Mimesis and Katharsis

Author(s): Leon Golden

Source: Classical Philology, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Jul., 1969), pp. 145-153
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/268156
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 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY
VOLUME LXIV, NUMBER 3
July 1969
MIMESIS AND KATHARSIS
LEON GOLDEN
HE long and as yet unresolved debate
T over the real meaning of Aristotle's
doctrine of catharsis continues vig-
orously today. If ultimate truth has not
yet been achieved, our understanding, at
least, of important aesthetic problems has
become sharper as we have debated the
merits and flaws of the various interpreta-
tions of Aristotle's enigmatic doctrine that
have been put forward.
The present paper is a resumption of an
argument presented in an earlier article in
which Aristotle's use of catharsis in the
Poetics was reinterpreted to mean "intel-
lectual clarification."' Subsequent to the
writing of that article I found that a ver-
sion of the intellectual interpretation of
Aristotelian catharsis had been made by a
German scholar, S. 0. Haupt, in a mono-
graph published in 1915.2 Haupt associated
some sound arguments with other rather
eccentric ones, and his work, virtually un-
known today, has had no effect on the
mainstream of criticism of the Poetics.
Also, in an article published in 1966,
H. D. F. Kitto, who does not mention and
1. L. Golden, "Catharsis," TAPA, XCIII (1962), 51-60.
2. S. 0. Haupt, Wirkt die Tragodie auf das Gemut oder den
Verstand oder die Moralitdt der Zuschauer? (Berlin, 1915).
Haupt attributes the origin of his own thoughts on this sub-
ject to a letter which he received from Professor Otto Immisch.
He writes: "Damals schrieb mir Herr Universitatsprofessor
Dr. Otto Immisch in Giessen unter dem 10. X. 1907: 'Bislang
glaube ich noch: 1. dass der Passus uber die Katharsis nur
infolge einer Polemik gegen Plato der Definition angehangt
ist: das Ipyov (die Wirkung) hat an sich, nach Aristoteles'
eigenen Satzen uber das Definieren im 6poT o6crIas nichts zu
suchen; 2. dass die Katharsis in Aristoteles' Sinn weder
145
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does not seem to be aware of my 1962
article, again suggested an intellectual in-
terpretation of catharsis.3 Other interpreta-
tions have dominated, without satisfying,
critical discussions of the issue. Since,
however, an intellectual interpretation of
catharsis has now appeared independently
at least three times in the literature on the
subject, a further attempt to validate this
interpretation of an important concept
seems amply justified.
We shall now review the arguments put
forward by Haupt, myself, and Kitto in
defense of an intellectual interpretation of
catharsis. Then we shall argue that certain
uses of the concept of mimesis by Plato and
Aristotle indicate a relationship between
the two terms and add further support to
the intellectual interpretation of catharsis.
In defense of the intellectual interpreta-
tion of catharsis, Haupt presented a num-
ber of arguments which, for the most part,
lack sufficient rigor to be persuasive. Thus
he argued that by adopting the intellectual
interpretation of catharsis all difficulties
with the use of this terimt-in the Poetics and
ethisch noch "hedonisch" noch therapeutisch ist, sondern
intellektualistich.' Ich habe mich lange gegen Immischs
Aufassung im 2. Punkt gestraubt, endlich aber die Richtigkeit
derselben eingesehen und nach langem Studium die Bedeutung
'Aufkldrung' als die einzig passende gefunden und mit dieser
haben sich alle Schwierigkeiten der Poetik, Rhetorik und
Politik, die bisnun jeder Erkldrung spotteten, in nichts auf-
gel6st, wie jeder unparteiische Leser im folgenden sehen
wird" (p. 18).
3. H. D. F. Kitto, "Catharsis," in The Classical Tradition,
ed. by L. Wallach (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966), pp. 133-47.
 146 LEON GOLDEN
in the other writings of Aristotle can be
explained away; that under this interpreta-
tion all plays, ancient and modern, trag-
edies and comedies, can be appropriately
classified; and that the Organon provides
evidence for this interpretation of catharsis.
