Fieldwork and the Perception of Everyday Life

Author(s): Timothy Jenkins

Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 433-455
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
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 FIELDWORK AND THE PERCEPTION
OF EVERYDAYLIFE

TIMOTHYJENKINS
ofCambridge
University

Thisarticleexamines theclaimthatfieldwork is an adequatemethodforgaining

knowledge ofeveryday life.It pointsto similaritiesbetween theconditions ofanthro-
pologicalknowledge and thoseof everyday lifethrough a discussionof a single
ethnographic example, thebuyingand sellingof cattlein south-west France.Four
interrelatedthemesemerge. First,an exploration oftheideaof 'acquiring habitsfor
action'through fieldwork,or apprenticeship, anditscongruence withthepractices of
everyday life,forthishasimplications thatimpinge upondiscussions ofethnographic
method, ethnographic writing andthestatusofanthropological knowledge. Second,
attentionis drawnto theeffects introduced intoethnographic descriptionsand,more
generally,intosocialpractice,bytheabstracting or'objectifying' propertiesoflanguage,
thattendtoeliminate anytraceoftemporality andoftheacquisition ofcontext,
ofhabits,
andof'livedlife'.Thethird theme, whichisorganized around theinescapablytemporal
nature oftheexperience ofeveryday lifeandthepotential inadequacy oflanguage to
expressfullythatnature,concerns thecomplexity of'socialordering' andtheimportance
ofwhathasbeencalled'mutual inthecreation
interpretation' of'thesocial'.Experience
is structuredbytheexploration ofheterocliterealitiesthatareownedbynobody, but
whicharefunctions ofeverybody's understandings. Lastly,thislocationofthe'objectivity'
ofthesocialemphasizes thematter ofconstraints tobe acknowledged andresources to
beexploited, andinparticular points toquestions ofinequality orpower, andhowthese
pertaintothefield, fieldwork andethnography.

The practiceof intensivefieldworkhas been centralto the definitionof

modernsocial anthropologyas a discipline,to the extentof being the single
distinctivefeatureof anthropologicalmethod. This being the case, it has
always been a matterof debate as to preciselywhat is achieved through
fieldwork.There are,broadlyspeaking,threeelementsin relationshipin the
equation: the fieldworkexperience,fromthe anthropologist's point of view;
the object of study,or the lives of the people in question; and the account
produced, the ethnography. Differentexplanationstend to shiftemphasis
fromone elementto another.
Thus one focus in recentdiscussionhas been upon the writing of ethno-
graphicaccounts,criticizingearlierethnographiesfor theireliminationof

Man (N.S.) 29, 433-455

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434 TIMOTHYJENKINS

anytraceofwhatfieldwork is likein practice, and drawingattention to the

consequences ofthiselimination forethnographic knowledge. In a survey of
stylesof ethnographic writing, Spencer(1989) identifies 'ethnographic real-
ism' as a formof description whichtendsto eliminate diversitywithinthe
populationunderconsideration, creatinga homogeneousobject ('homo
ethnographicus') and,in theprocess,expunging anytraceof theethnogra-
pher'spointofview.
Thesecriticisms deserveto be takenseriously Theyformpartofa gener-
alizedmovetowards whathasbeencalleda greater 'self-consciousness about
modesofrepresentation' (Geertz1973:19,n.3). Spencergoeson toconsider
whathe terms'experimental' ethnographies, as a reactionto thefirststyle,
whichtendto concentrate upontheexperience offieldwork anduponauto-
biography, sometimesto the extentof failingto give any consistent
description ofindigenous realities.The latter criticism alsoapplieswithforce
to Spencer'sthirdcategory, inwhichanthropology is analysedas a speciesof
writing, usingmethodsdrawnfromliterary criticism.1 In each case,one of
thethreeelements is privileged, perhapsto excess.
Formanyanthropologists, neither 'realism'nor'anti-realism' (be itexperi-
mentalor formalist in style)are fullysatisfactory approaches fordescribing
thecentral procedures ofanthropological practice - theexperienced realities
ofdoingfieldwork and ofwriting and publishing papersand monographs -
nordo theyreadily leadtoan adequateunderstanding ofthestatusofanthro-
pologicalaccounts,nor of the value or truthcontainedwithinpublished
ethnographies (see Rabinow1985; Keesing1987; Sangren1988; Dresch
1992).Perhapsthissenseof theunsatisfactoriness of someof theproposed
solutionsarisesbecausenoneof theseapproaches focusessufficiently upon
theinescapably temporal and constructed natureof experience. Rortyout-
linesa positionwhichhe distinguishes frombothrealismand anti-realism,
suggesting thatwe need an account'whichdoes notview knowledgeas a
matter ofgetting realityrightbut... as a matter ofacquiring habitsofaction
forcopingwithreality' (Rorty 1991: 1). This business of 'acquiring habitsof
actionforcopingwithreality' is commontoanthropologists andthesubjects
ofanthropology alike,andcomescloseto beinga restatement ofthecentral
principleof the ethnographic tradition. It givesa clue to anotherway of
approaching the questionof whyfieldwork is a sufficient way of gaining
knowledge aboutotherpeoplethatis sincereand reliable(and so testable),
whichI wishto explore.
This line of enquiryleads awayfroma dualistpositionand towardsa
concentration upon the productionof difference in a single,though
infinitely complex, world:theanthropologist andtheindigenous subjectsof
anthropology inhabitthesamecomplexworld;theyareengagedin thesame
kindof projects, exploring and constructing thatworld;and,mostimpor-
tantly,languageand understanding are equally featuresof this world,
participating in theseprojectsas theyshapebehaviourand receiveimpres-
sions.No one in thediscipline hascontributed moreto thedevelopment of

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 TIMOTHYJENKINS 435

an alternative
to thedualistpositionthanBourdieu(1977;1990),who delib-
eratelysituateshis workin anotherdimensionto thatof the opposition
characterizedaboveas realist/anti-realist
(althoughhe too can be takento
taskforcertainresidualdualisms;see Herzfeld[1987:8 sq.,83 sq], who has
developedsome of Bourdieu'spositions);I shalldrawupon his work,and
subsequently uponHerzfeld's, in exploring
thisapproachto thequestionof
fieldwork and theperception of everydaylife.The discussionis elaborated
through considerationofa singleexampledrawnfromfieldwork undertaken
in thesouth-west ofFrance,itsaimbeingtodistinguish a numberoffeatures
offieldwork thatpermitan adequateaccountto be givenofa particular way
oflife.

A Frenchcattlemarket
The exampleconcernspractices involvedin buyingand sellingcattlein the
market placeinsouth-west France(drawing uponFossat1972andT Jenkins
1981).EachsmalltowninBeaamandthesurrounding regionhasa weeklyor
fortnightly market,whenthepeasantscomein fromthedistricts around,to
shop,to do business,or simplyto meetfriends andto talk.On thatday,the
locallanguage, the'patois'(or,morecorrectly, 'Occitan';see Bec 1973),re-
places Frenchon the streets.The centreof the marketis the livestock
market, whereone findsonlymen,andonlythepatoisis spoken.
Therearetwoprincipal actorsin thecattlemarket: theprofessionaldealer
and thepeasant.The dealeris visiblymarked,by wearinga blacksmock.
Each dealerhas his circuitof markets, and some travelfarafield.All the
dealersrelate,in a hierarchy, to theslaughterhouses in theregionalcapital;
localdealers, who arealsosmallfarmers, actas intermediariesandas sources
of information forthebiggerdealers;therefore muchof thetrading is bet-
weendealers.The producer, thepeasant, hasa morelimitedhorizon,forhe
goesonlyto thelocalmarket.
The smallermarkets, thatserveonlya restricted area,havedeclinedsince
thesecondworldwar,perhapsforreasonsconnected withbettertransport
andcommunications, anda changing focusin theinterests ofyoungfarmers;
at any rate,it is now rareto see livestockat them.The largermarkets,
however, continueto survive andevenflourish. The localexplanation to an
outsider's enquiryofwhythisis so - forthesamefactors shouldhaveeroded
both- is givenin termsofa description ofthesortofpeasantwho buysand
sellsat market, and of a corresponding accountof thedealer.The peasant
who goesto thecattlemarket is supposedto be a bitlazy,and a bitsmarter
thanaverage; he prefers,
insteadofworking, togo to themarket andto tryto
makemoremoneyby sellingthere,by tricking thedealersor,at least,by
playing themoffagainsteachother.The qualitiesevokedbysucha descrip-
tionor explanation areambiguously markedforthepeasant:he admiresthe
abilityto makea bargain, evendishonestly, butthepersonwho showssuch
an abilityis notnecessarily
verysolidor moral.

