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LABOR CASES
1. MISAMIS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE (MORESCO II), v. VIRGILIO M. CAGALAWAN
(G.R. NO. 175170 - September 5, 2012)
FACTS:
Petitioner MORESCO II, a rural electric cooperative, hired respondent Cagalawan as a Disconnection Lineman on a probationary basis.
On March 1, 1994 Cagalawan was appointed to the same post this time on a permanent basis. In a Memorandum, MORESCO II General
Manager Amado B. Ke-e transferred Cagalawan to Area I sub-office in Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental (Gingoog sub-office) as a
member of the disconnection crew. Said memorandum stated that the transfer was done "in the exigency of the service."

In a letter dated May 15, 2002, Cagalawan assailed his transfer claiming he was effectively demoted from his position as head of the
disconnection crew to a mere member thereof. He also averred that his transfer to the Gingoog sub-office is inconvenient and prejudicial
to him as it would entail additional travel expenses to and from work. He likewise sought clarification on what kind of exigency exists as
to justify his transfer and why he was the one chosen to be transferred.

In a Memorandum dated May 16, 2002, Ke-e explained that Cagalawan s transfer was not a demotion since he was holding the position of
Disconnection Head only by mere designation and not by appointment. Ke-e did not, however, state the basis of the transfer but instead
advised Cagalawan to just comply with the order and not to question management s legitimate prerogative to reassign him.
Cagalawan eventually stopped reporting for work. On July 1, 2002, he filed a Complaint for constructive dismissal before the Arbitration
branch of the NLRC against MORESCO II and its officers

In the Arbitration proceedings, the Labor Arbiter directed the parties to submit their respective verified position papers, only Cagalawan
complied. He alleged that his transfer was unnecessary and was made only in retaliation for his having executed an affidavit in favor of a
co-worker and against MORESCO II. Cagalawan further alleged that his transfer from Balingasag to Gingoog sub-office was tantamount
to illegal constructive dismissal for being prejudicial and inconvenient as he had to spend an additional amount of leaving him nothing of
his salary. On September 30, 2003, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring that Cagalawan s transfer constituted illegal
constructive dismissal.
In its Memorandum on Appeal, In its Memorandum on Appeal, MORESCO II invoked the liberal application of the rules and prayed for
the NLRC to admit its evidence on appeal.

The NLRC, through a Resolution set aside and vacated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed Cagalawan’s complaint against
MORESCO II. The NLRC admitted MORESCO II s evidence even if submitted only on appeal in the interest of substantial justice. It then
found said evidence credible in showing that Cagalawans transfer to Gingoog sub-office was required in the exigency of the cooperative’s
business interest. It also ruled that the transfer did not entail a demotion in rank and diminution of pay as to constitute constructive
dismissal and thus upheld the right of MORESCO II to transfer Cagalawan in the exercise of its sound business judgment.

Cagalawan thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. In a Decision35 dated July 26, 2005, the CA found the NLRC to have gravely
abused its discretion in admitting MORESCO II s evidence, citing Section 3, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure36ςrνll which
prohibits the parties from making new allegations or cause of action not included in the complaint or position paper, affidavits and other
documents. MORESCO’s belated submission of evidence despite the opportunities given it cannot be countenanced as such practice
"defeats speedy administration of justice" and "smacks of unfairness."
MORESCO II filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that it may present evidence for the first time on appeal as the NLRC is not
precluded from admitting the same because technical rules are not binding in labor cases.

ISSUE:
(1)Whether or not the evidence presented by Moresco first time on appeal should be given consideration?
(2) Whether or not Cagalawan is entitled to moral and exemplary damage on account of Moresco’s bad faith in effecting his transfer?

RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
NO. MORESCO’s belated submission of evidence cannot be permitted. Labor tribunals, such as the NLRC, are not precluded from
receiving evidence submitted on appeal as technical rules are not binding in cases submitted before them. However, any delay in the
submission of evidence should be adequately explained and should adequately prove the allegations sought to be proven.