Haupt also argued that while ethical,
aesthetic and intellectual responses may be
evoked in an audience by a work of art,
only the intellectual responses must be
evoked. Finally he saw that the etymolog-
ical relationship between katharsis and
katharos justified the translation of the
former term as "Aufklarung."4 It is only
this final argument that I find sufficiently
rigorous and persuasive to use in defense
of an intellectual interpretation of catharsis.
My own argument for translating cathar-
sis as "intellectual clarification" was based
principally on an analysis of the internal
structure of Aristotle's own argument in
the Poetics. I pointed out, as others have
done, that all elements of the definition of
tragedy except catharsis had been discussed
by Aristotle in the five chapters of the
Poetics that precede the formal definition
of tragedy. Since the position occupied by
catharsis in the definition of tragedy has
indicated to most scholars that it represents
the climax of the definition and, as such,
the final cause of tragedy, I suggested that
Aristotle would have been guilty of a very
exceptional and grave fault if he had failed
to give any indication of what such an
important term meant.
I argued further that we should attempt
to see if Aristotle gave any indication of
what he considered the goal or final cause
of tragedy to be in the text of the Poetics
outside of the definition of tragedy itself.
Analysis showed that Aristotle defined all
of the varieties of poetry as forms of
mimesis and that he indicates that the im-
portance of mimesis for man is that it
4. These positions are taken both in the monograph cited
in n. 2 and in Die Losung der Katharsis Theorie des Aristoteles
(Znaim, 191 1).
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involves a learning experience and that the
chief pleasure which man derives from
mimesis is the pleasure of learning. We
remember that learning for Aristotle in-
volves a movement from the particular to
the universal and that it reaches its climax
in an insight or inference. That poetry is a
learning experience in this sense is con-
firmed for us in chapter 9 of the Poetics,
where we are told that poetry is "more sig-
nificant" than history because it aims at the
universal while history is concerned with
the particular.
Aristotle tells us in chapter 14 of the
Poetics that we must not expect every
pleasure from tragedy but only that which
is appropriate to it. We know, however,
that the pleasure of poetry in general con-
sists of learning (i.e., of proceeding from
the particular to the universal) and so the
pleasure of tragedy must also consist of
learning. Now in chapters 6 and 14 of the
Poetics we are told that tragedy is con-
cerned with pleasure that is derived from
pity and fear. Since tragedy as a species of
poetry and thus of mimesis must involve
learning and since tragedy is specifically
associated with pity and fear, it is clear
that tragedy must involve learning about
pity and fear. Thus tragedy must involve
a learning process consisting of a move-
ment from the particular to the universal
in regard to pitiful and fearful situations
and leading to the clarifying insight or
inference which we associate with the
learning process. This, then, is the goal or
end of tragedy as it is defined by Aristotle
in the argument of the Poetics outside of
the formal definition of tragedy.
We have seen that catharsis represents
the goal or end of tragedy in the formal
definition of tragedy in chapter 6 of the
Poetics. We must then ask how catharsis
relates to the goal of tragedy which we
 "MIMEsIs" AND "KATHARSIS" 147
have just derived from our analysis of the
general argument of the Poetics. We see
that under the traditional interpretations
of catharsis there is no relationship be-
tween the goal set for tragedy in the formal
definition of tragedy and the goal set for it
in the general argument of the Poetics.
When we realize that words related in
root to katharsis, specifically the adverb
katharos, regularly carry an intellectual
sense, and when we note that LSJ con-
firms the use of katharsis in the sense of
"clarification" in Epicurus and Philodemus
we can see a way out of our difficulty. If
we interpret catharsis to mean "intellectual
clarification," we see that it conforms
exactly to the goal of learning and inferring
what each thing is which Aristotle set in
chapter 4 of the Poetics. Moreover, this
interpretation of catharsis brings the con-
cept into close articulation with the em-
phasis on the universality of poetry in
chapter 9 and the discussion of the partic-
ular pleasure of tragedy in chapter 14 of
the Poetics. Our argument then has been
that catharsis can legitimately bear the
nuance of "intellectual clarification" and
that when it is interpreted in this way it
articulates closely with the general argu-
ment of the Poetics in a way that is not
true of the standard renditions of the term
as "purgation" or "purification."
