company was to be terminated on
the ground of habitual tardiness and absenteeism.
Israel then filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) alleging that his dismissal was without just cause
and due process since he was not given the opportunity to be heard and that he was
summarily dismissed from employment based on charges which had not been duly
proven.
Reyes denied his claim and alleged that It was alleged that Israel was
constantly told of his poor attendance record and inefficiency through the
company’s internal electronic mail (e-mail) system. According to petitioners, this
system allows paperless or “telematic” communication among IBM personnel in the
company offices here and abroad. An employee is assigned a “User ID” and the
corresponding password is provided by the employee himself and, theoretically,
known only to him. Employees are then expected to turn on their computers
everyday, “log in” to the system by keying in their respective IDs and passwords in
order to access and read the messages sent to and stored in the computer system.
To reply, an employee types in or encodes his message-response and sends the
same to the intended recipient, also via the computer system. The system
automatically records the time and date each message was sent and received,
including the identification of the sender and receiver thereof. All messages are
recorded and stored in computer disks.
Through these computer print-outs calling private respondent’s attention to
his alleged tardiness and absenteeism, petitioner sought to prove that private
respondent was sufficiently notified of the charges against him and was guilty
thereof because of his failure to deny the said charges.
The labor arbiter found Israel to have been terminated for cause and
accordingly dismissing the complaint. Prior to the release of the said decision, Israel
filed a “Manifestation And Motion To Admit Attached New Evidence For The
Complainant”. The evidence consisted of private respondent’s Daily Time Records
(DTRs) for the period June 1, 1990 to August 31, 1990 and pay slips for the period
January 1990 to June 1991 showing that he did not incur any unexcused absences,
that he was not late on any day within the period and that no deduction was made
from his salary on account of tardiness or absences.
Israel appealed to the NLRC which reversed the labor arbiter’s decision and
found private respondent’s dismissal illegal. The NLRC ruled: (1) that the computer
print-outs which petitioners presented in evidence to prove that private
respondent’s office attendance was poor were insufficient to show that the latter
was guilty of habitual absences and tardiness; and (2) that private respondent was
not heard in his defense before the issuance of the final notice of dismissal.
Petitioners moved for are consideration, but their motion was denied. Hence,
this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the print outs are inadmissible

2. Whether or not Israel’s dismissal was justified if the print outs are admissible

HELD:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that while it is true that administrative agencies,
such as the NLRC, are not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence in
the adjudication of cases that is why private respondent was allowed to submit
additional evidence even after the case was deemed submitted for resolution by the
labor arbiter.
The computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of petitioners,
afford no assurance of their authenticity because they are unsigned. The decisions of
this Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before
administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some proof of
authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of documents.
Not one of the 18 print-out copies submitted by petitioners was ever signed,
either by the sender or the receiver. There is thus no guarantee that the message
sent was the same message received. As the Solicitor General pointed out, the
messages were transmitted to and received not by private respondent himself but
his computer.
Neither were the print-outs certified or authenticated by any company
official who could properly attest that these came from IBM’s computer system or
that the data stored in the system were not and/or could not have been tampered
with before the same were printed out. It is noteworthy that the computer unit and
system in which the contents of the print-outs were stored were in the exclusive
possession and control of petitioners since after private respondent was served his
termination letter, he had no more access to his computer.

2. Even if the computer print-outs were admissible, they would not suffice to
show that private respondent’s dismissal was justified.
The burden of proving that the dismissal was for just cause is on petitioners.
They cannot simply rely on any admission by private respondent implied from his
failure to deny the alleged computer messages to him which he denied he had ever
received. On the other hand, private respondent’s additional evidence, consisting of
DTRs and pay slips, show that he did not incur unexcused absences or tardiness or
that he suffered deduction in pay on account of such absences or tardiness.
Indeed, petitioners could have easily proven their allegations by presenting
private respondent’s DTRs. Since these were in petitioners’ possession, their non-
production thereof raises the presumption that if presented they would be adverse
to petitioners. This is precisely what the best evidence rule guards against.
Furthermore, as already stated, the DTRs, showing private respondent’s good
attendance, were signed by petitioner Victor Reyes himself, and no good reason has
been shown why they cannot be relied upon in determining private respondent’s
attendance.

NUEZ vs. CRUZ-APAO

A.M. No. CA-05-18-P. April 12, 2005

FACTS: An administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct was filed
against Elvira Cruz-Apao, Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court
of the Fifteenth Division, Court of Appeals for allegedly soliciting One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of
the latter’s pending case in the CA entitled “PAGCOR vs. Zaldy Nuez.”
Nuez, as complainant, lodged a complaint initially with the Action Center of
the Television Program Imbestigador of GMA Network, the crew of which
accompanied him to the PAOCC_SPG in Malacanang where he filed a complaint for
extortion against Cruz-Apao.
Cruz-Apao was apprehended during an entrapment which prompted the
issuance of an Office Order which created an ad-hoc investigating committee. The
Committee was specifically tasked among others to conduct a thorough and
exhaustive investigation of respondent’s case and to recommend the proper
administrative sanctions against her as the evidence may warrant. It was found that
Nuez sought the assistance of Cruz-Apao learning of the latter’s employment with
the CA from her sister for the expeditious decision of his case. During their first
telephone conversation and thereafter through a series of messages they
exchanged via SMS, Cruz-Apao allegedly told complainant that a favorable and
speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the
decision was in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
Respondent’s evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and
sister as well as an acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and
complainant first met. Respondent’s own testimony consisted of bare denials and
self-serving claims that she did not remember either the statements she herself
made or the contents of the messages she sent. Respondent had a very selective
memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were propounded by the
Committee.
When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in
complainant’s cellphone and which reflected her cellphone number, respondent
admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not remember those
that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the text messages contained in Nuez’s cellphone is
admissible as evidence.

