2017 Leonardo Morlino, Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Bertrand Badie - Political Science - A Global Perspective PDF

Political Science
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Political Science
A Global Perspective
Leonardo Morlino,
Dirk Berg-Schlosser
and Bertrand Badie

SAGE Publications Ltd © Leonardo Morlino, Dirk Berg-Schlosser and
1 Oliver’s Yard Bertrand Badie 2017
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London EC1Y 1SP First published 2017
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Table of contents
List of boxes, figures, tables ix

About the authors xi
Preface xii
Introduction: Origins of political science and basic definition 1

Contending definitions 2
Different traditions and origins 6
From politics to political science 9
PART I: BACKGROUND 13
1 Epistemological and methodological foundations and approaches 15
Introduction: Basic distinctions 15
The epistemological foundations of the social sciences 16
Linking levels of analysis 20
Approaches to causality 23
Conclusions 28
2 Research designs and methods 31

Introduction: Basic distinctions 31
Research designs and applicable methods 33
Conclusion: Overview of different methodological emphases 40
3 Relationship with neighbouring disciplines 43

Introduction 43
Politics as a science or an object? 44
How do ‘imperial sciences’ work? 45
Coexistence, exchange and frontiers 47
Mixing social sciences and innovations 50
Conclusions 53
PART II: MACRO-POLITICS 55

4 The social bases of politics 57
Introduction 57
Levels of socio-economic development 59
Social classes and cleavages 60
Comparative historical approaches 63
Political culture: The conceptual framework 64
Substantive findings, recent developments 72
Conclusions 76

vi Political Science
5 Democracies 79
Introduction 79
State and regime, again 79
Definitions 80
Types of democracy 87
Conclusions 91
6 Democratization 93
Introduction 93
Regime change 94
Transition and installation 94
Consolidation and crisis 100
Democratic deepening and quality 104
Conclusions 108
7 Non-democratic regimes 111

Introduction 111
Traditional regimes 111
Hybrid regimes 112
Authoritarian regimes 115
Processes of change 120
Mobilization and electoral authoritarianism 121
Conclusions 123
PART III: GOVERNANCE 125

8 Government, parliaments and judiciary 127
Introduction 127
The legislative power 129
The executive power 134
The judiciary: high courts and ordinary judges 137
Conclusions 140
9 Public policies and public administration 143
Introduction 143
What are policies? 144
The bureaucracy 149
Policy evaluation 152
Models of policy making 153
Conclusions 156
PART IV: MESO- AND MICRO-POLITICS 159

10 Political participation, social movements, protests, revolutions 161
Introduction 161
A source of paradoxes? 162
The Civic Culture 163

Table of contents vii
The social roots of political participation 165

Different kinds of mobilization 167
Revolutions in perspective 169
Conclusions 171
11 Political communication and media 173

Introduction 173
Definitions 174
Key political developments 176
Arenas, actors and forms 178
Critical aspects 180
Conclusions 184
12 Interest groups 186

Introduction 186
Origins 186
Types 187
Activities 188
Forms of organization 191
Overall assessment 193
Conclusions 194
13 Political parties 196

Introduction 196
Origins 197
Functions 200
Types 201
Party systems 203
Conclusions 204
14 Elections and electoral behaviour 207

Introduction 207
Electoral systems 208
Electoral behaviour 210
Forms of ‘direct’ democracy 212
Conclusions 213
PART V: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 215

15 The globalization of international politics 217
Introduction 217
Wars paved the way to a new sub-discipline 217
How realism dominated 219
Discovering the international system 221
Domestic and international relations 223
International cooperation 224
Dependence 226

viii Political Science
Power reconsidered 227

War and peace 228
A rising global world 230
How to define the global world? 231
Sociology of transnational relations 232
New governance 233
New inter-social relations 235
Conclusions 235
16 Regionalism and beyond 237

Introduction 237
A political invention 237
Main issues at stake 242
Typology 247
Conclusions 247
Glossary 249
Bibliographical References 263
Index 287

List of boxes,
figures, tables
Box 1.1: Francis Bacon’s ants, spiders and bees 28

Figure 1.1: Dimensions of human existence 17
Figure 1.2: Degree of determination of theories 19
Figure 1.3: Linking levels of analysis 21
Figure 1.4: Multi-level analysis in a global context – state and
global interactions 22
Figure 1.5: Matching and contrasting of cases, MDSO- and MSDO-designs 26
Box 2.1: Boole’s algebra 000

Figure 2.1: Location of research designs and applicable methods 34
Figure 2.2: Regression left vote – scope of social insurance 38
Figure 2.3: Robust statistics 39
Table 2.1: Sartori’s ladder of abstraction 33
Table 2.2: Truth table, Lipset hypothesis for interwar Europe 36
Table 2.3: Different methodological emphases 41
Box 3.1: Schmitter, The future of globalized political science 52

Figure 3.1: The diversity of European political science 51
Box 4.1: Stein Rokkan’s ‘Conceptual Map of Europe’ 62

Box 4.2: Tocqueville’s concept of political culture 65
Box 4.3: Almond and Verba’s profile of the political culture of the
United States 70
Figure 4.1: Simplified system model 58
Box 5.1: Sartori, ‘How Far Can Free Government Travel?’ 81

Box 5.2: Amartya Sen, ‘Democracy as a Universal Value’ 82
Box 5.3: Robert Dahl, ‘On Democracy’ 85
Box 6.1: O’Donnell and Schmitter, ‘Transitions’ 95

Box 6.2: Juan Linz, ‘Legitimacy’ 101
Box 6.3: Andreas Schedler, ‘Accountability’ 105
Box 7.1: Linz: ‘Authoritarian Regime’ 114

Box 7.2: Schedler, ‘Electoral Authoritarianism’ 122
Figure 7.1: Salient dimensions to distinguish among authoritarian regimes 118

x Political Science
Box 8.1: Hanna Pitkin, ‘Political Representation’ 128

Box 8.2: Leston-Bandeira, ‘Parliaments’ 130
Box 8.3: Klaus von Beyme, ‘Government’ 134
Box 8.4: Jon Pierre, ‘Governance’ 134
Box 8.5: Richard Katz, ‘Party Government’ 136
Box 8.6: David Law, ‘Judicial Independence’ 138
Table 8.1: Types of bicameralism 133
Box 9.1: J.E. Anderson, ‘Policy’ 144

Box 9.2: Mauricio Ferrera, ‘Welfare State’ 148
Box 9.3: Max Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy 150
Box 9.4: Guy Lachapelle, ‘Policy evaluation’ 152
Box 9.5: Charles Lindblom, ‘Incrementalism’ 154
Box 9.6: Cohen, March, Olsen, ‘The Garbage Can Model’ 154
Box 9.7: Pierre Pierson, ‘Path Dependence’ 155
Table 9.1: Major policy areas of the EU 145
Table 9.2: Types of policies: sanctions 147
Table 9.3: Types of policies: costs and benefits 148
Table 9.4: Traditional public administration vs. new public management 151
Box 10.1: Max Kaase, ‘Participation’ 162

Table 10.1: Changes of unconventional political engagement 1990–2005 168
Box 11.1: B. McNair, ‘Political Communication’ 174

Box 11.2: Newman, ‘Political Marketing’ 179
Table 11.1: Actors and arenas of political communication 181
Table 11.2: Politics and media: the three models 183
Box 12.1: Interest Groups’ Code of Conduct 190

Box 12.2: Olson’s Theory of Collective Action 191
Box 15.1: War as International Relations 218

Box 15.2: The Peace of Westphalia 220

About the authors
Leonardo Morlino is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International

Research Center on Democracies and Democratizations at LUISS, Rome. He was
President of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) (2009–2012).
He is the author of more than 30 books and more than 200 journal essays and book
chapters published in English, French, German, Spanish, Hungarian, Chinese,
Mongolian, and Japanese. His most recent books include: How Economic Crisis
Changes Democracy. Evidence from Southern Europe (Palgrave, 2017, with F.
Raniolo), The Quality of Democracies in Latin America (International IDEA, 2016),
Changes for Democracy (Oxford UP, 2011), Democracias y Democratizaciones (CIS,
2008); Democratization and the European Union: Comparing Central and Eastern
European Post-Communist Countries (Routledge 2010, with W. Sadurski),
International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: Anchoring Democracy?
(Routledge 2008, with A. Magen). He was also one of the three editors of the
International Encyclopedia of Political Science (8 vol., SAGE, 2011), that won the
Honorable Mention of Darthmouth Medal for reference publishing in all domains of
knowledge.
Morlino was Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence and at the
Istituto di Scienze Umane in Florence and has held a number of visiting professorships.
In 2002–03 he was the Bechtel Visiting Professor at Stanford’s Graduate School of
Business; in 1995 visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution; and in 1989–90 NATO
Fellow of the Center for European Studies, Stanford University. His academic creden-
tials also include stints as the Monte dei Paschi Fellow at St. Anthony’s College,
Oxford (2010), the Jemolo Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford (2007 and 1998);
visiting professor at the Juan March Institute, Madrid (1995–96); and visiting profes-
sor at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris (1993–95, 2006, 2009, 2013).
Morlino is a leading specialist in comparative politics with expertise on Southern
and Eastern Europe, and Latin America with a focus on all phenomena of democrati-
zation. Now he is directing a new research on the quality of democracies in Western
Europe after the 2008–14 economic crisis.
Dirk Berg-Schlosser. born in 1943, is professor emeritus at Philipps-University,

Marburg/Germany. He has been awarded degrees of Dr. oec. publ. (Munich 1971);
Dr. phil. habil. (Augsburg 1978), and Ph.D. (UC Berkeley 1979). He has been Director
of the Institute of Political Science and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at
Marburg. He has also done research and taught at the universities of Munich, Aachen,
Augsburg, Eichstaett, Nairobi, Stellenbosch/South Africa and Berkeley. From 1988 to
2000 he has been chairman of the Research Committee on ‘Democratization in
Comparative Perspective’ of the International Political Science Association (IPSA).
From 2003 to 2006 he was Chair of the European Consortium for Political Research

xii EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
(ECPR), from 2006 to 2009 Vice-President of IPSA. From 2010 to 2016 he has been
founder and coordinator of the IPSA Summer Schools on Research Methods at the
universities of Sao Paulo, Singapore, Ankara and Mexico City.
His research interests include political culture, empirical democratic theory, devel-
opment studies, comparative politics, and comparative methodology. Recent major
publications are: Political Stability and Development (with Rainer Siegler), Political
Culture in Germany (with Ralf Rytlewski), Empirische Demokratieforschung,
Perspektiven der Demokratie (with H.J.Giegel), Poverty and Democracy (with Norbert
Kersting), Conditions of Authoritarianism and Democracy in Europe 1919–39 (2 vol.
with Jeremy Mitchell), Perspectives of Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe
(with Raivo Vetik), Democratization – the State of the Art, Aktuelle Methoden der
Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft (with Lasse Cronqvist), and Mixed Methods in
Comparative Politics, International Encyclopedia of Political Science (8 vol., co-ed.
with Bertrand Badie and Leonardo Morlino).
Bertrand Badie has held a number of positions including President of “jury

d’agrégation” in political science (2012–2013), President of the Scientific Committee
of the French Institute of the Near East Studies (IFPO) (2004–2013) and Member of
the Executive Committee of the French Political Science Association (1996–2004). He
has also acted as a Visiting Professor at institutions including University of Lausanne,
University of Bologna and University of Sussex. He is on the editorial board for sev-
eral journals such as European Review of International Studies, Contemporary
Politics, Journal of International Relations and Development, Etudes internationals,
Brazilian Journal of strategy and International Relations, Indian journal of Law and
International Affairs and International Journal of Human Rights. His publications in
English include International Encyclopedia in Political Science (2011, SAGE),
Humiliation in International Relations, (2017, Hart) and The Diplomacy of
Connivance (2012, Palgrave).

Preface
‘Elementary political science from an advanced standpoint’,

paraphrasing Jon Elster (1989: vii)
This book originated from the experience that available introductions to political sci-
ence usually aim at first-year students taking a mostly descriptive approach in very big
volumes. At the same time, they focus to a large extent on the Anglo-Saxon or, at best,
Western world. We felt that there is a need for a concise, yet comprehensive introduc-
tion at a more advanced level, for example students doing political science for the first
time in an inter-disciplinary M.A. program or Ph.D. students who have to brush up
on some of the basics. In this respect we found the phrase from Jon Elster quoted
above quite fitting.
For this purpose, the authors could build on their extensive experience as principal
editors of the huge International Encyclopedia of Political Science (Badie et al., 2011),
the most comprehensive and truly international one so far with almost 600 contribu-
tors from all parts of the world. They also combine different emphases, skills and
regional experiences. Leonardo Morlino has a strong focus on comparative politics
and governance, especially with regard to democracies and processes of democratiza-
tion. He has extensive research experiences in Southern and Eastern Europe and Latin
America. Dirk Berg-Schlosser also is a comparativist, but with an emphasis on politi-
cal sociology in a broad sense of the term, including questions of political culture and
quantitative and comparative methods. His regional interests lie more in Sub-Saharan
Africa and Central Europe. Bertrand Badie works mainly in the areas of political
theory and International Relations. He intensively follows developments in the Middle
East and Asia.
According to these different areas of specialization, the authors have organized the
division of labour for this book. Bertrand Badie wrote the largest part of the
Introduction, the chapters on neighbouring disciplines and political participation, and
Part V covering the international dimension. Dirk Berg-Schlosser contributed the
chapters on the epistemological foundations, research methods and the social bases of
politics. In addition, he authored the sections on interest groups, political parties, and
electoral behaviour. Leonardo Morlino concentrated on the chapters on democracy,
democratization and non-democratic regimes in Part II together with Part III (govern-
ance). Furthermore, he also wrote the chapter on political communication and media.
In spite of these specializations, we made a great effort to cross-check and cross-
reference all chapters in order to provide a comprehensive, yet concise and coherent
whole. For all of this we take equal and joint responsibility. In order to demonstrate
this, we decided to invert the alphabetical order of the authors this time, compared to
the order of the editors of the encyclopedia. The results, of course, will have to be
judged by our readers.

xiv EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Gianni Sabia who helped with
the bibliography and the glossary. Furthermore, Leonardo thanks Giusi Cotoia for his
continuing assistance.
Collectively, we would also like to thank our wonderful wives who had some more
spare time while we were working.
Summer 2016, Leonardo Morlino, Rome

Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Marburg
Bertrand Badie, Paris

Introduction:
Origins of political
science and basic
definition
Politics has always been a key aspect of human life. Like the weather, everyone is
affected by it, and since the times of the Greek classics humankind has attempted to
come to grips with its empirical and normative implications. Politics and political sci-
ence have been changing over time, and have been even more deeply transformed
during the second half of the last century in every part of an ever-smaller world.
Empirical research and theoretical reflections on politics and its multiple connections
with all other aspects of human life have developed enormously during this period and
now virtually cover all parts of the world and their growing interdependence. This
concerns, for example, such basic issues as war and peace, prosperity, welfare, and a
sustainable environment, but also issues of freedom, justice, gender, and democracy
under changing cultural perspectives.
In this Introduction, we first turn to the origins of political science and elaborate
some basic definitions. These are linked to broader epistemological positions (see
Chapter 2) and are presented here from a pluralist point of view. This is followed by
a discussion of the respective social and historical contexts of all forms of politics
ranging from early segmental societies and cities to nation-states and empires. Finally,
the more recent institutionalization of political science and its major sub-divisions are
introduced. On this basis then this volume is organized.
In this way, we provide the reader with a comprehensive, yet succinct overview of
the origins and the diversity of this discipline. Its ‘advanced standpoint’ (mentioned in
the Preface) implies that not only the basics of each sub-field, but also the ongoing
controversies and recent developments both in theory and in empirical reality are
discussed. This and its truly global perspective are the essence of this book as a guide
for more advanced students.
Political science, paradoxically, is both a very old and relatively recent discipline. Its
origins go back to antiquity in classic European or Asian thought as far as recorded
history goes. As an independent and respected academic field, however, it came into
being in most countries only after the Second World War. This is due in part to the fact
that its subject matter had been addressed by neighbouring disciplines like philosophy,
history, and public law, but also because it requires, more than others, a ‘breathing
space’ of freedom of thought and expression that is not voluntarily granted by most
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2 POLITICAL SCIENCE
authoritarian regimes and that has developed worldwide only with decolonization
and recent waves of democratization.
‘Political’, ‘politics’, ‘policy’ and ‘polity’ are among the most common words that
we find in the public debate. However, the concepts are not always clear and actually
have different meanings. They refer to a social science when scholars ‘study politics’
or they consider an activity when we say that somebody is ‘making politics’ or ‘playing
politics’. In fact, they point to a specific social function that is deeply rooted in the
history of all societies. Can we conceive of a society without politics? The question has
been often raised and deserves attention.
However, politics cannot be considered in a neutral way. We are directly concerned
by its main orientations and no one can expect that scholars are insensitive to them.
Those who study politics pretend to explain but also to prescribe what should be ‘the
good political order’. Some scholars distinguish between these two orientations, while
others regard these as inseparable. This permanent tension between the normative and
the positive vision of politics is one of the main features of the discipline. The norma-
tive orientation came first and was discussed all over the world, while the positive one
came at a much later stage. At that time, other social sciences had already been devel-
oped. Political science, in the formal sense, is a very recent discipline, but it keeps some
elements of a longstanding normative and philosophical orientation.
‘Politics’, therefore, must be considered as a sphere of action as a well as a sphere of
thought. ‘Policy’ designates a set of decisions organizing the sphere of actions, whereas
‘polity’ refers to a way of structuring a political order in a specific territory (see also
Chapter 4). Whether these concepts are employed in a normative or positive sense
depends on philosophical orientations, which are a matter of important debates. They
also depend on history: politics was not conceived in the same way everywhere around
the world. We thus have different lineages of politics and political thought. Finally, poli-
tics was constructed as a science in different ways that we have to take into account.
Contending definitions
The definitions of politics are strongly affected by the creative tensions between two
visions: politics as a social action shaped by the use of power or politics as a social
function to organize social coexistence and the polity. The first one is more empirical,
while the second one is more idealistic. The first is derived from a sociological perspec-
tive whereas the other is more philosophical and clearly connected to the idea of a social
contract. When politics is defined by the use of power, it appears as instrumental and is
often subject to manipulation, even cynicism, coercion and the brutal use of force.
When it is conceived as a function, it is part of a teleological vision of society and aims
to be in accordance with human nature and to achieve human happiness, sometimes by
totalitarian means. This tension is part of the background of the major political debates.
Political science as the science of power

A first approach is to define political science as the science of power. Here we face a
double postulate: power has its own specificity, its modes of legitimacy, its types of

INTRODUCTION 3
action and intervention; it is inseparable from politics, which could not work without
power. This perspective goes back to Machiavelli who pointed out that politics implies
virtù, that is to say the ability to impose one’s will on others (Machiavelli, 1961
[1532]). This orientation was mainly formalized by Lasswell and Kaplan (Lasswell
and Kaplan, 1950) for whom political science means to study how power is formed,
structured and shared, in their words: ‘who gets what, when, how’. From Machiavelli
to Lasswell, we find the idea that a social field has a political dimension as soon as
social relations are mediated by any kind of power.
We are then also in a Weberian tradition: the German sociologist considered power
(Macht) as one of the founding concepts of his sociology, when he defined it as the
ability to achieve one’s interest even against someone else’s will, by using any means,
including coercion (Weber, 1968). No one, in fact, contests the importance of power
in politics, but the question is whether all societies are constituted by power and
whether the use of power occurs in other social activities which are not thought to be
political. Some anthropologists have described ‘societies without coercive powers’
which are exclusively ruled by mutual social controls (Clastres, 1989). But the real
weakness of the definition by power is to create a too extensive concept of politics:
can using power in a club, a family or a firm be considered as a political action? Even
if politics implies power, is it not more accurate to say that political power is a specific
kind of power that we have to define?
Politics as a function
If power is not exclusively related to politics, we have to look for another criterion to
consider what power does in politics. This alternate tradition conceives of politics as
a function, as contributing to the conditions of social coexistence. Politics is then con-
sidered as the means of keeping together individuals in a society. This approach is close
to a normative conception: if politics pretends to structure the polity, it must operate
as well as possible and promote the ‘Good City’. Machiavelli was part of this debate
when he claimed that the Good City could not be defined and that politics should
be optimized by the right use of power. Then, the empirical orientation of political
science asks the question of ‘how the art of coexistence is really achieved’, whereas its
normative orientation would refer to ‘what the art of coexistence has to achieve’.
The issue at stake is to consider why people had to work to manage their own
coexistence. Some traditional societies have been spontaneously organized without
any political intervention or with only very weak and intermittent political structures.
In some tribal societies, the social order was able to manage social coexistence without
a differentiated political structure (‘tribes without rulers’, Evans-Pritchard and Fortes,
1940). Late Indus cities (among the oldest in the history of mankind) did not know or
experience elements of political power: political functions remained latent. Three
kinds of factors have in fact triggered political inventions: enmity, territorial manage-
ment, social stratification and complexity.
In contrast to Indus cities, Sumerian cities, at the end of the fourth millennium BC,
created differentiated political structures: political power then appeared in order to
organize each city against the military threat coming from outside (Aguilera-Barchet,
2015). Enmity activated all aspects of social coexistence: domestic solidarity, common

4 POLITICAL SCIENCE
identity, military activities and political coordination. The same process was observed
by Charles Tilly in the formation of the modern Western state. What he called ‘war-
making, state-making’ is conceived as the real dynamics of political inventions in
Europe in the modern age (Tilly, 1992). This tradition can also be found, in a more
radical and questionable way, when the German constitutional lawyer Carl Schmitt
considered enmity as the basis of the definition of politics: the enemy is conceived as
the main factor of cohesiveness in a society, from which then the invention of a nation
and political power are derived (Schmitt, 1996 [1932]).
The territorial dimension of the political system is another determining factor. A city,
on a very limited territory, does not need sophisticated political institutions, while a
large territory implies administration and coordination. Then rural societies (like
ancient Egypt) or societies resulting from conquest (like China or the first empires of
the Asian steppes) had to elaborate political structures consisting of centralized impe-
rial power, bureaucracies and norms. The dimensions of the empire generally imply
also additional sources of legitimacy, which were to be found in mobilizing religion and
various forms of theocracies, as was the case in Egypt, or in using ethics, as we can
observe in Chinese empires with the growing influence of Confucianism and Taoism.
This importance of territory in defining politics is a constant in political science up to
Max Weber who defined a political entity (the modern state) by a domination which
is accomplished over a population on a specific territory (‘Staatsgebiet, Staatsvolk,
Staatsgewalt’, Weber, 1968).
Social stratification is a third factor which is related to the territorial dimension of
politics: the larger the territory, the more complex becomes social stratification and
thus requires coordination. In Sumerian cities, the development of a military caste
constituted the first form of social stratification due to the need of political protection
and coordination. The political function appeared then as an element of the social
division of labour, and as an exceptional element: politics should in fact be considered
as exceptional since it is the only element based on constraint and coercion, implying
a legitimate constraint. We trace here the marks of Emile Durkheim (politics in the
social division of labour) (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]), Max Weber (legitimate coercion)
(Weber, 1968 [1922]) and Karl Marx (the pressure of social conflicts and the necessity
to manage them) (Marx and Engels, 1998 [1848]).
Durkheim vs. Weber

In this sociological debate, we find the major constitutive elements which today are
employed in the definition of politics. Emile Durkheim is clearly rooted in a holistic
vision of society which is centred on the concept of integration: politics will contribute
to the integration of societies, by ordering and coordinating the division of labour,
containing deviance, promoting norms and moral education. In this vision, power
seems to be secondary and coercion would be mobilized only for containing the risks
of anomy (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]). In a Weberian vision, politics springs from the
concept of social action and social relations, as a way to designate a kind of domina-
tion in a territorial context: integration seems then to be secondary, while power is at
the very centre of all kinds of social dynamics (Weber, 1968 [1922]). Marx, in turn,
takes another position: politics is conceived as a mode of managing class domination
or class struggles. Politics is then constructed on power and conflict-management.

INTRODUCTION 5
The holistic Durkheimian vision of society can be divided into two interpretations.
In a Platonic vision, human beings are considered as potential enemies of each other
and prone to struggle (Plato, 1980). Economic interests lead them to association and
to build the city, but their ability to coexist is always questioned: that is why politics
promotes unity through virtue and education (Plato, 1945). Plato thus opens a way
which affiliates politics to the art of building unity for living together inside the City.
By contrast, Aristotle considers human beings as ‘social animals’ (zoôn politikon) who
are spontaneously inclined to live together (Aristotle, 1962). Politics is no more bound
to an enforced unity, but is much more teleological: its function is to promote the
common good inside a cooperative society by referring to justice. In this perspective,
politics is considered as ‘the highest science’ (Aristotle, 2014, I.2.1094b 7–10 ). In the
Platonic vision, law, education and social control are the basic features of politics and
constitute a natural structure, while in the Aristotelian vision good policy and justice
play the major role.
Both views can be found in the subsequent philosophical and sociological tradi-
tions. In the Aristotelian tradition, functionalism considers politics as a contribution
to the integration of the social order (Merton, 1968; Almond and Coleman, 1960);
systems analysis conceives of politics as the interacting units which contribute to an
authoritative allocation of values (Easton, 1965); structuralism understands politics as
a meaningful Platonic construction which is organizing societies (Levi-Strauss, 1967).
By contrast, the paradigms of domination and the Weberian contribution are much
more influenced by the invention of the state. The crisis of Western feudalism resulted
in the creation of the state, which established the first clear differentiation of politics,
both from civil society and from religion (Strayer, 1970; Tilly, 1975). Max Weber
defined the state as a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical violence within a given territory (Weber, 1968). This definition is close
to his definition of politics and Weber seems to consider the state as the optimal
rationalization of politics: that is why his vision paved the way to those, also inspired
by Jean Bodin and his Six Books on the Commonwealth published in 1576 (Bodin,
1955), who consider politics as the science of the state, especially in the German
school of Staatstheorie .This powerful vision perpetuated the debates by instilling the
idea that the Western construction of politics is the rational achievement of a political
order which is applicable everywhere around the world.
Marx, in his own vision, focuses on conflicts which necessarily take place in all
societies and on power which is an instrument in the hands of the dominant class for
managing and containing these conflicts. Power finds then its realization through the
state. Contrary to what Weber argued, the state does not achieve the rationalization
of power in a society, but the rationalization of the domination of one class over the
others. It means that the state is only instrumental, that domination is the real essence
of politics, and that politics cannot be conceived as globally functional, except in the
classless society. Politics is then inseparable from class struggles.
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, written by Marx in 1852 as a com-
ment on the victory of French Bonapartism, adds an important dimension: the state and
politics have their own autonomy, their own rationality, and they reproduce their domi-
nation through their bourgeoisie d’Etat (Marx, 1963). There are, therefore, two
concepts of politics in the Marxist vision (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983). On the one
hand, it postulates that ‘the economic structure of society (is) the real foundation from

6 POLITICAL SCIENCE
which arises a legal and a political superstructure’ (Marx, 1970a: 20): ‘superstructure’
here indicates a heteronomy; that is to say a total dependence on the economic struc-
tures. On the other, Marx conceives of the political state as an ‘organism’ (Marx,
1970b: 11) holding ‘specific resources’ which cannot be limited to the simple expres-
sion of economic substructures. For some later Marxist followers politics means
managing conflicts, but the nature of these conflicts comprises more than a contestation
among antagonistic economic interests and includes other ‘politicized’ social conflicts
(such as between other segments of society with strong group identities) as well.
Later discussions also attempted to take into account the dimension of increasing
political participation, the extension of the suffrage in the nineteenth century, and the
beginning of mass politics (see also Chapters 5 and 10 below).
Different traditions and origins

This philosophical debate cannot be separated from the political practice and the great
diversity of historical conditions. Politics was created according to the context, that is
to say, the history, culture or economic structures of countless societies. Such a variety
cannot result in a unique or homogeneous kind of politics: history is shaping different
meanings of politics which are not substitutable for each other and which are differ-
ently affiliated to the various versions of politics that we have to take into account in
our typology.
Cities
Cities are generally considered as the oldest type of polity. The Greek word polis,
which was used for designating the City, is precisely at the origin of the term politics.
However, cities have a much longer tradition and existed first in the Indus valley in the
fourth millennium before Christ, and, some centuries later, in southern Mesopotamia,
where the first Sumerian cities were founded. All these cities were organized on the
basis of an association of people claiming to live together: when this association faced
a danger (coming generally from outside) or experienced other difficulties (as a result
of domestic conflicts), political power was progressively structured and resulted in a
specific polity (Sjoberg, 1965).
In Greek cities, these early associations were set up through an agreement among
free families who had the same ancestors and worshipped the same Gods. These then
gave rise to phratries, which were also believed to share the same origins (mythical or
not). Those phratries progressively drew the boundaries of a territory, which formed
a more permanent polity in the modern sense (Fustel de Coulanges, 1864). This ter-
ritorialization was mainly a feature of Greek history and does not fit other kinds of
associative orders. It is still now a feature of the city-states whose achievement does
not depend mainly on their territorial dimension, but rather on their capacity to acti-
vate informal or virtual networks, as is the case with Singapore, considered by Richard
Rosecrance as a ‘virtual state’ (Rosecrance, 1999), but also with Hong Kong or Dubai.
In all these instances, involvement in politics does not clearly result in a territorial
institution and reaches beyond their territories.

INTRODUCTION 7
Segmental systems
Associations of families and clans do not have any fixed territories in segmental soci-
eties, in which family relationships organize the social order sharing a ‘mechanical
solidarity’ in Durkheim’s sense. If clans and tribes are mostly nomadic, the idea of
territory completely disappears. The political space is then movable, while the nature
of family and clan solidarity and their interactions produces and shapes the political
order. In this case, politics is hardly differentiated from other social structures and
generated by functions like family authority, councils of elders, palavers, joint religious
worship, vendetta, restorative justice (Evans-Pritchard and Fortes, 1940). Politics is
here close to social integration, and, in the most traditional societies, close to social
conservatism. This kind of political (re-)construction can be found today again in
decolonized societies where the imported state has collapsed (as in Somalia, Libya,
etc.) (Badie, 2000).
Empires
Imperial political systems are almost as old as cities. The Xia Empire appeared in
China in 3200 BC, and at about the same time Thinis was created as the capital of the
first Egyptian dynasty. Imperial politics were thus invented in a different context,
consisting of large spaces to be governed. This environment was largely created by
conquest, but was also due to geographical conditions: steppes, deserts, lack of water
and need of irrigation, which had created all forms of ‘oriental despotism’ and
‘hydraulic empires’ (Wittfogel, 1957). These constraints resulted in specific functions
to be achieved, in a military sense, but also promoted public facilities and infrastruc-
tures. Politics was, therefore, organized in a more authoritarian and much more
centralized way where the bureaucracy had a key role to play.
Instead of being devoted to coordination, politics is here more oriented towards
centralization. One of the contributing factors of authoritarianism clearly is at work
here. The first Thinis Empire resulted from an effort to gather the Egyptian tribes in
a unique confederation, but the new imperial power promptly developed its central-
ized nature through its own authority, its deification and the construction of a
religion, which progressively covered and controlled all the territory. Thinis, as the
cradle of the Egyptian Empire, has a mythical place in the enduring Egyptian cosmol-
ogy (Gardiner, 1964).
Empires give to politics a new orientation, in which diffusion (and conquest) is
much more important than coordination of participating units (Eisenstadt, 1963). The
relationship to territory is then movable. Empires are reluctant to adhere to strict
boundaries as they were promoted by the Westphalian conception of the nation-state.
Instead of borders, empires have margins and do not consider territory as defining
political authority or shaping politics. This is probably why the Weberian definition
of politics does not really work even today in countries which were shaped by an
imperial tradition, like Russia or China. If territory is no longer the main resource nor
the main marker of politics, other factors come into play. These can consist of the
‘charismatic’ leadership of the founder of an empire or the ‘traditional’ legitimacy of
his successors claiming descent from the same dynasty as in Arabian monarchies or

8 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Ethiopia. It may also consist of a particular ethics shaping political behaviour as in

imperial China, or a religion, which comes to be the essence of politics reflected by
Muslim empires which set up a tradition of de-differentiation between politics and
religion (Eisenstadt, 1963) or in a ‘theocracy’ like Iran.
Nation-states
The formation of nation-states in Western Europe at the end of the feudal period
paved the way for a new approach to politics. In an ethnocentric manner, this step was
considered by some political scientists as the invention of political modernity: this
oversimplification tended to marginalize other conceptions which were downgraded
as ‘primitive’, ‘traditional’ or ‘pre-modern’. It also supposed that this Western model
would fit all other histories. In spite of these limitations, it must be admitted that the
nation-state model of politics has dominated the world since the Renaissance and the
European colonial expansion and all other cultures have to take it into account when
shaping their own vision (Badie, 2000).
Western state-building innovated first by strongly differentiating politics from soci-
ety. The invention of the Western state implied clearly a growing opposition between
state and civil society (Bendix, 1964; Tilly, 1974). As mentioned above, in all other
traditions politics was at least partly embedded into social structures. The Western
state, by contrast, reconstructed politics as a differentiated category of action, with its
own institutions, its territorial support, its sovereignty and its centrality (Tilly, 1974;
Anderson, 1974). This orientation directly led to the Weberian definition of politics as
a kind of domination and then introduced the idea of a political community, which
can be defined as a community of human beings who are gathered in the only perspec-
tive of accomplishing political functions in and for the nation-state. It implies that this
community is separated from familial, tribal, religious or any kind of other social
communities. In this perspective, a modern political community has to be secular and
any other form of politics which combines political action with other kinds of social
action is considered as ‘pre-modern’.
Obviously this vision is highly questionable: it denies the historicity of politics and
neglects the plurality of lineages in the invention of politics. That is why the present
debate tries to shed light on the real nature of politics in contemporary non-Western
political systems. Three paradigms are competing. The first one is related to the school
of political development which appeared during the early 1960s: as a result of mod-
ernization, political systems would move to the Western model of politics while their
cultural specificity is fading (Almond and Coleman, 1960; Shils, 1960). The second
one comes from cultural analysis and argues that politics is shaped by local cultures
(Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952): it inspired many ‘area studies’, which aim to describe
the specificity of politics in each culture or civilization. It fuelled also many studies in
comparative politics (Boix and Stokes, 2007). The risk is, however, to oversimplify this
plurality and then to conceive it as generating a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington,
1993). For containing this excess, a ‘neo-culturalist’ approach questions the excessive
reification of cultures and prefers to present cultures as ‘systems of meanings’: politics
would then have different kinds of meaning according to the various histories without
being fixed or stylized into antagonistic actors (Geertz, 1973).

INTRODUCTION 9
The third paradigm points to the process of hybridization of politics: contemporary

politics in the non-Western world is considered to be inspired by the Western model,
but this model can work only if it merges with local cultural traditions. According to
this vision, political science gets a new agenda by analysing the conditions of this
hybridization, the social and cultural resistances to political importations, the new
kinds of political and social protest which are resulting from them, as well as the way
in which social structures are achieving political functions by reacting to this importa-
tion. The crucial role of tribes, clans, enlarged families, on the one hand, of religion,
sects and traditional worship on the other hand, is a good example of this alternative
way of political construction in developing or rising countries.
From politics to political science

In Confucian or Greek philosophy, politics was considered as a set of norms and led
to the creation of a normative science. It was precisely what Aristotle meant when he
considered politics as the ‘highest science’, while Confucius, observing how Chinese
kingdoms were ceaselessly fighting, attempted to elaborate an ethics which would be
able to grant harmony among people. In these two instances, the purpose was to imag-
ine the best city, that is to say the best way to make human beings coexist together. In
this tradition, we find the main founding fathers of political science and political phi-
losophy around the world: Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, Al Farabi (a Persian philosopher,
872–950 AD, author of Al Madina Al Fazila, The Virtuous City), Machiavelli, Hobbes,
Rousseau, Kant.
At a much later stage, politics was considered as an empirical object which had to
be explained before being prescribed. A new political science joined the other social
sciences as the most recent one. Even if we find some empirical elements in Machiavelli’s
or Montesquieu’s works, this old tradition was classified as ‘political philosophy’,
while the new empirical science was mostly considered as the ‘real’ political science.
The emergence of an empirical political science

This empirical political science appeared in Europe and the USA in the second half of
the nineteenth century, when the institutionalization of nation-states made it necessary
to train high-level civil servants in the main areas of government. That is why this new
science was predominantly, as a first step, a science of government. This was the case
as early as 1857 at Columbia University (New York), in Paris with the creation in
1872 of the Ecole libre des sciences politiques, and in London, with the London
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in 1895 (Hurtig, 2011). This entry
into the academic field resulted in a political science oriented towards governmental
affairs and merging with other social sciences also involved in the science of govern-
ment (law, economics, and even geography and history). By contrast, sociological
matters and all aspects concerning political behaviour or critical dimensions of politics
were kept away. A clear separation from sociology and philosophy was taking place.
Significantly, an empirically oriented political science developed and became insti-
tutionalized more easily and at an earlier stage in the USA than in Europe. The

10 POLITICAL SCIENCE
American Political Science Association was created in 1903 and its journal in 1905,
while the major European associations emerged only after 1945. Courses in political
science proliferated at a steady pace in the USA and covered a larger field than at the
European institutions, which were still strictly centred on government matters.
Several reasons can be found for explaining these peculiarities. The end of the nineteenth
century and the first half of the twentieth century were dominated by political factors
which stimulated political research: the establishment of the first modern democra-
cies, the development of parties and elections, but also the institutionalization of
totalitarian regimes. In a certain way, this was the time of inventing modern politics.
To the contrary, countries which were affected by authoritarianism abandoned scien-
tific studies of politics, as was the case in Germany, Russia or Italy, while other
countries in Europe remained restricted to a rather conservative vision of the disci-
pline. By contrast, political science in the USA was boosted by intellectual immigration
coming from central Europe and a new technology in politics and the social sciences
(public opinion polls, quantitative methods, social psychology). In this way, behav-
iouralism – which became dominant in the USA from the 1920s – paved the way to
a new empirical political science and opened up new kinds of research that are more
oriented to social topics (Eulau, 1963). From this time on, political science was
mainly empirical and worked on the real facts more than on an ideal vision of what
politics should be.
In this context, political science acquired a new profile in the American universities.
Under this influence it became a science of political behaviour. The role played by Paul
Lazarsfeld and the first research centres at the Universities of Chicago, Princeton and
Columbia were particularly important in shaping a science centred around voting,
influence of media and opinion leaders. One of the first major publications was The
People’s Choice, by Lazarsfeld and his collaborators (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944). The
orientation was clear: the new science will be empirical, centred on attitudes, largely
quantitative and positivist (see Chapters 1 and 4).
In the meantime, the trauma caused by the Second World War opened the way to
International Relations as a new field of research (see Chapter 15), whereas the shock
coming from the excesses of the totalitarian regimes in Germany and the Soviet Union
inspired new studies on authoritarianism and the emergence of democracies and gave
rise to comparisons and Comparative Politics. These new fields were in turn submitted
to the same epistemological influences (empiricism, modelling, quantification). At the
international level, the International Political Science Association (IPSA) was founded
in 1949, initially also supported by UNESCO (Boncourt, 2009).
In Europe the context remained different. After the First World War, the main
debate was centred on democracy and the threats which it had to face. Political science
was closely related to institutions, law and philosophy and was not so much, at this
time, interested in public opinion and social behaviour. In England, a ‘Political Studies
Association’ was created in 1950, still in the line of the science of government, which
was promoted by the LSE. Oxford was mainly working on comparative institutions
and area studies. In France, Italy and Germany political science remained under the
wings of law, philosophy and history, while electoral studies in France were mainly
developed by political geography (Siegfried, 1913). It was not until the 1960s that
European political science achieved its autonomy, partly under the influence of the
American mainstream.

INTRODUCTION 11
However, this renewed European political science was not a servile imitation of an
imported model. A critical vision coming from sociology, history and philosophy
introduced new dimensions. The Frankfurt School in Germany, historical sociology in
France, or political philosophy in Italy had a less positivist view of scientific produc-
tion and assigned importance to new topics, like political sociology, protests,
revolutions, deviance, and ideologies. From all this resulted a more pluralist mix of
epistemological and historical orientations, which are also reflected in the European
Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), created in 1970, and which today encom-
passes about 350 European academic institutions (Newton and Boncourt, 2010).
A complex taxonomy
There is no consensus about a classification taking into account all the sub-fields of
this emerging political science. The continuing debate clearly reveals several problems
of identity which this discipline is facing. When political science was able to achieve
greater autonomy, it had first to define the specific status of International Relations
(see Chapter 15). As long as these were merged with economics, law or history,
International Relations (IR) was a natural part of a broader science of government.
When political science became more separated from the other social sciences, the sta-
tus of IR became blurred. Can we consider IR as an object which can be studied by
different social sciences or as an autonomous field of study which is separated from
general political science? Academic structures as well as scientific works still hesitate
between these two options.
The same is partly true about the differentiation between economics, law and politics.
This growing differentiation, as well as the emancipation of political science from nor-
mative visions, led to the definition of a new sub-field referring to the political
construction of all objects related to governmental action: public administration and
public policies became another sub-field of political science. In 1968, the Heinz College
was created in Pittsburg (Carnegie Mellon University) for promoting this new field of
research, which also brought to life the Harris School of Public Policy Studies (University
of Chicago) in 1988 and enriched the Kennedy School of Government (Harvard
University). If, for Lasswell, this ‘policy science’ should be interdisciplinary and still
conceived as normative and a source of advice (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1951), the new
political science reconsidered policy analysis as an empirical research separating the
study of the decision-making process from its normative evaluation (Wildavsky, 1979).
Another dimension of this problem can be found in the blurred identity of ‘political
sociology’. The concept was coined in Europe after the Second World War and still has
some ambiguity. Some scholars consider politics as a social fact and identify political
science as a whole with political sociology, whereas others consider political sociology
as only covering a part of political science, more particularly concerning political
behaviour, elections and parties, leaving political systems, institutions or International
Relations outside (see also Chapter 4).
With regard to such distinctions two kinds of classification are possible. The first
is thematic, based on the main objects of political science: institutions (including gov-
ernment at the national, local, regional and international levels), systems (international
relations, regional relations, national and local political systems), actors (elites, par-
ties, interest groups, social movements), and behaviour (culture, perceptions, beliefs,

attitudes). The second distinguishes between levels of analysis. It serves to differenti-

ate macro-politics which generates a global constraint on political actions, including
systems, cultures, regimes and ‘huge processes’ (Tilly, 1984) and allocates a special
status to international relations. Meso-politics then takes into account collective
actors, like elites, groups and parties, while micro-politics deals with individuals and
their political attitudes and preferences.
Following such distinctions, this volume covers first the epistemological and meth-
odological background of the discipline and its relations to neighbouring fields like
philosophy, history, sociology and economics in Part I. Part II then turns to macro-
politics including its major social-structural and political-cultural bases, the various
democratic and non-democratic regime types and their more recent developments. Part
III is devoted to the major aspects of the central political system, its institutional setup,
the major output structures and their performance. Part IV deals with meso- and
micro-politics in greater detail, discussing social movements, the media, interest
groups, political parties and electoral behaviour. Part V, finally, covers the international
dimension in the present age of globalization.
Questions
1 Which kind of vision would you adopt: politics as power or as a
social function? Explain your choice.
2 What is the role played by the main three founding fathers of the
discipline: Marx, Weber and Durkheim?
3 What are the main characteristics of an empire?
4 How can we analyse and explain the state-building process?
Further reading
Bailey F (1969) Stratagems and spoils: A social anthropology of politics. Oxford: Blackwell. A
classical introduction to the anthropology of politics.
Fortes M and Evans-Pritchard E (1940) African political systems. London, Oxford: University
Press. A famous anthropological study which gives very useful insights into the political
construction of traditional societies without state structures.
Eisenstadt S (1963) The political systems of empires. New York: Free Press. The best synthesis
on empires as a type of political system. A must on this topic.
Tilly C (ed.) (1975) The formation of national states in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton
University Press. One of the best works on the state, its meaning, definition and transforma-
tions in a sociological and historical perspective.
Sorensen G (2003) The transformation of the state, beyond the myth of retreat. Basingstoke:
Macmillan. A useful assessment on the contemporary state, discussing the conception of a
retreat of the state.
Lachman R (2010) States and power. Cambridge: Polity Press. An evaluation of states in history.
Trent J and Stein M (eds) (2012) The world of political science: A critical overview of the devel-
opment of political studies around the globe: 1990 – 2012. Opladen: Barbara Budrich
Publishers. An account of recent international developments.

Part I
Background
02_Morlino_Ch_01.indd 13 12/22/2016 3:55:48 PM

1
Epistemological and
methodological
foundations and
approaches
Key terms
Behaviouralism Methodological
Causality individualism
Constructivism Methodology
Epistemology Naturalism
Hermeneutics Ontology
Medium range theories Rational choice
Introduction: Basic distinctions

This chapter lays some of the major epistemological foundations of political science
and the social sciences in general. It points to the multi-dimensionality and the malle-
ability of the substance matter and outlines a general model of social explanations. On
this basis it discusses different concepts of causality in varying research situations
(single case, small N, large N) and some of the major conceptual and methodological
approaches based on them.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, political science has always been charac-
terized by a diversity of contending meta-theoretical positions, paradigms and
approaches. And this is, from the pluralist perspective of this introduction, as it
should be. In Europe, in the last century, various strands of normative-ontological,
Marxist, and empirical-analytical persuasions were at the forefront (for such and
similar terms see, e.g. Easton et al., 1991; Quermonne, 1996). In the USA, for several
decades ‘behaviouralist’ positions and, more recently, ‘rational’ and ‘public choice’
approaches have dominated (see, e.g. Almond, 1996). Reactions by the ‘perestroika’
movement have followed (Monroe, 2005). A strong ‘quantitative’/‘qualitative’
divide still persists (cf. the influential volumes by King et al.,1994 and Brady and

Collier, 2010). In other parts of the world, different theological, philosophical and
epistemological traditions have influenced the (more recent) emergence of political
science there (Barongo, 1983; Eisfeld and Pal, 2010; Stein and Trent, 2012; see also
Chapter 3 below).
In a very basic sense, it is important to distinguish three fundamental notions (and
fields of inquiry): Ontology (the ‘study of being’) is concerned with the question ‘what
exists?’ Is there a ‘transcendental’ world? How came our world about? Where is
it going? This is the realm of general philosophy, religion, diverse world views
(‘Weltanschauungen’), ideologies, each claiming some absolute ‘truths’, which, how-
ever, often are conflicting or non-compatible.
Epistemology (literally the ‘study of knowledge’, i.e. the theory of science) addresses
the question ‘what can we know?’ What are the foundations of scientific knowledge?
How can we be sure about our insights? What evidence do we have? Scientific expla-
nations in this sense are based on reasoning (‘logic’) and observations (empirical
investigations). Again, there are many controversies in these respects, but within cer-
tain ‘schools of thought’ and the respective scientific disciplines some agreements can
be found.
Finally, methodology (the reflection about and the knowledge of procedures and
tools in science) answers the question ‘how do we acquire scientific knowledge?’ How
reliable and valid are our tools and techniques? How can we be sure of the evidence?
How can these insights be inter-subjectively (i.e. among scientists in a particular field)
transmitted and accepted?
The ‘social’ sciences (dealing with human beings and their interactions) cover a
particular area which is distinguished from the ‘natural’ sciences (dealing with inani-
mate objects and ‘nature’) in a number of important respects. These concern the
‘multi-dimensionality’ of their subject matter, the ‘malleability’ and ‘plasticity’ of their
objects changing over time, and the fact, that we as human beings and investigators
are ourselves to some extent part of the subject matter which, again, poses special
epistemological problems of interacting with it. In the following, we briefly point out
these epistemological foundations for the social sciences in general and then turn to
some of the consequences for political science and specific approaches in particular.
This is followed by outlining different methodological approaches and their percep-
tions of causality.
The epistemological foundations of

the social sciences
Multi-dimensionality
The most basic distinction concerns the dimensions of the subject matter. As in nature,
there are certain hard ‘objects’ such as political institutions, social structures and so
on, which can be identified and which are ‘tangible’ and observable in certain ways.
In addition, however, there is a ‘subjective’ dimension in which such objects are per-
ceived by individuals and groups and translated into concrete actions. Such
perceptions themselves are shaped by a number of psychological, social, etc. factors.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 17
This distinction is commonly accepted and runs through the history of philosophy
from antiquity to the present day and concerns all sciences of man, including medi-
cine. There, distinctions between body and mind (or consciousness) and the
subsequent divisions into sub-disciplines like anatomy, psychology, etc. are common-
place. Similarly, the fact that there are possible interactions between these dimensions
is well accepted. The third dimension, the ‘normative’ one, which concerns ethical
judgements of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ actions and behaviour is more problematic. In medicine,
again, some ethical norms have been generally accepted since the time of Hippocrates,
but debates continue about, for example, where exactly human life begins or ends and
what the respective theological or philosophical justifications are for such positions.
In philosophy, this ‘three-dimensionality’ of human existence has also been elaborated
by Immanuel Kant in his ‘Architecture of Pure Reason’ (1956: 748 ff. [1787]).
A graphical representation of these dimensions can be rendered in the following
Figure 1.1 (where the dotted line represents a ‘holistic’ position as, for example,
expressed by Hegel (1956 [1833])).
The crux of the matter concerns problems of distinguishing such dimensions and
their interactions not only analytically but also in actual practice; and controversies
about normative, ontologically based justifications and their respective epistemologi-
cal and methodological consequences persist. The major emphases of the current
meta-theoretical positions in political science can be located with the help of such
distinctions. Thus, the major ontological approaches have their basis in the normative
dimension ranging from Plato to Eric Voegelin (1952) or Leo Strauss (1959), but also
concern attempts in linguistic analysis (e.g. Lorenzen, 1978), or communications the-
ory (Habermas, 1981). In the tradition of Plato (‘the allegory of the cave’), Voegelin
and Strauss build their ontology on transcendental Jewish and Christian religious
beliefs. This is also the case in non-Western religions and traditions such as Confucian
(Shin, 1999), Indian (Madan, 1992), or African (Mbiti, 1969) ones. Habermas and
others attempt to find ways of arriving at a secular philosophical foundation of a
potentially universal ontology.
Sharply opposed to such normative foundations of political theory are ‘critical-
dialectical’ or ‘historical-materialist’ positions in the tradition of Karl Marx and his
followers. There, the object dimension of the modes of production and re-production
of human existence is the basic one from which the others are derived. Thus, the
objective social existence determines the subjective consciousness and the political
and normative ‘superstructures’ (Marx and Engels, 1962: 9; see also the Introduction
above).
normative
subjective
objective
Figure 1.1 Dimensions of human existence

The third major position, a ‘behaviouralist’ one, takes the subjective dimension as its
starting point. Subjective perceptions and subsequent actions of human beings are what
really matters. These shape social and political life (Eulau, 1963). This position has been
most influential in election studies, for example, but also concerning aspects of political
culture research (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1997). In a somewhat broader
perception, both subjective and objective dimensions and their interactions are consid-
ered by ‘empirical-analytical’ approaches, but, from a ‘positivistic’ point of view, no
normative judgements can be made on this basis. Long-lasting controversies concerning
this position go back to Max Weber (1949) and his followers but are also reflected in
debates between Karl Popper and Jürgen Habermas, for example (Adorno et al., 1969).
These basic meta-theoretical positions and their variations remain, in the last resort,
incompatible. Similarly, whether these dimensions can in actual fact be separated or,
by necessity, always go together from a ‘holistic’ perspective remains controversial.
The latter position, in contrast to Kant, is for example represented by Hegel, but also
by Marx and some of his followers (Lukács, 1967). In the same way, epistemological
positions based on religion, including Buddhism and Confucianism, perceive these
dimensions in a holistic manner. From a more pragmatic perspective, many political
scientists today just ‘agree to disagree’ about such basic ontological or religious posi-
tions and their respective justifications.
The malleability of the substance matter

As a result of the change from Newtonian physics to quantum theory and probabilistic
relations in nuclear physics, Karl Popper (1972) has coined the metaphor of ‘clouds and
clocks’ with regard to the degree of determination of scientific theories. Clocks repre-
sent Newton’s deterministic world, as in astronomy for example, where the movements
of stars and planets or the next solar eclipse can be predicted (or retro-dicted) with
clock-like precision. Clouds, by contrast, constitute a very elusive substance, the struc-
tures and regularities of which cannot easily be grasped over a somewhat longer period
even today by the most advanced computers of meteorologists and their satellite-based
data. They remain ‘indeterminable’ in Heisenberg’s sense. In between these two
extremes, however, which should be perceived as the opposite poles of a continuum
rather than mutually exclusive positions, there is a ‘plastic’ matter which is malleable in
the course of time and which is neither perfectly determined nor subject to pure chance.
In an important essay, Almond and Genco (1977) have transferred this concept to
the social sciences and politics. They state that
the implication of these complexities of human and social reality is that the
explanatory strategy of the hard sciences has only a limited application to
the social sciences … Thus, a simple search for regularities and lawful rela-
tionships among variables – a strategy that has led to tremendous success
in the physical sciences – will not explain social outcomes, but only some
of the conditions affecting those outcomes. (p. 493; emphasis added)
In addition, factors of human choice and action plus, possibly, some elements of
pure chance in certain ‘conjunctures’ (Dobry, 1986) also have to be considered. Such
distinctions are illustrated in Figure 1.2:

Subject Matter of Social Sciences
‘clocks’ ‘plastic matter’ ‘clouds’
Figure 1.2 Degree of determination of theories
This figure can be helpful, once more, to locate some of the ‘harder’ and some
of the ‘softer’ approaches in our discipline along this spectrum. Epistemologists dis-
tinguish between ‘naturalist’ theories, which take the ‘real world’ for granted and, at
the other extreme, ‘constructivist’ theories, which consider the world to be merely
constructed by our concepts and perceptions. ‘Realist’ theories take an intermediate
position accepting a real world as perceived by our senses, but constructing and inter-
preting it through our concepts and theories (Moses and Knutsen, 2012). Naturalist
theories are located to the left of the continuum in Figure 1.2, constructivist theories
to the right. In between is the area of ‘medium range’ theories in Robert Merton’s
(1968) sense, bounded in time and space. The deductive subsumption of individual
events under ‘covering laws’ in Hempel’s (1965) sense at best refers to the ‘clocks’ on
the left. Statistical methods (and restrictions) apply to the ‘probabilistic’ realm, still
more to the left, with possibilities, based on large numbers and random sampling, of
statistical inference.
In the social sciences, with a small number of cases often only ‘conditions of occur-
rence’, more in the middle, can be established. In fact, there is not a single absolute ‘law’
in the social sciences. Even ‘Duverger’s laws’ (1951) about the impact of electoral sys-
tems on party systems or Anthony Downs’ ‘median voter theorem’ (1957) are highly
contextualized and are not applicable, for example, in situations where party systems
are highly fragmented along ethnic, religious, or regional lines. Systematic comparative
methods like ‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis’ (QCA) can establish some ‘covering
conditions’ in these respects. Further to the right, ‘qualitative’ studies of even fewer
cases can be found; these can be ‘deeper’ and more complex, but even less generalizable.
As a consequence, we have to be more modest in our claims about the precision of
causal relationships, the generalizability of regularities, and the universality of theo-
ries. Such a view also corresponds with a position already expressed by Aristotle who
located politics in an intermediate sphere between the necessary, where strict science
can be applied, and the realm of pure chance which is not accessible to scientific
explanations (Kuhn, 1967).
From this perspective, Almond and Genco (1977) conclude that ‘the essence of
political science … is the analysis of choice in the context of constraints. That would
place the search for regularities, the search for solutions to problems, and the evalua-
tion of these problems on the same level. They would all be parts of a common effort
to confront man’s political fate with rigor, with the necessary objectivity, and with an
inescapable sense of identification with the subject matter which the political scientist
studies’ (p. 522, our emphasis). The last point also leads to the next differentia
specifica of the social sciences as compared to the naturalist sciences and their distinct
epistemology.

‘Self-referential’ aspects
This ‘sense of identification’ can also be seen in different ways. First of all, it means that
as human and social beings we are inevitably part of the subject matter we are studying.
Even if we attempt to detach ourselves as much as possible from the object under con-
sideration some ‘subjective’ influences on our perception remain. These can be analysed
by psychology and the sociology of knowledge to discern our (conscious or uncon-
scious) ‘interests’ in such matters, but some individual ‘colouring’ of our lenses seems
inevitable (for a discussion of this problem see Mannheim, 1936 and Habermas, 1971).
Therefore, a certain ‘hermeneutic circle’, which should be made conscious and explicit
in the interactions with others, remains (Moses and Knutsen, 2012, Chapter 7). This
creates ‘self-referential’ situations (Luhmann, 1984) and poses specific problems of
perception or ‘objectivity’ and can create interactions with the objects we study
This limitation can, however, again in contrast to ‘naturalist’ perceptions of science,
be turned to one’s advantage. As human beings we can empathize with each other and
inter-subjectively, if not ‘objectively’, understand and interpret the meaning of each
others’ thoughts and actions. It also opens up specific possibilities of understanding
(‘Verstehen’ in Max Weber’s (1949) sense) and more sensitive interpretations of others
and the world we live in. This is even more the case when we are trained as social
scientists in a common methodology and scientific language. This latter point also
distinguishes the perception, level of information, and theoretical interpretation of a
political scientist from the ‘man (or woman) in the street’ talking politics in the same
way as a meteorologist has a different knowledge of what is happening in the atmos-
phere compared to the daily small-talk about the weather.
Nevertheless, such inevitable subjectivity, which is also historically and culturally
conditioned, opens the way to more pluralist interpretations and meanings.
‘Constructivist’ approaches, as contrasted to ‘naturalist’ ones, can dig deeper in certain
ways into this subjectivity and the plurality of meanings (Foucault, 1970).
Being part of the substance matter, we can also, consciously or unconsciously, act
upon it. Thus, ‘self-fulfilling’ or ‘self-defeating prophecies’ become possible as feed-
backs between the interpretation or even just personal opinion of an important actor
or social scientist whose authority in a certain sphere has become acknowledged in the
matter s/he is dealing with. This frequently occurs when some ‘analysts’ give their
opinion on probable developments of the stock exchange or currency rates and many
people follow suit. This also applies to electoral predictions with respective ‘band-
wagon’ or ‘underdog’ effects.
Finally, being part of our world and being able, to some extent, to act upon it, also
raises the question of social and political responsibility. This brings us back to the
normative side of politics with which we inevitably have to deal.
Linking levels of analysis

Furthermore, in the social sciences several levels of analysis have to be distinguished:
•• a ‘macro’-level referring to large social entities like entire societies, economies, states;
•• a ‘micro’-level of individual persons living and acting in these entities;
•• and a ‘meso’-level of more or less organized groups of persons and associations in
between.

The general model of social explanations

The links between these levels and their interactions can be illustrated with James
Coleman’s (1990) general model of social explanations which has been nicknamed his
‘bathtub’ (see Figure 1.3).
An explanation of social events starts at the macro-level on the upper left-hand side
(the ‘conditions of occurrence’). These then shape and ‘frame’ the possible perceptions
and actions of individuals at the micro-level. In order to become effective in a larger
sense, these actions often have to be aggregated by organizations at the meso-level on the
right-hand side (for example social movements, interest groups, political parties). These
then influence the final outcome on the macro-level on the right-hand side (the ‘explanan-
dum’). For example, to explain the outcome of an election (the explanandum) in a
comprehensive way, we start with the social-structural and political-cultural conditions
on the macro-level at the upper left-hand side. These may consist, say, of a rural-catholic
milieu or some other specific regional, ethnic or cultural conditions. The perceptions of
voters at the micro-level often were (and are) ‘framed’ by such conditions (see also
Chapter 14). This is then translated into the actual vote for a particular party. Parties
aggregate these votes and, taken altogether, the final election result is then arrived at.
In this way the major emphases of important theoretical approaches can be illus-
trated, too: Macro- (for example historical-materialist) theories can be located at the
upper left-hand corner which, however, may commit the (orthodox) Marxist fallacy
of drawing conclusions directly from the ‘objective’ macro-social situation (a ‘class in
itself’, ‘Klasse an sich’) to the explanandum on the macro-level at the upper right-hand
side (dotted line) without taking into account the extent of actual class consciousness
(‘class for itself’, ‘Klasse fuer sich’) and the actual organization of interest groups on
the meso-level (for the latter see also Chapter 12 below). By contrast, ‘methodological
individualists’ start at the micro-level, often based on very strong assumptions as to
the ‘rational’ behaviour of actors, for example about a ‘homo oeconomicus’ in eco-
nomic theory maximizing his/her material benefits or voters making their choice
according to such criteria.
Such assumptions can be extended to include a more comprehensive situation of
individual actors as ‘Restricted, Resourceful, Evaluating, Expecting, Maximizing Men’
(or women) (RREEMM) in Hartmut Esser’s (1993) sense. Further aspects concern
various social Identities (family ties, group membership, ethnic, religious communities,
etc.) and more Individualizing tendencies in modern societies leading to assumptions
Macro: Social Situation Explanandum
Meso: framing aggregation
logic of logic of
situation aggregation
Micro: Actor Action

logic of selection
Figure 1.3 Linking levels of analysis

Source: Adapted from Coleman (1990) and Esser (1993)

of RREEIIMM (in German this can be used for a play on words: to make a ‘Reim’
(Engl. rhyme) about something means making sense). ‘Bounded rationality’ at least
takes into account some restrictions on the macro-level (‘opportunity set’, Jon Elster,
1989) or cultural ‘framing’ (see also Chapter 4.3 below).
The meso-level on the right-hand side poses specific problems of aggregation, for
example for ‘collective actions’ (Mancur Olson, 1965) with the possibility of ‘free-
riding’ by those who are not part of a particular organization but nevertheless share
the benefits (for example of union activities). Similarly, assumptions of rationality or
individual preferences at the micro-level cannot be aggregated so easily and ‘collective
rationality’ may differ from individual ones (Simon, 1996, Chapter 2).
Dynamic and multi-level sequences

This whole pattern can, of course, also be sequenced showing dynamic interactions,
but also sometimes a certain ‘path dependency’ over time. This means that previous
conditions shape subsequent events, for example from one election to another, and the
historical context often has a long-lasting impact.
Similarly, states can be conceived as actors in the global context linking national
conditions to interactions on a worldwide level (Figure 1.4). In this way, various levels,
including the supra-national and international ones, can be integrated. When states
are actors in this context, assumptions about ‘rational’ behaviour, for example with
regard to nuclear deterrence theories (see Chapter 15), may be even more appropriate
than at the level of individual citizens.
World:
macro-level explanandum
logic meso-level logic

of situation of aggregation
micro-level
actor behavior
logic of selection
State:
macro-level explanandum
logic meso-level logic

of situation of aggregation
micro-level
actor behavior
logic of selection
Figure 1.4 Multi-level analysis in a global context – state and global

interactions

Approaches to causality
With regard to this epistemological background different methodological approaches
to establish causality can be distinguished. In the empirical social sciences these
depend on a ‘realist’, ‘critical-rational’ epistemological perspective and the level and
number of observations (evidence).
Hume’s regularity model

The most basic approach has been developed concerning the ‘object’ dimension in the
natural sciences derived from a highly deterministic (‘clock-like’) perspective. David
Hume (1748) summarized this ‘regularity model’ of causation by listing three condi-
tions to be necessary to speak of a strict (and testable) causality:
•• contiguity (the cause and effect must be contiguous in time and space);
•• succession (the cause must be prior to the effect);
•• constant conjunction (there must be a constant union between the cause and the
effect).
In this way many causes (independent variables or conditions) and effects (dependent
variables or outcomes) in physics or non-organic chemistry, for example, can be
explained.
John Stuart Mill (1843), who shared this view, elaborated this further by setting up
a list of rules (‘canons’) for strictly controlled research designs. The first is the ‘method
of agreement’: one factor in common, same outcome. In his own words: ‘If two or
more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in
common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or
effect) of the given phenomenon’ (5th ed., 1862, vol. I: 428). The second is the ‘method
of difference’: absence of one factor, different outcome. ‘If an instance in which the
phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur,
have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former;
the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or
an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon’ (ibid.: 429). The third, the
‘indirect method of difference’ applies the method of agreement once before and once
after an event (for example an external stimulus, an additional substance). This single
additional factor is then seen as responsible for the changed outcome (a simple appli-
cation of Mill’s methods in daily life can be found in Moses and Knutsen, 2012,
Chapter 5, for example).
Altogether, Mill’s methods are based on mechanical and deterministic, ‘naturalistic’
relationships. There will be no ‘discoveries’ without including ‘true’ factors. This
means, they presuppose a testable model or theory and are not purely inductive.
Nevertheless, they are useful ‘falsification’ devices (Karl Popper). They are also useful
for identifying more general ‘conditions of occurrence’ of a phenomenon (Cohen and
Nagel, 1934) at the macro-level (upper left-hand side in ‘Coleman’s bathtub’).
In the social sciences we often find a plurality of causes and probabilistic relation-
ships. Such causes can be multiple or ‘conjunctural’ in J.S. Mill’s sense, which means
that several combinations of factors may lead to the same outcome (‘equifinality’).

Mill himself was very much aware of this when he wrote: ‘The science of man in
society…, the actions of collective masses of mankind, and the various phenomena
which constitute social life … are more complex; because the number of concurrent
causes, all exercising more or less influence on the total effect, is greater, in the pro-
portion in which a nation, or the species at large, exposes a greater surface to the
operation of agents, psychological and physical, than any single individual’ (5th ed.,
1862: 456). He was also very critical of the state of political science in his time:
‘Students in politics … attempted to study the pathology and therapeutics of the
social body, before they had laid the necessary foundation in his physiology; to cure
disease, without understanding the laws of health’ (ibid.: 457).
Hume’s regularity model can be specified further by identifying necessary and suf-
ficient conditions. Necessary conditions are always present for a certain outcome, i.e.
in set-theoretical terms the outcome is a subset of the condition. Sufficient conditions
explain the outcome by themselves, and there can be several, but they may not be
necessary (i.e. the condition is a subset of the outcome). For example, to hold regular
elections can be considered to be a necessary condition for modern democracies. By
themselves these are, however, not sufficient to define a democracy because other ele-
ments (e.g. the fact that elections are free and fair, the respect of basic human and
political rights guaranteed by the rule of law) have to be present as well. We may also
distinguish different types of democracy (e.g. presidential or parliamentary systems
which exhibit a different combination of factors).
In a more abstract sense, this can be represented by the following formula, which
comprises three terms for different cases:
ABC (cases 1, 3, 5) + AbC (cases 2, 4, 6) + AD (cases 7, 8) → outcome
(in Boolean algebra the + symbol here stands for a logical OR, the presence of a con-
dition or high values are rendered by upper-case letters, the absence of a factor or low
levels are written in lower-case letters).
This means that either the combination of factors A and B and C, or A and b and
C, or A and D lead to the same outcome for the respective cases. Each term is a suf-
ficient constellation of conditions for this outcome, but since there are several terms,
none of them is necessary. Only A in all these constellations is a necessary condition
(occurring in all of them), but is in itself insufficient to explain the outcome (it always
goes together with some other conditions). This is called an INUS situation where we
find ‘Insufficient, but Necessary parts of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition’
(Mackie, 1965). An alternative combinatorial cause is a SUIN one which is a
Sufficient, but Unnecessary part of a factor that is Insufficent but Necessary for an
outcome. Necessary and sufficient conditions can also be calculated with the help of
‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis’ (QCA: see Chapter 2 below).
Statistical models
When we move from the deterministic ‘clock-like’ world more towards a probabilistic
one (as also in nuclear physics), causal relationships cannot be ascertained with such
certainty any more. Instead, they are based on a very large number of observations as
a proportion of the total (occurring almost always) or probability calculations of

random samples drawn from a large universe of cases assuming a ‘normal’ distribu-
tion (Gauss, 1809). Here, usually a linear additive model of causation is assumed as
expressed in a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, the ‘work-
horse’ of quantitative analysis in the social sciences (see Chapter 2 below).
Random selection of cases can also be used in controlled group experiments where
two sub-groups of a larger population are drawn at random and can, therefore, be
assumed to be largely identical on major demographic and other characteristics. If
then an external stimulus is introduced to one group and not the other, as for example
a medical treatment, and the outcome in that group changes (e.g. the disease is cured),
then the change in outcome can be attributed to this stimulus. This resembles Mill’s
method of difference, but is now based on probability calculations and allowing for
an error term. Such procedures have become common practice in some fields and are
considered the ‘gold standard’ of quasi-experimental research (Cook and Campbell,
1979). In reality, however, such experiments face some technical and ethical limita-
tions. For example, how to find a sufficiently large group of patients with the same
disease from which two random samples can be drawn? Similarly, under what circum-
stances can it be ethically justified to withhold a promising therapy from a group of
patients, in particular if the hoped-for cure may take a long time and some patients
may die before the end of the experiment?
In the social sciences, such experiments may be less dramatic or fatal than in medi-
cine, but the experimental situation can be a very artificial one. For example, in
behavioural economics or political science one randomly selected group of persons
(often college students) may be given a certain incentive (often cash rewards) to induce
a certain behaviour, which is not offered to another randomly selected group. Then
the different outcome is observed and, if there is a difference, attributed to the effect
of the stimulus. This can be done in closely controlled ‘laboratory’ situations testing
the assumptions of a specific model in economics or political science (Morton and
Williams, 2010). Some actual ‘field’ experiments may also be possible, for example
assessing the effects of different forms of political campaigning by randomly selecting
different target groups and exposing one to a particular form of campaigning
(like door-to-door canvassing) and not the other (Green and Gerber, 2008). These can
be consciously designed, but they may also happen ‘naturally’, for example, when one
community is exposed to a particular event and not another ‘very similar’ one leading
to a different outcome. This can be treated ‘as if’ a random selection of the two groups
had occurred. A similar situation arises when attitudes of the same group of persons
are assessed before or after a major economic crisis or political event (e.g. ‘9/11’) lead-
ing to a change in outcome. This can be measured at the micro-level by survey
research, but changes at the macro- (political system-) level may also be attributed to
major crises like the ‘Great Depression’ in the interwar period. This, once more, resem-
bles Mill’s ‘indirect method of difference’, but some of the stricter assumptions of
controlling for all possible influences have, of course, to be further relaxed in such a
situation.
Strictly speaking, such randomly selected groups are never completely identical. The
same individual cannot be a member of the group receiving the treatment and of the
control group at the same time. Here we speak of ‘counterfactual’ reasoning about
phenomena that did not occur. In a broader ontological sense this means we are speak-
ing of a different ‘counterfactual’ world (Lewis, 1986). Statistically, this problem of

impossible-to-observe causal effects has been dealt with by the Neymann-Rubin

Holland model, which replaces them by average causal effects over a population of
units (Brady, 2010).
Small and medium N analyses

When we deal with even smaller numbers, for example comparing entire countries,
societies, and economies at the macro-level where no random samples can be drawn,
other more recently developed techniques can be used. One is a derivation and further
advancement of Mill’s canons, again in a set-theoretical sense. Case selection then
must be determined by other criteria:
•• purposeful selection of cases based on theoretical and substantive concerns;

•• cases must be drawn from a sufficiently homogenous universe in order to be
comparable;
•• within that universe maximum heterogeneity should be achieved to allow for the
greatest possible variance and range of explanations.
‘Most similar’ and ‘most different’ systems designs (Przeworski and Teune, 1970) are
then possible. Complexity can then be reduced by identifying factors related to the
respective outcome: ‘most similar systems – different outcome’ (MSDO) and ‘most
different systems – same outcome’ (MDSO) research designs (Berg-Schlosser and De
Meur, 1994). This principle is illustrated in Figure 1.5 for three cases (represented by
the circles). Only in the shaded areas can possible causes for the respective outcome
be looked for. All the white zones can be excluded and are ‘controlled’ in this way.
This procedure pre-supposes, however, that ‘most similar’ and ‘most different’ cases
can actually be identified. This has to be based on extensive historical and contempo-
rary case knowledge and has to be operationalized in a systematic manner in order to
be inter-subjectively transparent. One such operationalization has been provided by
Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (1994, 1997) based on ‘Boolean’ distances (i.e. values of
1 or 0) on a large number of variables in a comprehensive ‘systems’ framework. In this
way, the focus of attention can be narrowed down considerably (like with a micro-
scope in biology) and the actual factors leading to the respective outcome may be
identified. It must be kept in mind, however, that this procedure is just a specific tech-
nique and will only lead to meaningful results if, like with Mill’s canons, the ‘true’
factors have actually been included in the analysis. Thus, ‘spurious’ relationships, as
MDSO MSDO
Figure 1.5 Matching and contrasting of cases, MDSO- and MSDO-designs

with statistical correlations, may also occur. It is, therefore, essential that such findings
are confronted with intensive case knowledge and can be confirmed or refuted by the
respective country experts in a constant ‘dialogue between theory and data’ (Ragin,
1987). Such results remain limited to the actual cases and period examined (‘internal
validity’). They can be further validated by examining other constellations of cases in
time and space. In the longer run, empirical theory of the respective field of investiga-
tion can be strengthened in this way (enhancing its ‘external validity’).
In a similar ‘small and medium N’ situation operates, to the largest part, ‘Qualitative
Comparative Analysis’ (QCA) in its different ‘crisp-set’, ‘multi-value’, and ‘fuzzy set’
variants. This is based on set theory and Boolean algebra as developed by Charles
Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008) and his collaborators (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009; Schneider
and Wagemann, 2012). Here, the initial complexity of cases is reduced by placing
them and the conditions leading supposedly to a particular outcome in a ‘truth table’.
At this stage, often already important contradictions (cases with identical conditions
having different outcomes) become apparent. These have to be eliminated as much as
possible, for example by testing other hypotheses and improved theory (see also
Chapter 3 below).
Case studies and process tracing

Large N (statistical) controlled experimental and smaller N comparative studies can
show strong relationships between certain variables or combinations of factors, but
the precise causal mechanisms at work remain in a black box. These can be ascer-
tained by detailed ‘causal process observations’ (CPO) and process tracing within
individual cases. Like in a detective story, the ‘true’ culprit and the precise sequence of
events must be found. Here, however, the research interest does not consist of explain-
ing a single event (the outbreak of a war, a revolution, a political assassination, etc.)
in an idiographic manner, but coming up with a theoretical explanation which is valid
for many similar circumstances (Beach, 2012; Blatter and Haverland, 2012). A num-
ber of tests, with varying strengths, can be employed for this purpose. The first, ‘straw
in the wind’ can point into a certain direction (like a statistical correlation) and affirm
the relevance of a hypothesis, but does not by itself confirm it. If this test fails, the
hypothesis may not be relevant, but it cannot be decisively eliminated. A ‘hoop’ test,
by contrast, has to be passed as a necessary condition which by itself, however, may
not be sufficient. A ‘smoking gun’ test provides very strong evidence, but cannot yet
exclude other possibilities. A ‘doubly decisive’ test, finally, establishes both necessary
and sufficient conditions as proof for the final outcome eliminating all other hypoth-
eses (these tests were proposed by Van Evera, 1997 and systematized by Bennett,
2010). In this way, increasingly strong evidence for a particular theoretical explana-
tion can be gathered.
Another approach in this context is a Bayesian one which builds upon previous
experiences and in this way increases the confidence in particular findings. As Derek
Beach puts it: ‘New empirical evidence updates our belief in the validity of the hypoth-
esis, contingent upon: 1) our prior confidence based on existing research, 2) the
probative value of the evidence in relation to the hypothesis, and 3) the amount of
trust we can place in the evidences’ (Beach, 2015, Chapter 5). This can also be
expressed in quantitative probabilistic terms (Jackman, 2011).