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436 TIMOTHYJENKINS

The dealerhasa muchworsereputation in theseaccounts:he is normally

termeda maquignon, whichmeansa horsetrader, butithasperjorative over-
tones. He is regardedas thoroughly capable of cheatingthe peasant.
Maquignons areconsidered a 'raceapart',andmanystoriesaretoldconcerning
theircunningand wickedness - includingtheirmakingallianceswiththe
devil- and theireventualdownfall.These storieshave,in commonwith
muchpublicknowledge, a mythicqualityin thattheylackanyconsistent
contextual reference;in them,thedealertendsto takeon characteristics that
belongtotheanimalshe dealsin;thisis particularly trueofthedealerin pigs
for,in thelocalview,pigs- unlikecattle- haveno redeeming features.
Locally,then,it is considered thatthemarketsurvives becausethereis a
certainkindofpersonwho relishesa contestofwits.Informants delightin
tellingoftechniques - somemorelegitimate thanothers- forimproving the
appearance of theanimalforsale.The notionofthe'contestofwits'makes
it verydifficult fortheanthropologist to be acceptedin themarketand to
learnwhatis goingon. The negotiations areprolonged, andneither partyhas
anyinterest in havinga disinterested thirdpartypresent.In particular, the
smallsumsofmoneybeingarguedoveraresecret;thewholeidea thatone
or otherpartymightstealan advantagedemandsthattherebe no inde-
pendentwitnesses. One cannot,then,fruitfully questiona dealerconcerning
hispractice, nora peasantconcerning his;theywillonlyanswerin generali-
tiesandin termsofa 'contestofwits'.
Yettheideaofextreme antagonism betweenthedealerand thepeasantis
quiteclearlyinadequate.Bothbenefitfromthe exchange, whichis highly
ritualized,anditis not,in fact,thenegotiation oftheprice,withitspotential
elementofdeceit,thatleadstohostility, butrather a failureto observepartof
the ritual.The anthropologist's job is to getpastthe 'official account',to
adoptBourdieu'sterm(1977),andto lookatthetransaction, andattheskills
and techniques thatarebrought to bear.The skillsofpeasantandtraderare
partof thesame'culture', althougha peasantdoes notsee exactly withthe
eyeof a dealer.Each sidehas itsmorality (see Fossat1972: 10): thepeasant
believesin hisability tojudge- he has hisknowledge and hisself-respect -
and thedealerbelievesin absolutefidelity -
to his 'word' he honourshis
bargain.
In bothcases,theirknowledge and valuesare transmitted fromfather to
son, not by wordof mouth,but by exampleand throughexperience. For
instance, thereis a sequenceof gesturesthe peasantperforms in orderto
examinetheanimalhe wantsto buy;thereis a rationale behindit,and the
sequencediffers fromtheone thatthedealerperforms atpointswheretheir
interestsdiffer.Bothchecktheanimalto estimate itshealth,age andpoten-
tialyield.The butcher(thedealerunderanotherhat) mustassesshow the
animalwill cut up, whatthe yieldwill be, and whatweightthe fatand
kidneys willcontribute, forit is in theaccurateassessment ofwhatis to be
got offthe carcassof the animalat presenton the hoofthatthe profitis
made.Nothingof whatis notedduringtheexamination is utteredaloud,

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 TIMOTHYJENKINS 437

although, unlikethepeasantwho conductshis examination in silence,the

dealer/butcher oftenmakescomments on whathe is doingas he proceeds.
There is an extensive lexiconof termsconcerning theanimal,itsbody,
habitsanddiseases,butchery termsandso forth, thatunderlieexplanations I
havebeengivenoftheactors'behaviour; butthesetechnical termsarenever
heardin themarket place.The market placehas itsown formsoflanguage,
itsvocabulary and figures ofspeech:theactorsspeaklargely in banalitieson
preordained topics.The peasants standaroundin groupsandtalkaboutfarm
work,theiranimalsand thecropsthatrelateto animalhusbandry (thatis,
maizeand hay).The dealersdiscussamongthemselves theanimalsforsale
and theirpotential yield.Bothsidesdiscussmoney, thedealersin particular
speaking in termsofpossibleprofit andyield.Thesediscussions takeplacein
intimate groups,in themarket placeor in thecafes,and thoseinvolvedgive
nothingaway.Conversations of thissortat whichI havebeenpresenthave
confirmed my view thatwhat goeson at themarket is to be discovered by
observation ratherthanbylistening.
The businessofselling,thetransaction betweenpeasantanddealer,is also
a ritualcontrolledbythemoralcodeofeachgroup.Once a dealerhasnamed
his offer,and thepeasanthis price,thereis an argument afterthepotential
buyerhas examinedtheanimal,andthereis,effectively, a technical vocabu-
laryof denigration. Afterthis,the two actorsseparate.Later,the dealer
returnsand repeatshis offer, and the peasantmaintains his price.At this
pointan intermediary stepsinandintroduces notionsofa compromise. Each
sideverbally takesa steptowardstheother.Once agreement is reached,the
actorsexchangea first, non-decisive ofhands;however,
striking further dis-
cussionis possibleafterthis.Indeed,thenegotiation can breakdownat this
point,and startagainat thebeginning, sometimes a weeklaterat thenext
market.The real agreement is signalledby a seconddecisivestriking of
hands.The dealerthenmarkstheanimalspurchased by shavingtheupper
partofthetail.Normally, theactorsthengo to a cafeto drinkcoffeeorwine
together. andabuse,occurwhenthesequenceis broken,
Hostility, andifthis
happensthesellerusuallyrefuses to negotiate
further. It followsthata buyer
comingfromoutsidetheregionmustbe accompanied bysomeonelocalwho
knowstherules.

thecattle
Accountingfor market
The moststriking conclusionto be drawnfromthisexampleis thatthe
explanationgiventoan outsideenquirer,ofthepersistenceofmarkets,ofthe
behaviour in themarket
oftheparticipants place,andofthecontestofwits,
is notan adequateaccount.2This is forseveralreasons(cf Bourdieu1977:
16-22).To beginwith,theaccountleavesouttheobvious,takingforgranted
all thatgoeswithoutsaying.To indicateonlyone aspectofthis,thoughone
thatimplicates everypartof peasantlife,theindigenous
practically account
omitsanycomment whatsoever upon therelationsof languageand gender,

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438 TIMOTHYJENKINS

whichare embodiedin thisinstancein thefactthatonlymenare present,

andthatonlythelocaldialectis employed.
The indigenousaccountintroduces distortions throughwhatmightbe
calledthe'desireto explain'.It generalizes, leavingoutmentionofparticular
examplesand names,whichinvoketheirown specifichistories of pasten-
countersand experiences, and insteadattributes standardized and,indeed,
mythic motivationsandbehaviour totheactors.In so doing,itabstracts from
thebehaviour ofthosein questionandcreatesa storythatrunsparallelto,or
a mappingthatis laid over,theperceptions, motivations, emotionsand so
forththatareatworkin theparticular instance.
These mappings, moreover, havetheirownproperties. On theone hand,
they'freezethepicture'and createimagessimpleenoughto be handledin
conversation; on theotherhand,theyalso havetheproperty ofmovingon,
of developingindependently, as if theyhad a lifeof theirown. These ac-
countsthusgainqualitiesand elaborations whichdo not derivefromthat
whichtheypurportto describe, but are subjectto theirown,independent
rulesof derivation (see Ardener1989: 178-80).A simplecase is where,in
stories,thedealersin certainanimalstakeon properties of thebeaststhey
trade.Theseaccountstherefore tendto deflect attention awayfromthepar-
ticularindividualsinvolved,and whatmaybe said to be goingon in the
specificcase,andto substitute anotherhistory.
an informant's
Finally, accountis oriented towardsthepresumed expecta-
tions of the enquirer.Because the accountis generalizedand abstract,
extractedfromitscontextand itstemporality, itlendsitselfto consideration
in termsofa setofrulesor a generalized 'structure',
whileat thesametime
itconcentrates uponexceptional events,upon'themostremarkable "moves",
i.e. those most esteemedor reprehended, in the different social games'
(Bourdieu1977:19). In thecase of themarket, one's attention is drawnto
examplesoftrickery, techniques ofdeceitandthebreakdown ofnegotiations,
leadingto abuseor evenviolence;all theseareexceptional.
The indigenous description therefore lendsitselfto academicredescrip-
tionin termsof structure and theviolationof rules,a redescription that
repeatstheproblemsraisedbythenativeaccount,withitsunreflective split
betweenthe behaviourof the actorsand the explanation offeredof this
behaviour. In thecase of theacademicaccount,theproblemsre-emerge in
questionsof determination on theone hand- ofwheretherulesor norms
(thestructure or culture)are located,and how theactorsenactor execute
them- andin questionsofdeviancy on theother- ofwhypeopleappearnot
to knowtherulesoftheirownculture, or underwhatconditions theyshow
powersofindependent thought (cf Bourdieu1977:24 sq; R. Jenkins 1981:
93).
This sequenceof distortion performed by the nativeaccount,through
leavingouttheobvious,objectifying upontheexceptional,
andconcentrating
lendsitselfnotonlyto academicaccounts,butalso to strongly stereotyped
ofpeasantlifein novels,so thatwriters
portrayals candescribethetransaction

