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Phronesis,

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Olav Eikeland
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Encyclopedia of Action Research: phronesis

Olav Eikeland

The word and concept “phrónêsis” is Greek. Its traditional rendering in English is “prudence”, from
Latin: prudentia. Currently, however, “practical wisdom” or “judgement” is more common. The
historical source for the current concept of phronesis, is Aristotle (384-322 BC), in particular his Book
VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. In the 20th century the specifically Aristotelian concept of phronesis has
been the explicit starting point for both Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology and Hans-Georg
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and for trying to find ways of conceptualising knowledge and
understanding of human and social relations, alternative to the modern period’s dominant attempts
at transferring models of theory, data, and “applied” knowledge from astronomy, physics, and other
natural sciences to the study and practice of human individuals, culture, and society.

Since the “re-launch” of the concept, and as part of its gradual re-appropriation, many have
attempted to apply, adjust, and integrate Aristotelian phronesis into professional and managerial
practice, modern education, and social research. Cf. for example Jonson & Toulmin (1988), Dunne
(1993), Toulmin (1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 2001), Flyvbjerg (2001), Schwandt (2002), Ramirez (xxxx),
Polkinghorne (2004), Statler & Roos (2007), Kinsella & Pitman (2012), Bondi et al. (2011), Rooney,
McKenna & Liesch (2010). Most interpretations separate phronesis from two other major knowledge
forms in Aristotle in order to emphasize and cultivate phrónêsis as an independent alternative to
epistêmê and téchnê, i.e. to “science” and “technology” or “technique”. Phrónêsis is seen as a form
of rationality connected to praxis, which in turn is interpreted as approximately our everyday or
professional activities, in contrast to a predetermined formalism of encroaching requirements from
science and technique.

Based on a close reading of the Corpus Aristotelicum, Eikeland (2006, 2008) criticizes widespread
tendencies in the “applied” appropriation of phronesis: Phronesis cannot be reduced to normative,
applied social research and counseling within a modern division of labor between researchers and
researched or between professionals and clients, and epistêmê cannot be equated with modern
science. There are differences both in kind and of degree within the Aristotelian epistêmê, and
theoretical and practical philosophy cannot really be segregated. Theory should not be abandoned,
but differentiated and redefined. The concept of praxis as the foundation for phronesis on the other
hand, is more specific than our everyday or professional activities. It is also more specific than most
modern hybrid concepts of “practice”. Different aspects of praxis must be distinguished even in its
specialized Aristotelian sense.
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According to Aristotle, phrónêsis is one of several “intellectual virtues” or “excellences of the mind”.
A virtue is a héxis, or habitus (Latin), which means an acquired ability, skill, habit, or disposition and
proclivity for acting and feeling in certain ways, resulting from practice, exercise, or habituation. A
habitus can be either deficient or adequate in relation to standards inherent in its activity, but virtue
is by definition the best habitus within its specific field or kind of activity. The activity of the intellect
– i.e. thinking – consists in the use of reasoned speech or lógos. Its lógos-character makes it
intellectual. Its ability to use lógos correctly makes it virtuous. The common task of intellectual virtues
is to attain truth by affirming and denying, as Aristotle puts it. The “true” and the “false” as species,
belong to the genus of validity in general together with “right” and “wrong”, “good” and “bad”,
“expedient” and “harmful”, “beautiful” and “ugly”, and other validity dimensions inescapable for
lógos users.

In book VI.iii-xiii of the Nicomachean Ethics (1140a1-1145a12), phrónêsis is defined in relation to

several other intellectual excellences and faculties and by connecting it to praxis. Sophía or
theoretical wisdom encompasses all the virtues, both intellectual and ethical. It is part of virtue as a
whole, as “head” of the virtues. Sophía is composed of two intellectual virtues immediately “below”
it; nous and episteme. These both relate primarily to levels and aspects of things that remain the
same. Nous moves “upwards” inductively from particulars and grasps basic principles, epistêmê
(“science”) moves “downwards” reasoning deductively from basic and primary principles. Nous
usually translates as some kind of intuitive intelligence, but is also considered to be more reflective.
Eikeland (2008) suggests that unfolded nous and the activity of noêsis is inductive and searching
dialogue or dialectics, in parallel to how Aristotle defines the unfolded activity of episteme as
deductive or didactic. The previous virtues are not only intellectual but also theoretical in being non-
intervening, non-normative and non-prescriptive, and merely descriptive, distinguishing, and
analytical. Other intellectual virtues like techne (craft competence) and phronesis are non-theoretical
but intervening or prescriptive, dealing with what can change or be brought into existence,
depending on what we ourselves do, or do not do. They concern things that we ourselves can
control, i.e. decide on, choose, initiate, change, develop, or stop, so that the variation depends on us.