In the present case, MORESCO II did not cite any reason why it had failed to file its position paper or present its cause before the Labor
Arbiter despite sufficient notice and time given to do so. Only after an adverse decision was rendered did it present its defense and rebut
the evidence of Cagalawan by alleging that his transfer was made in response to the letter-request of the area manager of the Gingoog sub-
office asking for additional personnel to meet its collection quota. To the Court’s mind, however, the belated submission of the said letter-
request without any valid explanation casts doubt on its credibility, specially so when the same is not a newly discovered evidence.
The rule is that it is within the ambit of the employer‘s prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and according to the
requirement of its business, provided that the transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits and other
privileges. Here, while we find that the transfer of Cagalawan neither entails any demotion in rank since he did not have tenurial security
over the position of head of the disconnection crew, nor result to diminution in pay as this was not sufficiently proven by him, MORESCO
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II s evidence is nevertheless not enough to show that said transfer was required by the exigency of the electric cooperative’s business
interest.
When there is doubt between the evidence submitted by the employer and that submitted by the employee, the scales of justice must be
tilted in favor of the employee. This is consistent with the rule that an employer s cause could only succeed on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the employee s evidence. Thus, MORESCO II cannot rely on the weakness of Ortiz s certification in
order to give more credit to its own evidence. Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are not sufficient where the quantum of
evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence, described as more than a mere scintilla.49ςrνll "The evidence must be real
and substantial, and not merely apparent

SECOND ISSUE:
NO. "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." Here,
although the Court do not agree with the Labor Arbiter that Ke-e acted in an arbitrary manner in effecting Cagalawan’s transfer, the same,
absent any showing of some dishonest or wrongful purpose, does not amount to bad faith.

2. FIL-PRIDE SIDPPING COMPANY, INC., vs. EDGAR A. BALASTA,

G.R. No. 193047, March 3, 2014

FACTS:
Respondent Edgar A. Balasta was hired by petitioner Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc. (Fil-Pride) for its foreign principal, petitioner
Ocean Eagle Ship Management Company, PTE. Ltd. (Ocean Eagle). Respondent was assigned as Able Seaman onboard M/V Eagle
Pioneer. While aboard M/V Eagle Pioneer, respondent experienced chest pains, fatigue, and shortness of breath. He was examined by a
physician in Gangyou Hospital in Tianjin, China, and was diagnosed as having myocardial ischemia and coronary heart disease. He was
declared unfit for duty and was recommended for repatriation. Respondent was thus repatriated on September 18, 2005 and was
immediately referred to the company-designated physician, Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz In Dr. Cruz’s medical report, respondent was
diagnosed with hypertension and myocardial ischemia.

Respondent consulted and was examined by an independent physician, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, who issued a medical certificate stating that
Balasta is now unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity and that his illness is considered work aggravated/related.
Respondent filed a claim for permanent disability benefits with petitioners, but the latter denied the same. On February 10, 2006,
respondent filed against the petitioners a Complaint for the recovery of disability benefits, illness allowance, reimbursement of medical
expenses, damages and attorney’s fees.
FIL PRIDE SHIPPING stated and argued in their Position Paper and Reply that respondent filed a labor complaint even before the
company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz, could complete his examination and treatment of respondent’s condition, which thus prompted
them to deny his claim for disability benefits; that the independent physician Dr. Vicaldo examined respondent only once on February 16,
2006, and thus could not have arrived at a competent diagnosis of respondent’s condition; that in the absence of a competent diagnosis and
substantial evidence, respondent’s claim for benefits cannot stand; that respondent’s illness is not work-related, and that his lifestyle
caused, or was a contributing factor to, his illness; that contrary to respondent’s claim, the latter has been paid his illness allowance in full;
that respondent’s medical expenses are being shouldered by them; and that respondent is not entitled to damages and attorney’s fees as a
result of prematurely filing the labor case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Balastas’ is entilted for permanent disability benefits

RULING: YES. It has been the Court’s consistent ruling that in disability compensation, "it is not the injury which is compensated, but
rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity."

The company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability within the
period of 120 or 240 days, pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code and Rule X, Section 2 of the AREC.36 If he fails to do so and
the seafarer’s medical condition remains unresolved, the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. On the other hand, an
employee's disability becomes permanent and total even before the lapse of the statutory 240-day treatment period, when it becomes
evident that the employee's disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period because, for
instance, he underwent surgery and it evidently appears that he could not recover therefrom within the statutory period. Respondent was
repatriated on September 18, 2005. He was further examined by the company-designated physician Dr. Cruz on September 21, 23 and 30,
2005; October 6, 2005; February 2, 13 and 17, 2006; March 6 and 20, 2006; and on April 19, 2006. And beginning from the February 2,
2006 medical report, respondent was diagnosed by Dr. Cruz with severe 3-vessel coronary artery disease, and was scheduled for coronary
artery bypass surgery on February 24, 2006. After surgery, respondent continued his treatment with Dr. Cruz, who on the other hand
continued to diagnose respondent with severe coronary artery disease even on respondent’s last consultation on April 19, 2006.
Concededly, the period September 18, 2005 to April 19, 2006 is less than the statutory 240-day – or 8-month – period. With Dr. Cruz’s
failure to issue a definite assessment of respondent’s condition on May 19, 2006, or the last day of the statutory 240-day period,
respondent was thus deemed totally and permanently disabled pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code and Rule X, Section 2 of
the AREC.
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3. DOMINADOR MALABUNGA vs. CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION (G.R. No. 198515 , June 15, 2015)