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 TIMOTHYJENKINS 439

in themarket strictlyin termsofa contestofwitsandthedomination ofone

partybytheother(forexample, Zola [1887]inLa Terre, part2, ch. 6). These
outsideaccounts, thoughfictional, arenotwithouteffect on theground:the
stereotypefeedsback,shapingand affecting thetransaction, influencing the
behaviourof the actorsin numerousparticulars. The complexactswith
whichwe areconcerned aremapped,andthereby interpreted, in languageby
the actorsconcernedin the sortof termsthatare givento outsidersin
explanation.Anypost-market analysis a participantgivesmaydrawuponthe
stereotype of a 'battleof wits'.He, as muchas anyoneelse in thewider
society,
sharestheimagesof thewily(or,alternatively, gullible)peasantand
the wickeddealer.This is not to say thatthisis how a participant views
himself,but it is theonlylanguagehe has in whichreadilyto discussthe
market. Such discussion is in anycasefragmentary. It is as iftheregistration
ofsociallifebelongedto neither party, butlayin a kindofno-man's-land.3
If we cannotrelyfullyupon oral accounts,thisis in partbecausethe
knowledge involvedis largely 'nonverbal':muchofthebehaviour or action
in questionpasses'on thehithersideofwordsor concepts'(Bourdieu1977:
2). This observation againimpliesa numberofaspects.To beginwith,there
are quiteformalized sequencesof behaviourthathavetheirown rationale,
whichis nevermade explicitby the participants. There is no indigenous
description of thesequencesof examination of theanimaland theconclu-
sionsto be drawnat eachpoint,althougha detailedtechnical vocabulary is
available.The sequencesarelearntandemployed bodily(Bourdieucallsthis
'mimesis'- 1977:116); practical mastery is transmitted in practice, without
attaining thelevelofverbaldiscourse. We areconcerned notwithcategories
but withhabits- withwaysof doingthings,schemesof perception and
patterns ofthought - whicharepresent in andinculcated through everypart
ofpeasantlife(cf Bourdieu1977:15). No nativeaccountwilldescribewhat
goes on remotely in termsof thesequencesI haveoutlined,the'rituals'of
examination andnegotiation. It is therefore no use askingdirectly forinfor-
mationuponsuchtopics;onewillonlybe givenaccountsofthekindalready
discussed.
If muchsociallifeis practical rather thantheoretical, embodiedin habits
and 'dispositions', behaviouris notmadeup of rule-governed responsesto
stimuli,but ratheris constructed or improvised upon the basis of these
habitsthatenableactorsto generate an infinite numberofpractices adapted
to endlessly changing situations, withoutthisbasiseverbeingconstituted as
explicitprinciples (cf Bourdieu 1977: 11,29,73). Ifthis is so, it follows that
'livedlife'is inescapably spatialand temporal:it is enactedthroughcon-
structedbodilyhabitsand in sequences.It is upon these groundsthat
Bourdieuopposesall attempts toobjectify sociallife,toconstruct theoretical,
language-based accountswhichreferto rulesor structures in a timeless
order,and so bothignoretheworkof theactorsin constructing theirown
practiceandalsolendthemselves to- as wellas feeding upon- theability of

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440 TIMOTHYJENKINS

the actorsthemselves to objectify and to givean abstract accountof their

ownpractice.
Withoutthepresenceof an outsideraskingquestions,theactorsdo not
need to giveanyaccountof whatis goingon; indeed,it maybe that,as
Bourdieusuggests, successful practicenormally excludesknowledgeof its
own logic.However,evenfromthepointofviewof theactors'interpreta-
tions,what is goingon is not discussed:thereis a whole techniqueof
misdirection, of discussingbanalities, of communication whichservesto
establishthatbothsidesknowverywell thatnothingof anysignificance is
beinguttered.It would be foolishof an actorto sayanything of whathe
thought, eitherofwhathe hadgathered ofthevalueofthebeastorwhether
he thought thepriceunderdiscussion was 'fair'.Thisis notonlyforreasons
of pecuniary advantage, but also becausetheactor'sjudgement, reputation
and self-respect areat stake.The aimis notsimplyto sellor buya cow,but
to gaina profit in thesenseofesteem,too. Indeed,financial profitis onlya
meansto suchan end,andis to a degreesubordinate to it:toogreata profit,
forexample,can tarnisha reputation, indicating thatthe personwas too
grasping, or taldngadvantage ofweakness. Anything theactorsaysis highly
colouredbythesefactors. It is impossible foran informant to discussopenly
suchmatters as these,pertaining to self-definition,evenwithan outsiderhe
has cometo knowwell.Self-esteem andprestige onlyexistwitha deviceof
misrecognition or denialto protect themfromexamination.
It followsthatthesituation in themarket placeis quitecomplex.Thereare
twopartiesinvolved, thedealerand thepeasant,whosereputations are en-
gaged,andwhoemploytheirskillsandabilities, their'savoirfaire', toachieve
an outcomewhichtheywillfindsatisfactory, giventheirinterests and goals
impliedin theperceptions, preconceptions and preconditions upon which
theydraw.The negotiation, then,hasitsowntime,a rhythm withitspauses
andaccelerations, as thetwoactorsprobeeachother'sintentions andreactto
whattheylearn.In thisregard, theroleoftheintermediary is important, for
he allowsadjustments, secondthoughts and backingoff- all ofwhichare
crucialfortheplayof equivocation - to takeplacewithouttheseriousor
irrevocable commitment ofreputation.
Each negotiation is notindependent in time,however;each actordraws
upon his previousexperience of buyingand selling,includinganyearlier
encounters withthisparticular otherparty. Indeed,everytransaction entailsa
historyofpasttransactions, contained in theself-confidence andself-esteem
of the actors,and theirreputations. Justas everyactionperformed in the
examination ofa beastimpliesan apprenticeship of signs,so everymovein
thebusinessofnegotiation impliesan ontogeny oftherelevant skills.
So farthisdescription of thedeployment of habitsand skillsfitsloosely
withtheanalogyof playersin a gameof cards(cf Bourdieu1977:58). Yet
thereis a further factorto takeintoaccount.The twopartiesinvolveddo not
use exactlythesamesystemof examination, and do not seekto drawthe
same conclusionsfromtheirexamination. In a real sense,each does not

