MATERNITY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL v.

SECRETARY OF LABOR

Facts:

·0 Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the

Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed. The hospital derives its
finances from the club itself as well as from paying patients, averaging 130 per month. It
is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De
Oro City government.

·1 Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, the
employees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from their
respective salaries

·2 On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different
capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor
and Employment, Region X, for underpayment of their salaries and emergency cost of
living allowances (ECOLAS).

·3 Payrolls covering the periods of May, 1974, January, 1985, November, 1985 and May,
1986, were duly submitted for inspection as per instruction of the Regional Director.

·4 On July 17, 1986, the Labor Standard and Welfare Officers submitted their report
confirming that there was underpayment of wages and ECOLAs of all the employees by
the petitioner,

·5 Based on this inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director issued an
Order dated August 4, 1986, directing the payment of P723,888.58, representing
underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner's employees

·6 Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment, Hon.
Augusto S. Sanchez, who rendered a Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying the
said Order in that deficiency wages and ECOLAs should be computed only from May 23,
1983 to May 23, 1986

·7 The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Secretary of
Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition is
for certiorari seeking the annulment of the Decision of the respondent Secretary of
Labor dated September 24, 1986, affirming with modification the Order of respondent
Regional Director of Labor

issue:

1. The primary issue here is whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the
case and if so, the extent of coverage of any award that should be forthcoming, arising
 from his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code.

2. We now come to the question of whether or not the Regional Director erred in
extending the award to all hospital employees. We answer in the affirmative.

Ruling:

1.)

This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as amended by
E.O. No. 111. Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws,
rules, and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other
monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7,
Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated
September 16, 1987). Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and
enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate
money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of
the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned.

Prior to the promulgation of E.O. No. 111 on December 24, 1986, the Regional Director's
authority over money claims was unclear. The complaint in the present case was filed on May
23, 1986 when E.O. No. 111 was not yet in effect, and the prevailing view was that stated in the
case of Antonio Ong, Sr. vs. Henry M. Parel, et al., G.R. No. 76710, dated December 21, 1987,
thus:

. . . the Regional Director, in the exercise of his visitorial and enforcement powers under
Article 128 of the Labor Code, has no authority to award money claims, properly falling
within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. . . .

. . . If the inspection results in a finding that the employer has violated certain labor
standard laws, then the regional director must order the necessary rectifications.
However, this does not include adjudication of money claims, clearly within the ambit of
the labor arbiter's authority under Article 217 of the Code.

We believe, however, that even in the absence of E. O. No. 111, Regional Directors already had
enforcement powers over money claims, effective under P.D. No. 850, issued on December 16,
1975, which transferred labor standards cases from the arbitration system to the enforcement
system.

2.)

The Regional Director correctly applied the award with respect to those employees who signed
the complaint, as well as those who did not sign the complaint, but were still connected with the
hospital at the time the complaint was filed

The justification for the award to this group of employees who were not signatories to the
complaint is that the visitorial and enforcement powers given to the Secretary of Labor is
relevant to, and exercisable over establishments, not over the individual members/employees,
because what is sought to be achieved by its exercise is the observance of, and/or compliance
by, such firm/establishment with the labor standards regulations. Necessarily, in case of an
award resulting from a violation of labor legislation by such establishment, the entire
members/employees should benefit therefrom.

The enforcement power of the Regional Director cannot legally be upheld in cases of separated
employees. Article 129 of the Labor Code, cited by petitioner (p. 54, Rollo) is not applicable as
said article is in aid of the enforcement power of the Regional Director; hence, not applicable
where the employee seeking to be paid underpayment of wages is already separated from the
service. His claim is purely a money claim that has to be the subject of arbitration proceedings
and therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

Calalang v. Williams

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon
de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.;
and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street,
from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic.

Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance
of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August
1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal
Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.

On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second
indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the
latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between
the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening
of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be
enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private
citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of
prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente
Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as
Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

Issue:

Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon
the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people.

Held:

The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any
given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."