The last of the three intellectual inter-
pretations of catharsis that are known to
me is that of Kitto. I find two major argu-
ments used by Kitto to justify his interpre-
tation. First, he gives, as Haupt and I did,
an etymological justification for rendering
catharsis as an intellectual "clearing up."
Then he cites and analyzes, as I did, the
passage in chapter 4 of the Poetics where
the pleasure of learning involved in
mimesis is discussed and the passage in
chapter 9 where the universality of poetry
5. R. McKeon, "Literary Criticism and the Concept of
Imitation in Antiquity," in Critics and Criticism: Ancient
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is indicated. Kitto concludes that tragedy
involves the "pleasure of understanding
things better" (p. 145).
We may now assess the results of the
three attempts known to me to justify the
interpretation of catharsis as "intellectual
clarification." All three of the arguments
reviewed above agree on two points: (1)
that there is adequate etymological justifi-
cation for interpreting catharsis in an
intellectual sense and (2) that Aristotle's
discussion of mimesis as a learning process
is relevant to understanding the true nature
of catharsis. In my own initial study of this
problem I have called attention, in addition,
to what I consider an essential argument in
support of the intellectual interpretation
of catharsis. I have shown that when cathar-
sis is interpreted in this sense it becomes
an organic part of the general argument
of the Poetics, closely articulated with
what precedes and what succeeds it, and
thus that this interpretation fully justifies
Aristotle's specific statement that his defini-
tion of tragedy "has emerged from what
we have already said." It is my intention
in this paper to present additional justi-
fication for the intellectual interpretation
of catharsis by showing that both Plato
and Aristotle in certain contexts indicate a
view of the concept of mimesis that strongly
supports or requires the interpretation
of catharsis as "intellectual clarification."
As Richard McKeon has pointed out,5
Aristotle's concept of mimesis, if not of
catharsis, is quite clear, and we may
profitably begin with a discussion of it and
then proceed to a study of the Platonic
interpretation of this term. The analysis
of Aristotle's concept of mimesis which I
shall develop here has already been indi-
cated in the review that was given above
of my earlier article on Aristotelian
catharsis.
and Modern, ed. by R. S. Crane (Chicago, 1952), pp. 160-68.
 148 LEON GOLDEN
In chapter 4 of the Poetics Aristotle
gives a clear account of the nature of
mimesis and the reasons for its value and
importance for human beings. The follow-
ing major points are made by Aristotle at
1448b4-17: Human beings are the most
mimetic of all living things, and this
mimetic quality is what is responsible for
their first learning experiences. Aristotle
observes that these learning experiences
induced by mimesis continue throughout
our life and are responsible for the pleasure
we feel in seeing artistic representations of
objects which in real life would cause us
pain. Aristotle clearly identifies the pleas-
ure associated with artistic representations
as the pleasure of learning. Moreover, he
asserts that the pleasure of learning be-
longs to all men and not only to the phi-
losophers who have the greatest share in it.
All individual art forms will use specific
techniques and methods for achieving the
purpose of mimesis, and 0. B. Hardison
has now given us a clear and detailed
account of the separate stages involved in
tragic mimesis.6 All art forms, however, in
that they belong to the general category
of mimesis are essentially learning experi-
ences whose climax or goal is an insight or
inference from the individual artistic repre-
sentation to a universal truth. This is the
important role which Aristotle sees for art
in human life, the role of deepening our
understanding about and insight into the
aspects of human existence that are por-
trayed in the artistic mimesis. In this pas-
sage Aristotle has made fully explicit his
view of the intellectual character and
intellectual goal of mimesis. This is a
point which we have used to defend our
intellectual interpretation of catharsis, and
6. L. Golden and 0. B. Hardison, Aristotle's "Poetics":
A Translation and Commentary for Students of Literature
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968), pp. 284-89.