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 TIMOTHYJENKINS 441

knowwhatthe otherknows.The complexity of the systemconsistsnot

simplyin themutualadjustment betweentheparties,but in thepotential
misreading or misunderstanding ofeachpartybytheother.
In thiscase,each party'sinterpretation consistsin the actsto whichhe
commitshimselfThereis no separation herebetweenthoughtand action:
theyare directly generated fromexperience. The interpretation thepeasant
makesofthedealer'sactionsexistsin thesale or non-saleof thebeast.The
transactionisthismutualinterpretation bysystems ofcomprehension which
ifpartially,
arepotentially, incompatible.
As Simmel(1950) pointsout, the situationoutlinedin factpertainsto
everycommunicative act.Although all relationshipsbetweenpeoplepresup-
pose a common culturethat theycan expectof each other,and the
complexity or development of relationships is relatedto thedegreethatthe
partiesrevealthemselves to one another, nevertheless, thiscommonculture
does notpresupposeaccurateor trueknowledge as such.Theremustcer-
tainlybe muchthatis truein theknowledgethatthepartieshaveof each
other,elsetheywouldact,in theextreme case,atrandom, yettheremayalso
be muchignorance and errorin eachparty's viewof theother.In addition,
thereis no rule of symmetry, or an equal distribution of ignorance:one
party'sviewmaycontainfewerofthesedefects thantheother's.Communi-
cationis basedupona pragmatic constraint, thatthepictureeachpartyhasof
theothermustenableactionto continueandnotto breakdown.
'The social'is notthentransparent, andcannotbe 'seen'at a glanceeven
an
by experienced It
actor. is not a homogeneous space,opento theinspec-
tioneither of the people who make it up or of theanthropologist,but is
complexand heterogeneous, madeup of differingand exclusiverealms,of
publicandprivate, evensecret, knowledge and deeds. Simmel in
writes, this
connexdon, that
thesecretin thissense,thehidingof realities
bynegative or positivemeans,is one
ofman'sgreatest achievements.In comparisonwith... (a state)in whicheverycon-
ceptionis expressedat once,and everyundertaking is accessibleto theeyesof all,
thesecretproducesan immense enlargementoflife:numerous contents of lifecan-
notemergeintothepresenceof fullpublicity. The secretoffers, so to speak,the
ofa secondworldalongside
possibility themanifestworld;andthelatter is decisively
influencedbytheformer (Simmel1950:330).
The 'inertia'of the socialis not experienced simplyin theunreflected-
uponobviousness ofall thatgoeswithoutsaying, norin theencounterwith
others,
adjusting practices andexpressions tomeetthereactions andexpecta-
tionsof theotheractors.It is presenttoo in themutualmisunderstandings
thatare potentialin anyencounter, thatare experienced as anomalies,as
mattersthatescapeanticipation. 'knowl-
This thirdkindof non-linguistic
edge'mayalso be handledwithdiffering we mightdrawattention
ability: to
as distinct
theactor's'flair', fromhishabitsandhisskills,in ordertoidentify
a thirdaspectof apprenticeship containedin theothertwo.This abilityis
displayedin theavoidanceofconflict andofthebreakdown ofnegotiations,

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442 TIMOTHYJENKINS

forthesearisethroughthe loss of trust,throughmisunderstandings

and
suspicionsofdeceit;it appearsin thesuccessfully
concludeddeal.

Practice,fleldworkandanthropologicalknowledge
Whataretheimplications ofthisdiscussion forthepractice offieldwork and
foranthropological knowledge? In theprevioussection,thethrust has been
to criticizetheopposition ofthought andaction,claiming thatknowledge is
practical,andthatabstract knowledge is a specialcasewithinthisframework.
In thissection,theunderlying themeis to rejecttheoppositionof anthro-
pologistto subject,insisting thatthe situationof the fieldworker is, in all
important respects, characteristicofthecondition beingstudied.
In makingthispoint,we shouldnot be distracted by the fieldworker's
initialexperience ofconfusion. The anthropologist beginning fieldwork may
represent an extreme caseofmutualincomprehensibility or misunderstand-
ing,anditis fairto saythatat theheartoffieldwork thereliesa problemof
perception. The anthropologist setsoffto an unfamiliar culture,withthe
intention notofjudging,but rather of understanding thevalues,categories
andpractices thatorderhowthings aredonethere.He or she,likeanynative
informant, can gaincertainhabits,skillsand,even,flair.Blochhas recently
drawnattention backto thepointof thetechniqueof participant-observa-
tion:'Becauseofitslong-term character, involvingcontinuousand intimate
contactwiththosewhomwe study, participant-observation makesus learn
theprocedures whichthesepeoplehavethemselves learnedandenablesus to
checkup on whether we arelearning properly byobserving our improving
abilityto cope in thefieldwithdailytasks,including socialtasks,as fastas
our informants' (Bloch 1991: 194). Perhapsthereis a degreeof overstate-
ment here,but the point is sound: fieldwork, like indigenouslife,is
characterized bya seriesofapprenticeships.
Yet,clearly, theinvestigator arrivestherenotwithan openmindclearedof
all preconceptions butwitha setofassumptions, consciousandunconscious,
thatshapesbothwhatthatpersonseesand is capableofseeing.Conducting
fieldwork is a two-sided process:theanthropologist mustundoandgradually
bringto consciousness his or her own assumptions at the same timeas
grasping theindigenous categories.This is bearingin mindthatthecatego-
riesandassumptions arenotsimplyintellectual, butalsobodily:habits,skills
and so forth. Thatis one reasonwhythefieldwork experience is frequently
so acute,andwhytheautobiographical taleof conducting fieldwork, ifit is
honestly told,oftentakestheformofa Confessions, an accountofthewrong
assumptions, oversights, blindnessto the obvious,insensitivity and social
gaffesmadebytheanthropologist whothought thathe - orshe- knewwhat
was goingon whenhe or shedid not.
The fieldwork experienceexemplifies the normalconditionof social
knowledge, albeitin an extremeformto beginwith:everybody constructs
understandings out of 'thatmixture of knowledgeof theworld,goalsand
ambitions, constraints and contingencies, imaginative "shotsin the dark",

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 TIMOTHYJENKINS 443

emotion and ignorance ... which combine in the human experience' (R.
Jenkins1981:93). The anthropologist is notdifferent in thisfromthepar-
ticipantin themarket place:fieldwork is simplyanothercaseofa meeting of
potentially incompatible systemsof comprehension. Social life,indeed,is
madeup oftheseactsofmutualinterpretation, and theanthropologist, like
anyotheractor,needsto createprotocols, through acquiring varioushabits,
skillsandsavoir-faire thatwillallowhimor herto participate in it.
The exampleof the cattlemarketsuggestsa further refinement in the
positionbeingdeveloped.It shouldalready be clearthat,as faras thepartici-
pants are concerned,thereis no such thingas objective,uninvolved
knowledge. Thereis no placeforan 'objectiveobserver': thereis no neutral
positionor neutralknowledge, andno placeforsomeonewhowillsaywhat
hasgoneon. Eithertheactoris on thepeasant'ssideor elseon thedealer's;
in eithercase,he does notarticulate whathe knows.Fromthefactthatthe
economictransaction consistsin theprocessofmutualinterpretation, itfol-
lowsthatto be 'in' themarket place(otherthansimplybodilypresent, as a
tourist,say) one mustbe involved.As a consequence,the anthropologist
mustgiveup the idealof objectiveknowledge, in thesenseof an under-
standing thateverybody mightshare.To understand is to acknowledge one's
ownparticipation, andtherefore to be changedsince,in orderto participate,
one of theroleson offerhas to be takenup and explored.This can be as
disturbing as theinitialexperience of fieldwork. Duringfieldwork, thean-
thropologist changesfroma positionof misinterpreting theoffers made,or
therolesavailable,to one of havingto decidewhetheror notto takethem
up. In thissense,'subjectivity'is thepricethathastobe paidto do fieldwork.
The anthropologist getscaughtup in the seriesof eventsthatconstitute
sociallife,wherethereis no objective truth, butsimplypotentially exclusive
versionsofthetruththattogether constitute theevent.
However,theanthropologist - likeanyinformant, ifasked- seeksto give
objectiveinformation: thereis a lurein theidealof a perfectly transparent
reading of the in
system question.'Objectiveknowledge' a valuein the
has
anthropologist's world,forit too is employedin thepursuitof reputation
and esteemand, indeed,of self-definition (cf Taylor's[1985] accountof
'social theoryas practice').But moreimportantly, as Bourdieuinsists,an
outsideris particularly vulnerable to taking indigenous objectifying accounts
at theirfacevalue,becausesuch accountsbuildin the relationof outside
observer to objectas ifitwerea property oftheobject.Thereis a matching
betweentheanthropologist's experience and thewayindigenous life'offers
itselfup' to outsideperception as transparent to such a gaze. In thisway,
indigenouslivesare attributed thequalityof beingdetermined by models,
rulesor structures, as iftheirpurposewerethecommunication of order(a
'code') to an outsideview,or the constitution of representations forthe
purposeof analysis. Yet,theeventsthatmakeup sociallifeare not,as the
transaction in themarket shows,examplesofperfect transparency.