HELD:
Yes. Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
“Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . .” In this
case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had
personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent
herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone
from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may
have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she
and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between
her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt
as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or
lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text
messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter
asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of
the former’s pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted
by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:
“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text
messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is
not recorded or retained.”

VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS vs. SALUD

A.M. No. CA-05-20-P. September 9, 2005.

FACTS:
Salud, Clerk IV, Mailing Section of the Judicial Records Division, Court of
Appeals was charged with the following offenses: 1) inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of official duties; 2) conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service; and 3) directly or indirectly having financial and material
interest in an official transaction.
Justice Magtolis called Salud to her office. He denied extorting or receiving
money for the release of Lagus whose appeal from his conviction of homicide before
the RTC of Pasig was on appeal where bail was granted upon posting of a bond.
Nevertheless, Justice Magtolis filed a complaint against Salud. Then Salud was
subjected to an administrative and disciplinary action.
In his counter-affidavit, Salud vehemently denied the charges and alleged
that he never demanded money from Lagua’s relative; his name had been used by
someone and was, thus, a mere victim of the circumstances. Moreover, the fact that
he immediately released the CA order in question was clear proof that he had no
financial interest in the transaction.
Considering the gravity of charges, the matter was referred to Atty.
Longalong. The latter found Salud guilty as charged.
In Salud’s testimony, he admitted that he was the sender of the first three
text messages in Atty. Madarang’s cellphone: “bkit, C rhodora to”; “CNO
KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO”; and “SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI.”
However, Salud claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against
him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of the text messages as evidence against Salud
constitutes a violation of his right to privacy

HELD: No. Salud’s contention is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as
“ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.” Any question as to the
admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent
himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first
three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Nuez v. Cruz-Apao.
In that case, the Court finding the respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for a
million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in case pending before the Court.

ANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 182835. April 20, 2010

FACTS: Rustan Ang was charged before the RTC of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the
Anti-VAWC Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 for sending through the Short Messaging
Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, his
former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked
body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is
depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture (Exhibit “A”). The sender’s
cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers
that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he
took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit “B”).
Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the pictures to him and that
he only went to Lorentess because he will help her identify a prankster who was
sending her malicious text messages. Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife,
testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an
honest and spontaneous manner. Thus, the RTC found Rustan guilty.
On Appeal, the CA affirmed RTC’s decision and denied Ang’s motion for
reconsideration. Hence this review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ang is guilty of the violation of Anti-VAWC Act; Whether or
not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the
case.

HELD: Yes. Rustan’s objection to the admissibility of the obscene pictures is too late
and he is deemed to have already waived such ground for objection since he should
have objected at the time the pictures were offered as evidence.
Also, Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by
means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). The rules he cites do not apply to the present
criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-
judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. In conclusion, this Court finds
that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt.

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004

FACTS: Tan, then President of the co-petitioner Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained
four loans in 1977 from the Allied Banking Corporation (Allied) covered by four
promissory notes in the amounts of P100,000.00 each. In 1979, the total obligation
amounted to P493,566.61 which the petitioners failed to pay despite demands made
by Allied. Allied then filed a complaint seeking for the payment against Tan and
Lapu-Lapu Foundation.
LapuLapu Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from Allied since the
loans were obtained by Tan in his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit and
on the strength of the personal information he furnished Allied.
 On the other hand, Tan contented that there was an agreement between him
and Allied that the loans were automatically renewable (“rolled-over”) every year at
an amount including unpaid interests, until such time as Tan was able to pay the
same from the proceeds of his shares to the real estate firm. Furthermore, he alleged
that Allied’s employee required him to affix two signatures on every promissory
note, assuring him that the loan documents would be filled out in accordance with
their agreement. However, after he signed and delivered the loan documents to
Allied, these were filled out in a manner not in accord with their agreement, such
that the petitioner Foundation was included as party thereto. Moreover, he
contented that there was no demand on him.
The RTC ruled in favor of Allied and required Tan and LapuLapu to pay
jointly and solidarily the obligation. CA afiirmed the said decision applying the Parol
Evidence Rule.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in applying the Parol Evidence Rule

HELD: No. Tan’s contention is untenable. The promissory notes clearly showed upon
their faces that they are the obligation of the Foundation, as contracted by Tan “in
his official and personal capacity.” All the documentary evidence (application for
credit accommodation, the signature cards of the two accounts in the name of
petitioner Foundation, as well as New Current Account Record, all accompanying the
promissory notes) were signed by Tan for and in the name of the Foundation,
unequivocally and categorically establish that the loans were solidarily contracted
by the Foundation and Tan.
The parol evidence rule constrains this Court to reject Tan’s claim regarding
the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the
payment of the obligation Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that “when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to
be considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.”
The promissory notes are the law between the parties. These promissory
notes contained maturity dates as follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, April
11, 1978 and May 5, 1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid on these
dates is clear and explicit. Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be
renewed on a year-to-year basis or “rolled-over” annually until paid from the
proceeds of petitioner Tan’s shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly,
this purported unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the
terms and conditions in the promissory notes.
 Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol
evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve
the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or
mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.