FACTS:

Respondent Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation is a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing steel
products. It hired petitioner Dominador Malabunga, Jr. as one of its machinists. On July 24, 2004, respondent served a written Notice
upon petitioner, charging the latter with theft of the aluminum level issued to its Fabrication Unit and requiring him to submit a written
explanation. Respondent claimed that petitioner stole the aluminum level issued to the Fabrication Unit and returned the same to cover up
the loss of the one issued to him.

On December 2, 2004, respondent issued its Decision21 suspending petitioner for a period of 30 days and requiring him to return the
value of the lost aluminum level, or ₱280.00, through salary deductions. The decision stated that petitioner was charged with theft of the
Fabrication Unit’s aluminum level. Thus, petitioner was suspended without pay. Thereafter, he returned to work.

On March 2, 2005, petitioner filed a Complaint for illegal suspension before the NLRC. In his Position Paper, petitioner argued that he
should not be blamed for the alleged loss of the Fabrication Unit’s aluminum level and that respondent’s warehousemen were to blame for
their failure to maintain a system that would clearly indicate the identity of borrowed tools and items from the warehouse; that in order to
conceal their negligence and lack of a system of checking and verifying tools and items in the warehouse, the warehousemen instead
passed the blame on to petitioner; that if he was being charged with the alleged theft of the Fabrication Unit’s aluminum level – which
was recovered anyway – then he should not have been suspended and made to pay for the value of the recovered item. . Thus, petitioner
prayed that his suspension without pay from January 10, 2005 up to February 13, 2005 be declared illegal and that respondent be made to
pay his salary during the period, based on his daily rate of ₱357.85.
In its Position Paper, respondent claimed that petitioner’s suspension was valid; that based on the written statements of the employees and
other evidence, petitioner was found guilty of theft of company property, for returning an aluminum level .
The CA ruled in favor of CATHAY and stated that there was reasonable ground to believe that petitioner was responsible for the theft of
the aluminum level assigned to the respondent’s Fabrication Unit.

In its Comment, petitioner maintains that respondent raises issues of fact which are beyond the purview of a petition for review on
certiorari; that what petitioner seeks is a review of the whole evidence and the credibility of the witnesses against him, which are clearly
issues of fact and not law; that there is no reason to disturb the CA Decision since there is nothing wrong therewith, and a finding of grave
abuse of discretion against the NLRC was justified; and that substantial evidence exists to warrant a finding that petitioner is guilty of
theft.

ISSUES: (1)Whether or not the Court may entertain issues of fact raised by respondent?
(2) Whether or not respondent was validly dismissed for theft?

RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: YES.

In labor cases, issues of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve, as this Court is not a trier of facts. However, in exceptional
cases, this Court may be urged to resolve factual issues: "[1] where there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the
findings of the tribunal or the court below; or[2] when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete
facts submitted by the parties[;] or, [3] where the [Labor Arbiter] and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions.42 "When
there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the labor tribunals and the CA, there is a need to refer to the record."43

The instant Petition presents not only a situation where the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA differ in their assessment of
petitioner’s case, but also one where the evidence miserably fails to support a finding that petitioner committed theft. The Labor
Arbiter and the CA – and the NLRC as well – ignored one material piece of evidence which should have exonerated petitioner
from the theft charge.

SECOND ISSUE: NO.

Even if it were to be assumed for the sake of argument that what petitioner returned was indeed the Fabrication Unit’s aluminum level,
still there could be no valid basis to charge him with theft. As respondent and its witnesses themselves admitted, there was no official
report of loss of the Fabrication Unit’s aluminum level; the workers at said unit concealed the loss, and declared it so and admitted it only
when Tercero supposedly discovered that what he had borrowed was the very same aluminum level which was purportedly missing since.
In other words, the aluminum level was declared lost at the same time it was found, in which case– using common sense and logic – there
could be no loss at all. As far as respondent is concerned, the Fabrication Unit’s aluminum level was never lost. More to the point, we
cannot rely on the statements of the Fabrication Unit workers Mangahas, Tercero, and Nagales; their failure to report the loss of their
unit’s aluminum level makes their statements not only highly doubtful and self-serving, but unnecessary and uncalled for – an
afterthought not worth considering. Faced with the limitations in respondent’s system, (poor system of recording, monitoring and
accountability within its warehouse) Faced with the limitations in respondent’s system, this Court cannot sustain its view that petitioner is
guilty of theft of company property. It could simply be that due to the ineffective system within the warehouse and its inefficient
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personnel, there was a mix-up of records; worse, it could be that tools and items within the warehouse were misplaced or lost due to its
irresponsible personnel. If any, respondent is alone responsible; it cannot conveniently put the blame on its employees in order to make up
for or cover its losses caused by its own disorganized system and inept personnel.