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444 TIMOTHYJENKINS

The problemofperception is therefore twofold. On theone hand,there

is thequestionwe haveoutlinedfortheanthropologist: how do youunder-
standsomethingthatis goingon whichyou do not (yet) possess the
categories to apprehend? and how do you avoida mistaken apprehension
throughthe use of yourown, inappropriate categories of understanding?
This questionliesattheheartoffieldwork and,indeed,ofanthropology as a
study.The finalpublishedaccountof the fieldwork, the monograph, has
traditionally leftout the confessional aspect,forwhatdoes it matter what
routewas takento reachthetruth? Nevertheless, thereareimplications that
concernthekindofknowledge thatis arrived at,whichderivefromtheway
thatit is gained.
On theotherhand,theseimplications withrespectto thekindofknowl-
edgegainedalso raisesimilarquestionsaboutwhatis known,or aboutthe
natureof(forwantofa better term)'everyday life'andtheactsandinterpre-
tationsthat make it up. Attentionhas frequently been drawn to the
distinction betweenthewaythatlifeis livedbyindigenous populations and
the statements the actorsmightmakeaboutwhattheydo. Similarto the
ethnographer in thisrespect, theinformant livesa 'confessional' life,butwill
delivera 'monographic' accountofitifasked.As we haveseen,something is
repressed in thisexchange.
We aretrying, then,in bothinstances to focusuponsomething thateasily
escapesattention, andthatcan,byitsnature, onlybe glimpsedas itwereout
of thecornerof theeye;werewe to claimself-confidently to havegrasped
andunderstood thephenomena we wantto call'anthropological knowledge'
in advancewithour conventional and overwhelmingly linguistic accepted
waysof thinking, we would distortthem,as we haveseen in the case of
accountsofthemarket. The categories of 'anthropological knowledge', both
in thesenseofwhatis producedthrough fieldwork and in thesenseof the
objectof knowledge, or everyday life,havean intrinsic elusivequality. Pin-
this
pointing quality allows us to focus the
upon question of the adequacyof
the knowledgegainedthroughfieldwork, or how one gainstrustworthy
knowledgeforaction.This elusiveness consistsin fourfactors whichhave
been identified in the earlierdiscussion:the non-verbalnatureof much
practicalknowledge, theapprenticeships undergone byall actors,themutu-
alityofall practices, andtherepresentational propertiesoflanguage.
Enoughhas been said concerning theway thatmuchof whatgoes on
escapeslanguageor conceptualization, exceptto add a caveat:if thereis
muchin sociallifethatis notspokenabout,or articulated in speech,and if
speech, where it is appropriate, has a variety of functions and effects, one
shouldbe carefulnot to place too greata relianceupon nativetermsin
ethnography, neither assuming too quicklytheir'univocality', or one-to-one
correspondence withsocial'facts'or institutions, nor employing themtoo
readilyin orderto construct a pictureofthenative'cosmology'(cf Keesing
1987;1989;Ardener1989:173sq.).

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 TIMOTHYJENKINS 445

Knowledgeofeveryday lifeis notavailableto thedisinterested gazeofan

inquirer;rather, fieldwork is an apprenticeship of signs,a processof entry
intoa particular world,governed bya variety of factors,including thesitu-
ation and previous experienceof the anthropologist. During an
apprenticeship, as well as skillsand perceptions, memoriesand desiresare
altered,so thateveryactor,indigenousor ethnographer, is engagedin a
personaland experiential capacity. Ardenerpointsout thattheactof 'com-
prehending others'cannotbe a kindofpassiveactleavingone or bothsides
unchanged(1989: 160). The capacity to perceive, or receiveimpressions, is
theothersideofthecapacity to act;theknowledge theethnographer gainsis
a function ofthedegreeofpowerofactivity gainedthrough theencounter of
fieldwork. Good ethnography, then,as wellas demanding sincerity andaccu-
racy,also involvesa degreeof experience or maturity.4EarlierI mentioned
discussions in anthropology concerning 'self-consciousness aboutmodesof
representation'; it is the qualityof the experience,ratherthanany self-
consciousnessin thewriting, thatin theend determines thequalityof the
monograph.
It is of interest thata certainproportion of monographs are written by
personswho are excludedthroughage and circumstances frommuchpar-
ticipation in the transactions thatconstitute responsible adultlifein their
ownsociety, andforwhomnotionsofsocialstructure, rulesandmodelsmay
be takenforreality bothat homeand abroad.As Bourdieuremarks, 'social
structure' is an effect ofa lackofpractical mastery (1977:2);5 one mightalso
regardautobiographical accountsthatclaimsocialknowledge is an impossi-
bilityas reactions withinthesamepremature perspective.6
In fact,the structure of knowledgethatmakesup everyday life,or the
objectof study, is identicalto thatof theknowledge gainedthroughfield-
workin thisrespect:thereis no indigenousperspective or view or set of
ruleswhichtheanthropologist will in timegain.It is impossible, through
participation, to learnto 'thinklikea native'(c? Bourdieu1990:34). Instead,
thereis a seriesofindigenous apprenticeships andexperiences to be mapped,
a multiplicity of interacting pointsofviewor practices, some ofwhichare
mutually exclusive. Allpractices aremutualor collective, notin thesenseof
or
beinghomogeneous transparent, but in thatthey involve mutualmeeting,
negotiation andinterpretation. This is a perspective certainnovelists seemto
have dealtwithbetterthansome anthropologists, who writeas if social
knowledge existedoutsidetheactsor context thatmakeitup.Yettheethno-
grapher's pointofviewhasto be includedwithinthisperspective; since'the
social'is madeup oftheinterpenetration ofinterpretations, it is notexperi-
encedas transparency butas anomalyThe experience ofanomalyis thebasis
thatallowsus bothto escapefroman impossible objectivity thateliminates
theobserver, andfroma self-regarding Fieldwork
subjectivity. is,onceagain,
onlya specialcaseofa generalcondition.
In thislight,thereare threeelementsto be discerned, or skillsto be
learned,in theapprenticeship of languageand itsrepresentations, whether

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446 TIMOTHYJENKINS

undertaken in themarketplaceor through fieldworkOne has to learnto

recognizefirstthedistortions brought aboutbygivingan account,thenthe
ofbringing
effects something to consciousness, and lastlythepossibilities of
manipulating thesedistortions andeffects in context.
As we havenoted,in suchan activity as negotiation in themarket place,
wherethe potentialformisunderstanding and conflictmaybe high,with
people involvedwho do not necessarily knowone another,each seeking
advantage in termsofprestige andmoney, thereis a highdegreeofpatterning
of behaviour, includinglanguage.Not onlyare optionsfewer,but repre-
sentationstendto eliminate theplayoffreedom ofmanoeuvre, to effacethe
temporal dimensionand itsdegreeof indeterminacy. Moreover,therepre-
sentations in languagehavetheirownforms ofdevelopment, they'freezethe
frame'andatthesametimedevelopindependent elaborations.Andlastly, the
representations feedbackand shapethetransaction: thereis a simultaneous
interpenetration of languageand theothersystems thatmakeup sociallife.
All thesefeatures areparalleled byacademicaccountsofothers.
No doubteachmapping, or meeting ofsystems, or mutualinterpretation,
has thesegeneralproperties. But mappingin languagehas the particular
property ofappearing to bringto consciousness, ifonlyfitfully and partially,
whatis otherwise going on unremarked. Much anthropological interest is
directed the of
towards range knowledge in
whichconsistsprimarily waysof
doingthings, in meansof organizing thecontinuity of everyday lifeand of
copingwithitsbreakdown, whicharenotmappeddirectly in languageor,if
theyare,areso rarely andintermittently. Thereis,indeed,a reluctance on the
partof informants to tryto map certainof theseareas.In thecase of such
implicitknowledge, a senseofan outsider's perspective comesintoexistence
immediately thatmappingin languageoccurs,andso something thatis nor-
mallyunremarked becomestalkedabout.This property createsone of the
majorpuzzlesin thekindofknowledge obtainedthrough fieldwork. Ifsuch
is
knowledge by definition largelynon-verbal and 'practical',it mayonly
reachthelightofday,orbe 'brought toconsciousness' andbecomean object
ofstudy,in a distorted form.
The thirdfeature to emergefroma consideration of thecattlemarketis
thatrecourseto languagein anycontactor contextraisesthe questionof
whatis at stake.The employment ofthe'official account',or ofanyabstrac-
tion,maybe definedin one perspective as a refusalof experience, a use of
powerto refuseto oneselfor to othersaccesstoa newperception andpower
of action.To echoArdener(1989: 175),theact of mutualinterpretation is
deeplyinvolvedin thenatureof thecontactbetweenthepartiesinvolved.
The positionthattheanthropologist is offered is alwaysthatofoutsider. This
is notto be regretted: ifwe acceptthatthereis no homogeneous 'insider's'
knowledge to be achieved,thisstateis againcharacteristic ofsociallife.The
questionis, rather, whatis beingrevealedand concealedbytherecourseto
representation in language, to someonedefinedin thecontext as an outsider?