7. R. McKeon, op. cit. (n. 5), makes the following point
about Plato's use of the term mimesis: "In its expansion and
contraction, the word 'imitation' indicates the lesser term of
the proportion of being to appearance: if God is, the universe
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it is a point to which we shall return after
our discussion of Platonic mimesis.
Plato's view of mimesis is generally
regarded to be a very negative one. There
is good evidence for this point of view in
Book 10 of the Republic and in other pas-
sages in Plato where imitative artists and
their works are attacked. There is, however,
an affirmative side to Plato's attitude to-
ward mimesis which we will investigate
now as it is highly relevant to the thesis
that is being argued in this paper.
In dealing with Plato's view of mimesis
we have, as McKeon points out, a task of
interpretation much more difficult than in
the case of Aristotle since Plato uses mime-
sis in a number of varying senses through-
out his work.7 Although Plato's negative
attitudes toward mimesis are well known
and frequently commented on, several
scholars, McKeon and Verdenius among
them, have perceptively criticized this
situation and have shown that Plato's
concept of mimesis is much more extensive
and complex than that which is presented,
for example, in Book 10 of the Republic. In
the discussion which follows I propose to
examine evidence for a positive attitude
toward mimesis on Plato's part. We shall
then undertake a comparison between the
Aristotelian and Platonic positions on
mimesis in order to see if any area of agree-
ment appears between them.
Of essential importance in understand-
ing Plato's attitude toward mimesis is the
recognition of the copy-model structure
which pervades the universe of existing
things for him. We will cite below a few
representative passages which illustrate
this concept in Plato. In the Statesman
(293E) we are told that there is one state
is an imitation; if all things are, shadows and reflections are
imitations; if the products of man's handicraft are, his
representations of them are imitations. If imitation is to be
avoided, it is because of the danger of imitating, through error,
ignorance, or falsehood, that which is not or that which is
less than it might be or is less than that which imitates it"
(p. 154).
 "MIMESIS" AND "KATHARSIS" 149
that is truly governed by wisdom and
justice and that we must speak of all other
states as imitating this one. Well-governed
states will be said to imitate the one truly
good state in a better way and other states
in a worse way. At 297C it is affirmed
again that there is one truly just state of
which all others are better or worse imita-
tions. At 300C we are told that laws written
by men who have as much knowledge as it
is humanly possible to have are imitations
of the truth, and at 300E we are told that
if men imitate without knowledge then
they must imitate badly but if they imitate
with knowledge then they transcend imita-
tion and arrive at the truth itself.
In the passages cited from the Statesman
we see that a model state has been posited
of which all existing states are more or less
imperfect copies. It is clearly indicated
that the close imitation of the model
results in the achievement of well-governed
states by human beings.
In the Timaeus we have further clear
evidence of Plato's concept of the copy-
model structure of the universe. At 49A
we have a description of the universe as
consisting of a model which is intelligible
and unchanging and a copy of this model
which is visible and subject to change. The
point is stated again at 50C where the
forms of changeable things are described
as copies of the always existing forms. At
28B-29D there is a very clear statement of
this situation. The visible universe is seen
as a copy of an eternally existing universe,
and we are warned that our approach to
ultimate reality is limited by the conditions
of human existence. Here we see that al-
though apprehension of ultimate reality is
our goal, the limitations of human exist-
ence regularly force us to deal with
imitations of this reality. As we shall see
later, however, the proper method of deal-
ing with these imitations can lead us to-
8. Op. cit. (n. 5), p. 156.
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ward an understanding of ultimate reality.
At 28A-B the model-copy concept of the
universe is further discussed, and it is
stated that when one uses the unchanging,
intelligible universe as a model the result-
ing copy is beautiful, but when one uses
a changeable, created object the resulting
copy is not beautiful. Thus in the Timaeus
a clear statement is made that the entire
sensible world of change in which we live
is a copy of an unchanging, intelligible one
which can only be apprehended by reason.