In actual practice, however, stronger theories based on case studies have remained
relatively rare so far and their actual scope (range in time and space) has to be deter-
mined. One such possibility consists in combining the findings of intensive within-case
process tracing with broader comparative small N or even large N statistical studies
to establish the external validity of results in multi-method research (Bergman, 2008;
Berg-Schlosser, 2012).
It is important to note that the arrow of causality can go in different directions
according to the research question and the method chosen. The standard model,
mostly in quantitative studies, attempts to establish the causes (independent variables)
of an effect (outcome, dependent variable). The reverse, often found in more qualita-
tive and ‘holistic’ approaches, is also possible: what are the effects of causes? The first
approach may, for example, attempt to identify broader historical, social or economic
conditions for the emergence of democracies. The second then can analyse the effects
of democratic regimes (as an independent variable) on social welfare, good govern-
ance, etc. (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012, Chapter 3).
Altogether, in our view, there is no single best approach with regard to broader
epistemological and methodological concerns. Everything depends on the kind of
research problem and the possible forms of reasoning and evidence at hand. From
a constructivist perspective a convincing narrative may enhance a deeper under-
standing of the problem. By contrast, a naturalist position seeks to establish
deterministic or probabilistic relationships with clear-cut patterns of causality,
which also allow for more concrete predictions. We advocate a pluralist and eclectic
perspective which must be aware of the respective strengths and limitations of our
approaches and tools. Such an attitude is already reflected in Francis Bacon’s (1620)
metaphor of ants, spiders and bees when he advocated a middle course of scientific
inquiry (see Box 1.1).
Box 1.1 Francis Bacon’s ants,

spiders and bees
Those who have handled sciences have been either men of
experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are
like the ant, they only collect and use; the reasoners resem-
ble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance.
But the bee takes a middle course: it gathers its material
from the flowers of the garden and of the field, but transforms
and digests it by a power of its own. (Francis Bacon, 1620,
Book 1: 95)
Conclusions
This chapter has provided an overview of the major epistemological foundations of
political science and the various approaches based on them. In this way, the different

emphases of these approaches can be characterized and located more closely. This
refers to the major dimensions covered, different levels of analysis, varying concepts
of causality and the number of cases included. Against this background more specific
research designs and methods are presented in the following chapter.
Questions
1 What are the relationships between ontology, epistemology, and
methodology in the social sciences? Give an example from a ma jor
study with which you are familiar.
2 To what extent can social research findings be generalized? What
are the limitations?
3 In which ways do researchers interact with their substance matter?
What are the advantages and dangers?
Further reading
Moses JW and Knutsen TL (2012) Ways of knowing: Competing methodologies and methods
in social and political research (2nd ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan. An easy-to-read,
well-argued overview of the epistemological and methodological foundations and contend-
ing approaches in social research.
Jackson PT (2011) The conduct of inquiry in International Relations. Philosophy of science and
its implications for the study of world politics. London, New York: Routledge. A ‘deeper’
look into the ontological and epistemological aspects of social research and their variations
with a specific application to International Relations.
Coleman JS (1990) Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
This ground-laying work provides a general model of sociological explanations exploring, in
particular, the relations between the macro- (systems, structures) and the micro- (actors)
levels of analysis.
Elster J (1989) Nuts and bolts for the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. A detailed discussion of major elements and causal relationships in the social
sciences.
King G, Keohane RO and Verba S (1994) Designing social inquiry. Princeton, NJ. Princeton
University Press. ‘KKV’, the bible of social inquiry derived from a quantitative empirical
perspective.
Brady HE and Collier D (2010) Rethinking social inquiry: Diverse tools, shared standard (2nd
ed.) Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. The antidote to ‘KKV’ emphasizing diversified qualita-
tive and comparative approaches.
Weblinks
This portal by the International Political Science Association, IPSA, represents the largest collec-
tion of websites related to political science. It is maintained and constantly updated at the
University of Naples/Italy. These websites are characterized in detail and evaluated by the
editors of the portal facilitating easy access and online research: www.ipsa.org/ipsa-portal

IPSA Research Committee 1 on ‘Concepts and Methods in Political Science’: www.concepts-

methods.org/
APSA Section 10. Political methodology: http://polmeth.wustl.edu/ (mostly representing quan-
titative approaches)
APSA Section 37: Qualitative and Multi-method research: http://www1.maxwell.syr.edu/moyni-
han/cqrm/APSA_s_Qualitative_and_Multi-Method_Research_Section/

2
Research designs and
methods
Key terms
Case studies Qualitative Comparative
Experiments Analysis (QCA)
(natural, field...) Regressions
Idiographic Reliability
Necessary Sufficient conditions
conditions Survey research
Nomothetic Validity (internal, external)
Introduction: Basic distinctions

With regard to this epistemological and methodological background, a large variety
of specific social science methods and techniques have been developed. These continue
to be further refined and supplemented. In this chapter, only a broad overview can be
presented. More details must be left to the respective literature and textbooks (e.g.
Babbie and Mouton, 2001; Pennings et al., 2003; Marsh and Stoker, 2010). We begin
by outlining some basic distinctions in the epistemological debates and then turn to
specific research designs and some of the most commonly applied methods. Their
specific features and emphases are summarized at the end.
First of all, idiographic and nomothetic methods can be distinguished (Windelband,
1901). The former refer to single cases or events, which are described and analysed in
great detail. This is the task of historians, for example, who are interested in a particu-
lar event or period and proceed like a criminal investigator in a detective story to find
out ‘what really has happened’ (Leopold von Ranke, cf. Vierhaus, 1977). The latter
attempt to establish more general patterns, regularities or even ‘laws’ across a large
and potentially universal number of cases (‘nomos’ in ancient Greek means law).
Here, we are mainly concerned with more general patterns and regularities to be
found in the social sciences, even though, as stated in the previous chapter, given the
‘malleability’ of our subject matter, more universal ‘laws’ are unlikely to be discovered.
But even studies of single cases, as pointed out before, can lead to a ‘deeper’ and
stronger theory building.
03_Morlino_CH-02.indd 31 12/22/2016 3:56:31 PM

Another distinction concerns what is often called the qualitative-quantitative divide

in the social sciences. Here again, basic epistemological positions come into play. At
one extreme, purely ‘constructivist’ positions deny any broader generalities. In the last
resort, they ‘ground’ their theories in only subjective perceptions. ‘Grounded theory’
can, however, serve as a first step in a more thorough qualitative investigation (Glaser
and Strauss, 1967). At the other extreme, purely quantitative methods based on large
numbers of cases and statistical procedures attempt to approximate the universality
of the ‘natural’ sciences. Here, we argue once more for a ‘middle ground’ in the social
sciences and, in particular, for political science at a macro- (country-) level of analysis
given the necessarily limited number of cases worldwide at any given point in time.
Even though some basic epistemological distinctions and different ‘logics’ remain
concerning this divide (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012), recent developments have shown
that quantitative and qualitative methods can often be meaningfully combined in
‘mixed methods’ or ‘multi-methods’ procedures (Bergman, 2008; Brady and Collier,
2010; Berg-Schlosser, 2012).
On the qualitative side, more ‘interpretative’ methods such as hermeneutics or dis-
course analysis can also be found. These mainly apply to the ‘humanities’
(‘Geisteswissenschaften’, Dilthey, 1883), but have some applications in political science
as well. They attempt to ‘understand’ the meaning of texts, symbols or visual docu-
ments rather than to ‘explain’ some social facts or events. Such texts can be speeches
of politicians, for example, political campaign documents, or national symbols like
anthems. These are analysed often as to their ‘hidden’ meaning and their effects on the
perception by others in a particular context. Such procedures pose some problems of
inter-subjective transparency in a ‘hermeneutic circle’, but these can be overcome to
some extent by referring to more general accepted standards in this regard (Rabinow
and Sullivan, 1987).
A further common distinction refers to deductive or inductive forms of reasoning
and theory building. The former proceeds by deducing from certain given assumptions
or axioms, often by mathematical transformations following established rules, more
concrete theorems concerning the ‘real’ world. In the social sciences this kind of theo-
rizing can be found, for example, in orthodox Marxist positions when the ‘laws of
history’ are deducted from its basic ‘historical-materialist’ premises (Klaus and Buhr,
1972) notwithstanding any other empirical evidence. Another deductive form of the-
ory, which has found more widespread applications in political science in recent
decades, is the ‘rational choice’ approach. Similar to strong assumptions in macro-
economic theory, scholars of this persuasion base their insights on the assumption of
utility maximization by individual actors and its consequences, for example, in elec-
toral behaviour or international conflict situations (Riker, 1962; Axelrod, 1984; see
also Chapter 4 below). Like others, this approach has found its critics (e.g. Green and
Shapiro, 1993), but also, in different variants of game theory for example, more con-
crete applications (e.g. Scharpf, 1997).
The opposite, inductive procedure, attempts to build theory from the bottom up.
Very strictly speaking, a ‘pure’ induction, starting from nothing so to speak, is logi-
cally not possible, as Karl Popper (1972) has convincingly argued, because any kind
of thinking and investigation already starts with some basic notions and concepts.
However, as is the case in many more exploratory studies, a very low level of

RESEARCH DESIGNS AND METHODS 33
concept formation and deduction can often be found in the social sciences from
which some broader insights can be gained in a process of ‘analytic induction’
(Blalock, 1984) moving up the ‘ladder of abstraction’ (Sartori, 1970; see Table 2.1).
There, a lower level concept like ‘parliamentary democracy’ can be incorporated in
a medium level one like ‘democracies’ which, in turn, is contained in a universal
level concept like ‘political system’ or ‘political regime’. Finer-graded quantitative
comparisons then only should be made at the same level of abstraction (per genus
et differentiam).
A final important distinction, which is related to the different forms of causality
discussed in Chapter 1, concerns experimental and observational studies. The former
try to emulate a strictly controlled laboratory-like research situation where the
researcher herself introduces a stimulus as a potential causal factor to determine
which effect it has on the observed outcome. The latter, which are much more frequent
in the social sciences, can only observe certain events and possible causal relationships
without the researcher being able to actively interfere in this process.
In the following, we will briefly present some research designs and methods that are
more commonly used in political science in an explanatory sense depending on the
numbers of cases and variables and, in some instances, the time frame, which is also
analysed.
Table 2.1 Sartori’s ladder of abstraction
Ma jor Comparative Logical and Empirical

Levels of Abstraction Scope and Purpose Properties of Concepts
HL: High Level Categories Cross-area comparisons Maximal extension

Universal among heterogeneous Minimal intension
conceptualizations contexts (global theory) Definition by negation
ML: Medium Level Intra-area comparisons Balance of denotation
Categories General among relatively with connotation
conceptualizations and homogeneous contexts Definition by analysis,
taxonomies (middle range theory) i.e. per genus et
differentiam
LL: Low Level Categories Country by country Maximal intension
Configurative analysis (narrow-gauge Minimal extension
Conceptualizations theory) Contextual definition
Source: Sartori (1970): 1044
Research designs and applicable methods

Each scientific investigation begins with a research question. This is like a puzzle or a
mystery; an ‘enigma’, which has to be solved and which bothers scientists. This is
absolutely crucial and has to be based on the ‘state of the art’ in any particular sub-
field of political science. On this basis then, some central hypotheses specifying this
question have to be established. These may later be revised or modified, but they are
a necessary starting point. In this way, it also can be made clear how the proposed

research differs from previous work and where the innovations of a particular project
in terms of new concepts, new methods or new data (other cases, other periods) may
lie. That something has not been done before is not a sufficient reason, this may be
well justified under existing circumstances.
The next step then consists of choosing an appropriate research design. This is
determined by the number of cases and the kinds of variables to be investigated con-
cerning a certain outcome (the ‘explanandum’). As a third dimension, variations over
time in a dynamic sense are investigated in some studies as well. The basic choice of
such designs is illustrated in the following Figure 2.1:
Number of cases
1 2 Small “1” Large “m” n
k World
system
Large “j” Paired Comparative CnVk
Number of variables
Comparison Method
Description
C2Vj C1Vj
C1Vj
Small “i” Statistical

Method
CmVi
2 Bivariate descriptive classification

1 World system Classification
C1V1
Figure 2.1 Location of research designs and applicable methods

Source: Aarebrot and Bakka in Berg-Schlosser and Mueller-Rommel (2006): 65
Single case studies investigating a large number of variables (C1,Vj) can provide a ‘thick
description’ in Clifford Geertz’s (1973) sense. At one extreme, a study may deal with a
single case and a single major causal factor considered, as Immanuel Wallerstein (1974)
did when he analysed the development of capitalism in the ‘world system’ since about the
sixteenth century. At the other extreme lie studies which attempt to cover as many cases
as possible, for example, all UN member states, and a very large number of possible
explanatory variables (Cn, Vk). The studies by Meadows et al. (1970) and the GLOBUS
project at the Science Center in Berlin (Eberwein and Deutsch, 1990) were of this kind. In
between lie methods which are truly comparative. These may start with paired compari-
sons (C2, Vj) as a minimum, followed by comparisons of a small or medium number of
relatively complex cases (Cl, Vj), and large N studies suitable for statistical procedures
looking at only relatively few variables at a time (Cm, Vi). These numbers indicate only
rough orders of magnitude, but they determine the kind of procedures in terms of case
and variable selection. To these we turn now in the following parts of this chapter. Only
the major principles of each method can be outlined here, details have to be left to the
more specialized literature mentioned below and the respective textbooks.

Case studies
•• Purely descriptive, idiographic. These are not theory-guided and may not have any
immediate theoretical relevance, but they may possibly serve at a later stage as a
data source or an illustration for certain hypotheses and theory-building.
•• Interpretative. These constitute an application or illustration of already existing
theories.
•• Hypothesis-creating, exploratory. These can serve to develop and deepen certain
ideas for further research.
•• Theory-confirming. These can be used as further empirical evidence, but, strictly
speaking, cannot definitely ‘verify’ a particular theory.
•• Theory-refuting. These can falsify a more widely accepted theory by showing at
least one or more instances where this does not apply (a black swan among many
white ones in Popper’s famous example).
•• Deviant cases. These also deviate from a particular theory, but they may serve
to modify and refine it leading to a broader and better assessment. Such deviant
cases can be particularly helpful in comparative politics. Case studies are, even
more than other methods, faced with the dilemma of doing justice to a highly
complex research situation, but including all relevant variables in a systematic
way which then can serve for further comparisons and theory-building. All too
often the analytic structure of case studies remains insufficient and the sources
used and the techniques employed are too divergent for meaningful comparisons.
In John Gerring’s somewhat more demanding ‘minimal’ sense a case study is,
therefore, defined as ‘the intensive study of a single unit … for the purpose of
understanding a larger class of similar units’ (Gerring, 2007: 96). Their valid-
ity, at least initially, is only ‘internal’, but in terms of their often more dynamic
‘process-tracing’ they may establish more general ‘causal mechanisms’ (see also
Chapter 1 above).
The actual observational techniques employed in such studies can vary greatly.
These range from archaeological findings and ‘interpretative’ accounts of texts and
other sources to quantitative document analysis, direct interviews of relevant actors,
and more general ‘participant observation’.
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

When we move from single case studies to a somewhat larger number of cases, MSDO/
MDSO procedures (see Chapter 1 above) and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
are the methods of choice. These have been developed during the last few decades and
are more appropriate in small and medium N situations rather than broader statistical
procedures based on a larger number of cases and often on random sampling assuming
a normal distribution. They stand in the tradition of J.S. Mill’s ‘canons’, but represent
an important step forward. They are based on Boolean algebra and set theory.
‘Qualitative’ here only refers to the presence or absence of conditions, and should not
be confused with ‘qualitative’ (interpretative) methods. ‘Configurational’ methods may
be the better term (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). Given the ‘small N – many variables’

dilemma in such a research situation, complexity here is reduced by systematic pairwise

comparisons of all potential causal factors (conditions, independent variables) with
regard to a particular outcome by employing Boolean (i.e. binary) algebra.
For this purpose, cases are first placed in a ‘truth table’ where each line represents
a case and where the columns indicate the kind of conditions (independent variables)
considered with regard to the outcome (in the last column). This may look like the
following example in Table 2.2:
Table 2.2 Truth table, Lipset hypothesis for interwar Europe
CASEID GNPCAP URBANIZA LITERACY INDLAB Outcome
SWE, FRA, AUS 1 0 1 1 C

FLN, HUN, POL, EST 0 0 1 0 C
BEL, NET, UK, GER 1 1 1 1 C
CZE 0 1 1 1 1
ITA, ROM, POR, SPA, GRE 0 0 0 0 0
IRE 1 0 1 0 1
This table represents a test of the so-called ‘Lipset hypothesis’, which postulates a
strong positive relationship between a high level of socio-economic development
(expressed by indicators of GNP per capita, and levels of urbanization, literacy, and
industrialization) with the existence and stability of democracies (Lipset, 1959). In this
example, the conditions first had to be dichotomized (high or low) in a Boolean way
and then related to the similarly dichotomized outcome (here the survival or break-
down of democracies in interwar Europe). This table already reveals a number of
contradictory constellations (outcome C); for example, Sweden and France as surviv-
ing democracies showing the same configuration of factors as Austria (a breakdown
case). This is already an important test and such contradictions should be eliminated
as much as possible by better theory, other conditions, etc. On this basis then the
conditions for the respective outcome (1 or 0) can be further reduced. This is done
according to the following rule:
If two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce
the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two
expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a
simpler, combined expression. (Ragin, 1987: 93)
Example: A*B*C + A*B*c = O; reduced to: A*B = O
This means if two cases characterized by the conditions A*B*C (the * symbol here
stands for a logical AND in Boolean algebra) or (the + stands for a logical OR) A*B*c
have the same outcome (O) then the condition C, whether present or absent, does not
affect the outcome and can be removed. This rule is implemented in the algorithm of
the available software for this purpose (e.g. TOSMANA, ‘TOols for Small N Analysis’
or fs-QCA, ‘fuzzy set QCA’) and repeats this procedure many times depending on the

number of cases and the number of conditions which are analysed simultaneously. In
this way some ‘prime implicants’ are extracted which represent the shortest logical
expression for the cases and the conditions analysed. These may also reveal a ‘conjunc-
tural causality’, i.e. different combinations of factors for different groups of cases
having the same outcome. This can be done with the help of the available software
(www.compasss.org/software.htm).
In the Lipset example, this resulted in the following solution for the breakdown
cases: natprodc * literacy * indlab (ITA, ROM, POR, SPA, GRE), i.e. the combination
of a low level of GNP, literacy and industrialization (indicated by lower case letters)
is linked to the breakdown of democracy in Italy, Romania, Portugal, Spain and
Greece, which confirms the Lipset hypothesis in these instances. For the positive out-
comes such a clear-cut result could not be obtained (partly due to the many remaining
contradictions) (Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell, 2002, Chapter 13).
More recently, in addition to ‘crisp-set’ QCA, as in the example above, some more
flexible procedures have been developed which no longer depend on dichotomized
variables alone. Multi-value QCA allows for several values on the independent vari-
ables (Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser, 2009) which is most appropriate for categorical
scales, and fuzzy set QCA can handle multiple values and continuous scales for both
the conditions and the outcomes (Ragin, 2008; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).
Regressions
Regressions have become the ‘workhorse’ of statistical analyses both on the macro-
and the micro-levels. They show the average effect of one or several independent
variables on the dependent one as in OLS- (ordinary least squares) regressions and are
an invaluable tool for many purposes, especially in large N situations (see also
Chapter 1 above). The standard formula looks as follows:
Y = α + β1X1 + ….+ ε,
where Y is the dependent variable, α a constant where the regression line crosses the
Y-axis, X1, etc. the independent variables with the respective β coefficients, and ε the
remaining error term (in the probabilistic world). Each independent variable in this
way adds some more causal explanation. The total variance explained is summarized
by a formula for R square.
This has been useful for many purposes, but it is important to note that in regres-
sions like this only the overall average values across all cases analysed are taken into
account. Some specific ‘outliers’ are often ignored. Similarly, problems of multicollin-
earity (interactions among the independent variables) or endogeneity (interaction with
the error term) may occur (Blalock, 1979, Chapter 24).
This procedure can also be illustrated in scatter plots as in the following example.
This is taken from a study which sought to explain the emergence of welfare states in
Western Europe in the late nineteenth century based on the hypothesis that there was
a strong relationship between the strength of left-wing (socialist and social-democratic)
parties (the independent variable on the X-axis) and the public provision of welfare
measures and social security (the dependent variable on the Y-axis: Alber, 1982, see
also Berg-Schlosser and Quenter,1996).

This relationship is shown in the scatter plot of Figure 2.2:
50
R2 = 0,4042
Social Insurance Scope 1900
Germany
40
30
20
Great Britain
10 Austria Denmark
France Belgium
Norway Schweiz
Sweden
Finland Italy
Netherlands
0
0 10 20 30
Left Vote 1900 in %
Figure 2.2 Regression left vote – scope of social insurance

Source: Berg-Schlosser and Quenter (1996): 14
Here, a fairly strong relationship, as expressed by the value for R2 as a summary

measure for the overall variance explained (here about 40%), becomes apparent. This
example also shows, however, some of the inherent dangers and pitfalls in this proce-
dure. An inspection of this scatter plot should have warned the author that this result
is largely due to the position of a single case, Germany, as an outlier. If this case is
removed the result falls flat.
‘Robust’ statistics, therefore, proceed more carefully. In Figure 2.3, for example, the
scatter plot clearly shows some form of ‘conjunctural’ causation. So, the lower part
definitely reveals more relevant relationships, and different explanations must be
sought for the two constellations of factors.
In the meantime, as in other fields, many developments and refinements have
occurred. Multiple regression analysis, probit and logit models which allow for a
dichotomized dependent variable, non-linear structural equations models, and many
more variants of this basic approach have become commonplace (Kellstedt and
Whitten, 2013). As with the other procedures, researchers must be aware of where
these are most appropriate and where their respective strengths and limitations lie.
Survey research
Since the behaviouralist revolution (see also Chapter 1 above), survey research
has become the most commonly applied method in the social sciences. Today, it
is applied practically on a daily basis in many areas of social research, for exam-
ple in election studies, public opinion polls on social and political attitudes and
values, media studies, marketing, etc. It proceeds at the micro-level where poten-
tially a huge number of cases (respondents) is available, and attempts to infer
from a relatively small sample drawn on a random basis of, say, 1,000 persons
to the universe of an entire (adult) population of many millions. By and large,

y
Are these points special?
x
(a) Least-squares fit: average opinion of all points (noisy)
y
What story do these
points tell?
x
(b) Highly robust fit: clear opinion of majority of points
Figure 2.3 Robust statistics

Source: Hampel et al. (1986): 5
since the first election studies (Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960) this
approach has been very successful. It is based on a specific logic (Rosenberg,
1968) and usually proceeds by its own ‘cookbook’ (Babbie, 1973) techniques.
In actual practice, however, it is faced with a (to some extent increasing) number of
problems.
This begins with the mode of interviewing. Initially, mailed questionnaires and
face-to-face interviews were used most commonly. Later, interviews were conducted
more often by telephone and, today, cell phones or the internet. This, however,
implies that you have a relatively stable and accessible universe of cases to start
from. Is there a population register with up-to-date addresses? Which percentage of
the population in various countries is actually covered by modern means of com-
munication and are these data (often from private companies) generally accessible?
These and similar problems strongly affect the representativeness of the samples
interviewed (Johnston, 2008).
Random sampling is based on the assumption of a normal distribution, which is
achieved in this way and allows for the calculation of levels of probability (usually
95 per cent and higher) and margins of error (in the range of plus or minus 2 to 3
percentage points). In actual practice, pure random samples are hard to achieve and
some forms of stratifying and clustering samples are employed. Rates of non-response
in ‘survey saturated’ populations are also increasing, distorting samples even further.
Polling companies, therefore, have developed their own weighting procedures based

on past experiences and deviations from actual (e.g. voting) results to balance these
effects. This may, however, create ‘house effects’ of their own (Jackman, 2012).
Cross-national surveys, in addition, face the problem of the equivalence of the
questions asked. These may often be ‘lost in translation’. Question wordings tap dif-
ferent sentiments and sometimes even identical terms (like ‘state’ or ‘nation’) have
different meanings in different countries (Davidov et al., 2011). Some ‘deeper’, often
unconscious attitudes, which have been shaped by cultural ‘framing’, or subjects
people do not like to talk about similarly can often not be discovered by direct ques-
tions (Fiske and Taylor, 1991).
In spite of all such difficulties, surveys have become a standard tool in electoral
studies and increasingly also in cross-cultural research since the first large-scale cross-
national survey by Almond and Verba (1963; see also Chapter 3 below). Today,
cross-national surveys like the Eurobarometer, the Afrobarometer, the Latinobarometro,
the European Social Survey, etc. are conducted on a regular basis and are used in
political research and for concrete policy applications. Nevertheless, these rich and
increasingly longitudinal databases remain largely under-utilized and under-analysed
after their initial practical purpose has been served. In a similar way, the ‘World Values
Surveys’, which have been conducted in six waves so far since the early 1980s, provide
an enormous source of cross-cultural information covering some 80 countries world-
wide today (Inglehart, 1997; Norris and Inglehart, 2009). Such micro-level findings
can then also be used on the macro- (country-) level in an aggregated form. Certain
cultural areas (‘civilizations’ in Huntington’s (1996) terms) and longer-term develop-
ments can also be mapped in this way (Welzel, 2013).
Conclusion: Overview of different

methodological emphases
The major methodological approaches and their different emphases, which were
exemplified in this chapter, can be summarized as in Table 2.3.
This is not a complete listing of all differences, but it emphasizes the major points
(see also Goertz and Mahoney, 2012, Chapter 17). Most of these are self-explanatory
(see also Chapter 1 above).
Today, in the toolbox of empirically oriented political science a large variety of
methods and techniques is available. Their concrete application depends on the level
of analysis (micro-, meso-, macro-, multi-level), the number of cases to be analysed
(single, several, very many), and the complexity of the problem at hand. Thus, single
case studies allow for a ‘thick description’, but also for more careful ‘process-tracing’
over time. Small and medium N studies retain a higher level of complexity and are
best conducted in a ‘configurational’ manner. Large N studies, preferably based on
random sampling, allow inferences, as for example in survey research, from a limited
number of respondents to large populations. The statistical tools for this purpose usu-
ally attempt to find the smallest (‘most parsimonious’) number of variables explaining
the largest part of the observed outcome. Rather than preferring one approach over
the other, researchers should be aware of these differences and then make their own
choices according to the research problem at hand.

Table 2.3 Different methodological emphases
Case-oriented Diversity-oriented Variable-oriented

Approach (process-tracing) (QCA) (regression)
Names of cases known known (more or less)

anonymous
Number one or very few small to large N
medium N
Case selection purposeful, crucial purposeful, each preferably
cases case relevant random, outliers
often ignored
Complexity high medium to high low (parsimonious)
Range of theory case-specific medium wide, potentially
universal
Validity internal internal (only external
observed cases) (inferences,
Explanation ‘thick’
generalizations)
deterministic ‘thin’, probabilistic
Explanatory causes of effects causes of effects effects of causes
focus
explanation of explanation of estimation of
individual cases individual cases average effect
within-case
cross-case cross-case
Concepts qualitative qualitative and quantitative
concepts quantitative
Measurement maximized
little variation limited variation variation
Conception of processual links necessary and stochastic/
causation (sequence, timing, sufficient causes probabilistic
junctures) holistic multiple, causes, across all
causation conjunctural cases
(convergence of causation
linear,
structures, actors, (different
and events) combinations of additive causation
explanatory (net independent
conditions) effect of each
explanatory
variable)
Questions
1 In which ways can case studies enhance social theory building?
2 What are the trade-offs between complexity and parsimony in
social explanations?
3 How can external validity be achieved?

Further reading
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M, Brady, Henry E. and Collier, David (eds) (2010) The Oxford
handbook of political methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. This is a broad com-
pendium on general methodological issues and specific methods and techniques.
Della Porta, Donatella and Keating, Michael (eds) (2008) Approaches and methodologies in the
social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A ‘pluralist’ presentation of the
major methodological approaches in the social sciences.
Kellstedt, Paul M and Whitten, Guy D (2013) The fundamentals of political science research
(2nd ed.). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. A basic textbook from an
empirical-analytical, mostly quantitative perspective.
Pennings, Paul, Keman, Hans and Kleinnijenhuis, Jan (2006) Doing research in political science.
An introduction to comparative methods and statistics (2nd ed.). London: Sage. A hands-on
textbook on comparative methods and statistics.
Weblinks
Methods training courses can be found at the following institutions and websites:
The Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor/MI.: www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/sumprog/ (quantitative methods)
The Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research (IQMR) at Syracuse University,
Syracuse/N.Y.: www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/cqrm/Institute_for_Qualitative_and_Multi-
Method_Research/
The Summer School in Social Science Data Analysis at the University of Essex, UK: www.essex.
ac.uk/summerschool/ (mostly quantitative)
The (summer and winter) methods schools of the European Consortium for Political Research
(ECPR): http://ecpr.eu/Events/EventTypeDetails.aspx?EventTypeID=5 (qualitative and
quantitative)
The summer schools on ‘Concepts, Methods, and Techniques in Political Science’ of the
International Political Science Association (IPSA): www.ipsa.org/summer-school/ (all qualita-
tive and quantitative); at Sao Paulo, http://summerschool.fflch.usp.br; Stellenbosch/Cape
Town: www.ipsa.org/summer-school/capetown; Singapore: http://methods-school.nus.edu.sg;
Ankara: http://ipsa.sbe.metu.edu.tr/ and Mexico City, www.flacso.edu.mx/.

3
Relationship with
neighbouring
disciplines
Key terms
Epistemology Paradigm
Functionalism Secularization
Holism Structuralism
Interactionism Systems analysis
Liberalism Teleological
Introduction
Political science has gained its identity and autonomy through a long process of
secularization. This development has occurred in varying degrees when we consider
different historical situations where politics was first conceived as a part of theology.
Varying from one cultural area to another, this dependence on theology is still strong
today in Islam or in Judaism, at least in their mainstreams, but can be found also in
Christianity, particularly in its fundamentalist and messianic variants. Theology is
then conceived as an explanatory science, as it pretends to provide the final explana-
tion of political structures and processes. Such an epistemology can clearly be found
in the politics of Alghazali (Persian philosopher, 1058–1111), Ibn Taymyya (Arab
philosopher and lawyer still inspiring the Salafi movements in Islam, 1263–1328), or
Augustine (Christian philosopher, AD 354–430) in Christian thought. Gradually, it
tended to disappear, especially with Aquinas (Christian philosopher, 1225–1274) who
signalled the beginning of the process of emancipation of politics from theology.
Machiavelli (1469–1527) then laid the first foundations to a secular political science,
when he related politics to a new utility, considering the need to develop a new science
of government. Political science was then less a normative concern than an experi-
mental science of good governance: its privileged links to theology lost at least part
of their meaning.
However, this ‘scientific revolution’ remained incomplete. Machiavelli was rather
isolated at his time among European thinkers, and was not really followed in other

cultures. Furthermore, when theology did not operate, ethics served as a substitute, as
was the case in China, especially when we consider the role of Confucius (Chinese
philosopher, 551–479 BC) and Confucianism over many centuries and even until now
in Chinese culture. This subordination of politics to ethics died hard all over the
world, even if Durkheim alleged that modernity would lead to positivism and to the
‘retreat of Gods onto Olympus’ (Durkheim, 1984 [1893] 1915 [1912]). Similarly,
Max Weber pleaded for a secular science even if he considered that religious factors
still explained many dimensions of political structures and political behaviour (Weber,
1949 [1904]). Whatever this meant, secularization did not put an end to the complex
relationship between political science and the other social and human sciences. On the
contrary, political science was permanently questioned and even weakened by its
uncertain identity. Is politics a science or an object? As a science, is it depending on
variables coming from outside and from other scientific fields? How can it coexist
with its neighbours? Can it borrow from others and import some concepts that were
elaborated in another perspective? In fact, the debate is not closed today and reflects
contrasting views on what political science should be and with regard to its autonomy
vis-à-vis all the other social sciences.
Politics as a science or an object?

If politics is considered as an object, rather than a science by itself, all efforts in
political analysis will consist in making use of different kinds of social sciences:
political science will then appear at the intersection of different disciplines, such as
economics, sociology, history, philosophy and law. It is obviously impossible to take
into account an economic policy without insights from economics; it is not possible
to consider a political institution without using the tools of law as an academic disci-
pline; it would be meaningless to analyse political behaviour without employing
concepts from sociology or social psychology.
The problem now is to define what we mean by ‘intersection’. If we consider it as
a simple cross-road, then political science will only have a very weak identity and risks
appearing as an addition of different sciences which are more or less related to politi-
cal objects. Many politicians and political actors, journalists or even more traditional
political scientists would then argue that, instead of a political science, we should then
speak of several political sciences. They would also argue that competence in politics
would necessarily imply an expertise in all the major social sciences related to politics.
This is particularly true in International Relations (IR) where such knowledge would
be constituted by the addition of international law, economics, strategy, geography
and history.
However, this perception is increasingly challenged by the progress of sciences. Is a
simple addition of different sciences able to construct a coherent knowledge and a
rigorous and convincing explanation? We must remind ourselves here that a science
is not based on an object, but on a question. The identity of political science comes
first of all from its own concerns: it does not address the same questions as in eco-
nomics or the other social sciences. Its main concern is to answer the question how
human beings are able to coexist in the same polity or how to create the coexistence
of different polities in the same international system (see the Introduction chapter

RELATIONSHIP WITH NEIGHBOURING DISCIPLINES 45
above on definitions of politics). As such, political science deals with specific con-
cerns, different from those that founded the neighbouring sciences. A political scientist
has to be concerned with his own issues and to use, only as instruments, what is
contributed by the other sciences. For instance, a scholar who is working on public
policies will have to make use of the data and the results collected by economists,
sociologists or lawyers; he will have to accommodate them to his own questions and
to make them compatible with his own theories and concepts following a process of
conceptual transformation.
This operation is obviously risky. First of all, a political scientist may not have
the required competence for a critical evaluation of the data and the conclusions
that he will borrow from his colleagues working in the neighbouring disciplines.
Certainly, the same is true for other social scientists importing their knowledge from
political science. This points to both the necessity and the fragility of interdiscipli-
narity (i.e. mobilizing several disciplines in training and research) (Augsburg, 2006),
as well as the weakness of transdisciplinarity (i.e. combining data and concepts
coming from different social sciences in order to produce a unified explanation)
(Nicolescu, 2002, 2008).
Furthermore, many scholars question even the compatibility of paradigms coming
from various sciences: if the concerns are not the same, how could we use the conclu-
sions reached by others? How to contain the risks of false analogies which result from
the concepts used in various social sciences? ‘State’ does not have, for example, the
same meaning in political science, economics, history, law or philosophy. The same
could be said about many other concepts like norms, values, alienation or crisis.
This fragility requires attention, but inter- and transdisciplinarity are clearly the
inevitable result of the complexity of our modern world. Political science (like all the
other social sciences) would not be able to survive and develop without a multidisci-
plinary concern and without a transdisciplinary epistemology. These two conditions
imply a rigorous commitment to precise concepts and well-conceived theories.
Altogether, they determine the epistemology of political science by submitting the qual-
ity of the research to the nature and the relevance of the question being considered and
the accuracy of the methods which are employed.
How do ‘imperial sciences’ work?

This strong interdependence among social sciences results sometimes in a domination
by some of them. According to the epistemological orientations of a scholar, one of
the social sciences may be considered as underlying the real explaining variable(s) of
a political object: in this case, this science would be considered as ‘imperial’. Political
science will then be de facto a part, or even a sub-discipline, of the ‘imperial’ science.
This phenomenon can be observed with regard to philosophy, economics, but also law
and history.
Philosophy was the first to have claimed such a pretention. As philosophy is con-
sidered to be the science of the ‘ultimate causes’ which studies the bases of common
and possibly universal values, many political scientists take it as the privileged instru-
ment of political analysis and explanation, especially when they consider problems
like legitimacy, political ideology or the normative orientation of a political system.

They then speak of ‘political philosophy’ and employ theories, concepts and methods
borrowed from philosophy (Goodin and Pettit, 1998; Barry, 1989; Smith, 2012).
This orientation is deeply rooted in contemporary political science, mainly through
important reviews (Journal of Political Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Philosophy
and Public Affairs). This trend is particularly meaningful among those who are
studying the bases of democracy and the conditions of its efficiency (Gutmann and
Thompson, 1998).
However, this perspective raises some questions, which are still open. First, is phil
osophy to be used as such for studying politics or is it necessary to rebuild it beforehand
as a political theory, which would be the mark of the autonomy of political science?
Some reviews like Political Theory and some scholars (Goodin, 2005) argue for the
second option. Second, is political science exclusively an empirical science or ambiva-
lent, normative and empirical? In the first option, mainly inspired by the behaviouralist
revolution, political philosophy would be excluded from the discipline (Favre, 1989;
Eulau, 1963; Easton, 1953), whereas it is considered at the rightful place in the second
option, and then as a normal component of political science (Barry, 1989).
The borrowing from economics has been more complicated as it covers two differ-
ent epistemologies. On the one hand, some economists consider politics as the direct
product of economic conditions; on the other hand, others consider politics as work-
ing according to the same rules as economics. The first point of view is mainly inspired
by Marxism. Marx deals with politics as the superstructure of economics; the primary
cause of political actions and political institutions is then to be found in the modes of
production and economic processes in such a way that political science cannot exist
without economic theory. There is, however, a wide variety of interpretations of
Marxism. Some of them, like political Marxism, reintroduce a part of political auton-
omy (Brenner, 1993; Wood, 2002), while some others, like in analytical Marxism,
combine Marxism with rational choice theory (Cohen, 1978; Elster, 1985).
The second kind of borrowing does not necessarily endorse the postulate of an
economic determinism but argues that politics is committed to the same processes and
the same rationality as economics. Economic theory, which is supposedly more
advanced than the political one, should then be used for investigating political prob-
lems. The main result of this epistemology is rational choice theory, which considers
political man as a homo oeconomicus who is a self-interested, purposeful and maxi-
mizing being (Petracca, 1992). In other words, this approach is based on a value
neutral postulate, which directly contradicts the philosophical tradition. If the political
actor behaves like an economic actor, the paradigms elaborated in economics can be
largely used in political science without any philosophical mediation.
This approach is also anti-behaviouralist, as behaviour is no longer observed by
empirical research, but simply deduced from economic theory. It appeared at the end
of the 1950s to explain how democracies are operating (Downs, 1957). It was then
rapidly extended to almost all sectors of political science: collective action and social
movements (Olson, 1965), party coalitions (Riker, 1962), bureaucracies (Niskanen,
1971) and finally to public policies (Downs, 1967; Hardin, 1968; Jones, 1994) and
International Relations (Axelrod, 1984). The ensuing debate, which still continues,
points to the danger of excluding values, perceptions and emotions as well as to the
risks of wrong (or too simple) analogies between economic rationality and political
choice (Brogan, 1996). The main dilemma is clear: an overestimation of the role of

values in politics leads to a domination of political science by philosophy, while its

underestimation creates the conditions of being dominated by economics. Obviously,
a real emancipation of political science from the neighbouring social sciences has to
take a much more sophisticated path.
The same is true concerning law. There is a strong tradition to study politics simply
as a part of constitutional law, particularly in societies where the state is powerful and
located at the core of the political system. This is the case in France, where political
science was first developed in Facultés de droit, or in Germany where Staatsrechtslehre
(prominently represented by authors like Hermann Heller, Hans Kelsen or Carl
Schmitt) played the same role, and in Italy where the Scuola di Legge participated in
the elaboration of Italian political science. Even if this ascendency was mainly formal
and strategic, a law paradigm became dominant in political science: it claimed to give
a central position to norms and institutions, and identified political science as a part
or as an extension of constitutional law. This tradition is still operating in some parts
of comparative politics, where many works deal with comparing parliaments or
political regimes, while neglecting political behaviour, public opinion or political cul-
ture (March and Olsen, 1996).
Political science also developed under the auspices of history. De Tocqueville elabo-
rated his two major books (Democracy in America and The Old Regime and the
Revolution) from a narrative of the historical lineages of the USA, France and
England. His main assertions were shaped by historical variables which explained
how political events and the political systems took different aspects in the three coun-
tries (de Tocqueville, 2000 [1835–1840]; de Tocqueville, 2001 [1859]). This conception
paved the way for a similar debate: is the historian posing the same types of question
as the political scientist? There is however, at this level, a part of irreducible depend-
ence on history in the sense that political objects are necessarily constructed as
historical facts. But when the historical epistemology aims at a broader explanation,
the political scientist looks for more precise and restricted dimensions of the facts
which he is investigating. Therefore, if he can – and must – borrow from the historian,
he cannot simply merge with his epistemology.
In fact, these ‘imperial postures’ have become today more uncertain and fragile. The
real problem is to define how frontiers and exchanges are conceived beyond the ques-
tion of dependence, which is now no more at stake.
Coexistence, exchange and frontiers

Let us then consider political science as an autonomous discipline, with its own theo-
ries, methods and concepts, as the greater part of scholars do nowadays. In doing so,
we do not assume that this science has grown in a kind of vacuum, behind closed
doors and independently from the other social sciences. The main example is to be
found in its relationships with sociology, which are particularly strong and diversified
to the point where the frontiers between the two disciplines are blurring. The behav-
iouralist revolution – which took place in American political science during the 1940s
and 1950s, and which was then extended to all Western countries – is an important
starting point for this trend. By giving priority to behaviour, rather than norms, and
also to quantification, this new trend brought the two sciences much closer together

(Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950; Key, 1942). Even though the concepts and theories kept
their political specificity, the objects were now strictly considered as simple social
facts, independently from norms, values and their historical context. This new trend
merged with a strong reaction observed in Europe, where, during the 1960s and
1970s, younger scholars tried to become emancipated from the tutorship of law stud-
ies. In France, the process was particularly remarkable coming from sociologists like
Raymond Aron (1967), Pierre Bourdieu (1998) or even from some lawyers who
intended to create a new science, like Maurice Duverger (1972). In a first step, the new
trend did not go very far, even though it participated in the creation of a new science,
which was significantly labelled ‘political sociology’. As time went by and political
sociology developed, its orientation became closer to American behaviouralist politi-
cal science but had a more critical perspective and included more diversified topics. It
was introduced to the USA by a famous reader edited by Shmuel Eisenstadt, who
included a very large range of contributors, from Max Weber and Emile Durkheim to
Franklin Roosevelt and Mao Tse-tung (Eisenstatdt, 1971). This political sociology has
three characteristics: it acknowledges the founding fathers of sociology as its ances-
tors; it considers political facts as social facts; and it has a broader conception of
politics, taking into account its anthropological dimensions, the political impact of
social structures, and the various kinds of social behaviour. However, it has kept a real
autonomy for politics and political research.
In the same way, a new kind of contact was established with philosophy. Beyond the
‘political philosophy’ that we considered above, a strong – but renewed – interaction
between political science and traditional philosophy progressively took place. Even
when trying to get emancipated from philosophy, some political scientists promoted in
fact a political theory, which was no longer conceived as providing the ultimate causes
and which shifted away from a speculative approach to values. The behaviouralist revo-
lution then led to the elaboration of ‘positive’ or ‘empirical theories’ (Boudon, 1981),
which were conceived as instruments for constructing the real world, and for organizing
the collected data. Functionalism (Mulkay, 1971), systems analysis (Easton, 1953),
structuralism, and interactionism opened the way to a new conceptualization and a new
epistemology. This kind of political theory gradually gave birth to a sub-discipline of
political science under a specific label. Even if this political theory should not be mis-
taken for ‘political philosophy’, it largely borrows from logics, and makes use of great
philosophers like Machiavelli, Hobbes or Montesquieu.
Economics opened another way to the development of political science, particularly
when ‘International Political Economy’ (IPE) appeared as another sub-discipline. In
fact, the process followed two different lines. In the USA, IPE resulted from the drastic
crisis that occurred in the early 1970s with the oil prize boom, the strong destabiliza-
tion of the US dollar, the American defeat in Vietnam, and a weak Nixon
administration, which had to face the Watergate scandal. Scholars like Charles
Kindleberger and Robert Gilpin questioned the relationship which relates economics
to the hegemony of the superpower. In a time when the superpower seemed to be
threatened by economic uncertainties, they attempted to stress the role played by the
hegemon in protecting and strengthening global economic stability (Kindleberger,
1973; Gilpin, 2001). This approach was progressively extended to other issues, such
as war and economics (Gilpin, 1981), and the globalization of the political order
(Gill and Law, 1988).

In the United Kingdom, this development was significantly different. The concern
was much broader and the method was much more transdisciplinary. Susan Strange,
who is at the origin of the British IPE, aspired to a global approach of the world sys-
tem in order to point out its transformations in the articulation between economics
and political power (Strange, 1988). Her major book States and Markets (1984)
focused on the decline of the state in a global world, or more exactly on the weaken-
ing of its own capacities, opening the way to other forms of political action and
political power (Stopford et al., 1991; Strange, 1996). She showed particularly how
‘mad money’, free from any control, weakens government capacity and even its
legitimacy (Strange, 1998). If the American IPE is clearly embedded in the political
science field, its British counterpart appears at its margins. Susan Strange considered
herself more to be an economist rather than a political scientist.
Social anthropology and geography must also be taken into account. The former
was often used for tracing the evolution from ‘primitive’ or traditional societies to
modern ones. The ambition was to understand the complexity of modern political
practices and institutions by comparing them to those of traditional societies observed
by anthropologists. The aim was to catch the elementary substance of politics and to
have a more precise vision of what was the nature of politics in such societies, far from
the dominant conception of ‘primitive politics’. For these reasons, politics progres-
sively became a part of social anthropology. Anthropologists imported concepts and
questions from political science, whereas political scientists, unfamiliar with the
anthropological field, were limited to using their conclusions. That is why scholars
commonly referred to what they called political anthropology. Significantly, this work
was initiated by African Political Systems published by E. Evans-Pritchard and Meyer
Fortes in 1940; they attempted to develop a typology of African political systems in
order to overcome the simple and common vision of a non-differentiated political
order in traditional societies (Evans-Pritchard and Fortes, 1940).
A second generation of political anthropologists initiated another step. They
worked in the context of decolonization and political transition and could observe the
adaptation of traditional societies to modern politics. That is why their objects of
research were much more diversified and were closer to classical political science
(Bailey, 1969; Clastres, 1989). Frederick Bailey worked on political action, while
Clastres posed the problem of the universality of the state and the possibility of finding
‘societies without states’. In this new context, political scientists came closer to social
anthropologists by using their methods and their fields in order to observe the com-
plexity of the transition processes (Apter, 1965).
In a third step, cultural anthropology interfered with the political science debate.
The first intervention was on political culture when some anthropologists like Clifford
Geertz criticized the oversimplification by political scientists. Geertz worked on a
more sophisticated vision of culture, based on semiotics, which opened the way
in political science to what he called the ‘politics of meaning’ (Geertz, 1973: 311ff.).
The same can be observed about identity and the concept of ‘imagined community’
(Anderson, 1983).
A similar interaction can be found between geography and political science. Towards
the end of the nineteenth century, Politische Geographie was conceived, first in
Germany, and then in Sweden, the USA (Alfred Thayer Mahan), Russia and France
(Antoine de Jomini), as a part of geography which considered space and territory as

political issues and objects of political competition, and even war (Ratzel, 1925 [1903]).
Its political use during the two world wars for legitimizing military initiatives made it
controversial, while a soft extension of its postulates still survives through the concept
of geopolitics which is in use among realist scholars who assert that the main interna-
tional issues can be explained and treated by making use of geographical explanations
(Brzezinski, 1997). Similarly, some electoral experts, particularly in France, but also in
the UK, borrowed from geography some elements of methods and concepts for analys-
ing and explaining voting and electoral behaviour (Siegfried, 1913; Johnston, 1979)
Mixing social sciences and innovations

With regard to all these experiences, it can be said that political science tends to
import more from the other sciences when it has to face a crisis and to get out from
a deadlock. This process frequently leads to transformations and innovations, which
began with the behaviouralist revolution that made possible a substantial leap for-
ward. The most significant case is to be found in the historical sociology of politics
which appeared at the end of the 1970s. Political science had in the meantime mobi-
lized history, sociology and even anthropology in order to reform the traditional
approach to comparative politics. At the same time, however, comparative politics
remained limited by the postulates of developmentalist paradigms, which were con-
veying an ethnocentric and oversimplified vision of the state. Then a double reaction
took place questioning the universal nature of the Western state and revisiting its
origins and identities. This perspective implied a return to history, sociology and the
anthropology of the state.
The founding fathers were solicited: Karl Marx and Max Weber inspired this new
trend of political science which gave birth to a new school inaugurated by Barrington
Moore in a neo-Marxist perspective and was extended by Perry Anderson, Immanuel
Wallerstein and Theda Skocpol in a similar neo-Marxist way (Moore, 1966; Anderson,
1974; Wallerstein, 1974; Skocpol, 1979), whereas Shmuel Eisenstadt, Stein Rokkan or
Reinhard Bendix followed the same path, but in a Weberian perspective (Bendix,
1964; Eisenstadt and Rokkan, 1973). For his part, Charles Tilly was influenced by
both tendencies (Tilly, 1975). For many of these scholars it would be difficult to deter-
mine whether they could be labelled as political scientists, historians or sociologists,
while Wallerstein is also known as an economist, a political scientist and a historian.
Significantly, these Marxist or Weberian inspirations were subject to the imperatives
of empirical research, and to a political science that was questioning the excesses of
developmentalism. This new trend operated as a solution to a crisis of universalism
which affected comparative politics as a whole. To overcome this naïve universalism
and ethnocentrism, all these authors turned to history, either for investigating the
diversity of social structures, class organizations or types of production in Europe and
beyond (Marxist perspective), or for constructing historical individuals (Weberian
orientation), stressing differences in cultures (Eisenstadt and Rokkan, 1973), in legiti-
macy (Bendix, 1978) or in state-building processes (Tilly, 1975). All of them remained,
however, rooted in political science as their explananda were politically conceived
(states, nations, political regimes, party systems) and their explaining variables were
partly shaped by political paradigms.

The main postulate is to consider that neither political practices nor political
institutions have, anywhere around the world, a universal and homogeneous orien-
tation. All of them have a historical ‘lineage’, which makes them different from the
others. For this reason, explaining the specificities implies a consideration of this
historical dimension. The historical sociology of politics is, therefore, both descrip-
tive and explanatory. As a description, it completes the general concepts developed
in political science by considering in addition what made their historical specificity:
the state in France is constructed and described as different from the state in
England, Italy and Germany while some more general factors are selected for
explaining these differences. Perry Anderson, for example, opposes a strong and
absolutist state in France to a weaker state in England and uses the degree of feu-
dalization of the society as the main explanatory variable (Anderson, 1974; Badie
and Birnbaum, 1983). Reinhard Bendix explained the difference among the
European political systems by considering various kinds of legitimacy (Bendix,
1978). Stein Rokkan did the same by taking into account three different variables:
economic evolution, territorial configuration and transformations of Christianity
(Rokkan, 1973). The mixture of influences in the European context is well depicted
in Figure 3.1.
Those who support this epistemology consider that historical sociology is not a
‘sub-field’ in itself, but covers all areas of political research. Theda Skocpol, for
example, argues that the historical nature of political (and, more generally, social)
objects makes it imperative to resort to a historical perspective (Skocpol, 1984). A
political party, a public policy or an inter-state conflict bring us back to their his-
torical roots: ignoring them affects the quality of the description and of the
explanation. This argument is very convincing, but, as Charles Tilly pointed out, it
raises the question of level of analysis. History operates at the level of each indi-
vidual actor, but macro-politics is concerned with ‘big structures, large processes,
Figure 3.1 The diversity of European political science

Source: from Dirk Berg-Schlosser (2006) Political science in Europe: Diversity, excellence, rel-
evance. European Political Science, 5(2): 163–70

huge comparisons’ (Tilly, 1989). If we consider ‘social revolutions’ (like the French
Revolution of 1789, or the Russian Revolution in 1917) as historical objects and
facts to be explained or use them as explanatory variables (for later events), we may
dangerously globalize history and deprive ourselves of any falsificatory procedures
(why did revolutions not occur in other instances, what would have happened if it
had not occurred?).
Is historical comparison acceptable at this macro-level, especially when we know
that no empirical verification or experimentation is possible? Many historians deny
the validity of such an approach. Does historical sociology divide political science
between ‘macro-politics’ and ‘micro-politics’, leaving the first one in a marginal – or
even ‘para-scientific’ – position? Such questions suggest that history can be used to
shape and define concepts, to give a more precise orientation to the questions which
are raised, to validate the comparisons and to develop an interpretation of the issue
(or the ‘enigma’) which is at stake. By contrast, it would be a wrong assumption to
use it for explaining a social or political process and to consider it as a cause. When
Barrington Moore explains the surge of fascism in some countries in Europe, he uses
history for pointing out the variables that were similar in all the countries that were
affected by this ideology (resilience of traditional classes, balance between aristoc-
racy, bourgeoisie and working class, revolutionary weakness of peasantry, state
tradition…) (Moore, 1966). However, the explanation that he finally provides is
elaborated from these socio-political variables and conceived in political terms: the
cause is not to be found in history (which remains unique and descriptive in each
case), but in a special historical configuration of the socio-political variables.
Sociological history should, therefore, be considered as a way of recognizing the his-
torical dimension of the social fact, rather than as a submission of political science to
historical variables.
Box 3.1 Schmitter, The future of

globalized political science
For those who want to practice a political science that is
critical of established power, sensitive to the distinctive
nature of its subject matter and capable of explaining the
complexities of political life to real people, they would be
better advised to‚ Go East… and, if possible, now and then,
South. That is where you will be free to question prevailing
assumptions, to develop innovative concepts and methods,
to address issues of significance and, maybe, even to influ-
ence the course of political events. You will also be more
likely to make a significant contribution to a globalised sci-
ence of politics.
Source: Philippe Schmitter (2002) Seven (disputable) theses concerning the future
of ‘transatlanticised’ or ‘globalised’ political science. European Political Science, 1(2):
23–40.

Conclusions
The relationship between political science and the neighbouring sciences is not one-
dimensional: it is complex and even contradictory. On the one hand, as a social
science, political science cannot remain separated from the other social sciences. But,
on the other hand, when it interacts with the other social sciences, it faces many dan-
gers. Many scholars consider that multidisciplinarity hinders political science from
being a ‘full-fledged science’: It may risk losing its own specificity and identity, and
becoming disconnected from the particularities of its own objects, to transform them
into attributes of a ‘homo oeconomicus’ or a ‘homo philosophicus’ with all the ideo-
logical postulates that this may imply. These dangers open the way to a subordination
or even a submission of political science to other sciences. For all these reasons, a
balanced multidisciplinarity has obviously to be considered as a remaining challenge,
which has not been fully achieved yet. However, in any case, it is not possible to inves-
tigate politics without a strong consideration of economics, sociology and history. We
must keep in mind that political science gains its identity from the nature of its ques-
tions and its kind of questioning.
Questions
1 How do you define ‘interdisciplinarity’ and how do you distinguish
it from ‘transdisciplinarity’?
2 What are the frontiers between history and political science?
3 Is political sociology equivalent to political science?
4 How do you define the ‘historical sociology of politics’? Is it a part
of history or a part of political science?
Further reading
Payne A and Philips N (eds.) (2014) Handbook of the international political economy of gov-
ernance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Probably the best and most complete book on political
economy and the interaction between economics and political science.
Tilly C (1984) Big structures, large processes, huge comparisons. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation. The most advanced discussion on historical sociology and the relations
between history and political science.
Skocpol T (ed.) (1984) Vision and method in historical sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Different views of what historical sociology means.
Runciman WG (1969) Social science and political theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. A classical and very useful book on the relation of sociology to political theory.
Augsburg T (2006) Becoming interdisciplinary: An introduction to interdisciplinary studies
(2nd ed.). New York: Kendall/Hunt Publishing. A very useful perspective on what inter- and
transdisciplinarity mean.

Part II
Macro-politics

4
The social bases
of politics
Key terms
Collective memory Social cleavage
Framing Social milieu
Modernization Specific and diffuse
theory support
Political culture System model
Introduction
As has become apparent in the previous chapter, contemporary politics and its inter-
pretations are embedded in broad historical, social, economic and cultural contexts,
which are analysed in greater detail by the neighbouring disciplines.
In order to distinguish major sub-disciplines within political science and illustrate
some of their relationships and interactions a more general ‘system’ model is useful.
The model below is derived from the well-known works by Easton (1965), Almond
and Powell (1978) and others, but it is used here only in a pre-theoretical classificatory
sense in order to locate the different elements and possible interactions more closely
without implying necessarily distinct causal relationships such as the effectiveness of
certain links and feedbacks or the stability of the system as such. In this sense it has
become common language in political science, talking about inputs, outputs, feedback,
and so on, as in many other disciplines (economics, computer science and so forth)
which took this general model from cybernetics. More specifically, Easton talks about
demands and supports on the input side of political systems, which are satisfied and
reinforced (or not!) at the output side and then fed back to the social system. System
is a notion that is useful to understand and explain the complex political reality that
encompasses all these components, which, of course, also interact with the economic
system and the social system. With the notion of system we adopt a theoretical con-
struct that is impossible to directly detect empirically, but empirical analysis of all its
components allows a view of politics to be developed that ultimately enables us to
achieve a better explanation of politics.
In English, we can also distinguish between the polity (a single political system as
the unit of analysis), politics (the processes within the system) and policies (specific
political areas such as education, health, the environment, etc. on the output side of

the system). This basic model should not be confused with more ambitious systems
theories, as propagated by Luhmann (1984) for example, which have been criticized
from different angles (see, e.g., Moeller, 2012).
A simplified version is presented in Figure 4.1.
On the basis of this model the major parts of this book have been organized.
They cover the social system (see this chapter below), the intermediary structures
on the input side (Part IV), the central political system (Chapters 5–8) and the out-
put structures (Chapter 9) together with the respective international environment
(Part V). Furthermore, with regard to each sub-system, an ‘objective’ dimension
(relating to the internal structures, institutions and more durable and ‘tangible’
aspects of the sub-system) and a ‘subjective’ dimension (reflecting the respective
perceptions and actual behaviour of the individuals and groups concerned) can be
distinguished (see also Chapter 1 above). All these systems and sub-systems are
connected by various feedback loops. No overall stability should, however, be
assumed and such systems can, indeed, explode or implode (as the former Soviet
Union or some ‘failed states’).
With regard to the broader social bases of politics three major approaches (and
specific theories and explanations based on them) can be distinguished. The first refers
to the overall level of socio-economic development as measured by some general indi-
cators. The second looks more specifically at distinct social structures and the
dynamics of their interactions. The third emphasizes the ‘subjective’ dimension in
terms of the more general political cultural perceptions and attitudes of the members
of a political system. To these approaches we now turn.
Political system:
Political styles
Political institutions
International System
International System
Intermediary
Output-Structures:
Structures:
Political parties Bureaucracy

Interest groups Security apparatus
Social movements Social welfare system
Social system
Political culture
Social structure
Figure 4.1 Simplified system model

THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 59
Levels of socio-economic development

Based on studies by Lerner (1958), Lipset (1960), and Almond and Coleman (1960)
among others, this approach takes general trends of socio-economic development,
urbanization, literacy, etc. and considers them as basic conditions for modern ‘political
development’, including democratization. This approach employs a number of indica-
tors, such as the levels of GNP per capita and of literacy, as independent variables on
which the resulting level of democratization is seen to depend.
Most studies emphasizing levels of wealth and development and their respective
indicators can be grouped under the category of ‘modernization theories’ (see also
Apter, 1987). Most prominent among these was Lipset’s Political Man, in particular
his chapter on ‘Economic Development and Democracy’. There, he re-stated the
general hypothesis that ‘the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it
will sustain democracy’ (Lipset, 1960: 31). Indeed, among the ‘stable European
democracies’, which he analysed in the 1950s were cases like Belgium, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom which all showed high levels of
wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization. Under his (very broad) cate-
gory of ‘unstable democracies and dictatorships’ countries like Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain, with lower levels in these regards, could be found.
But he also noted that ‘Germany is an example of a nation where growing industri-
alization, urbanization, wealth and education favored the establishment of a
democratic system, but in which a series of adverse historical events prevented
democracy from securing legitimacy and thus weakened its ability to withstand
crisis’ (Lipset, 1960: 28).
A limiting assumption lies in the (often) expected unilinearity of such developments.
History is supposed to proceed in rather regular phases or stages (most notably, for
example, in Rostow (1960), without taking into account the possibility of economic
or political reversals or the more complex international interactions which may
severely distort the expected outcomes. In a more extreme version, a high level of
socio-economic development is seen as a requisite for democracy (this was expressed
in the title of Lipset’s (1959) original article). In his later work he took a more com-
prehensive view combining economic, cultural and institutional factors in his analysis
of democratic successes and failures (Lipset and Lakin, 2004)
There always have been a number of counter-factual examples guarding against an
all-too-simple interpretation of the original thesis. These include the breakdown of
democratic regimes in highly modern countries, as happened in Weimar Germany, and
the continued existence of workable democracies in poor countries such as in India
and some other Third World states. In particular, some of the policy recommendations
based on such perspectives advocating ‘development dictatorships’ in the early stages
of modernization (for example, Löwenthal, 1963) have turned out to be false. The
most comprehensive study of this kind based on worldwide data of developments
between 1950 and 1990 clearly shows this: ‘Democracies can survive even in the poor-
est nations if they manage to generate development, if they reduce inequality, if the
international climate is propitious, and if they have parliamentary institutions’
(Przeworski et al., 1996: 49, our emphasis added). Rather than being a prerequisite,
economic development can be a condition favouring the emergence of democracy and
an associated factor that increases its sustainability.

Major criticisms against, at the extreme, a general mono-causal and unilinear mod-
ernization theory have been raised from different points of view. From a neo-Marxist
perspective, authors like André G. Frank (1967) or Cardoso and Faletto (1979)
pointed out that the colonialism and imperialism by the European powers had created
international economic structures of a continuing asymmetrical dependency of Third
World countries on the Western industrialized states. So, it was not a traditional static
underdevelopment of the poorer parts of the world contrasted to their ‘modern’ coun-
terparts, but a continuing process of the ‘development of underdevelopment’ which
had led to this situation. Along somewhat similar lines, ‘post-colonial studies’ inspired
by Frantz Fanon (1961) or Edward Said (1978) emphasize the lasting cultural and
socio-psychological impact of Western domination at the expense of indigenous cul-
tural traditions and ideas.
As a result, we are faced with a much more diverse and multi-faceted world than
envisaged by all-too-simple modernization perspectives. One way to cope with this
diversity is to take a closer look at the specific historical conditions and social struc-
tural consequences of capitalist development since about the sixteenth century, at first
in Europe, but today in a ‘global’ world. In this respect, there are no longer more
general levels of development, as indicated by statistical means and correlations, which
matter, but the more concrete distribution as represented by social classes and strata.
Such ‘structuralist’ approaches consider the specific emerging class structures and their
dynamic interactions, rather than the overall economic development, to be decisive.
Social classes and cleavages

Here we are concerned with the ‘objective’ dimension of the bottom square in
Figure 4.1, social structures. In this respect, two kinds of structures are important:
‘horizontal’ ones referring to social groups existing ‘side by side’ and ‘vertical’ ones
which reflect the ‘super-imposition’ of groups according to certain criteria. In the
horizontal sense, such groups are often formed on an ethnic/linguistic, religious,
regional or similar basis, not rarely with their own dominant areas of settlement, but
with further internal ‘vertical’ distinctions (see, for example, Horowitz, 2000).
Vertically, social strata characterized by inequalities with regard to criteria like
wealth, income, level of education, social status and similar ones can be distinguished
(see, for example, Lenski, 1966; a recent account is Grusky, 2014). So, it has become
customary to speak of lower, middle and upper classes or lower middle, upper middle
and so on. It is important to note, however, that the number of categories labelled in
this way and the borderlines between them are determined in a mostly arbitrary man-
ner or are merely based on statistical distributions (quintiles, quartiles, etc.).
In less graded ways, distinct ‘class’ categories in the tradition of Karl Marx and his
followers based on distinct qualitative characteristics can be identified. Such an analy-
sis of social structure as a primary explanatory factor for political developments lies
within the broad tradition of ‘historical-materialist’ approaches. Today, within this
tradition a great variety of authors can be found. These range from (still) quite ortho-
dox Marxist writers through more diversified and sophisticated (neo-) Marxist
thinkers to social-structurally and historically oriented authors who do not share
major epistemological assumptions of Marxist approaches.

Historically, in the European context and following Stein Rokkan’s conceptualiza-

tions (Rokkan, 1975; Flora, 1999) in this regard, four characteristic social cleavages
have been formed, the distribution of which influenced the social structure of Western
and Central Europe in a specific way since about the sixteenth century. The first is a
horizontal centre-periphery cleavage, which also affected the ethno-linguistic compo-
sition of the emerging states. The second refers to the state-church relationship and the
religious cleavages brought about by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, also
with regard to their regional distribution, but implicitly also the earlier schism
between Roman Catholicism and the Orthodox churches in Eastern and South
Eastern Europe. The third cleavage is an early product of the transition from feudal-
ism and the industrial revolution emphasizing the conflicts of interest between the
landed upper class and the urban bourgeoisie. The fourth, finally, concerns the major
class cleavage between capital and labour in more advanced industrial societies. These
cleavages have shaped major political developments such as early or late state forma-
tion, patterns of democratization, and the resulting party systems to a large and
enduring extent (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; see also Karvonen and Kuhnle, 2000).
There have been a few attempts to extend a Rokkanian framework to other parts
of the world as well. This has been done, in a still preliminary way, by Shiratori (1997)
for Asia, Temelli (1999) for Sub-Saharan Africa and Randall (2001) for the new ‘third
wave’ democracies. More detailed analyses of historical structures and developments
in these areas certainly still are required. Furthermore, more recent social cleavages
such as a materialist-post-materialist one as first observed by Inglehart (1977) leading
to the establishment of ‘Green’ parties or, more generally, anti-establishment or anti-
democratic ones providing a basis for populist or right-wing extremist parties can also
be observed (see also Lijphart, 1999).
For a differentiated analysis of ‘objective’ social interests the vertical dimension of
the resulting pattern can be refined even further. For example, some distinctions pro-
posed by Theodor Geiger (1932) in his seminal study of the social structure of Weimar
Germany can be helpful. He proposes, in addition to the Marxian classes of capitalists
and proletarians, to look separately at the ‘old’ middle class of owner-entrepreneurs of
smaller enterprises and middle-level craftsmen and traders and the ‘new’ middle class
of middle-level employees with some decision-making authority of their own, including
those in the public sector. Furthermore, those self-employed persons who do not pos-
sess any sizeable means of production and who are ‘workers on their own account’
constitute a particularly hybrid and under certain conditions politically relevant group:
objectively, being mostly dependent on their own labour, their life chances can be com-
pared to the proletariat proper, for which reason Geiger termed this group ‘proletaroids’.
Subjectively, however, as self-employed persons, they may tend to identify themselves
with the propertied classes. Finally, a ‘sub-proletariat’ of persons without any perma-
nent employment or source of income may exist, particularly in times of economic
crises, but also as more permanently marginalized groups. Geiger based his analysis on
the German general population census of 1925 and could identify in a prescient way
the social bases of Hitler’s National Socialist party (predominantly among the old mid-
dle class and the proletaroids in the Protestant areas), which took power in early 1933.
In addition, he emphasized the specific ‘mentalities’ of such groups which have
been developed in the course of time and which can crystallize in quite durable
social sub-milieus. In this way, macro-social structural conditions are combined with

62
05_Morlino_CH-04.indd 62
Box 4.1 Stein Rokkan’s ‘Conceptual Map of Europe’
The ‘state–economy’ dimension: West–East axis
Territorial Weak Strong Weak Strong Strong

centres Weak Strong Strong Weak Weak
City networks
Geopolitical type Seaward Seaward C i t y - s t a te E u r o p e Landward Landward

Peripheries empire-nations empire-nations buffers
Conditions of Distant Close Integrated Consociational Fragmented Close to Distant

consolidation from city to into larger formation until 19th c. city belt from city
belt city belt system belt
Protestant Iceland Sweden Finland

Norway Denmark Prussia
Scotland England Hanse
wales Germany
Religiously Mixed Netherlands Baltic
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Rhineland Bohemia territories

Switzerland
Catholic Ireland ‘Lotharingia’ Bavaria Poland
France Burgundy
Brittany Austria Hungary
Arelatum
Belgium
Catalonia
Spain Italy
The ‘state–culture’ dimension: South–North axis

Portugal
*Europe comprises the territories and nation-states of the Roman Catholic part of Europe after the Schism of 1054.
Territories recognised as sovereign, 1648–1789, are in italics. Arrows indicate changes in geopolitical position.
Source: Flora (1999), p. 142
12/22/2016 4:02:22 PM
subjective perceptions and attitudes at the micro-level (see also Chapter 1 above).
Such and similar analyses have to be adjusted, of course, to the concrete conditions
of economic developments in different parts of the world and the resulting social
structures and their patterns of organization.
Comparative historical approaches

For a broader assessment of such factors, truly comparative and longer-term historical
approaches seem indispensable. Among these, Barrington Moore’s (1966) study has
been most influential. He outlined three major routes to modernity: the bourgeois-
democratic; the authoritarian-reactionary, which later culminated in fascism; and the
peasant-based communist one. In each case, it was the particular transition from feu-
dalism to modernity during which a specific alliance of class forces emerged, which
was to shape later events. Put very broadly, the first route was, as in England, France
and the USA, characterized by a domination of the urban and gradually emerging
industrial bourgeoisie, a broad commercialization of agriculture, and a gradual incor-
poration of the working classes into the political system which allowed them to raise
their voice and mitigate the social costs of unfettered capitalist development. The sec-
ond route, in contrast, maintained the domination of the landed aristocracy in a strictly
centralized system controlled by the bureaucracy and the military into which the
emerging bourgeoisie was integrated (‘feudalized’), much at the expense of the lower
classes. The authoritarian and later fascist cases of Germany and Japan are Moore’s
main examples in this regard. The third route, finally, culminated in a successful peas-
ant revolution, as in Russia and China, which eliminated both feudal and bourgeois
elements in society and established a communist regime. This is an intriguing proposi-
tion, which is based on extensive historical material in the cases Moore analysed. Yet,
whether such a pattern could also be observed in other instances remains controversial.
His assertion that ‘smaller countries depend economically and politically on big and
powerful ones which means that the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their
own boundaries’ (1966: XIII), which does not leave them any choice or more differen-
tiated developments of their own, does not seem to be really convincing. In any case,
Moore’s argument should not be taken as, in retrospect, an entirely deterministic pat-
tern, which because of decisive developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
quasi automatically led to the Nazi takeover in Germany on 30 January 1933.
Along similar lines, but with some distinctive differences, other ‘historical sociolo-
gists’ further developed this kind of argument. In her study on the French, Russian
and Chinese revolutions Theda Skocpol (1979) emphasized not only the weight of
different social forces and their respective dynamics, but the specific forms of interac-
tion with the existing state structures, in particular the bureaucracy and the military,
together with international factors which had weakened the old regimes and set the
stage for a revolutionary breakthrough. In her words, ‘the key to successful structural
analysis lies in a focus on state organizations and their relations both to international
environments and to domestic classes and economic conditions’ (291, emphasis in
the original). Such a more comprehensive perspective has to be applied not only to
situations of genuine social revolutions, but also to other critical instances of system
breakdown or survival (see also Chapter 10 below).

In a more refined and extended version, which includes smaller European states and
Latin American countries, Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) and Ruth Collier (1999) fol-
lowed up this line of argument and pointed out the sometimes ambivalent role of the
middle classes and the significance of workers’ organizations, such as unions and
socialist parties, in the process of democratization.
A concrete interaction of horizontal and vertical aspects of social stratification can
also be particularly significant for the formation of political conflict groups. Thus,
whichever class structure we look at must be brought into relation with racial, ethnic,
and confessional patterns. It is very seldom a question of ethnic or religious conflict
per se, as these usually concern economic or political matters. The vertical and hori-
zontal aspects of social structure may reinforce each other when ethnic or religious
groups find themselves to a large extent in a particular economic or political position,
as for example in Northern Ireland, or may be cross-cutting and more evenly distrib-
uted which usually tends to mitigate the level of conflict between them (for such
notions see also Melson and Wolpe, 1970). Such conflict groups can also be ordered
in hierarchical (‘ranked’) or parallel ways (see, for example, Horowitz, 2000). In addi-
tion, ethnic or religious groups are usually also internally stratified, which complicates
their potential for conflict even further (Waldmann, 1989). In some cases, particular
‘consociational’ arrangements may be agreed upon between representatives of the
major ‘pillars’ in a society in order to contain ‘horizontal’ group conflicts (Lijphart,
1977; see also Chapter 5 below).
Political culture: The conceptual framework

Each political system is embedded in a particular culture. ‘Culture’, however, is one of
the most elusive concepts of the social sciences. Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952), for
example, found 164 different definitions ranging from words like agri-culture to very
elaborate notions of ‘enlightenment and excellence of taste acquired by intellectual
and aesthetic training’ (Merriam-Webster, 2003). Again, several distinctions are neces-
sary at this juncture.
First of all, the scope of the concept has to be defined. In a very broad sense, culture
refers to a large cultural area (‘Kulturkreis’), which in the past has been largely shaped
by the major world religions (Weber, 1963 [1920]). The term ‘civilization’ as used by
Huntington (1996, Chapter 2) and others is largely synonymous with this concept.
The number of cultures identified in this way varies to some extent. Weber speaks of
six major world religions: Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam
and Judaism (Weber, 1963 [1920]: 237f.). Huntington in his map of ‘The World of
Civilizations: Post-1990’ lists nine, where he adds a Latin American, an African and a
separate Japanese one. He further separates Orthodox Christianity from the ‘Western’
and subsumes Judaism under the latter (Huntington, 1996: 27f.). This very broad
concept thus neglects further important distinctions within these religions such as
those between Catholic and Protestant churches or the Sunnite or Shi’ite divisions in
Islam. It also does not take any existing political borders into account. Whether any
concrete social identities are formed on this basis is an empirical question to which we
will turn later.