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 TIMOTHYJENKINS 447

A recurrent questionis then'whoareyoutakenfor?'Everyapprenticeship

concernsnotonlyencounters betweenpersonswithindividual abilitiesand
skills,but also powerrelationsembodiedin thosepersons,and therefore
historicalencounters betweengroups.The anthropologist is notan individ-
ual withouta history faceto facewithhisor her'people',butis in a sensea
multiplicity,a certainkindof personwho will be 'read'in certainwaysby
thoseencountered, and who will perform certain'readings'in return.A
further themeto thetwooutlinedatthebeginning ofthesectionis,then,to
questiontheopposition betweentheone and themultiple, or thethemeof
power.

Anthropological
accounting
In theaccountof thecattlemarket, we haveseenhow an apprenticeship is
necessary in orderto takepartin themarket, whichhas itsown formsof
experience. We haveseen too how different modesof knowledge, labelled
'official'and 'practical',
areinvokedin different contexts, witha consequent
emphasisupon thepower,ratherthanthecontent, of speech(and silence):
ofwho sayswhat,to whom,underwhatconditions. Andwe havedescribed
theimplications ofthesefactors forthepractice oftheanthropologist.7 In the
courseofthisargument, theroleplayedin thecattlemarket byacademicand
literarydescriptions hasbeenmentioned, as has thewaytheofficial account
producedin answerto questioning lendsitselfto theseoutsideregistrations.
Now thequestionhas arisenofthestatusoftheselatteraccounts:whatare
theircharacteristics andwhatis atstakein theprocessofgivingan anthropo-
logicaldescription?
The first thingto sayis thatan anthropological accountshouldbe treated
withthesamecircumspection as an informant's reply,forparallelreasons;it
leavesout all thatgoes withoutsaying,thereis underlying it a desireto
explain, automatisms arepotentiallyatwork within it,and theaccount tends
to concentrate upon the exceptional. These featurespresentthemselves
simultaneously. In takingthe cattlemarketin Beam as an example,I am
following a well-establishedanthropologicalstrategy,ofstudying marginal or
exceptional sectorsofmodernsociety. In thisperspective,Beamis provincial,
not metropolitan, the cattlemarketis not fullyintegrated intothe market
economy, and thepeasantis an archaicratherthana contemporary figure.
The strategy drawsupona distribution ofvalueswhichseemsto insistthat
anthropology dealsin activities
thatarein somesenseoutsidethesphereof
modernity, looking to privateknowledge anddeeds,survivals, andlocal,non-
standard and non-cosmopolitan features.Such an accountis boundto tella
different storyfromtheone thesubjectsofanthropology mighttellto them-
selves;thequestionswhichpresentthemselves to an outsideenquirer, such
as whatarethereasonsforthepersistence of themarket?, andwhatarethe
motivations oftheparticipants?, do notarisefortheactorsthemselves.
In takingup thisoutsideperspective, one aspectoflanguageis crucial:the
powerlanguagehas of introducing an 'objective'pointof viewappearsto

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448 TIMOTHYJENKINS

lenditself toa specificsetofinstitutions - allofwhichwe writewitha capital

letter- whichhandleobjectiveclassifications withassuredness and familiar-
ity:Science(in all itsforms), theMedicalProfession, theState,theChurch,
and so forth.The studyof Anthropology drawsits possibility fromthis
property oflanguage. It is easytoemphasizetheideathatfluency in language
appearstobelongto certain socialgroups,andto simplify thisintoa formof
determinism. Thisis notmypoint,whichis rather thatonlycertain kindsof
classification appearto be invested withauthority: thereis an enlightened,
scientificpointofviewwhichhasbecometheacceptedwayoftalking about
things.It is not enough,then,in orderto get to gripswiththe 'muted'
practices we are considering to putthe'official' pointofview to one side.
Justas in thecaseofthecattlemarket, therelation betweenofficial accounts
andpractices areoftenambiguousandalwayscomplex.
The 'official' pointof view embodiedin Anthropology tendsto see all
'local' phenomenaas in some sensesurvivals, persisting in partbecauseof
geographical and culturalisolation.This stereotype, as I will call it,draws
upona powerful seriesofopposingterms, eachimplying an aspectofa great
transition:ruraVurban, pre-scientific/scientific,
backward/modern, resis-
tant/progressive, superstitious/enlightened, withouthistory/historical, oral
culture/literate culture,and so on. This serieswas drawnintoits modern
configuration towards theendoftheeighteenth century (cf de Certeau& de
Certeau,1975);thisspecific wayofperceiving thingshasitsownhistory, and
is nottimeless, absoluteor 'true'withoutqualification. This stereotype does
notdefinethepractice ofanthropology; itis,however, omnipresent: likethe
participants in themarket who do nothavereadyaccessto waysof talking
abouttheirpractice otherthantheofficial account,whichseemsto be repro-
ducedby themechanisms of representation, anthropologists muststruggle
foranotherperception oftheirpractice, and maycontinually be caughtun-
awares.
The stereotype can haveeffects in all kindsofways.To takemyself as an
I
example: rejectedthestereotype, I knewpeasantsto be strong-minded,
for
rational,modernand so forth.So I sternly ignoredcertainanomaliesthat
croppedup in myworkTo mentiona simplecase:fromthefirst timeI went
to Bearn,I was told of watercults,concerning springsthathad arisenat
variousspotswheretheVirginhad madean appearance, thatreputedly had
curative properties, particularly withrespectto barrenness inwomen.Butas
thesereports werevague,andwerealwaysmadein thepasttense,andas my
informants impliedthatthesecultswereonlyevertakenseriously bytheold,
thecredulousandthesuperstitious, I showedlittleinterest. Onlythreedays
beforemydeparture did I hearsomething thatmademe realizethatin fact
thesecultsarebothquitenumerousand absolutely contemporary; and only
thendid I thinkthateach timeI had travelled by trainfromToulouseto
BearnI hadpassedthrough Lourdes,wherethousands ofsickpeoplego each
yearto bathein thewaterscomingfromthespringthataroseat thespot
wherethe Virginappearedto BernadetteSoubirous.My firm,negative