We will cite our last example of Plato's
copy-model concept of the universe from
the Phaedrus 250B. Here we are informed
that the unchanging always existing ideas
have images of themselves which strike the
senses of human beings and which should
remind them of the ideas themselves.
The evidence which we have cited suffices
to show that the Platonic universe is con-
structed on a copy-model basis. Our sen-
sible, changing world of becoming imitates
an unchanging, intelligible world that is al-
ways existent. We must now attempt to
determine what the significance is of the im-
itations of the eternally existing forms. Here
McKeon gives us succinct and perceptive
help: "Images and copies, however, as the
metaphor would suggest, provide no satis-
factory substitute for reality, though they
are a necessary stage in the approach to
reality. To understand the image we must
know the reality; but to know the reality
we must dispose of images."8 For Plato
our ultimate goal is the apprehension of
reality, and in the pursuit of this goal
mimesis, as McKeon points out, has an
important role to play. In the Republic
516A-B we find supporting evidence for
McKeon's position. Here an analogy is
drawn between the sense experiences of men
dwelling in a cave and the intellectual ex-
periences of those who pass from opinion to
knowledge. Plato indicates that the passage
 150 LEON GOLDEN
from opinion to
one and can be accomplished only in stages
in which the various degrees of imitation of
reality must be traversed before reality
itself can be contemplated. The important
purpose has, therefore, been attributed to
mimesis of providing the necessary pre-
liminary steps in the intellectual process
that leads to the apprehension of reality
itself.
The copy-model conception of the uni-
verse thus has the important consequence
of awarding a significant status to mimesis
as a means for clarifying and apprehending
reality itself. For Plato we must be ex-
tremely careful never to confuse reality
with mimesis, and we may, perhaps, under-
stand Plato's well-known negative judg-
ments on imitations and imitators as a
warning not to commit this serious error.
Thus Plato points out at Republic 600E
that artists are imitators of images of
goodness, not goodness itself, and he
points out at 596E-598B that the painter
imitates the appearance, not the reality, of
things; and it is for this reason, too, that
he indicates at Republic 599A-B the creator
of real goodness, truth, and beauty is better character of good and bad men and thus
than the imitator of them. In all of these
cases and other similar ones where Plato
attacks artistic mimesis he is reminding us
of the all-important distinction between
reality and mimesis and asserting the pri-
ority of reality. Nevertheless, we have seen
that when this distinction is properly
safeguarded mimesis has a legitimate and
significant role to play in the process of
apprehending reality.
Our argument has led us at this point
to a crucial problem since we must now
determine the conditions that permit
mimesis to play this important role in
process of achieving knowledge of reality
itself. We shall cite a series of passages be-
low which provide evidence justifying this
relationship between mimesis and reality.
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knowledge is
In the Cratylus (423C-424B) a told
we are very
that names are imitations of the essential
nature of things and at 426C-427D we are
told that letters possess the capacity of
representing real qualities of the things of
which they are names. Plato justifies this
phenomenon by indicating that individual
letters are similar to, and therefore appro-
priate images of, various qualities of things
themselves. At 431C-D he explicitly states
that the difference between a good and bad
name is that the good name by revealing
the essence of the thing named is a good
image of it while a bad name is a bad image
of it. Since a name is an imitation of the
thing named, it is clear that a good name,
by containing within it appropriate letters,
is able to reveal the essential nature of the
thing itself. This point is made again in the
Laws (668A-B) where we are told that
the goal of an imitation is to be similar to
its original and not to be pleasant as many
think. Clearly the imitation, in virtue of its
similarity to its model, permits us to learn
from it about the model itself. This point
is again made at 798D-E where we are told
that rhythm and music are imitations of the
offer us an opportunity for understanding
such character.