Second, the content of what is covered by the term culture varies enormously as
well. This ranges from very encompassing definitions as the customary beliefs, social
forms, and material traits of social groups or, in other words, their ‘way of life’
(Thompson et al., 1990) to specific forms of ‘high culture’ in the arts and sciences.
Quite often the term also has strong normative connotations distinguishing those
who are ‘cultured’ and ‘civilized’ from, at the other extreme, ‘barbarians’ (from
Greek barbaros meaning foreign or ignorant, Merriam-Webster, 2003). At this place,
we confine ourselves to specific aspects of political culture in a sense more precisely
elaborated below.
Box 4.2 Tocqueville’s concept

of political culture
I consider the mores as one of the great general causes to
which maintaining the democratic republic in the United
States can be attributed. I understand the expression mores
here in the sense that the ancients attached to the word
mores; I apply it not only to mores strictly speaking, which
could be called habits of the heart, but to the different no-
tions that men possess, to the diverse opinions that are
current among them, and to the ensemble of ideas from
which the habits of the mind are formed. So by this word
I understand the whole moral and intellectual state of a
people. (p. 466f.)
I am persuaded that the most fortunate situation and the
best laws cannot maintain a constitution in spite of mores,
while the latter still turn to good account the most unfavora-
ble positions and the worst laws. The importance of mores is
a common truth to which study and experience constantly
lead. It seems to me that I find it placed in my mind like a
central point; I see it at the end of all my ideas. (p. 499)
Source: Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) Democracy in America, Part II, Chapter 9: ‘Of the
Principal Causes That Tend to Maintain the Democratic Republic in the United States’.
Translated from the French by James T. Schleifer (2010) Indianapolis:

Liberty Fund.
In the following, we will first provide a conceptual framework of political culture. We

then turn to its analytic status in political science. A final part will then discuss recent
substantive developments in this respect on a global scale.
In political science, the current use of the term has been coined in a seminal article
by Gabriel Almond reflecting a ‘Weberian’ tradition in the social sciences. There, he
defined it as ‘the particular pattern of orientations toward political actions in which

every political system is embedded’ (1956: 396). Another pioneer of this approach,
Lucian Pye, proposed a more elaborate definition:
Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give
order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying
assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It
encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity.
Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psycho-
logical and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the
product of both the collective history of a political system and the life
histories of the members of that system, and thus it is rooted equally in
public events and private experiences. (Pye, 1968: 218)
This definition thus emphasizes culture as the subjective dimension of politics reflect-
ing the perceptions, attitudes and values of citizens vis-à-vis both domestic and
international politics, but also vis-à vis each other as political actors. It interacts,
however, also with the normative dimension (the ideals and norms) and the ‘object’
dimension in terms of social-structural variations in this respect (see also Chapter 1
above). At the same time, it reflects both collective historical experiences and personal
socializing factors.
The precise elements of any particular political culture, however, are not defined
in this way and are, again, a matter of historical and contemporary empirical analy-
sis. In order to elaborate this further, once more a ‘systems framework’ can be
helpful. Four major social sub-systems and their interactions can be distinguished in
this regard: the community system identifying the external boundaries, the socio-
cultural system expressing its value orientations, the economic system providing its
material basis, and the political system as the major regulating body. These have
been placed by Parsons (1951) in his well-known AGIL scheme. With some modifi-
cations, this general taxonomic scheme can also be used to identify the major
contents of a political culture and to locate the specific emphasis of some of the
varying approaches. The following dominant features of each sub-system should be
considered – a precise operationalization according to the cases analysed may vary,
of course, in time and space.
The community system

First, the boundaries of each case have to be determined. In modern times, the ‘nation-
state’ has become the most pertinent unit of analysis. Its objective ‘thresholds’ to the
outside world today are defined by international law. In political-cultural terms, the
extent and degree of a sense of identity with a person’s political community is the most
relevant aspect. This ‘national’ identity tends to become a social ‘skin’ for the indi-
viduals concerned, which, after a certain age, cannot be shed very easily any more. A
person’s social identity is linked to his/her ‘ego-identity’ and the personality system.
Problems and crises at one level may easily affect the other (Erikson, 1968), and an
excessive sense of nationalism, for example, is often found in persons who experience
other serious psychological problems as well.

In many cases, the political community is not homogeneous and various sub-
national identities persist. Each contemporary nation-state has been formed by
specific historical developments, some of which, as for example the drawing of
boundaries by the colonial powers in Africa, but also the division of Germany after
the Second World War, have been arbitrary and accidental. In this way, sometimes
quite curiously composed units have come into being, which, however, in the course
of time develop their own ‘life’ and weight. In certain instances, different aspects of
objective group differentiations can be combined in a ‘social milieu’ with a common
sub-culture. Thus Lepsius (1966), for example, distinguished a rural-Catholic, a
Protestant-bourgeois, and a worker’s milieu, each with its specific regional concentra-
tions, in Imperial Germany. These milieus can develop quite extensive internal
structures and organizations (e.g. in the fields of education, common social and cul-
tural activities, the media, economic and political organizations, etc.) and become
largely autonomous from the wider community. It has been shown that such sub-
milieus have been persisting in Germany, for example, since the territorial and
religious divisions of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and still influence elec-
toral behaviour (more Catholic or Christian vs. other parties) to a considerable extent,
confirming Rokkan’s and Geiger’s arguments (see above; Rohe, 1992).
In more extreme cases, these milieus can ossify into certain ‘Lager’, which view each
other as hostile camps and which, at best, cooperate only as ‘pillars’ in a ‘consocia-
tional’ manner at the elite level (Lijphart, 1977). The other alternative in such cases not
rarely is civil war or, if a group is more remote and regionally concentrated, secession.
More often, however, multiple identifications, which need not necessarily be in con-
flict with each other, can be found within the larger community. Thus, a person can be
a local, regional, and national ‘patriot’ at the same time, the kind and intensity of the
attachment depending on the concrete circumstances. The respective scope and inten-
sity of expressions of social trust may similarly vary in each instance. In extreme cases,
it may extend only to members of a person’s immediate family or other narrow in-
groups. In others, it may be quite pervasive and generalized (Banfield, 1958; Putnam,
1993). At the overall community level, certain often unconscious consensual norms
also are at work which accept and support the social system as such, even though
individuals and groups may act mostly in a conflicting manner within it. Such identi-
ties can, of course, also change over time and lose some of their significance. This can
be observed, for example, when party identifications based on particular sub-milieus
lost their importance in processes of ‘de-alignment’ (see also Chapter 13 below).
The socio-cultural system

The social-cultural system reflects the basic values of each society and gives meaning
to its existence. In traditional societies, the interpretation and internalization of these
values was closely linked to a transcendental sphere, which legitimized the existing
social and political order. In modern societies, a general secularization and rationaliza-
tion of values has taken place. But even there, common rituals and symbols can be
observed which give meaning to political life by referring to constitutive historical
events in the light of some universally claimed values and their particular evolution in
a certain society. Examples such as the American, French or Soviet Revolutions and

their respective value base, but also more gradual evolutions (as in the UK) or more
peaceful events elsewhere, for example, celebrations of independence in ‘new’ nations,
are cases in point. Some authors have coined the term ‘civil religion’ referring to this
phenomenon (Bellah and Hammond, 1980), which is congruent with this aspect of
political culture.
Such values justify the place of individuals and groups in the society (in a more
egalitarian or more hierarchical sense, but also concerning differentiations of age,
gender, etc.), determine their scope of action (in a more dependent or more participa-
tory way), and define the respective realms of solidarity, in particular when claims
running counter to egotistically perceived or other more immediate material interests
have to be made. These values also define the extent of the political sphere proper (in
a more pervasive or more limited sense), in which authoritative common decisions
have to be made. They include, basically, the rules for the resolution of conflicts in
society (in a more consensual or more antagonistic way) and of decision-making (in
an authoritarian or more democratic manner). In this regard, they closely interact with
the bases of legitimacy of the political system proper.
Cultural values are transmitted through the usual socializing agents of each society
(families, peer groups, the educational system, the media, etc.) and are more or less
internalized by each member (Hyman, 1959; Jennings and Niemi, 1981). They are, in
turn, shaped by collective historical experiences (in particular, traumatic ones such as
wars, intensive political or economic crises, assassinations of political leaders, terrorist
acts) and form the ‘collective memory’ of each society. The strength and durability of
this memory varies culturally, too, depending to a certain extent on the more specific
orientation of each society towards its past and future (van Beek and Ziolkowski,
2005). It seems that during long periods of external political suppression such memo-
ries can become particularly keen (as in Ireland, Poland or Israel, for example).
In many communities, the interpretation of basic values has been the particular
domain of ‘priests’ and similar specialists. In modern societies this role has increas-
ingly been taken up by secular intellectuals and scientists. They reflect and justify such
values in a discursive manner at a higher level of abstraction. In this sense they con-
tribute to a cultural meta-system (‘culture of culture’). Their role, however, is not
limited to legitimizing the existing political order in a docile way, but, on the contrary,
they may critically point to existing insufficiencies in the realization of certain values
and inconsistencies and contradictions between them. The political discourse of such
intellectuals often is coded in its own particular way, for example, by labelling certain
notions and forms of behaviour as ‘conservative’ or ‘progressive’ (Luhmann, 1974).
The analysis of the more general distribution of attitudes and values in the socio-
cultural sub-system is amenable to the usual tools of modern representative and
quantifiable survey research, provided that a certain minimal technical infrastructure
exists for this purpose and the political ‘climate’ of a particular regime permits it. In
this way, too ‘holistic’ generalizations as in former ‘national character’ studies (Inkeles,
1997) can be avoided and, in a critical sense, existing stereotypes and prejudices con-
cerning other communities which are assessed in the same manner can be refuted. It
is important, however, that such overall distributions of certain characteristics are
broken down by the major social structural categories and linked to the cleavages in
the community system. The political codes and meanings, and their interactions with
the political orientations in the population at large, have to be assessed by more

‘qualitative’ methods and interpretations. In this respect, the complementary nature of

quantitative and qualitative methods, requiring a certain in-depth knowledge and
sensibility of the respective researcher, is of particular importance.
The economic system

The economic system constitutes the material basis for the existence and development
of each society. Again, it is not so much its ‘objective’ side (i.e. the different modes of
production, the concrete allocation of resources, the effects on social structure and
their dynamics over time) with which we are concerned here, but its ‘subjective’,
political-cultural implications. This sub-system is determined by its own logic of
instrumental-rational (‘zweckrational’ in Webers’s sense) thinking and behaviour and
characterized by a specific economic ethic (‘Wirtschaftsethik’), which varies from cul-
ture to culture and can be strongly shaped by religious beliefs (Weber, 1963 [1920]).
To a certain extent, these orientations are also conditioned by interactions with the
general social-cultural sphere. They relate to individualistic vs. more collective orienta-
tions, attitudes towards work, property, the accumulation of wealth, patterns of
consumption, certain life-styles, and so on. The interactions with the political sub-
system consist of certain regulatory needs and concrete demands towards the public
sphere. Their satisfaction may create ‘specific supports’ for the political authorities in
Easton’s sense and may contribute in the longer run towards a ‘diffuse support’ for the
political system as a whole (Easton, 1965).
The political system

The ‘core’ of political culture can be found in the sources and the extent of legitimacy
of the political system, the ‘diffuse support’ it enjoys in the political community.
Whereas this support is always based to a certain extent on the customary acceptance
of certain rules and institutions, if they have existed over a longer period of time, its
value-base also has to be justified in terms of the more general discourse of the social-
cultural system. Again, in more traditional communities, this base is grounded in the
transcendental sphere concerning the divine origin or ‘gift of grace’ of certain dynas-
ties or the consecration of political rulers by religious authorities. In modern societies,
the major source of legitimacy is a ‘rational-legal’ one in Weber’s sense (1968 [1922]:
122 ff.), based on a critical reflection of the institutionalized rules of political recruit-
ment and decision-making (‘legitimization by procedure’ in Luhmann’s (1984) terms).
Open and fair elections involving the widespread participation of the population have
become the major instrument in this regard. Weber’s ‘charismatic’ type of legitimacy,
based on the personal appeal of a political leader, is a special case, which, by defini-
tion, is a relatively short-lived one. If the ‘routinization’ of charisma in terms of more
generally accepted principles fails, this type of legitimacy ends with the death of the
political leader, at the latest. Where conflicting principles of legitimacy, as for example
monarchic and democratic ones (for an analysis of this dilemma see Huntington,
1968), exist side by side, the stability of the system as a whole is undermined. Such
conflicts often lead to civil wars or revolutions. Where no more durable and pervasive
forms of legitimacy can be established, rulers usually attempt to achieve compliance
by coercion.

This systemic outline thus leads to a more complex conceptualization of political

culture. In contrast to some of the early protagonists of this approach it is not only
concerned with aspects of democratic stability in a ‘civic culture’, but points to pos-
sible tensions and sources of system breakdown as well. Each sub-system possesses, to
a certain extent, its own mechanisms and logic. If this internal logic becomes overrid-
ing (as, for example, the pursuit of individual or particular group benefits in the
economic system at the expense of certain collective goods), the overall system may
disintegrate.
Box 4.3 Almond and Verba’s

profile of the political culture
of the United States
The pattern of political culture found in the United States
approximates what we have labeled the civic culture. There
are several significant components in this cultural pattern. In
the first place, the role of the participant is highly developed
and widespread. As our data show, respondents in the United
States, compared with those in the other four nations, are very
frequently exposed to politics. They report political discus-
sion and involvement in political affairs. A sense of obligation
to take an active part in the community, and a sense of com-
petence to influence the government. They are frequently
members of voluntary associations. Furthermore, they tend
to be affectively involved in the political system: they report
emotional involvement during political campaigns, and they
have a high degree of pride in the political system.
Source: Almond, Gabriel Abraham and Sidney Verba. 1965. The civic culture: Political atti-
tudes and democracy in five nations. Paperback edn, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, p. 313.
Significantly, no mention is made in this profile of important ethnic/

racial and regional differences in this pattern, even though, for exam-
ple about 100 Afro-Americans had been included in the sample and
ma jor civil rights restrictions still existed in the South. This is noted by
Alan Abramowitz in Almond, Gabriel Abraham, and Sidney Verba (1980)
The civic culture revisited: An analytic study. Boston, MA: Little Brown,
Chapter VI, ‘The United States: Political Culture under Stress’, pp. 177–211.
Critical assessments
In the course of time the concept of political culture has generated many criticisms and
controversies. While the importance of cultural factors in politics is more generally
acknowledged, its analytical status and explanatory power have been questioned in

many ways. Almond himself, in retrospect (1993), distinguished four main lines of
criticism. One, advanced by Barry (1970) for example, questions the assumed causal-
ity: culture is not an independent but a dependent or, at best, ‘residual’ (Elkins and
Simeon, 1979) variable. It is not socialization, attitudes and subsequent behaviour
which shape political institutions and decide the fate of a polity as in Weimar
Germany, but rather the other way round: that institutions and performance influence
attitudes and determine the eventual downfall of a regime. This, Almond considers as
a ‘straw man polemic’ (1993: 16) because the concept has to be seen in a dynamic
sense with feedback mechanisms working in both directions. This could be observed
in the different processes of state formation in Europe, for example, but also in the
attempts of ‘nation-building’ in post-colonial Africa and elsewhere. The very process
of European integration will similarly imply some of these ‘directed’ political-cultural
changes in the longer run. Interactions of this kind, where institutional aspects can be
considered as independent variables affecting the other sub-systems creating attitudi-
nal and behavioural changes ‘from above’, are also considered by more recent
‘neo-institutional’ approaches (March and Olsen, 1989; Rothstein, 1996).
The (orthodox) Marxist critique that the mode of production and the resulting
social structures determine attitudes and behaviour (Wiatr, 1980) is similarly dis-
missed as one-sided and ‘monistic’ (see also Almond, 1996). More recent neo-Marxists
referring to Gramsci’s (1980) concept of cultural ‘hegemony’ discuss the complexity
of the relationship between basis and super-structure and arrive at more balanced and
(self-) critical accounts (Galkin, 1986).
A third line of criticism (Tucker, 1973; White, 1979) puts into doubt the separation
of political attitudes and actual behaviour. This is a general problem for a ‘behaviour-
alist’ perspective mainly based on survey research, as in election studies. Almond
refutes this argument, saying that by separating the two the complexities of the rela-
tion between political thought and political action, for example, situational aspects,
can be more fully explored.
Finally, Almond dismisses the ‘rational choice’ anti-culturalist critique replacing
historically shaped values and norms by mere calculations of (material) self-interest of
political actors (Popkin, 1979; Calvert, 2002) as reductionist and, at least again in an
orthodox or maximalist and scientistic variant, ‘monistic’. On the whole, thus,
Almond considers his original concept to have withstood these criticisms quite well
and, even, to have experienced a ‘renaissance’ in the last decade (Almond, 2002; see
also further below).
Political culture is a concept referring to the macro-level of society which, however,
in the behaviouralist Almond/Verba tradition is usually only assessed by survey
research at the micro-level. In this way, many important aspects may escape the atten-
tion of the observer. For example, expressions of a sense of patriotism and the use of
the flag and the national anthem, as has vividly been demonstrated again after
September 11, 2001, differ markedly between the USA and Germany. This can only be
fully understood if the representative national ‘macro’-histories and, in particular, the
traumatic German one are taken into account (Rüsen, 2001). Conversely, the use of
such symbols and their relative level of perception and acceptance can only be assessed
by quantifiable methods.
For bringing these levels and their interactions into a coherent framework, the gen-
eral model of explanations in social science, as it has been proposed by James Coleman

(1990) is again helpful (see also Chapter 1, Figure 1.3 above). This model can be sup-
plemented by the concept of ‘framing’. This is derived from cognitive psychology
(Fazio, 1986) and, to some extent, cultural psychology (D’Andrade, 1995; Shore,
1996) where the observation of a certain object (e.g. a certain material symbol like a
flag) must fit into the ‘frame’ of a known or anticipated situation in order to be able
to interpret it and to act accordingly. The subsequent action then follows a certain
routinized and often unconscious ‘script’ which has been ‘programmed’ by the social-
izing experiences of a particular group or society (e.g. when you raise and place your
right hand on your heart while listening to the national anthem during official cere-
monies in the USA, a ‘frame’ and ‘script’ which are not practised in this way in most
other countries).
These frames are often specific to particular (ethnic, religious, regional, local, etc.)
‘sub-milieus’ in a larger society where the structural components of the community
system and their specific identities again come into play. When these sub-milieus are
also territorially segregated to a certain extent (in certain regions, constituencies, pre-
cincts, city quarters, etc.), the long-term preferences for certain parties based on such
cleavages can be better explained than by economic or other immediate utility consid-
erations alone. In this sense, ‘electoral geography’ as originally developed by André
Siegfried (1913) can in certain situations provide a better explanation (and prediction)
of election results than the usual cross-national surveys where particular findings may
not fit and remain contradictory (for example, Catholic workers voting for a conserva-
tive party). Nevertheless, some ‘modernizing’, secularizing and other individualizing
influences are also at work and, at least as party preferences and voter identification
are concerned, a certain ‘dealignment’ concerning the ‘frozen’ cleavage situation in
Western Europe can be observed (Mair, 2001). In this way, tensions may arise between
a person’s ‘cultural’ group identity and her individual preferences.
Substantive findings, recent developments

After a certain lull in the 1980s, the political culture approach has experienced a
‘renaissance’ in the 1990s, but has also received renewed criticism. This renaissance
was influenced both by epistemological considerations and concrete events. In a
broader sense, the ‘cultural turn’ in the humanities brought with it a renewed empha-
sis on the more ‘subjective’ sides of human existence, aspects of meaning and
understanding, but also a more ‘relativist’, less universal, and more ‘post-modern’
rather than ‘scientistic’ epistemological orientation (the boom in cultural studies is
documented, for example, in Kellner, 1995 and Ferguson and Golding, 1997; ‘post-
modern’ positions in the social sciences are discussed in Rosenau, 1992). More
specifically, in political science the general post-materialist and in this sense also ‘post-
modern’ value change was sought to be demonstrated by authors like Inglehart (1988,
1990) and the broader cultural and deeper historical dimension of politics was (re-)
emphasized in Eckstein’s (1988) approach and Putnam’s (1993) influential study.
At about the same time, the events after 1989/90 in Central and Eastern Europe and
the demise of the Soviet Union opened up a rapidly widening field of democratization
and political culture studies more or less in the Almond/Verba tradition (Diamond,

1994; Plasser et al., 1998; Rose et al., 1998). Similarly, in international politics the
perception of an ongoing and intensifying ‘clash of civilizations’, in Huntington’s
(1993, 1996) terminology, replacing the Cold War of the former super-powers by
intra-societal and international conflicts based on ethnic, religious, and, in general,
‘cultural’ identities was intensively discussed and seemingly confirmed by the events
of September 11, 2001, and after.
As usual in our discipline, these changing emphases were accompanied by intensive
criticisms and alternative perceptions and proposals. In the following, we briefly
sketch some of these developments together with some critical assessments and place
them in the framework outlined above.
Global cultural modernization

‘Modernization’ theories have been en vogue in the social sciences since the late
1950s and early 1960s (see above). While Lipset based his assessment on broader
socio-economic and objectifiable indicators like GNP per capita and literacy,
Lerner explicitly identified a socio-psychological component, the increasing ‘empa-
thy’ of persons in the transition from traditional to modern societies. A similar and
still broader-based approach has been pursued by Inkeles and Smith (1974) and
their collaborators. In more recent times, Ronald Inglehart has become the most
prominent (and persistent!) scholar to follow this approach on a broad cultural
basis. He first detected and proclaimed the existence of ‘post-materialist’ attitudes
and values in the ‘silent revolution’ (1977) and ‘culture shift’ (1990) of the younger
generation in the well-to-do Western countries. His concepts, methods and findings
have been widely reviewed and criticized in the meantime (Dalton, 1996; Jackman
and Miller, 1996a).
Even more recently, he further broadened his approach to document ‘modernization
and post-modernization’ (1997) in 43 societies now including a number of non-
Western ones mostly based on the first two waves of the ‘World Values Survey’ which
were conducted in the early 1980s and 1990s. There, he expanded his concept to tap
a large variety of orientations ranging from religious beliefs, economic and political
attitudes to sexual norms and changing gender roles. He argues that in the course of
modernization traditional, including religious values are replaced by ‘rational-legal’
ones in Weber’s sense. But, as he puts it, ‘modernization is not the final stage of his-
tory’ (1997: 5). Increasingly in the younger generation in the advanced countries,
‘post-modern’ values, including ‘post-materialist’ ones, but also ‘a growing mass desire
for participation and self-expression’ (ibid.: 327) can be found. In this way, he con-
cludes, ‘economic, cultural, and political change go together in coherent patterns, and
they are changing the world in broadly predictable ways’ (ibid.: 341). Such sweeping
statements have again raised a lot of criticism, mainly concerned with methodological
aspects (Inkeles,1998).
Even more ambitious is the latest attempt in this respect put forward together
with Christian Welzel and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. They propose a general ‘Theory
of Human Development’ (Welzel et al., 2003; further developed in Inglehart and
Welzel, 2005 and Welzel, 2013) now attempting to integrate socio-economic devel-
opment as the ‘means’ component of their theory with the ‘motivational’ component

of cultural and the ‘rules’ component of (democratic) political outcomes. Even

though they do not say so explicitly, such a theory can be made compatible with the
overall model of social explanations outlined above. Socio-economic development
can be seen as the initial condition on the macro-level (at the upper left-hand side
of Coleman’s ‘bath tub’) linked to the individual perceptions and values at the
micro-level and finally resulting in the political changes again at the macro-level (on
the right-hand side). They conclude that ‘socio-economic development, changing
values, and democratization constitute a coherent syndrome of social progress’
(Welzel et al., 2003: 370) across the various cultural zones which previously had
been identified by Inglehart and Baker (2000). Such bold attempts again are, of
course, open to major criticisms concerning their data base, methodology, and over-
all model (Berg-Schlosser, 2003).
Historical depth and persistence of cultures

Rather than drawing broad ‘universal’ conclusions, Robert Putnam (1993) and his
collaborators emphasize the deep historical dimension of political cultures. They ana-
lysed the civic traditions in the newly created regions after the administrative reforms
in Italy in the early 1970s and the differential impact of these reforms. They attributed
the relative success of these reforms in the North compared to the persistence of more
traditional structures and low institutional performance in the South to the rich tradi-
tions of city-states and republics in Northern Italy since the Middle Ages. There, a
dense network of organizations of civil society with high levels of social trust and
political participation has emerged in the course of time. This ‘social capital’ has been
continuously reproducing itself and constitutes the basis for further economic and
political developments until the present day. By contrast, social relations in Middle
and Southern Italy, in the areas of the former (much larger) Vatican State and the
Kingdom of Sicily have been characterized by a political culture of suspicion, feudal
and more recent clientelistic relationships including the Mafia, economic backward-
ness and political apathy or cynicism. Thus, this has remained in line with what
Banfield (1958) earlier had called the ‘amoral familism’ of the South. Thus, here too,
self-reproducing mechanisms and game theoretical equilibria are at work, this time as
a circulus vitiosus rather than a circulus virtuosus as in the North.
This study has found much acclaim. Nevertheless, some weaker points relating to
certain aspects of the methodology (Morlino, 1995) and their overall approach
(Jackman and Miller, 1996a) have been pointed out as well. By going back in history
almost indefinitely such an explanation can easily be made unfalsifiable, overlooking
important changes that have taken place as well.
Cultural conflicts on a global scale

Even more widely discussed than Inglehart’s ‘universal’ and Putnam’s ‘deep’ histori-
cally rooted concepts of political culture has been Huntington’s (1993, 1996) ‘Clash
of Civilizations’ (in the book version without a question mark). He distinguishes nine
broad cultural zones, which are characterized mainly by common fundamental
religious traditions and beliefs and constitute the basis for common identities. These

determine the most significant cleavages in international politics after the end of the
Cold War. The Islamic region, in particular, is seen to be characterized by ‘bloody
borders’ and ‘fault line wars’, as for example in Bosnia or Kosovo, Chechnya, Kashmir,
the Philippines, Northern Nigeria, etc. In addition, in the longer run, ‘core states’ in
the major regions, in particular China and, if a common centre should emerge, in the
Islamic world, would pose a major challenge to the present dominance of the West. At
the extreme, a scenario of ‘the West against the rest’ may become possible. He con-
cludes that ‘in ... the global real clash between Civilization and barbarism the world’s
great civilizations ... will hang together or hang separately’ (1996: 321). This percep-
tion stands in stark contrast to Inglehart’s assessment of a universalizing ‘post-modern’
world culture, but also to the emerging international regimes based on commonly
accepted charters within the framework of the United Nations and an increasingly
universal perception of basic human rights, democracy, and ‘good governance’ (UNDP,
2002; see also Chapter 8 below).
Not surprisingly, this spectacular thesis has provoked many reactions and criti-
cisms. Among the favourable comments were those by hardliners on either side of the
cultural divide, as among Conservative and military interests in the USA or Mahatir’s
Malaysia in defence of non-democratic ‘Asian values’ (Council on Foreign Relations,
1996). Others pointed out some major weaknesses in his concept. Mark Juergensmeyer
(1993) also identified ‘religious nationalism’ as a major, more recent phenomenon, but
saw it largely confined to smaller groups including terrorist ones, in some cultures, as
among Islamic fundamentalists or Hindu nationalists. Rather than the ‘apocalyptic
vision of a worldwide conflict between religious and secular nationalism’ he sees ‘rea-
son to be hopeful. It is equally as likely that religious nationalists are incapable of
uniting with another, and they will greatly desire an economic and political reconcili-
ation with the secular world’ (ibid.: 201).
Huntington’s warnings, again intensified after ‘September 11’, have stimulated a
wide range of reactions both in international politics and political science. Harald
Mueller (1998), for example, questions some of Huntington’s major assumptions such
as the prevalence of cultural vis-à-vis state politics, the more or less uniform identities
of the respective civilizations, their capability to become major coherent actors on the
world scene, the neglect of global economic factors, such as the importance of world
trade and energy supplies, and not merely ‘cultural’ ones.
Huntington’s and similar concepts also have to be checked against the framework
of the model discussed above. First of all, it is important to note that his concept of
‘civilization’ is not identical with political culture. The latter is defined by the estab-
lished territorial boundaries of the respective polity and shaped (in a dynamic
feedback loop) by the existing type of political system. Only in cases where, in
Huntington’s terminology, ‘core states’ coincide with the respective ‘civilization’ as in
China, Japan, and, to a relatively large extent, India, may the two notions be treated
as synonymous. In all others, the diversity of states and regimes in each cultural zone
may lead to significantly varying political cultures, such as more authoritarian or
more democratic ones. Second, ‘macro’ preconditions (on the upper left-hand side)
such as cultural and religious cleavages, but also economic discrepancies, etc., only
play a role if they are perceived as such and acted upon at the ‘micro’-level and then
may be aggregated at the meso-level on the right-hand side in order to have political

‘macro’-effects (on the upper right-hand side). If and to what extent this really is the
case at each stage can only be answered empirically, but some of these (necessary)
links seem to be rather weak in Huntington’s scenarios.
Cultural perspectives
As we have seen, the relationships between culture and politics are manifold and
often controversial. It has become clear that culture influences politics in many ways.
The opposite is also true. Political actors, decisions, events and the kind of political
units we live in have an impact on our perceptions and attitudes. The vast cultural
areas shaped by the major world religions (‘Kulturkreise’, Huntington’s ‘civiliza-
tions’) only form the background in this regard. The more specific political aspects
and identities are still mostly shaped in the existing world order on the individual
state level. In this respect today, enormous amounts of data are constantly being col-
lected, among others by the major regional regular ‘barometers’ such as the
Eurobarometer, the Afrobarometer, the AsiaBarometer, the Latinobarometro, and
similar ones. All of these proceed on a country-by-country basis, sometimes also
showing important sub-national variations. Where states have failed or are failing, as
in parts of Africa and the Middle East, as a result of their relatively recent and largely
artificial creation, pre-colonial structures such as different ethnic entities, clans, etc.
again have come into the foreground and more traditional leaders and respected
authorities like chiefs, elders, priests and similar ones exercise a considerable influ-
ence. Our cultural maps, therefore, still have to be filled in many ways and have to
take account of ongoing changes.
In spite of many criticisms and varying emphases, the concept of political culture as
discussed above is here to stay. It highlights the ‘subjective’ dimension of politics and
can integrate the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels in sensitive and subtle but yet inter-
subjectively transmissible (and falsifiable!) ways. As the preceding discussion has
shown, the over-emphasis of certain aspects by major recent protagonists has, on the
one hand, re-stimulated, enlivened and enriched the debates in this important field
concerning pressing issues of our time with respect to the deeper historical and cul-
tural foundations of democracy (Putnam), global value changes (Inglehart), or
impending world conflicts (Huntington). On the other hand, the (almost) infinite
historical regress by Putnam, the sweeping seemingly universal statements by
Inglehart, and Huntington’s crusadal zeal to save ‘the West’ have exposed some of the
limits of this approach when it is overdone or overstated.
Conclusions
The overall systems framework sketched above, into which the different social-
structural and political-cultural approaches with their varying emphases can be
integrated, can show a way to cope with our complex multi-dimensional and multi-
level reality. Both its relatively persistent and changing features over time, in a
meaningful way, bring together quantifiable and, to a certain extent, formalizable
micro- and more qualitative meso- and macro-aspects. Not each single study can be

expected to cope fully and extensively with this complexity. For this reason, the
sweeping rejection by Jackman and Miller (1996a, 1996b) of the political culture
approach misses the point. While most of their detailed methodological criticisms in
Inglehart’s and Putnam’s studies concerning the relatively low level of variance
explained by ‘cultural’ factors alone are well taken, this purely ‘micro’-perspective
cannot explain the preceding ‘framing’ of such attitudes and the subsequent identities
formed in particular ‘milieus’.
Not all the possible links in such a more complex conceptualization have been suf-
ficiently specified so far and more conceptual and substantive elements both have to
be ‘filled in’ to enhance our assessments and understanding of major political pro-
cesses at all levels and in all major parts or countries of the world. Similarly, our
quantitative, qualitative and ‘formal’ methods and techniques have to be brought
more in line to cope with this contextually rich and deep, but nevertheless, in social
scientific terms ‘intelligible’ reality. What may be achieved in an historically suffi-
ciently deep, demonstrable and, to some extent, quantifiable way is a Rokkanian kind
of analysis of the major regions of the world in both their longer-term social-structural
and cultural aspects, their self-reproducing mechanisms under increasing global pres-
sures, and their relevance for day-to-day politics including changing social movements,
party systems, political regimes, and transnational (at the social level) or international
(at the state level) conflicts (see also Parts IV and V below).
To point to just one example of such emerging more supplementary and synthetic
possibilities: if looked at more closely, the maps of the ‘cultural zones’ listed by both
Huntington (1996: 26/27) and Inglehart (1997: 349) begin to resemble each other both
in their major sub-categories and some of their surveyed or alleged substantive aspects
(with, significantly, the exception of most of the Islamic world which is still missing in
Inglehart’s global analyses). In a similar way, the cultural ‘frames’ in each society which
shape individual orientations, but which also may be a source of certain stereotypes
and prejudices, can be examined more closely and made aware in both their potentially
more ‘positive’ and negative functions. Inter-ethnic, religious, and overall inter-cultural
conflicts may then be better understood and, possibly, regulated and accommodated by
appropriate political institutions and, if necessary, interventions.
Our culturally extremely rich and increasingly interacting and interdependent
world thus is still full of challenges for a meaningful analysis of the relationships
between specific social and cultural conditions and their political consequences on
different levels. No mono-causal or linear explanation can do justice to this diversity.
Indeed, there is no single route to ‘modernity’ and the diversity of its interpretations
(see also Eisenstadt, 2003). The broader social bases of politics as discussed in this
chapter underlie the more specific democratic and non-democratic types of regimes,
which historically have evolved in different parts of the world (see the following chap-
ters of this Part below). A fuller picture then emerges when we look at the governance
and performance aspects in Part III as well. Only then can the existing feedbacks, both
in a negative and a positive sense leading to increasing overall development and con-
solidation or to severe political crises and decay, be fully appreciated. Some recent
works by Charles Tilly (2007), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2012) and Francis
Fukuyama (2011, 2014) have attempted to take such a comprehensive and long-term
historical view.

Questions
1 Which factors are going to change present social-structural patterns?
2 How can social-structural and political-cultural approaches be
combined?
3 Why is the concept of culture so elusive?
4 Why can culture be both a dependent and an independent variable?
5 What are the main assumptions of Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’
and the main counter-arguments?
Further reading
Almond, Gabriel Abraham and Verba, Sidney (1963) The civic culture: Political attitudes and
democracy in five nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. The pioneering com-
parative study of political culture based on large-scale survey research in the USA, the United
Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Mexico.
Almond, Gabriel Abraham and Verba, Sidney (1980) The civic culture revisited: An analytic
study. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. A critical review of the original study by the authors and
major invited critics almost 20 years after the first publication.
Putnam, Robert (1993) Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press. A study of the historical cultural differences of major regions in
Italy and their consequences for present-day politics and administrative reforms.
Huntington, Samuel P (1996) The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New
York: Simon & Schuster. A provocative scenario of the world in the twenty-first century
based on alleged clashes of cultural identities among civilizations.
Inglehart, Ronald and Welzel, Christian (2005) Modernization, cultural change, and democracy.
The human development sequence. Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press.
A more peaceful scenario analysing longer-term cultural changes based on empirical find-
ings from the ‘World Values Surveys’ over a period of more than 20 years.
Lipset, Seymour M (1963) Political man. The social bases of politics. New York: Doubleday.
The most influential early work on the socio-economic conditions of democracy.
Moore, Barrington (1966) Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Lord and peasant in
the making of the modern world. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. A historical-materialist study
on different paths to modernity.
Weblinks
World Values Survey: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
Eurobarometer Data Service: www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/survey-series/standard-
special-eb/study-profiles/?no_cache=1
Afrobarometer: www.afrobarometer.org/
Lationobarómetro: www.latinobarometro.org/

5
Democracies
Key terms
Consensus democracy Regime
Direct democracy Representative democracy
Liberal democracy Semi-parliamentary democracy
Ma joritarian democracy Semi-presidential democracy
Parliamentary democracy Social democracy
Presidential democracy State functions
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we presented the broader social-structural and political-
cultural bases of politics as they shape current political structures and processes.
Here, we have to define more precisely the notion of regime, in connection with state
as discussed in the Introduction and with political system as discussed in the previ-
ous chapter. We then present an analysis of democracies from a static perspective and
in the next chapter from a dynamic one. Chapter 7 will be devoted to the non-
democratic regimes. In this way, we lay out the main theoretical bases of
macro-politics, which are needed to develop our specialized language and any kind
of empirical theory in the field. From a different perspective, we can learn an impor-
tant lesson: a precise, but also open and pluralist, set of basic concepts is the
necessary basis for developing empirical research in political science, as in any other
discipline. Consistently using these key empirical concepts with the same meanings
provides a necessary theoretical structure for the semantic field of political science
as a discipline. To start any analysis of macro-politics a few macro-concepts need to
be carefully defined as they are at the heart of our subsequent analyses of democra-
tization and micro- and meso-politics. These are state, regime, and political system
as the three most important pillars for our further discussion.
State and regime, again

To the discussion about the state in the Introduction, here we add the empirical mean-
ing of this notion. In this vein, we first distinguish major state functions, as Fukuyama
does (2004, esp. Chapter 1), such as defence, law and order, protecting property rights,
macro-economic management, public health, education and similar ones. These are

carried out by the state apparatus, which consists of the armed forces in a broad sense
of the term including the police, of central and local bureaucracies, and of the judici-
ary. This implies that when there is a change of regime the state apparatuses often
show a strong continuity. It also means that there is a close connection between state
institutions and regime institutions. If, for example, a bill is approved by parliament,
it has to be implemented by the bureaucracy (Poggi, 2011).
The first characteristic of a regime is a stabilization of its institutions over a period
of time. As Fishman (1990: 428) notes, regimes ‘are more permanent forms of political
organization’. That is, we are not in a fluid phase of transition related to change to
another regime (see the next chapter). A precise distinction between the two situations
is easier to detect through a qualitative analysis. However, persistence of the same
institutions for about a decade points to a regime, even if an unstable one. A widely
accepted definition of this notion is offered by O’Donnell (2004: 15), who suggests
considering the patterns, explicit or otherwise, that determine the channels of access
to the main government positions, the characteristics of the actors who are admitted
to or excluded from such access, and the resources or strategies that they can use to
gain access. Easton (1965) defined regime along similar lines: the way power is distrib-
uted among the various roles and positions within the political system. We can add
that a regime is the set of government institutions and norms that are either formalized
or are informally recognized as existing in a given territory and with respect to a given
population. More explicitly, we are referring to a constitutional order, the institutions
that exercise the legislative and executive powers (e.g. the president of a republic or
monarch, the government, the parliament and the division of power among them), the
constitutional court and the electoral law, if they exist. The regime is in close continu-
ous interchange with the state and the political system (see also Siaroff, 2011).
So far, we have been discussing institutions and rules. However, we know very well
that the same rules or institutions on paper can work in very different ways in reality
depending on the interactions among them, that is, among the components of the
regime and the state, but also on the interactions of all the formal and informal rules
and institutions with the society and its culture (see also Chapter 4). Consequently, we
also need to take the political community into consideration, i.e. the society seen in
connection with the regime and the state apparatus, which together shape the political
system. This community may be differently organized or not organized, more or less
active, with well-identifiable political groups and parties or with poor identifications,
with more or less fragmentation, and with or without political movements (see Chapters
11 and 12). When we consider the state, the regime, the authorities in the regime, and
the political community, taken altogether with their interactions, we can speak of a
political system (see also Chapter 4 above). Thus, with the above notions in mind we
can now analyse different regime types and their interactions with parts of the state and
society, starting with the various types of democracy.
Definitions
It is well known that the term democracy covers not only the complex connections
between power and people but also the inextricable connection between the different

DEMOCRACIES 81
realities that a number of scholars, citizens and elites include under the label and the
normative and ideal views that give content to it. As Sartori (1987: 7) suggests, ‘what
democracy is cannot be separated from what democracy should be’. But if we are
interested in an empirical approach to democracy, how should we go about it?
Box 5.1 Sartori, ‘How Far Can

Free Government Travel?’
‘Demo-protection … meaning the protection of a people
from tyranny … is the necessary and defining element. And I
would also hold that this is the global or universal element,
the one that can be exported anywhere and implanted in
any kind of soil. As this element is concerned primarily with
the structural and legal means of limiting and controlling the
exercise of power, and thus of keeping arbitrary and abso-
lute power at bay, we have here a political form that can be
superimposed (since it is only a form) on any culture regard-
less of underlying socioeconomic configurations.’
Source: Sartori (1995) How far can free government travel? Journal of Democracy 6(3): 111
Moreover, although the term was coined in the West, nowadays it is adopted and has
been exported to all areas of the world. In this vein, Sartori (1995: 101) affirms ‘that
democracy is a Western invention does not entail that it is a bad invention, or a prod-
uct suitable only for Western consumption’ (see Box 5.1), and Amartya Sen (1999: 5)
adds: ‘recognition of democracy as a universally relevant system, which moves in the
direction of its acceptance as a universal value, is a major revolution in thinking, and
one of the main contributions of the twentieth century’ (see Box 5.2). The fact is that
democratic rhetoric is adopted by politicians who define very different sets of institu-
tions as democracy. In other words, democracy can today be present or even
consolidated in every area of the world, but any definition of democracy is still
culture-bound (see Hu Wei and Lin, 2011 and Ilyin, 2011). While this has to be
accepted when discussing a normative definition of democracy – i.e. a definition
inspired by and focused on the values we believe in – when attempting to establish an
empirical definition the culture-bound aspects still cannot be fully eliminated.
Ultimately, even an empirical definition will be built on assumptions and interests,
although in the end it has to be supported by empirical control of the existing realities.
This implies a persistent possibility of disagreement over empirical definitions, espe-
cially that of democracy, which is a fully accepted word in political rhetoric all over
the world. Consequently, if we acknowledge that a culture-bound aspect of democracy
is assumed, and we recognize the Western origin in the emphasis on rights and indi-
viduals, is there a way out of this conundrum?

Box 5.2 Amartya Sen, ‘Democracy

as a Universal Value’
‘Democracy’s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one
particular merit. There is a plurality of virtues here, including,
first, the intrinsic importance of political participation and
freedom in human life; second, the instrumental importance
of political incentives in keeping governments responsible
and accountable; and third, the constructive role of democ-
racy in the formation of values and in the understanding of
needs, rights, and duties. In the light of this diagnosis, we
may now address the …. case for seeing democracy as a
universal value.’
Source: Sen (1999)Democracy as a universal value. Journal of Democracy 10(3): 11
A minimalist definition
A sub-optimal solution is to limit the empirical definition of democracy to a few
minimalist features so that they can be shared by the largest possible number of peo-
ple, experts and otherwise. That is, we may assume that a minimalist empirical
definition will be better able to cross at least some cultures and be accepted by them
even if it is rejected by other cultures. The additional advantage of a minimalist defini-
tion is that it is the simplest one possible and consequently makes it relatively easier
to distinguish the empirical cases of regimes that we eventually consider as democratic
from those that are not. This is also essential in order to understand when a regime in
a transitional process turns into a (minimalist) democracy, or is close to doing so.
The best minimalist definition is still one inspired by Dahl (1971, esp. Chapter 1):
a regime should be considered democratic if it has at least the following: a) universal
male and female suffrage; b) recurring, free, competitive, fair elections; c) more than
one political party; and d) different and alternative sources of information. To better
understand this definition, it should be stressed that it ultimately includes a genuine
respect for civil and political rights as an essential feature. The related implicit
assumption is that these rights actually exist if there is effective universal suffrage, i.e.
if the right to vote is an actual possibility for the whole adult demos; if in connection
with this there are free, fair and regular elections, which are an expression of the effec-
tive existence of freedom of speech and thought; if there is more than one political
party competing, which is a manifestation of the existence of a real and practised right
of association; and if there are different sources of media information with different
ownership to guarantee some objective conditions of fair information, which is so
relevant in the formation of political opinions, attitudes and consensus. One impor-
tant aspect of this definition is that all these elements are necessary conditions for a
democracy of this kind, which means if one of these features is absent or ceases to
exist, the regime we are analysing is no longer a democracy, but very likely a hybrid
regime (see below).

DEMOCRACIES 83
An important addition to this definition can be made by recalling Schmitter and

Karl (1993: 45–46), who stress that democratic institutions, existing rights and the
decision-making process should not be constrained by either non-elected elites or
external powers. In the first case, an example might be a desire of the armed forces to
influence democratic decision-making processes and consequently the actual working
of a democracy. In the second, strong unacceptable influence might come from an
external power undermining the independence and sovereignty of a specific demo-
cratic regime. The former scenario would push the regime beyond the boundaries of
democracy in a non-democratic or ambiguously democratic institutional arrangement.
In the second scenario, there may be democracy within the country but not independ-
ence and sovereignty; the country is controlled by other interests, which are not those
of its own citizens. However, regarding this second situation of an important role of
external powers, a crucial distinction has to be made with regard to democracies
whose elites openly and formally renounce sovereignty through international treaties
to achieve other important goals. This is what happened with the six European
democracies whose elites with two treaties in Paris and Rome (see also below) during
the 1950s created first the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the
European Economic Community (EEC), which by now has become the European
Union (EU). Thus, the second form of control has very different implications and does
not necessarily move in an anti-democratic direction.
A common-sense warning should be added when analysing the components of the
minimalist definition in detail. In fact, while it can be easier to check the presence
of universal suffrage, recurring elections and even multiparty competition, as
Diamond (2002: 28) points out, it is much more difficult to check if the elections
are actually free and it is even more difficult to see if they are fair, without bribery,
vote-buying or manipulation in vote counting. It is not even always easy to detect
‘alternative sources of information’ in terms of different ownership as there are dif-
ferent ways to circumvent this rule, such as through cartel agreements or dummy
ownership.
In other words, even with the minimalist definition the problem of what are the
right and adequate indicators and measures to adopt is open and unsolved. Moreover,
an additional aspect must be mentioned: should the measurement simply distinguish
whether a regime is democratic or not on a qualitative basis or should democraticness
be measured on a continuous scale from the least to the most democratic? This ques-
tion can only be answered with regard to the specific research problem. If, for
example, a distinction between democracies and other regime types (see next chapters)
is the goal, then a dichotomous approach, i.e. to distinguish between democracy and
non-democracy as Przeworski and his colleagues (1995) do, is appropriate. If more
differentiations are to be explained, a continuous scale can be more helpful. With this
in mind, the conundrum of the empirical assessment of a minimalist democracy is
grounded not on formal aspects alone, which are easier to control empirically (univer-
sal suffrage, elections, more than one party), but on a thoughtful expert evaluation of
the fairness of elections (no bribes, no manipulation), the freedom of the voting right
(no constraints of different kinds), the effective competitiveness of elections (more
than one party that effectively contends the seats), but also an evaluation of pluralism
in media ownership. These are expert assessments that require the knowledge of each
specific case. The most elaborate and comprehensive attempt of this kind is the

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. The multi-dimensionality of the concept of

democracy can also be rendered in a cobweb graph without aggregating the different
dimensions into a single scale.
Other empirical definitions

Once the minimalist definition with its limits and goals has been accepted, the next
question is whether there are more precise and better-developed definitions of democ-
racy. Of course, a positive reply to this question should be immediately complemented
by two considerations. The first and most obvious one is that such definitions are the
result of attempts to single out the key elements of the regimes we define as democra-
cies that have existed in the Western world for longer periods of time. Second, the
dominant definition of democracy has been that of a ‘mass liberal-democracy’ and its
procedural aspects have been most crucial.
A procedural definition was initially proposed by Schumpeter (1942: 269 and
1964: 257): ‘The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people’s vote’. However, the actual meaning of ‘procedure’
must be understood correctly. In fact, it would be wrong to assume that any decision-
making ‘content’ can be the result of the formalized democratic rules. When excessive
stress is placed on the procedural dimension or one talks in terms of absolute uncer-
tainty – by which it is understood that within defined democratic procedures any
decision, for example even one to abolish the market and private property or funda-
mental human and political rights, may be taken – there is a change in the level of
analysis, a shift towards the normative dimension and away from the empirical one.
On the empirical historical plane, in fact, mass liberal democracy has been based on
the maintenance of certain socio-economic conditions, principally associated with
private property, and basic human rights.
Therefore, it can be argued that: a) a democratic regime is one that permits the most
indeterminacy with regard to the concrete content of the decisions that can be made
by elected bodies; this uncertainty is always relative and cannot exceed certain bound-
aries defined by the safeguarding of the rule of law; b) these boundaries are,
furthermore, fixed by the fact that the democratic system is underpinned by a com-
promise agreement which recognizes collectively accepted rules for the peaceful
resolution of conflicts between social, politically represented groups; and c) the limits
are exceeded not only when there is an attempt to make decisions that contravene
these rules, but also when decisions are taken that impinge on interests perceived to
be vital by the social actors involved in the political compromise agreement. In an
industrialized liberal democracy, for instance, such actors would range from business
associations to unionized workers’ associations.
A more comprehensive procedural definition was later developed by Dahl (1989:
37–38), who identified five criteria as key elements of a democracy: effective participa-
tion; voting equality; enlightened understanding, i.e. citizens have adequate and equal
opportunities to learn about policy alternatives; control of the agenda, i.e. citizens
have the opportunity to decide which matters are placed on the public agenda; and
the inclusion of adult residents who enjoy citizenship rights (see Box 5.3).

DEMOCRACIES 85
Box 5.3 Robert Dahl, ‘On Democracy’

…. is it possible to identify some criteria that a process for
governing an association would have to meet in order to
satisfy the requirement that all the members are equally
entitled to participate in the association’s decisions about
its policies? There are, I believe, at least five such standards.
Effective participation. Before a policy is adopted by the association,

all the members must have equal and effective opportunities for mak-
ing their views known to the other members as to what the policy
should be.
Voting equality. When the moment arrives at which the decision about
policy will finally be made, every member must have an equal and
effective opportunity to vote, and all votes must be counted as equal.
Enlightened understanding. Within reasonable limits as to time, each
member must have equal and effective opportunities for learning
about the relevant alternative policies and their likely consequences.
Control of the agenda. The members must have the exclusive oppor-
tunity to decide how and, if they choose, what matters are to be
placed on the agenda. Thus the democratic process required by the ...
preceding criteria is never closed. The policies of the association are
always open to change by the members, if they so choose.
Inclusion of adults. All, or at any rate most, adult permanent residents
should have the full rights of citizens that are implied by the first four
criteria. Before the twentieth century this criterion was unacceptable
to most advocates of democracy.
Source: Dahl (1998) On democracy, pp. 37–38.
Dahl’s definition is simpler and more straightforward than Sartori’s, which we com-
pare for a better understanding of this debate. According to Sartori (1987: 156),
‘large-scale democracy is a procedure and/or a mechanism that (a) generates an open
polyarchy whose competition in the electoral market (b) attributes power to the peo-
ple and (c) specifically enforces the responsiveness of the leaders to the led’. This more
complex definition does not just include participation and dissent, which were already
envisaged by Dahl, but it also stresses liberal and democratic values such as the com-
petition and pluralism of the polyarchic system itself, reference to electoral
mechanisms, an underlining of the relationship between the elected and electors, and
envisages a ‘responsiveness’ of the former as a consequence of being elected.
Despite being largely procedural, these two definitions contain a substantive differ-
ence behind which there lie two different research perspectives. Dahl is interested in
producing an entirely empirical definition, an indispensable step for anyone wanting

to conduct empirical research in this area, as he does. Sartori acknowledges, and

indeed values, the connection between empirical and normative elements, and regards
it as inevitable that this link will be maintained in a political theoretical perspective.
While Sartori’s more complex definition is important and legitimate when the focus is
also on democratic ideals, Dahl’s definition has the merit of being a more appropriate
empirical description of democratic regimes, and can be preferred for the purpose of
empirical analysis. In fact, while both participation and dissent are essential features
of mass liberal democracies, competition and responsiveness are key characteristics of
a normative definition. In other words, Sartori may be right in arguing indirectly that
some degree of competition and responsiveness, however minimal, are indispensable
for a real democracy. But although these two elements are crucial when evaluating the
gap between a real regime and an ideal democracy, they are of less importance when
it comes to judging whether a country is a democracy or an authoritarian or hybrid
regime. Expressed differently, if competition and responsiveness are almost non-
existent but rights and freedoms are concretely guaranteed, thus enabling participation
and the real possibility of dissent, would it not be fair to say that we are still in the
presence of a democratic regime? Considering nations usually regarded as democratic,
such as Italy or Sweden, the former characterized by limited responsiveness and the
latter by decades of political dominance by the Social Democratic Party, it is difficult
to argue that such characteristics are essential constitutive components of a real
democratic regime, i.e. that the presence or lack of one or both would imply a change
of definition from a democratic to a non-democratic regime.
Between procedures and contents

To make this definition more empirically salient and helpful, it is necessary to decide
which rules and institutions distinguish a democratic regime. Expanding the sugges-
tions by Dahl (1989: 221), at least the following should be included: the set of formal
rules and procedures regarding universal suffrage; free, fair, competitive and recurrent
elections; a decision-making and governing body elected with the above-mentioned
norms, usually corresponding to a parliamentary assembly; a prime minister and a
government that are answerable to parliament or are the result of direct election by
the electorate; a set of intermediary structures represented by political parties and
interest groups; and all the bureaucratic structures (public administration, judiciary,
armed forces, police, social welfare system, etc.), which continually interact with the
elected democratic structures. These institutions and norms presuppose, albeit to dif-
ferent degrees, a genuine guarantee of political rights and liberty, such as freedom of
expression, union and association, and alternative sources of information, and there-
fore also the existence of other norms and of a judicial and bureaucratic apparatus
that guarantees such rights.
Behind the dominant attention to the procedural definition of democracy there has
been a strong belief, solidly supported by empirical evidence, that the formal proce-
dural components of a democracy are the necessary requisites for any kind of
democratic deepening towards more substantive elements, be they less economic
inequality or the existence and development of social equality (see also Chapter 9).
Thus, Sartori (1987: 357) affirms that there is ‘a procedural linkage’ between the

DEMOCRACIES 87
procedural features represented by elections, civil and political rights and the other
aspects mentioned above and the substantive aspects represented in economic and
social equality. In fact, ‘liberty … comes first … on the simple consideration that equal-
ity without freedom cannot even be demanded … he who is unfree does not even have
a voice in the matter,’ namely in deploring and combating socio-economic inequality.
During recent decades, however, two phenomena have contributed to turning atten-
tion towards these more substantive aspects of democracy. First, there has been the
most important phenomenon of political change in the past half century with the
building of new democracies in all parts of the world (see Chapter 6). This meant that
the issue of what is behind the forms and procedures became a central one. Moreover,
the new democracies had a problem of legitimacy vis-à-vis their citizens. As Diamond
(2008: 294) puts it, ‘the new democracies … must demonstrate that they can solve
governance problems and meet citizens’ expectations for freedom, justice, a better life,
and a fairer society. If democracies do not work better to contain crime and corrup-
tion, generate economic growth, relieve economic equality and secure justice and
freedom, sooner or later people will lose faith and embrace or tolerate other – non-
democratic – alternatives.’ Second, in the fully fledged consolidated democracies
economic crises have brought about a parallel delegitimizing of existing institutions,
with similar demands for ‘citizens’ expectations for freedom, justice, a better life, and
a fairer society’ (ibid.) to be met. These two phenomena have led to a partial enlarge-
ment of the notion of democracy; with the classic procedural element now being
enriched by substantive aspects where social rights become a key component of a
fuller definition (see also the next chapter). To this can be added the view of Kriesi and
Morlino (2016), with reference to the European situation, that democracy is not only
procedural, but also includes the idea that a democratic government should protect its
citizens against poverty and promote social justice.
Types of democracy
An empirical implementation of the minimalist definition suggested in the previous
section allows us to decide which the actual cases of democratic regimes are. For
example, we could take the countries that Freedom House assesses as free, or the cases
analysed by the Economist Intelligence Unit and defined as democratic regimes. Of
course, at this point the next question is how to distinguish among democracies. Are
there satisfactory typologies which provide a reply to this question?
Parliamentary, semi-parliamentary, semi-presidential,

presidential types
First of all, let us be explicit that although during recent decades in a number of
democracies there has been the adoption and implementation of institutions of direct
democracy of different kinds, the regimes we are considering here in terms of this
typology are representative democracies characterized by a variety of electoral laws,
and differently organized competitive elections, legislatures and governments. Second,
the most traditional typology, which was revised through a lively debate in the 1990s

(see among others, Linz and Valenzuela, 1994; Lijphart, 1994; Sartori, 1994; Shugart
and Carey, 1992; Elgie, 2011), distinguishes between parliamentary democracies,
semi-parliamentary democracies or chancellor democracies, and semi-presidential and
presidential democracies. The key criterion at the core of this typology is how the
relationship between the legislative and the executive branches of government is
organized. To make this discussion simpler, in a semi-parliamentary or chancellor
democracy there is a strong premiership determining major policies and which
through a stable parliamentary majority controls the working of parliament. In a
parliamentary or assembly democracy the prime minister is ‘a first among equals’ and
has to take into account the supporting party coalition in leading the activity of the
parliament. In both cases, the prime minister is elected and receives a vote of confi-
dence by the parliament, often from only one chamber if the system is bicameral. The
best European examples of a semi-parliamentary democracy are the United Kingdom,
Germany, Spain and Greece. Despite some important differences, examples of parlia-
mentary democracy include Denmark, Norway and Italy.
In a semi-presidential system, the head of state or president is elected directly and
at the same time there is a prime minister who is supported by a parliamentary major-
ity. If the president is the leader or belongs to the party or parties that enjoy a
parliamentary majority, then the prime minister belongs to the same majority and the
elected president is a powerful figure. If the elected president is confronted with a dif-
ferent parliamentary majority led by the prime minister, then the president is weaker
and has to share the executive power with the prime minister. The best known case of
semi-presidentialism is the French Fifth Republic, and to avoid the problem of so-
called cohabitation – with a president and prime minister who belong to different
parties – a constitutional reform at the beginning of the twenty-first century required
that the elections of president and parliament should take place at the same time
ensuring similar majorities, with a consequent hyper-presidentialism.
Presidentialism is characterized by the election of a president who is at the same
time the head of state and the leader of the executive power, i.e. the prime minister.
The USA is the best known and most often quoted example of a presidential regime,
but according to the constitutional rules on the division of power the legislative
power is beyond the control of the president, who can only exert influence in
Congress through the parliamentary groups and their leaders. Thus, if in the House
of Representatives and/or in the Senate there is a parliamentary majority belonging to
the opposition, the president is largely blocked in promoting the government’s poli-
cies. In Latin American presidentialisms, the head of state can influence the legislative
process more easily and be a strong leader, as happens in the European chancellor
democracies.
The picture of the previous exclusively legalistic typologies – including the old ones
of parliamentarianism and presidentialism – was enriched by debates and revisions in
the 1980s/1990s adding some substantive aspects: mainly the role of parties and party
systems in accounting for the actual working of these democracies. In this vein, the
main lesson not to be forgotten is that the same rules can actually work very differ-
ently in different political (e.g. mainly partisan) and social contexts. Moreover, even if
enriched, the focus on the relationships between legislative and executive power was
too limited to analyse such a complex reality as a democratic regime.

DEMOCRACIES 89
Majoritarian and consensus models

Consequently, it is no wonder that such typologies have become less relevant and a
more comprehensive proposal has become more widely accepted despite being
mainly focused on formal institutions as well. Arend Lijphart (1999) identified two
polar models of democracy – majoritarian and consensus democracy. The two mod-
els are characterized by a number of dimensions that can be grouped together into
two subsets: one relating to the executive branch and political parties; the other
relating to the unitary or federal character of the democratic regime. The first subset
includes: (1) composition of the cabinet – whether it is formed by a single party or a
coalition; (2) relations between the executive and legislative branches – whether the
executive dominates the legislature or there is a balance between the two; (3) the
number of parties and the features of the party system – two-party versus multi-party
systems and the number of cleavages, i.e. the basic political conflicts that divide the
country; (4) the electoral system – whether it is majoritarian or proportional; (5) the
relations between government institutions and interest groups – whether they are
pluralist or neo-corporatist in nature, i.e. if there are interest groups that pursue their
own interests and can be in competition among themselves (pluralist) or there is an
agreement among them with the executive power (neo-corporatist). The second sub-
set includes: (6) the dispersal of government power – unitary versus decentralized
power, which takes place in federal or regionalized regimes; (7) the number and the
diversity of the parliamentary chambers – unicameralism versus weak or strong
bicameralism, i.e. whether there is only one chamber or a lower chamber and a sen-
ate, and whether the chambers have similar or different powers and are elected using
similar or different electoral laws; (8) a rigid versus a flexible constitution, i.e. laws
are subject to a review of constitutionality by constitutional or supreme courts or the
parliament has the last word on the constitutionality of legislation; (9) central banks
dependent on the executive power or independent central banks. An additional
democratic dimension can be the extent to which there are institutions of direct
democracy, such as referenda.
Lijphart applied his two models to thirty-six empirical cases. The first model, the
majoritarian or Westminster model, inspired by the British model and parliament, is
based on the principle of majority rule. It is characterized by a concentration of
executive power in one-party and simple majority cabinets; cabinet dominance with
a consequent fusion of powers (legislative and executive); a two-party system; a
majoritarian and disproportional electoral system; interest group pluralism; unitary
and centralized government; a unicameral parliament; constitutional flexibility and
parliamentary sovereignty; an absence of judicial review or constitutional control; a
central bank controlled by the executive; and, one might add, an exclusive existence
of forms of representative democracy, i.e. the absence of the possibility of having
referenda. Accordingly, a Westminster democracy is a regime where representatives
who are appointed on the basis of free, fair, competitive and recurrent elections reach
their decisions through the majority principle, which is guaranteed through a set of
institutional arrangements.
The most important aspects of the second model, consensus democracy, are executive
power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets; an executive-legislative balance of power; a

multi-party system; a proportional electoral system; interest group corporatism; federal

and decentralized government; strong bicameralism; strong representation of minori-
ties; constitutional rigidity; minority veto power; judicial review; and independence of
the central bank. The consensus democracy encourages the sharing of power in broad
coalitions. Whereas the majoritarian model appears suitable for countries with a rela-
tively homogeneous society, with the major parties usually tending to be closer to the
political centre, in heterogeneous societies that model would not be suitable. In fact,
in plural societies that are sharply divided by religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural,
ethnic or racial cleavages and have differentiated political parties, interest groups and
media, a majority government would prove not only undemocratic but also danger-
ous, as the more or less permanently excluded minorities would go against the
democratic institutions. Therefore, in these cases a consensus model is more suitable
(‘kinder and gentler’ in Lijphart’s words) and can have the broad support of citizens
and groups in that society. The best examples that match this model are Belgium and
Switzerland.
Over the years, Lijphart’s proposal received great attention, but gradually its prob-
lems and limits also emerged. First, being based on two models that are the poles of
several continua, once the models are applied to reality we realize that most cases are
mixed ones and consequently the discriminating virtue of the distinction is limited.
Among today’s about one hundred democratic regimes worldwide, very few belong to
one of the two pure models. Second, the distribution of empirical cases is skewed
towards the pole of the consensus model with hardly any case other than the United
Kingdom being an (almost) purely majoritarian one. Third, the positive aspect of the
nine or ten dimensions considered, which is a good way to escape from the excessive
simplification of most typologies, is counteracted by the fact that except for the inclu-
sion of party cleavages and interest articulation all the other dimensions are strictly
formal-legal. In this vein, there is a high risk of detecting appearances rather than the
effective political reality. For example, to know how corrupt or how well performing
a democracy is, can be – and usually is – considered much more relevant than whether
it is unicameral or bicameral, unitary or decentralized, or has a flexible or rigid con-
stitution. But precisely these aspects are overlooked by Lijphart’s analysis. In fact, in
cases with grand and over-sized coalitions, which lack an effective parliamentary
control, forms of clientelism and nepotism, which reduce governmental efficiency and
economic performance, tend to be more frequent.
Finally, if we match the two models with the models people have in their minds
this gap is strongly confirmed. In fact, on the basis of survey research (see, for exam-
ple Ferrin and Kriesi, 2016), we know that the dominant visions of democracy have
nothing to do with consensus or majoritarian models of democracy. Instead, they
include the model of liberal democracy, which is characterized by free and competi-
tive elections, the protection of minorities, freedom of opposition, and impartial and
independent courts; the social democratic model, with additional attention to social
rights; and the direct democracy model, where referenda and direct participation in
decision-making processes complement the representative democratic institutions.
There is no doubt that these visions are mainly normative rather than strictly empir-
ical. Nevertheless, precisely for this reason a final remark needs to be made: in

DEMOCRACIES 91
addition to or even beyond the analysis of types of democracy, checking their dis-
tance from the normative visions of citizens can in itself become a relatively more
important issue to explore.
Conclusions
Once the key definitions, such as regime, state, and political system are spelled out we
have to accept that the minimalist definition of democracy with all its merits is culture-
bound, that is, its origin comes from the Western experience with all additional
considerations developed by Sen, Sartori and others.
A merely procedural definition of democracy was also discussed in this chapter, but
when compared to what people actually think, the substantive aspects come out very
clearly, too. In an empirical sense, these are more widespread and universal than some
critics of Western values may want us to believe. This also becomes apparent in the next
chapter when we deal with the notion of democratic quality. This will be seen in the
context of the more general phenomenon of democratization to which we now turn.
Questions
1 Explain the difference between normative and empirical definitions
of democracy and provide the minimalist definition.
2 What are the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy,
respectively? What phenomena have contributed to bring the
latter to the fore in recent decades?
3 On what criterion is based the distinction between parliamen
tary, semi-parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential
democracies?
4 Why are ma joritarian and consensus democracy defined as ‘polar’
models? What are their main characteristics, respectively?
5 What is direct democracy?
Further reading
Dahl RA (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
This is the classic analysis of the conditions for democracy and historical paths of democ-
ratization. Despite the time elapsed since publication, it is still worthwhile to be read.
Dahl RA (1998) On democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. A thorough but concise
handbook discussing what democracy is, why it is valuable, how it works, and what chal-
lenges it confronts in the twenty-first century.
Diamond L (2008) The spirit of democracy: The struggle to build free societies throughout
the world. New York: Times Books, Henry Holt and Company. This book effectively
reviews internal and external factors concerning the development and maintenance of
democracy worldwide.

Manin B (1997) The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press. This book provides a helpful theoretical background to understand better the logic
and the key features of representative democratic institutions.
Sartori G (1987) Theory of democracy revisited. Vol I. New York: Chatham House. This is an
authoritative, necessary reading to achieve the background and content of the major con-
temporary theories of democracy.
Weblinks
Varieties of Democracy aims to produce better Indicators of Democracy: www.v-dem.net/
Democracy Barometer: www.democracybarometer.org/
The Democracy Barometer is a new instrument to measure the quality of established democracies.

6
Democratization
Key terms
Accountability (electoral & inter-institutional) Installation
Competition Legitimacy
Consolidation Participation
Crisis Regime change
Democratic quality/ies Responsiveness
Socio-economic equality Rule of law
Freedom Transition
Introduction
As mentioned in the previous chapter, democratization has been the most important
political phenomenon of recent decades on a global scale, at least since the political
transformations in Portugal (1974–76), Greece (1974–75) and Spain (1976–77), in
almost all the Latin American countries, later in the Eastern European countries
after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), and in many African and Asian countries,
ranging from South Africa to South Korea, Taiwan, and many others. As a result,
democracy has now become the most common type of regime in the world. Which
processes of change contributed to these developments? How can such transforma-
tions, of great significance above all for the lives of the populations in the countries
concerned, be analysed? Bearing these questions in mind, we will attempt to specify
what is meant by the transition to democracy and what its distinctive features are;
how consolidation of democracy can be understood and what, conversely, is meant
by a crisis of democracy; and, finally, what does a deepening or worsening of
democratic quality involve. In short, we will focus on the processes of transition
towards democracy and those within this regime, also in view of possible further
changes and the potential creation of new supra- or ultra-national entities. A note
of caution is, however, immediately necessary: the broader notion of democratiza-
tion and those of transition to democracy, consolidation and deepening are not
framed within any kind of evolutionist or progressive perpective. In every process
there can be stops, stalemate and reverse trajectories. It is only the empirical analy-
sis, supported by theoretical definitions and concepts, that will suggest what is the
specific outcome.