From the foregoing, there are serious doubts in the evidence on record as to the factual basis of the charges against petitioner. These
doubts shall be resolved in (his) favor in line with the policy under the Labor Code to afford protection to labor and construe doubts in
favor of labor. The consistent rule is that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of
justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.

4. ISLAND OVERSEAS TRANSPORT CORPORATION/PINE CREST SHIPPING CORPORATION/CAPT. EMMANUEL L.

REGIO, v. ARMANDO M. BEJA, G.R. No. 203115, December 07, 2015

FACTS:
Beja was hired as Second Assistant Engineer for a vessel of petitioner Pine Crest Corporation. While at sea, Beja experienced pain and
swelling of his right knee, which he immediately reported to the Master of the vessel. He was brought to a hospital in Italy and was
diagnosed to have Arthrosynovitis. He underwent arthrocentesis of the right knee, was referred to an orthopedic surgeon and was advised
to take a rest. However, while in Spain, the pain in his right knee recurred and persisted. He was brought to a physician on and was
advised to be medically repatriated.
Meantime, while undergoing therapy, Beja filed a complaint against petitioners for permanent total disability benefits, medical expenses,
sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Beja alleged that his knee injury resulted from an accident he
sustained on board the vessel when a drainage pipe fell on his knee. He claimed that from the time of his repatriation on, his knee has not
recovered which rendered him incapable of returning to his customary work as seafarer.
In its Decision, the Labor Arbiter awarded Beja maximum disability benefits under the CBA. The Labor Arbiter did not give credence to
the assessment given by Dr. Cruz as it was issued after the lapse of 120 days which, by operation of law, transformed Beja's disability to
total and permanent. Moreover, despite continued physical therapy, Beja’s condition did not improve even beyond the 240-day maximum
medical treatment period.
On appeal, petitioners attributed error in the Labor Arbiter in granting Beja the maximum disability benefits under the CBA. Petitioners
argued that since Dr. Cruz made an assessment on May 26, 2008 or before the lapse of the maximum 240-day treatment period from the
date of Beja's repatriation, there was no factual basis in ruling that Beja is entitled to full disability benefits. They cited Vergara v.
Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.,20 where it was pronounced that only after the lapse of 240 days of continuous medical treatment
without any assessment given by the company doctor that a medically repatriated seafarer could be adjudged as permanently and totally
disabled.

ISSUE: Whether or not Beja is entitled to permanent disability benefits?

RULING: YES. Beja is entitled to a total and permanent disability compensation.

Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that:

Art. 192. Permanent total disability.

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules;
The Rule referred to in this Labor Code provision is Section 2, Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation (AREC)
implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, which states:
Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement — (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or
sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance
beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid.
However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as
may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.

Section 20 B (3) of the POEA-SEC, meanwhile provides that:

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he
is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall
this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

In Vergara,38 this Court has ruled that the aforequoted provisions should be read in harmony with each other, thus: (a) the 120 days
provided under Section 20 B(3) of the POEA-SEC is the period given to the employer to determine fitness to work and when the seafarer
is deemed to be in a state of total and temporary disability; (b) the 120 days of total and temporary disability may be extended up to a
maximum of 240 days should the seafarer require further medical treatment; and (c) a total and temporary disability becomes permanent
when so declared by the company-designated physician within 120 or 240 days, as the case may be, or upon the expiration of the said
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periods without a declaration of either fitness to work or disability assessment and the seafarer is still unable to resume his regular
seafaring duties.

Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent
disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the
seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.

Beja was repatriated on November 21, 2007. Roughly a month after his right knee operation or on May 26, 2008, Dr. Cruz rendered a
Grade 10 and 13 partial disability grading of his medical condition. Thereafter, Beja's medical treatment, supervised by another company-
referred doctor, Dr. Matias, continued. On August 28, 2008, Dr. Matias issued a medical report declaring that Beja has not yet fully
recovered despite continued therapy. Hence, although he was given Grades 10 and 13 combined disability rating by Dr. Cruz, this
assessment may only be considered as tentative because he still continued his physical therapy sessions, which even went beyond 240
days.
In this case, there was no assessment that Beja was found fit to resume sea duties before the end of the 240-day period. Also Beja's
allegation that he has not been able to perform his usual activities has not been contradicted by petitioners or by contrary documentary
evidence. In fact, in his medical report dated August 28, 2008, Dr. Matias opined that there was still difficulty in Beja's knee movements.
Beja should, therefore, be deemed to be suffering permanent total disability.

