public domain?

HELD

1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides that…lands acquired under free patent or
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date
of approval of the application and for a term of 5 years from and after the date of
issuance of the patent or grant…The contracts of lease and mortgage executed by
Morato constitute an encumbrance as contemplated by section 18 of the Public Land
Act because such contracts impair the use of the property.

2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide. When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the
invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain.
In Government v. Cabangis, the Court annulled the registration of land subject of
cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. In another
case, the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court
had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject
land in this case, being foreshore land should therefor be returned to the public domain.

zamboanga del norte v city of zamboanga

Facts:
After the incorporation of the Municipality of Zamboanga as a chartered city, petitioner
province contends that facilities belonging to the latter and located within the City of
Zamboanga will be acquired and paid for by the said city.

(Such properties include lots of capitol site, schools, hospitals, leprosarium,

high school playgrounds, burleighs, and hydro-electric sites.)
However, respondent city avers that pursuant to RA No. 3039 providing for the transfer
free of charge of all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of
Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga to the said City.

Issue:
Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprives Zamboanga del
Norte of its private properties.

Held:
No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by Zamboanga del Norte is a public
property.

The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings
thereon in question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over
the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself
is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in
its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute
control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived
of it without due process and payment of just compensation.

The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it
is intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that
obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the
properties in question?

Civil Code
The Civil provide: ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is
divided into property for public use and patrimonial property; ART. 424. Property for
public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads,
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and
public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All
other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this
Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots
used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the
former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites,
and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They
would fall under the phrase “public works for public service” for it has been held that
under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate
use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of
Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.

Law of Municipal Corporations

On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law
of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted
to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental
purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.

Final Ruling
The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations
— State vs. Province — than along that of Civil Law. If municipal property held and
devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary private property, then that
would mean they can be levied upon and attached; they can even be acquired thru
adverse possession — all these to the detriment of the local community. It is wrong to
consider those properties as ordinary private property.

Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the
municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is “… without prejudice
to the provisions of special laws.” For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining
under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as “special laws”. Hence,
the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as
public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

FACTS:

From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A
law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power
to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement
between AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be
transferred to AMARI .

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution

RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution:
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell
or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is
contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and
void from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio

Villarico v. Sarmiento, 442 SCRA 110, 115 2004

FACTS:

Spouses Villarico sought for the confirmation of title over a parcel of land to which they allege that they
absolutely own the land. This was opposed to by a person who posed himself also to be the rightful
owner of the land, as well as by the Director of Forestry who said that the subject land is part of
forest land and may not be appropriated. Trial and appellate court dismissed application of
petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff-appellant has acquired a right of way over the land of the government which is
between his property and the ninoy aquino avenue.

RULING:

There has been no showing that a declassification has been made of the
land in question as disposable or alienable. And the record indeed
disclosed that applicants have not introduced any evidence which would have led the court a quo to
rule otherwise.

Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no

matter how long doesn’t ripen to a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant or title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions
of the public domain.
HEIRS OF MALABANAN V REPUBLIC

FACTS:

Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property he
purchased from Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the property formed part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession
and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title.The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for
the Republic appealed the judgment to the CA, which reversed the RTC Judgment.Due
to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the
said decision to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.The petition was
denied.Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

1. What are the classifications of public lands?

1. Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.

1.Classifications of land according to ownership.

Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or

of private ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either:(a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character
but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial
property of the State. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a
private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into
the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. This means that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.All lands not appearing to be clearly under private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or
alienated them to private persons.
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the
Executive Department, not in the courts. If, however, public land will be classified as
neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
effect. Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or
reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer
intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth,
the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

2.Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945.
Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession – possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even
upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never
began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

REPUBLIC V SANTOS

DOCTRINE “The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed
belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a
law vests the ownership in some other person”

Facts:

1. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan Santos III filed for an application for land
registration on the ground of prescription. He alleged that the property had been
formed through accretion as the land is limited in the southeast by the Paranaque
river.
 2. The City opposed such registration on the ground that it was only an orchard that
had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.

RTC Affirmed
CA Affirmed

Issue: Whether or not the dried up orchard belongs to the respondent by virtue of Art.
457, NCC

Held: No. Art. 457 states that “To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.”