Regime change
The empirical analysis of a change of regime, even in a non-democratic sense, is based
on the identification of the key dimensions of a regime and the detection of more or
less profound changes in one or more of these dimensions. In short, there is a change
of regime towards the establishment of a democracy when, besides the collapse of the
main aspects of authoritarianism (Chapter 7), all the elements of the minimum empir-
ical definition of democracy can be clearly observed. The underlying logic of the
analysis does not alter if the change we are dealing with concerns the shift from one
kind of democracy to another. For example, if the change is from a majoritarian to a
consensus democracy (Lijphart, 1999), the following proposition can be formulated:
there is a change from a majoritarian democracy to a consensus democracy, or vice
versa, when all or almost all the significant dimensions outlined by Lijphart change in
one direction or another. There is no change in regime, but just a more limited adjust-
ment or adaptation, in other words only a partial change, when one or only a few
dimensions change substantively in the same direction, which may be either majoritar-
ian or consensual; or also when one or a few of those dimensions change partially, but
in different directions. In these cases, the regime continues to be either a majoritarian
or a consensus democracy.
Moreover, it should be noted that some changes towards democracy in the Eastern
European nations, at least since the end of 1989, oblige us to mention the cases in
which democratization has been accompanied by fundamental economic changes, or,
in some cases, by territorial and population changes as well. From our perspective,
these are more complex cases, in which the central issue is to empirically identify the
sequence, that is, whether the economic or territorial changes took place as a conse-
quence of a change in regime or at the same time, and how they influence each other
reciprocally.
Finally, the change of regime is often used as a synonym for revolution. In Chapter 10
this notion is discussed with regard to its main feature, popular participation. Such
regime changes are often characterized by violence and radical transformations. They
usually develop into a non-democratic arrangement (see also Chapter 7).
Transition and installation

First of all, we should remember that the initial phase of the creation or installation
of a democracy overlaps with transition. The latter process can be defined as the inter-
mediate and ambiguous period in which a regime has abandoned some of the key
characteristics of the previous institutional set-up, without having acquired all the
features of the new regime that will be established. It is distinguished, then, by a period
of institutional fluidity with various contrasting political solutions supported by the
different actors involved. Given that in a vast number of cases the point of departure
is an authoritarian regime, it can be said that transition begins when the limited plu-
ralism inherent to authoritarianism (see Chapter 7) breaks down, and the civil and
political rights characterizing every democratic regime begin to be recognized. It can
be regarded as over when the democratic direction taken by the transition is evident,
and when the concrete possibility of installing a democracy becomes clearly visible

DEMOCRATIZATION 95
with the holding of the first free, competitive and fair elections. Of course, as also
emphasized by Box 6.1, the transition can also go in another non-democratic direction
(see also Chapter 7).
Box 6.1 O’Donnell and Schmitter,

‘Transitions’
Transitions are characterized by the breakdown of limited pluralism
of an authoritarian regime and the starting of a fluid phase of change
that can unfold into the installation of democracy, the reconsolidation
of the same authoritarianism or of another one, an hybrid regime, or
even the emergence of more profound transformations.
Source: O’Donnell G and Schmitter PC (1986) Transitions from authoritarian rule:

Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies. In: G O’Donnell, PC Schmitter and
L Whitehead (eds.) Transition from authoritarian rule: Southern Europe. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 6.
A number of the fundamental characteristics of transitions in Western Europe, Latin

America and Eastern Europe must be highlighted: degree of continuity, participation,
resort to violence and length of transition. Discontinuity refers to the transformation
brought about by a concrete change in the actors, by a rupture and a modification of
the system of rules and by a change in the institutions of the previous non-democratic
regime. It is an identifiable event after which a regime collapses and transition begins:
a coup; the handing over of government to civilians; the abolition of the single party;
the elimination of corporative parliaments; and other similar events. If there has been
an open conflict – not necessarily violent – to bring down the old regime, this in itself
will already have created some coalitions of major groups, which will subsequently
make it simpler to reach agreements, and also to solve the biggest problems that arise
during the installation of democracy.
If, instead, there is continuity, the authoritarian regime begins to change gradually,
according to the rules envisaged by the regime itself for an internal transformation.
Some members of the old regime may remain in their positions and certain govern-
ment institutions may continue to operate. These are then adapted to different
purposes from the ones for which they were originally created. The main aspect of
continuity in the transition period is the central role played by the governing elite of
the previous authoritarian regime, which guides and manages the transition. The old
norms are used for two ends: on the one hand, to bring about controlled change – the
final result of which is not necessarily a democracy, at least not according to the plans
of that elite – and on the other, to more readily and effectively legitimate the process
of transformation in the eyes of social groups associated with the old regime, thereby
reassuring them and making them more willing to accept the change.
An authoritarian governing elite may decide to commit political ‘harakiri’, when at
least part of the elite acknowledges that, for various reasons, democratization cannot

be blocked without resorting to coercion on a scale that it would be impossible or

undesirable to apply. In other words, the elite decides that it is in its interests to take
part in the change and get rid of the more reactionary elements of the authoritarian
coalition. In this way, it anticipates the mobilization of the opposition and tries to
control the change, and to obtain the support of moderate strands of the opposition,
isolating extremists and avoiding the dangers associated with a head-on clash. This is
a pattern of transition that Hermet (1986: 138) labelled as democratie octroyée or
granted democracy to stress the key role of the previous authoritarian elite.
The installation of democracy entails the complete extension and effective recogni-
tion of civil and political rights; if necessary, the full civilianizing of society; the
emergence of a number of parties and of a party system, but also of collective interest
groups, such as unions and other organizations, besides the adoption of the main
democratic procedures and institutions that characterize the regime, starting with the
electoral law, specification of the relations between legislative and executive organs,
and other aspects concerning the functioning of the regime.
Empirical observation of the numerous and different transitions towards democ-
racy and of the installation of democracy in Southern and Eastern Europe and in Latin
America, some thirty cases altogether, suggests that there are no very recurrent models
or patterns of transition and installation. In this process, it seems more fruitful to try
to single out the main dimensions of variation in the installation of democracy. The
chief aspects to analyse are: the duration and role of violence; the actors involved in
transition and those – sometimes different – involved in the installation of democracy,
including the armed forces, the government elite, the bureaucratic chiefs of the author-
itarian regime and, more in general, the authoritarian political forces which, for
various reasons, are induced to embark upon a process of democratization and to try
to steer it. It is useful to distinguish between cases of transition and installation led by
government institutional actors and those moved forward by non-government institu-
tional actors, such as sectors of the army or political forces that initially supported the
authoritarian regime and then distanced themselves from it. Nor should the possible
presence of international actors be forgotten, as they are sometimes very important
both in transition and installation.
A less frequent scenario occurs when the political forces that formed the opposition
in the authoritarian period become the protagonists of the political change. If the
opposition has been at the centre of the transition, it is normally an armed opposition
and the result of the process is not democratic. If the opposition does not have any
coercive potential, it may try to exert pressure and make threats, which can often be
effective and significant, but rarely involves the taking of initiatives. The opposition
may be a protagonist of democratization in the various cases in which transition has
been set in motion by foreign actors or by internal institutional actors. But perhaps
the other more interesting combination is the one between foreign actors and the
opposition, both in triggering transition and, afterwards, during installation (see also
O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1986).
Whatever its role in the installation of democracy, the position of the army is sig-
nificant for reasons that are not hard to grasp: the armed forces have the monopoly
on coercion. From this point of view, the simplest cases are those in which the armed
forces have been defeated or are internally divided. The more complex ones are those
in which they remain intact during the change, also in terms of status and social

DEMOCRATIZATION 97
prestige. What might initially be passive neutrality sometimes gives way to partial or
complete politicization in opposition to the democratic regime. Even if the army sup-
ports such a regime, it remains potentially dangerous because it could always decide
to maintain partial control of political power, especially in the event of recurrent
crises (see also Stepan, 1988). Thus, the worst case is the one where the army starts
the new regime and an authoritarianism is inaugurated (except for the Portuguese
transition to democracy where the army eventually came back to the barracks, see
Chapter 7).
Another fundamental aspect of the process we are considering is the formation of
the coalition that establishes the regime. Schmitter (1984: 366) emphasizes the main
characteristics of such agreements or ‘pacts’: they are the result of negotiations
between representatives of the elites and of the institutions; initially they tend to
reduce competiveness and conflict; they represent an attempt to control the agenda of
the essential problems that need to be addressed; they produce a distortion of the
democratic principle of equality among citizens; they modify future power relations;
they set in motion new political processes and produce different results that are some-
times far removed from those envisaged by the promoters. Besides these conditions, it
can be added that the agreement, implicit or otherwise, constitutes first and foremost
recognition of the possibility and legitimacy of different political (and ideological)
positions. The first case is the Spanish transition with the so-called ‘pactos de la
Moncloa’, but also the Chilean and Polish transitions are good examples to recall.
In the transition phase, in the initial installation of democracy or at a later stage,
there is often a high degree of mass participation, which can be intense and extensive.
Participation can occur in classic forms such as demonstrations, strikes and, some-
times, in acts of collective violence like riots. These manifestations offer a relatively
simple means for measuring the trajectories or waves of participation. Mass participa-
tion offers opportunities to exert pressure or influence that will then be used by elite
actors in the negotiations or conflicts (latent or otherwise) between the parties
involved, perhaps going against pre-existing agreements. The preparatory phase lead-
ing to the first elections is the best occasion for these demonstrations of strength,
especially if the real scale of support for one or another of the actors involved is not
yet clear.
At this point it is worth considering how to explain the variants in the ways democ-
racies are installed, and their outcomes (see also Huntington, 1991). Above all, there
is the question of whether the country has experienced violent conflict, perhaps in the
extreme form of civil war, in its immediate past, which has taken root in the collective
memory. There is little doubt that individual memories of the enormous human costs
of such experiences exert a moderating influence on the behaviour of the elites of the
future democracy, and transmit a propensity for compromise. Previous phases of vio-
lent mass conflict, even if they did not degenerate into civil war, may have a similar
moderating effect, if it has subsequently been possible to fully evaluate the conse-
quences – equally if not more negative – of the authoritarian period following this
extreme conflict.
In a number of cases the introduction of democracy should really be defined as
re-installation and the entire process as re-democratization. That is, a specific term
needs to be adopted to indicate that in the country in question there has already been
a mass liberal democracy for a certain period of time, which used to enjoy civil liberties,

universal (at least male) suffrage, political parties, with a certain number of grassroots
organizations, trade unions and other associative bodies. In other words, there has
been a prior situation characterized by collective politicization (the duration and
intensity of which might vary), participation in political and electoral choices at both
a local and national level, and the defence of interests through unions and other inde-
pendent associations. In such cases, there will also have been stronger processes of
identification with parties insofar as they had distinct social bases and ideological
orientations. A previous experience of this kind will influence the new democratic
set-up through the transmission mechanisms of so-called historic memory, that is,
mechanisms of political socialization that create continuity and renewal, in terms of
leadership and party organization, of spheres of electoral strength, and also the con-
tinuity of other collective organizations characterizing mass democracies. Examples
can be found in Europe where a number of democracies broke down in the interwar
period, but also in Latin America.
Politicization can be evaluated more accurately if two additional factors are taken
into consideration: the duration and kind of the authoritarian experience. The length
of time that has elapsed from the previous democratic experience and the type of
authoritarianism that existed in the intervening period determine whether the influence
of the legacy of the previous mass political experience is strong or weak. The impor-
tance of the previous democratic experience is correlated to its duration and breadth
of support and, at the same time, to the brevity and limited support of the authoritar-
ian regime. The influence of the earlier mass experience can be seen more clearly by
looking in two distinct directions. The first are the representational institutions that
emerge, the second are the parties and the party system that are formed. As regards the
former, the institutional choices made at the beginning of the re-democratization
process can often be explained either by the reintroduction of former institutions or,
on the contrary, by a reaction to memories of the failings and weaknesses of the previous
democratic regime. Such reactions may also be influenced by the impact and propa-
ganda of the subsequent authoritarian regime and remain present in the minds of the
new democratic leaders.
As far as political parties and the party system are concerned, a proportion of the
new democratic elite will consist of leaders from the previous period, who may have
spent years in prison, under cover in opposition or also in exile abroad where some of
them became socialized into democratic Western culture. Furthermore, there will also
be recollections of the parties, their organizations and identities, which can be trans-
mitted from one generation to another. In the political vacuum which emerges, more
or less completely and suddenly, due to the collapse or change of the authoritarian
regime and of the new space opened up by the attainment of civil liberties, it will be
natural for the old parties, some of which may have continued to exist underground
during the authoritarian regime, to be re-constituted. The re-establishment of parties
with the same names, perhaps with some of the old leaders and the same electoral
support base, does not mean, however, that the same party systems are recreated. The
two variables mentioned above – the duration and type of authoritarian experience –
are extremely significant and it is highly improbable that the authoritarian regime has
failed to leave deep traces. The previous military intervention or some other form of
authoritarian takeover has often been carried out for anti-party and anti-democratic
sentiments supported by strong propaganda campaigns.

DEMOCRATIZATION 99
The influence and importance of the previous non-democratic regime are obvious.
The first kind of case concerns transitions to democracy from a competitive oligarchy
or monarchy. It corresponds, then, to the experience of the first cases of transitions
to democracy, as in the United Kingdom and others, and should be related to those
areas and times at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twenti-
eth. The second relates to the attempts, generally unfruitful, to install democracy
following decolonization. The points of departure for the majority of the other cases
of transition to democracy are, however, various types of authoritarian regime. The
two most important, and interconnected, variables in this regard are the degree to
which an authoritarian regime mobilizes, organizes and controls civil society and
manipulates the forms of participation; and the extent to which the regime succeeds
in disarticulating the social structure and in destroying previous political and social
identities. As far as the first variable is concerned, the main vehicle of participation is
the single party in its various forms. Potentially enduring loyalties are created through
processes of socialization or resocialization; such loyalties overlap with the experi-
ence of a democratic regime that might have existed previously and are able to
survive in the new democratic set-up. As for the second variable, namely the disar-
ticulation of civil society and the destruction of the previous political and even social
identities, the authoritarian regime achieves this, in addition to structures of mobili-
zation such as the single party, through systematic and organized repression, with the
elimination of opponents, whether active or passive, real or potential. This latter
factor is significant in relation to the installation of democracy because it slows down
and makes it more difficult and problematic to activate civil society, and for new
social and political entities to emerge in the vacuum created following the collapse of
the authoritarian regime. In other words, for a certain period of time, sometimes
many years, civil society is weak, relatively disorganized and with little unity and
social cohesion. Of course, the duration of the authoritarian regime also matters very
much in this respect.
The reasons for the collapse or the more or less sudden change of the previous
authoritarian regime are another important macro-variable for understanding the
subsequent democratic installation, together with the concrete problems the new
regime has to face. The most recurrent reasons for the collapse or change of a regime
are: a military defeat, either by itself or accompanied by disastrous economic circum-
stances; an external intervention by a foreign country, which imposes democratic
institutions; deep socio-economic changes which, in the long run, significantly alter the
social base of the authoritarian regime; and finally, a split in the dominant coalition
supporting the regime following the emergence of disagreements about which eco-
nomic policies to pursue or, more simply, due to the inability to reach agreement on
succession in key posts, or, again, for other specific and sometimes contingent reasons.
The importance of foreign intervention, of a military defeat or simply imitation of
neighbouring and influential countries can explain the crisis and collapse of many
authoritarian regimes and play a role in the subsequent installation of democracy.
Whitehead (1996: 3–26) conceptualizes the importance of these factors, referring to
the chief forms of foreign influence on a country going through a crisis or transition,
namely contagion, control and consensus. While the meaning of the first two terms is
easy to grasp, as they describe the foreign country’s capacity to influence and inter-
vene, consensus relates to the interdependence between foreign influence and the

internal actors that accept and embrace the change towards democracy. There are
several cases here that can be recalled, from Japan when the military defeat is consid-
ered to a number of East European countries when neighbour influence is analysed.
The degree of organization of the opposition under the authoritarian regime also
needs to be considered. The presence of a more or less organized democratic opposi-
tion in the final phase of an authoritarian regime makes an enormous difference in the
installation of democracy. If such an opposition exists, the parties forming it can
immediately occupy the political arena created by the liberalization during the early
phases of transition and democratization, putting them in a position to influence the
main choices made by the provisional organs of government right from the start.
These may concern fundamental choices about urgent problems left unsolved by the
authoritarian regime or choices capable of determining the future institutional struc-
ture of the democracy under construction. In any case, the pre-existing degree of
organization of the opposition can condition the entire dynamics of the installation of
democracy – from the main actors to the agreements reached, the spectrum of political
forces that emerge to the intensity of the demand for participation.
Consolidation and crisis

The questions to answer are: does a process of democratic consolidation exist, and if
yes, what characterizes and explains it? And similarly, is there a process of crisis, and
if so, what characterizes and explains it? Consolidation is the process through which
institutions and democratic rules become solidly rooted in a society and by which the
relations between civil society and the regime are structured. Internal crisis is a process
whereby the regime’s institutions, intermediate institutions, including parties, and
society gradually move apart and become unstuck. There may also be a crisis not in,
but of democracy. In recent years, the former has been more relevant than the latter.
In many areas of the world the desirability of a well-functioning democracy is less and
less called into question, due to learning processes, the lack of institutional alterna-
tives, and the international spread of democracy.
When analysing democratic consolidation empirically, it is necessary to see whether
there is a stabilization of electoral behaviour, the emergence of recurrent models of
competition between parties and a stabilization of the leadership. The examination of
these three phenomena provides an immediate picture of the stabilization of the rela-
tions between political parties and civil society, that is, some of the key elements in the
whole consolidation process, which are also related to other aspects such as the more
general process of structuring representation or of the functioning of the decision-
making process. Electoral stabilization involves the establishment of relations between
political parties and citizens-electors, and between the parties themselves. Following
the initial phase of transition, which is accompanied by considerable fluidity, mass
behaviours begin to follow more predictable and recurrent models. The key indicator
of the stabilization of voting behaviour is total electoral volatility (TEV) (Bartolini and
Mair, 1990). As stabilization proceeds, it is expected that there will be a tendency for
volatility to diminish, with a progressive shift from high volatility and electoral uncer-
tainty to more predictable models of voting behaviour. The decline of TEV indicates
that party–voter relations have become more stable; that the parties have consolidated

DEMOCRATIZATION 101
their images; that the sphere of effective electoral competition has narrowed to some
sectors of the electorate; and that a crisis of the party system is improbable.
With the emergence of recurrent models of competition, the party system acquires
its main features. The party fragmentation (PF) index, or the number of ‘effective’ par-
ties (NEP), in addition to a qualitative analysis of the non-emergence of new parties
and movements, offer the best available indicators for verifying whether party compe-
tition models have been established and whether these will remain stable for some
time or are changing. After two or three elections, if the electoral system does not
change, the party system will stabilize. So, there will be a clear difference between the
first two or three elections, when dozens or even hundreds of party lists will be pre-
sented, and subsequent electoral contests, when a process of natural selection has
already begun and a stable leadership, party identities, image and programmatic com-
mitments have emerged. When there is a process of consolidation, the creation of new
parties and movements becomes increasingly exceptional. A different way of exploring
the models of competition is to see whether political conflicts have stabilized along
major social cleavages. If, that is, the party system has been divided into two major
camps along left-right lines, and other divisions (relating to centre-periphery, ethnicity,
language, religion) have emerged and stabilized. Electoral stabilization and the emer-
gence or change of models of party competition are centred on the mass level. The elite
level is also significant, especially with regard to the stabilization of the party leader-
ship, and more generally of the political class. This is the third key dimension, to be
analysed by looking at the decreasing turnover of the parliamentary and local elites.
The two sub-processes distinguishing consolidation and crisis are legitimation/
delegitimation and anchoring/disanchoring. The first sub-process moves from the bot-
tom up, and has attracted the attention above all of scholars working on Western
democracies with long-established traditions, very limited (if any) experience of author-
itarianism and a strong civil society that can easily be activated. Legitimation – the
process of developing legitimacy – is the unfolding of a cluster of positive attitudes of
citizens towards democratic institutions, regarded as the most appropriate form of
government. In other words, legitimation occurs when citizens are generally of the view
that, despite their shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better
than any other possible alternative. As Linz (1978: 16) put it, democratic ‘legitimacy is
characterized by the acceptance of existing political institutions (see Box 6.2). The
objects of legitimation are norms and institutions, and their functioning, while its
actors are sectors of civil society, which may be organized to varying degrees. The sec-
ond sub-process, anchoring, moves in a different direction, from the top down. Its
object is civil society, while the main actors are institutions as they actually function
through political leaders. The two processes are reciprocally integrated.
Box 6.2 Juan Linz, ‘Legitimacy’

Democratic ‘legitimacy is the belief that in spite of shortcomings and
failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that
might be established, and that they therefore can demand obedience’.
(Linz, 1978: 16)

The empirical analysis of legitimation, by means of survey data and documents, offers
clear proof that at least two forms of this process can be identified. One is character-
ized by a weaker and more passive acceptance of existing democratic government
institutions, the other by a stronger and more active form of legitimation. The first
can be called consent, the second legitimacy in a strict sense. Here, for the sake of
simplicity, an empirically more complex situation can be included in a continuum
relating to elites or citizens. At one end is a partial or exclusive legitimation, which
(i) is incapable of attracting positive attitudes and the backing of significant sections
of the elites – sometimes very important due to their economic resources and influence
or simply for their numbers – and (ii) is characterized by limited consensus, in which
at least one political alternative is present in people’s views and values, and there are
political forces that consider themselves to be outside the democratic arena, in addi-
tion to being regarded as such by others. At the opposite end, there is a broad or
inclusive legitimation, in which all the political organizations come together to sup-
port the democratic institutions, there is broad consensus and no support for an
alternative regime.
It should be added that a more adequate explanation of democratic consolidation
and of crises in democracy requires a closer examination of the effective functioning
of institutions. This means that, to achieve consolidation, legitimation may be sup-
plemented by anchoring; and crisis is the result of interactions between elites and
citizens that impinge in different ways and to different degrees on existing forms of
anchoring. The anchor is an institution, which entails organizational elements and
established interests, and is able to exercise an involving and restraining effect on
more or less organized persons within a society. From this point of view, anchors are
those intermediate entities which, in a top to bottom process, are able to hold together
citizens and associations. Anchoring refers to the emergence, definition and adaptation
of anchors that involve and hold together civil society, and can therefore also control
it, either in general or with regard to specific sectors. Dis-anchoring is the opposite
process of rupture or structural breakdown, more or less gradual, of those institutions
and of constituted interests. Anchoring and disanchoring are democratic, in that they
are created and develop within a democracy with its main electoral and decisional
mechanisms. The anchor and anchoring metaphor aims to highlight the asymmetrical
relationship between the elites that are at the centre of those anchors and the general
population. It also conveys the idea of a mechanism of involvement whereby elite
actors and people interact, with possible adaptions to the real situation. The metaphor
can be better understood if the government institutions to which people refer are seen
as the ‘ship’ from which the anchor descends, and civil society as the seabed the
anchors hook on. The ship then has the possibility of changing and adapting its posi-
tion within the limits permitted by the length of the anchor lines, that is by the various
intermediate institutions. Anchoring involves, therefore, the possibility of limited
change and adaption: the anchored ship moves on the water without going beyond
certain limits.
The most important anchors belong to the two circuits of territorial and functional
representation in their connections with the democratic system. In this regard, the par-
ties and their organizations deserve special attention. Even in weakly ideologized
contexts, democratic competition obliges parties to develop – as far as is concretely
possible – more efficient and functional organizations in order to conduct electoral

DEMOCRATIZATION 103
campaigns, to be present and active in the period between elections, and to come up
with and plan policy choices for electors, including parliamentary activities. After sev-
eral elections and the application of the same electoral system, one of the collateral and
not explicitly declared effects of competition is the acquisition by parties of a certain
ability to direct civil society through the stabilization of the party ‘offer’ and its leader-
ship (also at a parliamentary level) and through the organization of the parties
themselves and the creation of collective identities. A deeper analysis of the consolida-
tion process helps to explain how left-wing parties founded with subversive and
anti-regime objectives can find themselves – and this has actually been the case –
channelling, cooling down and integrating a potential for protest that would otherwise
be expressed in ways dangerous for the democratic institutions. In short, it is possible
to explain the paradox of ‘negative integration’ on the left, which is an essential ele-
ment in the consolidation of some democratic regimes, including post-1948 Italy.
In the functional circuit of representation, three other institutions that induce
anchoring can be taken into consideration. They are: (i) interest groups, such as busi-
ness elites, unions or even religious organizations and other structured interest groups;
(ii) non-organized but active elites, such as private companies, intellectuals or even
(often wealthy and influential) individuals engaged in clientelism; and (iii) organized
interests engaged in some kind of neo-corporative compromise, that is, an accommo-
dation is settled among unions, employers’ organizations and government on a few
economically relevant issue, such as salary, taxes, inflation. It can be noted that forms
of clientelism which characterize some specific social and cultural contexts as in parts
of Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia make non-organized people with few
resources dependent on the elites in power, especially those distributing benefits and
resources of various kinds. Clientelism thus creates and shapes a strong anchoring
process marked by specific formal institutions and informal rules deeply rooted in the
political culture of the country or of particular regions. Neo-corporativism, character-
ized by stable agreements and a more or less developed network of unions and other
types of interest groups acting as intermediaries, is also a potentially very powerful
anchor. In such cases, as for a while in some West and Northern European countries,
no specific formal institution produces the binding effect imposed from above;
instead, it is the indirect result of agreements reached by associations that may even
be organizationally weak, although they always maintain a preeminent role in the
specific sectors of society in which they are active. The main consequence is the pos-
sibility to contain conflict, protest and potential delegitimation.
It is also possible to find other effects of anchoring in democracies. For example, a
major television channel, a daily newspaper with a large readership, or even a supra-
national actor like the EU, and the norms deriving from one or more international
treaties, like those concerning human rights or the processes of adhesion to the EU,
may have a strong anchoring effect on the political elites and on a nation’s citizens.
Though only for a brief period, even a social movement can have an anchoring effect.
Furthermore, it is also conceivable that, in some way, in a very minimally structured
social and political context, with little or no tradition of democratic institutions, even
a government institution, such as the head of state or the prime minister, may have
anchoring effects, with various related consequences for the consolidation process.
The ‘re-education’ process initiated by the Allies in West Germany after the Second
World War also is a case in point.

There are obvious connections between such aspects and the existence of a varyingly
structured civil society, with various types of independent non-political elites, plus
networks of associations, including interest groups. They are the two sides of the same
coin. What’s more, it is not particularly hard to analyse a civil society empirically: an
active, participatory public, various kinds of elites together with an independent press
and television networks, a rich fabric of associations, organized to different degrees –
in other words, a high level of associationism can readily be detected in empirical
terms. In such a case, the gate-keeping relationship with the party elites will be one of
neutrality. However, if civil society is not very organized, and without independent
resources, domination by the existing elites is more probable.
Democratic deepening and quality

A democracy of high quality can be defined as ‘a stable institutional structure that
realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct function-
ing of its institutions and mechanisms’ (Morlino, 2011: 195). Above all, it is a broadly
legitimated regime that fully satisfies citizens (quality in terms of results); in which
citizens, associations and the communities comprising it enjoy freedom and equality
in different shades and forms (quality in terms of content); and the citizens themselves
have the power to check and evaluate whether the government is pursuing the goals
of freedom and equality according to the rule of law (quality in terms of procedure).
It is possible to single out eight possible dimensions or qualities according to which
democracies can vary in opposite directions, that is towards a democratic deepening or
improvement or alternatively towards a democratic worsening. The first five are proce-
dural. Though also relevant with regard to content, these dimensions principally
concern rules. The first procedural quality is the rule of law. The second and third pro-
cedural qualities are the two forms of accountability (electoral and inter-institutional).
The fourth and fifth are the classic dimensions of participation and competition. The
sixth and seventh dimension are substantive in nature: full respect for rights, which have
been attained through a series of freedoms; and the progressive implementation of
greater social and economic equality. The eighth and final dimension regards the
responsiveness or correspondence of the system to the wishes of citizens and of civil
society in general.
The first procedural dimension, the rule of law, is not just about the application of
legal norms. It also enshrines the principle of the supremacy of the law, that is, Cicero’s
famous statement ‘legumi servi humus, ut liberi esse possimus’ (we are slaves of the
law so that we may be free). This entails at least the capacity, even if limited, to make
authorities respect the laws, and to have laws that are non-retroactive, of public
knowledge, universal, stable and unambiguous. These characteristics are fundamental
for any civil order, and a basic requisite for democratic consolidation as well. In this
respect, the sub-dimensions of the rule of law are principally: (1) individual security
and civil order; (2) an independent judiciary and a modern, professional and efficient
justice system, which grants equal access to justice, free from undue pressures on rul-
ings; (3) the institutional and administrative capacity to formulate and apply the law;
(4) the ability to effectively combat corruption, illegality and the abuse of power; and
(5) security and police forces that are respectful of citizens’ rights and are under civilian

DEMOCRATIZATION 105
control. Each of these aspects can be represented by means of various indicators, and
the relevant data can be analysed on a case-by-case basis using both quantitative and
qualitative techniques. The main characteristics and the degree to which the rule of
law is respected can be reconstructed for each case in each nation.
Box 6.3 Andreas Schedler,

‘Accountability’
Schedler (1999: 17) suggests that accountability has three main fea-
tures: information, justification and punishment/reward. The first of
these, information about a political act or a series of political acts by a
politician or political body (the government, parliament and so on), is
indispensable in order to attribute accountability. Justification relates
to the reasons provided by government leaders for their actions and
decisions. The third element, punishment/reward, is the consequence
imposed by the elector or any other person or organism following a
critical assessment of the information, justifications and other aspects
and interests lying behind political actions. All three elements require
the existence of a public sphere characterized by pluralism and inde-
pendence, and the active participation of a wide range of individuals
and collective actors.
The second and third dimensions refer to accountability, that is, the commitment of
elected political leaders to answer for their political decisions when asked to do so by
citizens-voters or by other constitutional bodies. Schedler (1999: 17) suggests that
accountability has three main features: information, justification and punishment/
reward (see Box 6.3). The first of these, information about a political act or a series
of political acts by a politician or political body (the government, parliament and so
on) is indispensable in order to attribute accountability. Justification relates to the
reasons provided by government leaders for their actions and decisions. The third ele-
ment, punishment/reward, is the consequence imposed by the elector or any other
person or organism following a critical assessment of the information, justifications
and other aspects and interests lying behind political actions. All three elements
require the existence of a public sphere characterized by pluralism and independence,
and the active participation of a wide range of individuals and collective actors.
Accountability can be both electoral and inter-institutional. Electoral accountability
is what voters can demand from those they have elected. This accountability is periodic
and ‘vertical’, and depends on the various rounds of local, national, and, if they exist,
supra-national elections. The voter decides, and rewards the candidate or list of candi-
dates with a vote in favour, or punishes them by voting for another candidate or party,
abstaining from voting or spoiling the ballot paper. The actors involved in electoral
accountability are the rulers and the ruled, who are politically unequal. This dimension
of democratic quality can become more frequent and ‘direct’ when citizens can vote in
referenda on issues that relate to the activities of local or central governments.

Inter-institutional accountability takes place when members of the executive have

to answer to other institutions or collective actors with the power to control their
decisions. In contrast to electoral accountability, these actors are for the most part
politically equal (‘balance of powers’). Inter-institutional accountability is relatively
continuous, as it is substantively formalized by law. In practice, it is usually evident in
the monitoring carried out by the opposition in parliament, by various sentences and
checks performed by the judicial system and the constitutional courts, by state audit
offices, by central banks, and by other institutions with similar functions that exist in
democracies. Political parties outside parliament also exercise this kind of check, as do
the media and other intermediate associations like trade unions, employers’ associa-
tions and organized groups of civil society. This notion of inter-institutional
(‘horizontal’) accountability is, therefore, not strictly juridical, but also involves civil
institutions like the press or television, which can effectively and decisively control the
actions of the executive.
Participation and competition are qualities that can influence all the other dimen-
sions (Diamond and Morlino, 2005; see also Chapter 10). Participation can be defined
as the set of behaviours, conventional or non-conventional, legal or on the fringes of
legality, that permit women and men, as individuals or as groups, to create, revive or
reinforce a group identity or to try to influence recruitment by the political authorities
and their decisions (the representative ones and/or those of government) in order to
maintain or change the existing situation. The two goals of participation are to obtain
or reinforce an identity or to satisfy a specific interest. In other words, participation
means being ‘part’ of, reviving or reaffirming a sense of belonging or identification
with a group (identity-related participation), and to try to reach common objectives
(instrumental participation). There is also a third aspect to take into consideration
(Elster, 1998): the simple fact of participating transforms citizens into more informed
and involved people, developing their civic attitudes and making communication and
social relations simpler. Citizens become more aware of their rights and duties and
develop more structured and conscious political opinions. These aspects help to
develop more efficacious political behaviour (Verba et al., 1995). In short, participa-
tion reinforces itself.
The second ‘engine’ that can develop other qualities, besides being considered a
quality in its own right, is competition, which exists if more than one political actor
is involved in the political decision-making process. This notion has various aspects,
too. There is competition within the party system, within parties themselves, and
within and between different interest groups in various intercommunicating arenas. A
fundamental point to be clarified here is the relationship with democracy, which has
been a central issue in democratic theory (Schumpeter, 1942; Downs, 1957; Sartori,
1957, 1987). One way to sum up this theme is the following: if there is formalized
‘free and fair’ political competition, there is democracy, but the opposite is not neces-
sarily true. In some instances, there may be democracy with little competition, as in
‘consociational’ or ‘consensual’ democracies (Lijphart, 1968, 1999), in contrast to
‘majoritarian’, highly competititve ones. If the fundamental notion of competition is
that of peaceable, non-threatening interaction between individuals and groups, in
order to allocate a recognized value that is repeatedly put into play (Bartolini, 2000),
the possibility of reaching agreements and to arrive at a consensus between the major

DEMOCRATIZATION 107
political actors in a ‘grand coalition’ or a similar more permanent arrangement as in

the ‘politics of accommodation’ in the Netherlands or the ‘Konkordanz’ in Switzerland
shows how competition can be set aside and democracy maintained. This point can
be seen more clearly when considering the increasing political competition in the
Netherlands in recent decades or of other typically consensual democracies. At the
same time, it demonstrates how the rule of law and freedom are conditions of compe-
tition and are not conditioned by it.
Freedom and equality are the two main democratic values. For the most part, these
values can be translated empirically into a set of political and civil rights for freedom,
and of social rights for equality/solidarity. Political rights include the right to vote, the
right of political leaders to compete for electoral support and the right to be elected
to public office. In a more ‘direct’ democracy, the political right par excellence, namely
the right to vote, can be reinforced and extended if the electoral mechanisms are such
that the voters have the possibility of electing the government both directly (elections
for the head of state or for the prime minister who is also the head of the government)
or de facto (when the leader of the party or of the coalition that has won in a bipolar
contest is elected prime minister). An even richer version of this right exists when
citizens can influence or choose the candidates in primary or intraparty elections. One
problem to solve in this field is the extension of political citizenship to adult residents
in a given territory so that immigrants can participate in this dimension of the political
process as well. Essential civil rights include personal freedom; the right to legal coun-
sel; the right to privacy; the freedom to choose where to live; freedom of movement
and residence; the right to emigrate; the freedom and secrecy of correspondence; free-
dom of thought and expression; the right to education; the right to information and
to a free press; and the freedoms of association and organization.
The main social rights in a democratic order include the right to health or to
physical and mental wellbeing; the right to care and social welfare; the right to work;
the right to human dignity; the right to strike; the right to study; the right to a healthy
environment; and the right to housing. As regards these rights, there are not many
differences from one country to another, although they all face obstacles to full activa-
tion and they all have a greater margin for improvement than political or civil rights.
The major problem associated with the rights mentioned thus far is the cost imposed
on the community, especially for the social rights. Consequently, there have been
attempts to redesign above all the policies that make provision for social rights in
order to lessen the economic burden on society. It is also well known, however, that a
broad application of social rights is the best available means of reducing inequality
and therefore of progressing towards the democratic ideal. Furthermore, among the
vast category of social rights mention should also be made of so-called civil-economic
rights. Formulated by Giddens (1984), these include not only the rights to private
property and to entrepreneurship, obviously within legally determined social limits,
but also the rights associated with employment and the way in which work is carried
out, the right to fair pay and leisure time and the right to collective bargaining.
In analysing democratic quality, frequent reference is also made to responsiveness,
that is, the capacity of the government to satisfy the electorate and shaping policies
to respond to its requests. This dimension is analytically connected to accountability.
In effect, judgements on accountability imply that there is a certain awareness of the

actual requests and that the evaluation of the government’s responsiveness is linked
to the way in which its actions comply with or diverge from the interests of voters.
Responsiveness should, therefore, be treated in connection with accountability,
despite the tension existing between the two. In reality, the tension stems from the
possible conflict between the evaluation of the elected with respect to the decisions
they implement and their accountability, and the responsiveness of the elected to vot-
ers’ needs. In the Western constitutional tradition, the attempt to overcome this
tension involves giving the elected the possibility of evaluating the public good and at
the same time of isolating themselves from the particular needs of specific groups.
In turn, the behaviour of the elected is controlled through the different mechanisms,
enshrined in the constitutions of many countries, that are set up to ensure inter-
institutional accountability.
In order to analyse responsiveness empirically, reference can be made to empirical
measures of the satisfaction of citizens that can be found in the many investigations
that have been regularly conducted for many years, especially in North America and
Western Europe, but also, more recently, in Latin America, Eastern Europe and other
countries around the world. Some scholars have also obtained, indirectly, another
measure of responsiveness, by measuring the distance between the perceptions of rul-
ers and the electorate in relation to certain policies (see, for example, Lijphart, 1999:
286–88). Perhaps the most effective method for evaluating responsiveness is to exam-
ine the legitimacy of the government, that is, the perception citizens have of
responsiveness, rather than the effective reality. The spread of attitudes favourable to
existing democratic institutions and the approval of their activities would seem to
suggest satisfaction and, indirectly, that civil society perceives a certain level of
responsiveness.
Conclusions
Democratization can occur as regime change from a non-democratic regime to a
democratic one or as a deepening and strengthening of the qualities of a democracy.
At the beginning of the chapter we suggested the criteria to detect this phenomenon.
We then analysed the four specific processes that characterize the democratic dynamic.
These are: transition, democratic installation, consolidation/crisis, deepening or wors-
ening of democracy. Every process presents its own main peculiar characteristics and
a possibility of overlapping, especially between transition and installation or consoli-
dation and deepening.
As it has been shown, democracies, by their very nature, are inherently dynamic and
conflictual. Their various elements, the electoral process, the institutional set-up, the
rule of law, the performance and responsiveness, ideally should keep these elements in
balance through multiple feedback processes between the political system, the econ-
omy and the society. But this cannot be taken for granted. Established democracies
may degenerate into populist systems, at the expense of the rule of law and civil liber-
ties as in Chavez’s Venezuela for example. In other cases social inequalities, either
concerning specific minorities or even large parts of the working population, may
become so strong that the overall coherence of the system can be put in danger devel-
oping into some kind of ‘post-democracy’ (Crouch, 2004). At the extreme, democracies

DEMOCRATIZATION 109
may even abolish themselves by popular vote or by forming new anti-democratic

coalitions, as happened in Weimar Germany.
Democracies may also lose some of their qualities (and sovereignty) in a process
of supra-national integration as has been happening in the European Union. Chapter
16 will deal with this question from different perspectives in greater detail. Here, two
aspects can be immediately anticipated. First, the process of integration of a number
of democracies can be considered as something totally new, and consequently we have
neither a model nor a recipe of any kind for it. But we can take some clues from the
empirical experience of federal states such as the USA, Germany or India and a large
literature provides some guidelines for possible developments in such a new context.
Second, the process of supra-national integration has consequences for a number of
aspects related to the internal working of the democratic member states. To focus on
the main aspects, on the one hand, all dimensions of the democratic qualities are
affected by the integration process as the policies of the supra-national authorities
influence the rule of law, accountability, popular participation, forms of freedom and
levels of equality, to mention only some of them. On the other hand, as emphasized by
some authors (Mair, 2013), in addition to the electoral and inter-institutional account-
ability, we can see the emergence of a third accountability, the one that the incumbent
authorities of an integrated democracy have vis-à-vis the supra-national authorities and
the other democracies that take part in this integrative process. Such an accountability
intrudes in a large number of domestic policies and substantially decreases national
sovereignties in these respects. This can endanger their democratic legitimacy, if the new
supra-national authorities are not similarly democratically legitimized.
Questions
1 What is regime change?
2 Why is the position of the army particularly significant for the
installation of democracy?
3 What are the key factors that account for the varied outcomes of
democratic installation?
4 How would you define the process of legitimation? What is the
difference between inclusive and exclusive legitimation?
5 What are the eight main democratic qualities?
6 What is the difference between inter-institutional and electoral
accountability?
Further reading
Gunther R, Diamandouros PN and Puhle HJ (eds.) (1995) The politics of democratic con-
solidation: Southern Europe in comparative perspective. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press. This edited volume systematically compares the experience of four
Southern European countries – Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece – which have successfully
consolidated their democratic regimes. It is the first of a series of books on democratization
dimensions

Haerpfer C, Bernhagen P, Inglehart RF et al. (eds.) (2009) Democratization. Oxford, UK:

Oxford University Press. This exhaustive textbook focuses on the theoretical and empirical
dimensions of democratization in an accessible and systematic way.
Linz JJ and Stepan AC (1996) Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press. A classic volume that conceptualizes the main types of recent changes
towards democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America and singles out every specific
path to democracy.
Morlino L (2011) Changes for democracy: Actors, structures, processes. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press. Building on the empirical results of previous research and his own the
author presents a systematic empirical analysis of the all macro-processes of democratiza-
tion in South Europe, Latin America and East Europe.
O’Donnell G, Schmitter PC and Whitehead L (eds.) (1986) Transition from authoritarian rule.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. A locus classicus, this four-volume work
represents the foundational text for the study of the process of transition from authoritari-
anism across a broad range of countries.
Rothstein B (2011) The quality of government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. The book
provides an alternative view to the quality of democracy literature by focusing on the
empirical analysis of the relations between the quality of government and key political,
economic, and social outcomes.
Whitehead L (ed.) (2001) The international dimensions of democratization: Europe and the
Americas. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. This edited volume focuses on the inter-
national factors, which the previous research was glossing over, and more precisely on the
impact of US foreign policy, international finance, the UN, and the European Union, as
well as a broad array of international political influences on democratization.
Weblinks
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI): http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi
CIRI Human Rights Data project: www.humanrightsdata.com
Transparency International: http// transparencyinternational.com
Quality of Government Institute: http://qog.pol.gu.se/
Electoral Integrity Project: https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/home
Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index BTI 2016: http://www.bti-project.org
International IDEA: www.idea.int/
National Endowment for Democracy: www.ned.org.

7
Non-democratic
regimes
Key terms
Authoritarianism Limited democracy
Civilian authoritarianism Military authoritarianism
Civilian-military authoritarianism Quasi-democracies
Democracy without state Traditional regimes
Hybrid regime
Introduction
In the previous two chapters, we paid attention to democracies and the phenomenon of
long-term processes of democratization. Here, our attention is on the non-democratic
alternatives and the key aspects of their own processes of change. According to empiri-
cal data, such as those by Freedom House, less than half of the almost 200 independent
countries in the world are ruled by democracies and the other half by other kinds of
regimes. Among the contemporary non-democratic countries, there are still a few tradi-
tional regimes (absolutist monarchies), roughly 50 to 60 hybrid regimes and 40 to 50
authoritarianisms. As with democracies, these alternatives today can be found in most
parts of the world. In this section, after a short analysis of traditional regimes, we will
give our attention to the two most important alternatives, hybrid regimes and authori-
tarian systems.
Traditional regimes
These regimes are still present in some areas, such as the Middle East, and examples
of this model include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. The base of
their legitimacy can be understood if the classic notion of patrimonialism, developed
by Max Weber, is complemented by the role of institutions of an absolutist monarchy.
For this kind of regime, Chehabi and Linz (1998) coined the term sultanism, based on
the example of the Ottoman Empire. It rests on the power of the sovereign who con-
siders the territory and people as his personal property (patrimony) and binds its
personnel and subjects with a relationship made up of fears and rewards. The regime

is legibus solutus (‘not bound by law’), as the decisions of the sovereign are not
restricted by rules and need not be justified on an ideological basis. Succession is usu-
ally hereditary. There is a use of power in particularistic forms and for essentially
private purposes. The police and the army play a central role, there is an obvious lack
of any ideology or mass mobilization of the kind we can see in other types of author-
itarian regimes (see below), and the political arena is dominated by established elites
and traditional institutions including religious ones.
Hybrid regimes
Although the term hybrid regime and similar notions have been present in political
science for years (see, e.g. Finer, 1970: 441–531), the reality of ambiguous political
arrangements and consequently the related empirical concept have become more rel-
evant during the last decades with the widespread phenomenon of democratization
(Chapter 6 above). Thus, in the mid-1970s Rouquié (1975) and somewhat later
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) discussed the terms dictablanda (‘soft dictatorship’)
and democradura (‘hard democracy’) as mixed types of regimes. Levitsky and Way
(2010) developed the model of competitive authoritarianism, stressing how after the
end of the Cold War there was a proliferation of hybrid political regimes in Africa,
Asia and Latin America. Overlapping notions, such as exclusionary democracy (Apter,
1987; Remmer, 1985–86), semi-democracy (Diamond et al., 1989), illiberal democracy
(Zakaria, 1997), semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2003), defective democracy (Merkel,
2004), partial democracy (Epstein et al., 2006) and mixed regimes (Bunce and
Wolchik, 2008), proliferated. Many of the ‘democracies with adjectives’ (Collier and
Levitsky, 1997) such as ‘tutelary democracies’, ‘guided democracies’, ‘sovereign democ-
racies’, and so on also denote regimes lacking some essential democratic qualities.
In fact, in many countries changes away from authoritarian or traditional regimes
were initiated, but there were also political and social forces which opposed the
changes. Often, after the first open elections when a minimalist democracy was estab-
lished the new regime was not able to become consolidated and a change towards
different forms of authoritarianism began. The result has often been a long and even
rather stable stalemate of an ambiguous undefined institutional arrangement. In a
number of cases such a political arrangement is also the result of partial openings by
rulers or elite groups who are not, however, willing to accept and inaugurate a mini-
mal democracy for fear of losing their power. Considering, for example, the Middle
Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, such hybrid regimes include Morocco
and Jordan (as monarchies with some limited democratic institutions such as an
elected parliament, but where the real power still rests with the king).
Thus, a hybrid regime is a set of government institutions and norms that are either
formalized or informally recognized as existing in a given territory and with respect
to a given population which cannot be defined either as a minimalist democracy (see
above) or a clearly non-democratic regime. First, there are fairly stable institutions
that have stayed in place for a considerable span of time. This is a relevant feature so
as not to confound a hybrid regime with a transitional phase between one type of
regime (e.g. a democracy) and another (e.g. a military dictatorship). Second, at the
same time not all the minimalist requirements for a democracy (universal suffrage;

NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 113
free competitive recurrent fair elections; more than one party; different and alternative
media sources) are present (see above) and likewise not all the characteristics of a
strictly authoritarian regime are present (see below). It is a regime that ambiguously
presents characteristics of other regimes. Thus, as Terry Karl (1995: 80) suggests with
a focus on Latin America, it can be characterized by an ‘uneven acquisition of the
procedural requisites of democracy’, no firm ‘civilian control over the military’, and a
‘weak judiciary’. Therefore, we are considering authoritarianisms that have lost some
of their key characteristics but retained some authoritarian or traditional features and
at the same time have acquired some of the characteristic institutions and procedures
of democracy. With regard to Latin America, for example, we can mention Venezuela,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, or Bolivia. A greater number of African countries such as Kenya
or Nigeria also are cases in point.
The definition just presented emphasizes that a hybrid regime is always a set of
ambiguous institutions that maintains aspects of the past. In other words, it stems
from a crisis and partial change from a previous regime that brought about a reshap-
ing of some essential characteristics of that regime, but also failed to acquire other
characteristics that would make it fully democratic or authoritarian. Consequently,
the term ‘hybrid’ can be applied to all those regimes preceded by a period of authori-
tarian or traditional rule followed by the beginnings of greater tolerance, liberalization
and a partial relaxation of the restrictions on pluralism; and to all those regimes
which, following a period of minimal democracy in the sense indicated above, are
subject to the intervention of non-elected bodies – the military, above all – that place
restrictions on competitive pluralism without, however, creating a more or less stable
authoritarian regime. We thus can define a hybrid regime as ‘a set of institutions that
have been persistent for a prolonged period, have been preceded by an authoritarian
or traditional regime and are characterized by the break-up of limited pluralism,
forms of independent, autonomous participation, and the absence of at least one of
the four essential aspects of a minimal democracy’. (Morlino 2011: 56–7)
Types of hybrid regimes

On the basis of the previous definition, a crucial aspect of hybrid regimes is the pres-
ence and role of individual or collective actors who are influential or decisive in
maintaining the regime in its characteristic state of ambiguity and uncertainty. These
actors play the role of veto players and can include: a foreign power who is influential
in the domestic politics of the country; a traditional king or an authoritarian leader
who came to power through a coup; the military; a single party run by a small group;
religious hierarchies; economic oligarchies; other powerful groups or a coalition of
sections of these actors, who are, however, unable or unwilling to eliminate more
recent pro-democratic forces.
In this perspective, an attempt at a more effective classification should focus on the
legacy of the previous regime and on the constraints that hinder a country from being
a minimal democracy or a fully authoritarian regime. Consequently, if the criteria for
classification are the reasons that prevent a change towards a democracy or an author-
itarian regime, the types of hybrid regimes that can be identified depend on the existing
typologies of authoritarian regimes and democracies that have already been estab-
lished, focusing mainly on the factors that prevent change. However, when we perform

an empirical analysis of hybrid regimes, considering the regimes that Freedom House
labels as ‘partly free’ (Morlino, 2011), three key groups of mutually consistent features
emerge: a first one closely grouping electoral process, political pluralism and participa-
tion, freedom of expression and beliefs, and freedom of association and organization;
a second factor where state functioning stands alone; and a third one where rule of
law, characterized by a lack of or limited corruption, an independent judiciary, some
efficiency of bureaucracy and personal autonomy are also strongly connected.
Additional empirical analysis shows that three models can result (Morlino, 2011,
Chapter 3). Thus, the first hybrid regime model, deriving from the first component,
can be labelled ‘limited democracy’, which is characterized by universal suffrage, a
formally correct electoral procedure, elective posts occupied on the basis of elections
and a multi-party system, but also by civil rights that are constrained by the police or
through other effective forms of suppression. Consequently, there is no effective
political opposition and, above all, the media are curtailed and controlled by a situa-
tion of monopoly to the point that part of the population is effectively prevented from
exercising their rights (Wigell, 2008). The second empirical model is that of ‘democra-
cies without law’, or rather ‘democracy without state’, as the state can be conceived as
a ‘government based on the primacy of the law’, where there are no relevant legacies
or powerful veto players, nor are there any forms of state suppression or non-guarantee
of rights, but simply a situation of widespread illegality where the state is incapable
of performing properly due to poorly functioning institutions. This situation is, how-
ever, different from and actually better than that of a failed state (see above). Limited
democracies and democracies without state have been confirmed as empirically rele-
vant categories for which different, contrasting, elements need to be stressed. These
include a lack of an effective guarantee of rights despite the presence of state institu-
tions in the case of limited democracies, and a lack of the rule of law and of a
functioning state, with laws that are not applied because the judiciary has no effective
independence, widespread corruption and flawed and inefficient bureaucracy in the
case of democracies without state. The third model suggested by empirical analysis is
that of quasi-democracies, characterized by regimes where all the main aspects men-
tioned above are deeply rooted in ambiguity: there is illegality and at the same time
partial constraints on the effective guarantee of rights. This model is the empirically
most relevant one. Examples of quasi-democracies in 2015 include Albania,
Macedonia, Moldova and Turkey. Examples of limited democracies are Bangladesh,
Guatemala, Jordan, Nicaragua and Paraguay. And examples of democracies without
state are Armenia, Haiti, Nepal, and Nigeria.
Box 7.1 Linz, ‘Authoritarian Regime’

An authoritarian regime is a ‘political system with limited, not responsi-
ble political pluralism, without an elaborated and guiding ideology, but
with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political
mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which
a leader or occasionally a small group, exercises power within formally
ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones’. (Linz, 1964: 255)

Authoritarian regimes
In the past, this regime type has been analysed by Marx in the mid-nineteenth century
(Bonapartism), by Gramsci (Caesarism) and by a number of other authors (see, e.g.
Hermet, 1986 and his use of terms like neo-Bismarckism). However, the definition
advanced by Linz (1964; Box 7.1 above), originally based on his experience in
Franco’s Spain is still the most useful one and identifies five significant dimensions: (1)
limited pluralism, with regard to the political community and the key actors in the
regime and its policies; (2) distinctive values or mentality, which concerns the ideo-
logical justification of the regime; (3) low political mobilization or the absence of
compulsory political participation by people through the coercive action of authori-
tarian authorities; 4. a leader or small group that exercises political power; 5. formally
ill-defined but predictable limits on citizens’ rights.
Central to these dimensions is limited and not responsible pluralism with a few
relevant elite actors. They usually include: the army; the bureaucracy, or a part of it;
a single party; the church; industrial entrepreneurs or groups of them; large landown-
ers; and in some cases even the unions or transnational economic groups that have
important interests in the country. Of course, these actors are not politically account-
able, that is, they are not responsible towards the citizens as usually happens in
democracies through free competitive fair elections. If there is some sort of ‘responsi-
bility’, this is sought at the level of ‘invisible’ policy in the relationships, for example,
between the military and leading economic groups or large landowners, that is, among
the very elite actors who support the regime. In addition, elections or other forms of
electoral participation, such as direct consultations through plebiscites, have no
democratic significance because, first of all, they are not characterized by genuine
political competition. They mainly have a symbolic meaning to express consensus and
support for the regime by a controlled, not autonomous, civil society. The salience of
limited pluralism suggests the importance of identifying the relevant actors in each
authoritarian regime to better understand both the structure of the regime and the
policies it implements. Thus, it is helpful to refer to the dominant coalition, i.e. the set
of political and social active personalities and groups, more or less institutionalized,
who together support the specific authoritarianism in its establishment phase and in
subsequent periods.
This agreement is for the benefit of the actors that are part of the coalition, and
simultaneously excludes and marginalizes all others – for example, small farmers or
workers. Political marginalization is achieved through a combination of police repres-
sion and ideological legitimation adopted by the elite. Especially when it follows
a democratic regime, the authoritarian establishment is often the result of an ‘anti-
something’ coalition rather than one for something, i.e. a negative coalition. In
addition, such a coalition can be more homogeneous than a democratic one: there is
agreement on the method (non-democratic) and agreement on rejecting political divi-
sions that existed in the previous regime, and sometimes even on positively supporting
certain solutions. The coalition is dominant in terms of coercive resources, influence,
and status, which are specifically used by the actors in the political arena to achieve
their objectives. To avoid misunderstanding, it should be added that the dominance in
terms of resources also involves consideration of potential or real opponents to the
regime. Once the regime is established, the coalition may gradually change as some

actors can become marginalized and others achieve greater prominence depending on
the same events that characterized the installation of the regime or as a consequence
of external events that affect the domestic situation. Moreover, such pluralism can be
characterized by multiple actors, but also by one or two actors who are able to
monopolize all the politically relevant resources. This feature can create objective
room for the opposition. Among others, Linz (1973) and Germani (1975) analysed in
depth the different types and forms of opposition, semi-opposition or even pseudo-
opposition that can be found in authoritarian regimes: from an active opposition to a
passive one, from a legal to an illegal or even an a-legal opposition. In this political
context, it can even be more convenient to tolerate a certain degree of opposition or
maintain a pseudo-opposition that gives a liberal paint to the authoritarian regime.
The degree of ideological justification of authoritarianism is characterized by the
fact that its legitimacy is based on ‘mentalities’, which according to a notion that Linz
borrowed from the German sociologist Theodor Geiger (1932) is based on some atti-
tudes and values, more or less ambiguous, on which it is easier for the different actors
with different characteristics and interests to find an agreement (Linz, 1975: 266–9).
These values include attachment to the motherland, to the nation, respect for order,
hierarchy and authority, and similar ones. Although in these regimes we never find
developed, complex and well-articulated ideologies, such as Marxism-Leninism and
Nazism as in the USSR and Nazi Germany respectively, partially more elaborate ide-
ologies can be present in some authoritarianisms, especially in the past. This was the
case, for example, in Egypt under the rule of Nasser (1953–70) or in Ghana with
Kwame Nkrumah (1954–66) and his African Socialism.
If the regime is able to achieve consolidation, a low level of mobilization during the
central phase of stability obscures a large variety of possible situations. First of all, it
is necessary to see if the regime has a mobilizing structure, that is, a hegemonic polit-
ical structure or single party or unions or interest associations that organize from
above and exert pressure for different forms of participation that show support for
the regime. However, an authoritarian regime can pursue an alternative goal through
limitation and control of participation, with a resulting low level of mobilization. This
happens particularly when mobilization structures that are able to control participa-
tion are absent. Authoritarian rulers frequently fear popular participation that they
may eventually no longer have the ability to control if it starts to become autonomous
and the regime has no or poor means of suppression, such as a badly organized or
undisciplined and corrupt police.
At the level of political structures, Linz also recalls the ‘formally ill-defined limits,
but ... quite predictable’ (1964: 255) within which authoritarian rulers exert their
power. The fact that these limits are only roughly defined contrasts with the ‘legal
certainty’ that should characterize democratic structures and give rulers the possibility
of exercising their power with greater discretion and using suppression.
The fourth of Linz’s features refers to the ‘leader or small group’ in power. Indeed,
these regimes are characterized by considerable personalization of power, visibility of
the leader or the few leaders who actually possess the power and are present in the
decision-making governing bodies.
While weak definition of the limits to authoritarian power and the leader or
small group at the top are not necessary features distinguishing among different
forms of authoritarian regimes, attention to the political structures of the regime is

indispensable in order to check whether and to what extent the regime creates and
possibly stabilizes new institutions, such as a single party, unions controlled from
above, distinct forms of parliamentary assembly, characteristic electoral systems, or
any other specific bodies that are different from those of the previous regime. Thus,
in addition to the three dimensions discussed before (political pluralism, degree and
forms of mobilization, ideological justification), this dimension is also important
when distinguishing between different authoritarianisms. To clarify this, pluralism
leads to distinguishing among the different dominant coalitions that can be vari-
ously composed of certain institutional (bureaucracy, the military) and/or political
(parties, unions) and/or socio-economic (oligarchic groups of landowners, different
groups of entrepreneurs, middle-class commercial) actors. As for the regime’s offi-
cial beliefs or ideological support, it is also essential to understand which values are
used to justify and legitimize the regime: traditional, modern, or what else?
Regarding the degree and forms of mobilization or participation that are encour-
aged by the regime, their extent and characteristics (and possible institutionalization)
are very important. Finally, the characteristics and originality of new institutions
created by the regime is the fourth dimension that has to be distinguished among
the varieties of authoritarian regimes.
Types of authoritarianism
Figure 7.1 shows the four dimensions and stresses the salience of the connections
among them when distinguishing the different types. If we make the connections
among these dimensions explicit, we can capture the inner logic of any authoritarian
regime. In fact, if there is only one main political actor, which is very often the army,
then the most recurrent mentalities are related to order, hierarchy, national interest,
safety, or a need for a technocratic rationalization that will eliminate inefficiency,
corruption or gross injustice. People’s participation and involvement is limited and
most often suppressed, and the new structure of the regime is a junta (military
authoritarianism).
If the army is allied with social groups, such as industrial entrepreneurs, shopkeep-
ers, landowners, or the Catholic Church, then the mentality also focuses on order and
motherland, but possibly also on corporatism and very often on technology and devel-
opment. People’s involvement is limited and can be controlled through vertical unions,
where employers and employees are in the same organization, or through corporative
chambers, i.e. chambers constituted by implementing the functional principle of rep-
resenting the different economic activities in the country – or even a single party,
which becomes one of the regime’s characterizing actors. This regime (civilian-military
authoritarianism) can be more innovative than purely military ones because of the
creation of unions, the corporative chamber and the single party, in spite of being
weakly organized.
A short excursus on military intervention

On the whole, the political role of the army and police has been a recurrent aspect in
the past and the present in different areas of the world. Thus, an important question
to address is: why does the military intervene in politics? To reply to this question we

Legitimating
Dominant
mentality/ideology
coalition
(what and how
(what actors)
much developed)
Authoritarianism
Mobilization Regime
from above structuration
(characteristics (degree of
and degree) innovation)
Figure 7.1 Salient dimensions to distinguish among authoritarian regimes
can start from Huntington’s (1968: 194–8) classic statement that the most important
reasons for military intervention are not military, but political, as they depend on an
absence of consolidated political institutions and the presence of unstable democracies
or hybrid regimes, or even authoritarianism with strong personalistic characteristics.
The actors in the intervention, which is usually a coup d’état, are the military because
in any country the military (and police) have a monopoly on the use of force (Janowitz,
1964, 1977). As for the political conditions or pre-conditions that facilitate an inter-
vention, cases where outside involvement can be clearly identified as the factor
determining military intervention are very rare. In other words, it is very rare that the
domestic political situation is not the most important aspect to consider. For example,
without denying the role of the USA in explaining the coup and its success in Chile in
1973 a classic situation for military intervention prevailed: a deep internal political
crisis characterized by low legitimacy of democracy, radicalization of conflicts, per-
ceived threats to the interests of the middle classes, a deep economic crisis, illegality,
violence and corruption. Similar situations like a poor institutionalization of demo-
cratic structures, a weakness of intermediate structures such as political parties and
trade unions, a weak civil society or the lack of other countervailing forces have
facilitated military takeovers in large parts of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East
and parts of Asia.

Moreover, what are the organizational and structural features which benefit the
military as actors in an intervention? A concise answer was provided by Samuel Finer
(1980: 16): ‘the military with their fivefold advantage due to organization, hierarchi-
cal discipline, communication and team spirit, besides the fact of possessing heavy
weapons, are by far the most powerful organization in society’. As for the reasons that
ultimately lead to a military intervention, the political situation provides the basic
conditions and the internal organizational features of the military account for its
actual occurrence. But what drives sections of the military to intervene? In this regard,
Nordlinger (1978) underlines the prevalence of corporate interests of the military. In
situations of civil unrest or severe economic or political crisis the military identifies
itself with the ‘national interest’ and intervenes to prevent cuts to the defence budget
or to increase its expenditure. Another specific reason can be a reaction to interference
by civilian authorities that limits military autonomy with regard to promotions, train-
ing, decisions on curricula and similar issues. A third element in corporate interests of
the military can be the creation of separate militias that threaten the military’s monop-
oly of force, or even political initiatives that threaten the survival of the military as an
institution (Nordlinger, 1978: 96–113). The military may also be motivated by a class
interest fearing a politicization of the lower classes and a consequent threat perceived
by the middle classes, the failure of civilian governments (illegality, economic crisis,
disorder), or a loss of legitimacy of the regime. In some African military interventions,
the class interests have become ethnic or regional interests. Decalo (1976), for exam-
ple, offers similar explanations for several coups that occurred in Burundi, Uganda,
Benin and the People’s Republic of the Congo.
The analysis of military intervention has also to consider the opposite question: which
factors can prevent the military from intervening or which factors are effective obstacles
to a coup? In this respect, objective and subjective factors can be distinguished. The
objective ones refer to strong countervailing forces such as strong unions, a strong civil
society or even other armed organizations which would resist a military takeover.
Several scholars also point to the presence of a dominant or hegemonic party –
an institution that plays a decisive role in political stabilization. Subjective factors refer
to a specific ‘ethos’ of the military or prevailing attitudes at least in the military leader-
ship. Finer (1975: 20–8) pointed out some of these factors that may keep the military in
the barracks: a high level of professionalization of the military together with an accept-
ance of civil control, a negative evaluation of the capacity for action and efficiency of
the armed forces, even a fear of a war among different parts of them, or finally a fear
that after intervention the army may disintegrate.
A third major variant of authoritarianism is the civilian one. This is characterized
by actors such as those mentioned above, but usually also by a stronger develop-
ment of its legitimating mentality, which may be an ideology, such as nationalism or
a socialist or religious orientation. Salazar’s Portugal or some contemporary regimes
in Central Asia are cases in point. This may also involve stronger popular mobiliza-
tion with a more permanent organizational structure, but controlled from the
centre. In this type of regime, the institutional structuring is important and is also
often characterized by the presence of militias or other paramilitary groups.
Nationalist mobilization regimes are born from a struggle for national independence
directed by the indigenous elite, and three major liberation movements were success-
ful and established such regimes in ex-Portuguese colonies during the 1970s

(Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau). Moreover, China today is still a good

example of civilian authoritarianism characterized by controlled mobilization
through the Communist Party. Iran is a different example of civilian authoritarian-
ism, where the ideology is Shiite Islamism and the Army of the Guardians of the
Islamic Revolution is the main structure for controlling people under the command
of religious authority.
The four dimensions of variation with the resulting military, civilian military and
civilian regimes cannot be understood if we do not take a broader systemic approach
(see above). The socio-economic development and cultural characteristics of each
society account for the elite actors and the degree of involvement of the people. Behind
a military regime there is usually a poor, underdeveloped society, sometimes character-
ized by the presence of economic resources such as oil, precious metals or other
commodities, but the possibility of broader socio-economic development turns into
the ‘curse of the plenty’ as predatory political leaders, such as generals who control
the army, take over the country’s power and riches.
Processes of change
The definition of regime change, which was given in Chapter 6, is also applicable to
the regimes described here. In this respect, during the last few decades the most fre-
quent changes include transitions from democracy to hybrid regimes, from hybrid
regimes to authoritarian ones and vice versa, and from one type of authoritarian to
another. Of course, to these transitions other internal changes can be added in parallel
with the analysis of processes of democratization as discussed in the previous chapter.
These at least include installation, consolidation and crisis, but also other internal
evolutions of non-democratic regimes.
During the last decades the change from a democracy towards a hybrid regime has
been more frequent than changes towards authoritarian forms, as had been more often
the case before, for example in the transition (1936–42) in Spain towards the author-
itarian Franco regime or in several Latin American transitions towards military
regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. The recent transitions to hybrid regimes were pre-
ceded by crises of democracy in countries where essential aspects of democratic quality
as discussed in Chapter 6 were curtailed, especially concerning electoral accountability,
inter-institutional accountability and basic political rights and civil liberties so that the
regime could no longer be considered even a minimal democracy. The most important
case of such a transition is Venezuela during the Chavez presidency (1999–2013).
Despite some successful policies which Chavez implemented to curb strong social
inequalities, he made several decisions that limited the freedom of the press, the
autonomy of other institutions, and eventually basic freedoms of citizens.
The Venezuelan case and that kind of transition recall the high salience of a factor that
is often labelled as the ‘curse of the plenty’ (see above) or the ‘resource trap’ (see esp.
Ross, 2001). That is, there are a number of countries in the Middle East and other areas
of the world where the presence of oil or valuable mineral resources may have an estab-
lishing or consolidating effect on already existing authoritarian regimes, reinforcing the
internal security apparatus and the army to maintain effective repressive mechanisms.
On the whole, the presence of such resources has an anti-democratic impact.

The transition from hybrid regimes to authoritarian ones also presents some pecu-
liarities. They usually not only concern even greater limitations of political pluralism,
but also the suppression and demobilization of civil society, which is inconsistent with
the mobilization that occurred during the hybrid phase and would be unbearable in
the new context. The best example of this case is Egypt after the demise of the
Mubarak regime which experienced a short phase of a hybrid regime and even expec-
tations of a fuller transition towards democracy or at least a stabilization of the hybrid
system during the ‘Arab Spring’. The break of a possible coalition between the new
younger army officers led by the minister of defence during the Morsi presidency,
General Al Sisi, and the Muslim Brotherhood led to a military intervention and a new
military authoritarianism. In the preceding years of an unstable hybrid regime (2011–
13) there had been widespread popular mobilization in addition to a referendum and
semi-free elections so that the new military leadership resorted to strong suppressive
measures to curtail public unrest, and widespread popular dissatisfaction which
increased with the economic crisis due to the threats to tourism and the generally
negative economic situation.
With regard to other processes mentioned in Chapter 6 concerning the installa-
tion and consolidation of new regimes, such processes can also be observed for
hybrid and authoritarian regimes with respect to some of their major characteris-
tics. This concerns the limitation of freedom and the rule of law for hybrid regimes,
and the further curtailment of a limited pluralism and popular participation enforc-
ing existing authoritarian mentalities in the authoritarian regimes. Moreover,
especially concerning a possible consolidation of the new regimes we find attempts
of legitimation through the action of parties and leaders, as for example it has been
the case with the role performed by the ‘United Russia’ party and President Putin
in Russia.
Mobilization and electoral authoritarianism

The internal changes that affect authoritarian regimes are the most interesting pro-
cesses to explore because of their innovative characteristics. As already understood
and illustrated by Germani (1971) in his research on young Italians and Spaniards
during the 1930s and 1940s, especially civilian authoritarian regimes with some
mobilization and participation characteristics may develop an internal opposition. In
fact, when people are compelled to meet and discuss they may develop ideas and
proposals that the authoritarian authorities may not accept. In such cases the recur-
rent solution is suppression of actual or potential opposition groups. But when a
mobilization regime is persisting over a longer period of time another development
can supplement suppression. There is the possibility of accepting different policy posi-
tions within the regime, provided that all of them acknowledge its legitimacy. This
limits the cost of suppression and reduces the need for stronger police or army inter-
ventions. Two different cases stand out to show quite clearly such a process. These are
the Islamist regime in Iran and Communist China. In the first case, a mobilization
regime with a religious basis was established after 1979, but as the formally con-
ducted elections show there is an institutional structure which keeps the authoritarian
rule in the hands of the religious authorities, but allows for different policy positions

on some issues, for example, the nuclear agreement and relationship with the USA, to
compete in a controlled way within the country. In China, the rule of the single party
and the leadership is strong and stable, but within the party different positions are
allowed, always in a moderate controlled way.
A key feature of these two cases is the salience of elections which became more
important within these – for China at the local level only – and other authoritarian
regimes. Why is this so? First of all, by and large, a democratic electoral rhetoric has
become more widespread and accepted after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the
subsequent democratizations of several East European countries in addition to a few
African and Asian countries. Thus, to adopt this way of legitimation enables the regime
to become less repressive in order not to give intelligence services and police a power
that could become too difficult to control. Consequently, in some case we can have a
civilian regime that Schedler (2013) labels ‘electoral authoritarianism’ which presents
all the formal rules and institutions of a democracy: from the constitutional charter to
the electoral system, from the parliament to the supreme court and elected local govern-
ments (see Box 7.2). Civic associations, interest groups and private media are allowed,
but regulated. In the elections, more than one party can participate, again to give the
appearance of a democratic regime. In this way, the opposition parties indirectly legiti-
mize the regime, and often get rewarded by the authoritarian ruler. Moreover, the
elections are systematically manipulated in different ways, such as the alteration of lists,
the purchase of votes and the falsification of ballots. Thus, the elections do not have
the essential characteristics of being free, fair and actually competitive as suggested in
the minimalist definition of democracy (see above). Putin’s Russia can also be consid-
ered a good example of this kind of regime together with Iran; in China, however, the
grip of the single party at the country level does not allow to have an open opposition.
Box 7.2: Schedler, ‘Electoral

Authoritarianism’
Electoral authoritarianism presents all the formal rules and
institutions of a democracy: from the constitutional charter
to the electoral system, from the parliament to the supreme
court and elected local governments. Civic associations,
interest groups and private media are allowed, but regulat-
ed. In the elections, more than one party can participate,
again to give the appearance of a democratic regime. In this
way, the opposition parties indirectly legitimize the regime,
and often get rewarded by the authoritarian ruler. Moreover,
the elections are systematically manipulated in different
ways, such as the alteration of lists, the purchase of votes
and the falsification of ballots. Thus, the elections do not
have the essential characteristics of being free, fair and ac-
tually competitive as suggested in the minimalist definition
of democracy. (Schedler, 2006: 3)

Conclusions
In this chapter we presented the two major types of non-democratic regimes: hybrid
regimes and authoritarian ones. When looking at them more closely we realize that
these types and sub-types have been subject to evolution and change as they also were
indirectly affected by recent processes of democratization. The borderlines between
these types, as some of the examples suggest, remain fluid. Although a few essential
characteristics were developed in the last section of this chapter, the conditions for
how these regimes came about are quite specific. Their attractiveness for others or as
a universal vision to be achieved is very limited. This distinguishes them from democ-
racies, at least as an ideal.
Questions
1 What are hybrid regimes and how can they be classified?
2 Provide the definition of authoritarian regime proposed by Linz
and discuss its constitutive elements.
3 What role does the dominant coalition play in an authoritarian
regime?
4 Can you describe the process of transition from hybrid to
authoritarian regime, and propose a significant example of it?
5 What are the main characteristics of electoral authoritarianism?
Further reading
Brooker P (2014) Non-democratic regimes (3rd ed.). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
The author offers a comprehensive assessment of the nature, character and performance of
authoritarian regimes.
Chehabi HE and Linz JJ (1998) Sultanistic regimes. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press. This edited volume became the reference book on important sultanistic regimes,
Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, Iran, and the Philippines included.
Diamond L and Plattner MF (eds.) (2014) Democratization and authoritarianism in the Arab
World. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. The edited volume examines sev-
eral key issues concerning the post-Arab Spring political changes in the Middle East and
North Africa.
Gel’man V (2015) Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet regime changes. Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press. It is an excellent overview of regime change in Russia from
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the present day.
Levitsky S and Way LA (2010) Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold
war. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Based on 35 case studies, the book intro-
duces a new regime type (‘competitive authoritarianism’) and offers a new theoretical
framework for understanding why external democratizing pressure varies across countries
and regions.
Linz JJ (2000) Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
This classic work develops the fundamental distinction between totalitarian and authoritar-
ian non-democratic regimes while proposing a thoughtful typology.