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 TIMOTHYJENKINS 449

credencein thestereotype prevented me frominvestigating thisandsimilarly

markedphenomena.
It is also quite possibleto studythesebeliefswhilstsharingthe same
incredulous frameof mind.This approachmaybe exemplified in a strong
formby folklorists who,however, as Herzfeldpointsout (1987: 67), share
moreanthropological assumptions thanwe mayatfirst think.Fromthestart,
theydenyanytruthto thepractices. The folkloricattitudedoesnotask'what
aretheytrying to expressbymeansofthisseriesofactions?', butonly'what
are theyhidingfromus?' (cf.Favret-Saada 1980:4); it looksforsecrets, or
tricks,orrecipes, andcollectstechniques andartefacts. Hencetheappearance
of folklore collections (and,bythesametoken,of linguistic atlases):listsof
proverbs and sayings, rowsof old objectsand detaileddescriptions of out-
modedpractices, all takenoutoftheircontext. The credulity and simplicity
ofthefolkwhoaresupposedstilltobelieveinthis(literally speaking) incred-
iblenonsenseis therefore decidedin advance.The attitudes suchcollections
detailis widelyshared,and maybe exemplified bytheMedia withitstaste
forsuperstition.
Peasants, who are notfools,are reluctant to be takenforthesimpletons
publicopinionwould have thembe. Whenquestionedin thisvein,they
eithermaintain a silence,or else sharein thetermsofthediscussion. In the
lattercase,theytakeup an objectivestanceandsharetheinterest in folklore;
theyproduceold objects(farmimplements, forexample)thatareno longer
used,describeherbalremediesandmeteorological prognostications,and re-
call old festivals and customsthatare now in declineor have recently
disappeared. This maybe called'folklorizing bythefolk';ithas implications
forthewayI was toldaboutthewatercults,forexample.If theyremain
silent,whichtheygenerally do ifquestioned directly aboutanything toonear
thebone,forinstanceto do withillnessor death,theycan be interpreted by
beingplacedwithinthe stereotype. Thus the local educatedperson,who
claimsto understand peasantsbutwho sharesmodem,urbanvalues,says
'theirlanguageis too simple',they'areincapableofsymbolizing', they'don't
talk'(Favret-Saada 1980: 4). In the moredetailedcases of the stereotype,
whichmayconveniently be studiedin novelswithruralthemes, peasantsare
close to theanimalstheykeepin severalsenses(one mightcomparelocal
accountsof maquignons). Favret-Saada quotesa psychiatristin Normandyas
saying'Medicineis a veterinary artroundhere'.To translate, such people
haveto be handled,notunderstood.
This attitudeis anotherexampleof whatBourdieucalls the 'synoptic
illusion':local lifeis definedin an accountwhichignoresitspractices and
functions, itstemporality andtheirreversibility ofitsexperiences, andwhich
producesa myth,capableof scholarly elaboration, withitsown setting and
rules,its own ideal development or 'history'.It is withinthiscontextof
interpretation and counter-interpretation - or manipulation oftheinterpre-
tation by those questioned- that many of the exchangesbetween
anthropologist and informant in themarket placehaveto be understood. As

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450 TIMOTHYJENKINS

we haveseen,theindigenous representation oflocalpractices - thetermsin

whichthe accountis offered, whatis passedoverin silenceand whatis
drawnattention to - lendsitselfto theoutsiderepresentation beingformed,
whichequallyin itsoperations exercises controloverwhatis concealedand
whatis revealedoftherelations at stake.
Peasants,then,are neithercredulousnorbackward;theyare not in fact
playing out somefolkloric game.The use ofthepairedtermsmodern/back-
wardsaysmoreabouttheworldoftheinquirerthanthatofthepeasant.In
the stereotype, peasantsare survivalsof the pre-modern, embodyingits
qualitieswhicharedefinedagainstourown.Theyhavebeliefs, itis claimed,
whilewe havetheories. This unequaldistribution ofvaluesis broughtinto
questiononce theanthropologist is placedon a levelwiththepeasant,as a
humanactortoo. Taylor(1985) offersa discussionof whatis involvedin
givinga theoretical accountof societiesdifferent fromour ownwhichem-
phasizestheparallelsbetweentheoretical and (in his term)pre-theoretical
formulations (whethertheseconsistin myth-like accountsor in highly
orderedbehaviour). Bothformulations makeexplicit theself-understandings
thatconstitute sociallife,expressing sharedgoods in publicspace.At the
sametime,bothactas waysofmodifying self-understanding, oforienting the
actorsin the socialworldand adjustingbehaviourso thatpractices better
achievetheirends.In boththeoretical andotheraccounts, questionsofself-
definition andexplanation arelinkedthrough practice.
This notionof theactivepowerof definition at workin explanation is
developedbyHerzfeld, who pointsout thattheanthropological assumption
of local archaismis a refraction of the distinction betweenbureaucratic
(State)conceptions ofsocialization and informal (local)ones:socialanthro-
pologyreadily reinforces hierarchical relationsbetweentheNation-State and
villageculture, distributing thevaluesofmodernandother.The localcom-
munity in thisviewis defined byitsdoublestatusas havingfailedto takeon
modemvalues,andas beinga backward renditionofthenationalculture.In
thisway,thenationalcultureis givena universal, transcendent status,and
localcultureis givena subordinate and homogenized status,bothremoved
fromcontextandabstracted fromtime.Scholarsandnationsalike,Herzfeld
concludes,tendto lose sightof the materialand social metaphors upon
whichtheirabstract ideasarebased(Herzfeld1987:9-13).
Further, thiskindof accountis madeto playdifferent partsin different
contexts, beingmanipulated atvariouslevelsoftheopposition betweenthe
Stateand thelocalworld.Apartfrominteractions at a local levelbetween
inquirers andindigenous informants, HerzfeldshowsfortheGreekmaterial
how localintellectuals treatpeasantsas backward in a domesticcontextbut,
forexternalconsumption, as 'folkculture',partof the commonnational
heritage (1987: 10, 12). The folkloric he claims,is a productofthe
attitude,
interaction ofthewestern Nation-State withlocalsocieties.Suchan account,
then,does not simplydistortlocal practices by removing themfromtheir
context; italsooffers ajustification fortheself-ascribed statusoftheState,as

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 TIMOTHYJENKINS 451

itselfthenaturalproductandclimaxofa processofhomogenization oflocal

differences.The notionof 'folklore'in practicecan serveto legitimize the
domination oftheStateofthelocallevelandindeed,in context, to legitimize
congruentrelationsof inequality,of male to female,and of one class to
another(Herzfeld1987:25).
The processesidentified
earlieras the'official
version'arethenrepeated at
a numberof levels.The perspective such a versionoffersis singularly ill-
adaptedto lookingat thecomplexformsof everyday life(cf Sanjek1991:
612-14).Yetanthropologicalmaterials containwithinthemselves a counter-
fortheybearthemarksbothofconstruction
vailingcritique, andofamnesia
in theinteraction.
On thebasisoftheexampleofthecattlemarket, I wantto
pleadthatno partofsociallifeneedbe studiedin isolationfromitscontem-
porarysettingand, indeed,thatcontinuities may be discoveredto exist
betweenexoticor evensecretpractices andtheapparently banalconcernsof
the widersociety(cf T. Jenkins1992). One shouldnot takethe official
account - at whateverlevel - at its word, and imagine that the mythit
proclaims existsas suchon theground.Official claimsas tothenatureofthe
worldarepartofthematerial to hand,withwhich,froman actor'sperspec-
tive,to assertworthand to act in the present(even thoughthe official
accountin questionmayexcludetheparticular actorfromthispresent). All
humanactorsasserttheirworth,usingthehabits,skillsand flairtheyhave
acquired,according to thecontext in whichtheyfindthemselves. Actorsuse
originalityand initiative in deployingresourcesand responding to con-
straints,
even when theseresourcesand constraints includethe apparent
denialof originality and initiative
to thoseacting.Fieldwork is an adequate
methodofgaining socialknowledge becauseitreproduces in allvitalrespects
theprocessesit is studying, theplayofself-presentation and self-knowledge
(to adoptHerzfeld'sterms)in thecreation ofeveryday life.

Conclusion
Ifitis thecasethat,in Herzfeld's words,thereareontological consequences
of bringing lifeor experienceintowords,whatsortof knowledgeis the
anthropologist aimingat? The approachsketchedin thisarticlerejectsa
dualismthatassertsthe priority of mind over bodyand, amongstother
oppositions,ofabstract theoryoverlivedlife;instead, it aimsto reassertthe
temporal and embodiednatureof everyday life,and to suggestthatanthro-
pologicalfieldwork is a privileged
siteto effectsucha correction becausethe
anthropologistis committed in thebody- unlikealmostanyotherformof
research- to an encounter withanotherformofsociallife.The corollary to
thisreassertionis a reassessment of thenatureoftheory, withtheemphasis
equallyuponitsembodiedness. An attempt in thisperspective to weighthe
value of theideasproducedthroughfieldwork would takeaccountof the
following points,concerning theirpartiality,
expressive natureandadequacy.8
First,as knowledgeis gainedovertimeand in situthrougha seriesof
apprenticeships,a givenknowledge, in the sense of experience, is never