Phronesis, then, is a way of using lógos, a way of reasoning or arguing about what to do. In the
Aristotelian scheme, there are several ways of reasoning. A finished science is deductive, research or
unfinished science is dialectical or dialogical, and techne is calculative. Phronesis, however, is
deliberative (bouleutikê), i.e. it searches for and weighs arguments pro et contra on what to do, here-
and-now, considering the particulars of the situation. But analyzing and understanding the
particulars of the situation is not peculiar to phronesis alone. What Aristotle calls súnesis or concrete
understanding, does too, but without being normative and prescriptive. Sunesis is merely critically
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distinguishing; a form of dialogical discretion. It is a theoretical virtue. Deliberation as such is not

peculiar to phronesis alone either. Cleverness, or smartness (deinótês), deliberates as well, but for
non-virtuous ends (arbitrary, tactical, strategic, egotistical, evil etc.). As a deliberative ability,
phronesis is inherent to the other ethical virtues (justice, friendship, courage, etc.). The “non-
intellectual” ethical virtues provide the ends, while phronesis deliberates about “means”, which is
why we cannot be prudent (phrónimoi) without being (ethically) good (EN1144a36, 1178a16-19,
EE1246b33). But, in turn, the non-intellectual virtues are developed primarily through praxis and
critical dialogue.

Cleverness (deinótês), concrete understanding (súnesis), and ethical virtue (êthikê arête) are in a way
integrated parts of phronesis, which transforms the parts in the integration process. An ethical virtue
is a habituated inclination (habitus) to act and feel “correctly”, but not only according to right reason.
Single virtuous acts can be done in a formally correct way from mere habit, by chance, by mechanical
rule-following, or under the influence of others (by following orders). To be truly virtuous, acts must
spring from a virtuous disposition and be done with the right reason or justification according to
Aristotle, and phrónêsis is right reason in these matters (EN1144b17-33).

Most of the intellectual disciplines and virtues are instruments or means that can be used for both
good and bad ethical purposes. But phrónêsis in itself is also an ethical virtue, i.e. a virtue of
character. Apart from theoretical wisdom (sophía), the other intellectual virtues, being merely
rational powers, are not given intrinsic ethical value. In such technical and instrumental virtues, a
voluntary error is not as bad as an involuntary error. Making a deliberate mistake in singing or
playing an instrument may merely prove your mastery of the art. But in the ethical virtues a
voluntary mistake – being deliberately unjust, unfriendly etc. – is worse than an involuntary mistake
of being unknowingly unjust or unfriendly. Also, forgetting a technical skill is not generally considered
blameworthy. But forgetting the ethical virtues is. Forgetting or making a mistake concerning
phronesis is. Why?

Phrónêsis deliberates about how I or we should be just, fair, friendly, and caring, etc. in relation to
other people here and now, people with quite different needs and wishes, all things considered, but
still respecting their autonomy as thinking minds and wills separate from ours. Phrónêsis has to heed
appearances through different opinions and desires of different people at different stages, phases, or
situations of life, and how one identical, accidental property of something may appear pleasant,
harmful, indifferent, or simply useful to different people. Hence, there cannot be any téchnê or
precept for dealing with it. In addition, phrónêsis cannot be used to deliberate instrumentally about
how to make anyone simply serve our purposes. Doing that would reduce it to téchnê.
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Phrónêsis does not try to manipulate, or merely to persuade or seduce. It must present its own
thinking and reasons for deciding and acting in certain ways as openly and as transparently as
possible to the mindful judgement of others (as to itself), trying to show, and convince, making them
see, but still respecting their autonomy. Phrónêsis must consider where others are, emotionally,
intellectually, and in their skills and attitudes, in trying to find the right thing to do, but it cannot use
these circumstances manipulatively in setting through some hidden agenda, without ruining itself
qua phrónêsis. It must know how to deal with egotistical, strategic, manipulative behaviour in others
without itself becoming like this, but also without simply being subdued by it and letting such
behaviour prevail in others and in general.

This is why and how phrónêsis is both ethical and intellectual, a) because we would blame someone
for forgetting or neglecting to do these intellectual exercises in dealing with others, treating
everyone exactly the same regardless of circumstances, preconditions, etc., b) because abstaining
consciously and voluntarily from deliberating pro et contra on what to do would be considered an
ethical deficiency, and c) because we would blame someone for deliberating merely cleverly for
other – unethical – purposes in dealing with others, or even manipulating others technically.

Defining the right thing to do in general and unqualified ways, as general rules or commandments,
becomes too simple, unconditional, and absolute. Novices and amateurs with a shallow and
superficial understanding of what they are dealing with think and talk in too general terms.
Simultaneously, lacking the ability to analyse and deliberate autonomously, they depend on general
rules. Such moralists do not adjust to the kairós – doing the right thing, for the right purpose, in the
right way, to the right people, in the right amount, at the right time, in the right place, etc. – but
prescribe doing things “always” or “never”. But phronesis is situated and considerate. It takes its own
circumstances and conditions of performance into account. Following a rule always, dogmatically or
mechanically, is not praxis because it does not use phronesis.