Schedler A (2013) The politics of uncertainty: Sustaining and subverting electoral authoritarian-
ism. New York: Oxford University Press. The book presents an analytical framework and
empirical data to understand the distinctive political dynamics of electoral authoritarian
regimes.
Teets JC (2016) Civil society under authoritarianism: The China model (4th ed.). New York:
Cambridge University Press. The author proposes a new model of ‘consultative authoritari-
anism’ showing how Chinese officials and civil society organizations mutually learn from
one another through their interactions, thereby making domestic institutions more adaptive
and less fragile over time.
Weblinks
Amnesty International: www.amnesty.org
Autocratic Regime Data: http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/
Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index BTI 2016: www.bti-project.org
Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) Index: https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/
democracy-and-dictatorship-revisited
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU): www.eiu.com/democracy2015
Freedom House: www.freedomhouse.org
Human Rights Watch: www.hrw.org
Polity IV: www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

Part III
Governance

8
Government,
parliament and
judiciary
Key terms
Bicameralism/Unicameralism Party government
Cabinet Representation
Fusion of powers Rule of law
Governance Separation of powers
Government Technocratic government
Judicial independence
Introduction
When in The Spirit of Laws (1748) Montesquieu developed his constitutional theory
on the separation of powers, he based it on the three main powers that characterize a
Rechtsstaat, namely the rule of law in a constitutional arrangement. These are the
executive power, i.e. the government; the legislative power, i.e. the parliament; and
the judicial power or judiciary. In more recent times and in other areas of the world,
the famous political leader Sun Yat-sen in China also referred to those three powers.
In their general theory of politics Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell (1966,
Chapter 6 and 1978, Chapters 9 and 10) developed their theory through a merging of
functionalism and systems analysis. In this theory the three key functions and struc-
tures of a regime again are the same and considered as crucial: the decision-making
process and related institutions, that is, the legislative function, the executive function,
and the judicial review by the courts. Several other examples could be mentioned
restating the crucial role of the three powers in addition to their separation and the
relevance of the checks and balances among them.
Such a largely accepted constitutional wisdom has two inherent paradoxes from a
political science perspective. This is also the reason why it is not easy to understand
them and for many people the sirens of direct democracy are much more appealing
and seducing (see Chapters 10 and 14). The first paradox lies in the key principle of

representation that justifies and legitimizes the legislative power and the top of the
executive. The second one is the fact that the judiciary is the main power that checks
both the legislative and the executive, but is itself not based on a democratic principle,
but on an elitist tenet, that is, the competence in laws and the implementation of them.
Why there is a paradox behind the notion of representation has been spelled out by
Hanna Pitkin when she explains the meaning of the concept: ‘representation means …
re-presentation, a making present again … this has always meant more than a literal
bringing into presence … Rather, representation … means the making present in some
sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact. Now, to say
that something is simultaneously both present and not present is to utter a paradox,
and thus a fundamental dualism is built into the meaning of representation’ (1967:
8–9). By Pitkin and others (Rehfeld, 2006) the notion is defined in different ways and
captures several dimensions. For our purposes, the definition presented in Box 8.1
suggests that public representation is different from the private one, where a lawyer
‘represents’ the specific, individual interests of a client. The interests to be represented
in political representation are collective, and this provides the justification for the
representative to act independently with ‘discretion’ or relative freedom and judge-
ment. Conversely, those represented are not passive subjects, but agents – principal
agents – who assess the behaviour of the representative and take her to task. Not
surprisingly, these relations can be conflictive.
Box 8.1 Hanna Pitkin, ‘Political

Representation’
Political representation:
…. representing here means acting in the interest of the

represented, in a manner responsive to them. The repre-
sentative must act independently; his action must involve
discretion and judgement; he must be one who acts. The
represented must also be (conceived as) capable of inde-
pendent action and judgement, not merely being taken care
of. And, despite the resulting potential for conflict between
representative and represented about what is to be done,
that conflict must not normally take place. (Pitkin, 1967: 209)
Altogether, this definition shows how the representative is a trustee and not a delegate.
A trustee can be understood as a representative caring for the nation’s interests, based
on her own judgement about public goods and interests and acting according to civic
virtue. A delegate, by contrast, is a representative looking after the interests of her
constituency, based on the judgement of the constituents and is more responsive to
sanctions (no re-election) (Rehfeld, 2009: 215). Elections are the key mechanism
through which representation is carried out and the effective reward or punishment
of the representative by the represented, who votes again for her or not, is the key

GOVERNMENT, PARLIAMENTS AND JUDICIARY 129
aspect that makes representation work (Chapter 14). Through the elections the parlia-
ment is formed and, in a parliamentary system, the government is created. The
following three sections review how parliaments and governments effectively imple-
ment the principle of representation, that is, how they actually work.
The third power, the judiciary, guarantees and implements civil rights. It carries out
the tasks Montesquieu stated as being essential for a democratic republic where in
addition to the executive and legislative powers the judicial functions should be allo-
cated to a third separate power that checks the activities of government and parliament
so that one power cannot prevail over the other, and that the liberty of the citizens is
adequately guaranteed. This separation of powers and the mechanisms of checks and
balances are at the core of a democracy. But as is also well known, most judges are
not elected and are recruited through tests aimed at examining their knowledge of
laws and how to implement them. In other words, a key aspect of democracy is char-
acterized by a set of constraints imposed on the elected powers through the activities
of a professional power. This is the second paradox at the basis of every democratic
regime that makes it more difficult to understand democracy from a too simplistic
perspective. The fourth section of this chapter will be devoted to the judicial power,
its independence and its relationships with the other two powers.
The legislative power

Out of the presently 193 independent countries that are members of the United
Nations, 191 of them have, taken together, 268 parliamentary chambers (Inter-
Parliamentary Union website), that is on average more than one chamber per country.
If we add municipal, regional and federal state assemblies, supra-national parliaments,
such as the European Parliament, and international assemblies, such as the one of the
United Nations, we immediately realize how parliaments are very numerous and can
be considered to be the most common political institution worldwide.
Simply defined, in general an assembly is a group of elected representatives that
forms a political body and is characterized by the following features: it is a permanent,
collegial institution whose composition is renewed on average every four to five years
(more rarely every six years) and is based on the representative principle (though not
always through elections, see below). Democratic assemblies, in addition, are defined
by an internal pluralism that characterizes every democratic regime (Chapter 5). This
means that a democratic assembly is an institution where different ideological and
policy positions are present and are usually structured along partisan lines.
The most distinctive element that characterizes such a democratic assembly is better
grasped when it is understood as an intermediary institution that is the expression of
the society the representatives are chosen from with the related cultural aspects and
needs and at the same time a decision-making institution that contributes to the work-
ing of democracy. The Inter-Parliamentary Union emphasizes how parliaments
contribute to democracy by being representative (‘an elected parliament that is
socially and politically representative and committed to equal opportunities for its
members so that they carry out their mandates’), transparent (‘a parliament that is
open to the nation and transparent in the conduct of its business’), accessible (through
‘the involvement of the public including civil society and other people’s movements,

in the work of parliament’), accountable (‘to the electorate for their performance in
office and for the integrity of their conduct’), and effective (‘in accordance with these
democratic norms and values’) (IPU, 2006: 7).This view clearly is a normative one,
and is largely shared in the debates on the role of parliaments.
Box 8.2 Leston-Bandeira, ‘Parliaments’

Parliaments are institutions that bring together formally
recognized members to discuss and legitimize decisions on
matters affecting the community at large. (Leston-Bandeira,
2011: 1772)
Parliamentary functions
This definition may create the impression that the main function of parliament is the
legislative one. Moreover, when talking about parliaments we usually call them ‘legis-
latures’ and make reference to the ‘legislative power’. But when we analyse the
empirical functions actually performed by most parliaments more closely we have to
distinguish three main functions of contemporary parliaments: the representative one;
the function of controlling and monitoring the government; and, finally, the legislative
function. These differ in the forms by which they are carried out and in their relative
salience with regard to different patterns of executive/legislative relations and conse-
quently the kind of democracy (parliamentary, semi-parliamentary, semi-presidential,
presidential, see Chapter 5).
The representative function actually performed is not the same as representativeness.
Therefore, a parliament or a congress in a presidential democracy should not be con-
sidered as a body where the elected representatives mirror the social composition of the
electorate in terms of social class, religion, ethnic groups and so on. First of all, this
depends very much on the electoral system and on the degree of proportionality of that
system (Chapter 14). Second, if representation would be understood as a mere mirror
of society then it would consist only of ‘delegates’ rather than ‘trustees’ and would
betray the more complex meaning of assembly representation (see above). Nevertheless,
in recent decades there has been a growing tendency to better represent women, for
example, in elected parliaments (almost 23 per cent in 2016, UPI website) or to have
certain quotas for distinct social groups such as some specific minorities, which other-
wise would not be represented. The broader representative function is performed by
individual representatives or by groups of them organized through parliamentary par-
ties and is carried out through legislative initiatives – interpellations – that is, a specific
parliamentary procedure of demanding that a government official explains and justifies
some act or policy, and several other procedures to implement the access, transparency
and accountability that are emphasized by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (see above).
The function of monitoring and controlling the government is the most relevant
in contemporary democracies. Here, we immediately see the difference between a
parliamentary or semi-parliamentary democracy and a presidential one. In fact, in the

first two types of democracy the parliament elects the cabinet and supports it for-
mally with a vote of confidence, but may also dismiss it if a majority for the
government can no longer be obtained. In Germany, Spain and some other countries
the latter possibility is restricted by the constitutional provision that a constructive
vote of no confidence is required. This is a tool which aims at the strengthening of
the stability of cabinets by dismissing them only if there is an alternative parliamen-
tary majority which can form a new government. By contrast, in presidential
democracies where the head of government is not elected by parliament the president
forms the cabinet without asking for a vote of confidence from congress. However,
in a number of Latin American democracies with presidential systems there are de
facto connections between the president and congress. In the absence of a formal vote
of no confidence, there is the possibility to impeach the president which compels her
to resign in specific cases laid down in the constitution. Much more frequent are
informal agreements between the president and parties in congress concerning the
appointment of ministers and the policies to be decided. Thus, the expression of a
‘parliamentarization’ of presidential systems is fairly common, especially in countries
such as Brazil with multi-party systems.
An additional key aspect where the function of controlling the cabinet by the assem-
bly is very relevant lies in the scrutiny of legislative activities formally proposed by the
cabinet in a parliamentary democracy and by representatives in congress under the
informal leadership of the president in a presidential or semi-presidential constitutional
arrangement. This is the most salient aspect of the inter-institutional accountability
(Chapter 6) where the opposition checks all legislative activities of the ruling majority.
These monitoring functions are guaranteed through a number of formal parliamentary
procedures, such as the question time where cabinet ministers have to reply to oral and
written questions on all governmental activities, the various procedures for overseeing
the budget and government spending, and regular debates on all major policy areas, in
addition to a motion of censure, the possibility of impeachment, and a few others. In
modern democracies such an inter-institutional accountability is complemented by the
informal, but potentially also very effective control by the media including the efficacy
of the opposition in performing its role (Chapter 11).
The third function is the legislative one. In parliamentary democracies this activity
is mostly performed by the incumbent cabinet, and in fact usually more than 75 per
cent of proposed bills come from the initiative of the cabinet. Here we can see the
strong role of a prime minister or chancellor in situations where there is a broad and
secure parliamentary majority. In the UK, for example, the decade when Tony Blair
was prime minister was called a ‘decade of tyranny’, also pointing to this aspect. In
multi-party parliamentary democracies more room is left for parliamentary initiatives,
especially for the proposal of amendments by members of parliament.
Such a close relationship between parliament and cabinet is called fusion of powers,
which means that the executive power and the parliamentarian majority are fused in
their main activities under the leadership of the prime minister and the leaders of the
parties in power. In such a situation, the monitoring functions of the media and the
judiciary become even more relevant. In case of a semi-presidential democracy, as in
France, there can also be a fusion of power which results in a ‘hyper-presidentialism’
when the directly elected president also represents a majority in parliament. By con-
trast, if the head of state is directly elected and there is no prime minister and no vote

of confidence by parliament to support the cabinet, then there is a real separation of

powers between the executive and the legislative as in the USA. However, if the
president cannot count on a majority in congress, the result can be a decisional stale-
mate, even a protracted and very detrimental one.
Internal organization of parliaments

The next important question is how parliament is actually organized and how it car-
ries out its functions. In fact, the internal organization of a parliament or congress is
a key factor to account for the effectiveness of its performance. Again, three aspects
are the most relevant ones here. These are the internal relations within the assembly
with regard to the role of parties, the internal structure of working through commit-
tees or in similar ways, and the existence of one or two chambers. Beginning with the
last point we find that about 60 per cent of all parliaments are unicameral. Moreover,
between the first and the second chamber there can be very important differences. In
most cases the size of second chambers is smaller than that of the first: 72 per cent of
second chambers fewer than 100 representatives, while 72 per cent of the first cham-
bers have more than 100. The term of office tends to be longer in second chambers:
in 90 per cent of first chambers the term is four to five years, but in 27 per cent of the
second chambers it is six to nine years. 96 per cent of first chambers are directly
elected, while 33 per cent of second chambers are indirectly elected and 28 per cent
appointed (IPU website).
We can assess how weak or strong bicameralism is on the basis of two main criteria.
The first one concerns the question whether the respective powers defined by the
constitution are complemented by democratic legitimacy, i.e. a direct method of elec-
tion. With regard to formal powers in almost all cases the first chamber has more
powers than the second except for Italy, Switzerland and the USA where they basically
retain similar powers. In most cases (61 per cent altogether) the second chamber is
indirectly elected or appointed. In this respect, we can also speak of symmetry or
asymmetry of the two chambers. Thus, bicameralism is symmetric if the two chambers
have equal or almost equal powers and are directly elected. It is asymmetric if they
have different powers and are indirectly elected or appointed.
The second criterion is the difference in the electoral system, that is, in a number of
second chambers minorities are overrepresented or are elected by very different sys-
tems. Here we speak of the congruence or incongruence of the chambers. Incongruence
can be detected very easily in federal systems where the second chamber represents the
states or regions. Thus, for example, in the US Senate we have two representatives for
Rhode Island, which has a little more than one million inhabitants, and the same
number of senators who represent California with more than 37 million inhabitants
and a GDP that is close to one of the largest European countries. The French and the
Spanish senates are also cases of incongruent second chambers. France and Spain are
not federal systems, but the senates are elected by a greatly different system compared
to the first chamber. Table 8.1 shows the strength of bicameral structures in a number
of democracies according to Lijphart (1999: 212). It is immediately evident that if the
strength of bicameralism is defined on the basis of the two criteria we described, most
bicameralisms are weak or very weak, and a strong bicameralism exists in those fed-
eral democracies that have similar powers, but different electoral systems.

Table 8.1 Types of bicameralism
asymmetrical symmetrical
incongruent weak bicameralism strong bicameralism

Canada, France, Australia, Germany,
United Kingdom Switzerland, United States
congruent weakest bicameralism weak bicameralism
Austria, Ireland, Sweden Italy, Japan,
Netherlands
Source: adapted from Lijphart (1999: 212)
The other two organizational aspects, the role of committees and parties in an
assembly, are also important. If in an assembly most legislative activities are carried
out through specialized committees with stable members and strong chairs – and
all of the chairs belong to the majority and there is a control on the agenda by the
committee – we have one type of parliament or congress. If we have the opposite
institutional arrangement or an intermediary one there are greatly different types of
assembly with regard, on the one hand, to the possible role of interest groups and,
on the other hand, to the role of party leaders to mention only the most important
aspects. With stable, specialized committees that have relevant legislative powers
most decisions are made in the meeting rooms of committees and consequently the
best opportunities for the influence of interest groups exist. The US congress is basi-
cally this kind of assembly, and the city with the highest number of interest group
organizations is Washington, D.C. The other city that is renowned for the same
reason is Brussels where the European Parliament also works mainly through com-
mittees. In an assembly that is organized through committees the role of party
leaders is also very relevant. They almost unavoidably become the gate-keepers for
the access of interest groups to committee members and for the definition of working
procedures including the agenda.
This aspect is very much related to the role of parties in the effective working of the
assembly itself. In fact, party groups are the main actors and organizers of the activi-
ties of modern assemblies. With the transformation of parties to professional electoral
parties or to cartel parties (Chapter 13) the most problematic issue has not been the
dominant role of party leaders but the voting loyalty and discipline of each party
representative along official party lines. It is easy to understand that a strong role of
committees makes the control of the voting behaviour of representatives more diffi-
cult. Electoral systems characterized by proportional representation on fixed party
lists (Chapter 14) allow for a stronger control of representatives who want to stand
for re-election. This aspect becomes even more evident when we consider another
dimension, namely the government/opposition relationships in the assembly. In a par-
liamentary democracy this relationship determines the choice of the cabinet and its
support. Especially in a parliament with a clear governmental majority virtually every
action inside that body, committees included, is determined or strongly influenced by
that divide. Within a highly fragmented parliament, however, or in a presidential sys-
tem, the government/opposition divide can be less strong and party discipline more

difficult to keep. As a special case, the European Parliament, which does not elect a
‘government’, only after the most recent elections began to show that divide. This
consideration shows the salience of supporting a government for the effective working
of an assembly characterized by that divide.
Box 8.3 Klaus von Beyme, ‘Government’

Government is a key concept in … political science that has
undergone frequent changes in terminology … Its core, more
current definition refers to all activities of steering within
human groups, from tribes to the state and to supranational
and international organizations. (von Beyme, 2011: 1036)
The executive power

This highly important power has gone through different meanings in the history of
mankind. To clarify and understand its main aspects, we can start from the more gen-
eral definition of government, suggested by Klaus von Beyme (Box 8.3). There the
steering aspect is emphasized which takes place in very different institutional contexts.
During the last few decades, another notion has been become more relevant, the con-
cept of governance. If the term ‘government’ stresses the formal activities and at the
same time the authorities who perform those leading roles, the notion of governance
also captures the informal processes whereby all individual and collective interactions
of governments with non-governmental organizations, interest groups, social move-
ments, and citizen groups are included. Although there are different definitions of and
approaches to governance (Rhodes, 2000), the core new aspect refers to all activities
of co-ordination, formal and informal ones, within policy networks (Box 8.4). Of
course, in the interactions of governance steering is also a crucial feature, as in govern-
ment, but it is analysed in a different framework, which focuses on processes and
policy networks. It is not accidental that the term ‘governance’ has first been devel-
oped in international relations where ‘government’ and all formal aspects related to it
have a limited meaning (see Chapter 15).
Box 8.4 Jon Pierre, ‘Governance’

Governance is ‘the co-ordination of various forms of formal
and informal types of public-private interaction, most pre-
dominantly in the form of policy networks’ (Pierre, 2000: 3)
Here we focus on the narrower notion of government as executive power. It would be

completely misleading to understand the expression ‘executive’ as referring to a sub-
ordinate power vis-à-vis another power, such as the legislative. Although a strongly
normative parliamentary approach may suggest this interpretation, the term refers to

the primacy of laws, namely the rule of law. That is, the government or executive is
limited by law and performs a leading role by respecting the law. This notion goes
back to the constitutionalist doctrine, but it has now been overcome in contemporary
politics. Thus, the executive power has the formal steering tasks in carrying out poli-
cies and includes the chief executive, her office and the entire cabinet of ministers or
secretaries as heads of departments. Cabinets are ‘organizational units within govern-
ments that consist of politicians who are responsible for the overall policy performance
of the government’ (Mueller-Rommel, 2011: 183).
In parliamentary democracies the main functions of the executive include, first of
all, the policy initiative, that is, bills drafted by executive offices are sent to parliament
to start the process of approval. In fact, most bills that eventually are approved are by
governmental initiative whereas the bills coming out of parliamentary initiatives con-
stitute a small minority (see previous section). Second, governments have more and
more regulative powers, that is, the task of transforming into regulations the approved
legislation to take the first, critical step in its implementation. In this respect, it is
mostly the ministers who are also responsible for the implementation phase of the
approved laws. Research in this field has shown that the content of bills can be
reshaped and partially changed through the specific choices a bureaucracy has to
make in the implementation process. The responsibility for such choices is in the
hands of each minister. The third function to point out is co-ordination, that is the
function of the prime minister or the president and of the ministers or secretaries of
each branch of government to co-ordinate, to exchange information, to set similar
goals, and to avoid internal conflicts among the respective units of a bureaucracy. In
complex organizations, which are typical for modern states, overlapping competences,
redundancies, conflictive goals and results are occurring very frequently, and it is pre-
cisely the task of an effective government to co-ordinate its activities at all levels in
order to avoid the wasting of resources and the failure of its policies.
These functions are performed by different kinds of executives. When we address
the question of what these different models are, there are two criteria we can adopt
as distinctive axes. The first one is whether the executive is directly elected or
appointed by parliament and linked to this body by an explicit vote of confidence.
The second concerns the relationships inside the cabinet. Thus, in presidential and
semi-presidential democracies we have a directly elected leading figure; in a chancel-
lor democracy the prime minister is elected by parliament and is the leading political
figure with special prerogatives defined in the constitution. Following the suggestions
made by Elgie in considering the four most relevant actors (head of state/prime min-
ister, cabinet, ministers and bureaucrats) and the models he proposed (1997, esp.
pages 222–5), we have in the first case a directly elected monocratic government and
in the second case an appointed monocratic government. Moreover, if we consider
other parliamentary democracies we can have at least two more models: a collective
government where small, face-to-face groups formed by the ministers decide on poli-
cies with no strong leading figure, or a ministerial government, where the ministers as
heads of major departments decide with a primus inter pares, i.e. a first co-ordinator
among ministers in equal positions. In periods of strong economic crisis in parliamen-
tary democracies sometimes also another model can be found, a technocratic
government which is formed by ministers chosen on the basis of their expertise and
not of their party affiliation.

Cabinets and parties

Within chancellor or semi-parliamentary and parliamentary democracies cabinets can
also be classified from a different perspective by addressing two questions. First, how
many parties support the cabinet in parliament and are they represented by ministers?
Second, have the supporting parties a majority in parliament or not? Thus, we can
have single party cabinets and coalition cabinets formed by representatives of two or
more parties. Coalition cabinets often have problems of internal fragmentation along
party lines. Coalitions can also be: (1) oversized, that is, supported by a higher number
of representatives than necessary to achieve the parliamentary majority; (2) a minimal
winning majority, that is, supported by the minimal necessary number to reach the
majority; (3) minoritarian, where the parties supporting the cabinet do not have the
majority of the members of parliament. Oversized and minority cabinets seem to be
irrational. Why should one look for more support than necessary and how is it pos-
sible to have cabinets lasting for a long time without having the majority needed to
pass parliamentary decisions? Actually, under several circumstances and in a number
of countries other factors can be more relevant than the simplistic idea that only
minimal winning coalitions should be formed. Thus, there are phases of crisis or the
first years of democratic transitions where oversized cabinets are obvious solutions.
There are also cases where it is impossible to agree on a majority supported cabinet
and the best acceptable solution is a minority cabinet that has to look for the neces-
sary votes in parliament to pass every single bill or by counting on the abstention or
tolerance of a party to reach the majority of votes for a specific bill. Thus, there is a
strong relation between the number of parties, i.e. the fragmentation of the party
system, and the type of cabinet (Lijphart, 1999: 112–13). For example, the higher the
number of parties in parliament, the lower the possibility of a minimal winning
majority cabinet and consequently the higher the possibility of one of the other two
kinds of cabinets.
Box 8.5 Richard Katz,

‘Party Government’
Party government involves at least three conditions. Firstly,
all ma jor governmental decisions must be taken by people
chosen in elections conducted along party lines, or by indi-
viduals appointed by and responsible to such a people … The
party government … requires that party based leaders be
able effectively to control the bureaucracy and other public
or semipublic agencies … Secondly, policy must be decided
within the governing party, when there is a ‘mono-colour’
government or by negotiation among parties when there is
a coalition … Thirdly, the highest officials (e.g., cabinet minis-
ters and especially prime ministers) must be selected within
their parties and be responsible to the people through their
parties. (Katz, 1996: 43)

When we examine the different models of the executive and the legislative, the most
salient questions which arise are: What are the effective relationships within the
executive, between the executive and the legislative, within the legislative, and what
is at the core of these relations? For a long time, the most frequent reply has been: the
party government structures which give content to all these relationships. Consequently,
we must clarify what is a party government and, above all, what is left of it? In a
classic formulation (Box 8.5), party government was defined as an executive power
that is characterized by politicians who are recruited through parties and are primar-
ily responsible to them; political decisions made by elected partisan leaders; policies
decided by parties that can propagate them during electoral campaigns and attract
support by interest groups and voters; and cohesive governmental parties that imple-
ment those policies by voting with discipline in the parliament or congress. This
basically has been the core of political reality that structured the effective working of
North American and European democracies for decades after the Second World War.
Party leaders at different levels and in different positions were the major actors who
were able to connect and frame the entire process of decision-making and often the
most important starting phase of policy implementation (see Chapter 9). Today, what
is left of all this with regard to the profound transformations of parties? (See Chapter
13.) Although the role of parties is much more difficult to see today in the shaping
and decisions of policies, party leaders are still very relevant, and their role has
become even more accentuated by the new political role of media (see Chapter 11).
We can also see that the power of patronage, that is, appointing loyal followers to the
most relevant bureaucratic positions, when allowed by law, is continuing and even
strengthened with the weakening of party organization (see Chapter 13). However,
although the policies are decided by elected leaders, today it is difficult to find cases
where those decisions are first made inside the relevant party organizations as often
in the past. At the same time, parliamentary parties are still very relevant, but also
much less cohesive than in earlier times, with a consequent weakening of voting dis-
cipline (Blondel and Cotta, 2000).
The judiciary: high courts

and ordinary judges
As can be easily understood by reflecting on the reality of party government, the
famous doctrine of Montesquieu on the separation of the three powers has been par-
tially ignored or overcome by the development of modern parliamentary democracies
where the actual functioning is not based on a strict separation, but on a fusion of the
executive and legislative powers with the exception of the USA and the partial excep-
tion of some cases of Latin American presidentialism. However, a crucial aspect where
Montesquieu’s doctrine cannot be ignored is the strict separation of powers between
the executive and legislative on one hand, and the judiciary on the other. Blurring this
separation is a possible path for a transition from democracy to some kind of author-
itarianism. Only non-democratic regimes are characterized by a full fusion of these
powers. When analysing transitions towards democracy or vice versa (see Chapter 6),
it is immediately evident that one of the actual dividing lines between democracies and
non-democracies lies in the way the judiciary performs its two crucial functions: (1) an

effective control of the legislative and executive with regard to the respect and imple-
mentation of the constitution and existing laws; (2) the impartial resolution of
conflicts where public authorities are involved. These two general functions are carried
out at different levels from ordinary judges at lower courts up to supreme and consti-
tutional courts. The key condition for every judge to carry out these tasks effectively
is the guarantee of independence.
Box 8.6 David Law, ‘Judicial

Independence’
Judicial independence refers to the ability of courts and
judges to perform their duties free of influence or control
by other actors … As a practical matter, the type of judi-
cial independence that is widely considered both the most
important and the most difficult to achieve is independence
from other government actors. On the one hand, this type
of judicial independence is highly valued among those who
impute to courts a special responsibility for ensuring that
individuals and minorities do not suffer illegal treatment at
the hands of the government or a tyrannous ma jority. On the
other hand, this type is also considered especially difficult to
achieve because the other branches of government ordinar-
ily possess the power to disobey or thwart the enforcement
of judicial decisions, if not also to retaliate against the courts
for decisions that they oppose. (Law, 2011: 1370)
As suggested in Box 8.6, the very notion of judicial independence is not so easy to
define. However, once we accept the definition given in Box 8.6 (‘ability of courts and
judges to perform their duties free of influence or control by other actors’), it is fairly
obvious to understand why the most relevant aspect of independence concerns the
independence from the political powers as they can ‘disobey or thwart the enforce-
ment of judicial decisions’, and even ‘retaliate against the courts’. Moreover, in a
democracy the existence of a de jure independence, that is, a set of legal norms aimed
at protecting the independence of judges, is a necessary condition but not sufficient
for their de facto independence. In fact, in non-democratic countries those de jure
norms very often exist but are constantly violated. Consequently, it is imperative to
analyse the de facto independence. This can be done by some effective indicators. In
this perspective and taking mainly into account the highest courts and the impartiality
of judges, important indicators of independence include:
•• the effective term length of the members of the highest court; this should be fairly
long as short term appointments open the way to stronger political influence (for
example, twelve years for the German Constitutional Court, the US Supreme
Court judges are even appointed for life);

•• adequate salary in connection with the court’s budget as an organization as

reflected in the number of clerks employed, the availability of modern computer
equipment and similar aspects;
•• stability of the legal system as any change of that system implies uncertainty and
consequently weakens the de facto independence;
•• and finally the autonomy in the implementation of their rulings; if in order to be
implemented these decisions depend on the action of some branch of government
and this cooperation is not granted, then the independence is lower and flawed.
(Hayo and Voigt, 2007: 286)
When can we expect a higher independence of judges in a democracy? There have

been two different replies to this question. On the one hand, the experience of devel-
oping a strong self-government of the judiciary brought about a strong independence.
Especially, the creation of judicial councils promoted the strengthening of that inde-
pendence and the expectation of higher impartiality because in these councils all
sectors of the judiciary are represented and recruitment, promotion and sanctions
(removal included) are internally managed (Guarnieri, 2011; Piana and Guarnieri,
2012). On the other hand, when considering the processes of democratization in
Eastern Europe and Latin America a high confidence of the citizens in their legal sys-
tem, a developed freedom of the press, and above all the existence of an organized,
even if fragmented, political opposition were guarantees for a weaker, if existing,
political control by incumbent political leaders on the judiciary and consistently of a
higher independence and impartiality of judges (Morlino and Sadurski, 2010).
In periods of transitions from authoritarianism another aspect is of great impor-
tance, too. In cases where there was a great degree of corruption in authoritarian
states (and that is more often the case than not because of the lack of other controls),
the judiciary or at least many individual judges were corrupt as well. This requires a
thorough cleansing of the system and the careful vetting of judges who may have been
incriminated in the previous regime. This can be done through a Judicial Review
Commission (JRC), for example, sometimes involving highly respected judges from
abroad as it has been the case in South Africa or Kenya.
Public prosecutors and supreme courts

An additional important way for analysing the connections between the judiciary and
the executive power consists of looking at the role of the public prosecutor. In fact,
the legal representative of the prosecution is responsible for starting an enquiry and
presenting a case in a trial against an individual accused of breaking a law. Whatever
the existing legal system, i.e. a common law adversarial system or a civil law inquisito-
rial system, the key distinctive element is whether the prosecutor is directly subordinate
to the executive branch or whether the prosecutor is a judge who enjoys the same
guarantee of independence as all other judges. Within these two poles of a continuum
there are a number of different possibilities. Thus, for example, in the USA the pros-
ecutor belongs to the executive power and is usually elected; in Italy, this person is a
judge and has to pass a professional competition; in France, the prosecutor is a judge,
but works for the ministry of justice and is subordinate to the minister; in Germany,
the prosecutor is trained in law but is also subordinate to the executive power. What

is important to understand here is that, in spite of the different formulas, the depend-
ence or independence of the prosecutor from the political power is not so much
relevant for the function of general rule adjudication, but is much more important for
the way political power is actually controlled. An independent prosecutor is usually
stricter in controlling the actions of political powers. For example, a number of
enquiries by public prosecutors in Italy, Spain and Brazil started a process of delegiti-
mizing political leaders that in some cases brought about a serious political crisis and
in other cases revealed the extent of political corruption.
The major function of supreme courts or constitutional courts consists of the judicial
review, namely the task of controlling the actions of legislative and executive powers
in terms of their conformity with constitutional rules and other laws. There are differ-
ent models of such highest courts: those that perform only judicial review (constitutional
courts) and those that also serve as the highest court for the general resolution of
judicial conflicts. Some are only formed by career judges; others are mixed cases with
judges elected by legislative and/or executive powers. In some countries citizens have
the right to address the highest court directly, for example, when basic human rights
are claimed to have been violated, in other cases citizens do not have such rights and
the access is only possible from lower courts within the legal system.
This latter model of high courts as the last resort to appeal judicial decisions often
has a longer tradition. Constitutional courts are a more recent institutional innovation
to prevent the abuse of power by political authorities and to interpret constitutional
provisions about fundamental human rights. All constitutional courts can be situated
along a spectrum between two poles, one emphasizing the protection of rights, the
other the abuse of power. Consequently, the key point is not the specific organization
of the highest court, but how the inter-institutional accountability is actually carried
out by the court. The best highest court is one which is supported by the confidence
of citizens and where its independence is also acknowledged and supported by the
political opposition.
Finally, the phenomenon of an increasing judicialization of political and civil life
and consequently a growing political role of the judiciary in a number of contempo-
rary democracies must also be mentioned. As suggested, for example, by Ian Shapiro
(2011), since the latter half of the twentieth century the courts have played an increas-
ingly active role in public policy making through their powers of constitutional
judicial review and review of the lawfulness of administrative actions. The position of
the German constitutional court (‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’), for example, is particu-
larly strong with regard to the previous totalitarian experience. Similarly, in
international law since the Nuremberg trials after 1945 a tendency towards a stronger
role of courts, as with the creation of the ‘International Criminal Court’ (ICC) in 1998
where political leaders can be held accountable for crimes against humanity, can
be observed.
Conclusions
This analysis of the three powers and their functions and organizations demonstrates
very clearly the basic differences between democratic regimes and non-democratic
ones. That is, there has to be at least a strong separation between the political powers,

i.e. the executive and the legislative, and the judicial power to have a democracy. Such
a separation is the result of an effective political pluralism and the existence of the rule
of law, characterized by the protection of civil and political liberties. At the same time,
it can bring about a better working of every democratic regime through the more
effective implementation of inter-institutional accountability (see Chapter 6), which is
one of the key elements to improve the functioning of democracies. This separation of
powers also means that there should be a loyal cooperation between the judiciary and
the other two powers. Mutual control and cooperation within the frame of the rule of
law, therefore, are the key characteristics of a properly working democracy.
In non-democratic regimes the control of political power by public prosecutors,
who are usually appointed by the incumbent authorities, but also by ordinary courts,
which through different ways of informal manipulation are not allowed to issue rul-
ings that are against the government, is usually lacking. Of course, there are degrees
of the lack of such control, which is also one aspect that distinguishes hybrid regimes,
where some control may exist, from authoritarian ones where no such constraints and
checks can be found.
The results of the activities of the powers we have analysed in this chapter can be
seen in the policies which are decided and carried out by the different regimes. To
these we turn in the next chapter.
Questions
1 Explain what is meant by public representation and what is the
difference between a trustee and a delegate.
2 Provide a general definition of parliament and discuss the key
aspects of the parliamentary monitoring and controlling functions.
3 Provide a general definition of government and discuss the key
functions performed by the executive in contemporary democracies.
4 What is party government? Why is there a strong relation between
the type of cabinet and the fragmentation of party system?
5 Define the notion of judicial independence and explain the
difference between de jure and de facto independence.
Further reading
Bell J (2010) Judiciaries within Europe: A comparative review. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Based on the detailed case studies of France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and
England, this book identifies factors that shape the characteristics of the judiciary in differ-
ent countries.
Blondel J and Muller-Rommel F (2nd ed.) (1997) Cabinets in Western Europe. New York:
St. Martin’s Press. Presents a common framework to compare the structure and workings of
the national cabinets in Western European countries.
Ginsburg T (2015) Judicial reputation: A comparative theory. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. Explains how reputation is an essential quality of the judiciary and explores how
judges respond to the reputational incentives provided by the different audiences they inter-
act with.

Guarnieri C and Pederzoli P (2002) The power of judges: A comparative study of courts and
democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A comparative study of the role of judges in
European countries and the USA.
Lijphart A (ed.) (1992) Parliamentary versus presidential government. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. The volume collects the most important contributions to the debate on the respective
advantages and disadvantages of presidential and parliamentary forms of government.
Linz JJ and Valenzuela A (eds.) (1994) The failure of presidential democracy. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press. This edited volume examines the issue of whether presiden-
tialism or parliamentarism is best at ensuring government stability and democratic continuity.
McKay WR and Johnson CW (2012) Parliament and congress: Representation and scrutiny in
the twenty-first century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. It offers an authoritative com-
parative account of both Congress and Parliament and their procedures.
Rhodes RAW, Binder SA and Rockman BA (eds.) (2006) The Oxford handbook of political
institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. This handbook provides an excellent, com-
prehensive survey of the state of the art in the study of political institutions.
Sartori G (1994) Comparative constitutional engineering: An inquiry into structures, incentives
and outcomes. Basingstoke: Macmillan. A still up-to-date comparative analysis of how the
main democratic institutions work with regard to electoral laws and the different relation-
ships between executive and legislative powers.
Shugart MS and Carey JM (1992) Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and elec-
toral dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The analysis provides a systematic
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of various forms of presidential systems.
Weblinks
Centre for Legislative Studies: http://www2.hull.ac.uk/fass/politics/research/research-centres-
and-groups/cls_updated.aspx
Comparative Constitutions Project: http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org
Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE): www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccje/textes/
Travaux10_en.asp
European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD): www.ecprd.org
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice: www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/
default_en.asp
IDEA Global Database on Elections and Democracy: www.idea.int/resources/databases.
cfm#gdb
Inter-Parliamentary Union: www.ipu.org
Parliament and government composition database: http://parlgov.org
Party Systems and Governments Observatory: http://whogoverns.eu
World Justice Project: http://worldjusticeproject.org

9
Public policies
and public
administration
Key terms
Bureaucracy Policy agenda
Garbage can model Policy evaluation
Incrementalism Policy making
Neo-institutionalism Public policy
Path dependence Welfare state
Introduction
Once decisions are made (see previous chapter), there is the problem of implementing
them. This issue is so highly relevant that in the very decision-making process the
problem of subsequent implementation is already present. In fact, during that process
the actors who are in charge of implementation, namely the administration or public
bureaucracy, are very often involved (see below), along with the people who are
affected by the decisions, especially when these are elite groups whose interests may
be greatly affected. This, in turn, also impacts on the compliance with the decisions
that are made. Thus, before entering into an analysis of public policies as such let us
recall the key phases of the policy-making process.
Following a classic perspective (Mény and Thoenig, 1989), the first step in the
policy-making process takes place when an issue enters the political agenda. This may
be caused by external events: how to deal with a severe economic crisis; what to do
with a new wave of immigration; or how to cope with corruption revealed by whistle-
blowers and the media. It also can be a leader who wants to exploit a favourable
situation and thinks that an issue can bring important electoral returns, such as com-
bating tax evasion, or strengthening civil security. Who defines the issue and how it is
framed at the beginning is very relevant for the policy that eventually will be carried
out. Following different motives and purposes, party leaders, opinion leaders and
interest groups define the issue within the frame set up by their values, cultural
boundaries and specific interests.

The second obvious step is the formulation and the drafting of the policy. This is the
key moment when alternative solutions are put forward and where different interests
and the related conflicts come into play. In some cases this may result in a stalemate,
which can even be very protracted because of the differences and conflicts, and then
there is no further step. If under the pressure of the problem that needs to be solved, or
because one side becomes stronger or a coalition is built for a solution of the issue, a
third step follows. This is the decisional phase we have already discussed in Chapter 8.
This is the phase when the formal actors, such as the government and parliament, but
also the bureaucracy, informal actors, affected interests and citizens groups, become
involved at different levels (international, supra-national, national, regional and local).
This is also the phase when bargaining, exchanges, accommodations and compromises
take place informally and pave the way for the formal decisions.
The fourth phase is the implementation we discuss below in the section on bureau-
cracy. The fifth step concerns the evaluation of the implemented policy, which is
especially relevant for the subsequent sixth phase, the continuation, reshaping or end-
ing of the policy. Once started, policies are often continued showing a strong inertial
strength as a number of vested interests is built around them. In many instances, such
policies form a continuous policy cycle which is fed back through the different parts
and mechanisms of the political system. Effective results, the possible change of actor
coalitions or changes in the external environment are among the main factors that
account for the reshaping or the termination of a policy. These six phases are often
more blurred and less distinct than they are described here.
In this chapter we try to provide a realistic picture of that process, first, by defining
what is a public policy and discussing some of the most well-known classifications of
policies; second, by making a short excursus on the most relevant set of policies
devised during the last seventy years or so, namely welfare policies in many countries;
third, by describing roles and activities of the main agent of policy implementation,
the public bureaucracy; fourth, by analysing how the policies are assessed, a crucial
aspect of the entire policy-making process; and fifth, by presenting and discussing the
main models of policy making that have been developed in the literature.
Box 9.1 J.E. Anderson, ‘Policy’

A policy is
a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of

actors in dealing with a matter of concern..., public policies
are those developed by governmental bodies and officials.
(Anderson, 1990: 5)
What are policies?

There are a number of different definitions of public policy. Some of them are classic
and constantly referred to (‘Who gets what, when, how’, Lasswell, 1950 and 1971).
Some are more recent and provide a review of the previous ones (Nelson, 1987). Some

PUBLIC POLICIES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 145
especially stress the salience of implementation, that is, we only have a public policy
when a bill is translated into actions so that the decisions are more or less effectively
implemented (Peters, 1983). Box 9.1 suggests a basic definition of public policy that
takes into account its main components. Thus, first, a single decision is usually not
enough to speak of a policy. A policy is rather a set of decisions (‘a … course of
action’) that are connected by the intentions of political actors. Second, those actions
have to be ‘purposive’, that is, they should try to solve a problem which has entered
the political agenda. Third, the policy is public when it affects directly or indirectly a
collectivity, even a small one, and is carried out in all its phases by public authorities,
political leaders and civil servants. Fourth, as emphasized by Peters, we have a policy
when declarations and written normative documents are translated into action.
Following this definition we can immediately see the connections between policies and
public responsiveness as a key element of democracy, but one that is salient in non-
democratic regimes as well (see Chapter 6).
With regard to this straightforward definition, what are the main examples of pub-
lic policies and how can they be classified? Concerning the first question, various
courses of public action in different domains by governments at the supra-national,
national, sub-national and local level must be considered. In addition, there are a num-
ber of policies that need to be conceived, decided and implemented through a complex
procedure of co-ordination among the different levels, such as for example the
European regional cohesion policy, which is a crucial set of decisions to fight against
the economic and social imbalances existing among European Union member states.
There are also policies, such as those concerning economic measures to recover from
a high level of public indebtedness at the country level, that require co-ordination
between international authorities, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
national governments. Other policies involve co-ordination between central authori-
ties and the regional or municipal ones. As examples, Table 9.1 provides a list of major
Table 9.1 Ma jor policy areas of the EU
•• Agriculture •• Education, training and •• Human rights

•• Audiovisual and youth •• Institutional affairs
media •• Employment and social •• Justice and home
•• Budget affairs affairs
•• Climate action •• Energy •• Maritime affairs and
•• Competition •• Enlargement fisheries
•• Consumers •• Enterprise •• Multilingualism
•• Culture •• Environment •• Regional policy
•• Customs •• EU citizenship •• Research and innovation
•• Development •• Food safety •• Single market
and cooperation •• Foreign and security policy •• Space
•• Digital economy •• Fraud prevention •• Sport
and society •• Health •• Taxation
•• Economic and •• Humanitarian aid and civil •• Trade
monetary affairs protection •• Transport

policy areas that are pursued by the European Union. At the national and local levels,
the sectors involved largely parallel that list and the policies are managed and imple-
mented by the various ministries or local branches (see below).
Since the end of the Second World War many democracies have been enlarging the
domains and deepened the extent of public intervention by creating and implementing
a greater number of policies. But since the economic crisis towards the end of the
1970s (‘oil crisis’ and stagflation), this trend has been reversed. The person who
started this process of liberalization and of reducing public interventions and conse-
quently public policies was the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. To recover
from public debt and balance the budget, her policy was followed by a number of
other leaders in the world, not only in Europe. This is an example of ‘meta-policy’,
that is, a policy that reduces state intervention and consequently a greater number of
other policies which are no longer pursued.
The classic classifications of policies

With regard to such a high diversity of policies, some classification is helpful. To start,
we can draw first a common-sense distinction between procedural and substantive
policies. The first are policies that set the rules and processes concerning how policies
are to be developed and implemented in various areas. The second are policies which
regulate a specific domain such as public health services, public education and many
other fields. But at a closer look we can realize that a number of policies are both
procedural and substantive. Therefore, a more sophisticated typology is needed which
better captures the complexity of policies and their implementations. This is the case
with the typology developed by Theodore J. Lowi. In his perspective, a policy is not
just a set of empty declarations that remain on paper, but its actual implementation is
most crucial. In this respect, the enforcement of policies and possible sanctions accom-
panying their non-compliance are essential. For such actions, two main dimensions can
be distinguished. The first concerns the likelihood of coercion in case of non-compliance.
This can be either immediate or remote. The second dimension refers to the applicabil-
ity of coercion, that is, towards whom sanctions are directed. In some cases, coercion
is triggered by the conduct of an individual. As an example, Lowi mentions the policy
against fraudulent advertising, which is only applicable to the conduct of individual
advertisers or of a specific advertising company. But the applicability can also refer to
the environment of conduct. The example given by Lowi is a change in the interest rate
of a central bank that affects the behaviour of every investor making an investment
or not.
Table 9.2 shows the four resulting kinds of policies concerning these dimensions.
Distributive policies allocate services or benefits to individuals, certain groups or com-
munities with no or few accompanying sanctions. Examples include education policy
and a number of economic policies. Regulative policies are procedural policies, which
impose strictly sanctioned restrictions on the behaviour of persons and groups. These
are legitimated because they protect a more general public interest. Examples are
environmental policies, labour policy, policies to achieve fair competition among
firms, and so on. Constituent policies are also procedural and concern the setting up
or reorganization of institutions by regulating the power of governing authorities.
They refer to the basic institutional rules or revisions of such rules. Examples are the

Table 9.2 Types of policies: sanctions
applicability of coercion (works through:)
individual conduct environment of conduct

likelihood remote distributive policy constituent policy
of coercion
immediate regulative policy redistributive policy
Source: adapted from Lowi, 1972: 300.
introduction or major changes of an electoral system, the creation of some new public
authorities such as a regulatory agency in a particular area, etc. Finally, redistributive
policies are policies aimed at shifting the allocation of wealth and income in favour of
lower classes or poorer people. It is a substantive policy and the most immediate
example is a progressive income tax, but, in fact, all social welfare policies, public
health, civil rights and similar policies have redistributive effects (see below).
Although helpful and enlightening, Lowi’s typology can become misleading when we
analyse a specific policy and realize that a policy can be regulative and distributive at the
same time or a mixture of more than one type. In other words, we have to realize how
difficult it is to provide a clear distinction among empirical policies. Moreover, an
analysis that is only focused on sanctions and coercion misses other very salient aspects
such as the costs and benefits of regulations, which are at the core of any policy. Thus,
another more widely accepted classification has been proposed by James Q. Wilson
(1973, 1980), who emphasizes that policies always imply costs and benefits. In any par-
ticular policy area these can be concentrated or dispersed. Thus, as seen in Table 9.3, we
have majoritarian policies when both costs and benefits are widely dispersed. This means
that large parts of society bear the costs and receive material or other kinds of benefits.
The opposite situation of a concentration of costs and benefits characterizes interest
group policies, where a subsidy or regulation rewards a small group at the expense of a
different group and the society at large is not affected by these policies. Entrepreneurial
policies provide generalized, although usually small benefits and the costs are concen-
trated on a small section of society. Wilson suggests that this is a policy that needs skilful
entrepreneurship to be approved. As a result of this kind of policies, for example, protest
movements that became known as NIMBY (not in my backyard) developed as local
communities had to pay for the construction of a highway or a tunnel so that NIMBYs
emerged as a reaction. Finally, client-oriented policies have costs that are dispersed in the
society, but benefit only small, often well-organized groups. As the costs are dispersed,
there is usually not much opposition to these kinds of policies. The key element of this
typology is that it can also capture the decisional tensions that usually accompany any
kind of policy where someone is the winner and someone else is the loser. If the losers
are always the same, then the ground for protest and even for violence is prepared.
Welfare States: a short excursus

In Lowi’s typology welfare policies are usually redistributive policies. According to
Wilson they can be majoritarian or client policies. It depends on how they are actu-
ally carried out. However, although they are only marginally considered in Table 9.1,

Table 9.3 Types of policies: costs and benefits
benefits
dispersed concentrated
costs dispersed ma joritarian policies client policies
concentrated entrepreneurial policies interest group policies
Source: adapted from Wilson, 1980: 367–70.
at the national level welfare state policies are the most relevant ones in contempo-
rary democracies and in a number of authoritarian regimes as well. For this reason,
they deserve a brief excursus here. The labels ‘welfare policies’ and even more com-
monly ‘welfare state’ refer to key policy areas to improve individual and collective
wellbeing. As suggested by Ferrera (Box 9.2), these policies protect citizens against
‘a predetermined set of social risks and needs’. In the concept of citizenship devel-
oped by Marshall (1950) these policies give content to social rights and they
complement civil rights and political rights to achieve a fully democratic citizenship.
They include all policies of health care with a network of public hospitals and other
forms of health assistance, free and compulsory education for children, cheap hous-
ing for low-income families, different forms of benefits for unemployment, pensions
for elderly and retired employees, assistance for handicapped persons, and other
forms of social assistance. Most societies today, democratic but also some non-
democratic ones, have their own mix of welfare policies (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
Box 9.2 Maurizio Ferrera, ‘Welfare State’

‘Welfare state denotes a number of policies through which
the government provides protection against a predeter-
mined set of social risks and needs.’ (Ferrera, 2011: 2748)
To understand the actual meaning and political consequences of welfare policies (see
also Chapter 6), it must be noted that in particular after the Second World War the
development and implementation of such policies profoundly revitalized all European
democracies by revising the very definition of this kind of regime with the recognition
of basic social rights (see above and Marshall, 1949). These policies also became more
widespread in Latin America from the early to mid-1980s during the phase of democ-
ratization. In countries such as Uruguay, Chile and Argentina, we can find the first
welfare programmes even much earlier, but also in Costa Rica and more recently in
Brazil successful welfare programmes were implemented. For example, the Brazilian
bolsa família is a programme to help families to send their children to school and to
enjoy better health by direct cash transfers. At the core of Eastern European regime
changes and the democratization since the end of the 1980s there was precisely the
failure of the so-called real existing socialism with regard to economic performance
and the continuation of social services and the appeal of North European countries as

models of strong welfare states. Different kinds of welfare programmes today can be
found in China or other authoritarian regimes. On the whole, in different times and
in different areas these policies are the most powerful legitimating programmes that
have been conceived.
This accounts for the fact that even in a context of deep economic crisis as during
the Great Recession in the late 2000s such policies have been maintained at least in
some adapted forms. Following Ferrera (2011) in his analysis of the phenomenon,
democratic governments have shown a strong adaptive capacity by reforming welfare
in four different directions. First, there have been structural adjustments in response
to socio-economic developments in terms of growing costs because of longer life
expectancy. Thus, pensions programmes, for example, have been revised by increasing
the age of retirement. In the health care sector, the focus has been on the efficacy and
efficiency in the allocation of resources. In social services, innovations have mainly
concerned the needs of the elderly population, the changing gender division of labour,
and new forms of poverty and exclusion. Second, there has been a new approach
concerning unemployment with access to benefits made more restrictive and condi-
tional. Third, with regard to social protection programmes, there has been a higher
attention to the poorer, marginal groups and a reduction of transfer programmes with
regard, for example, to old age and disability pensions. Finally, fourth, in the expen-
sive pension systems there has been a stronger attention to protect income security at
retirement against expected demographic imbalances. Briefly, on the whole, there has
been an attempt by governments to defend and maintain these policies despite the
danger of economic unsustainability.
The bureaucracy
The relevance of welfare policies can also be seen very clearly when we realize that
welfare administrations are at the centre of contemporary bureaucracies (Peters and
Pierre, 2003). Even though dramatic events, such as the election of a President or
Parliament attract the attention of many people, most of the substantial and crucial
political activities take place when bureaucrats translate the decisions of the elected
authorities into actions that deeply affect the reality and the personal lives of millions
of citizens. Cabinets and legislatures can pass all kinds of bills, but without the subse-
quent implementation by the public administration these decisions would remain
empty declarations. Thus, public administration is the necessary component of every
governmental activity and its main task consists of the implementation of formal
political decisions.
In addition to the translation of laws and decrees into practical actions, implemen-
tation carries out two other important tasks. The first one stems from the fact that
most laws or decrees cannot be immediately implemented. They are too general and
consequently need the elaboration of a secondary kind of legislation, which are regu-
lations that make the laws implementable and clarify their actual impact. This is a
genuine legislative activity where the expertise of public administration is applied to
implement the laws in an appropriate way. Of course, there may be doubts about the
accountability of this activity as it is not carried out by elected authorities and can
potentially lead to unanticipated consequences of a particular law. Moreover, even

already during the drafting of laws the higher echelons of administration are very
often involved in advising the members of the government and legislators. This is the
second key additional task of public administration. In parliamentary democracies
most legislation is the result of governmental initiatives (see Chapter 8) and the first
drafts of such bills are usually done by high-level bureaucrats. Thus, altogether, public
administration is present at the beginning of a policy-making process (drafting), in the
second phase of secondary legislation (regulation), and in the final moment of imple-
menting decisions. This means that the bureaucrats are public officers who are closer
to political leaders in their higher echelons and at the same time to citizens in the
lower echelons at the moment of implementation. These officers, such as policemen,
teachers, civil servants and so on represent the government for most citizens. When
replying to the standard survey question ‘how are you satisfied with the way democ-
racy works?’ the reply by the respondents is very much influenced by the perception
of the effectiveness of bureaucracy.
Box 9.3 Max Weber’s ideal type of

bureaucracy
1 bureaucracy derives its authority through law;
2 bureaucracy has differentiated offices or units that have special-
ized competencies and jurisdictions;
3 bureaucracy is characterized by an internally hierarchical system
of authority required to bring its distinctive parts together as part
of a unified system of coordination;
4 bureaucracy is characterized by rules and procedures that govern
its internal functions;
5 bureaucracy is typically characterized by a full-time corps of
officials.
(adapted from Rockman, 2011: 167)
The main consequence of this analysis to be emphasized here is that there is no effec-
tive government without an efficient bureaucracy. The related question, then, is how
to make a bureaucracy really efficient. The earlier, most influential reply was pro-
vided by Max Weber and is summarized in Box 9.3. Thus, first, the bureaucracy is a
professional corps of civil servants whose authority is based on the rule of law.
Second, bureaucracy has formally defined competencies, jurisdictions and procedures
of operation and is organizationally differentiated in specialized branches. This
allows it to acquire the necessary experience and expertise for the tasks mentioned
above. Third, hierarchy is the main organizational feature and is indispensable to keep
a complex organization working through a system of command and co-ordination.
If we go beyond the formal rules, this implies an administrative leadership that is
supported by the different units, follows clearly defined purposes, and provides a
lucid assessment of feasible paths to effective implementation. Fourth, bureaucracy is

internally organized with a set of standard operating procedures to deal with recur-
ring problems that are identified and coped with. Fifth, full-time civil servants
characterize the bureaucracy and assure the continuity of the working of every gov-
ernment. These features can be summarized in a classic definition of bureaucracy as
a hierarchical, complex, differentiated organization with formally specified rules and
procedures of operation.
As soon as we reflect on these characteristics we can realize the problems
that emerge for the very efficiency of such an organization. To begin with, the co-
ordination of complex organizations is problematic as there can often be conflicting
perspectives; the actual working of hierarchical control can be imperfect; the real
problems to cope with are often complicated and ambiguous to identify and the
consequent bureaucratic response can be inadequate. When we empirically examine
bureaucracies at work we realize how, beyond those more immediate ‘pathologies’,
other problems persist in contemporary bureaucracies, and they can unfold precisely
from the features suggested by Weber (Peters, 2001, Introduction). The result has
been a long debate about those characteristics as identified in Table 9.4, in the
attempt to find more adequate solutions and to have better bureaucracies that are
also closer to the needs of citizens. According to this debate, the rigidity created by
formal competencies should be substituted by flexibility, an open, result-oriented,
task-based and innovative management and ‘flat’ hierarchies. The higher efficiency
of such a managerial approach, which is more frequent in private business, has
become obvious and has been adopted by a large number of public administrations.
This new approach has been labelled the new public management, and Savoie (2011)
spells it out in detail in Table 9.4.
Table 9.4 Traditional public administration vs. new public management
Traditional Public Administration New Public Management
Controlling Empowering
Rigid Flexible
Suspicious Trusting
Administrative Managerial
Secret Open
Power based Task based
Input/process oriented Results oriented
Pre-programmed and repetitive Capable of purposeful action
Risk averse Willing to take intelligent risks
Mandatory Optional
Communicating poorly Communicating well
Centralized Decentralized
Uniform Diverse
Stifling creativity Encouraging innovation
Reactive Proactive
Source: adapted from Savoie, 2011: 24.

Policy evaluation
Despite all limits and difficulties, scholars and practitioners have become increas-
ingly aware that the assessment of policies is a necessary step, which is now largely
accepted by democratic politicians as well. This can be considered not only to be
a more realistic way to understand the effectiveness of implemented policies in
connection with the declared purposes, but also a way to better understand the
role and functions of governments in contemporary democracies. How can such a
policy evaluation be carried out? In a nutshell, the answer is suggested in the defi-
nition of policy evaluation by Guy Lachapelle (Box 9.4). But how to assess the
effectiveness of a policy in terms of consistency between decisions made and its
implementation and between that implementation and the actual outcomes that
have been achieved? To reply to such a question, we should first consider who is
the evaluator, which can be: an academic team, an independent public or private
agency, a branch of a ministry that performs that task, an opposition group, an
international agency.
Box 9.4 Guy Lachapelle,

‘Policy evaluation’
Policy evaluation concerns the estimation of the effective-
ness of public policies, programs, or projects and their
management and implementation. (Lachapelle, 2011: 1980)
The second crucial step is the analysis of the impact. From a methodological perspec-
tive, the usual way of doing research is to analyse an effect (dependent variable) and
to look for the causes (independent variables). Here, we have a cause, the imple-
mented policy, and look for an effect, the impact of the policy. It is important to be
aware of this inversion of procedures. This step implies an accurate definition of the
adopted empirical concepts and the consequent development of reliable indicators
and measures when, for example, we consider the impact of a new educational pol-
icy. It also implies the fairly precise knowledge of the governmental policy goals.
The analysis of the impact can be ex-post, which means the evaluator conducts the
analysis once the policy has been implemented and some time has elapsed.
The analysis can also be carried out ex-ante, where the impact is monitored while the
policy is being implemented. This can be done with a focus on the process, namely
the procedures that are employed to implement the policy, or with a focus on the
outcome, that is on the results of the policy as it is implemented. For example, a
policy to improve health care involves the building of hospitals and the hiring of
doctors and nurses before an improvement in health conditions of a population in a
given area can be achieved. In this perspective, looking at the process of the required
infrastructure can be as important as looking at the results, the improvement of gen-
eral health of the population.

The third step concerns the identification of specific causes of the observed
impact, also taking rival hypotheses and unintended consequences into account.
When considering the causes, the actors who carried out the policy have to be con-
sidered and the available resources and means in general, but also the reactions of
the people who are involved and directly affected should be carefully analysed. In
particular, attention should be paid to the perceived legitimacy of the policy and the
acceptance by the recipients. If for some reason these policies are rejected and do not
find sufficient support, then the possible reasons for a partial, distorted or even
negative impact can be more easily explained. This specific point is more relevant for
the politicians than for the evaluators, and underlines the importance of communica-
tions and feedbacks when a policy is decided and implemented (see Chapter 11).
It is also very important to look for the side-effects of a policy. For example, when
at the beginning of the twenty-first century the European policy of regional cohesion
aiming at reducing discrepancies in economic development by providing substantial
amounts of economic resources was analysed, it turned out that there was almost no
impact in terms of greater regional equality of living conditions, but there has been
an effective modernization of regional bureaucracies in Southern European countries
(Fargion et al., 2006). The reason was quite simple, because this modernization was
a prerequisite to obtain such European resources.
In the fourth step, the effectiveness of the policy is evaluated by comparing the
declared goals and the actual results. At this point, the assessment of the success or
failure of the policy is concluded and the responsible politicians are confronted with
the results of the evaluators. If the outcome is mostly negative, this will have conse-
quences for the reports by the media, especially during electoral campaigns. If for no
other reason, this shows quite clearly why all governments have their own statistical
bureaux which they carefully control. This is even more the case in contemporary
politics when policy evaluation has become an instrument of leaders in their everyday
political activities. In this final stage, the ball goes back to the governmental authori-
ties for a termination of the policy, a continued intervention without changes or a
partial revision with regard to available resources.
Policy evaluation, therefore, is a complex and politically sensitive exercise where
also for the evaluator the political consequences of the assessment can become
relevant from the very beginning of this activity. Such problems can be captured
even better when the different models of the whole decision-making process are
outlined
Models of policy making

After having spelled out definitions of policies and the concrete steps in their imple-
mentation, how can we better understand the process of policy making as a whole?
The reply to this question is provided by two opposing policy paradigms. On the one
hand, there is an instrumental rationality that provides the key to explore a world in
which problems are clearly defined with a single decision maker, a known hierarchy
of values and objectives, and a certainty of outcomes. From this perspective, policy
analysts and policy makers can calculate the best course of action to achieve the

expected results. On the other hand, we can see a world characterized by diversity, by
an unknown number of participants, conflicting agendas, controversies over values
and objectives, and uncertainty about the outcomes. In this paradigm, policy analysts
are part of the game, mobilized by the policy makers to reach results that are almost
always different from the expected ones. Within these paradigms two models have
become most prominent in the course of time.
Box 9.5 Charles Lindblom,

‘Incrementalism’
Incrementalism is defined as a mutual adjustment pro-
cess that may produce small ranges of budgetary outputs.
(Lindblom, 1959: 79)
The first one is the incremental model (see Box 9.5). Once empirical analysis has made
us aware that exact predictions or more correct estimates of empirical consequences of
alternative policy choices are beyond our reach, Charles Lindblom (1958: 301) affirms
that policy-making ‘proceeds through a sequence of approximation. A policy is directed
at a problem; it is tried, altered, tried in its altered form, altered again, and so on. In
short, incremental policies follow one upon the other in the solution of a possible prob-
lem.’ This incremental strategy through trial and error is unavoidable when the decision
maker cannot anticipate the result of a policy and is aware that unanticipated conse-
quences may occur. Therefore, a ‘wise policy-maker … expects that his policies will
achieve only part of what he hopes … If he proceeds through a succession of incremen-
tal changes, he avoids serious lasting mistakes in several ways’ (Lindblom, 1959: 86).
This actually is the ‘science of muddling through’, which Lindblom considered to be the
only possible way to carry out policies and which characterizes democracies that
change their policies through incremental adjustments. The postulate of incrementalism
is that the observed policy change in a given time period is determined by the preceding
time period. In other words, a good part of the observed change is highly dependent on
the existing situation. Within this method, cuts and reductions in budgets and pro-
grammes are possible from year to year and decision makers do this only in small steps.
In a public administration perspective, this incremental approach refers to the differ-
ence between what the administrators of a department or programme request in a
specific year and what they actually received in the previous year.
Box 9.6 Cohen, March, Olsen,

‘The Garbage Can Model’
The garbage can process is one in which problems, solu-
tions, and participants move from one choice opportunity to

another in such a way that the nature of the choice, the time
it takes, and the problems it solves all depend on a relatively
complicated intermeshing of elements. These include the mix
of choices available at any one time, the mix of problems
that have access to the organization, the mix of solutions
looking for problems, and the outside demands on the deci-
sion makers. (Cohen et al., 1972: 16)
The second model is the garbage can model. With this colourful metaphor, March and
Olsen make a further step in trying to capture the recurring complexities of policy
making, which add uncertainty and ambiguity to this process. Thus, the key point to
grasp is that in political reality the problems to cope with, the possible solutions, the
available choices, and the participants in the entire process are much less connected
than traditional theories assumed. The reality of a policy process is that of ‘organized
anarchy’. As seen in Box 9.6, the ‘garbage can process’ is one in which there is a com-
plex intertwining of elements: problems, solutions and participants move from one
choice opportunity to another. And we find a mix of choices, a mix of problems, a mix
of solutions looking for problems, and a mix of the demands from citizens on the
decision makers. Actually, the organizations have inconsistent, ill-defined preferences,
their working is not understood by their members, they operate through trial and
error, as Lindblom has already pointed out. The decision makers can change their
policies without a rational motivation, or because they have too-busy agendas. The
garbage can does not resolve the problem in the most appropriate way. However, ‘it
enables choices to be made and problems solved’ despite ambiguities and conflicts
(Cohen et al., 1972: 16).
Box 9.7 Pierre Pierson, ‘Path Dependence’

The key claims of path dependence:
1 ‘specific patterns of timing and sequence matter’;

2 ‘a wide range of social outcomes are often possible’;
3 ‘large consequences may result from relatively small and contin-
gent events’;
4 ‘particular courses of action, once introduced, are often virtually
difficult or impossible to reverse even if their consequences prove
to be disastrous’;
5 ‘political development is punctuated by critical moments and junc-
tures which shape the basic contours of social life’; and, finally,
6 ‘in the political realm, there are a high density of institutions, a
central role of collective action, the complexity and opacity of poli-
tics, compounded by the short time horizon of politicians and the
“stickiness” of politics’ (Pierson, 2000: 257–63).

These two models can be even better understood if framed within a relatively more
recent approach, path dependence. Path dependence reinforces both previous mod-
els and can be considered as complementary to both of them. With concepts
borrowed from economics, Paul Pierson (2000) attempts to sketch out a theory
based on a few key propositions (see Box 9.7). His first point stresses the salience
of the sequence in each process and also the moment when it takes place, which
means ‘history matters’. In this perspective, there is a strong resemblance to the
incremental model. While a variety of different social results are possible, a very
important aspect in this theory is how minor, accidental events can bring about
much broader consequences. But the characterizing feature of the approach points
to the institutional inertia and the vested interests created around the existing struc-
tures and policies; so that once a policy has been initiated it is very difficult to
change it, least of all radically. The complexity of political institutions and the lack
of transparency complement this aspect. But this approach not only explains conti-
nuity, as developed in the other two models, it also tries to explain change that is
concentrated in critical junctures when a few often accidental events take place and
pave the way for change if someone grasps this opportunity. Thus, the policies that
are actually possible to be decided and carried out within a precise historical situa-
tion are constrained and limited by the policies implemented in the past, even
though past circumstances may no longer be relevant, but they may also be subject
to unexpected turns of events.
Conclusions
The attention to the policy process, its phases, and its complexities, the analysis of the
most salient policies (the welfare state), the reference to the roles and activities of the
public bureaucracy, the singling out of the high contemporary salience of policy evalu-
ation and finally the discussion on the main models of policy making are all aspects
that we often consider as outputs of the system, democratic or non-democratic. But
how is the output achieved or, in other words, what are the inputs? This is a question
that the next part will reply to by devoting attention to participation, communication,
elections and the actors of those processes.
Questions
1 List and briefly describe the main stages in the policy-making
process.
2 Provide a definition of public policy and discuss the typologies of
public policies proposed by Lowi and Wilson, respectively.
3 What is the welfare state and what are the most important
implications of its recalibration for contemporary democracy?
4 According to the classic Weberian definition, what are the main
features of bureaucracy?
5 Define and explain the difference between the incremental model
and the garbage can model in policy making.

Further reading
Castles FG (2004) The future of the welfare state: Crisis myths and crisis realities. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. The author carefully assesses the threats posed to modern welfare
states by globalization and demographic changes and envisages trajectories of welfare state
development in coming decades.
Christensen T and Lægreid P (eds) (2001) New public management: the transformation of ideas
and practice. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. The edited book examines the dynamics of compre-
hensive civil service reform in Norway, Sweden, New Zealand and Australia, challenging the
globalization thesis of a worldwide convergence among civil service systems.
Ferrera M (2006) The boundaries of welfare: European integration and the new spatial politics
of social solidarity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Given increasing influence of the EU
on domestic policies, this book provides an in-depth analysis of the impact of the EU on
welfare states at both the national and regional levels.
Kraft ME and Furlong SR (2004) Public policy: Politics, analysis, and alternatives (5th ed.).
Washington, DC: CQ Press. Through a fully integrated and evaluative approach, this book
gives the tools to understand how and why policy analysis can be used to assess policy
alternatives.
Moran M, Rein M and Goodin RE (eds.) (2006) The Oxford handbook of public policy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. A solid point of reference, this volume encompasses various
institutional and historical sources and analytical methods to discuss how policy is made, how
it is evaluated and how it is constrained.
Peters BG (2015) The politics of bureaucracy: An introduction to comparative public adminis-
tration (6th ed.). London: Routledge. A comprehensive exploration of the political and
policy-making roles of public bureaucracies providing extensive, and a well-documented
comparative analysis of the effects of politics on bureaucracy.
Pierson P (ed.) (2001) The new politics of the welfare state. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A collection of essays examining a wide range of countries and public policy arenas, includ-
ing health care, pensions, and labour markets.
Vedung E (2009) Public policy and program evaluation (4th ed.). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers. The author provides an introduction to policy evaluation as a mechanism for
monitoring, systematizing, and grading government activities and their results.
Weblinks
Comparative Agendas Project: www.comparativeagendas.net
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): www.oecd.org
Policy Library: www.policylibrary.com/
Policy Studies Organization: www.ipsonet.org
The Brookings Institution: www.brookings.edu
United Nations Public Administration Network(UNPAN): www.unpan.org
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI): http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi
World Health Organization: www.who.int

Part IV
Meso- and micro-
politics

10
Political
participation, social
movements,
protests, revolutions
Key terms
Alienation Free rider
Clientelism Identification
Collective action Mobilization
Developmentalism
Introduction
Political participation is defined as actions by citizens trying to influence political
decisions. As such, it lies at the core of all democracies. No modern democracies are
possible without electoral participation (see also Chapter 14). But democracy is
unthinkable if political institutions and laws do not open the way also for a wide
range of other social actions for citizens to participate in, such as demonstrations,
strikes, rallies, debates, free discussions. From this point of view, democracy is con-
sidered as an achievement of human virtue which was already underlined by
Aristotle: human beings must be considered as ‘zoon politikon’, i.e. as political ani-
mals who are naturally prone to participate in city life (Aristotle, 2014 [350 BC]).
Participation is seen as the essence of democracy (Plamenatz, 1973), but participa-
tion is also one of the major consequences of the social nature of human beings and
is part of social reality, even beyond the institutions which are supposed to make it
possible and legal.

Box 10.1 Max Kaase, ‘Participation’

No society, be it traditional or modern, can exist and survive without
the active engagement of its members in the various domains of life
that have resulted from processes of social differentiation . This does
not imply that every member of any given society has to be active in
each domain. What it means, however, is that each domain encom-
passes individuals (the micro-level), an intermediary structure (the
meso-level) linking individuals and institutions in that domain, and
systemic elements crystallized in rules and institutions regulating the
particular domain in question (the macro-level). Especially in modern
times, these three levels are complemented by a fourth overarching
level linking units in various ways (globalization is a particular phe-
nomenon resulting from such linking processes).
Participation refers, first, to activities by individual members of any
given meso- or macro-unit of analysis. Second, in the core of participa-
tion is the action itself—that is, individual behavior—even if attitudes
as the antecedents of such behavior, as obtained in survey research,
may also be of interest. Third, individuals never act in a social void;
therefore, to understand why people act at all and in the way they do,
one has to consider the embeddedness of individuals in a context con-
ducive to action. This context can be the institutional arrangements
on the macro-level (e.g., for voting, the electoral law in a given coun-
try) or the social environment that an individual is part of.
Source: Max Kaase, ‘Participation’, in Badie et al., 2011: 1778.
A source of paradoxes?
High levels of electoral participation, however, are often not correlated with strong
institutionalized democracies. In the USA, as well as in Switzerland, political apathy
and abstention have reached record highs, and electoral participation continues to
decline in many of the established democracies (see also Chapter 14). One of the most
accepted explanations for this phenomenon refers to the level of social and economic
development: the more a society is endowed with material resources, the more people
are inclined to stick to their own private interests and their private happiness
(Hirschman, 1982). This first paradox is important, as it suggests that economic devel-
opment and the consolidation of democracy contribute to reduce political participation.
This hypothesis was presented from a functional point of view by Seymour Martin
Lipset when he argued that a stable democracy implies a low level of participation
(Lipset, 1960). An ‘active society’, as it is propagated by some sociologists (Etzioni,
1968), is then considered to be counterproductive as it leads to excessive mobilization
and a high risk of instability and dissent (Lipset, 1960). For instance, Italy or Germany
after the First World War are presented as examples of ‘hypermobilized’ societies
which resulted in an authoritarian reaction, whereas the USA or Switzerland remained
at a low level of mobilization showing a stronger political consensus. This view has

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 163
been challenged by other scholars who point out that weak participation can reveal
an attitude or a culture of alienation where individuals feel excluded from the political
system and do not consider themselves as belonging to it (Lane, 1959). This weak
participation may then endanger the political system and its democratic orientation.
De-politicization is in fact another way to authoritarianism as some studies have
shown (Apter, 1965).
The second paradox comes from the ambiguous nature of collective action. Mancur
Olson, for example, has argued from a rational choice perspective that collective
action can be useful and functional for a social group or organization, but individual
participation in this action may not be rational when it may make more sense not to
take part in this action but to benefit nevertheless from its results as a ‘free rider’. A
non-union member, for example, may benefit from higher wages negotiated by a trade
union without paying membership dues or participating in strikes (Olson, 1965). This
perspective had a strong impact in political science and has initiated an important
debate. Mancur Olson and the rational choice school argued, on the one hand, that
participation and activism can be explained only by referring to the material and
symbolic rewards that can be obtained in a collective action. Sociologists or socio-
psychologists point out, on the other hand, that participation is mainly promoted by
the social control and pressures coming from the social groups a person belongs to or
from normative obligations as a citizen (Tarrow, 1994).
Those who do not agree with rational choice theory use various sociological expla-
nations for collective action, which can be interpreted as a social imitation and an
effect of the psychology of the crowd (Tarde, 2000 [1898]; Le Bon, 2009 [1895]), as a
way of promoting class interests (Marx, 1848), as preventing the fragmentation and
individualization of mass societies (Kornhauser, 1959), of reacting to frustrations
(Davies, 1971; Gurr, 1970) or, in a more political perspective, to be integrated in a
political organization (Tilly, 1978).
The third paradox is even more decisive. Participation may be even more important
in authoritarian regimes where there are no legal frameworks for organizing it. Social
movements, riots, revolutions then are mobilizing many more people, with higher
risks in authoritarian contexts, leading to drastic social and political changes, revolu-
tions, but also to national emancipation, decolonization or liberation. This potential
mobilization is evidence of the social and political nature of human beings, whether
or not it is supported by a civic culture.
The Civic Culture

The publication of The Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba (1963)
opened the way to a new empirical approach to institutional political participation.
Based on a survey in five democracies, they attempted to discover the political atti-
tudes that are most functional for a real working democracy. They found such a model
in the United Kingdom where political attitudes are described as shaped by transac-
tions and negotiations according to a tradition inherited from the British bourgeoisie
and aristocracy, cultivating a culture of compromise. This orientation resulted in a
long and strong parliamentary history and an institutional culture of pluralism, peace-
ful negotiations and a commitment to the institutions. Conversely, in Germany or

Italy, democracy was much less established and characterized by tensions and con-
flicts, which made it more fragile. The first model is considered by the authors as
optimal and more ‘civic’. Thus, we can identify two kinds of participation: the first is
shaped by strong political institutions, while the second is directed against or runs in
parallel to the political institutions (see also Chapter 4).
Almond and Verba considered this civic participation as the most democratic one,
while there are other kinds of institutional participation, even in authoritarian or
totalitarian systems (see also Chapter 7). This is what David Apter described as the
‘politics of mobilization’, in which a strong commitment to the official ideology, to the
rules of the political game or to the charismatic leader is a substitute for democratic
civic-mindedness. This participation consists of huge rallies (the most spectacular ones
today take place in North Korea), mass meetings, expressions of support (more or less
organized) for the leader as we observed in Egypt at the time of Gamal Abdel Nasser
or now in favour of General Sisi. With regard to the importance of this phenomenon,
we must distinguish between ‘classical and non-classical forms’ of participation, the
former designating a normal and predictable behaviour (Kaase, 2011).
The institutional forms of political participation in democracies are more routinized
and classical in Kaase’s sense. The scale of this kind of political participation is very
well known (van Deth, 1999; Inglehart, 2005): 1) to keep oneself informed in the
political field; 2) to vote; 3) to mobilize oneself during an electoral campaign or in case
of a collective action; 4) to be a regular activist in a political party; 5) to run as a
candidate in a political election. The nature and the intensity of this participation is
not the same everywhere and under any circumstances. Beyond measuring this par-
ticipation, political scientists are first committed to explain why participation varies
and to find the explanatory variables. The context is particularly important (Morales
and Giugni, 2011). People participate more when they have just escaped from a dic-
tatorship, when they perceive a strong threat to democracy (for instance in the case of
Turkey), or when a new institution has been invented (the direct election of the French
President in 1965). The mobilization is higher in the case of a drastic change (street
mobilizations and rallies in Athens in January 2015 when Syriza won the election,
contrasting with a weak mobilization in the September election).
The political opportunity structure theory completes this view by stressing the role
of the political offer: the nature of the state, the configuration of political cleavages,
the variety of interest representation as well as political strategies which open the way
to more or fewer opportunities of participation (Kriesi et al., 1995). This explanation
is clearly in line with The Civic Culture and is still dominant in the literature and in
the empirical surveys. However, it hardly explains the differences, which can be
observed in political participation among similar political systems or the differences in
participation inside a given society. That is why social variables have increasingly been
taken into account, starting with age (with a peak of participation between 40 and 50)
(Milbrath, 1965), and education, which is extending participation among those who
are above 50 (Verba et al., 1979), gender, which is limiting the participation of women
in politics (Norris, 2002), and the socio-economic variables which appear to be the
most important predictors (Schlozman et al., 2012). Globally, political participation is
related to political competence which keeps democracy in an elitist context.
This classical participation must now include a growing number of individual
patterns of participation, as suggested first by a survey in the United Kingdom

(Pattie et al., 2004). People tend to be more mobilized for promoting their own inter-
ests or their local problems (‘grass-roots democracy’) than for national causes. We
must also consider the new structure of communication and the role this plays in
shaping new forms of participation: the role of the internet and of the social networks
becomes stronger and stronger (de Vreese, 2007; see also Chapter 11). This impact of
new technologies is also easily identifiable in non-democratic countries where it
appears as a substitute for the prohibited institutional forms of protest, as was clearly
observed during the Arab Spring, particularly in Egypt. For all these reasons, the tra-
ditional model of a ‘civic culture’ which is correlated with democracy through the
classical forms of participation is greatly challenged. Recent studies are, therefore,
reorienting their concerns to more sociological variables: political participation is no
longer conceived as a political function, but more and more as an effect of the social
transformations and social needs of people.
The social roots of political participation

The influence of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim seems clear: social transfor-
mations create expectations and frustrations, which lead to new forms of political
participation (Durkheim, 1982 [1894]). While Almond and Verba considered the civic
culture as a sign of a proper functioning of the democratic institutions, the most recent
studies point out the opposite: classical – notably electoral – participation is decreas-
ing while we observe an increasing number of extra-institutional forms of mobilization.
This probably shows that democracy does not work very well and creates new kinds
of protest, which are not taken into account in a traditional manner. As explanations
for this development, we have to consider the weak responsiveness of the political
system to social demands, the growing gap between voting and decision-making (espe-
cially in the complex structure of the European Union), the marginalization of various
social minorities who are not considered by the classical political parties, and the
impact of globalization (Inglehart, 1997).
A growing sense of alienation probably encompasses all these features. Rather
than a support for the existing institutions, political participation appears to be an
expression of discontent due to a failed integration in society. This is probably why
the non-institutional (‘non-classical’) forms of participation prevail over the classi-
cal ones which tend to decline. In a Durkheimian perspective, several social factors
seem to determine the present conditions of political mobilization and protest: exclu-
sion, uncertain identification, alienation, lack of representation. Exclusion is in part
inherited from the beginnings of industrial society when poverty led to marginaliza-
tion. With the rise of a more organized working class, this phenomenon was
contained to a large extent, where socialist and communist parties created a ‘counter-
society’. Today, the influence of these parties is strongly decreasing and the poorest
segments of society are politically abandoned. The present globalization and, par-
ticularly, the migrations play today the same role as industrialization in the
nineteenth century when workers were excluded from the political scene, triggering
political alienation and non-representation of an important part of the population
which became inclined towards violence and anarchy (Ireland, 1994; Messina, 2007;
Strijbis, 2015).