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452 TIMOTHYJENKINS

exactlyrepeated:everypersonmakessense as he or she can, giventheir

resources andconstraints, opportunities andskills.Then,anytotalization is a
movemade in a specificcontext, an attempt at self-definitionat the same
timeas explanation, a bidsimultaneously forpowerto perceiveandpowerto
act.In Herzfeld'sformulation, formalism and socialexperience arenotthe
pairedalternatives positedby the formalist debate,forall termsare nego-
tiable.The commongroundof all formalism is a 'rhetoricof regularity',
balancedagainsta criticalsocialexperience thatdeniesit.All usageis social
and context-dependent. Officialdiscourse(at whateverlevel) blocksthat
understanding through thestrategy ofdenying itsownrhetorical nature, and
so expresses itspowerto control(cf Herzfeld1987:135).
It is on thegroundsof rhetoric thatHerzfeldcriticizes thetechniqueof
participantobservation: iftheassumption is madethatabsoluteknowledge is
possible,at thesametimeit is assumedthattheobserver's own contextis
irrelevant. Contextbecomesa function ofthefield,a non-literate place,and
the authority of the ethnographer (having'been there')relatesto abstract
knowledge(withoutcontext)in a literatesociety(Herzfeld1987: 14-15).
'They'havea context, while'we' maketimeless, abstract propositions. Butas
he sayssubsequently: 'Participant observation is onlya fictionin as muchas
we treatitas an activity significantly different fromthatofthepeopleunder
observation' (1987:90). We andtheyalikeareparticipant observers. Ifthisis
so, we too are confronted withthecomplexity of thesocialand thepartial
natureofknowledge. Thereis no singlesocialorderto be understood, only
heterogeneous practices, includingthe knowledgetheybear.Knowledge,
ratherthanbeingtotalized, is constructed in the construalof specificen-
counters. This is as truefortheanthropologist as fortheinformant.
There is moretherefore to anthropological knowledgethansimplythe
discernment of patterns and significances whichtheparticipants mayfailto
recognize, forthereis also theelementofreformulation ofperceptions and
self-identitywhichis at stake.This is notto relativize understanding: ideas
are relatedto the powerto act and the powerto be affected, and to be
adequate,or expressive, an ideamustexplainor envelopitscause.Herzfeld,
following Vico, callsthisapproach'etymological'. Thereis thena shiftin
emphasis, fromthedivisionoftheexoticfromthebanal(notlikeus/like us),
to findingourselvesin the otherand the otherin us. In thisperspective,
inequalities of powerand hierarchies of valuesare neitherinscrutable nor
fixedandeternal;theyarelearntaboutbybeingexperienced and negotiated.
If theoryis active,fieldwork is also richin theory, becauseit produces
whatmightbe calledmoralknowledge, bothordering and revisable, inter-
veningandreflecting, actingand comprehending. The knowledge gainedby
an anthropologist is close to thatgainedby a good operatorin themarket
place:ithasto do withapprenticeships undertaken, habitsacquired,negotia-
tionsachieved,failuresof comprehension coped with,all withinshifting,
interacting contexts. Hence the initialclaimthatfieldwork, whethertheo-
rizedor not,is an adequatemethodforgrasping theordering of everyday

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 TIMOTHYJENKINS 453

life.Therearecertaincriteria
fortheemergence ofmeaningthatarebrought
outbyfieldwork, as byanytaskofinterpretationor translation.
The knowl-
edgeachievedmaylack'absolute'status,butnevertheless it hasan adequacy
to its complexsituation.Good theoryis markedby an awarenessof its
originsandfunctions,bothin thatithasa powerto actandto perceive, and
inthatitwillbe takenup andused:inbrief,an awarenessthatittoois a form
oflife.9

NOTES

This articlein its presentformowes much to the commentsof HastingsDonnan

and the two referees.My fieldworkin B6arnwas conductedfromNovember1979 to
July1980, at the conclusionof a longerinvestigation of the Occitan regionalistmove-
mentin southernFrance,begunin December1976.
1 As examplesof 'ethnographic realism',SpencercitesBritishethnographies in gen-
eral fromthe period of 'professional consolidation'(1940-62); he pointsto Rabinow
1977, Crapanzano1980 and Dwyer 1982 as examplesof experimental ethnographies;
and sees the move to literary criticismexemplified in workby Geertz(1973; 1988) and
Clifford& Marcus (1986).
2 It is not my intentionin thisarticleto offeran explanationof the persistenceof
the market,thoughI referback to thisquestionbrieflylater;see Rogers (1991), who
does offersuch an accountof peasantlife,and who includesa briefdescriptionof the
marketin the Rouergue.
3 These observationsecho in some respectsthe distinctionmade by Caws (1974)
between'operational'and 'representational' models,and his furtherdistinction within
the lattercategorybetween'representational' (native)and 'explanatory'(anthropologi-
cal) models. Caws makesthe firstdistinctionin orderto explainthe discrepancy ob-
servedbetweenthe behaviourof an individualand the accounthe or she givesof that
behaviour,and the second to pointto the distinctive natureof the anthropological un-
derstanding. My approach,however,differs fromhis: I do not sharehis individualism,
nor his beliefin the dualityof mentalstructures, nor the oppositionshe makes be-
tween thoughtand action,consciousnessand the unconscious,and so forth(cf. R.
Jenkins1981).
4 In thisregard,cf Mill's remarkconcerningBentham,thatwhile his knowledgeof
humannaturewas whollyempirical,it was 'the empiricism of one who had littleexpe-
rience'(Mill 1980: 2).
5 cf. Bourdieu'sremarkthatthe inabilityto recognizethe primacyof practiceis a
'corollaryof neglectof the social conditionsin which science is possible' (Bourdieu
1977: 1).
6 This situationparallelsthatfoundin the field,wheremanypeople cannotusefully
serveto informthe anthropologist, even if theyare willing,because theydo not know
about the matterin questionand,whatis more,positively knowwrongly.
7 I draw attentionto Favret-Saada'saccountof how a peasantin ruralNormandy
becomescaughtup in a witchcraft crisis,forher description parallelsthe accountgiven
here,in a more dramaticform(1980: chs 1-3). She also providesmaterialon the de-
tailedpracticeof fieldwork withinthisperspective (Favret-Saada& Contreras1981).
8 For a somewhatdifferent pathoverthe same terrain, see Hastrup1993.

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454 TIMOTHYJENKINS

9 This awarenessmay be linkedto a shiftto fieldworkbeing seen as a long-term,

open-endedprocess;ratherthanconsistingin a periodof a yearor two (at best),with
fieldworkin some cases has become partof the con-
perhapsoccasionalbriefrevisits,
consistingin repeatedannualvisits.This prolonged
tinuinglifeof the anthropologist,
and unfinished formof fieldwork raisesthe questionof adequateliterary
techniquesto
presentthekindof knowledgegained.

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Travail de terrainet perceptionde la vie de tous les jours

Resume'
Cet articleexaminel'assertion qui voitdans le travailde terrainune methodetouta fait
adequatepourcomprendre etconnaitre laviede touslesjours.La similaritedesconditions
de la connaissanceanthropologique et de la vie quotidienneestillustr6eparl'ethnogra-
phie d'un march6au b6taildans le sud-ouestde la France.La discussionestorganis6e
autourde quatrethemesqui se recoupenten partie.On se penche toutd'abordsur
l'apprentissage ethnographique, en montrant que l'acquisitiond'habitudesguidantl'ac-
tionsurle terrain correspondauxpratiquesde la viecourante.Cetteconstatation devrait
menera un renouveaude la reflexion concernant la methodeetles6critsethnographiques,
etlestatut de laconnaissance anthropologique. On adresseensuitela questiondu caractere
abstraitet objectificateurdu langage,qui entrainel'6limination de toutetracede tempo-
ralit6(sansoublierson effet surla description ethnographique, etplusg6n6ralement, sur
les pratiquessociales),ainsique les questionsde l'acquisitiond'habitudes, du contexte,
et de la 'vie v6cue'. Le troisiemetheme,organis6autourde la naturenecessairement
temporelle de l'exp6riencedu quotidien,tresdifficile a capturerlinguistiquement,aborde
la complexitede la 'miseen ordredu social',ainsique l'importante questionde 'l'inter-
pr'tation mutuelle' dans la creation du 'social'. L'experienceest structur6epar
l'exploration de r6aliteshet6roclites qui n'appartiennent a personne,maisqui sontune
fonctionde l'entendement de chacun.Le dernierth6mesituel"objectivit6' du socialen
insistant sur la reconnaissance des contraintes sociales,de l'exploitation
des ressources,
ainsique sur les grandesquestionsde l'in6galitM et du pouvoir.Ces dimensionsde la
realit6objectivefontpartieint6grante, non seulementdu terrainen tantque tel,mais
aussidu travailde terrain et de l'ethnographie qui en resulte.

JesusCollege,
Cambridge
CBS 8BL

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