We have seen that Plato states that good
imitations are images that closely represent
their models, and we have seen that this
situation permits us to learn about reality
itself from good imitations. An important,
related point is made in the Sophist (267B)
where we are told that some imitators have
knowledge of what they imitate while
others do not. Clearly, imitations accom-
plished by imitators who have knowledge
of their subject will be able -to illuminate
the reality of which they are imitations.
the
Since good imitations accomplished by
imitators who have knowledge can clarify
the nature of reality itself they are used by
Plato throughout his work as a means
 "MIMEsIs" AND "KATHARSIS" 151

of teaching about reality. The examples of constructed on a copy-model basis. We

this use of imitation are too numerous to have further been told that those copies
discuss here but we shall cite some repre- that have been constructed by men who
sentative examples. In the Sophist (218D, have knowledge will bear a similarity to
221B-C) the Stranger uses the image of their original models. From Plato's own
angling to clarify the essential nature of the
usage we see that copies so constructed can
sophist. In the Symposium (21 5A) Alci- be used for learning and teaching about
biades uses the Silenus and satyr figures to reality itself. We conclude from the evi-
clarify the inner nature of Socrates. In the dence cited above and from the mimetic
Theaetetus (1 50A) the image of the mid- quality of the dialogues themselves that
wife is invoked to illuminate Socrates' Plato gave his approval to a correct form
procedure as a teacher and philosopher. of mimesis whose goal is to bring us to
Throughout Plato's work many additional knowledge of reality itself.
examples can be found of this capacity of We must now proceed to a comparison
mimesis to represent reality. between the Aristotelian and the Platonic
Beyond the individual uses of images concepts of mimesis. We saw that Aristotle
which we have mentioned above, there are explicitly defined mimesis as a learning
two larger uses of mimesis by Plato which we
process which culminated in the pleasure
should now cite. In the Critias (107B-D) derived from a learning experience. We
we are told that in discussing divine matters have now cited evidence to show that im-
we must use imitations and representations portant aspects of Plato's concept of
of them since we do not possess scientific mimesis are also concerned with appre-
knowledge of them. We know that in a hending and clarifying ultimate reality and
number of important places where Plato so bear a significant resemblance to Aris-
wishes to express his deepest and most pro- totle's concept of mimesis. In a work of
found thought he has recourse to myth for great perception and importance Verdenius
this purpose. The myth is a representation has emphasized this aspect of Platonic
of a truth or insight that cannot be demon- mimesis and I should like now to quote his
strated scientifically and in a number of conclusions as a confirmation of the argu-
instances provides us with our only means ment presented above:
of dealing with this truth. Finally, we may
This is sufficient proof that Platonic imitation
note, as Aristotle observed, that the
is bound up with the idea of approximation
Platonic dialogues themselves are a form and does not mean a true copy. Plato himself
of mimesis.9 Students of Plato's work have has warned us against this interpretation:
long found profound philosophical and "The image must not by any means reproduce
psychological truths and insights in it and all the qualities of that which it imitates, if
so we may credit Plato with having pro- it is to be an image." "Do you not perceive
vided us with a prime example of mimesis how far images are from possessing the same
that has been constructed with knowledge qualities as the originals which they imitate?
and which, by possessing a bond of Yes, I do" (Crat. 432 bd). In other words
imitation can never be more than suggestion
similarity with its model, can help us under-
or evocation.... for Platonic transcendence
stand and learn about reality itself.
is mitigated by the idea of exemplariness. The
We are now in a position to summarize
Demiurge "being devoid of envy desired that
the Platonic attitude toward mimesis. We
all should be, so far as possible, like unto
have seen that for Plato the universe is Himself" (Tim. 29e). So a gradually fading
9. Poetics 1447b5.

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 152 LEON GOLDEN
sheen of eternal radiance may be said to
pervade all stages of reality. Accordingly,
art is not confined to the limits of its visual
models. True art does not lapse into flat
realism, but it strives to transcend the material
world; in its poor images it tries to evocate
something of that higher realm of being
which also glimmers through phenomenal
reality.... Art, therefore, has a double aspect:
in its visible manifestation it is a thing of the
most inferior value, a shadow; yet it has an
indirect relation to the essential nature of
things. The intensity of this relation depends
upon the degree to which the artist succeeds
in illuminating the higher aspects of the inter-
mediate plane, viz. of visual reality. Thus
imitation, when viewed in the light of a
hierarchical conception of reality, may con-
stitute a reconciliation of realism and idealism
in art.10
We therefore conclude that for both
Plato and Aristotle artistic mimesis, when
pursued properly, is an important learning
experience which reaches its climax in an
insight into aspects of reality itself.