These transformations of representation and the transnationalization question the

classical concepts of identity and identification. Classical forms of identification are
declining while new kinds of identification play a growing role. In a world affected by
a decreasing influence of ideologies and the crisis of the traditional political parties,
intra-political identification is becoming more important: sexual, ethnic, cultural or
religious identities become more prevalent (Inglehart, 1977). In a global world, narra-
tives also become more transnational and a tendency to identify oneself with the
conflicts of others becomes more common (Wimmer, 2002). Ethnic mobilization takes
place in the extra-parliamentary arena (Olzak, 2006), especially among people coming
from countries affected by civil wars or persecutions (Strijbis, 2015). This significant
development can be observed in the new practices of mobilization by which marginal-
ized young people in Europe are sometimes prompted to participate in the djihâd in
Syria. It is important to observe that these ‘djihadists’ are not only recruited among
recent immigrants, but also involve young converts coming from native Christian
families who were facing individual failures, frustrations and unemployment.
In parallel, the transformations of the socio-economic order do not put the labour
unions at the centre of social protests any more, but generate a crisis of activism in
many of them. Their representativeness is then questioned, while new categories of
actors have difficulty finding new organizations which would be able to represent
them. This lack of representation frequently results in the creation of ad hoc and pre-
carious organizations (called ‘coordination committees’), and also in wildcat labour
strikes which are disconnected from traditional ideologies. These spontaneous actions
create irregular participation, a regression of classical activism and more difficult
conditions for a social dialogue. They also generate less-organized social movements
which are potentially more violent.
At the same time, the post-industrial society transforms the nature and the orienta-
tion of protests giving rise to ‘new social movements’ (Buechler, 1999; Melucci, 1989;
Offe, 1985). Socio-economic demands are more neglected or marginalized, while pro-
test is more oriented against the various forms of domination which affect the
post-industrial society (Touraine, 1981). Sexual domination triggered a reaction among
women and resulted in important gender and feminist movements (Cott, 1987), which
were especially centred on the denunciation of the sexual division of labour (Hoschild,
2003). In a second step, discrimination against sexual minorities became a major theme
of mobilization among homosexual and bisexual people. It resulted in demands which
obtained a high priority in the political agenda (gay marriage, medically assisted pro-
creation, equality of rights in civil society). It also opened the way to new forms of
mobilization such as gay parades and various forms of spectacular rallies (Ayres and
Brown, 2005).
In a similar development, post-materialist values are progressively substituted for
interests as the basis of mobilization (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). In this context,
cultural protests and demands are increasingly at the top of the political agenda:
cultural minorities, life conditions, environment, respect of life, cultural symbols and
identity are currently the main targets of mobilization. These ‘new social move-
ments’ have a specific configuration which makes them different from the classical
mobilization at the time of the labour movements. These new movements are more
decentralized, granting more autonomy to local actors and to the rank and file.
Ideology does not play the major role anymore as was the case with the trade unions

and socialist movements, the various protest issues are not integrated but juxtaposed
and only related by common post-materialist values which are vague.
As they are mainly oriented against authority and tradition, these movements have
a common libertarian orientation. In addition, the state is no longer the main target
of their action, which is more oriented to all kinds of micro-power which we find in
society: medical power, patriarchy, religious power, social control and alignment to a
‘normal kind of behaviour’. For all these reasons, the state and class struggles are no
more at the centre of mobilization. The traditional social movements and communist
parties are often strongly opposed to this new orientation. In addition, all these new
movements tend to be fragmented given the diversity of the targets: the relations
between all of them can be found in their ‘contemporaneity’ (Deleuze and Guattari,
2009) and their ‘transversality’ (Foucault, 1975). In this atmosphere a new ideology
tends to centre around the themes of post-modernism and post-structuralism
(Derrida, 2011; Baudrillard, 1975).
Different kinds of mobilization

New kinds of social movements and protests do not eliminate the older ones. They are
coexisting or even overlapping with each other. New models of labour unions, inspired
by the ‘New Left’, have appeared in Western democracies and are more oriented
towards post-material values (for example, the French CFDT or the Spanish STEM,
linked to the 15M movement). In the same way, new kinds of collective action, more
pragmatic and corporatist, are growing among salaried employees (nurses, pilots, taxi-
drivers) and mix traditional practices (strikes) with new actions (pressure on public
opinion, the media, spectacular demonstrations).
This mobilization can also be differentiated according to the nature and the organ-
ization of the protesting group and the structure of the society concerned (Oberschall,
1973). The social group can be weakly structured and organized either like a com-
munity (Gemeinschaft) or in an associative way (Gesellschaft). The society can be
integrated (in the Durkheimian sense) or segmented. According to these distinctions
we can identify six kinds of social movements. Most of the developing societies are
characterized by a strong segmentation which prevents the institutionalization of
social movements. The more they resemble a community, the more the potential mobi-
lization is strong, permanent and potentially violent. By contrast, in industrialized
(‘developed’) societies, social movements are more routinized and institutionalized as
part of the political game. We can see here the contrast between traditional social
movements in Europe and North America on the one hand, and the social movements
in the Southern countries on the other where they are more episodic and fragile, but
strong and more violent when they erupt.
Even if protests are more precarious in developing countries, they must be taken
into account everywhere. It would be wrong to think that authoritarian regimes and
even totalitarian ones are able to eliminate them completely. Empirical studies on
Mao’s China, the Stalinist Soviet Union or Nazism indicate a kind of partial
‘de-totalitarization’ in face of even the most coercive regimes. Individuals as such pos-
sess a personal resilience which is at the basis of every kind of social or political
protest. For this reason, we can identify a large range of clandestine mobilizations. We

can, first, distinguish protests by transfer. In coercive systems, opposition can be

expressed only if it is disguised by other forms of social expression. That is why reli-
gion plays such an important role and holds a primary position in the resistance to
dictatorships: mosques and preachers’ networks during the Shah regime in Iran;
Buddhist monks in Burma facing the military regime, and in South Vietnam where
they set themselves on fire to protest against war and dictatorship; the Christian
Church in Poland mobilizing against the Communist regime; public prayers in East
Germany or Czechoslovakia. Tradition, popular folklore and national customs can
also be used for the same purpose, as was the case in France during the occupation in
the Second World War or in Iran through the celebration of the secular ‘now rooz’ (the
Persian New Year) instead of religious festivities.
Even Western democracies, with a long history of institutionalized protest move-
ments, have been partly inspired by these recent developments. The Egyptian Tahrir
mobilization clearly had an impact in the USA and in Europe, particularly with regard
to the Spanish indignados who first appeared in May 2011 or Occupy Wall Street in
Fall 2011. We can find in such movements the same capacity to motivate young peo-
ple, the same role played by social networks, the common distrust of traditional
political parties and trade unions, an horizontal mobilization, an hostility against
institutionalized forms of politics, a strong desire ‘to change the world’ and to pro-
mote human dignity. This new orientation also spread to Israël (‘tent revolt’ in 2011),
to Greece when facing the severe economic crisis, as well as to Portugal (‘Geraçao a
rasca’), Iceland or France (‘Nuit debout’, 2016). It opens the way to unconventional
forms of political engagement which, in many countries, have been on the increase
during the last decades (see Table 10.1).
Table 10.1 Changes of unconventional political engagement 1990–2005
Demonstrations Petitions Boycotts
Argentina +8.8 (22.6−31.4) −6.5 (34.2−27.7) +.4 (2.6−3)

Australia +7.9 (12.2−20.1) +9.5 (69.7−79.2) +10.5 (4.9−15.4)
Brazil −0.2 (18.5−18.3) +5.9 (49.8−55.7) −1.8 (9.8−8)
Chile −12.6 (29.5−16.9) −5.1 (22.1−17) −1.2 (3.9−2.7)
Finland −4.2 (14.5−10.3) +20.7 (29.8−50.5) +7.5 (8.5−16)
India +4.1 (15.3−19.4) +6.6 (22.4−29) −0.1 (15.2−15.1)
Japan +17.6 (8.7−26.3) +52.2 (8.7−59.9) +3.9 (3.1−7.0)
Mexico −5.1 (8.9−3.8) +7.5 (9.6−17.1) +0.7 (1.3−2.0)
Poland +0.1 (10.1−10.2) +12.1 (11.5−23.5) +0.2 (4.7−4.9)
Russia +14.7 (30.6−15.9) −18.3 (26.5−8.3) −1.2 (3.6−2.8)
South Africa + 5.1 (7.7−12.8) −8.4 (20.1−11.7) +0.6 (9.4−10)
South Korea + 4.3 (7.1−11.4) +14.1 (19.9−34) +3.7 (2.3−6)
Spain +13.0 (22.9−35.9) + 7.9 (15.5−23.4) +1.5 (5.5−7)
Switzerland +12.9 (15.2−28.1) +16.1 (61.5−77.6) +8.6 (10.6−19.2)
Turkey +0.6 (5.3−5.9) −.9 (12.8−11.9) +.2 (5.2−5.4)
Average increase 4.5 7.6 2.2

The second way is abstention. If people are not free to protest, they have the pos-
sibility to refrain from participating in mass meetings, official public rallies or
becoming a member of the single pro-government party. This fading participation is
often interpreted as a decreasing charismatic capacity of the leader and a weakening
support for the regime. The third form consists of using coded messages, by ridicule,
mockery or caricatures of the leader. The many jokes, which circulate inside regimes
where political articulation is forbidden, are real instruments of challenge to the estab-
lished power, but also an efficient way to mobilize support for a clandestine movement
and to strengthen bonds and solidarity among opponents. Other forms can also play
a role, in particular the body language everyone can use, even in non-democratic
regimes. Wearing a tie or not in Iran, opting for a veil or not in secular countries, hav-
ing a moustache or not in Kemalist Turkey, growing beards or not are expressing a
political identity, and often a protest.
In an authoritarian system, the decision to participate in a collective action depends
on the perceived difference between the risks incurred and the expectations of success
(Tilly, 1978). However, scholars take more and more into account the effect of anger
which urges individuals to take higher risks either in fighting against minorities per-
ceived as a threat (Appadurai, 2006), or in challenging authoritarian systems, as is
currently the case in the Middle East with the ‘Arab Spring’, or in parts of Africa. In
these instances, mobilization can trigger revolutions, leading to a perspective which
was first experienced in European history.
Revolutions in perspective
For a long time, revolutions have been conceived to lie at the centre of gravity of
political development, because of the importance of the French Revolution, which has
often been considered as the beginning of Western modernity and as the political
achievement of the Enlightenment. Marxism made revolutions the key concept of its
own vision of history: class struggles and objective contradictions of the modes of
production are supposed to result in social revolutions, which finally would lead to a
classless society (Marx and Engels, 1998 [1848]). Increasingly, the main issue turned
to another question: how can we explain that some European countries did not expe-
rience revolutions (for example, the United Kingdom)? This problem was at the origin
of one major book of Alexis de Tocqueville (1955 [1856]) and opened the way to a
sociology of revolutions (Tilly, 1978, 2004; Skocpol, 1979; Parsa, 2000, 2011).
Further studies argued that the dichotomy was not perfect: instead of opposing
countries where a revolution took place and countries which did not experience any
revolutionary events, Barrington Moore (1966) considered three categories by distin-
guishing between ‘bourgeois revolutions’ which led to democracy (according to the
French model), ‘mass revolutions’ which resulted in communist regimes (Russia,
China) and ‘revolutions from above’ which ended in Fascist regimes (Germany, Italy).
Theda Skocpol extended and refined this typology by opposing ‘political revolutions’
and ‘social revolutions’. The latter result in a transformation of the structures of soci-
ety, whereas the former are limited to the political institutions and do not impact upon
the society itself (Skocpol, 1979). Such a distinction shows the difference in the nature
of these two types of revolution: an active social process which can be violent, strongly

participative and multi-dimensional and a political process (which can also be par-
ticipative and violent but to a lesser degree) which is strictly limited in its aims to the
political sphere. The first one relates to the French Revolution in 1789 as well as the
Russian and the Chinese revolutions, and the second one to the English Revolution
which took place in 1640, resulted in the beheading of the King without greatly affect-
ing English society or challenging its aristocracy.
In these two instances, revolution is defined as a ‘forceful transfer of power’ (Parsa,
2011: 2312), but, for the political revolutions, the characteristic is exclusively political
(Tilly, 1978), whereas for a social revolution the transfer affects the society as a whole
(Skocpol, 1979). This notion of forceful transfer remains vague: what is the required
level of force to speak of a revolution? Do we take into account the involvement of
social movements to distinguish them from mere coups by the military? Or is it more
important to consider the suddenness of the rupture for distinguishing revolutions
from reforms? Do we focus on the result or on the process? The 1968 movement
which took place in many regions of the world can be seen as a revolutionary move-
ment, when we consider it as a mobilization process, but certainly not when we
analyse its consequences. All these questions show the weakness of this concept, which
is in fact dependent on its position in a more encompassing theory.
The main question is then linked to the origin of revolutions. Some analysts point
to the role of socio-economic factors, while others give priority to a political explana-
tion. Karl Marx has initiated the first approach, presenting revolution as the inevitable
result of a double contradiction. First, between productive forces and social relations
in the production process; where the former are changing due to technological innova-
tions, whereas the latter remain frozen under the control of law and political power.
Second, another contradiction develops between dominating and dominated social
classes, worsening the class struggle. This increasing mobilization leads to a crisis of
the society and results in a revolutionary process.
The problem is now to understand why a revolution did not occur in all societies.
If Marx was right, it should have been a necessary stage everywhere around the
world. That is why some neo-Marxist scholars attempted another explanation in
taking into account the relations between social classes. Barrington Moore concluded
that revolutions will happen when the bourgeoisie becomes stronger than the aris-
tocracy, as was the case in France, or when the peasantry can be mobilized, as
happened in China and Russia (Moore, 1966). No revolution is possible without
being supported by a strong social class which is determined to initiate a profound
social and political change. The bourgeoisie was too weak and the aristocracy was
still strong enough in England in the seventeenth century for a social revolution aim-
ing to transform the structures of English society. By contrast, the bourgeoisie and
the aristocracy balanced each other in Germany so that they had no other choice
than to cooperate in a social compromise which led to an authoritarian regime rather
than a democracy.
This exclusively socio-economic explanation was not considered as satisfactory by
other neo-Marxist scholars, such as Theda Skocpol, who considered also the role of
the state. She explains social revolutions as an historical result of two combined con-
tradictions. The first opposes the active producers to the dominant class allied with
the state, whereas the second opposes the State to the dominant class. So, in France,
Russia and China, the weakened absolutist State was challenged by the aristocracy.

Without doubt, the anger and even the rebellion of the French nobility against Louis
XVI, just before 1789, played a major role in triggering the French Revolution.
Contrary to Karl Marx’s vision, revolutions then are not achieved by dominated
classes but mainly by the collapse of the dominating forces.
This explanation can be linked to the political theory of revolution, as it was mainly
elaborated by Charles Tilly (1978). He considered frustration as the main social factor
of revolution rather than domination, as many other authors did in refuting the ortho-
dox Marxist view (Davies, 1971; Gurr, 1970). This concept is less economic, as
frustration introduces a subjective dimension and all the expectations that can be
raised by the major actors. Charles Tilly adds that mobilization becomes strong and
revolutionary if it is organized by a solid political movement and a powerful leader-
ship, but also if it is opposed to a failing or collapsing state. Strangely, this view is not
far from the Leninist concept of a revolution based on a strong ‘iron-like’ revolution-
ary party fighting against a weak state (Lenin, 1961 [1902]). The coercive capacity of
the state thus is an important explanatory factor which we have to take into account
in a sociology of revolutions.
The concept of revolution has probably changed its meaning. In European history,
it was mainly associated with a class movement and dominated by the Marxist model.
After the Second World War, it became rare on the Old Continent, if we exclude the
‘Revolution of the Carnations’ in Portugal in April 1974, which was more a military
coup than a social revolution. Revolutions are now moving increasingly to the South
and developing countries. In this process, decolonization movements were a first step.
They were characterized by a nationalist ideology which encompassed different
classes and by the use of military force and guerillas. It had to face not a contested
State but a foreign and occupying state.
This resulted in a second step which was oriented against coercive and weakly
legitimate post-colonial states which were fought by violent mobilizations. This new
generation of revolution can be found in Cuba (1959), Nicaragua (1978) or the
Philippines (1986), as well as in the more recent Arab Spring events. In all these cases,
revolutions came closer to a civil war, even generating ‘war societies’ as is the case with
the Syrian revolution initiated in 2011 (Korany and El Mahdi, 2014). This combination
of strongly repressive states which gave no room to opposition and a deep feeling of
alienation and humiliation in the population reoriented these new movements towards
a political mobilization which is less affected by the nature of social stratification
(Badie, 2014a).
Conclusions
All in all, political participation seems to take on new forms more or less every-
where, expressing its distance from more traditional and institutional forms of
democracy. With new communication technology, participation becomes more indi-
vidual, less hierarchical and more oriented to reshaping the world and promoting a
new sense of humanity. Political science has not yet fully grasped these transforma-
tions and has remained still more committed to an institutional approach to political
participation. The coexistence of the two is probably one of the key features of the
present political order.

Questions
1 Is political participation connected to a kind of political regime?
2 How are social variables impacting political participation?
3 How do you compare the new kinds of political mobilization with
the classical forms of political participation?
4 What are the main variables that can be used for explaining
revolutionary processes?
Further reading
Milbrath LW (1965) Political participation: How and why do people get involved in politics?
Chicago: Rand McNally. The founding book in the discipline: a very useful introduction to
the topic, even if it is dated.
Whiteley P (2012) Political participation in Britain. The decline and revival of civic culture.
Basingstoke: Palgrave. A very rich presentation on the decreasing participation in Great
Britain and particularly on a fading identification to the traditional political parties.
Zukin C, Keeter S, Andolina M, Jenkins K and Delli Carpini M (2006) A new engagement?
Political participation, civic life and the changing American citizen. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. A well-known research devoted to the transforming political participation
in the USA, and particularly among young people.
West P (2013) Social movements in global politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. A solid synthesis
of the social movements which are growing with globalization.
Parsa M (2000) States, ideologies and social revolutions. A comparative analysis of Iran,
Nicaragua, and the Philippines. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A precious synthe-
sis on the new kinds of revolution in a global world.

11
Political
communication
and media
Key terms
Audience democracy Political communication
Mass media Political marketing
Mediatization of politics Presidentialization of politics
Personalization of politics Public opinion
Introduction
In several chapters of this book, some aspect of political communication is directly or
indirectly relevant and deserves attention. Thus, for example, one of the key criteria in
a minimalist definition of democracy is ‘alternative sources of information’ (see
Chapter 5), that is, the pluralist ownership of TV channels and newspapers is a key
element to assess whether there is a democracy or not. Of course, the implied indirect
assumption is that only alternative sources of information allow a free, unconstrained
formation of political opinions and the consequent free political behaviour of citizens.
Aspects of communication are also relevant in the analysis of the quality of democracy
as they are at the core of electoral accountability and even more of inter-institutional
accountability (see Chapter 6 and below). In fact, when elected authorities justify their
behaviour and the citizens assess it, the necessary link is provided by the media, which
communicate not only the behaviour but also that justification. Indeed, for all acts of
government and other public institutions the media perform a crucial role of critical
appraisal. This is often more important and immediate than the control that is per-
formed – for instance – by the Constitutional Court. It is well known, moreover, that
the more recent organizational changes inside political parties are largely the result of
the technological evolution of political communication including the ‘social media’ (see
Chapter 13). The key role of media can also be seen in non-democratic political sys-
tems, and in fact the close control of political communication is at the core of activities
of political authorities in China and even more in North Korea. In this vein, it is well
known how the beginning of the ‘Arab Spring’ in December 2010 and early 2011,

especially in Tunisia and Egypt, was very much influenced by blogs in Arab and other
forms of internet communication.
The first, immediate consideration is how much this topic is omnipresent in contem-
porary politics. In this vein, several decades ago (1963), coming from a cybernetics
perspective, Karl Deutsch affirmed that ‘government is communication’. Thus, the
consequent obvious questions are: how can we define political communication and
what is really salient about communication in politics? After suggesting a definition,
the focus of this chapter will lie on the question how communication and its techno-
logical advances have been affecting or even shaping political institutions and processes
in different domains.
Box 11.1 B. McNair, ‘Political

Communication’
Political communication as:
1) All forms of communication undertaken by politicians and

other political actors for the purpose of achieving specific
objectives; 2) communication addressed to these actors by
non-politicians such as voters and newspaper columnists;
3) communication about these actors and their activities,
as contained in news reports, editorials, and other forms of
media discussion of politics.
(McNair, 2011: 4)
Definitions
Being so pervasive in its characteristics and processes, it is difficult to provide an
adequate and precisely circumscribed definition of ‘political communication’. As pre-
sented in Box 11.1, communication is, first, ‘an exchange of contents’ and it is
‘political’ when that exchange is on public issues that concern citizens and non-citizens
living in a territory (Mancini, 2011). Actually, especially within non-democratic sys-
tems, political communication can be only a top-down flow of information – and not
an exchange – as inside any hierarchically organized institutions. The core content of
political communication is among people with interpersonal exchanges, among media
of different kinds (from press to television and any other form of digitalized media or
communicative networks), among institutions or political actors or much more fre-
quently among the three sets of units (people, media, elite actors). To better describe
such exchanges, the metaphor of a triangle is often used with those units at the three
corners. As with most metaphors, this can be misleading when it obscures two possi-
bilities, namely, when it glosses over the fact that the media can be a neutral (as much
as possible) channel of information, but can also be an actor by itself, which creates
or consciously manipulates the exchange of information. Moreover, having in mind

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA 175
the definition of politics we suggested in the Introduction, we must take into account
that political communication is always adversarial and conflictive, namely, that it
concerns and expresses different interests involved in different political processes
Most political communication is actually adversarial, but part of it only concerns
symbolic aspects or issues where there is a broad consensus as, for example, the com-
memoration of public holidays or specific memorial events. Let it be added that the
kind of communication that is characterized by a top-down flow is usually defined as
propaganda. And it can be defined as the form of communication that is deliberately
and purposively developed by a political actor – for example, a party, a leader – within
a democratic or non-democratic system to influence or shape values, attitudes and
behaviours of citizens. The attention to symbols and the adoption of a sophisticated
rhetoric has also characterized non-democratic regimes such as Nazi Germany, the
USSR, Communist China or the Islamist Iran (see Chapter 7). But electoral campaigns
in democratic countries have also been characterized by adopting a similar sort of
rhetoric and symbols to bring citizens to vote for a certain party in order to enhance
its image and create a strong identification.
In the contemporary world, the technological advances of the mass media and elec-
tronic forms of communication make political communication essentially mediatized.
Mazzoleni and Schultz (1999) push this argument even further when they state that
today politics has lost its autonomy and has become dependent on media and is being
continuously shaped by them. Although this is a phenomenon that is more or less
present in different countries, we can safely state that most political communication
in most countries is carried out through media that have the opportunity to shape
politics and at the same time to become actors of politics.
This last consideration brings us to ask what can be the political role of media and
what should be their proper place and structure in a democratic regime. Of course, if
a medium acts as an autonomous actor it has the kind of political role that it chooses.
Namely, it can influence a party leadership, can intervene by suggesting how citizens
should vote, or influence decision-making processes by suggesting specific policies.
Behind such a medium, which can be a newspaper or a TV channel, there can be an
interest group or a group of intellectuals who play the role of opinion leaders. If, by
contrast, a medium acts as a neutral or quasi-neutral channel of communication, then
we can expect that it provides unbiased information on what happens in politics, helps
in understanding what occurs at national and international levels, but above all gives
space and attention to the different opinions that are present within the political
sphere. Thus, in this crucial role of media we find the formation of public opinion that
is so relevant in the actual working of a democracy.
The notion of public opinion goes back to Locke (2008 [1689]) in his An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, and later to Enlightenment intellectuals such as
Mercier, Kant, Constant, Marx, Tocqueville and Mill. After the Second World War, in
the democratic Western context with Hannah Arendt (1958) and Habermas (esp.
1962) it became a central topic of debate. The public sphere, as theorized by
Habermas, is the area where public opinion is formed. Moreover, for opinions of citi-
zens to be public they have to be concerned with a collective issue and must have a
public diffusion. Empirically, public opinion can be analysed through mass surveys,
despite some of the limits of this method (see also Chapter 3). In a democracy, public
opinion is pluralistic, and can be seen at different levels and on different issues. It is

the result not only of needs and wants, but also of a number of other factors, such as
the values and beliefs of people in a given country, the group identifications that guide
or ‘frame’ opinions (see Chapter 4), and the mutual influence among different actors
at mass and elite levels through various media. Moreover, the key condition for the
development and open exchanges and adaptations of public opinion is the existence
of an autonomous and pluralist civil society.
Historically, in fact, Habermas traces the creation of public opinion to the develop-
ment of modernity, and especially of a commercial bourgeoisie. Thus, in contemporary
complex societies with the technological advancements of communication media there
is a much broader space for potential autonomy of civil society. Let us not forget,
however, that this kind of opportunity also brings other consequences. That is, the
space is also created for the manifestations, often in an anonymous form, of deep
conflicts, ethnic and personal hate, social envy, class differences and all other expres-
sions of political incorrectness that also characterize modernity, but which in other
forms of discourse are usually masked by accepted rules of civil coexistence and
repressed by social conventions.
Consequently, it is important to understand the connections between public opinion
and democracy, especially when contemporary democracies can appropriately be
defined as an ‘audience democracy’ (Manin, 1997, Table 6.1). This is characterized by
a strong role of media as socialization agents, by the salience of media expertise, and by
a key role of public opinion that may also be inconsistent with the views of the elected
representatives. In this mediatized public opinion, simplifying a more complex parlia-
mentary deliberation (see also Sartori, 1987, esp. 86–9), we can see that opinion as a
collective, non-unitary political actor with articulated, differentiated results in at least
three moments. First, when there are elections: the electoral moment is the most impor-
tant ‘translation’ of public opinion into party preferences, votes and seats for the elected
authorities. There are various electoral occasions: local, regional, parliamentary, and for
some countries presidential and European elections. Second, in the inter-electoral period
through more informal ways of influencing the decision makers who often make use of
mass surveys to check the orientation of public opinion on specific issues (see also
below). And, third, still in the inter-electoral interval through non-institutionalized
forms of participation, such as demonstrations, protest manifestations and even strikes
and riots we can see the role of public opinion (see also Chapter 10). Thus, for example,
the salience of non-institutionalized participation has been very relevant during eco-
nomic crises (see, e.g. Morlino and Quaranta, 2016). On the whole, all three moments
are the most effective expressions of how in a democracy public opinion as a whole or
as a part of the public can influence and control political decisions.
Key political developments

When looking at the developments of contemporary political communications in con-
nection with democratic public opinion, as suggested by Blumler and Kavanagh
(1999), we see the fragmentation of the means of communication as well as of the
audiences. Television is still very important, but now there are a much larger number
of channels in addition to satellite and cable TV. The television formats, that is, the
opportunities for political communication, are also increasing with new forms of talk

shows and infotainment. The development of the internet is, however, the character-
izing aspect of contemporary communication and provides people the opportunity to
get in touch with each other and to get a wide range of news. On the whole, at least
within the most advanced areas of the world, this also implies a strong competition
among different media. The main consequence of this wealth of media is the fragmen-
tation of public opinion into audiences who are interested in different topics and kinds
of information. All this, of course, contributes even further to the fading away of party
identification and the increase of voter volatility.
Of course, some of the earlier aspects of modern communication have become per-
manent in contemporary political systems and are even strengthened. These include
the two main consequences of the intrusiveness of mass media into contemporary
societies, namely the professionalization of communication with the development of
trained experts in different areas of communication and the personalization of politics
(Mancini, 2011). Thus, first, political consultants, pollsters and spin doctors are the
new professionals who are needed by parties and candidates to win the vote of the
citizens. As we see with the transformation of professional electoral parties and of
cartel parties (Chapter 13), the so-called militants and party bureaucrats have been
disappearing. The new contexts need the new expertise that is able to organize elec-
toral campaigns and to attract the attention and support for the candidate by the
voters. Moreover, there is the problem of keeping or attracting the support between
one election and the subsequent one as the competition among party leaders triggers
a sort of permanent electoral campaign. This implies that the new professionals are
also necessary in the intervals between elections. At the same time, there are tasks of
communication and ‘public relations’ to be performed by other government and pub-
lic institutions. The additional consequence is that these new professionals become
more and more relevant in contemporary democracies.
The personalization of politics is the second major consequence. There are two
aspects that mutually reinforce this personalization. In fact, on the one hand, the fad-
ing away of political ideologies and increasing secularization have put on the shoulders
of individuals and especially of leaders the main political burdens. On the other hand,
as communication is much more effective if individuals – leaders – are the main actors,
then this reinforces the personalization of politics. Ideologies and great political values
are abstract constructs. When cultural and economic changes and the fading away of
past memories bring to an end these abstract ideologies and new political messages
have to be communicated, then this is only possible in concrete, often down-to-earth
ways, and this needs to have individuals, faces, men and women who are able to com-
municate those messages and attract followers.
Even in old parliamentary democracies personalization is further accentuated by
the presidentialization of politics, along the lines suggested by Thomas Poguntke
and Paul Webb (2007). The ‘internationalization of modern politics’ which is espe-
cially visible in the transformation of European democracies as a consequence of
European Union membership and which is characterized by an ‘executive bias’
of the entire decision-making process with a consequent strengthening of the role of
the highest elected authorities vis-à-vis the role of the parliament and the elected
representatives in that body. Their predominance has been amplified further by the
vastly expanded steering capacities of state machineries, which have severely
reduced the scope of effective parliamentary control. In this way, the distinguishing

pattern of presidentialism has been developing: an increasing power of top executive

leaders complemented by the sort of personalization that is more and more depend-
ent on a successful appeal to the audience (Manin, 1997).
Arenas, actors and forms

In this picture, we can single out both the main arenas of contemporary political com-
munication and its main actors. The arenas include:
•• the face-to-face family, friend and group socialization, that is, the exchange of
information and related values that are so influential in different personal domains;
•• the social conventional and non-conventional communication where there is a
great deal of exchange and flow of political information, sometimes at the border-
line between legality and illegality;
•• the entire electoral process (campaigns and voting);
•• the partisan communication before and after elections on party programmes and
controversial issues;
•• the institutional communication that comes from the incumbent authorities at
executive and parliamentary levels;
•• the bureaucratic communication that is relevant for citizens and non-citizens in
everyday life;
•• the conflictive, pluralist communication that is instrumental to shape political
decisions and subsequent policies.
Among the actors, we can distinguish elite actors, citizens and non-citizens living in
a given territory, and media that can also be neutral channels of communication. Elite
actors can be differentiated as opinion leaders, elected and non-elected partisan
actors (i.e. party leaders, prime ministers, presidents, parliamentarians, local and
regional councillors), public officers of different administrative branches at different
levels (see below), or representatives of interest groups.
When the relevant arenas are matched with the actors, we can better understand the
resulting changing or stable forms of communication. Thus, the moment of socializa-
tion where families, friends and peer groups are central is characterized by informal,
face-to-face communication where, however, the technological developments of the
internet and the existing very successful ‘social’ networks can nowadays play a crucial
role without the previous more closed personal relationships. This new aspect with all
its potentialities recently emerged in the social non-conventional communication
where it brought about a new pattern of mobilization that was so important in the
non-democratic context of the Arab Spring (2011–13). The non-conventional social
communication is the arena where we can also see the action of violent, radical leaders,
in some cases supported by a scientifically built and effective propaganda, as was the
case with the so-called Islamic State (IS). For terrorist and protest movements alike this
kind of communication is a vital feature which can mean their failure or success with
regard to how this information is carried out. In this vein, we can plainly state that
terrorists, to be effective, totally depend on the media that even unwillingly become
the most important tool for a more effective impact of their actions (Weimann, 2006).

Communication is also crucial for electoral campaigns with the two main goals of
bringing people to vote and convincing the electors to vote for a particular party or
leader. In contemporary electoral campaigns communication is also crucial for fund-
raising. The first electoral organization for President Obama, for example, was able to
collect through ‘crowd-funding’ over the internet large amounts of money from a great
number of small individual donors to allow him to conduct a successful multi-media
campaign. Today, the electoral arena is mainly characterized by the adoption of multi-
media strategies, that is, by the attention to all possible channels of communication.
At the same time, there still is a dominant reference to local and national TV in addi-
tion to e-mails and media such as Facebook and Twitter. Well-designed advertisements
are the main modality of campaigning. The dominant logic is that of a marketing
campaign where the voter is considered as a consumer and the candidate is the good
to be advertised and sold or, in a different perspective, a service provider who has to
single out what are the needs of the consumer and the consequent ‘service’ to sell. In
addition to the candidates and party leaders, media and citizens, the professionals of
political marketing have become influential actors themselves.
Box 11.2 Newman, ‘Political Marketing’

Political marketing can be defined as
the application of marketing principles and procedures in

political campaigns by various individuals and organizations.
The procedures involved include the analysis, development,
execution, and management of strategic campaigns by can-
didates, political parties, governments, lobbyists and interest
groups that seek to drive public opinion, advance their own
ideologies, win elections, and pass legislation and referenda
in response to the needs and wants of selected people and
groups in a society.
(Newman, 1999: xiii)
Therefore, as shown in Box 11.2, Newman suggests a definition of electoral market-

ing and, more generally, political marketing where marketing principles are
implemented to influence public opinion, win elections and make political decisions.
Electoral and political marketing are characterized by the definition of the precise
goals of a campaign, the analysis of the target through polls, of possible campaign
issues, of competing candidates and of available means. To keep the continuous sup-
port of voters, contemporary democratic politics have become characterized by
permanent electoral campaigns (see also above). Consequently, the forms of com-
munication during electoral campaigns also become present in the non-electoral
periods. An additional consequence, as mentioned before, is the fundamental trans-
formation of parties where the organization that has characterized the old mass
parties (see Chapter 13) is no longer necessary as communication through mass

media serves as a functional substitute. This especially applies for the classic socialist
and communist European parties.
The institutional and bureaucratic contexts provide the arenas where other impor-
tant forms of communication take place. This is especially the use of communication
as a tool for legitimizing governmental and parliamentary actions when decisions are
made by the president, the prime minister, or a minister as well as when bills are
approved by legislative power. More specifically, as stressed by McNair (2011), for
governments there is a need for media, information and image management. With
regard to the first, there is an exchange between the governmental authorities, on the
one hand, to provide media with opportunities to get news and information and, on
the other hand, to influence the media to present governmental decisions in a favour-
able light. Information management means the close control of all information coming
from the government and bureaucracy. Finally, image management refers to the efforts
of authorities to transmit a successful, winning, positive image and is very much
related to the personalization of politics.
In the communication concerning legislative activities, we again see a formal and
informal management of information to the extent that media are playing a filter role
with regard to what is transmitted to the public (see Mann and Orenstein, 1994). The
salience of all these forms of communication becomes evident when we think about
the growing role of the spin doctors in information and image management and when
the delicate, unstable role of the spokespersons for executive, bureaucratic and legisla-
tive authorities is considered, and how often in contemporary democracies they are
dismissed or take the blame for recurring problems that happen in the relationships
with the press or in TV programmes.
It must also be pointed out that the different forms of communication are carried
out at five different levels: the local, regional, national, supra-national (for example,
the EU) and international levels. The different levels of communication become evident
when we consider the actors and the circumstances in which they come into play. That
is, for example, when we see which actors are involved in a certain policy, whether at
the local, regional, national, supra-national or international level. Table 11.1 sums up
the most relevant actors and arenas of such communications.
Critical aspects
With regard to the arenas, actors and forms of communication a few aspects emerge
as very critical and deserve special attention. These concern the major recurring pat-
terns in the connections between politicians and media, the ways by which political
leaders make efforts to reach the citizens more directly, and how intermediary actors
are replaced by other forms of communication. Similarly, what is the role of media
with regard to inter-institutional accountability and which role do they play concern-
ing an observed delegitimizing of democratic politics?
In Table 11.1 the crucial role of media and of the relationships between them and
politics in different contexts has been made apparent. The consequent question is
whether there are recurrent patterns in these relationships. For this purpose, Hallin
and Mancini (2004) conducted an in-depth empirical analysis of 18 countries (see
Table 11.2). They found three different models of media systems on the basis of four

12_Morlino_CH-11.indd 181
Table 11.1 Actors and arenas of political communication
arenas
societal societal non- political-
actors socialization conventional conventional electoral partisan institutional bureaucratic policy
citizens only X X X
citizens and non- X X
citizens
societal elite and X X
citizens
radical, violent elite, X
media, citizens and
non-citizens
political leaders, media X X X
and citizens
political leaders and X X
citizens
elected leaders, media X X
and citizens
elected leaders and X
citizens
public officers and X
citizens
interest groups and X
elected leaders
Source: my own elaboration.
12/22/2016 4:31:18 PM
distinguishing dimensions. Two dimensions affect directly the media side of the phe-
nomenon. The first concerns the newspaper market, which can be characterized by a
low, medium or high newspaper circulation and readership, by an elite-oriented press
vis-à-vis a mass-oriented press, by the relative salience of newspaper and television as
sources of news, and by the relative proportions of local, regional and national news-
papers. The second dimension refers to the professionalization of journalism
characterized by autonomous, independent forms of organization with professional
rules and a public service orientation vis-à-vis an instrumental journalism oriented
towards particularistic interests and a disregard of ethical principles.
The other two dimensions are:
1. political parallelism, that is the extent to which the media system reflects the
major political divisions of society with or without consequent distinct political
orientations, different organizational connections between media and political
organizations, different tendencies of media personnel to take part in politi-
cal life, partisanship of media audiences, the journalists’ role, orientation and
practices, coverage of different opinions within one medium (internal pluralism)
or within one media branch (external pluralism), regulation of public service
broadcasting;
2. the role of the state, that is, the power of the political regime to shape the structure
and functioning of media systems through censorship or other political pressures,
economic subsidies, the ownership of media or telecommunication organizations,
or provisions for regulating the media.
With some simplification, these dimensions can be grouped empirically into three
models, at least with regard to most of the Western experience. The Mediterranean or
polarized pluralist model is characterized by low newspaper circulation and an elite-
oriented press, weak professionalization and instrumentalization, high political
parallelism and strong state intervention. The North/Central European or democratic
corporatist model represents high newspaper circulation and a mass-oriented press,
strong professionalization and self-regulation, external pluralism, strong party press,
shift towards commercial press, with strong state intervention, press subsidies and
strong public service broadcasting. The North Atlantic or liberal model has a medium
newspaper circulation and mass circulation of commercial press, strong profession-
alization and non-institutionalized self-regulation and neutral commercial press,
information-oriented journalism, professional broadcast governance, and is market
dominated with no role of the state. These dimensions and the three models are pre-
sented in Table 11.2. Subsequent research has shown how the analysis proposed by
Hallin and Mancini was able to ‘travel’ and is also a helpful tool for understanding
the Eastern European cases (Dobek-Ostrowska et al., 2010) and, to some extent, more
countries in other regions (Hallin and Mancini, 2012). The work by Hallin and
Mancini clearly shows how the connection between media and politics is always
relevant and shapes political communication in a democratic regime.
This analysis, however, still leaves some key questions unanswered. First, in con-
sidering the different forms of communication, but especially the political institutional
ones (see Table 11.1), we can see how political leaders make efforts to reach citizens
directly and to outdo the media. That is, they try to reach out to prospective supporters

Table 11.2 Politics and media: the three models
North/Central
models European or
Mediterranean or Democratic
key Polarized Pluralist Corporatist North Atlantic or
dimensions Model (a) Model (b) Liberal Model (c)
newspaper market low circulation; high circulation; medium circulation;

elite oriented mass oriented commercial press
professionalization weak; not strong; strong; non-
differentiated institutionalized institutionalized
self-regulation self-regulation
political high; party press; neutral neutral commercial
parallelism parliamentary/ commercial press; press; information-
government model autonomy of oriented journalism;
of broadcast governance formally
governance autonomous system
role of state strong intervention strong intervention; market dominated
strong public
service
broadcasting
Legend: (a) France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain; (b) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland; (c) Britain, United States, Canada,
Ireland.
Source: adapted from Hallin and Mancini (2004: 67)
directly and to avoid the filter or, better, the gate-keeping role of media with a con-
sequent weakening of media salience. In this vein, there is a subtle and sometimes
confused game where incumbent authorities need the media and their favourable
support and at the same time they would like to surpass them as they are afraid of
unfavourable treatment and news manipulation. This phenomenon is complemented
by another, which is at least as important. That is, by trying to reach out directly to
the citizens, political leaders can also outdo their own party organization and even
organized interest groups through the various channels and forms of communica-
tion. Consequently, media are avoided and surpassed in certain situations by some
leaders and at the same time are courted by other leaders who would like to avoid
and surpass intermediary institutions. Actually, in these ways the context for new
forms of populism is created with a direct appeal to contemporary fragmented soci-
eties. Moreover, the previous discussion has left out the critical role of media as
important actors in achieving a more effective inter-institutional accountability (see
Chapter 6). That is, we refer to the very salient tasks that press, TV and other media
perform by monitoring and assessing the effective actions of executive and legislative
powers and whether these actions are compatible with democratic norms and repre-
sent the interests of the population. This aspect has also another side, namely, that
in this way the media as actors with a power of delegitimizing the elected authorities
play an important political role themselves.

Conclusions
There is no doubt that in today’s societies communication and media are highly relevant
in every kind of political activity. Table 11.1 displays this evidence. Thus, when we refer
to the democratic qualities discussed in Chapter 6, we can observe how all of them –
from rule of law to electoral accountability and inter-institutional accountability, to
competition, participation and even the perception of equality and responsiveness –
can be manipulated and distorted by different forms of communication.
Even though we focused here mostly on democratic systems, the salience of the
media is also obvious in hybrid regimes and forms of electoral authoritarianism with
forms that parallel those described above. Furthermore, the obsessive control of com-
munication and its severe limitations especially by North Korean authorities, but also
by Chinese ones, show how authoritarian leaders are fully aware of the dangers and
the potentially disruptive power of communication.
Finally, we can see all technological developments in communication and the media
as ways of creating new opportunities and risks. The most important political ones are
those arising from new forms of participation by the more recent protest parties that
compete with the traditional parties. Similarly, the new forms of direct democracy that
can undermine intermediary institutions, especially parties, and, to some extent, rep-
resentative institutions show opportunities and risks. They can increase participation
in new ways, but may also be exploited by new forms of populism violating demo-
cratic norms.
Questions
1 Provide a definition of political communication and explain why
media play a crucial role in contemporary politics.
2 What is meant by audience democracy?
3 How do the personalization and the presidentialization of contem
porary politics relate to political communication? What tendencies
in modern politics do incline to reinforce these two phenomena?
4 What is political marketing and how does it affect contemporary
electoral arena?
5 What are the main recurring patterns in the relationships between
politicians and media?
Further reading
Dobek-Ostrowska B, Glowacki M, Jakubowicz K. et al. (eds.) (2010) Comparative media sys-
tems. European and global perspective. Budapest: Central European University Press. Taking
stock of twenty years of transformation of East European media systems after the collapse of
communism in 1989, the book offers a comparative, systematic discussion of media politics.
Flew T (2014) New media (4th ed.). South Melbourne, VIC: Oxford University Press. Based on
an historic understanding of new media developments, the volume complements a compre-
hensive overview of theories of new media with contemporary case studies.

Gunther, Rand Mughan A (2000) Democracy and the media: A comparative perspective.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. It offers a comparative perspective on the relation-
ships between the media and politics, also dealing with media effects that influence
non-democratic regimes and helping to define the path of democratic transition and the
quality of new democracies.
Hallin DC and Mancini P (eds.) (2012) Comparing media systems beyond the western world.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The edited book offers a broad exploration of the
conceptual foundations for comparative analysis of media and politics globally.
Norris P (2000) Virtuous circle: Political communications in post-industrial societies.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The author singles out appropriate standards for
evaluating the performance of the news media and compares changes in the news media,
including the rise of the internet and the development of postmodern election campaigns.
Semetko HA and Scammell M (eds.) (2012) The SAGE handbook of political communication.
Los Angeles: Sage. This is an authoritative and comprehensive survey providing a state-of-
the-art review on political communication.
Weblinks
European Journalist Center: www.ejc.nl
Economic Freedom of the World Project: www.freetheworld.com
Freedom House ‘Freedom of the Press 2015’: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/
freedom-press-2016
Global ICT Statistics (ITU): www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/default.aspx
Global Media Freedom Dataset, 1948–2012: http://faculty.uml.edu/Jenifer_whittenwoodring/
MediaFreedomData_000.aspx
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ): www.ifj.org
Index of Censorship: www.indexoncensorship.org
Reporters Without Borders (RSF): https://rsf.org/en/ranking
World Press Trends Database: www.wptdatabase.org

12
Interest groups
Key terms
Advocacy Pluralism
Collective action Political machine
Corporatism/neo-corporatism Policy networks
Lobbying
Introduction
In addition to social movements (Chapter 10), political parties (Chapter 13) or even
individual action, another form of expressing demands towards the political system is
represented by interest groups. These articulate and aggregate interests at the meso-level
of politics (see also Chapter 1). Interest groups can be defined as ‘formal organizations,
usually based on individual voluntary membership, which seek to influence public poli-
cies without assuming government responsibility’ (Mattina, 2011: 1219). This definition
emphasizes three elements: 1) interest groups are formal organizations which means they
are relatively permanent and have a clearly identifiable membership and leadership
(as distinct, for example, from social movements); 2) membership is usually voluntary,
you can join or leave freely; 3) they try to influence policy making, but do not seek
political positions themselves (as distinct from political parties). The word ‘interest’ also
implies a shared attitude or goal of the members of such groups, most often of a material
kind, but sometimes also directed towards the public good, for example, environmental
issues, or similar idealistic or altruistic concerns (Salisbury, 1975). More or less synony-
mous terms are ‘pressure group’ or ‘lobby’. The latter can be traced to the hallways
(‘lobbies’) of the British Houses of Parliament since the early nineteenth century where
MPs would meet members of the public or certain organizations expressing their con-
cerns. Others attribute it to the practices of some US Presidents, in particular Ulysses
Grant (1869–77), to meet interested clients in the lobby or the bar of a hotel to discuss
and to influence political decisions. In this chapter, we first discuss the origins of interest
groups in modern politics. We then turn to some specific types, their major activities and
concrete forms of organization. This is concluded by an overall assessment.
Origins
The origin of modern interest groups is clearly linked to the beginnings of industri-
alization and an increasing division of labour in modern societies beginning in
Western Europe in about the sixteenth century and later spreading to North America

INTEREST GROUPS 187
and elsewhere (Wallerstein, 1974; Durkheim, 1984 [1893]). Before that time, in any
kind of regime (city-states, monarchies, etc.) personal relationships between those in
power and the population at large prevailed. Specific interests were then expressed on
this basis. Some authors see this as the most natural form of relationship in the devel-
opment of humankind (Fukuyama, 2011). Only with the advent of a greater division
of labour in the transition from largely agrarian societies to more commercialized
forms of transactions did more organized forms of expressing professional interests
emerge. In medieval times, merchants and craftsmen formed their own guilds, which
in some cases were grouped into a larger estate of its own vis-à-vis the nobility and
the clergy. This process was also closely linked to broader patterns of state formation
and the general world order which was created after the Westphalian peace treaties in
1648 (Tilly, 1974; see also Chapter 4 above). All these states were still largely ‘patri-
monial’ in character, reflecting a personal dependence of a state’s subjects on their
rulers (Weber, 1968 [1923]).
Up to the present day, various forms of such patrimonial or ‘neo-patrimonial’ kinds
of rule and relationships exist. This not only applies to still existing absolutist monar-
chies as in some countries of the Middle East, but also to many other forms of
authoritarian or ‘hybrid’ regimes in parts of Africa, Central Asia, etc. (Bratton and van
de Walle, 1997; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Even in contemporary democracies more
‘clientelistic’ forms of interest mediation can be found. These constitute asymmetrical
and unequal relationships between those in power granting some special favours (pub-
lic service jobs, preferable provision of public services for some localities, etc.) in
exchange for more generalized political support. Today, this is often exercised by the
parties in power rather than by particular persons. In various forms this could and can
be found in the ‘political machines’ of some cities in the USA, or under long-lasting
patterns of dominance of certain parties as in Japan, Italy, Greece or Austria (Kitschelt
and Wilkinson, 2007).
Only with the development of more impersonal state–society relations, the estab-
lishment of the rule of law and an independent judiciary, a free press and independent
media and, more generally, a stronger civil society, could such patterns be diminished
and broken. Democratic accountability is an important ‘self-cleansing’ mechanism in
this respect when corruption or political scandals are punished by the electorate (see
also Chapter 5). Again, there are various historical patterns and ‘paths’ which illus-
trate such developments (Fukuyama, 2014, Chapter 13). Interest groups of all kinds
have become instrumental in this regard as well.
Types
In modern societies a wide spectrum of interest groups exists. Many are based on
immediate economic interests of various occupations and professions, others pursue
specific causes such as social or environmental issues which are not directly related to
a particular self-interest and seek to promote an (apparently otherwise neglected)
public good. This can also be done by advocacy groups which act on behalf of persons
who cannot effectively represent their interests themselves, such as certain groups of
handicapped people, sick or elderly persons or otherwise underprivileged and margin-
alized groups. Not all voluntary associations, however, can be considered to be
political interest groups. A vast majority of them are mainly concerned with their own

purposes (sports and leisure activities, neighbourhood associations, etc.). They only
touch upon the political sphere when a more general regulation is at stake, for exam-
ple, safety or environmental regulations for certain sports or the prevention of cruelty
against animals for the breeding of pets (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998).
A very specific kind of association can often be found when larger public works
projects such as new roads, energy plants, airports, etc. are being planned. These are
created for the sole purpose of preventing such projects, usually because some
groups or neighbourhoods are more or less directly affected by them. These ‘not in
my backyard’ (NIMBY) groups have gained increased importance in recent decades,
making consensual or majority policy decisions more difficult to arrive at. Who is a
legitimate stakeholder in such instances, those who live near a particular project or
everyone in the larger region? Who is entitled to have a voice and, perhaps, a vote
and where to draw the line in a geographical sense? Principles of representative and
more direct forms of democracy also conflict in such instances (Della Porta and
Kriesi, 2009).
Another type concerns institutional interest groups, the membership of which is not
entirely voluntary and which represent large established public or private bodies such
as local or regional governments, established churches, charities and so on acting in
joint organizations vis-à-vis the central government. At the national level there are
also often umbrella organizations for certain interests, mainly again the major eco-
nomic ones like a national employers’ or industrialists’ organization, a national or
federal Trade Union Congress and similar bodies, which in Europe today also have
their equivalent on that level.
Activities
The range of activities is equally very wide. Since interest groups seek to influence
policy decisions, they attempt to do so in all conceivable ways. In some countries
these are more strictly regulated, in others there are some ‘grey zones’ (for example,
in terms of party financing, see also Chapter 13 below), and some activities are strictly
illegal (like bribing politicians and officials), but may be a not-so-uncommon practice
nevertheless.
One (indirect) form of achieving influence already begins in the electoral process.
Contributions to political parties or individual candidates by major interest groups,
big companies or rich individuals are frequent in many countries. The amounts
(officially) permitted and the degree of transparency and disclosure vary, however,
considerably. Once elected, this support may continue in many ways, especially if
the elected party or candidate join the government. But also ‘ordinary’ parliamen-
tarians and members of the opposition often continue to enjoy some financial
support, for example, when their ‘expertise’ is hired as consultants for particular
projects by companies or lobby groups. The extent to which such payments have to
be revealed and made public also varies from country to country. Not rarely, it is
only some ‘scandals’ revealed by the media or a whistleblower that show such links
in retrospect.

INTEREST GROUPS 189
The more direct day-to-day influence of interest groups takes place in the legisla-
tive process. There, all kinds of interests are represented in the hearings for a specific
piece of legislation and the (often highly technical) expertise of external groups is
required and helpful for finding meaningful and workable regulations as, for exam-
ple, in environmental matters. As long as this is done is public or open committee
meetings this is part of the democratic process. Only if, again, there is a lack of
transparency in such proceedings do these become more doubtful. Similarly effective,
and usually even less transparent, is the influence of important lobby groups in the
preparation of particular bills in the respective ministries and their bureaucratic
apparatus. There, all kinds of influences exist, from providing useful information and
expertise to the ‘grey zones’ of serving specific interests and not rarely, again, direct
forms of bribery and corruption. The former German Chancellor Bismarck (1815–
1898) is claimed to have said ‘for laws and liver sausage you never can tell what has
got inside’. The regular reports by ‘Transparency International’ and similar organiza-
tions are full of instances of unlawful ways of exerting influence and all forms of
corruption.
Today, in the major democratic capitals of the world, thousands of permanently
employed full-time lobbyists can be found who are either representing a specific inter-
est group or who offer their services and contacts to anyone for hire. In places like
Washington D.C., Brussels or Berlin such activities dominate the political agenda. In
many modern parliaments and administrations institutionalized procedures exist to
consult with all registered groups for certain policy areas. The more complex a politi-
cal system, like a federal system or the European Union, the more ‘entry points’ exist
for such activities (at the local, state, national and even supra-national level) and the
more untransparent and often dubious such activities become (Warntjen and Wonka,
2004; Nownes, 2013). In authoritarian systems such activities undoubtedly exist as
well, but, by their very nature, they are even less in the open and less researched and
documented.
In all fairness it must be added that such activities not only concern major economic
interest groups, but also ‘cause’ groups and those advocating some public interests.
This is often done by privately financed non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace and many others. Their activities often aim
less at the policy-making process as such, but attempt to influence public opinion by
regular reports, but also some spectacular activities such as symbolically occupying
certain buildings or organizing public demonstrations. Today, the use of the ‘social
media’ is an important instrument in this respect.
A special form of activity is provided by ‘advocacy’ groups. These attempt to rep-
resent the ‘weaker’ interests in society and act on behalf of persons who are
handicapped or disadvantaged in some way. Such activities include legal advice and
representation, but also the usual lobbying activities both vis-à-vis direct policy-
making and towards the general public. In today’s world many groups of this kind
also act on an international scale, for example in the EU or the United Nations (von
Winter, 2011). At certain moments, also ‘advocacy coalitions’ may be formed to bring
various groups and political forces together to achieve a major policy change
(Sabatier, 2007).

Box 12.1 Interest Groups’ Code of Conduct

The parties hereto consider that all interest representatives interacting
with them, whether on a single occasion or more frequently, registered
or not, should behave in conformity with this code of conduct.
In their relations with EU institutions and their Members, officials
and other staff, interest representatives shall:
(a) always identify themselves by name and by registration number, if
applicable, and by the entity or entities they work for or represent;
declare the interests, objectives or aims they promote and, where
applicable, specify the clients or members whom they represent;
(b) not obtain or try to obtain information or decisions dishonestly or
by use of undue pressure or inappropriate behaviour;
(c) not claim any formal relationship with the European Union or any
of its institutions in their dealings with third parties, or misrepre-
sent the effect of registration in such a way as to mislead third
parties or officials or other staff of the European Union, or use the
logos of EU institutions without express authorisation;
(d) ensure that, to the best of their knowledge, information, which they
provide upon registration, and subsequently in the framework of
their activities covered by the register, is complete, up-to-date and
not misleading; accept that all information provided is subject to
review and agree to co-operate with administrative requests for
complementary information and updates;
(e) not sell to third parties copies of documents obtained from EU
institutions;
(f) in general, respect, and avoid any obstruction to the implemen-
tation and application of, all rules, codes and good governance
practices established by EU institutions;
(g) not induce Members of the institutions of the European Union,
officials or other staff of the European Union, or assistants or
trainees of those Members, to contravene the rules and standards
of behaviour applicable to them;
(h) if employing former officials or other staff of the European Union,
or assistants or trainees of Members of EU institutions, respect the
obligation of such employees to abide by the rules and confiden-
tiality requirements which apply to them;
(i) obtain the prior consent of the Member or Members of the
European Parliament concerned as regards any contractual rela-
tionship with, or employment of, any individual within a Member’s
designated entourage;
(j) observe any rules laid down on the rights and responsibilities of
former Members of the European Parliament and the European
Commission;
(k) inform whomever they represent of their obligations towards the
EU institutions.
Source: Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, 8th parliamentary term – April
2015, Annex IX: Transparency register; Annex 3.

INTEREST GROUPS 191
Forms of organization
The political impact of interest groups depends to a large extent on the size of their
membership and their financial strength. This also requires special forms of organiza-
tion. In the course of industrialization labour unions became the most numerous ones
in many countries. In democratic systems they can make their influence felt by provid-
ing big voting blocks for particular parties. Historically, however, trade union
organization developed in different ways. In some countries, as in the United Kingdom,
their organization was based on the specific occupation and skills. So you had mem-
bers of different unions in the same company depending on their specific qualification,
which reduced their collective strength. In other cases, such as in France or Italy, union
organization is strongly divided along ideological-political lines. So you find
Communist, Socialist and Christian Democratic unions, for example, which not only
act as a lobby but also compete with each other. A third form of organization repre-
sents ‘unity unions’, as in Germany, which group together workers and employees in
entire branches of industry.
In spite of their origins linked to processes of industrialization and early democra-
tization many unions are internally not very democratic. A notable exception has been
the International Typographical Union in the USA which operated, at least for a while,
an internal two-party system with competitive elections (Lipset et al., 1956). In most
other unions, elections of the leadership are done either in a more consensual but also
not rarely in a more oligarchical way. At the extreme, Mafia-like internal structures
can be found, as for example in the Teamsters Union in the USA, in the past taking
bribes and extorting contributions for not going to strike.
Large-scale organizations of this kind are faced with the more general dilemma of
‘collective action’ (Olson, 1965). They need a large membership in order to exercise
their influence more effectively, but their achievements such as higher wages and bet-
ter working conditions may also benefit non-organized workers in the same company
or branch of industry. This may lead to ‘free riding’ on a large scale and a significant
weakening of unions. Some unions attempted to prevent this by concluding ‘closed
shop’ agreements with large companies where only union members would be
employed. Others provided additional fringe benefits such as specific forms of insur-
ance and similar services in order to make membership more attractive.
Box 12.2 Olson’s Theory of

Collective Action
“In a very small group, where each member gets a substantial propor-
tion of the total gain simply because there are few others in the group,
a collective good can often be provided by the voluntary, self-inter-
ested action of the members of the group. In smaller groups marked
by considerable degrees of inequality – that is, in groups of members
of unequal ‘size’ or extent of interest in the collective good – there is
(Continued)

(Continued)
the greatest likelihood that a collective good will be provided; for the
greater the interest in the collective good of any single member, the
greater the likelihood that that member will get such a significant
proportion of the total benefit from the collective good that he will
gain from seeing that the good is provided, even if he has to pay all
of the cost himself. Even in the smallest groups, however, the collec-
tive good will not ordinarily be provided on an optimal scale. That is
to say, the members of the group will not provide as much of the good
as it would be in their common interest to provide. Only certain spe-
cial institutional arrangements will give the individual members an
incentive to purchase the amounts of the collective good that would
add up to the amount that would be in the best interest of the group
as a whole.
This tendency toward sub-optimality is due to the fact that a col-
lective good is, by definition, such that other individuals in the group
cannot be kept from consuming it once any individual in the group
has provided it for himself. Since an individual member thus gets only
part of the benefit of any expenditure he makes to obtain more of
the collective good, he will discontinue his purchase of the collec-
tive good before the optimal amount for the group as a whole has
been obtained. In addition, the amounts of the collective good that a
member of the group receives free from other members will further
reduce his incentive to provide more of that good at his own expense.
Accordingly, the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing
an optimal amount of a collective good…
The most important single point about small groups in the present
context, however, is that they may very well be able to provide them-
selves with a collective good simply because of the attraction of the
collective good to the individual members. In this, small groups differ
from larger ones. The larger a group is, the farther it will fall short of
obtaining an optimal supply of any collective good, and the less likely
that it will act to obtain even a minimal amount of such a good. In
short, the larger the group, the less it will further its common interests.”
Olson, Mancur (1965) The logic of collective action - Public goods and the theory of groups.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 33 ff.
The bargaining power of unions and similar interest groups not only depends on
their size and organizational strength, but also on their conflict potential (Offe, 1969).
Relatively small strategic groups are thus able to wield enormous power by not pro-
viding their services, such as strikes by air controllers or subway drivers who can cause
havoc by affecting large numbers of persons not being able to pursue their regular
activities.
Among the many kinds of interest groups a large variety of forms of internal
organization exists. Some have local or regional branches and actively involve their

INTEREST GROUPS 193
membership in many activities and decision making (Amnesty International, for

example), others are highly centralized and act in strictly hierarchical ways
(Greenpeace). The claim to speak for large numbers in policy matters may also be
dubious when membership is based more on the services which are delivered rather
than on specific common interests. This is the case, for example, when the German
Automobile Association (ADAC) claims to speak for millions of members arguing
against the introduction of a speed limit without ever having actually consulted them
on this issue.
Overall assessment
Interest groups thus possess an important position in the overall political process and
specific forms of policy making. In all their diversity they are a necessary and inevita-
ble part of political decision making in all kinds of political systems. Their role in
contemporary democracies, in particular, has been at the centre of debates. In addition
to some of the shortcomings and downsides mentioned above the representativeness
and democratic legitimization of such groups has been questioned.
One school of thought emphasized the pluralism of all these groups which would
lead to a balanced democratic process representing all interests in society relatively
fairly and according to overall democratic principles with regard to their numerical
strength and respect of rights and legal provisions (Truman, 1971; Dahl, 1961). This
view has been challenged by others who point out great inequalities among interest
groups and the kinds of influence they exercise, questioning their overall democratic
legitimacy (Lowi, 1969). As one observer put it: ‘The flaw in the pluralist heaven is
that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent’ (Schattschneider,
1960: 35). In some countries even the dominance of pressure groups in the political
process (‘Herrschaft der Verbände’) was highlighted (Eschenburg, 1963).
Other scholars pointed to specific forms of accommodating the major economic
interest groups (unions and employers) in tripartite agreements together with state
authorities. These ‘neo-corporatist’ arrangements served to avoid long-lasting labour
conflicts such as strikes and to put them in line with the overall macro-economic
objectives of the incumbent government. This practice could be found in the
Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden, for long periods of time, but also in
Austria and Germany in the 1970s when these countries were faced with the conse-
quences of the ‘oil crisis’ and high levels of unemployment and inflation (‘stagflation’).
These arrangements privileged the strong economic interest groups at the expense of
smaller or more ‘cause’-oriented ones. A neo-corporatism of this kind does not neces-
sarily, however, supersede party government, but it works in close cooperation with
the major parties which, in turn, have strong links with the respective interest groups
(conservative parties with the employers, social democratic parties with the unions)
(Lehmbruch and Schmitter, 1982).
Since the1980s, however, more ‘neo-liberal’, market-oriented policies have come to
prevail in many Western countries and through the influences of the IMF and the
World Bank these also have been imposed on many states in other regions of the
world. The strength of unions generally has declined. The forces of economic globali-
zation have led to unregulated forms of capital–labour relations in many of the

‘emerging’ economies where low wages and often miserable working conditions
including very long working hours, dangerous work places, sometimes child labour,
etc. have attracted many international companies for their labour-intensive forms of
production. Local interest groups or international advocacy groups such as ‘Attac’
have remained relatively weak in these respects. This is even more true with regard to
the ‘Great Recession’ after 2008 and the effects of purely speculative and largely unfet-
tered financial transactions leading to severe economic (and political) crises in many
countries after the breakdown of the Lehman Brothers investment bank and its reper-
cussions worldwide (van Beek and Wnuk-Lipiński, 2012).
Conclusions
Altogether, the world of interest groups in all their forms and differentiations has to
be seen in the overall political context. They exist in all kinds of contemporary
political systems and exercise necessary functions. At the same time, their potential
negative effects and ‘grey zones’ in the political process should not be overlooked
either. An assessment of their impact on central political values such as political rep-
resentativeness, political accountability, equality of opportunity, fairness, lack of
corruption, democratic legitimacy cannot be done without taking other aspects of
political processes such as the forms of institutionalization, parties and party sys-
tems, the role of media and communication, and the international situation into
account. No single interpretation (pluralist, corporatist or other) does justice to this
multi-faceted and complex world any more. A policy network approach can clarify
such relationships in certain instances (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989). A wider view,
however, must take the entire context into account as covered in the other chapters
of this volume.
Questions
1 How can clientelistic relationships be eliminated?
2 Where lie the limits of a pluralist view of politics?
3 What are the dangers for democracy in political systems with
intensive lobbying?
4 How can the dilemma of collective action be overcome?
Further reading
Baumgartner, Frank R and Leech, Beth L (1998) Basic interests. The importance of groups in
politics and in political science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. A broad overview
of the study of interest groups.
Lipset, Seymour Martin, Trow, Martin A, Coleman, James S and Kerr, Clark (1956) Union
democracy; The internal politics of the International Typographical Union. Glencoe, IL: Free
Press. A classic case study of a democratically organized trade union.
Lowi, Theodore J (1969) The end of liberalism. Ideology, policy, and the crisis of public author-
ity. New York: Norton. A major criticism of the ‘pluralist’ view of politics.

INTEREST GROUPS 195
Olson, Mancur (1965) The logic of collective action – Public goods and the theory of groups.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. The classic on group theory and public goods.
Truman, David B (1971) The governmental process. Political interests and public opinion (2nd
ed.). New York: Knopf. A principal text on pluralism.
Weblinks
ECPR Standing Group on Interest Groups: www.ecpr-sgig.eu/
IPSA RC38 - Politics and Business: www.ipsa.org/research-committees/rclist/RC38
APSA section ‘European Politics and Society’ (Section 21): www.apsanet.org/section21
Transparency International, www.transparency.org.

13
Political parties
Key terms
Cartel party Electoral systems
Catch-all party Left-right spectrum
De-alignment/re-alignment Party identification
Duverger’s laws Proportional
Effective number of parties representation
Introduction
Political parties are an indispensable part of modern representative democracies. In
the first broad empirical study on modern democracies James Bryce (1921: 119)
stated, for example: ‘parties are inevitable. … No one has shown how representative
government could be worked without them’. Later, Elmer Schattschneider (1942: 1)
affirmed: ‘political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable
save in terms of the parties’. These statements are still empirically correct today, but
will be qualified below. Moreover, in some forms political parties can be found in
non-democratic states, but the word itself (from Latin pars, i.e. part) suggests that
they are part of a larger entity, namely a party system with at least two, if not more
parties. A one-party system, therefore, is a contradiction in terms, which means that
a single party in any country is something different from its pluralist and competi-
tive counterparts. According to Max Weber’s original definition, modern parties
‘… designate associations, membership in which rests on formally free recruitment.
The end to which their activity is devoted is to secure power within an organization
for its leaders in order to attain ideal or material advantages for its members’
(Weber, 1968: 284). From this and similar definitions the following three constitu-
tive elements can be derived:
1. Parties (in contrast to interest groups, see Chapter 12) seek to exercise power in a
political system and recruit (at least part of) its leadership.
2. They pursue ideal or material benefits for their members, which, however, are not
shared by everyone, and attempt to mobilize members and supporters for this
purpose.
3. They form more or less permanent organizations with a clearly defined structure
(in contrast to social movements).

POLITICAL PARTIES 197
The degree to which these characteristics are formally regulated in a constitution or

specific laws varies from country to country, especially as far as internal decision-
making procedures (more or less democratic) and party finances (sources and
transparency) are concerned. In certain countries, as in the Federal Republic of
Germany, some parties, which do not fulfil such basic requirements (for example, on
the extreme right or left, or radical fundamentalist groups), are outlawed. In this chap-
ter, we first discuss the origins of modern political parties, describe their major
functions, and present the major contemporary types. We then turn to different party
systems, followed by a critical assessment of major recent developments.
Origins
Divisive factions may exist in all kinds of regimes. The difference concerning political
parties lies in their formal organization and open competitive situation. Historically,
modern political parties emerged with the (relatively slow) ‘first wave’ of democratiza-
tion in the nineteenth century. The French political scientist Maurice Duverger (1951,
1959) distinguishes between parties, which have been formed ‘internally’ as groups in
parliaments (as for example in the United Kingdom) or ‘externally’ as more permanent
products of social movements such as the labour movement in the course of industri-
alization in many countries. Not all parties, of course, have been considered to be
legitimate parts of the political process from the very beginning. There have often been
protracted struggles to achieve that aim in the face of feudal or other authoritarian
regimes (Seiler, 2011).
Europe
In the European context, specific lines of conflict have developed in the course of time,
which shaped party systems in many countries up to (almost) the present day (see also
Chapter 4 above). One line of conflict in a West–East dimension goes back to the
period of (relatively early) state formation in the seaward countries (UK, France,
Portugal, Spain), the much later state-building in the ‘city belt’ (including Germany
and Italy) in the middle, and the emergence of new states in the landward regions after
the dissolution of the Tsarist, Habsburg and Ottoman empires at the end of the First
World War. The early state formation in the absolutist monarchies of the period led to
highly centralized forms of state structures (as most notably still in France), but also,
in the course of time, to conflicts between the centre and the peripheries (Scotland and
Wales in the UK; Cataluña and the Basque country in Spain, Corsica and Bretagne in
France), together with political groupings on this basis.
Another line of conflict concerned the relationship between the (Catholic) church
and the state. This began with the ‘investiture controversy’ in the eleventh and twelfth
centuries over the question whether the Pope or the monarch would appoint local
church leaders and bishops and whether the Pope would crown the head of the Holy
Roman Empire and so invest him with his blessing. The period of the Protestant
Reformation (after 1517) and Counter-Reformation (until the Westphalian peace

treaties in 1648) then led to a North–South division in Europe where the Southern
countries remained largely Catholic and the Northern states became Protestant with
some mixed cases like Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland in between. Going
back to this cleavage, at a later stage Catholic (or Christian Democratic) political par-
ties were founded as opposed to more secular forces in these countries.
A third major cleavage developed as a conflict between the landed aristocracy and
the emerging urban bourgeoisie in the course of commercialization and early industri-
alization as, for example, in the UK beginning in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
There, the parties of the Tories and the Whigs were formed on this basis as were more
conservative or more liberal groupings elsewhere. This included conflicts over food
prizes (urban consumers vs. rural producers) and led to the formation of agrarian par-
ties in some countries (as in Scandinavia) or strong rural interest groups elsewhere.
The final historical conflict line and the dominant one until the present day is the one
between capital and labour in the course of industrialization in many countries as
emphasized by Karl Marx and his followers. Since the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury many social-democratic, socialist and communist parties were founded on this
basis. The common ‘left–right’ dimension to characterize party systems also reflects
this more recent and most prevalent cleavage. In addition, the revolution in Russia led
to a split between social-democratic/socialist and communist parties where the latter
for a long time remained strongly influenced from Moscow (von Beyme, 1985).
As noted, in particular, by Stein Rokkan, these conflicts and the resulting party sys-
tems have become quite durable in the course of time and even led to a ‘freezing’ of
the party landscapes when full universal suffrage (including women) had been reached
in most European countries after the First World War (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; see
also Flora, 1999).
Only since about the 1970s in Europe did these social-structural determinants of
parties and party systems begin to decline and a more general ‘de-alignment’ of voters
concerning these groupings and a stronger electoral volatility could be observed. At
the same time, new social movements and parties emerged which were based on ‘post-
materialist’ value orientations and represented to some extent the ‘new middle classes’
of better-educated and better-off employees in the private and public sectors (Inglehart,
1977; see also Chapter 4). Major new issues in this respect concern economic vs. eco-
logical orientations, gender problems, a stronger emphasis on ‘self-realization’ values
and broader rights for (sexual and other) minorities. These found their expression in
‘Green’ and similar parties in many countries.
With the increasing political integration of Europe (see Chapter 16), some anti-
European parties like the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) were also
formed. Furthermore, the ‘Great Recession’ after 2008, the ensuing Euro crisis, and
the strong migration flows from the Middle East and North Africa as a result of the
civil wars in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria led to the emergence and
strengthening of populist and right-wing extremist protest and ‘anti-establishment’
parties in a broader range of countries including the Netherlands (‘Partij voor de
Vrijheid’ led by Geert Wilders), the ‘Sweden Democrats’, the ‘True Finns’, the ‘Front
National’ in France, the ‘Cinque Stelle’ (Five Star Movement) in Italy or ‘Alternative
für Deutschland’ in Germany. In this way, some new issue dimensions changed the
existing party systems or even led to a complete collapse as in Italy (see also
Lijphart, 2012).