Federico Ledesma v. NLRC

Facts:

·8 Petitioner Federico Ledesma was employed as a bus/service driver by the private

 respondent on probationary basis where he was required to report at private
respondents Philippine National Training Institute (PNTI) training site in Dasmarias,
Cavite, under the direct supervision of its site administrator, Pablo Manolo de Leon (de
Leon).

·9 Petitioner filed a complaint against de Leon for allegedly abusing his authority as site
administrator by using the PNTI vehicles and other facilities for personal ends. In the
same complaint, petitioner also accused de Leon of immoral conduct allegedly carried
out within the PNTI premises

·10 De Leon filed a written report against the petitioner addressed to PNTI Vice-President
for Administration, Ricky Ty (Ty), citing his suspected drug use.

·11 PNTI HR Manager served a copy of a Notice to petitioner requiring him to explain within
24 hours why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for allegedly violating
Section 14, Article IV of the private respondents Code of Conduct.

·12 Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the
Labor Arbiter.

·13 In his Position Paper, petitioner averred that in view of the complaint he filed against de
Leon for his abusive conduct as site administrator, the latter retaliated by falsely accusing
petitioner as a drug user. VP for Administration Ty, however, verbally dismissed
petitioner from service on 29 November 2000.

·14 Petitioner was then asked by HR Manager Cueva to sign a resignation letter and also
remarked that whether or not petitioner would resign willingly, he was no longer
considered an employee of PNTI. All these events transpired in the presence of VP for
Administration Ty, who even convinced petitioner to just voluntarily resign with the
assurance that he would still be given separation pay. Petitioner did not yet sign the
resignation letter replying that he needed time to think over the offers. When petitioner
went back to private respondents training site, he was no longer allowed by the guard to
enter the premises.[

·15 On the following day, petitioner immediately went to St. Dominic Medical Center for a
drug test and he was found negative for any drug substance. With his drug result on
hand, petitioner went back to the main office in Manila to talk to VP for Administration
Ty and HR Manager Cueva and to show to them his drug test result. Petitioner then told
VP for Administration Ty and HR Manager Cueva that since his drug test proved that he
was not guilty of the drug use charge against him, he decided to continue to work for the
private respondent.

·16 On 2 December 2000, petitioner reported for work but he was no longer allowed to
enter the training site for he was allegedly banned therefrom according to the guard on
 duty. This incident prompted the petitioner to file the complaint for illegal dismissal
against the private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.

·17 However, Private respondent denied all the allegations of the petitioner.

·18 The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, in favor of the petitioner declaring illegal his
separation from employment. The Labor Arbiter, however, did not order petitioners
reinstatement for the same was no longer practical, and only directed private
respondent to pay petitioner backwages.

·19 Both parties questioned the Labor Arbiters Decision before the NLRC. On 15 April 2003,
the NLRC granted the appeal raised by both parties and reversed the Labor Arbiters
Decision. Petitioners claim for reinstatement was granted by the NLRC. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied by the NLRC in its Resolution
dated 29 August 2003.

·20 The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and affirmed the NLRC Decision. Hence, this is an instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is illegally dismissed?

Ruling:

In the present case, there is hardly any evidence on record so as to meet the quantum of
evidence required, i.e., substantial evidence. Petitioners claim of illegal dismissal is supported by
no other than his own bare, uncorroborated and, thus, self-serving allegations, which are also
incoherent, inconsistent and contradictory.

Petitioner himself narrated that when his presence was requested on 29 November 2000 at the
private respondents main office where he was served with the Notice to Explain his superiors
report on his suspected drug use, VP for Administration Ty offered him separation pay if he will
just voluntarily resign from employment. While we do not condone such an offer, neither can we
construe that petitioner was dismissed at that instance. Petitioner was only being given the
option to either resign and receive his separation pay or not to resign but face the possible
disciplinary charges against him. The final decision, therefore, whether to voluntarily resign or to
continue working still, ultimately rests with the petitioner. In fact, by petitoners own admission,
he requested from VP for Administration Ty more time to think over the offer.