Deliberation distinguishes phrónêsis in its relation to praxis. Someone deliberating presupposes

independent minds like himself acting. Deliberation necessarily relates to independent minds in
taking and giving counsel, since advices and admonitions must be understood. Téchnê and poíêsis do
not presuppose independent minds or any consciousness at all, among the receivers of their
technical treatment. They presuppose the opposite. Technical causes do not have to be understood
in order to work.

Phronesis differs from rhetoric. Phronesis searches openly for the best thing to do, weighing
arguments pro et contra. Rhetoric is not primarily deliberative but persuasive and seductive. In being
open-ended regarding its concrete conclusions, phronesis is not deliberately persuasive while
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rhetoric is deliberately persuasive or seductive for any kind of purpose. But in arguing persuasively in
favor of predetermined and favored decisions as conclusions, it is not very deliberative. True
deliberation is open-ended. Rhetoric delivers the tools for conducting a debate where the point is to
beat an opponent and to win an audience. It operates persuasively towards the audience and in
agonistic ways towards its opponent. Aristotle speaks of rhetoric as a techne.

Practical reasoning is sometimes reduced to practical syllogisms, i.e. to a form similar to the
following: Two premises, one universal (normative major) as for example “All sweet things ought to
be tasted”, and one particular (descriptive minor), for example “this particular thing is sweet”, will
lead to the individual tasting this particular thing, if nothing stops him. But phrónêsis cannot be
reduced to practical syllogisms. The most important aspect of phrónêsis is that it deals with particular
circumstances in connection with acting. But the practical syllogism is deficient in leaving out its two
most important parts: 1) the analysis of the concrete situation, and 2) the deliberation about what to
do and how, all things considered. There is no analysis, nor is any deliberation going on, moving
through the practical syllogism, only deductive inference through formally identical terms.

There are several controversial aspects of phronesis, particularly its relationship to general
knowledge and to ends and “values”. Many modern interpreters seem to think that phronesis is self-
sufficient and can abandon theory and general knowledge. At the same time they seem to think it
represents a form of “value-rationality” in contrast to technical or instrumental rationality. Aristotle
is quite explicit (EN1141b15-17, 1143a8-10) that phrónêsis does not only (ou mónon) consist in
general knowledge but in knowledge of particulars as well (kaì), since it is practical, and has a
decision on what to do as its objective. If general knowledge is needed, the question is what kind.
There is much general knowledge in the ethical virtues, not only in modern scientific theories.
Aristotle also emphasizes repeatedly that phronesis deliberates the means, while the virtues provide
the ends. Sometimes it is also claimed that phronesis is based on experience, in contrast to science
and technique. But the same experience (empeiría) forms the base for all of these in Aristotle.
Challenges like these complicate claims that phronesis can be a self-sufficient and independent
alternative to episteme.

Further Reading:

Bondi, L . ; Carr, D, ; Clark, C. and Clegg, C. (eds.) (2011), Towards Professional Wisdom – Practical Deliberation in the People
Professions, :Ashgate

Dunne, Joseph (1993): Back to Rough Ground – “Phronesis” and “techne” in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle, Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press

Eikeland, Olav (2006b), Phrónêsis, Aristotle, and Action Research, pp. 5-53 i International Journal of Action Research, Vol. 2,
No.1
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Eikeland, Olav (2008b), The Ways of Aristotle – Aristotelian Phrónêsis, Aristotelian Philosophy of Dialogue, and Action
Research, Bern: Peter Lang Publishers

Flyvbjerg, Bent (2001), Making Social Science Matter – Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Jonsen, Albert R. and Toulmin, Stephen (1988), The Abuse of Casuistry – A History of Moral Reasoning, University of
California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London

Kinsella, A.E. and Pitman, A. (eds.) (2012), Phronesis as professional knowledge – practical wisdom and the professions,
:Sense Publishers

Polkinghorne, Donald E. (2004), Practice and the Human Sciences – the case for a judgment based practice of care, Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press

Ramírez, José Luis (1995), Skapande mening – En begreppsgenealogisk undersökning om rationalitet, vetenskap och
planering, Stockholm: Nordplan

Rooney, D.; McKenna, B. and Liesch, P. (2010), Wisdom and Management in the Knowledge Economy, London: Routledge

Schwandt, Thomas (2002), Evaluation Practice Reconsidered, ew York: Peter Lang

Statler, M. and Roos, J. (2007), Everyday strategic preparedness – the role of practical wisdom in organizations, New York:
Palgrave MacMillan

Toulmin, Stephen and Gustavsen, Björn (eds.) (1996), Beyond Theory – Changing organizations through participation,
Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company

Toulmin, Stephen (1996a), Introduction, pp.1-4 in Toulmin, S. and Gustavsen, B. (eds.) (1996)

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