Latin America
On other continents some similar, but specifically historically shaped developments
could be observed (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966). Some authors attempted to apply
some of Rokkan’s ideas to other world regions (for example, Shiratori, 1997; Temelli,
1999; Randall, 2001), even though the cleavages there had been developed in very dif-
ferent ways and the patterns of state formation were strongly influenced by the colonial
powers. In Latin America, for example, the Spanish and Portuguese spheres of influence
were demarcated relatively early on and independent states were created in the early
nineteenth century as a result of the defeat of these powers in the Napoleonic wars. The
social structure had been strongly shaped in feudal and neo-feudal ways resulting in an
oligarchy with very large latifundias, large parts of the population as farm labourers or
‘mini-fundistas’ and an emerging bourgeoisie and work force in the cities. The indige-
nous populations were either eliminated or socially and politically side-lined. In the
early republics, as far as they were democratically constituted, a dominant two-party
system emerged reflecting the relative strength of the (‘conservative’) landed oligarchy
and the more ‘liberal’ urban bourgeoisie. Similar groups were called ‘Colorados’ and
‘Blancos’ in Uruguay, for example. At a later stage, workers’ parties (such as the
Peronistas in Argentina or the Partido Socialista in Chile) emerged as well. Many of
these parties were highly personalized depending on strong leaders, today including
also a number of populist parties like the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)
founded by Hugo Chavez or the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) led by Evo Morales
in Bolivia. Altogether, Latin American political parties have remained less institutional-
ized than their European counterparts and show greater volatility (Mainwaring, 1998).
Sub-Saharan Africa
In the Sub-Saharan African context, soon after independence in the late 1950s and
early 1960s when the democratic constitutions negotiated with the former colonial
powers were discarded, a number of one-party states emerged proclaiming some
‘African socialist’ way as in Tanzania or Zambia, or gave way to military dictatorships
as in Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and many other cases. With the ‘third wave’ of democ-
ratization, which also affected many African countries, multi-party systems were
created again. In many cases, as in Nigeria or Kenya, these were largely based on the
respective ethnic, religious or regional strongholds of these parties (Bratton and van
de Walle, 1997; Temelli, 1999). The degree of institutionalization also remained very
low and a lot of fluctuations and renaming of certain groups have occurred in the
meantime. South Africa is a special case where under the Apartheid regime for a long
time only parties representing the white population could compete. The African
National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912 as a black nationalist organization, had
been banned from 1960 to 1990. After the first free elections in 1994 the ANC has
become the dominant party in a multi-party state.
Asia
In South and Southeast Asia, for a long time India remained the only relatively stable
democratic state. The party system there was long dominated by the overarching

‘Congress’ party, but has given way to a more pluralist spectrum including religious-
based groups like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), but also Communist and smaller
regional parties in the meantime. In Japan after the Second World War the (conserva-
tive) ‘Liberal Democratic Party’ (LDP) has been dominant most of the time. In other
more recently democratic countries such as South Korea, the Philippines or Taiwan,
highly personalized parties with certain regional strongholds emerged.
In the wake of the ‘third wave’, a number of ‘semi-competitive’ systems or ‘hybrid’
regimes in a number of post-communist countries, but also in parts of Africa and the
Middle East, came into being (see also Chapter 7). These regimes characteristically are
ruled by a dominant and usually also highly personalized party with some opposition
allowed in the considerably less than ‘free and fair’ elections (Levitsky and Way, 2010).
Functions
Such reflections on the origins of modern political parties immediately bring us to
explore what are the main functions that parties perform and why they are still neces-
sary in contemporary democracies in spite of a widespread disenchantment about
them in different parts of the world. The first functions to be considered are those
related to elections. So, first of all, parties have to designate citizens who are to repre-
sent them in the electoral campaign and the elections (candidate nomination). Second,
parties are necessary for electoral mobilization, that is, to convince citizens to partici-
pate in the elections and to vote for their candidates or party list. In many
contemporary democracies voter turnout has declined in recent decades and dissatis-
fied citizens often prefer to abstain rather than to vote for another party (see also
Chapter 14). Third, the electoral campaign and the discussion of party programmes is
also the moment of issue structuring. Party leaders and conventions structure the
choices and policy alternatives, which they offer to the electorate in order to mobilize
their support.
In addition to these electoral functions, parties perform functions of social represen-
tation and interest aggregation as well as the formation and support of governments
or ruling coalitions. Social representation refers to the groups and social strata repre-
sented by the party and their elected members of parliament. In this way, various
social interests are also aggregated (see Chapter 12). Many modern parties do this in
a rather broad ‘catch-all’ way (see also below). The formation and support of govern-
ments is another vital function in parliamentary democracies. In presidential systems,
an elected president may govern without the continuous support of parliament or will
have to seek legislative support for each of his/her initiatives in rather loosely struc-
tured party systems as in the USA.
Diamond and Gunther (2001: 8) also mention social integration as another impor-
tant function of political parties. In this way, they ‘may play a crucial … role, as they
enable citizens to participate effectively in the political process and, if successful in
that task, to feel that they have a vested interest in its perpetuation’. The opposite
effect, however, can also be observed when citizens become increasingly dissatisfied
with the performance of governments and the parties which support them. Times of
economic crisis, such as the ‘Great Recession’ (2008–14), can especially fuel such anti-
party and anti-establishment attitudes.

The analysis of these functions can be summed up by three models of party behav-
iour suggested from a rational choice perspective. These include: (1) vote seeking;
(2) office seeking; and (3) policy seeking (Downs, 1957; Riker, 1962; Budge and Laver,
1986). The first attempts to maximize the number of votes in an election, the second
strives to gain or share power in the central political system, and the third aims at
achieving specific political goals, for example, in economic or ecological terms. It also
must be seen that the first usually is not a goal in itself, but a means to obtain the
second or third objective, and the third model is often combined with a specific gov-
ernment office (Strom, 1990). Nevertheless, beyond these formal functions the many
informal ways to influence governments and party politics must not be overlooked in
any given context (see Chapter 12).
Types
These different origins and functions are also reflected in the types of parties and
their organization. In this respect, we also must distinguish the ‘party on the ground’,
that is, the members, militants and local elites who are present and active in a com-
munity; the ‘party in central office’, that is, the functionaries who run the party; and
the ‘party in public office’ especially in the parliament and other elective bodies (Katz
and Mair, 1995).
The early nineteenth-century parties in Europe, which were formed inside parlia-
ments, largely represented respected personalities (‘notables’) at local, regional or
national levels. They remained loosely structured and showed a great deal of fluc-
tuation. By contrast, those parties which emerged on the basis of, initially, ‘external’
forces and strong social movements became ‘mass parties’ often with a highly cen-
tralized internal organization and a solid membership base. The sociologist Robert
Michels, having observed this kind of organization first-hand when he unsuccessfully
ran for a seat in the German Reichstag at Marburg for the Social Democratic Party
(SPD), spoke of an ‘iron law of oligarchy’ which characterized such organizations
(Michels, 1962 [1911]). This tendency was even more pronounced in the strictly
centralized Communist parties following Lenin’s principle of ‘democratic centralism’
where the vanguard of the working classes showed the way, not rarely purging dis-
senters from their ranks. This type of party, therefore, was often designated as a
‘cadre party’.
Generally speaking, the conservative and liberal parties remained more loosely
structured for a long time whereas the parties of the left had a stronger and more
stringent pattern of organization. With the advent of universal suffrage in the twenti-
eth century most parties developed a permanent organization with a full-time staff at
the centre and many local and regional branches. In a number of countries the ideo-
logical differences also tended to decline and Otto Kirchheimer (1969) coined the term
‘catch-all parties’ for this tendency to become oriented to middle-of-the-road policies
and the ‘median voter’ (Downs, 1957).
This could also be observed in the USA where both big parties, the Republicans and
the Democrats, had their distinct historical roots and geographical strongholds but
were, by and large, less ideologically oriented and also less organized. They centre
more on personalities, with candidates in elections helping to organize their campaigns

and financing. There is no permanent party membership organized in local and

regional branches and voters for party primaries have to register for each election.
There used to be, however, a strong sense of ‘party identification’ concerning social
and historical backgrounds and family traditions in this respect. This is conceived as
an ‘individual’s affective orientation’ to a party (Campbell et al., 1960: 121) and is less
based on social structural characteristics as in Europe. In the meantime, however, a
certain de-alignment can be observed there as well and fluctuations in voters’ prefer-
ences have become greater (Bartle and Bellucci, 2009).
Similar developments were conceptualized by Panebianco (1988), who proposed
the model of electoral-professional party, which has no links or relationships with the
old mass party and is characterized by an emphasis on personal leadership and spe-
cific policy issues, exercised by a small group of professionals with marketing and
communication skills, by weak links to broader interest groups and citizens and a
weak party organization. Berlusconi’s ‘Forza Italia’ (Go Italy!), has come very close to
this new type.
Where parties dominate over longer periods of time they become more closely inter-
twined with state institutions and offer chances of patronage as ‘cartel parties’ (Katz
and Mair, 1995). Thus, this type is characterized by becoming part of the state, the
privileged access to state-regulated channels of communication, the blurred distinction
between party members and non-members, the emphasis on members as individuals
rather than as an organized body, in addition to other aspects mentioned for the elec-
toral professional party, such as the emphasis on politics as a profession and the sali-
ence of managerial and marketing skills. In a nutshell, the party is no longer a
representative of social groups, but an agent of the state. However, the most distinctive
aspect of such a party is not only the interpenetration of party and state, but also a
pattern of party collusion. Thus, the emergence of cartel parties ‘depends on collusion
and cooperation between ostensible competitors, and on agreements which, of neces-
sity, require the consent and cooperation of all, or almost all, relevant participants’
(Katz and Mair 1995: 17). This phenomenon has been recognized in Italy, Austria, or
some German states such as Bavaria, for example. At the extreme, they may turn into
‘political machines’ for their clientele, as in Chicago or New York in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, or into almost purely clientelistic parties as in
Greece for a long time. Such clientelistic patterns are also prevalent in many of the
more recent democracies in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (Kitschelt
and Wilkinson, 2007, see also Chapter 6).
Parties can also not be considered and analysed as organizations just by themselves,
but as parts of larger social networks with many linkages towards a broad range of
more specific interest groups, old or more recent social movements, and often close
ties with the state apparatus and other public institutions as a result of past or present
recruitment patterns (Lawson, 2005).
The names and labels of parties also mean different things in different countries. A
liberal party, for example, in the classic European sense of the term refers to middle
class and political centre parties such as the ‘Free Democrats’ (FDP) in Germany or
the Liberal Democrats in the UK, whereas ‘liberal’ in the USA designates left-wing and
in Japan’s LDP, right-wing conservative orientations. Similarly, the ‘Social Democratic’
Party in Portugal is a right of centre conservative grouping unlike its counterparts in
Austria or Germany.

Party systems
As mentioned above, a party in a democratic sense is only part of a larger entity, a
party system. These also have been labelled in different ways. The simplest termi-
nology just refers to the number of parties in a particular country, at least those
represented in parliament. So, two-, three-, four- and so on party systems can be
distinguished. In addition, however, other factors have to be taken into account.
These refer to the relative size of parties, their social basis in the existing cleavage
structure, their ideological distance, and the level of polarization in the overall
party system. Giovanni Sartori (1976), therefore, emphasized the relative relevance
of parties in a party system pointing to their respective ‘coalition’ or ‘blackmail’
potential. On this basis the major parties in a multi-party system and their posi-
tions towards each other can be identified. In many of the longer-established
Western democracies a major party on each side of the left-right spectrum exists
which, depending on the outcome of the elections, can then govern alone or in
coalition with one or a few smaller ‘pivotal’ parties which may tip the scale in
either direction. This can lead to a moderate pluralism in Sartori’s sense and cen-
tripetal forms of party competition. Under such a pattern some of the more extreme
parties on the right or left may be permanently excluded from taking part in a
governing coalition.
This pattern can become more complicated, if other salient cleavages such as strong
ethnic, religious or regional ones exist leading to an even greater number of parties
and greater difficulties of coalition formation as in Belgium, Israel or the Netherlands.
At the extreme, a polarized pluralism may lead to a high level of party system frag-
mentation, centrifugal competition, great government instability and, eventually, to a
breakdown of democracy as in Weimar Germany (Karvonen and Quenter, 2002).
Empirically, the degree of fragmentation of a party system can be measured by an
‘Index of the Effective Number of Parties’ (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) which takes
into account the number and relative strength of parties in a parliament (see also
Lijphart, 2012, Chapter 5).
The number of parties and the stability of a party system are also closely related
to the electoral system. In a seminal contribution Maurice Duverger (1951) postu-
lated that majoritarian (‘first past the post’) electoral systems in single member
constituencies lead to stable two-party systems as in the UK or the USA, whereas
proportional representation (PR) creates multi-party systems and a high level of
party system fragmentation as in many of the continental European countries. He
distinguished two effects in this respect, a purely numerical one where small parties
not obtaining a relative majority in a constituency would be eliminated and a psy-
chological one in terms of tactical considerations of voters with respect to possible
coalitions of two minor parties vis-à-vis a larger one. In fact, in the UK extreme
right-wing or Communist parties have never gained a single seat in the House of
Commons. If smaller parties have strong regional strongholds, however, such as the
Scottish or Welsh nationalists, this ‘law’ does not apply and such parties are then
represented.
Conversely, PR ‘mirrors’ the electorate much more closely and reflects the diversi-
fied cleavages. Some minimal thresholds for representation in parliament, like the
five-percent-clause in Germany, can dampen this effect and lead to a more limited

multi-party situation. In actual practice, there are many variations of electoral laws
including some mixed systems, limitations of voter registration, the drawing of con-
stituency boundaries and the allocation of seats according to certain mathematical
procedures like the one developed by Victor D’ Hondt, and so on (Nohlen, 1996;
see also Chapter 14).
The choice of an electoral system depends on conflicting aims: greater and ‘fairer’
representation on the one hand, and less party system fragmentation and greater gov-
ernment effectiveness on the other. Given the highly diversified historical origins and
social conditions, there certainly is no universally ‘ideal’ electoral system for all coun-
tries. The fact that those who make decisions about various electoral regulations are
the (majoritarian) parties themselves opens the way to many forms of electoral and
constitutional ‘engineering’ and outright manipulation as with ‘gerrymandering’ or
specific rules favouring majority parties (Sartori, 1994).
Conclusions
In today’s world parties are subjected to continuous changes. Conflicts and issues are
changing over time and parties have to attempt to cope with these changes. As E.E.
Schattschneider (1960) has observed, processes of ‘conflict displacement’ are taking
place and new issues and conflicts take centre stage for a while. This is also reflected
in the social composition of party members and their political aims and policies. The
strong worker-based socialist and social-democratic parties, for example, have incor-
porated more ‘new middle class’ elements and have become more oriented towards
ecological, gender and ‘self-realization’ issues. In a way, the same organizational ‘shell’
can thus serve many changing interests over time.
Parties in many countries are also faced with increasing disenchantment and cyni-
cism due to political scandals and incidences of nepotism, corruption and dubious
financial practices. In this respect, the support for political parties (and democracy in
general) is also closely linked to aspects of the overall performance of the political
system, ‘good governance’, and an effective judicial control (see also Part III).
Otherwise, this opens the political space to new social movements and groupings (see
also Chapter 10). Some of these may become more permanent and become integrated
in the party system, as many ‘Green’ parties in West European countries. Others are
more temporary and often ‘populist’ and ‘anti-system’. International migration for
economic or political reasons also creates new minorities, which may become targets
for xenophobic sentiments and reactions.
As Peter Mair (2013) has documented, in a large number of European countries
electoral turnout and party memberships have decreased significantly during the last
60 years. At the same time, electoral volatility has increased enormously and the
‘political space’ for new, often populist groups and parties has been considerably
widened. Many of these, however, have also been relatively short lived. A large part
of such developments can be attributed to a growing political indifference and a
turn to more private or hedonistic concerns by many people, especially in the
younger generations. This makes the ‘demos’ not only semi-sovereign as in
Schattschneider’s (1960) apt expression, but even non-sovereign, leaving politics to

some professionals. It then depends whether a democracy can absorb such forces in
a centripetal way and become invigorated by new organizational forms or whether
the disenchantment is not only directed against long-established parties, but against
basic democratic principles and procedures as such. Democratic breakdowns or
changes towards more ‘hybrid’ and often highly personalized systems then become
a possibility again.
In many of the ‘third wave’ democracies, parties and party systems are still very
fragile and subject to many fluctuations (Mair, 1999). New groupings may appear and
others change their names. Party identification of individuals then also becomes more
fluid and can turn to populist leaders or become oriented again towards more primor-
dial characteristics like ethnicity or religion. Such phenomena become stronger in
times of economic crises and greater uncertainties in an increasingly ‘globalizing’
world. At the extreme, not only may party systems and the democratic order disinte-
grate, but the often relatively weak states as such. This also may be instigated by
cross-border activities of armed groups and terrorist attacks as in some countries of
the Middle East and parts of Africa.
In addition to socio-economic and demographic changes, technological develop-
ments also play an increasing role with regard to political mobilization and party
organization. On the one hand, in countries where parties and electoral campaigns are
not, at least in part, subsidized by public funding or free TV advertizing such cam-
paigns have become outrageously expensive, as in the USA, and put into question
principles of democratic equality and fair representation. On the other hand, the
‘social media’ have gained increasing importance and facilitate political mobilization
and ‘crowd-funding’ for campaigns at very low costs.
Political parties as the major ‘transmission belts’ between the electorate and the
central political institutions in representative democracies are faced with many new
challenges. In all their variety, they remain indispensable for this purpose. Traditional
party activities and organizations, however, have to adapt to these new circumstances.
In part, they may be replaced by other forms of communication and organization and
more ‘direct’ forms of democracy (see also Chapters 6 and 11). As part of electoral
mechanisms, as pointed out above, they will retain some of their original functions.
But as active communities, especially on the local level, they may largely disappear.
Consequently, they still are and will be vote seekers and office seekers, but much less
programmatic policy seekers.
Questions
1 How can parties, which by their very nature reflect only parts of
the electorate, contribute to the common good?
2 In which ways can party organization be prevented from becoming
oligarchic?
3 What are ma jor factors for increasing disenchantment about
political parties in contemporary democracies? What can or
should be done about this?

Further reading
Duverger, Maurice (1951/1959) Political parties. English edn, London, New York. A ‘classic’
about the emergence of parties in Europe and the effects of electoral laws on party systems,
formulating ‘Duverger’s law’.
LaPalombara, Joseph and Weiner, Myron (eds) (1966) Political parties and political develop-
ment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. A broad assessment of parties in the
developing areas.
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Rokkan, Stein (eds) (1967) Party systems and voter alignments:
cross-national perspectives. New York, London: Free Press; Collier-Macmillan. The first
elaboration of the ‘cleavage’ concept for the historical formation of parties in Western
Europe.
Mair, Peter (1999) Party system change. Approaches and interpretations. New York: Oxford
University Press. A comparative assessment of processes of de-alignment and re-alignment
in European party systems.
Sartori, Giovanni (1976) Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. A broad conceptualization of parties and party systems empha-
sizing their respective relevance and possible polarization.
Weblinks
IPSA Research Committee on Political Elites: http://rc02.ipsa.org/
IPSA Research Committee on ‘Political Finance and political corruption’: http://rc20.ipsa.org/
ECPR Standing Group on Political Parties: http://political-parties-standing-group.com/
The ‘Party Manifesto’ database: https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/

14
Elections and
electoral behaviour
Key terms
Direct democracy Median voter theorem
Electoral volatility Populism
Gerrymandering Referendum
Introduction
Free and fair elections are a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for modern democ-
racies. They constitute the formal process of selecting persons or parties to fill public
offices or of accepting or rejecting a political proposition in a referendum. In such
procedures voters must have an effective choice between at least two alternatives. For
elections to be ‘free’ means that they are based on the effective existence of civil rights
including freedom of information, expression and organization (see below and
Chapter 5). ‘Fair’ means that there are no frauds, manipulations, constraints or
unequal conditions created by the incumbent authorities to influence the voters.
There must be, as in football and many other sports, a level playing field. Otherwise,
such elections cannot be considered to be democratic (see below and Chapter 7).
There are two kinds of voting. One is typical of representative democracies and con-
sists of the choice of persons or parties to whom the responsibility of making
collective decisions is given. In another type of vote the electorate decides on substan-
tive political issues as a form of direct democracy. The first type of voting in a
representative democracy occurs at constitutionally determined (usually regular)
intervals. The second type, where it is constitutionally permitted, can be conducted
at any time either ‘from above’ as in plebiscites or ‘from below’ through citizens’
initiatives (see below).
Thus, elections are a decision-making mechanism, the basic rules of which have been
accepted and are considered to be legitimate in contemporary representative democra-
cies. In this respect, they constitute a ‘minimal’ element of such forms of rule (see
Chapter 5). Decisions by a majority in elections or in a parliament are not necessarily,
however, always the best and correct ones. Majorities can be wrong, but in well-func-
tioning democracies such errors can be corrected in the course of time, at least after the
next elections. At the same time, majorities cannot decide everything and are bound by

basic democratic principles such as the respect of basic human and political rights and
the rule of law, as another essential element of democracy (see also Dahl, 1989).
The actual conduct of elections varies widely, however, and the determinants of
electoral behaviour have been one of the most frequently analysed and most fruitful
endeavours of contemporary political science. In the following, first the major charac-
teristics of electoral systems and some of the major criteria and practices will be
discussed. Then, determinants of electoral behaviour and various approaches dealing
with it are presented. This is followed by a brief discussion of special forms of ‘direct
democracy’, such as referenda and plebiscites. Finally, some current trends and per-
spectives will be pointed out.
Electoral systems
When we analyse the ways in which elections are conducted we have to take into
account several elements. These include: the geographical area in which the elections
are held; the electoral formula of transforming votes into seats in parliament; possible
minimum thresholds of parties to be represented; and the categorical or preferential
kind of vote. The geographical area can be divided into a number of electoral districts
with a given population size, it can correspond to the pattern of federal states where
these exist, or it can include the entire territory of a state. Electoral formulas consist
of two major types, a majoritarian one (‘first past the post’ in single member con-
stituencies or in nationwide presidential elections) and a proportional one allocating
seats in parliament according to the (approximate) proportional share of votes for
parties (see also below). In some electoral systems, there is an explicit threshold of a
minimum percentage of votes to be obtained by a party, for example, 5 per cent in
German federal elections. This avoids a larger number of splinter parties being repre-
sented and facilitates the eventual formation of governing coalitions. Otherwise, an
implicit threshold exists concerning the minimum number of votes depending on the
number of seats available nationwide or in a specific province or district. So, for exam-
ple, if there are 100 parliamentary seats nationwide a party has to reach at least one
per cent to fill a single seat. If there are only 10 seats in a province or federal state, the
effective (implicit) threshold is 10 per cent. Furthermore, we speak of a categorical
vote if a person can only vote for a single candidate or party. In other systems, voters
may rank order their preferences for certain candidates or they may have several votes
even across party lists. In actual practice, there are many more technical details, as in
Ireland, for example, concerning the ‘single transferable vote’ (STV), which allows for
even greater choice (see also Lijphart, 2012, Chapter 8).
Even more important, however, is a normative concern. As mentioned above, in
order to be democratic and accepted as legitimate, even by the losers, truly democratic
elections have to be ‘free and fair’. But what are the criteria for this and who makes
sure that this is actually the case? Ideally, in a democratic election each adult citizen
should have an equal right and possibility to exercise his or her vote and each vote
should have the same weight. This should be supervised by an independent electoral
commission and, as has been increasingly the case in recent years, possibly also by
external observation teams as organized by the European Union, the Organization of
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU) and similar

ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR 209
international organizations, but also many NGOs, such as the Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in Stockholm.
In actual practice, however, there are many infringements on such principles.
These may range from outright manipulation and rigging of elections by those in
power, through vote buying, fraud in the tallying and computing procedures, une-
qual and unfair representation of candidates and parties in the public media, to
legal and institutional provisions which prevent a level playing field. Elections then
may be relatively free, but still they are not fair as is often the case in some of the
‘hybrid’ regimes or mere ‘façade’ or ‘electoral’ democracies (see also Chapter 7). An
important international research project and database is, therefore, concerned with
such questions of electoral integrity and their actual empirical assessment (Norris
et al., 2014).
But even in the well-established contemporary democracies the existing electoral
systems and certain specific rules prevent voters from having an equal weight of their
vote. Such rules may be perfectly legal and, to some extent, legitimate, but they nev-
ertheless deviate from the democratic ideal. Indeed, they are the easiest form of some
kind of ‘institutional engineering’ since such laws usually are not part of the constitu-
tion and can be changed by simple parliamentary majorities. There are many ways in
which such rules can distort an election outcome. In majoritarian (‘first past the post’)
electoral systems with single member constituencies a relative majority is sufficient to
obtain a seat in parliament. All other votes are disregarded and ‘lost’. This may have
the effect, as has actually been the case several times in the USA and the UK, that the
party with the largest number and even an absolute majority of seats may not have
received most votes nationwide. Here, the relative size and the actual shape of the
constituencies also play a role. If constituencies are very unequal in size or when their
boundaries are drawn in favour of a political party to include their strongholds
(‘gerrymandering’) then obviously elections are less than fair. In some countries, as in
France for certain periods, there may be a second round of voting as a run-off between
the two leading candidates in a constituency. Then the winner will have an absolute
majority in the second round which can be considered to be more legitimate.
Nevertheless, all minority votes are lost. In between such rounds negotiations between
candidates and parties may take place to form some winning alliances in constituen-
cies across the country. Majoritarian systems in multi-member constituencies, as in
Chile for example, can have a somewhat less distorting effect, allocating seats also to
second- or third-placed candidates.
Proportional representation (PR) seems fairer in the sense that more votes are
actually taken into account for the distribution of seats and that the composition of
parliament more closely resembles the distribution of party preferences in the elec-
torate. But here, too, certain rules, like the 5 per cent clause in Germany or even a
10 per cent clause in Turkey, may prevent smaller parties from gaining seats.
Similarly, in list PR systems where each party presents a nationwide (or statewide in
federal systems) list of candidates the way votes are converted into seats can differ
greatly and can have some distorting effects (often favouring the larger parties).
There are various mathematical procedures to do this such as divisor (d’Hondt, for
example) or greatest remainder (originally proposed by Alexander Hamilton) meth-
ods. All of these have some special effects (Rae, 1971; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989).
In some countries, as in Greece and more recently in Italy, the largest party also

receives some ‘bonus’ seats in order to ensure greater majorities and government
stability. More representativeness can be gained by allowing voters to vote for indi-
vidual candidates on party lists or even across party lists (‘single transferable vote’)
or have several votes according to the number of seats available (‘cumulative vote’),
for example in local elections.
As Bernard Grofman (2011: 754) notes, there is a huge variety of such rules and
‘the devil lies in the detail’ of such regulations. Not only must the purely numerical
effects of such rules be considered, but also the psychological and tactical incentives
they provide for voters, candidates and parties. These rules not only determine the
success or failure of any party in a given election, but they also affect the entire party
system as expressed in ‘Duverger’s laws’, for example (see also Chapter 13).
Electoral behaviour
The interests and motives of any individual to actually take part in elections vary
greatly as well. One school of thought emphasizes the material interests of voters.
They would vote for the candidate or party which would serve these interests best,
such as a socialist or social-democratic party for workers or a liberal (in the classic
sense) or conservative party for the middle and upper classes. In this sense, voters
would behave ‘rationally’ (‘it is the economy, stupid’ was the most widely accepted
explanation for Bill Clinton’s re-election in the USA in the 1990s). This explanation
is, however, faced with the paradox that the material benefits for any individual voter
remain marginal in any national election compared to the actual ‘costs’ of voting
(registering, following campaigns, the time spent for casting the vote, etc.). So, it
would be more ‘rational’ to ‘free ride’ and stay at home.
At the level of party strategies in any given election and if a more or less ‘normal’
distribution of voter preferences in a statistical sense can be assumed, then it would be
most ‘rational’ to seek votes in the middle towards the median of such a distribution.
This is Anthony Downs’ famous ‘median voter theorem’ (Downs, 1957). But, again,
party strategists do not always act in this way and can be successful nevertheless. In
the 2004 United States presidential elections, for example, the Republican Party and
its strategist Karl Rove aimed not so much at the median voter in the middle, but
attempted to mobilize the right-wing vote instead which had not been activated so
much before. In this way George W. Bush was elected by a considerable majority.
Apparently, there must be other factors at work, too. Another explanation, there-
fore, focuses on long-term social cleavages and ‘milieus’ formed on this basis in the
Lipset-Rokkan tradition (see also Chapter 13). A voter’s perceptions would then be
‘framed’ by such macro-social conditions and a voter would habitually turn to parties
which reflect his personal position most (industrial workers voting for Labour parties,
Catholics for Christian Democratic parties and so on). Such macro-social conditions
still have a strong impact in many countries, but this does not mean that every voter
with a working-class background would actually vote for Labour in any given elec-
tion and many other factors (satisfaction or not with the incumbent government,
personalities of leading candidates, etc.) come into play. There may also be cross-
pressures at work as for a Catholic worker or for voters with strong ethnic or regional
ties which may not vote primarily for parties reflecting their economic position.

In the USA, in particular, regional and family traditions in terms of party identifica-
tion have been shown to exercise a strong influence in this regard (Campbell et al.,
1960). Party loyalties on this basis then strongly colour voters’ reactions to party
candidates and specific campaign issues. Voters may also base their choice on the past
performance of candidates and parties. This is what Morris Fiorina (1981) calls ‘ret-
rospective voting’. This corresponds either to the direct experience of a person’s life
situation, which has changed for better or worse during the previous term of office,
or it reflects the more general conditions in the country as reported through the media.
Electoral research in this respect was greatly enhanced by the development of large-
scale sophisticated representative surveys which nowadays are conducted regularly
before and after each election in most countries. The rich body of data collected in this
way over longer periods gives more precise answers to questions of electoral behav-
iour but indicates also important changes over time (Merrill and Grofman, 1999;
Budge et al., 2009). One of the major findings of such research emphasizes the fact
that voters are, indeed, multi-motivated. This means that any mono-causal explana-
tion, ‘rational’ or otherwise, will not do and that individual-level findings have to be
‘embedded’ in the overall historical and macro-social context.
Predicting electoral outcomes is, therefore, a complex matter. Nevertheless, this has
become a thriving business (and employment opportunity for political science gradu-
ates) for private and public polling organizations in many countries. Modern survey
research based on random sampling can come fairly close to this (see also Chapter 3),
but there are many practical hurdles as well. Samples usually have to be stratified in
order to save costs and face-to face interviews have, for the same reason, been largely
replaced by telephone or increasingly internet contacts. A fair level of representativeness
is then even harder to establish. In some countries, as in the United States where the
number of votes in the Electoral College for either party is strongly determined by a few
‘swing states’, predictions will have to be based on state-by-state assessments, increasing
the costs even more. Yet, strong media and public interest have led to high density poll-
ing situations in the longer-established democracies. The aggregate assessment of many
polls, including specific ‘house’ effects (Jackman, 2012), can then come up with more
reliable and more precise results. In the 2012 United States presidential election between
Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, Nate Silver correctly predicted the winner of all 50
states and the District of Columbia in a New York Times blog. But even then the statis-
tical margins of error of +/- 2 to 3 per cent remain high and a forecast of 51 per cent
for one party or candidate and 49 per cent for the other is, in fact, ‘too close to call’.
Such inevitable margins of error and the underlying sampling procedures and sample
sizes are often not sufficiently reported in the media, contributing to a negative image
of public opinion polling and survey research when such predictions fail.
A further difficulty lies in the fact that before an election only prospective voters
can be interviewed. Even if they proclaim their intention to vote they may not actually
do so on election day, because many external circumstances like the weather, family
obligations and so on may intervene. Exit polls as they are reported by the media on
election eve, having asked voters when they leave the voting station, are therefore
much more reliable, but, alas, only after the fact.
In the more recent democracies polling usually is even less reliable and usually also
less intensive. The requisite infrastructure of trained interviewers, demographic data
for meaningful sampling procedures, powerful technical equipment, sophisticated

analysts, etc. are often not available or still in an early stage. Costs for high density
polling and widespread geographical coverage in large states then often are prohibitive.
In many Western democracies electoral volatility has increased in recent decades,
which means that longer-lasting social ties have been decreasing. Political issues and,
in particular, leading party officials and candidates play a stronger role. This is also
enhanced by the ‘mediatization’ of political campaigns and the strong influences of
both public and, increasingly, social media. Volatility, the level of aggregated electoral
change of party preferences over two consecutive elections, can be measured by a
special index (Pedersen, 1979). Recent comparative studies show that, not surpris-
ingly, volatility has been considerably higher in the ‘third wave’ democracies of
Eastern Europe and Latin America where party systems are less institutionalized
(Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007). In other parts of the world, as in Africa and Asia, in
spite of often changing party names and organizations, which would indicate a high
volatility, underlying ethnic, religious or similar primordial ties have remained very
strong in often highly clientelistic systems (see also Chapter 13).
In a similar way, turnout for elections can vary considerably. At certain times the
political mood in a country can be highly charged and polarized leading to intensive
political debates, sometimes even violent conflicts and often as a consequence high
levels of voter participation. This may be the case for ‘founding elections’ of new
democracies after a significant regime change as in the early 1990s or during times of
severe economic crises when protests are taken into the streets and mobilize a large
part of the population (see also Chapter 10). In the European and North American
contexts during the last few decades, a more general decline of voter turnout could be
observed, indicating a greater indifference towards political issues and sometimes even
alienation and cynicism towards political parties, their leaders, and even democracy in
general. This has also changed electoral campaigns to some extent. Under such cir-
cumstances it has become more crucial to mobilize one’s own potential voters rather
than to convince adherents of competing parties (Mair, 2013; see also Chapter 13).
Forms of ‘direct’ democracy

Direct democracy refers to forms of political decision making by citizens without inter-
mediate ‘representative’ institutions such as parliaments and assemblies. This can
happen in public meetings on a local basis as on the ‘agora’ (market place) in ancient
Greek city-states or in the ‘Landsgemeinde’ of some Swiss cantons. The overall size of
such meetings remains, of course, limited. Alternatively, direct decision making may
occur in specific state-wide or nation-wide referenda on particular policy issues. The
forms and regulations of such referenda also vary widely, however. In contemporary
large-scale democracies they supplement representative institutions but cannot replace
them altogether.
The major forms to be distinguished concern mandatory referenda which are required
by law in some countries, for example to approve changes of the constitution or impor-
tant international treaties. Official referenda can also be initiated by governments or
parliamentary groups when some specific legislative measure is subjected to public
approval. This may sometimes take the form of plebiscites in a more derogatory sense of
the term when they are used in authoritarian systems for pure public acclamation under
often highly manipulative circumstances. Such plebiscites then are less than ‘free and fair’.

To be distinguished from such referenda initiated ‘from above’ are various forms of
citizens’ initiatives. These often start in the form of the collection of a minimum num-
ber of signatures from persons eligible to vote in any given context in order to arrive
at a public decision on a particular issue in this way. If this number is reached within
a prescribed period and the actual referendum passes a certain ‘quorum’ of voter par-
ticipation, often fairly high, then such a decision can become law. Once more, there is
great variation in the actual procedures and requirements and the area of admissible
subject matters in any country (Budge, 1996).
Historically, democratic referenda have been developed and most frequently used in
Switzerland since the middle of the nineteenth century and in a number of states in
the USA, such as California since the ‘progressive era’ in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Today, they have become relatively frequent at the local or state
and provincial levels in many contemporary democracies. At the national level they
are still less frequent, but have been introduced more recently in a number of countries
in Eastern Europe such as Latvia and Lithuania or Uruguay in Latin America (Altman,
2011; Setälä and Schiller, 2012). Some innovative forms of direct democracy on the
local level are now also being experimented with such as ‘public budgeting’ in Porto
Alegre in Brazil (IDEA, 2009).
Conclusions
Out of the 195 countries covered by the 2015 Freedom House report, 89 (46 per cent)
were rated ‘free’ and (by implication) democratic, and another 55 (28 per cent) were
classified as ‘partly free’ and can be termed ‘electoral democracies’ or ‘hybrid’ regimes
(see also Chapter 7). In all of these states, regular elections and, in a number of them,
referenda are taking place. Only in the remaining 51 (26 per cent) ‘not free’ states are
elections not held or are purely acclamatory in authoritarian or single-party regimes.
Even though this categorization has been criticized from a number of perspectives, it
at least shows relevant orders of magnitude. Regular elections thus have become part
of everyday life in most parts of the world. Electoral behaviour is also increasingly
scrutinized by regular surveys and election studies in these countries.
Overall election turnout has also been relatively high in many countries, especially
if some crucial issues are at stake or when elections have become highly polarized
between contending candidates or parties. It is in the older democracies where a cer-
tain decline in voter turnout could be observed in the last few decades. This has been,
in part, compensated for by increased numbers of referenda on different levels. In
some countries, like the USA or Switzerland where institutional hurdles for registra-
tion are relatively high or where a certain fatigue concerning frequent referenda can
be observed, turnout is often less than or just about 50 per cent of the electorate. This,
in turn, of course affects the overall democratic legitimacy of such procedures if a
majority of a population is not voting (Franklin, 2004).
A certain disenchantment of voters thus can be observed in many countries (Pharr
and Putnam, 2000; see also Chapter 13). This is especially the case when leaders and
parties have been blemished by scandals and corruption. Nevertheless, elections also
create new hopes and the possibility of change. This is one of the most important
features of modern democracies: that they offer some self-cleansing mechanisms
(together with an independent judiciary and pluralist media) and regular procedures

for political succession. In this way, a longer-term consolidation of democracies even

under initially difficult circumstances can be achieved (Linz and Stepan, 1996).
In countries where for historical reasons consociational or consensual patterns of
government prevail as in Switzerland, Austria, for a while in the Netherlands, Belgium,
Germany, etc. (Lijphart, 2012; see also Chapter 5) and where parliamentary opposi-
tion is weak, referenda and initiatives by civil society organizations can contribute to
a re-vitalization of democracy and provide a check for possible clientelist abuses by
oversized majorities.
Questions
1 What are the limitations of Duverger’s laws?
2 Why can voting be considered to be ‘irrational’?
3 What are causes for decreasing election turnouts and increasing
disenchantment with democracy?
4 What are the advantages and limitations of ‘direct’ democratic
procedures?
Further reading
Campbell, Albert Angus, Converse, Philip E, Miller, Warren E and Stokes, Donald E (1960) The
American voter. New York and London: John Wiley. An early classic on electoral behaviour
in the USA based on extensive survey research.
IDEA (2009) Direct democracy. The international IDEA handbook. Stockholm: Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance. A handbook on various forms of direct democracy in
the world.
Lijphart, Arend (2012) Patterns of democracy. Government forms and performance in thirty-six
countries (2nd ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. An overview of the longer estab-
lished democracies advocating more consensual forms as ‘kinder and gentler’.
Linz, Juan J and Stepan, Alfred C (1996) Problems of democratic transition and consolidation.
Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press. The standard reference work on democratic transitions during the ‘third wave’.
Norris, Pippa, Frank, Richard W and Martínez i Coma, Ferran (2014) Advancing electoral
integrity. Oxford: OUP. A report on a long-term research project on election observation
and electoral integrity.
Weblinks
‘Electoral Integrity’ data set: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/PEI
APSA section ‘Representation and Electoral Systems’: www.apsanet.org/section8
APSA section ‘Elections, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior’: www.apsanet.org/section32.
ECPR Standing Group ‘Public Opinion and Voting Behaviour in a Comparative Perspective’:
http://povb-ecpr.org/
IPSA RC13, ‘ Democratization in Comparative Perspective’: http://rc13.ipsa.org/

Part V
International
politics

15
The globalization
of international
politics
Key terms
Club diplomacy Linkage
Constructivism (IR) Neo-colonialism
Deterrence Nuclear proliferation
Geopolitics Peace
Hegemony Realism
Idealism (IR) Sustainability
Imperialism Virtual state
Liberalism Washington consensus
Introduction
International relations (IR) have always been given a special status in political science.
In a traditional perspective, it aimed to investigate the relationship among sovereign
nation-states. We will see that this view has become very much questioned nowadays.
In the USA, as well as in the UK, this discipline developed apart from political science,
even if it was strongly influenced by theories, concepts and methods elaborated by
political scientists. Moreover, in the UK, IR has always had a multi-disciplinary back-
ground, while in the USA its strong autonomy does not preclude its dominant
political orientation. On the Continent and elsewhere in the world, IR is much more
embedded into political science, even though the field is sometimes organized in
separate professional associations. The way by which IR emerged as a discipline – or
a sub-discipline – must be cautiously considered. In today’s world, IR studies tend to
lose their own character and specificity, especially by the impact of globalization.
Wars paved the way to a new

sub-discipline
History must be taken into account for explaining the evolution of the main paradigms
and the transformations of what international means (Buzan and Lawson, 2015).

International relations were conceived as a discipline by the pressure of the two World
Wars (Groom and Olson, 1991). In the context of the first one, peace studies were
promoted, especially in the UK in the wake of the Great Illusion already published in
1910 by Norman Angell (Angell, 1910). Lowes Dickinson, Alfred Zimmern and others
also strove to define the right conditions for building a world of peace (Dickinson,
1916; Zimmern, 1936). At this time, Aberystwyth University in Wales created the first
professorship in International Relations. In France, solidarism (which considers that
national as well as international order relies on a strong interdependence between
actors) was blossoming from a Durkheimian vision of what international integration
should be. In combination with Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a more institutionalized
world, these first approaches led to the creation of the League of Nations in 1919. In
this context of peace research, liberal institutionalism, which stressed the role of insti-
tutions in promoting peace, exchanges and cooperation, and solidarism, which
developed the notion of international social needs, paved the way of a new IR theory.
The Second World War also played an important role, but in another direction. It
actually boosted realism as the dominant theory of IR. Realism had been in gestation
during several centuries, as its postulates date back to the Westphalian Peace Treaties
(1648) and Thomas Hobbes. The great English philosopher considered Leviathan(s) (we
would say today sovereign states) as gladiators fighting each other in the international
arena in a power competition process (Hobbes, 1651). The Westphalian Peace shaped
the European map as a juxtaposition of sovereign states constituted on a territorial basis
(see Box 15.1). The pattern was a novelty and unseen in a world then dominated by
empires or tribal orders. Power competition was considered from this time on as the
normal dynamics of any international order, while war was defined as being part of
ordinary international life. The Second World War was so dramatic that this classical
vision was confirmed and overcame the promotion of peace and peace studies.
Box 15.1 War as International Relations

(…) War became the normal condition of the international system of
states and the normal means of defending or enhancing a position within
the system. Why war? (…) War as a potent means served more than
one end. But surely part of the answer goes back to the central mecha-
nisms of state making: The very logic by which a local lord extended
or defended the perimeter within which he monopolized the means of
violence, and thereby increased his return from tribute, continued on
a larger scale into the logic of war. Early in the process, external and
internal rivals overlapped to a large degree. Only the establishment of
large perimeters of control within which great lords had checked their
rivals sharpened the line between internal and external (…)
What is more, other states competing in the global power game
developed similar organizational forms and similar hardiness: they
too became nation-states – in a defensive reaction, because forced
to take issue with or to confront a global power, as France confronted
Spain and later Britain (…).

GLOBALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 219
This logic of international state making acts out on a large scale the
logic of local aggrandizement. The external complements the inter-
nal. If we allow that fragile distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’
state-making processes, then we might schematize the history of
European state making as three stages: (a) The differential success
of some powerholders in ‘external’ struggles establishes the differ-
ence between an ‘internal’ and an ‘external’ arena for the deployment
of force; (b) ‘external’ competition generates ‘internal’ state making;
(c) ‘external’ compacts among states influence the form and locus
of particular states ever more powerfully. In this perspective, state-
certifying organizations such as the League of Nations and the United
Nations simply extended the European-based process to the world as
a whole. Whether forced or voluntary, bloody or peaceful, decoloniza-
tion simply completed that process by which existing states leagued
to create new ones.
The extension of the Europe-based state-making process to the
rest of the world, however, did not result in the creation of states in
the strict European image. Broadly speaking, internal struggles such
as the checking of great regional lords and the imposition of taxa-
tion on peasant villages produced important organizational features
of European states: the relative subordination of military power to
civilian control, the extensive bureaucracy of fiscal surveillance, the
representation of wronged interests via petition and parliament (…).
Source: Charles Tilly (1985) In: Bringing the state back in edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.184–86.
How realism dominated

The USA became the cradle of this new discipline and underlined through realism its
military capacity and its status of winner. Liberal institutionalism was left aside and
realist theory achieved the status of a science of international power. In his Politics
among Nations, Hans Morgenthau described a world of gladiators in which states
competed in order to maximize their national interests (Morgenthau, 1948). In this
race, all instruments could be used, so that international politics was limited to the
status of an anarchical arena in which states are in a permanent conflict only con-
tained by the balance of power.
The main concepts which were elaborated in IR derive from this dominant vision
which reflects the history of Western states. Rivalry among the main European powers
contributed to create a lasting international anarchy on the Old Continent; war had
been a common way for redefining the balance among the most powerful states (Little,
2007). Hegemony decided which one held the leading role. Territory was the real
marker of state sovereignties through precise borderlines which were rectified at the
end of each war. The question then arises: is this practice relevant to other histories?
For the moment, it appears clear that this new political science of international rela-
tions which was conceived in the USA after 1945 was a narrative of Western history.

It conceives the nation-state as the unique actor of international relations. Starting

from a Weberian vision of the state, it considers all international actions as the normal
extension of state capacity to hold the monopoly of legitimate violence. In this per-
spective, all other actors were negligible in the international arena, deprived of any
rights. In contrast, the European state grew and got strength from its capacity to make
war: according to Charles Tilly’s formula, ‘making war’ could help to ‘make states’
(Tilly, 1985, see Box 15.2). While inter-state relations were the cornerstone of all
international actions, diplomacy, negotiations, international concerted actions, mili-
tary capacity, inter-state conflicts and territorial contentions were the main components
of what we now call the ‘Westphalian system’. International law was conceived as an
inter-sovereign law which is characterized by the absence of any sanctions against a
deviant state.
Box 15.2 The Peace of Westphalia

(cornerstone of the modern system of sovereign states)
The Peace of Westphalia was signed simultaneously at Münster and
Osnabrück on 24 October 1648 and consisted of 128 clauses. The main
parts can be summarized as follows:
1 The principle of cuius regio, eius religio (‘whoever rules the ter-
ritory determines the religion’) was reaffirmed, but construed to
relate only to public life.
2 Calvinism was finally recognized within the Confession of Augsburg
and, except within the Bavarian and Austrian lands (including
Bohemia), Protestant retention of all land secularized before 1624
was guaranteed.
3 In matters of religion there were to be no ma jority decisions made
by the diet. Instead, disputes were to be settled only by compromise.
4 To all intents and purposes, the separate states of the Holy Roman
Empire were recognized as sovereign members of the diet, free to
control their own affairs independently of each other and of the
emperor.
5 Maximilian of Bavaria (1573–1651) retained his electoral title and
the Upper Palatinate.
6 A new electoral title was created for Karl Ludwig (1617–1680), the
son of the former elector palatine, on his restoration to the Lower
Palatinate.
7 John George of Saxony, a leading German Protestant prince who
had supported Ferdinand, was confirmed in his acquisition of
Lusatia (a region of eastern Germany and southwest Poland).
8 Frederick William of Brandenburg (1620–1688) acquired Cammin,
Minden, and Halberstadt, along with the succession to Magdeburg.
9 The emperor’s claim to hereditary rights in Bohemia, Moravia, and
Silesia was established. The Habsburg Sundgau was surrendered
to France.

10 The Peace of Westphalia confirmed Swedish control of the river

mouths of the Oder, the Elbe, and Weser—virtually the entire
German coast-line—by the occupation of western Pomerania,
Stettin, Stralsund, Wismar, the dioceses of Bremen and Verden, and
the islands of Rügen, Usedom, and Wollin. Sweden was also paid
an indemnity of 5 million thalers.
11 France acquired Habsburg territory and other jurisdictions in
Alsace. Other acquisitions included Pinerolo in Savoy and Breisach
and Philippsburg on the right bank of the Rhine.
12 The United Provinces of the Netherlands (Dutch Republic) were
declared independent of both Spain and the Holy Roman Empire
(Switzerland was also acknowledged as independent of the
empire).
13 No prince of the empire, not even the emperor, could ally with the
Spanish monarchy.
Source: Darby, Graham (2004) Europe, 1450 to 1789: Encyclopedia of the Early Modern
World. Farmington Hills, MI: The Gale Group.
In this purely realist vision, power relations constituted the main topic of IR studies.
That is why problems of arms race and arms control achieved a dominant position in
the hierarchy of researches conducted in this field (Buzan and Herring, 1998). This
also contributed to a strong emphasis on quantitative methods (Richardson, 1960).
The Cold War and nuclear weapons played a major role in giving priority to this topic
and in supporting the idea that the international arena mainly consisted of a very
precarious balance of power between the two nuclear superpowers, while peace was
first of all a question of deterrence (Brodie, 1959; Schelling, 1980). Some works even
suggested that an organized and controlled proliferation of nuclear weapons would
create the conditions of a new kind of peaceful world (Waltz, 1995).
In this perspective, diplomacy was supposed to manage gaps which were separating
antagonistic states, without taking into account their own regime, values or ideology,
following a way opened by Harold Nicolson (Nicolson, 1946). It was supposed to be
essentially bilateral, aiming to adapt the sovereignty of a state to another and deploy-
ing material instruments (embassies, central administration, laws and conventions…)
for making it possible. In this way, foreign policy analysis (FPA) attempted to describe
how states behave in the international arena. In a first step, priority was given, espe-
cially in the USA, to ‘comparative foreign policies’ which mobilized large-scale data in
order to compare how different states react to international issues (Farrell, 1966;
Rosenau, 1968).
Discovering the international system

The evolution of international relations contributed to reshape this first vision. As
bipolarity was structured and opened to a routinized game, many scholars considered
that anarchy did not reflect the correct picture of the new international order. That is

why the concept of system progressively emerged in international studies while it was
already dominant in other fields of political science (Kaplan, 1957). It should be con-
sidered as the first amendment to the realist orthodoxy and the starting point of what
was coined as ‘neo-realism’ (Waltz, 1979): states should not be considered as totally
free in the international arena, but partly constrained by a system of which they are
constitutive units. Even more, this system is structured and states cannot ignore the
nature of its polarization.
In the Cold War context, polarization was considered as a normal aspect of the
international system. This was, however, an exception and resulted in a condominium
which had never existed before and which has now a poor chance to come back. A
pole must be considered as a force of attractiveness which was in fact related to a need
for protection: the invention of nuclear weapons, the clear opposition between two
competing ideologies and two antagonistic social systems appeared in 1947 as excep-
tional factors of polarization which were broken down in 1989. That is why researches
devoted to international systems focus on more open variables: (1) the degree of
inclusiveness of each international arena; (2) the level of its deliberation; (3) the ties
and alliances that compose the system; and (4) the type of domination that is exercised
and can be challenged (Badie, 2012).
Inclusiveness is an important issue which has been neglected. It is too easily forgot-
ten that international systems have always been selective and not very inclusive.
During the nineteenth century, it was limited through the ‘European Concert’ to fewer
than ten European states at a time when the USA followed the Monroe doctrine and
abstained from participating in international negotiations. The system became slightly
more open at the end of the nineteenth century with the Hague conferences on disar-
mament (1899 and 1907) and remained relatively closed up to the end of bipolarity,
in spite of the decolonization process. Nowadays, the most relevant question relates
to the capacity of the international system to open itself up to non-state actors which
are more and more internationally active: NGOs, economic or religious actors.
Deliberation has somewhat tarnished the image of fighting gladiators by introduc-
ing recurrent negotiations, and then rules, procedures, summits and conferences. The
process started in 1815, in Vienna, when the major European monarchs realized that
blind competition could endanger their crown, as it did with the French Revolution
and Napoleon’s wars. Afterwards, different kinds of deliberation shaped successive
international systems: oligarchic concerts (European concerts up to 1848), occasional
concerts (up to 1914), weakened concerts (1919–1939), formal multilateralism
(1945–1967), condominium (1967–1989), or unstable concerts (after 1989).
Alliances describe mutual assistance commitments among the states and evaluate
their potential isolation. Alliance introduces duration and is more lasting than coali-
tion which is merely temporary; it leads to the very notion of enmity, as it aims to
protect against a threat coming from a potential enemy. Carl Schmitt considered an
enemy as a public and common one who cements the nation, strengthens the state and
organizes international politics (Schmitt, 1996). The process was at its peak during the
Cold War and resulted in a system of highly structured alliances (NATO vs. Warsaw
Pact). The issue which is now at stake is to determine whether the present interna-
tional system is still structured by enmity and who are the enemies: USA vs. China or
vs. terrorism? The debate is far from being closed. As President Barack Obama put it,
can a method (i.e. terrorism) be considered as an enemy?

Finally, an international system is defined by its configuration of power, which has

always been an emblematic question in political science. Power is defined in IR as the
capacity of a state to force another to do something or to refrain from doing some-
thing. This conception has been at the core of IR theory for a long time and has
influenced many researches which particularly aimed to build up a hierarchy of states
(Baldwin, 1989; Lake, 2009). In this hierarchy, hegemony describes the capacity of a
powerful state to run as the leader and then to organize and protect the rules of the
game (Kindleberger, 1973; Gilpin, 1987). As such, the hegemon is considered as
the ‘stabilizer’ (Kindleberger) or the ‘benign leader’ (Gilpin) who is able to contain the
negative effects of international anarchy and to be helpful to all the weaker units of
the system. In a typology of international systems, some questions are of particular
relevance: how is power structured? Is there a hegemon? What is its real capacity? Is
the hegemon in a situation of monopoly or has it to share this position with others?
A hegemonic situation would imply polarization, while the number and the identity
of competing hegemons enable the analyst to qualify this polarization (unipolar, bipo-
lar, tripolar or multipolar).
Domestic and international relations

The evolution of International practice could also progressively question the sharp
discrimination made by realist theories between the domestic and the international
spheres. One of their main followers, Arnold Wolfers, considers states in the interna-
tional arena as like billiard balls (Wolfers, 1962). The metaphor has been very
common in the discipline, but is no longer adequate for more recent developments.
What happens inside the balls appears, more and more, as a major factor of foreign
policies. That is why behaviouralism has been gradually solicited when studying for-
eign policies: it led to taking into account different actors and policy-makers, pressure
groups, medias, NGOs and so on (Snyder et al., 1962). In a famous book devoted to
the Cuban missiles crisis, Graham Allison stressed that the American decision made
during the crisis did not imply a single rational actor, but mobilized different actors
who were holding different interests (Allison, 1971). From this research onwards, it is
clearly admitted that foreign policy is not so exceptional and keeps in step with
domestic political life. It is exactly what James Rosenau pointed out when he devel-
oped the concept of linkage between foreign policy and domestic issues, and
considered that many foreign policy orientations are linked with specific domestic
issues (Rosenau, 1969).
This new orientation was probably the first step towards a reunification of IR and
political science. From this new vision, it appeared clearly that IR were submitted to
the same processes as all the other political aspects. In this perspective, classical
political science parameters were reintroduced in IR investigations: cultures (Lapid
and Kratochwil, 1996), perceptions (Jervis, 1976), public opinion (Holsti, 1992), pas-
sions and emotions (Crawford, 2000) are considered as important variables as they
are for all kinds of political actions. It became clear that international choices were
depending on normal political behaviours, while the traditional hypothesis which
conceived IR as exclusively made by ‘cold monsters’ regressed. In the meantime, new
evidence appeared. IR could not anymore be considered simply as a rational game, but

as a much more complex one, which is mediated by psychology, culture, individual

interests (different from national interest), misperceptions and countless types of
social pressures.
For these reasons, constructivism penetrated into IR studies throughout the 1980s,
when it became clear that the world was not frozen in time and was not predeter-
mined by a perennial definition of competing national interests. Questioning the
positivist orientation of the mainstream theories, Alexander Wendt, Friedrich
Kratochwil or Nicholas Onuf, among many others, advocated for a social construc-
tion of international relations, conceived more as an intersubjectivity than an objective
system (Wendt, 1987; Kratochwil, 1989; Onuf, 1989). The project was to mobilize
social theories for explaining how IR was in transformation, at the moment when the
Berlin Wall was falling down. Wendt came then to argue that the social construction
of the states inside the international arena must be considered as an explaining vari-
able: how they perceive their national interest, how they consider their peer
competitors, how they interpret their interactive conflicts (Wendt, 1999).
Moreover, this ‘domesticization’ of international politics boosted Foreign Policy
Analysis (FPA). With the transformations of IR as a sub-field of political science,
FPA changed to a more sociological approach which stresses more and more the
decision-making processes and their ability to affect the outcomes. Instead of con-
sidering foreign policy as the rational response of the ‘cold monsters’ to international
issues, scholars tend to show how the social components of decision making explain
the configuration of foreign policies (Rosenau, 1971; Hill, 2011). Priority is also
given to actors, and FPA tends to focus on action and agency, stripping away former
interpretations in terms of global structures (Hill, 2011). The main challenge is prob-
ably now to go beyond FPA limited to Western countries, then to introduce other
histories and cultures, and to take into account foreign policies in a global world
(Hill, 2003).
International cooperation
In addition, international practice suggested more and more that ‘billiards balls’ have
never been so isolated nor even so sovereign as realism had claimed. International
cooperation was conceived as a new field, which describes how states could be
prompted to prefer cooperation rather than pure competition for achieving their own
interests (Axelrod, 1984). This trend started slowly, growing towards the end of the
nineteenth century when the first international common goods appeared, in particular
through the Universal Postal Union (UPU), created in 1874, and the International
Telegraph Union (ITU) founded in 1865. During the nineteenth century, inter-state
meetings took place in Europe and elaborated common practices, rules and norms. In
1864, the first humanitarian law convention was adopted in Geneva. At the end of the
First World War, the League of Nations was founded by the Versailles Peace Treaty,
giving birth to the first global international institution.
This new trend paved the way to multilateralism which can be defined as a perma-
nent cooperation between at least three sovereign states (Ruggie, 1993). It made
clearly explicit that anarchy did not take into account all the dimensions of the inter-
national arena. On the contrary, Woodrow Wilson, President of the USA (1913–1921),

and also Professor of constitutional law and President of the American Political
Science Association (APSA), considered that international peace could be reached only
if the international system could be organized with shared norms, as democratic
nations are. This new vision reactivated institutional liberalism as a challenging ver-
sion of international politics. This perspective was obviously deepened after 1945 by
contemporary scholars who presented the new UN system as an institutional achieve-
ment of a world of exchanges and interdependence (Keohane, 1984; Keohane and
Nye, 1972; Doyle, 2001). Other scholars worked on international regimes that were
then described as outcomes of cooperation between governments for managing areas
of IR in which actor expectations converge. It supposes a minimum of common
norms, values and procedures (Krasner, 1983).
In parallel, the English School of International Relations promoted the concept of
a ‘society of states’ which exists in spite of the global anarchy of the international
arena (Linklater and Sugunami, 2006). This society is mainly due to common interests
of states which need a minimal cooperation and minimal agreement on a few norms
to contain the risks of disruption. This School was initiated during the inter-war
period by Charles Manning (Manning, 1975) and revived by Hedley Bull and Martin
Wight at the end of the 1950s (Bull, 1977; Wight, 1992). In France, solidarism
adopted multilateralism in a more social way which was shaped in 1919 by the crea-
tion of the International Labour Organization (ILO), and personalized by its first
director, the French Socialist Albert Thomas. This social conception of international
cooperation was extended by the creation, in 1965, of the UNDP (United Nations
Development Program).
However, this new multilateralism has never been devoid of strong contradictions
which run counter to the very notion of international cooperation. When the League
of Nations was created, several states were excluded, particularly those that were
defeated in the war; the same was true when the UN was founded in 1945. Cooperation
was not really universal and inclusive, but looked like a club of winners. Even if the
UN Charter claims the ‘sovereign equality of state-members’, the most powerful ones
are granted a veto right that they can use in the Security Council for blocking all kinds
of undesirable resolutions. That is why the present multilateralism should be consid-
ered as a mix of power and cooperation or as an uncompleted cooperation which fuels
frustration and bitterness especially among middle powers.
This dissatisfaction triggered many reform projects which came to nothing. The
enlargement of Security Council, which was the main issue at stake, could not result
in a positive decision, as the club of the permanent members can cast a veto at any
moment. For the same reason, the UN was generally unable to solve the main conflicts
of the world (between Israel and Palestine, as the USA cast its veto more than forty
times; or on Syria, ex-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Great Lakes region in Africa
and so on). A 1973 UNSC resolution opened the way to a multilateral intervention
which was transformed into a NATO intervention so that Russia and China blocked
any further interventions. In fact, only the ‘Desert Storm operation’ (UNSC 678) for
kicking Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait was agreed upon as a consensual multilateral
initiative.
Otherwise, the UN system is mainly oriented on a traditional vision of security
while international social issues are rather marginalized in spite of their growing
importance. The ECOSOC Council (on economic and social affairs) is neglected

and put aside. Kofi Annan pleaded in vain for promoting a ‘social multilateralism’
which is still atrophied in spite of the creation of UNDP and the growing number
of accredited NGOs. States are rather reluctant to extend multilateral competences
to social problems, as they consider such a trend as a threat to their own sover-
eignty. The Millennium Summit (2000) could go ahead in this way, but in a
rhetorical manner much more than through concrete decisions. International con-
ferences, on environment (Rio, 1992 and 2012), population (Cairo, 1994), housing
(Istanbul, 1996), racism (Durban, 2001) and social development (Copenhagen,
1995) set up new practices which are at least symbolically enlarging the field of
multilateral issues.
Dependence
We must also consider a final aspect of the transformation of the post-1945 world,
which was successively impacted by colonialism, decolonization and a very fragile
post-colonial order. This new dimension undermined the concept of sovereignty in its
status of cornerstone in the IR edifice. Colonial systems were never really taken into
account by realist theories and, more globally, by IR theories. Marxism and post-
Marxism had the monopoly of its analysis, especially in the wake of Lenin who
considered colonialism and imperialism as the ‘highest stage of capitalism’ (Lenin,
2000 [1917]). Decolonization resulted formally in a new context in which sovereignty
of the new states was deeply weakened and created asymmetric states, strongly differ-
ent from Hobbes’ gladiators.
An important literature covered this new kind of post-colonial dependence, which
was mainly inspired by a neo-Marxist economic school emerging in Latin America
during the 1960s, after the great wave of decolonization in Southeast Asia, the Middle
East and Sub-Saharan Africa (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Furtado, 1964). However,
economic domination could not be considered as the only variable: cultural depend-
ence and inter-state clientelism must also be taken into account. In addition, the
fragility of the new states generally resulted from very artificial boundaries drawn by
the colonial powers not taking local structures into account, and a failed importation
of the Western model into societies shaped by other cultures, histories and economic
conditions (Badie, 2000). This discrepancy can easily explain how these new states are
sometimes collapsing or at least failing (Zartman, 1995), triggering civil wars, new
regional conflicts, legitimating interventions or submitting themselves, through their
own elites, to the former colonial power.
This more complex view of the international system led to a new systemic perspec-
tive which was constructed in terms of economic inequalities and capitalist domination
(Wallerstein, 1976). But it also resulted in researches more oriented towards anthro-
pology for pointing out the cultural discrepancies between the imagined identity and
the dominating Western culture. It is along those lines that we can situate the new
post-colonial approach (Bahbah, 1990; Chakrabarty, 2000). All these works try to
point to how power in new countries is connected to a social knowledge and a world
vision which are shaped independently from the local actors. It shows also that the
main social categories, identities, gender, ethnicities are defined and structured by an
international discourse.

Power reconsidered
All these transformations reshaped the main IR concepts rather than wiping them out.
Power is still one of the pillars of IR theories, but its configuration is more and more
elusive, while its concrete efficiency is more and more questionable. During the Cold
War, and even before, power in IR was measured by assessing the military capacity of
a state. Even though a state had a real economic capacity, it was considered as a dwarf
when it did not have a powerful army. This was, for example, the case of Japan and
Germany during the 1960s and 1970s. If a state had an efficient military capacity, it
had a status of power even with a poorly performing economy: this was especially the
case of the Soviet Union. In this context, which was wrongly considered as lasting
forever by realist theory, power was easy to measure and its consequences were easily
predictable. Military expenses, the volume of armies, the nature of military equipment,
or the number of missiles were common instruments for assessing military capacity
and the actual power of a state.
When the USA made up more than 40 per cent of the world military expenses at
the end of the twentieth century most observers then concluded that the American
superpower was clearly the unique hegemon and that the international system had
turned unipolar. Some analysts even remarked that a growth of 5 points in the USA’s
GNP would add to the American military capacity even more than an alliance with a
European partner like the UK!
This observation could, however, shake the foundations of this thesis: if military
capacity is the basis of power, it will finally depend on the economic capacity of the state.
More exactly, power would then be dependent on two variables: economic resources and
the will to use them for building up a military power. Japan (as this country was limited
in its military investments), Germany or, in another context, Brazil opted for a reduced
military budget, when Israel, North Korea or Saudi Arabia chose the opposite option
which led them to an overachieved power status: subjective and objective variables are
then interplaying in the definition of international power. On the one hand, this subjec-
tive dimension plays a major role discriminating between states which intend to reach
an overachieved status and those which are not interested in it (Volgy et al., 2011).
A geopolitical context of conflict (Middle East, for instance), a deviant diplomacy
(North Korea), a strategy of emergence (China, India, Turkey) or a nostalgia for a long
history of power (France, UK, Russia) will explain this strategy of overachievement
which is not, however, totally translatable in terms of military expenses (the part of GNP
devoted to these expenses is not so high in France, UK and even China). But, on the other
hand, economic capacity appears as an independent variable which works as a limiting
factor. Economic weakness blocks military capacity, as was the case when the USSR
could not keep up with its American adversary launching the Strategic Defense Initiative
in 1983. The USA could base its hegemony on the strength of its GNP which definitely
outperformed all the others. For a long time, a middle power’s GNP only could be com-
pared with the GNP of some of the 50 federal states of the USA.
Nowadays, this crucial aspect is no longer so clear. Economic US hegemony is chal-
lenged by China, even if calculation of GNP there has to be used cautiously. Moreover,
new sources of power have emerged. Economic power is less independent than previ-
ously. Technology and knowledge have gained strategic importance, which, for
example, grants Japan a strong position in the world hierarchy. Besides, other sources

play a deciding role without being connected to the economy. Cultural, religious or
communication resources have become more and more important. Qatar takes advan-
tage of Al Jazeera TV which is based on its territory for overachieving in its foreign
policy. France tries to make use of the French language with the same target, as this
language is shared by about 40 countries (the Francophone International Organization
even counts 53 members). Iran and Saudi Arabia can use their religious networks for
strengthening their power capacity in the international arena.
For all these reasons, the real power capacity is not easy to measure or to predict.
This ‘deregulation of the power market’ prompts many states to imagine their status
with audacity and boldness. Some of them, with a kind of voluntarism, overuse their
own resources for climbing to a level of power which is obviously overachieved, given
their size, or their military capacity. The case of Qatar is particularly telling. More
globally, it seems dangerous and hazardous to build up a hierarchy of powers as we
are obliged to blend different ranges of power without being able to weight each of
them. How to distinguish and aggregate religious, ethnic, economic or military
resources? This difficulty explains why increasingly the American superpower has
been defeated in asymmetric wars.
This point introduces the problem of efficiency. Power is more and more getting
powerless (Badie, 2004). Many traditional powers have been defeated by smaller and
weaker actors. This was true for decolonization, but also for the Vietnam War,
Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, where the greatest superpower was unable to enforce
its own order. In fact, power is not conceived through a peer competition among states
and regular armies. From the time of decolonization, new kinds of conflict opposed
traditional armies to militias, non-military actors, activists and resistance fighters. A
power which is shaped and conceived for fighting an army is not so efficient when
meeting social actors.
Moreover, in a world of interdependence, economic factors are playing their own
functions and are no longer submitted to military objectives. Sanctions are no longer
operating as they formerly were and economic actors are operating as sovereignty-
free actors. For all these reasons, power loses its ability to enable a state to achieve a
significant advantage over its competitors.
War and peace

That is why war and peace have currently lost a part of their traditional meaning. War
was traditionally considered as a conflict opposing states, which make use of force; as
such, it was conceived as the trivial result of a multi-century competition among states
(Aron, 1966). Quincy Wright added an important point: war was supposed to bring
together states that had a similar level of power and development. It was, first of all,
a tournament among homogeneous fellows (Wright, 1942). In this vision, peace was
no more than a transitional interlude between two wars.
This classical vision helped to distinguish between wars and civil wars or private
wars (which precisely were abolished by the formation of modern states). But it barely
takes into account new kinds of war which have become common in the contemporary
world: ‘trade wars’, ‘economic wars’, ‘propaganda wars’, etc. Moreover, this vision led
to the Clausewitz doctrine which considered war as an opportunity to pursue political

goals by other means (Clausewitz, 1989 [1832]). Nowadays, conflicts are much more
separated from a clear and finalized political logic. This new orientation has led to
consider them as ‘new conflicts’ (Kaldor, 1999).
In the European history (or Westphalian history), states resorted to war when they
could not resolve a dispute by negotiation or diplomatic transactions. Armies con-
fronted each other on a battlefield which decided the outcome. Victory was achieved
by those who had more strength and military genius than the others. Moreover, the
final goal was, according to Clausewitz, to bring down the enemy. Progressively, the
game got more complex. Wars became more and more socialized, civil societies got
involved in traditional wars which were less limited to fighting armies, as became clear
from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars onwards, and with the two
World Wars on a global scale. Wars became then ‘total wars’ and left progressively the
territory of the battlefield. Social hatred, radical nationalism, new social behaviours
resulted from this new configuration of conflicts, which make any conflict-solving
processes, negotiations and peace treaties much more difficult. None of the three
Franco-German wars since 1870–71 were concluded by a real inter-state negotiation.
Germany was absent when the Versailles Peace Treaty was negotiated in 1919 and
conclusions of wars have become much more oriented towards punishment, sanctions,
and even judicial trials of those who were defeated.
This new trend re-introduced the concept of a just war which goes back to the
Middle Ages. The enemy is less and less a peer competitor, but an offender who must
be punished. This became obvious during the Second World War when the Free World
had to fight against Nazism, but the idea has become generalized in all kinds of war,
blurring the traditional vision of international conflicts. These are no longer a peer
competition of power but a competition of values which pretend to be universal and
consider the other camp as bringing evil instead of referring to competing interests.
Mary Kaldor took this a step further when she published her book on ‘new wars’
and contributed, with other authors, to introduce the perspective of new international
conflicts (NIC) (Kaldor, 1999; Münkler, 2005). In this vein, we can observe that
Europe is no more the battlefield of the world. In fact, 75 per cent of the post-1945
conflicts took place in Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia. The major part
consisted of intra-state conflicts, and their main actors were non-state actors, militias,
warlords, terror networks. Finally, a majority of these NIC do not result in a victory
or a defeat. Far from Clausewitz’s perspective, war is no more an instrument of power,
but rather a result of a social breakdown.
What does this mean? New conflicts are no longer promoted by states but derive
from their collapse. Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra-Leone,
Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq (after 2003), Central African Republic are among those
countries where lasting NIC took place in the context of a state collapse or at least a
weakened capacity of state institutions. State collapse is the result of either a poorly
legitimated political power or a fragile social contract. In fact, social factors are much
more decisive at this level than all the other variables. The lack of social contract is
often due to a very low level of human development, i.e. poverty, poor education, bad
health conditions, or the appeal to primordial or religious identities. All these factors
create unemployment, social exclusion, social insecurity which prompt particularly
unemployed young people and even children to join militias to get a shelter, a chance
to be fed, and even an absurd sense of life.

NIC then tend to create ‘war societies’ in which war provides the main social ties
needed by a population and offers elementary social protection. War societies create
an economy of war, often consisting of mafias and militias coming together. They
promote a new social order in which social hierarchy depend on military roles and
status. They use identity, religion, ethnicity as emblems replacing citizenship.
Altogether, they give to war a finality per se: in a ‘war society’ wars must be repro-
duced as a lasting social order. For these reasons, NIC are particularly difficult to
resolve. The interest in negotiations is poor where warlords are concerned about los-
ing their status and authority in a peaceful society. Negotiation is hard to promote, as
the partners are not clearly defined and not easy to identify. Militias can appear one
day and disappear the day after. The discipline inside militias is lax compared to state
armies. If someone negotiates in their name, this person may soon be disavowed by
somebody else.
If contemporary wars depart from the classical Clausewitz model, peace follows the
same way. Social definitions of peace emerged when wars increasingly gained social
dimensions. Positive peace was then conceived as resulting from increasing exchanges
and development of trade, but also from the extension of democratic values, as was
already conceived by the theory of perpetual peace elaborated by Kant in 1795. The
German philosopher considered that war was a component of human history, but
should be contained, particularly by the republican nature of the state and increasing
international exchanges (‘Kantian peace’) (Russett, 1993; Doyle, 2001). But is this
relation always meaningful? Were democracies going to war less? Was it true during
the colonial era or does it apply in the present Middle East conflict? Is trade always
containing war and not triggering also conflicts?
A rising global world

Globalization is opening a new era which cannot be considered with the traditional
instruments of IR, even if many authors and scholars are advocating their continuity.
The growing influence of ‘Global Studies’, which are emerging as a new academic sub-
discipline, indicates that many academics consider that we are in a new phase of the
world order which is no longer ‘Westphalian’ (Scholte, 2000; Held and McGrew,
1997). ‘Global Studies’ appear as more transdisciplinary, including political science,
but also economics, law, history, geography, demography. In short, ‘global studies’
consider that we are living in a world which is more and more ‘inter-social’, and not
only international (Badie, 2014b).
Many historians point out that there were several globalizations, the first one taking
place in the sixteenth century when the Atlantic Ocean was opened to a new interna-
tional trade. They claim also that the nineteenth-century industrial revolution gave a
new dimension to international exchanges and must be considered as another moment
of globalization. However, from a more sociological and political point of view, the
present globalization is something totally new, which initiates a new world order. The
former globalizations did not question or challenge the inter-state Westphalian system.
They even strengthened and stabilized it. The present globalization leads in fact to the
opposite result.

How to define the global world?