In an earlier paper, which has been cited
previously, I have argued that for Aristotle
this insight is represented by the famed but
vexed concept of catharsis. Under this
interpretation catharsis, rendered as "in-
tellectual clarification," is seen as the
normal climax or end product of the pro-
cess of imitation. If mimesis is understood
in a similar way by both Plato and Aris-
totle then we should expect that katharsis,
if it is indeed related to mimesis, should
also be understood by them in a similar
way. I have already discussed the reasons
for interpreting catharsis in Aristotle's
Poetics as "intellectual clarification," and
I now wish to cite some important evidence
from the Phaedo that indicates that Plato
10. W. J. Verdenius, Mimesis: Plato's Doctrine of Artistic
Imitation and Its Meaning to Us (Leyden, 1962), pp. 17, 18, 19.
11. Haupt, op. cit. (n. 2), indicates that he originally
interpreted katharsis in the Phaedo as "Aufklarung" but later
reversed his judgment on the matter (p. 73, n. 102). H. Otte,
Neue Beitrage zur Aristotelischen Begriffsbestimmung der
Tragddie (Berlin, 1928), p. 65, writes: "Wie bei dieser Sachiage
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also had a concept of katharsis that in-
volved the idea of intellectual clarification.
The passage which is of fundamental
importance here is Phaedo 67C-D where
katharsis is used to describe the process of
separation of the soul from the body which
is the lifelong goal of philosophers and
which is perfectly achieved only at death.
This separation or "purification" of the
soul from the body is important to the
philosopher because the body continually
interferes with the soul's drive to contem-
plate reality itself. In this passage, then,
katharsis is the process of separation of
soul from body which has as its essential
goal the apprehension of true reality. We
are further informed here that katharsis is
a source of joy and pleasure to the
philosopher because it serves as the climax
of his lifelong striving for real knowledge.
I think that it is clear that Plato's use of
katharsis here bears a strong relationship
to Aristotle's use of katharsis in the Poetics
when that term is rendered as "intellectual
clarification." In the Phaedo the moment
of katharsis is the moment of a sublimely
pleasant apprehension of reality just as in
the Poetics (under the arguments given
above) it is a pleasurable learning experi-
ence in which insights and inferences are
achieved about aspects of reality. In the
passage cited from the Phaedo, katharsis
represents the ultimate clarification of
reality which could only be partially clari-
fied by the imitative process as long as soul
and body were linked together; in the
Poetics, katharsis, we argue, represents the
more common and regular learning ex-
perience that climaxes every mimetic pro-
cess, but the two uses are obviously very
closely related.1"
Bywater und P. Cauer zu der Behauptung kommen konnten,
das Aristotelische Tvv TCV TOLO&rwV ITaO-q4Ti-Wv KcOapawL sei
eine unbewusste Reminiszenz an Plato Phaedon 69 b ist mir
unverstandlich; denn wie man auch 'die Reinigung derartiger
7raO7/,Ua1-a' fassen moge, von einer Trennung der Seele vom
Leibe ist doch hier keine Spur." I have argued that the
acceptance of an intellectual interpretation of katharsis
 "MIMESIS" AND "KATHARSIS" 153

We have now concluded our argument consideration of the suggested possibility

that for both Plato and Aristotle mimesis is that mimesis and katharsis are closely
a learning process which reaches its natural related concepts with all of the richly
climax in katharsis, a state of intellectual provocative implications that such a judg-
clarification. We believe that the evidence ment has for the most vexed of all questions
that has been cited, the inferences that have in the history of aesthetic theory.
been drawn, and the views of other scholars
that have been quoted justify further serious FLORIDA STATE UNiVERSrrY

would firmly establish the relationship between the use of

this term in the Poetics and in the Phaedo which Bywater,
Cauer, and Haupt, at one time in his career, observed.

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