5. MARY JUNE CELIZ, v. CORD CHEMICALS, INC., LEONOR G. SANZ, AND MARIAN ONTANGCO

G.R. No. 200352, July 20, 2016

FACTS:

Private respondent Cord Chemicals, Inc. (Cord, Inc.) was owned and managed by private respondent Leonor Sanz (Leonor), after the
death of her husband Francisco Sanz (Francisco), the former operator of the business.

Petitioner Mary Celiz was Chief of Sales in respondent’s company, the second highest ranking position, concurrent with her position as
Senior Operations Manager. In the complaint it was alleged that Celiz was the paramour of Francisco Sanz.

In her petition Celiz averred that upon the death of Francisco, the new management advised her not to report for work anymore. When
Celiz return to Cord, Inc. to tender her resignation she was informed by the company counsel that she will be dismissed from work
because of her failure to account for numerous unliquidated advances amounting to P713,471.00.

Thereafter, Cord, Inc. served upon Celiz the Notice to Explain informing her that being a managerial employee, she was vested with a
high degree of trust and confidence and that her failure to liquidate accounts was tantamount to dishonest handling of company funds.
Cord, Inc. was impelled to place her on preventive suspension. She was also asked to submit her formal explanation, and to attend the
investigation that would be conducted so she could explain her side of the matter.

In 2008, Cord, Inc. dismissed Celiz for serious breach of trust and confidence. Left with no other recourse, she sued Cord, Inc. for Illegal
Dismissal and Monetary Benefits before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding that the severance of
employment was for a just cause and after observance of due process.

In a Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA petitioner sought to reverse the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), and be awarded her claim of backwages arid other benefits, damages, and attorney's fees, with reinstatement, on account of her
illegal dismissal. She claimed that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Labor Arbiter; that it was error for the
NLRC to validate her dismissal for failing to account for the P445,272,93 unliquidated cash advances, and that respondents were not able
to adduce substantial evidence to prove that she received the cash advances attributed to her; as such, she is not bound to account
therefor. In essence, petitioner claims that respondents were not able to adduce substantial evidence to prove that she received the cash
advances attributed to her; as such, she is not bound to account therefor

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Court can consider the issue of fact raised by petitioner

(2) Whether or not committed serious breach of trust and confidence which would warrant her termination from employment

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: NO.

In labor cases, issues of fact are for the labor tribunals and the CA to resolve, as this Court is not a trier of facts. In the present case, since
the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA are unanimous in their finding that petitioner was not illegally dismissed, this Court must abide
by such conclusion. "Factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect
and even finality by this Court, more so when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter. Such factual findings are given more weight
when the same are affirmed by the Court of Appeals."
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SECOND ISSUE:

YES. The Court reiterates the rule that in cases of dismissal for breach of trust and confidence, proof beyond reasonable doubt of an
employee's misconduct is not required. It is sufficient that the employer had reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible
for the misconduct which renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. In the case at bench, it cannot be
doubted that petitioner succeeded in discharging its burden of proof.

In any event, The Court reviewed the records of the case and found that, contrary to petitioner's contention, there was substantial evidence
showing that the subject cash advances were properly attributed to petitioner and that she failed to liquidate the same. In short, there was
just cause to dismiss her from the service.

It is also beyond cavil that respondents observed the requirements of procedural due process. In the first notice to explain, petitioner was
properly informed of the charge against her, i.e., failure to liquidate the cash advances. In addition, respondents allowed petitioner access
to company records in order for the latter to thoroughly prepare her explanation and defense. Considering the circumstances, respondents
even generously granted petitioner more time to sift through the company records. However, petitioner was only able to liquidate a small
portion of the cash advances; she failed to explain how and where she spent the rest. Consequently, respondents have no other recourse
but to dismiss petitioner for loss of trust and confidence. It is on record that respondents notified petitioner of her termination from
service.

Finally, no ill motive or bad faith may be attributed to respondents. It is on record that respondents even acceded to petitioner's request for
a graceful exit. However, the discovery of anomalies connected with her office simply took away her privilege of receiving monetary
benefits at such exit, which, despite the unfortunate circumstances, Cord Chemicals was graciously willing to grant.