The main difficulty consists in defining the present globalization. There is clearly no
consensus on a clear definition of this new process. Nevertheless, we can mention
some aspects or symptoms of globalization: inclusion, interdependence, mobility,
extending communication, de-territorialization. Inclusion should be considered as a
new aspect in international relations: for the first time in the long history of humanity,
all human beings are now acting together in the same arena. Let us keep in mind that
the international system was limited to Europe in the nineteenth century and was only
extended to North America and Japan during the twentieth century, up to 1989.
During this time, West and East had de facto the monopoly of international relations,
while China was marginalized, Latin America mainly ignored, and Africa under the
colonial yoke. When the Berlin Wall fell, Europe was no more the battlefield of the
world and countries of the Global South gained an increasing autonomy and occupied
a more and more central position on the international agenda. We left a world made
up of similar countries and moved to a contrasting new arena with different compet-
ing cultures and strong discrepancies in their economic and social development.
Today, the average income of a Qatari is 200 times higher than the average of a person
living in Central Africa. That is to say that the new global world gives to social con-
trasts and social issues a salience that it did not have before. Unlike the Westphalian
system, this new system is now less based on political and inter-state competition.
Interdependence confirms this new orientation. Globalization indicates a world in
which economies are more dependent on each other, and this economic interdepend-
ence spills over into social and political areas. No one has anything to win from the
weaknesses of the other. China has nothing good to expect from a strong crisis of
Western economies which are her primary customers. A financial crisis in the USA
would undermine the finances of China which is one its main creditors. This new
interdependence overthrows the traditional international order. The famous ‘zero sum’
game is less and less credible and probably over. Competition no longer has the same
meaning. Classical instruments have also become less functional. Economic sanctions
create negative feedbacks on those who use them. Sovereignty is obviously fading in
this new context and and no longer has the status of a pillar concept that it had in the
previous order (Biersteker and Weber, 1996). All these transformations imply a global
governance of common goods as we shall see below.
Mobility is partly linked to interdependence. As the world is becoming increasingly
interconnected, the temptation (and even the need) to move from one place to another
is important and decisive. Employment is more and more dependent on a global mar-
ket. Africa has now more than 60 per cent of its population aged under 30 (compared
to 29 per cent in Europe). This discrepancy is an important factor of migration which
will more and more respond to the global employment market. Furthermore, mobility
also has other dimensions: mobility of pictures, news, internet, travels and so on. We
move from a static world (‘state’ has a common root with ‘stasis’) to a world of mobil-
ity, which implies a new social grammar and probably another vision of institutions.
Communication is not only an important dimension of the global world, but prob-
ably also one of the main factors which contributed to create it. New technologies have
deeply modified political and social relationships. Rulers no longer have the monopoly
of international communication. Individuals are now able to communicate in the

global world and to directly achieve many economic and social functions. They are
able to create what James Rosenau considered as a ‘second world’ made of transna-
tional relations which are monitored with difficulty by governments.
De-territorialization is the result of this new configuration. Borderlines are less effi-
cient and easy to transgress, an extending communication downgrades the territorial
support of the state. So, one of the main pillars of the Westphalian system is weakened,
while political communities are less and less based on territories (Appadurai,
2002; Sassen, 1998). Transnational networks, diasporas, migrant communities play
an increasingly important role, giving a crucial meaning to non-territorially based
communities.
Sociology of transnational relations

In this context, James Rosenau promoted a new sociology of International Relations,
founded on the hypothesis of a ‘dual world’ constituted by inter-state relations on the
one hand, and transnational relations on the other. The concept was already coined
by Keohane and Nye (1972), but was formalized by Rosenau in his famous book,
Turbulence in World Politics, published in 1990 after the end of the Cold War
(Rosenau, 1990). A transnational actor can be defined as all kinds of actors who,
deliberately or not, operate in the international arena by transgressing international
borderlines and who are avoiding, at least in part, state control. A transnational rela-
tion is a social relation that takes place in the international arena between at least
two transnational actors or between a transnational actor (NGO, multinational
firms…) and one or several states. A transnational flow is then a recurring transna-
tional relation, which takes place in one field or another (migration, investment,
tourism, trade...).
Transnational relations can be formal, even institutional (international trade
which is ruled by norms and conventions) or informal, i.e. constituted by ‘weak ties’,
sometimes even non-visible. They are considered as ‘transnational networks’
(Granovetter, 1973). For instance, a network of alumni coming from a prestigious
university and scattered all over the world can play an important role in international
politics. The ties which are created in this way can become clearly relevant in the
international arena.
This ‘dual world’, consisting of states and transnational actors, becomes even more
complicated and distorted by a third kind of actors who can be termed ‘identity
entrepreneurs’. While transnational actors are inclusive and open to everyone, iden-
tity entrepreneurs are exclusive and their appeal is limited to those who share the
same identity (religious, ethnic, tribal...). A ‘triangular game’ is then constituted by
these three kinds of interplaying actors who are unable to play separately and are
committed to make transactions. The game appears as unstable and tense, as three
different rationalities are competing: the state refers to a universal rationality based
on sovereignty and citizen commitment; transnational actors refer to a global and
post-sovereign rationality; while identity entrepreneurs are motivated by an exclusive
communitarianism. These systemic tensions are structuring the new international
order and help to explain the configuration of the NIC as well as the new background
of international negotiations.

Moreover, this new transnational context adds new chapters to IR studies. It points
out the new role of individuals who do not play in the international arena only with
the status of citizens. Individuals are nowadays economic actors, investors, but are
also acting through their religious identity and many other roles, when they consume,
watch TV or surf the internet. They participate in national public opinion which is
more and more concerned with international issues, as was the case when, in the
United Kingdom, people convinced the Cameron government to give up its participa-
tion in the coalition against Syria in August 2013. An international public opinion is
also growing: it could mobilize about 15 million people in the streets, in February
2003, protesting against the US intervention in Iraq. This mobilization could not stop
the initiative, but strongly contributed to its international de-legitimization. In the
same vein, we have to take now into account the role of transnational social move-
ments which started in 1999, in Seattle (USA) to protest against a WTO Summit. The
Summit could not be held and the event was so visible that it generated a tradition
which was reproduced on several occasions (G8, NATO, World Bank meetings)
(Tarrow, 2005).
New actors of IR also have to be considered in the global world: multinational
firms, advocacy and pressure groups, religious actors, NGOs. All of them play an
important role in creating new international relations and have in some circumstances
more resources than states. That is why they are achieving many international func-
tions, either in addition to those accomplished by states, or as substitutes for states. In
the first category, we must point out the growing importance of advocacy networks
constituted particularly by NGOs in different fields, like development, human rights
or the environment. We have also to mention the role of non-state actors in dissemi-
nating information, when traditional diplomacy is mainly secret. The ‘fact finding’
function achieved by NGOs fighting against human rights violations is an important
reorientation of international politics which now exposes dictators to public denun-
ciation and puts their abuses on the international agenda. As for the substitutive
actions, we can observe how NGOs and even religious actors (e.g. the Sant’Egidio
community) take the place of states as mediators in many conflicts or for achieving an
economic cooperation in the field of development.
For these reasons, a new diplomacy takes place: social routes to diplomacy are now
open, either by mobilizing new actors who do not leave diplomacy entirely to states,
or by adding new chapters and new issues to the international agenda. Social prob-
lems are therefore more and more promoted at the expense of more traditional issues
like arms competition or political rivalry (Kerr and Wiseman, 2013).
New governance
This new configuration largely questions the traditional model of international coop-
eration, which was mainly based on inter-state cooperation and intergovernmental
methods. Private actors can now be solicited for participating in new ways of interna-
tional regulation, even if they face state reluctance to this new concept of international
politics. At the liberal moment, when the ‘Washington consensus’ was at stake, many
actors and scholars claimed the necessity of mixing public and private actors for rul-
ing the world. That is why, during the 1980s, the concept of governance was borrowed

from the firms. The World Bank used it for defining what should be ‘good govern-
ance’, which meant that the public sector should be downsized, states should be more
‘modest’ and less active while economic actors should participate more actively in
ruling the national and international world order.
In IR, the paradigmatic revolution then began: sovereignty was no longer the cor-
nerstone of international politics (Czempiel and Rosenau, 1992). Sovereignty was
challenged from two different, even opposite, points of view. The new governance
could now either lead to a neo-liberal vision which would bring back a so-called
regulatory international market, or could serve common goods in a post-liberal per-
spective. Those goods can be defined as competing but non-excludable goods which
are essential for the survival of mankind (e.g. energy, fish stocks, water…). In a lib-
eral vision, Garett Hardin argued that, if they are considered as such, these goods
risk being destroyed and lead to a ‘tragedy of the commons’. He opted for a private
and liberal management of these goods (Hardin, 1968). By contrast, Elinor Ostrom
asserted that a collective management of common goods was crucial and suggested
institutional arrangements for containing risks of waste (Ostrom, 1990). Making
these institutional arrangements is precisely the basis of post-liberal governance
which implies multilateral negotiations and conventions in the major social and
economic areas.
Is traditional multilateralism adapted to this function? Significantly, the UN system
was mostly conceived in political terms, and for dealing with political and military
issues. The Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank, IMF) are still largely conceived in
a liberal perspective, even if some recent debates in the World Bank went beyond this
perspective (Stiglitz, 2002). In any case, the present institutional arrangement of the
world order does not really suit this new kind of governance (Boas and McNeil, 2003).
In the same perspective, International Political Economy (IPE) gained greater
importance. Historically, IPE was constituted as an American sub-discipline in a
dominantly political perspective. Charles Kindleberger in the early 1970s pointed out
that a global (or then pre-global) economy needed a hegemon for ruling the world and
stabilizing it. If there is no stabilizer, economic anarchy may result in a severe crisis,
as was the case after 1929 (Kindleberger, 1973). This argument was developed and
completed by Robert Gilpin who considered this ‘benign leadership’ as a function of
the present international system, while he noted that it was necessarily costly for the
leader who may become exhausted in achieving this role and particularly in running
the wars which that implied (Gilpin, 1987).
The British approach to IPE is somewhat different and sticks more to the specific
features of globalization (Payne and Phillips, 2014). It was first conceived by Susan
Strange who argued that globalization was weakening states and their political
functions, while enhancing capacities of transnational actors (especially firms) and
restructuring international power relations. The ‘retreat of the state’ is considered
as the triumph of the market (Strange, 1994, 1996). Restarting from the famous
works of the economic anthropologist Karl Polanyi, IPE endorses the postulate that
the economy is no more embedded into politics (Polanyi, 1957) and that its new
autonomy tends to give it a precedence over politics which would endanger democ-
racy (Teivanen, 2002). This IPE approach analyses this development (Payne and
Phillips, 2014).

New inter-social relations

These new international issues have become so important that they are presently
determining international stability. We saw that they contribute to generate trans-
national social movements and that they constitute more and more the real roots
of the new conflicts. Moreover, they shape a new kind of international violence,
which is increasingly independent from states and which becomes more fragmented
and scattered everywhere around the world. At this level, domestic social violence
merges with international violence, using international proclamations which claim
that international actors are really responsible for the social problems at stake. In
this way, they identify local victims with others around the world. For instance,
excluded persons in the marginalized quarters of Western cities are prone to iden-
tify themselves with Palestinians or victims of the Syrian civil war. International
issues thus penetrate into domestic life and create the conditions of transnational
violence. Some scholars even perceived a ‘clash of civilizations’, which would
endanger the global world (Huntington, 1996). It must be kept in mind, however,
that such tensions are not caused by cultural pluralism as such but by a social lack
of integration where political entrepreneurs make use of cultural symbols as instru-
ments of mobilization. At the same time, these new interactions and conflicts give
rise to increased anxieties and xenophobic and often also violent reactions on the
part of resident majority populations, which, in turn, are similarly instrumentalized
by populist leaders.
All these new orientations are currently reconstructing international relations which
can no longer be interpreted through the Westphalian paradigms. Inter-state competi-
tion is decreasing under the pressure of global social factors. New social issues are
structuring the international agenda; new social (and non-state) actors are playing an
increasing role in the international arena. At the global level, a lack of international
social integration is triggering new tensions and violence. This lack of integration is to
be observed both in its material aspect (access to material goods) and in its symbolic
aspects (humiliations, debasement of Southern nations). This pathology of our present
international system takes the form of cultural and even religious conflicts which
penetrate deeply inside the domestic life of every nation which becomes increasingly
hybrid, paving the way to a new step in the complex relations between domestic and
international politics.
Conclusions
Today, two views of the discipline are competing. On the one hand, there are those
who point to and emphasize these recent transformations and who are increasingly
attracted by a sociological orientation of the discipline which moves from ‘interna-
tional relations’ to global studies. On the other hand, others prefer to keep a more
traditional approach based on state actors and approaches inspired by strategic stud-
ies. Even if this split is deep, it would be quite impossible to deal with IR without
taking into account these two dimensions and without considering that, in a global
world, inter-state and inter-social relations are definitely bound to each other.

Questions
1 What is the role of war in constituting international relations?
2 Is the duality ‘domestic’–‘international’ always relevant?
3 Does power work in contemporary international relations?
4 How could you define peace?
5 How could you build up a relevant definition of ‘globalization’?
6 What is a ‘transnational actor’? Could you elaborate a relevant
typology of these actors?
Further reading
Carlsnaess W, Risse T and Simmons B (eds.) (2002) Handbook of international relations.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. A very complete synthesis covering all the aspects of the field,
with many contributors.
Jackson R and Sorensen G (1999) International relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A very good and very clear introduction, easy to read and very relevant as a first step in
the field.
Waltz K (1979) Theory of international politics. New York: Addison Wesley. The famous book
which renovated the classical realist perspective.
Keohane R (1984) After hegemony. Cooperation and discord in the world political economy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. An updated vision of the institutional liberalism
on international relations.
Art R and Jervis R (eds.) (2015) International politics. Enduring concepts and contemporary
issues. Boston, MA: Pearson. A very original and rich reader which mixes articles on theory
and papers on international practical issues written by scholars or actors.
Scholte J (2000) Globalization: A critical approach. New York: Palgrave. A very successful
presentation of globalization in a critical way.
Heywood A (2011) Global politics. New York: Palgrave. The opposite of the latter: a more
classical – but very complete and pedagogic – presentation of the same concept.
Weblinks
International affairs resources: www.Virtual Library
On international organizations: www.un.org (official UN website)
Official WB website, with many data: www.world bank.org
On security and peace research: www.sipri.org (among the best on conflicts and military expenses)
Peace Research Institute Oslo: www.prio.org
On global international issues: www.brookings.edu

16
Regionalism and
beyond
Key terms
Functionalism Hegemony
Geopolitics Integration
Introduction
The concept of region traditionally described an intermediate level between national
and local authorities. On this basis, regionalism was considered as a way of giving
new prerogatives and functions to sub-national regions. But, after 1945, regionalism
got a more complex meaning. Regions were no more exclusively considered as sub-
national units, but also as supra-national structures bringing together neighbouring
states. Actors and observers now distinguish macro-regions, which refer to interna-
tional relations, and micro-regions, which relate to domestic contexts (Acharya and
Johnston, 2007; Soderbaum, 2011; Soderbaum and Shaw, 2003). From an institu-
tional point of view, this major innovation was the first blow at the sovereignty
principle and the traditional international order. States were no longer considered as
‘billiard balls’, since their integration in a broader political structure could generate a
new polity. Here, we deal exclusively with this macro-regionalism, as an extension of
the issues that we examined in the previous chapter. Three main questions are at stake:
What are the modalities of such a new international process? What is the nature of
this resulting new polity? How to consider the main issues and tensions that it entails?
A political invention
Old and new regionalisms
Macro-regional integration was initiated in Europe after the Second World War. It
was a strategy by which state actors opted for strengthening and formalizing their
association, even their eventual union, rather than protecting their national sover-
eignty. Such an option was a revolution in European history, which was until then
structured around the idea of national sovereignty. In an idealistic perspective, the

goal was to make war between members of this supra-national unity definitely obso-
lete and impossible: the nightmare of 60 million persons killed between 1939 and
1945 was considered as sufficient that the previous principle of ‘war-making/state-
making’ had to be totally abolished. Even though they pretended to be the cornerstones
of European politics, states appeared as a danger, even a poison when conceived in a
context of absolute sovereignty. The major founding fathers of post-war Europe con-
curred on this new vision: Robert Schumann, Jean Monnet, Alcide de Gasperi,
Konrad Adenauer…
A more pragmatic conception merged with this idealist view: Europe could not
reconstruct itself through the initiatives of sovereign states working separately. De
Gaulle noted that British coal would not be sufficient for achieving the ambitious
target of reconstruction, the Old Continent needed also German coal. Regional needs
coincided with national needs. However, if states were put into question and even
challenged, they were not really abolished. The purpose was more appropriately and
more conveniently to associate some of them in order to contain their war capacity
and, in the meantime, to strengthen their economic effectiveness. This double target is
still at the root of many ambiguities. It based regionalism on the postulate of inventing
a new stake-holding without taking the risk of a new burden sharing. In other words,
regionalism created an association for receiving new benefits, but not really creating
a new polity. The result was inevitably fragile.
This first vision was substantially enriched by a functionalist perspective. This
approach developed under the pressure of the Second World War dramas and opened
the theoretical debate on regionalism (Rosamond, 2000). In 1943, David Mitrany
published his famous A Working Peace System, in which he pointed out that the main
function of politics should be to meet all major human needs (Mitrany, 1943). As far
as the nation-state appears as the best instrument for achieving such a function, it
should be used and promoted; but if other institutions can operate in a better way, they
must supplement or replace the nation-state. Local or sub-national powers came to be
considered as possible levels of final decisions, but supra-national structures were
henceforth also taken into account. Regional institutions were legitimated in this way.
The first regionalism was thus hybrid, idealist and pragmatic, but essentially based
on the needs of the European reconstruction. That is why it resulted initially in the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which was established by the Paris
Treaty signed in 1951 by the six founding states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxemburg and the Netherlands). In a functionalist perspective, some scholars noted
that these economic functions could have a ‘spill-over’ effect and bring about new
steps towards a more active political integration (Haas, 1964). However, this spill-
over did not work efficiently. The Rome treaties creating the European Economic
Community (EEC) and Euratom (on atomic energy), signed in 1957, entailed very
little progress on the way to a real political integration. Sovereign resilience was fre-
quent thereafter, particularly with regard to de Gaulle’s position. This contributed to
dampen European enthusiasm and to lead to a deadlock. Treaties and agreements
were negotiated and concluded exclusively by the states and their governments for
overcoming the blockages related to sovereignty, but they were in fact conceived for
the sake of maintaining the core of the sovereignty principle.
This model was, in a first step, rarely imitated. We must just mention the Arab
League, created in 1945, and the Organization of American States (OAS) initiated

REGIONALISM AND BEYOND 239
in 1948 at Bogota. None of these aimed at real post-sovereign integration and their
purpose was mainly to promote an inter-state cooperation on behalf of a vague com-
mon identity (Arabism or a common American destiny). They were followed by the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), created in 1963 and inspired by a Pan-
Africanism as propagated by some leaders such as Nkrumah, Nyerere or Haile Selassie
which was contained in the limits of the recently acquired national sovereignties.
A step forward was made in Africa in 2003 with the creation of the African Union
(AU), which remains, however, in the same category. The same can be said about the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) created in 1967, initially, in the
context of the Vietnam War for structuring the coalition of pro-American authoritar-
ian regimes.
Globalization paved the way to a second kind of regional integration which is con-
sidered as the new regionalism (Gamble and Payne, 1996; Fawcett and Hurrell, 1996).
From the 1970s onwards, the context had changed. In Europe, reconstruction was
over and war was no longer a threat. The bipolar system had faced decolonization
while rising new powers gave a global dimension to the world economy. State compe-
tition was no longer considered as a source of international instability. On the contrary,
new transnational flows were threatening old sovereignties and were creating new
regional and international disorders or uncertainties. The increasing international
capacity of non-state actors such as international corporations and NGOs and their
ability to transgress borderlines could draw new areas which appeared as autonomous
from sovereign state territories. A regionalism from below began to take shape.
Asia played a role as leader in this invention. The Asian continent had been deeply
affected by political conflicts between nation-states which impeded a form of interna-
tional integration similar to the European one. In the meantime, however, Taiwanese
investors, for example, were more and more operating inside the Chinese hinterland,
while Japanese local actors were actively participating in Siberian development.
‘Growth triangles’ were cutting across borderlines of sovereign states in order to pro-
mote cooperation between local actors, as was the case towards the end of the 1980s
with ‘SIJORI’ (Singapore–Johore in Malaysia–Riau islands in Indonesia) which
included Singapore and some parts of Indonesia and Malaysia.
With this new process, economic actors and functions defined new regional territo-
ries which were different from the institutional state configuration. That is why
Robert Scalapino called them ‘Natural Economic Territories’ (NET), while the
Japanese scholar Kenichi Ohmae pointed out that this new configuration resulted in
the decline of the traditional state and in its transformation into what he called a
‘Region State’ (Scalapino, 1989; Ohmae, 1995). This new regionalism appears then as
a process coming from below, rather than from a political negotiation among states;
it is built on a pragmatic basis, according to local economic rationalities. For these
reasons, it entails some overlappings and multi-memberships, as some Asian states
belong to several groupings (ASEAN, APEC, growth triangles...). Such an informal
structure contributes to weaken the regional institutions which are restricted to some
minimal forms, while it gives a stronger capacity to non-state actors.
This new trend strongly impacted on classical regionalism. Economic actors went
on to play a greater role in European construction, operating as lobbyists, but also as
partners in the decision-making process. Inter-regional cooperation inside Europe
significantly increased and took over some functions of official institutions. In short,

the wind is now blowing in favour of actors, more than in favour of institutions which
seem to be in a deadlock. For all these reasons, regionalism is expanding everywhere
around the world, while the European Union is less considered as a model. NAFTA
(North America Free Trade Agreement, initiated in 1994 by Canada, USA and Mexico)
is clearly limited to promoting trade while the same is true for Latin America. Even
though the MERCOSUR treaty (Mercado Comùn del Sur, signed in 1991 by Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and joined by Venezuela) includes some political provi-
sions, its nature and evolution are clearly centred on promoting trade.
Nature of the new polity

In their various shapes, regional constructions seem to be an intruder, or even an
unclassified category of political science typologies. From this point of view, three
kinds of ambiguities have to be taken into account. First, the sovereignty principle is
severely restrained in some significant cases, even if it is still considered as the unalter-
able cornerstone of international and constitutional law. This problem does not arise
when the regional system is clearly limited to economic cooperation or a continental
grouping. It is less clear when the regional system implies a reduction of sovereignty.
If this abandonment is total, constitutional law considers different models of federal-
ism, which had never been used before in regional construction, even in Europe. But
if the abandonment is only partial, the process is difficult to conceptualize. Is it a ‘pool
of sovereignties’, by which state members delegate some of their decision-making
powers to shared institutions that they have created (Soldatos, 1990)? Can this delega-
tion be considered as a sovereign choice? Can we imagine a ‘sovereign delegation of
sovereignty’, when Jean-Jacques Rousseau defined sovereignty as inalienable? This
problem is clearly at stake in the European institutions and is fuelling the political
debate in many European states, where people are mobilized for recovering their
abandoned sovereignty.
This debate around sovereignty paved the way for a second one: Is the European
Union acting for itself as a whole or in a context of bargaining among its members?
The functionalist theory was inclined towards the first option (Standholtz and Stone
Sweet, 1998; Lindberg, 1963), when it postulated that the increasing number of trans-
actions within Europe implies new rules and a deeper integration which ultimately
leads to new norms and new common interests. By contrast, inter-governmentalism
(i.e. a theory which considers public actions promoted inside Europe as created and
negotiated by states and not inspired by common needs and interests) was developed
from the end of the 1960s onwards and was based on the opposite option which chal-
lenged the functionalist theory (Moravcsik, 1998). In this vision, European integration
means a dense and permanent negotiation among its members. Its real nature remains
close to the nation-state culture and mirrors the traditional concept of international
cooperation. Instead of declining sovereignty, this pragmatic and limited integration
aims to manage inter-state cooperation within a regional system. Instead of generating
a new polity, it creates a community of security (Deutsch, 1957). But here comes the
rub: How can we consider, in this case, the nature of the common norms which are
elaborated in this context?
That is why a regional polity is really at stake through its own normative system,
when common norms are shared by all its members and are concretely binding for all

of them. The real nature of European law has then to be considered neither as an
addition of laws, nor as an ordinary international law, the nature of which is enforce-
able with great difficulty and cannot exercise effective sanctions. This regional law
appears then as a new level in the hierarchy of norms.
If we consider this law-making process, we raise, as a third dimension, the question
of the political community which is supposed to act as a sovereign law-maker. On the
one hand, and in a strict inter-governmental perspective, regional law results from
bargaining and negotiations among sovereigns, in the way it is commonly practised in
international relations. Regional law then loses its specificity and even a part of its
legitimacy. On the other hand, if regional law is made by a unique sovereign, regional
integration can be considered as more democratic, but it is then not easy to determine
who the sovereign actually is – whether there is only one European sovereign or
whether there are two levels of sovereignty (at the European level and at the national
level). Because of this dilemma, we encounter the problem of democracy inside a
regional system, the difficult relationship between increasing regional integration and
democratization and, more concretely, the ambiguities of the European Parliament
(Scharpf, 1999). Even if this parliament can enlarge its own prerogatives, its nature is
still uncertain compared to national parliaments. Its election, through national cam-
paigns which are usually debating national issues, confirms this fuzzy context. It is a
dangerous paradox that the electoral turnout for the European Parliament is decreas-
ing when its institutional powers are increasing (62 per cent in 1979 compared to
42.5 per cent in 2014).
This marginalization of the sovereign is progressively dissociating policy from poli-
tics inside Europe, as Vivian Schmidt put it (Schmidt, 2006). Policy-making is then
much more relegated to the role of the Commission and committees rather than to a
real debate among elected representatives, paving the way for comitocracy (that is to
say, giving important law-making powers to committees). In this perspective, the
European Commission is assisted by a few hundred committees which are staffed by
member state bureaucrats who represent their own countries without being elected.
These committees work for adjusting European laws to national legislations and play
a crucial role in making, implementing and adapting these laws. Even though the
Lisbon treaty granted the Parliament a new capacity of controlling the committees,
this persisting aspect of European law-making illustrates the ambiguous status of the
sovereignty principle but also of a fragile democracy inside the European Union
(Bergstrom, 2005).
Moreover, if there is any doubt about the nature of the sovereign, how can we
determine the identity of its citizens? The very notion of ‘European citizenship’ has
been, in fact, highlighted and promoted by several texts, in particular the Maastricht
treaty (1993). On the one hand, this European citizenship is formally considered as
based on rights and duties which are shared by a community of persons. But, on the
other hand, this citizenship appears only as the extension of the national citizenship
held in one of the member states. For this reason, European citizenship cannot be
considered as a prior allegiance, but only as a by-product of the national commitment.
Public opinion polls indicate that a national allegiance is much more prevalent than
a European one in all European countries (87 per cent). Respondents either considered
that they do not have a European identity (38 per cent), or that their national identity
is prevalent (49 per cent). This European identity is thus somewhat blurred: it appears

as secondary compared with national identity, but takes shape when it is opposed to
other world regions. Even if it is ambiguous and sometimes fragile, this regional iden-
tity has to be taken into account as something unusual. Europe strongly contributed
to inventing it, but it developed later also in Asia (‘Asianism’), as it was promoted by
the Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew or the former Malaysian Prime Minister,
Mahatir ibn Mohamad. Similarly, ‘Arabism’ was popularized by the former Egyptian
raïs Gamal Abdel Nasser or ‘Pan-Africanism’ by the Ghanaian state-builder and first
President Kwame Nkrumah.
Main issues at stake

Economics or politics?
Regionalism is, therefore, a practice and a concept in progress, which cannot be con-
sidered as something stable. There are even doubts about its future as a lasting
phenomenon. Some scholars argue that it is a functional mediation between globaliza-
tion and nation-states (Farrell et al., 2005), even a way of ‘taming the global
governance’ (Cooper et al., 2008), or an incarnation of the new ‘transnational capital-
ism’ (Van Apeldorn, 2002), whereas others conceive it as a transition between a
sovereign and a post-sovereign world. The main problem is probably to be found in a
double contradiction: globalization requires open and large economic structures,
while it leads to a more and more fragmented and resilient sovereignty as it enhances
local powers. The resilience of sovereign structures reorients open economies towards
mercantilist practices. Regionalism faces these two contradictions with difficulties. We
can observe this tension in Asia, where processes of integration from below have to
coexist with numerous political conflicts (North Korea vs. South Korea, China vs.
Taiwan, Malaysia vs. Indonesia, China vs. Japan, China vs. Vietnam, Japan vs. Korea,
China vs. the Philippines and so forth). To a lesser degree, the same is true in Europe,
where economic crises have revived political competition and nationalism. The ques-
tion is then to understand whether regional construction is a lasting and efficient
substitute to a regime of an open economy that GATT and WTO were not able to
promote successfully.
If this economic interpretation of regionalism is generally considered as well
founded, it suggests that the political outcomes of regionalism risk being rather poor.
We can understand, therefore, why these macro-regions are not able to produce a real
common foreign policy. Europe was able to set up its own diplomacy only in precise
contexts, particularly before its enlargement, when France and Germany were promot-
ing the Franco-German couple, while Great Britain lost interest in a common European
foreign policy to which it would be committed. As soon as the process of foreign
policy-making was institutionalized through the ‘High representative of the Union for
foreign affairs and security policy’ by the Lisbon treaty (2007) and already prepared
by the Amsterdam treaty (1999), we observe a stagnation and even a decline of a com-
mon foreign policy which had looked promising at the turn of the century (Hill and
Smith, 2005). The same is true about Asian regionalism which only rarely resulted in
a common security policy, and Latin America where political convergence was mainly
due to commonly shared ideologies rather than common regional membership.

If state-actors consider more and more regionalism through such an economic ration-
ality, the founding political dream, as it appeared just after 1945, is decreasing and
weakened by the comeback of a ‘neo-sovereignism’ and a new trend of nationalism.
The question is then to evaluate how this economic pragmatism can lead to regional
integration when the political pressure works in the opposite direction. This issue is
clearly at stake with the problem of the common currency in Europe: Can a common
currency be efficient without a minimal political integration? Is it compatible with
fragmented sovereignties? What happens when the ‘spill-over’ does not work and is
substituted by compromise or bargaining? Does bargaining as an economic strategy
take the place of a defective political structure?
Regional power
Whatever its level of political integration, a region tends to be dominated by a leader,
which can be considered as a regional hegemon. We face here a paradox which
explains the contradictions of political integration: If regionalism aims to overcome
power politics and sovereignties, it paves the way to new powers. That was the case
of France and Germany in Europe, Brazil in MERCOSUR, South Africa in SADC
(Southern African Development Community, created in 1992), or India in SAARC
(South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, created in 1985). All these middle
powers took advantage of regional groupings for which they could successfully claim
to become their real leaders. This trend is so strong that all the rising powers attempt
to establish their regional influence, even by following poorly formalized ways: Turkey
in the Middle East, China or Japan in the Far East by an active policy of intrusion into
ASEAN which was enlarged as ‘ASEAN+3’ (China, Japan, South Korea). This power
competition fails to result in real leadership when potential leaders are territorially too
close to each other and unable to agree, as is the case in the Far East, and, from time
to time, in the European Union, when Franco–German controversies arise.
This regional leadership was considered, in a first step, as functional and even
similar to the ‘benign leadership’ defined by Robert Gilpin (Gilpin, 1981). The
Franco-German couple in the EU as well as Brazil in MERCOSUR or South Africa
in SADC played an important role in shaping the regional construction and in mak-
ing decisive steps forward, particularly when power was backed by charismatic
leaders (de Gaulle–Adenauer in the EU, Ignacio Lula da Silva in MERCOSUR or
Nelson Mandela in SADC). By contrast, a too-assertive regional power can create
reactions among small or middle powers which jeopardizes regional integration. For
example, solidarity between Germany and France during the Iraq crisis in 2002–
2003 led to a split within the EU and prompted several members to join the USA in
a coalition. A common diplomacy dictated by Paris and Berlin has probably put off
some weaker partners and slowed down the process leading to a common European
foreign policy.
In the same vein, Brazilian hegemony in MERCOSUR triggered a rebellion of small
countries like Paraguay or Uruguay, while it activated the rivalry between Brasilia and
Buenos Aires. SADC is probably blocked by the fear of some small members of
becoming clients of Pretoria, while large continental unions like OAS or AU are per-
manently under the threat of a too-strong leader which would contain real multilateral
deliberation. The USA in the first case, Nigeria and South Africa in the second. This is

probably why more restricted regional organizations appeared in a second step, bring-
ing states together in a more limited area, like ECOWAS in Western Africa (created in
1975) or assembling states which share the same political orientations (ALBA, Alianza
Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America, created in 2004 on the initiative of
Cuba and Venezuela for counteracting the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas)
propagated by the USA since 2000). Both of these innovations could not really ques-
tion the larger regional leadership. ECOWAS established Nigerian leadership in West
Africa, while ALBA invented ‘ideological regionalism’ which probably makes leader-
ship more acceptable but does not decrease it, as we could observe with the Chavez
predominance on ALBA.
New state or new region?

We now come to the core of the problem. In a famous book, Peter Katzenstein argued
that these new regional associations were promoted following the pressure of
Germany and Japan and in the context of the American imperium. The purpose was
to invent new world politics, which would be able to overcome the contradiction
between traditional states and new markets (Katzenstein, 2005). In this perspective,
the new world politics would be dominated by inter-regionalism, more than inter-state
competition. The point is convincing when we consider the present trade negotiations,
and particularly the famous TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership),
which seeks to establish a new transatlantic trade order, beyond nation-state control
and beyond the national legislations of the involved states. In this perspective, inter-
regionalism is definitely one of the main centres of the new international relations and
certainly more in accordance with the new structure of the international market. It
triggered many new forums and meetings, for example: ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting
initiated in 1996); the Asia-Africa Sustainable Energy Forum, created in 2010 on the
initiative of Japan and Algeria; the Summit of South American-Arab Countries initi-
ated by Brazilian President Ignacio Lula da Silva in 2005; or the Africa-South America
Summit created in 2006. This must also be considered in the framework of the ‘South-
South cooperation’, which was not considered as such by Katzenstein, even if it
becomes a new dimension of inter-regionalism.
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) can be considered as the most advanced
form of inter-regionalism (Drysdale and Ishigaki, 2002). It was established in 1989 as
an ‘open regionalism’, weakly institutionalized and mainly consisting of yearly sum-
mits. Its main goal was to promote a regime of free trade and investment among 21
members coming from the two sides of the Pacific Ocean. Even if it has been stalling
in recent years and blocked to some extent by strong power rivalry (USA, China,
Russia and Japan), it inaugurates in a very dense and complex area a regional con-
struction which neglects and even abandons institutional arrangements for the benefit
of market demands. However, APEC has had some interesting spill-overs, particularly
when it was used as a forum for addressing political and security issues, and also as
an instrument for fighting against some plagues, like bird flu in 2005.
However, this vision by Peter Katzenstein is challenged from three other points of
view. First, it does not take into account the state and sovereign resilience nor the reluc-
tance to common foreign policies, nor the multiple forms of national power resurgence

inside new regions. It neglects a new kind of nationalism which is enhanced by regional
integration. Second, it disregards the complex articulation between macro-regions,
dominated by an economic rationality, and military alliances which are functioning as
communities of security. While the European Union experiences difficulties in setting
up a common foreign and defence policy, NATO has its own existence, gathering,
around the USA, almost the same actors and defining its own targets. This differentia-
tion between politics and economics qualifies or modifies what Katzenstein proposes.
Third, this open regionalism seems to be less and less regional. If we consider the new
shape of international cooperation, geographical proximity loses its importance in a
world in which territorial distance is no longer an obstacle to cooperation. Recently,
the most attractive and efficient groupings are related to trans-regional cooperation
rather than intra-regional ones. States are coming together more on common interest
considerations than proximity.
Trans-regionalism
Trans-regionalism can be defined as a surpassing of regionalism, in which association
is multifunctional, but no longer based on proximity or territorial continuity. It is
more than an ordinary inter-state cooperation as it is a long-lasting institution with a
minimal organization. That is why it appears like a macro-region building, even
though the result has no geographical rationality.
For example, the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil, South Africa) was created in
June 2003 by the ‘Brasilia Declaration’ (Stuenkel, 2014). It includes three countries
coming from different continents and separated by very great distances. Significantly,
they claimed to be concerned not only about trade and investment, which did not
cover a large part of the Declaration, but mainly about development, human security
and reforms of multilateralism in order to give new prerogatives to these rising pow-
ers. IBSA holds yearly summits, but it is also constituted by many commissions
working on the main issues included in the Declaration. Even if its role is not to pro-
duce common norms, it aims to create common positions on the main issues which
are at stake in the international arena. Instead of aiming at a common order, it wants
to achieve a progressive harmonization of the policies of the three states in a way
which is original when compared to traditional regionalism.
The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) states can also be considered
to belong to this category (Chun, 2013). This case is particularly interesting, as its
origin is not to be found in a political decision made by the states, but from a classi-
fication proposed by the Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O’Neill who considered in 2001
that some economies should be distinguished by their ability to grow fast and to create
new balances in the global world. Eight years after, in June 2009, Brazil, China and
India accepted an invitation coming from the Russian leader Vladimir Putin to par-
ticipate in a common meeting at Yekaterinburg. South Africa joined the group in
December 2010. For the first time, a structure of cooperation was developed from a
conceptual analysis, and took shape before any political choice. The swiftness of
the political actors in accepting this analysis and transforming it into a political
creation lends evidence to the functional hypothesis of a political need of cooperation
among rising powers. At the same time, it clearly shows that this cooperation is not

necessarily based on territorial continuity and proximity. Something more seems to

appear through the IBSA and BRICS experiences, namely the political exclusion or, at
least, the relative diplomatic marginalization of their members (Russia was only a
later addition in a G7+1 summit). This is probably the main cement of such groups
and activated a demand, or a will, for cooperation.
Trans-regionalism appears in fact as a defensive and a pro-active structure. This
double function gives it a strong capacity for further development. As a defensive
structure, it helps marginalized states or rising powers to get greater visibility and a
bigger status on the international arena. It is able to balance the influence of G7 and
to contain the club diplomacy promoted by the old powers. As a pro-active structure,
it contains the risk of an increasing economic competition among emerging powers
and gives them a common diplomatic shape. This can be found in this ‘split diplo-
macy’ which successfully helps rising powers to operate with one foot in the North,
among developed countries, and another in the South, in affinity and solidarity with
developing countries. The question at stake would be then to consider whether or not
the present transformation of our global world and its de-territorialization favour this
‘post-territorial’ regionalization, which actually goes beyond the traditional types of
regionalism and, from a certain point of view, is challenging them.
Supports, mistrusts and public debates

This new trend is clear among the rising powers: Brazil seems a little bit disappointed
by MERCOSUR and the anger that Brasilia provoked among its partners; South
Africa prefers to invest in BRICS and IBSA rather than in AU which is paralysed and
suspicious of Pretoria; India has almost nothing to expect from SAARC, while China
attempts to establish its regional leadership with many difficulties.
At the same time, the level of trust among partners of macro-regions is clearly
decreasing. In 2014, a poll indicated that 59 per cent of Europeans had no trust in the
European Union and only 32 per cent had the opposite feeling. In fact, the European
complexity and its technocratic orientation appear as the only possible compromise
among 28 member states, but, at the same time, this situation alienates more and more
people from European institutions. The same poll in 2009 showed that only 30 per
cent of European people considered that their voice counted in the evolution of the
Union, while this figure was still 57 per cent in 2007. Meanwhile, the failure of refer-
endums (in France and the Netherlands) played a negative role. Regional integration
does not raise enthusiasm anymore and is considered as a complex technical device.
However, the social density which characterizes all regional constructions makes
them a real public sphere in which many issues are debated. This is particularly true
of the European Union as Jüergen Habermas pointed out. Whatever the political dead-
locks in which European construction finds itself, Europe is definitely a space of
mobilization and protests. This is true for the lobbies, unions (especially peasant
unions), but also for many NGOs and many kinds of trans-national social movements.
Even more, it appears as a new space in which citizens are more or less socialized to
a post-sovereign world (Habermas, 2012). In fact, the level of integration has already
gone much further than is reflected in opinion polls. Many things (free travel, open
markets, a common currency, etc.) are taken for granted, especially in the younger

generation which is no longer shaped by the war and post-war experience.

Paradoxically, a new territorial threat from Russia may lead again to a higher level of
awareness in this respect, in particular in Eastern Europe.
Typology
How then can we consider the results of such a process? After our investigation, we
must distinguish five major kinds of regionalism:
1. A formal inter-state cooperation which does not really challenge the sovereignty,
but creates the condition of a permanent and minimal cooperation: OAS, the Arab
League, ASEAN, AU are some examples of this first category. Military alliances
(NATO) can be considered as an extreme incarnation of this first category.
2. A formal economic cooperation, which goes rather far in trade agreements with a
weak political spill-over, or no political spill-over: MERCOSUR (weak spill-over)
or NAFTA (no spill-over) are in this category which is clearly related to globaliza-
tion and tries to promote a minimal adaptation to it. This economic cooperation
is promoted and controlled by the states.
3. An institutional process of integration, which is multifunctional and explicitly
includes political integration. For the time being, the EU seems to be the only
example of this type, which was previously considered as a model for the future of
many regions, while it seems to be presently much less attractive, given its failures
and its deadlocks.
4. An informal process of integration, which is coming from below and under eco-
nomic pressures and which is promoted in an inter-governmental way (APEC) or an
inter-regional process (‘natural economic territories’, ‘growth triangles’). In the first
type (inter-governmental), we observe a slight spill-over which is totally absent in
the second one (inter-regional), except through individual (and marginal) initiatives.
5. A trans-regional cooperation, which is promoted by states, but without any kind
of territorial continuities. The issues which are dealt with are mixed (economic,
political or diplomatic). The sovereignty is clearly back. In this category, we can
find BRICS and IBSA.
Conclusions
In fact, macro-regionalism is more and more conceived in a pragmatic way, and does
not follow any theoretical model. In all the cases, it appears as a transaction between
state sovereignty and globalization, following more and more diversified kinds of
model. For this reason, its structures are unstable and its evolution remains uncertain.
Whereas towards the end of the twentieth century integration processes seemed to
prevail, in the new millennium a sudden burst of nationalism re-occurred. Regional
integration must be seen as a function required by the progress of globalization, but
it is permanently thwarted by nation-state policies (or nation-state interests), public
opinion, social protests or social movements.

Questions
1 What are the main differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ regionalisms?
2 What is a ‘natural economic territory’? Does this concept provide
a good vision of the economic background of regionalization in the
world?
3 Is regionalism resulting in a new polity?
4 How do you evaluate ‘trans-regionalism’? Is it really a new trend in
world politics or an exception?
Further reading
Gamble A and Payne A (eds.) (1996) Regionalism and world order. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
A classical, but still very useful, approach to regionalism and its various forms of constructions.
Fawcett I and Hurrell A (eds.) (1996) Regionalism in world politics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. Another excellent synthesis pointing out the new forms of regionalism which are
considered through the transformation of the international context.
Cooper A, Hugues C and de Lombaerde P (eds.) (2008) Regionalization and global governance.
The taming of globalization. London, New York: Routledge. A very useful approach to the
interaction between regionalization and globalization.
McCormick J (2002) Understanding the European Union. A concise introduction. London,
New York: Palgrave. A very easy and clear introduction on European integration. Very pre-
cious for beginners.
Fligstein N, Sandholtz W and Sweet AS (eds.) (2001)The institutionalization of Europe. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. For a second step: a very clear and dense assessment on the insti-
tutional European integration.
Websites on regionalism
On European Union: http://europa.eu (official website)
On ASEAN: www.aseansai.org (official website)
On MERCOSUR: www.mercosur.int (official website)
On African Union: http://po.au.int (official website devoted to political issues)

Glossary
Accountability The commitment of elected political leaders to answer for their

political decisions by citizens/voters (electoral or ‘vertical’ accountability) or by
other constitutional bodies and collective actors (inter-institutional or ‘horizontal’
accountability).
Advocacy An activity by individuals or organizations which aims to influence
political decisions usually on behalf of socially weaker or marginalized groups.
Alienation A political attitude which characterizes individuals or groups who
remain uninvolved and estranged from their political or social environment.
Anchor An institution, entailing organizational elements and established interests,
which is able to hold together citizens and associations within a society, thereby con-
tributing to democratic consolidation. Political parties, interest groups, clientelism and
neo-corporatism are the most relevant anchors.
Anchoring A top-down process referring to the emergence, definition and adapta-
tion of anchors that involve, hold together and control civil society, either in general
or with regard to specific sectors. An anchoring process is democratic as it develops
in a democracy with its main electoral and decisional mechanisms.
Audience democracy A concept of a third stage of democracy, after the one char-
acterized by parliaments in the nineteenth century and the one characterized by parties
in the twentieth century, that is marked by a strong role of media as socialization
agents, by the salience of media expertise, by a key role of public opinion that may
also be inconsistent with the views of elected representatives, by recurring debates
through the media and by volatile electorates.
Authoritarian/Authoritarianism Following a definition by Juan Linz: A political
system with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guid-
ing ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political
mobilization, except at some points in its development, and in which a leader or occa-
sionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually
quite predictable ones.
Behaviouralism A major approach in political science based on the ‘subject’
dimension of politics which seeks to examine the behaviour, actions and acts of indi-
viduals and groups in different social settings and explain this behaviour as it relates
to the political system. This approach is mostly based on quantifiable data obtained
from survey research.
Bicameral/Bicameralism A parliamentary system based on the existence of two
chambers or houses, often to be found in federal states. Bicameralism is strong when
both chambers are provided with (nearly) equal powers and are elected with similar
electoral systems. In the opposite case, it is weak.
18_Morlino_Glossary.indd 249 12/22/2016 4:41:50 PM

Bureaucracy The organization and structure of the public administration of a

state, both at central, regional and local levels, and the hierarchically organized body
of public officials (civil servants) in charge of enacting legislation.
Cabinet Small organizational unit of a government that consists of politicians (min-
isters, secretaries) who are responsible for specific sectors (ministries, departments)
and for the overall policy performance of the government.
Cartel party A concept developed by Richard Katz and Peter Mair in the 1990s
which states that political parties in many European countries function like cartels,
employing the resources of the state to limit political competition and ensure their
own electoral success.
Case studies A research design focused on a single or very few cases analysing
them in great detail.
Catch-all party Term coined by Otto Kirchheimer to designate a tendency of con-
temporary political parties to lose their original class-based, religious, ethnic or similar
social identity and to provide only vague centrist and often inconsistent party platforms.
Causal process observation Pieces of data that provide information about pos-
sible causal relationships in a given context as evidence for further inference from a
single or a few cases to a larger universe.
Chancellor democracy See semi-parliamentarianism.
Civil society The totality of voluntary institutions, organizations and associations
that operate in the public sphere with relative autonomy from the state, such as pro-
fessional associations, trade unions, religious bodies or students groups.
Civilian authoritarianism A non-democratic regime characterized by the stronger
development of a legitimating mentality or ideology, often nationalistic, and the pres-
ence of more permanent organizational structures allowing for controlled popular
mobilization, such as a single or hegemonic party.
Civilian-military authoritarianism A non-democratic regime based on the coali-
tion between the army, which can be more or less professionalized, and the civilian
actors, whether civil servants, professional politicians, technocrats or representatives
of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie.
Clientelism A relationship between persons with unequal economic and social status
(‘the patron’ and the ‘clients’) that entails the reciprocal exchange of goods and services
such as political support by the client in exchange for material benefits from the patron.
Club diplomacy An oligarchic conception of diplomacy and international affairs
which considers that only a few powerful states are entitled – or able – to rule the
world and deal with major international issues.
Collective action An action taken together by a group of people to achieve a com-
mon objective such as to obtain better wages for union members. According to
Mancur Olson this can create the problem of ‘free-riding’, i.e. non-union members
benefitting as well.

Glossary 251
Competition A procedural quality of democracy, which exists if more than one

political actor is involved in the decision-making process within a politically free and
fair context.
Competitive authoritarianism A regime in which democratic institutions and
some form of electoral competition exist in form but not in substance, as the electoral
playing field is skewed in favour of the incumbent rulers by virtue of their privileged
access to material and symbolic resources, the media and the law.
Consensus democracy A regime which, in contrast to majoritarian democracy, is
based on inclusion. Key institutional features include bicameral legislatures, the use of
proportional electoral laws, multi-party systems and broad governing coalitions, and
substantial protection of minorities.
Consolidation The multi-faceted process by which democratic structures, norms
and regime–civil society relationships are firmly established and become well embed-
ded within society.
Constructive vote of no confidence A parliamentary rule, first introduced with
the German Basic Law of 1949, which prescribes that in order to cast a no-confidence
vote against the incumbent government the parliament must simultaneously agree on
who to designate as new head of the government.
Constructivism A research tradition focusing on how people view and, to some
extent, create social reality by developing concepts to describe it.
Constructivism (IR) As a new paradigm in International Relations, constructivism
challenged the positivist orientation of the mainstream theories and particularly the
‘realist’ one (see below). It questioned the objective conception of national interest,
arguing that actors were playing according to their own conception of the national
interest, their perception of all the competitors and their vision of the conflict.
Constructivism triggered the sociological orientation of International Studies.
Corporatism/Neo-corporatism The close cooperation between major social
interest groups, sometimes also involving the established churches, and political
authorities as in some authoritarian regimes. The term neo-corporatism, as coined by
Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, refers to the tripartite cooperation
between employers, large unions and the state, as in the Scandinavian welfare model
or in times of economic crisis.
Crisis In a democratic regime, a process of growing distance between regime institu-
tions, intermediary institutions, including parties, and society.
De-alignment/Re-alignment The decrease of strong party identification based
on more traditional social cleavages as in Europe since the 1980s or its, at least partial,
reversal.
Democracy A political regime that features, as a minimum, the right of all
male and female adults to vote (universal suffrage); free, competitive, periodic and
fair elections; more than one political party; different and alternative sources of
information.

Democracy without law An empirical model of a hybrid regime in which there

are no relevant legacies or powerful veto players or any forms of state suppression or
non-guarantee of rights but simply a situation of widespread illegality in which the
state is incapable of performing properly due to poorly functioning institutions.
Democratic installation A process entailing the complete extension and effective
recognition of civil and political rights, the emergence of a number of parties and of
a party system, but also of collective interest groups, such as unions and other organ-
izations, and the adoption of the main democratic procedures and institutions that
characterize the regime, starting with the electoral law.
Democratization The complex phenomenon of transformation from a non-demo-
cratic to a democratic political regime within a sovereign state. It may be broken down
into the following macro-processes: transition towards democracy, consolidation or
crisis, and democratic qualities’ deepening or worsening.
Deterrence A strategic concept which appeared after the Second World War and
the invention of nuclear weapons, which considered that the main function of these
new arms consisted of their ability to deter the opponent from using them.
Developmentalism A set of political theories elaborated in the 1960s, mainly in
the USA, dealing with the transformations of the new states emerging from decoloni-
zation. It postulates that all countries follow the same kind of development, evolving
more or less easily from a traditional organization to a more differentiated, plural and
secular political order resembling the Western model of democracy.
Dictatorship A form of government in which political power is highly concentrated
in individuals or a small group who are unaccountable to citizens and unlimited by
the constitution or other laws.
Direct democracy A full-scale system of political institutions or, more often, spe-
cific decision-making procedures (such as referenda) allowing for the direct
participation of citizens in democratic decision making in contrast to representative
democracy, based on the sovereignty of the people.
Disanchoring The process of rupture or structural breakdown, more or less grad-
ual, of the anchors (institutions and constituted interests) that bind the elites and the
general population, holding together the civil society.
Effective number of parties A formula developed by Laakso and Taagepera to
measure the fragmentation of a party system.
Electoral stabilization A process which involves the establishment of more pre-
dictable and recurring patterns of electoral behaviour and party–voter relations. It is
signalled by a decline of electoral volatility and the realignment of voting patterns in
case of critical elections.
Electoral system The legal rules defining how an election should be conducted
and how votes are calculated and translated into seats in parliament. The major ones
are the majoritarian (‘first past the post’) in single member constituencies and the
proportional (PR) electoral systems based on the proportion of votes for a party list.

Glossary 253
Electoral volatility The number of voters switching parties from one election to
the next. This ‘floating vote’ has increased in many countries over the last few
decades.
Epistemology The theory of knowledge (and science).
Equifinality Two or more constellations of factors (independent variables) can lead
to the same outcome (dependent variable); J.S. Mill coined the term ‘conjunctural
causation’ for this possibility.
Experiments Research in which the investigator introduces a treatment or stimulus
in order to evaluate its causal effect. This can be done, for example, with two ran-
domly sampled groups where one receives the treatment and the other serves as a
control group.
Failed state A state whose political or economic system has become so weak that
the government has lost the monopoly of force or the capacity to effectively control
the national territory.
Founding coalition The coalition of (socio)political actors who are actively
involved in the process of democratic installation through the establishment of an
agreement or pact.
Framing A socio-psychological concept of how individuals and groups perceive
social reality as ‘framed’ by historical and cultural traditions.
Freedom A substantive democratic quality and value, it refers to the full respect of
civil rights (e.g., personal freedom, freedom of movement and residence, freedom of
thought and expression, the freedoms of association and organization) and political
rights (the right to vote, the right for political leaders to compete for electoral support,
and the right to be elected to public office).
Functionalism One of the major theories in the social sciences. It originated in
Durkheim’s sociology considering the main social needs as functions that must be
performed for maintaining the integrity and the continuing existence of the society, the
political system or of any of its parts. These functions can be considered as a causal
explanation (absolute functionalism) or as a description of the social reality (relative
functionalism).
Fusion of powers The constitutional principle or logic by which, in parliamentary
or semi-presidential systems, a political connection exists between the legislature and
the executive, as the latter may govern only if and as long as it enjoys the (direct or
indirect) confidence of the (majority of the) former.
Garbage can model A model of policy making which posits that, far from being
coherent structures, bureaucratic organizations are loose collection of ideas (‘organ-
ized anarchies’) in which decisions are essentially the result of the random interaction
of opportunities, actors and ideas.
Gender Refers to the social construction of sexual identities as emphasized, for
example, by feminist theories.

Geopolitics A set of theories in IR coming from nineteenth-century geography

which consider the state in its territorial structure and its spatial environment as the
main explaining variable in International Studies.
Gerrymandering A practice to establish a political advantage for a particular
party or group by manipulating electoral district boundaries.
Governance A concept capturing the informal processes of individual and collec-
tive interactions of governments with non-governmental organizations, interest
groups, social movements and citizen groups. Its core is the co-ordination of various
forms of formal and informal types of public-private interaction, most predominantly
in the form of policy networks.
Government In a general sense, all the activities of steering within political com-
munities, from tribes to the state and to supra-national and international organizations.
Within a state, it refers to the body of persons (the chief executive, her office and the
entire cabinet of ministers or secretaries as heads of departments) in charge of policy
initiation, implementation and co-ordination.
Hegemony One of the key concepts in IR theory for describing the domination in
the international system. In the Greek tradition, hegemony was considered as a clear
and admitted supremacy of one city over all the others (as was Athens with the Delos
League). The concept is sometimes used in a more specific way for designating a
granted, even desired supremacy (A. Gramsci), or a functional supremacy, brought
about by the stabilizing leader (C. Kindleberger).
Hermeneutics A method of interpretation (of texts or similar sources).
Holism First a doctrine, and then a theory, which considers that the whole is an
indivisible entity. In sociology, it means that a society does not consist of a simple addi-
tion of its constituting units, but forms a common body, which has its own existence.
Hybrid regime A set of fairly stable government institutions and norms, either
formalized or informally recognized as existing in a given territory and with respect
to a given population, which cannot be defined either as a minimalist democracy or a
clearly non-democratic regime.
Idealism (IR) A set of doctrines and theories which consider that wars are not
inevitable and that international relations can be shaped according to international
law, human rights, free trade and positive peace. This concept which was initiated by
Immanuel Kant conceives foreign policies as an instrument for promoting a more
moral world, whereas realism favours a more cynical Realpolitik.
Identification Major concept in psychology and sociology which describes how an
individual or a group recognize themselves in a community, an experience or a set of
values, whatever their real participation in it.
Idiographic Describing a single case or event.
Imperialism Doctrine and strategy which aims to promote the expansion of an
empire. At the end of the nineteenth century, the concept was mainly used for desig-
nating the colonial expansion of the main European powers and was commonly

Glossary 255
presented as the result of modern capitalism (Lenin). The concept was then extended
to the world hegemony of the superpowers during the Cold War or to the hegemonic
position of the USA after 1989.
Incrementalism A model of gradual and piecemeal policy making which postu-
lates that the observed policy change in a given time period is determined by the
preceding time period. Governmental policies are never completely reviewed as a
whole because of the incremental calculations from the actors, and the value of all
programmes is never completely compared with other policy alternatives.
Integration The strategic option by which one or several actors prefer to give prior-
ity to the whole they are belonging to, rather than to its constituting units
Interactionism An important paradigm in the social sciences, which considers that
social reality is constituted by actors who are permanently interacting. It must be
distinguished from holism, which considers society as a substance, and individualism,
which does not consider the social environment of individual actions.
Judicial independence The ability of courts and judges to perform their duties
free from influence or control by other political or social actors.
Judicial review The practice of judges deciding whether or not to declare void a
statute or an executive order on the grounds of conflict with a higher law or the con-
stitution.
Judicialization The phenomenon of intensification of the active political role
played by the courts in the civil and political life that has taken place in a number of
democracies since the latter half of the twentieth century.
Left–right spectrum A classification of political parties based on socio-economic
distinctions ranging from socialist/social democratic parties on the left to centrist par-
ties in the middle and conservative parties on the right.
Legitimacy In a democracy, the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the
existing political institutions are better than any others that may be established, and
that they, therefore, can expect compliance.
Legitimation The process of developing legitimacy, which is the unfolding of a
cluster of positive attitudes of citizens towards democratic institutions, regarded as the
most appropriate form of government.
Liberal democracy A model of democracy characterized by free and competitive
elections, the protection of minorities, freedom of opposition, and impartial and inde-
pendent courts.
Liberalism/Neo-liberalism Liberalism is a doctrine based on the idea of liberty
and its corollary, the idea of individual responsibility. It mainly appeared at the end of
the seventeenth century with John Locke and received a special meaning in IR under
the influence of Grotius and Kant. In IR, it refers to the supremacy of the state by
promoting the rule of international law, free trade and the involvement of individuals.
Neo-liberalism appeared as a contemporary extension of liberalism in the late twenti-
eth century which contests the role of the welfare state as well as the excessive

protection of individuals by collective institutions and which advocates the restoration

of individual liberties.
Limited democracy A hybrid regime which is characterized by universal suffrage,
a formally correct electoral procedure, elective posts occupied on the basis of elections
and a multi-party system, but also by civil rights that are constrained by the police or
through other effective forms of suppression. Consequently, there is no effective
political opposition.
Linkage Concept coined by James Rosenau stressing the role of domestic issues in
the elaboration of foreign policies. It was extended in foreign policy analysis for point-
ing out how political actors, diplomats and negotiators strive to link an issue to
another for reaching a global agreement or a global transaction.
Lobbying Activities of organized interest groups attempting to influence decisions
made by government officials, legislators or members of regulatory agencies.
Ma joritarian (or Westminster) democracy An ideal type of democracy inspired
by the British model and based on the principle of majority rule. It is characterized by
a concentration of executive power in one-party and simple majority cabinets, cabinet
dominance with a consequent fusion of powers (legislative and executive), a two-party
system, and a majoritarian and disproportional electoral system.
Mass media All the channels of communication (such as newspapers, magazines,
cinema, radio, and television) aimed at spreading and disseminating various messages,
information, signs and symbols to an anonymous, undifferentiated and dispersed pub-
lic (mass audience).
Median voter theorem As formulated by Anthony Downs, the median voter theo-
rem states that a majority rule voting system will select the outcome most preferred
by the median voter.
Mediatization of politics The complex process consisting of the media becoming
increasingly autonomous from political institutions and actors while at the same time
increasing their influence and capacity to shape politics.
Methodological individualism An approach in the social sciences explaining
social phenomena as resulting from the motivations and actions of individual agents
including their ‘rational’ choice.
Methodology The systematic analysis of the methods applied to a field of study.
Military authoritarianism A non-democratic regime in which the one main politi-
cal actor is the army. It is characterized by juntas as main decision-making bodies,
limited and often suppressed popular participation, and recurring mentalities related
to order, hierarchy, national interest, safety, or a need for a technocratic rationalization.
Minimal winning ma jority A cabinet supported by the minimal number of repre-
sentatives which is necessary to be supported by the majority of members of
parliament.
Mobilization As a concept, political mobilization refers to how political involve-
ments and political identifications are created, strengthened or renewed. In a more

Glossary 257
empirical way, it designates all kinds of political participation involving citizens in a

democracy or an authoritarian regime.
Modernization theory A developmental theory referring to a progressive socio-
economic transition from a ‘pre-modern’ or ‘traditional’ to a ‘modern’ society.
Naturalism An epistemological position which takes the ‘real world’ for granted as
opposed to constructivist perspectives.
Necessary conditions A cause whose presence is required for an outcome to
occur; it may by itself, however, not be a sufficient condition to explain the outcome.
Neo-colonialism A set of economic and political practices by which previous colo-
nial powers strive to maintain their domination over a decolonized country. It also
designates the cultural predisposition to promote or support such practices.
Nomothetic The attempt to find scientific regularities or ‘laws’.
Nuclear proliferation The process by which nuclear weapons are imported or
developed by new countries. This proliferation is considered as a danger particularly
among the old nuclear powers, which prevented proliferation by the Non Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which was finalized in 1968 and renewed in 1995.
Ontology The ‘study of being’ dealing with meta-theoretical (metaphysical) con-
cerns of human existence.
Pact In the context of a democratic transition, the agreement which is at the basis
of the new regime, resulting from the negotiations between representatives of the old
elites and leaders of the democratic opposition.
Paradigm A set of representations of social reality from which social scientists
construct explaining hypotheses about the origins, transformations and ways of oper-
ating of societies. A paradigm can include several more specific theories.
Parliament Institution that brings together formally recognized members to discuss
and legitimize decisions on matters affecting the community at large. The main functions
traditionally associated with parliaments are legislation and parliamentary control.
Parliamentary committee A sub-parliamentary collegial body, appointed by the
parliament and composed in such a way as to proportionally reflect the assembly on
a smaller scale, empowered to perform specific legislative and monitoring functions.
Parliamentary democracy A democratic regime in which the head of the execu-
tive is the prime minister, who is ‘a first among equals’ and has to take into account
the supporting party coalition in leading the activity of the parliament. To take office,
the prime minister must receive a confidence vote by the parliament.
Participation The entire set of behaviours that allows women and men, as indi-
viduals or groups, to create, revive, or strengthen group identification or to try to
influence the recruitment of, and decisions by, political authorities in order to main-
tain or change the existing allocation of values.
Party government An executive power characterized by politicians recruited
through parties and primarily responsible to them; political decisions made by elected

partisan leaders; policies decided by parties that can propose them during the electoral
campaign; and cohesive governmental parties implementing those policies by voting
with discipline in the parliament.
Party identification A concept originally developed in American voting studies
referring to loyalty towards a political party which is developed early in a person’s life
mainly through family and social influences.
Path dependence An approach that emphasizes the role of the timing and
sequence of events in the social and political world. It postulates that when things
happen in a chain of events, this affects how they take place, as small and random
occurrences happening at a certain time may have long-lasting, self-reproducing pat-
terns or paths.
Patrimonial/Neo-patrimonial A system of governance in which government offi-
cials regard and treat public resources as private property, to the detriment of the
general population.
Peace In IR, peace was often considered as ‘no war’, that is to say an exception
which cannot last a long time. This negative vision of peace was challenged by
Immanuel Kant who initiated an attempt to give it a positive definition. This concept
of positive peace was then related to international law, free trade and democracy. More
recently, the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) gave a more substan-
tial and social definition to positive peace by defining it as human security, that it is to
say freeing human beings from fear, hunger, diseases and environmental disasters.
Personalization of politics The process of progressive shift from collective to
individual actors and institutions in relevant political arenas (e.g. voting behaviour,
governmental decision-making, electoral campaigning and party organization) driven
by the growing importance of leadership and media in contemporary politics.
Pluralism A situation in which numerous distinct economic, ethnic, religious or
cultural groups are present and tolerated within a society allowing for a balanced
interest representation.
Policy A purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing
with a matter of concern. Public policies are those developed by governmental bodies
and officials.
Policy agenda The set of issues and demands that decision-makers agree to con-
sider, rank and address according to the political priorities.
Policy cycle The process of public policy making composed by the chronological
sequence of the following set of activities: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy
decision-making, policy implementation, policy evaluation, and continuation, reshap-
ing or ending.
Policy evaluation The stage of the policy cycle dedicated to the estimation of the
effectiveness of public policies and their management and implementation.
Policy networks Focus on the links and interdependence between governments and
societal actors, aiming to understand the policy-making process and public policy
outcomes.

Glossary 259
Political communication The exchange of contents on matters of public interest

that involve citizens, social actors and the mass media.
Political culture Refers to the ‘subjective dimension’ of politics, in Gabriel
Almond’s words ‘the particular pattern of orientations towards political actions in
which every political system is embedded’.
Political equality Condition in which all citizens have equal rights to influence the
collective decision-making of a political community.
Political machine A form of party organization in American politics, headed by a
single boss or small autocratic group, which commands enough votes to maintain
political and administrative control of a city, county, or state.
Political marketing The implementation of marketing principles to influence pub-
lic opinion, win elections and make political decisions.
Political system A form of governing society, embedded in a legal (constitutional),
economic, and cultural environment, that essentially relies on the interdependence of
the institutions and collective actors (political parties, organized interests, govern-
ments and bureaucracies) that operate within such a system.
Populism Describes the strong and emotional direct relationships that exist between
the people as an indistinct whole and a leader who pretends to embody the ideas and
feelings of the people without any mediation of representative democratic institutions
and without respect to the rule of law.
Post-modern A late twentieth-century philosophical position characterized by
broad scepticism, subjectivism, or relativism vis-à-vis the achievements of ‘modernity’.
Presidential democracy A democratic regime in which the roles of head of govern-
ment and chief of state are blended in the same institution, the president, who is directly
elected for a fixed term. The president cannot be removed by a legislative vote of no
confidence, only by specific impeachment procedures in the case of personal misconduct.
Presidentialization of politics The strengthening of the role of the highest elected
executive authorities vis-à-vis the role of the parliament, further amplified by the
vastly expanded governing capacities of state machineries and the internationalization
of modern politics.
Propaganda A top-down form of communication that is deliberately and purpo-
sively developed by a political actor – e.g. a party, a leader – within a democratic or
non-democratic system to influence or shape values, attitudes and behaviours of citizens.
Proportional representation An electoral rule aiming at a representation of par-
ties in parliament in proportion to their electoral strength.
Public opinion The aggregate of the individual attitudes and beliefs about a par-
ticular topic, often of a political nature, held by a significant share of private citizens
in a community.
Quasi-democracies A multidimensional model of hybrid regimes where all main
components fail to achieve the minimalist characteristics of a democracy characterized
by widespread illegality and constraints on the effective guarantee of rights.

Rational choice An approach in the social sciences, in particular in economics, but

also in parts of political science that assumes that individuals always make prudent
and logical decisions that provide them with the greatest benefit or satisfaction and
that are in their highest self-interest.
Realism A long-time dominant paradigm in IR; realism was strongly influenced by
Thomas Hobbes’ work and the theorists of sovereignty. It considers the world as a
permanent anarchy resulting from the full sovereignty of the constituting states and
their aim to promote first their own national interests. This situation fuels a perma-
nent antagonism among states which leads to war that only can be contained by a
policy of a balance of powers.
Referendum A political decision in which all the people of voting age in a country
or an area are asked to give their opinion about or decide an important issue.
Regime Refers in comparative politics to the formal and informal structure and
nature of political power in a country, including the method of determining office
holders and the relations between the office holders and the society at large.
Regime change A profound change affecting one or more of key dimensions of a
political regime. There is a change of regime towards the establishment of a democ-
racy when, besides the collapse of the main aspects of authoritarianism, all the
elements of the minimum definition of democracy can be observed.
Reliability An indicator of the quality of a measure, which is applied repeatedly
producing the same results.
Representation In politics, the basic institution by which the governed choose
those who will govern through elections and authorize them to do so in their name,
thus granting representatives a mandate to look after the interests of the governed.
Responsiveness The capacity of the government to satisfy the governed by execut-
ing its policies in a way that corresponds to their demands.
Rule of law A procedural quality of democracy that indicates the enforcement of
legal norms, the principle of the supremacy of the law, and the capacity, even if limited,
to make authorities respect laws that are non-retroactive, publicly known, universal,
stable and unambiguous.
Secularization Process by which societies become emancipated from sacred values,
sacred narratives and sacred authorities to give priority to rationality and positive
science.
Semi-parliamentarism A form of government characterized by a strong premier-
ship determining major policies and controlling the working of parliament through a
stable parliamentary majority.
Semi-presidentialism A form of government in which a directly elected head of
state coexists with a prime minister who is supported by a parliamentary majority. If
the head of state is the leader or belongs to the party enjoying the parliamentary
majority, then the elected president is a powerful figure. In the opposite case, the
president is weaker and has to share the executive power with the prime minister.

Glossary 261
Separation of powers The constitutional principle according to which the funda-

mental functions of the sovereign state (legislative, executive, judiciary) must be
attributed to and exercised by different constitutional bodies, reciprocally independent
and on an equal level.
Social cleavage Refers to the division of people and conflict lines in societies
along historically shaped political issues.
Social democracy A model of democracy featuring an economy partly regulated
by the state and a welfare state offering social support to those in need (e.g. basic
rights with regards to education, health services, employment and pensions).
Social milieu The social setting in which people live and which shapes their social
and political attitudes.
Socio-economic equality The lifting of barriers that limit social and economic
equality as well as the full development of human personalities and the effective par-
ticipation of all citizens in the political, economic and social organization of a country.
Specific and diffuse support Types of political support as defined by David
Easton, the former being based on material benefits and policies, the latter on a more
generalized form of support for a regime (legitimacy).
State A form of political organization characterized by the existence of a sovereign
entity (the state), having a legal personality, which claims the monopoly of the legiti-
mate use of physical force within a given territory.
Structuralism One of the main paradigms in social sciences coming from a holistic
vision of the world. It postulates that each social system is constructed on a model of
organization, which contributes to explain how the system operates and reacts to its
environment
Sufficient conditions A cause which by itself produces a certain outcome, but this
may not be an always necessary condition.
Suffrage Defines the extent of legal voting rights in a democracy.
Sustainability A concept of common goods mainly initiated by the Brundtland
report (1987) which claims that development must meet the current economic and
social needs without endangering the future generations, particularly in the environ-
mental field.
System model Describes interactions and feedbacks between the different social
sub-systems as conceived by David Easton.
Systems analysis A scientific method in social sciences stemming from the general
systems theory elaborated by the Austrian biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy and
similar models in cybernetics. It considers the society (or the political life) as a whole
which reacts globally to its environment by striving to maintain its own identity.
Technocratic government In chancellor or parliamentary democracies, the gov-
ernment (monocratic, collective, ministerial) formed by ministers chosen on the
ground of their expertise and not of their party affiliation.

Teleological Every kind of explanation which is based on a final cause. A teleolog-

ical explanation will explain a social phenomenon by referring to its consequences and
the goal (telos) which is supposed to be reached.
Theocracy A political system in which political rule is exercised by the clergy or
other religious officials deemed as representatives of God on earth.
Traditional regime A type of non-democratic regime that is legibus solutus (‘not
bound by law’) and rests on the power of the sovereign; who considers the territory
and people as his personal property (patrimony), and binds its personnel and subjects
with a relationship made up of fears and rewards. Succession is usually hereditary.
Transition The intermediate and ambiguous period of institutional fluidity in which
a regime has abandoned some of the key characteristics of the previous institutional
set-up, without having acquired all the features of the new regime that is about to be
established.
Unicameral/Unicameralism A parliamentary system based on the basis of a sin-
gle chamber.
Validity The extent to which a concept or measurement is well founded and cor-
responds accurately to the real world.
Virtual state Concept elaborated by Richard Rosecrance for pointing to states
which draw their strength not from their territory and their natural resources, but
from their ability to participate in the global trade (trade-state), even if they are
deprived of material resources. Singapore is a major example.
Washington consensus A set of economic policy orientations which were devised
by the British economist John Williamson and which were adopted by the Bretton
Woods institutions as well as the US Department of the Treasury in order to ‘adjust’
economic policies in developing countries. It included privatization, retreat of the
state, tax reforms, free foreign investments and cuts in public aids. This ‘consensus’
was operating during the 1980s and resulted in many social crises and political reac-
tions. This policy was criticized among others by Joseph Stiglitz, a former chief
economist of the World Bank and winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, and partly
abandoned at the end of the 1990s.
Welfare state A set of policies through which the government provides protection
against predetermined social risks. Through social policies, the government defines
rules and standards regarding resources and opportunities, which are considered to be
highly relevant for individual life.

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Political Science

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Los Angeles | London | New Delhi | Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne

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Library of Congress Control Number: 2016961164

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List of boxes, figures, tables ix

Introduction: Origins of political science and basic definition 1

2 Research designs and methods 31

3 Relationship with neighbouring disciplines 43

PART II: MACRO-POLITICS 55

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7 Non-democratic regimes 111

PART III: GOVERNANCE 125

PART IV: MESO- AND MICRO-POLITICS 159

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The social roots of political participation 165

11 Political communication and media 173

12 Interest groups 186

13 Political parties 196

14 Elections and electoral behaviour 207

PART V: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 215

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Power reconsidered 227

16 Regionalism and beyond 237

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Box 1.1: Francis Bacon’s ants, spiders and bees 28

Box 2.1: Boole’s algebra 000

Box 3.1: Schmitter, The future of globalized political science 52

Box 4.1: Stein Rokkan’s ‘Conceptual Map of Europe’ 62

Box 5.1: Sartori, ‘How Far Can Free Government Travel?’ 81

Box 6.1: O’Donnell and Schmitter, ‘Transitions’ 95

Box 7.1: Linz: ‘Authoritarian Regime’ 114

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Box 8.1: Hanna Pitkin, ‘Political Representation’ 128

Box 9.1: J.E. Anderson, ‘Policy’ 144

Box 10.1: Max Kaase, ‘Participation’ 162

Box 11.1: B. McNair, ‘Political Communication’ 174

Box 12.1: Interest Groups’ Code of Conduct 190

Box 15.1: War as International Relations 218

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Leonardo Morlino is Professor of Political Science and Director of the International

Dirk Berg-Schlosser. born in 1943, is professor emeritus at Philipps-University,

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Bertrand Badie has held a number of positions including President of “jury

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‘Elementary political science from an advanced standpoint’,

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Summer 2016, Leonardo Morlino, Rome

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Political science as the science of power

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Durkheim vs. Weber

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Different traditions and origins

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Ethiopia. It may also consist of a particular ethics shaping political behaviour as in

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