Moreover, the petitioner alleged that he was not allowed to enter the training site by the guard
on duty who told him that he was already banned from the premises. Subsequently, however,
petitioner admitted in his Supplemental Affidavit that he was able to return to the said site on 3
December 2000, to claim his 16-30 November 2000 salary, and again on 9 December 2000, to
receive his 13th month pay. The fact alone that he was able to return to the training site to claim
his salary and benefits raises doubt as to his purported ban from the premises.
 Finally, petitioners stance that he was dismissed by private respondent was further weakened
with the presentation of private respondents payroll bearing petitioners name proving that
petitioner remained as private respondents employee up to December 2000. Again, petitioners
assertion that the payroll was merely fabricated for the purpose of supporting private
respondents case before the NLRC cannot be given credence. Entries in the payroll, being entries
in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of the
Rules of Court. It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to adduce clear and convincing
evidence in support of his claim of fabrication and to overcome such presumption of regularity.
[30] Unfortunately, petitioner again failed in such endeavor.

On these scores, there is a dearth of evidence to establish the fact of petitioners dismissal.

It is true that the Constitution affords full protection to labor, and that in light of this
Constitutional mandate, we must be vigilant in striking down any attempt of the management to
exploit or oppress the working class. However, it does not mean that we are bound to uphold
the working class in every labor dispute brought before this Court for our resolution.

The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor self-
destruction of the employer. It should be made clear that when the law tilts the scales of justice
in favor of labor, it is in recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and
management. The intent is to balance the scales of justice; to put the two parties on relatively
equal positions. There may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the
interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the
employer. Justitia nemini neganda est -- justice is to be denied to none.

Pasei v. Drilon

Facts:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,"
1challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" 2that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3and that it is violative of the right to
travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in character.

The Solicitor General filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the
respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar,
Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the
validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the
Philippine State.

Issue: Whether or not the Deparment Order No. 1 is constitutional

Ruling:

It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare." 5As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.

Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its
awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in
that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good.
Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is
a clear misuse of the power.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers,"
14but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled
that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15does not import a perfect Identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the
same class.

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers - rests on
substantial distinctions.

The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits"is not well-taken. The right granted
by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of
regulation.

The Constitution declares that:

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities
 for all.

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the
Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and
humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands
because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the
Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection,
personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence,
an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such
protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services

By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).

FACTS:

·21 Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-
approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:

·22 Duration of contract 12 months

·23 Position Chief Officer
·24 Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
·25 Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
·26 Overtime US$700.00 per month
·27 Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month

·28 On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

·29 Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence,
petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on
May 26, 1998.

·30 Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998
up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served
only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of
nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
·31 Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73.

·32 The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner
illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:

·33 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the
dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case
was illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner],
jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at
the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S.
DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the complainant’s salary for three (3) months of
the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.

·34 The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

·35 In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation
on the salary period of three months only — rather than the entire unexpired portion of
nine months and 23 days of petitioner’s employment contract – applying the subject
clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner’s
“[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, +
US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”

·36 Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question
the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

·37 The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum
salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to
US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay,
which should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.

·38 Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC denied the motion.

·39 Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional
challenge against the subject clause. After initially dismissing the petition on a
technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its
Resolution which granted the petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.

·40 The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however,
the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

·41 His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brings his
 cause to this Court on the following grounds:

·42 The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in
accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting
unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of
employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months.

·43 Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No.
8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner’s award the
overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract since under the contract they
form part of his salary.

·44 The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance
of the constitutional question raised therein.

Issue: Whether or not the subject clause is constitutional

Ruling:

The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not
disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all
three fora.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without
distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate
to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of
similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed
on, others in like circumstances.

It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired
portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in
case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their
basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of
computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment
periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of
one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary
awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is
less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter’s
unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally
dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with
fixed-term employment.

The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her
right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire
unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.