Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
TOYS
vs.
PONENTE: Leonen
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for
by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names
ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of
the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of
review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC
En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-
neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence
or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act
of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the
manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the
fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does
not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s
letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is
enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included,
while sponsored messages are covered.
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On
the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to
post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect
anyone else’s constitutional rights.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private
property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the
face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is
to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account
. . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed,
or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish.”
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