Accretion is to be construed as:

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be:

(a) gradual and imperceptible;

(b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and

(c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers

Drying up of the bed is not a process of deposition, given that area of 1,045 square
meters could not have accumulated by a gradual and imperceptible process in the span
of about 20 to 30 years.Petition granted.

Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines

Facts: A Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) issued in Navy Officers’ Village Association,
Inc (NOVAI)’s name covers a land situated inside the former Fort Andres Bonifacio
Military Reservation in Taguig. This property was previously a part of a larger parcel of
land which TCT’s under the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
The then President Garcia issued a Proclamation No. 423 which reserves for
military purposes certain parcels of the public domain situated in Pasig, Taguig,
Paranaque, Rizal and Pasay City. Thereafter, then President Macapagal issued
Proclamation No. 461 which excluded Fort McKinley a certain portion of land situated in
the provinces abovementioned and declared them as AFP Officers’ Village to be
disposed of under the provisions of certain laws. However, this area was subsequently
reserved for veterans’ rehabilitation, medicare and training center sites.
The property was the subject of deed of sale between the Republic and NOVAI
to which the TCT was registered in favour of the latter. The Republic then sought to
cancel NOVAI’s title on the ground that the property was still part of the military
reservation thus inalienable land of the public domain and cannot be the subject of sale.
The RTC ruled that the property was alienable and disposable in character. The Court
of Appeals reversed RTC’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not the property covered by TCT issued under the name of NOVAI is
inalienable land of public domain and cannot be the subject of sale.

Held: Yes, the property remains a part of the public domain that could not have been
validly disposed of in NOVAI’s favor. NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving
that the property was not intended for public or quasi-public use or purpose.
The classification and disposition of lands of the public domain are governed by
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land Act, the country's primary law on
the matter.
Under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may, from
time to time, classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands, and transfer these lands from one class to another for purposes of their
administration and disposition.
In a limited sense, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-
public uses under Section 9 (d) of C.A. No. 141 are still non-alienable and non-
disposable, even though they are, by the general classification under Section 6,
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. By specific declaration under
Section 88, in relation with Section 8, these lands classified as reservations are non-
alienable and non-disposable.
As provided in Article 420 of Civil Code, “property of the public dominion as those
which are intended for public use or, while not intended for public use, belong to the
State and are intended for some public service”. In this case, the property was classified
as military reservation thus, remained to be property of the public dominion until
withdrawn from the public use for which they have been reserved, by act of Congress or
by proclamation of the President. Since there was no positive act from the government,
the property had to retain its inalienable and non-disposable character. It cannot
therefore, be subject of sale otherwise, the sale is void for being contrary to law.

CITY OF LAPU LAPU V PEZA

Facts:

1. In 1995, the PEZA was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 7916 or “the
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995” to operate, administer, manage, and
develop economic zones in the country. The PEZA was granted the power
to register, regulate, and supervise the enterprises located in the economic
zones. By virtue of the law, the export processing zone in Mariveles,
Bataan became the Bataan Economic Zone and the Mactan Export
Processing Zone the Mactan Economic Zone.
2. The City contends that due to the enactment of the LGC, specifically
withdrawing all tax exemptions and with the PEZA law of 1995 which did
 not have any provisions on tax exemptions, it maintains that PEZA is liable
for real property tax.

Issue: Whether or not PEZA should be exempted from real property taxation.

Held: Yes. Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, real properties
owned by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt from real property
taxes. Properties owned by the state are either property of public dominion or
patrimonial property as per Art. 420.

Citing Manila International Airport Authority: Properties of public dominion, being

for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public
or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any
property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential
public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to
encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.

In this case, the properties sought to be taxed are located in publicly owned
economic zones. These economic zones are property of public dominion – sites
which were reserved by President Marcos under Proclamation No. 1811, Series of
1979 (Mactan).

REPUBLIC V ABOITIZ

Facts:

1. On September 11, 1998, respondent Aboitiz filed his Application for Registration
of Land Title of a parcel of land with an area of 1,254 square meters, located in
Talamban, Cebu City.
2. That as per record of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Region VII, the subject property had been classified as alienable and
disposable since 1957; that per certification of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City, the subject property was not
covered by any subsisting public land application; and that the subject property
had been covered by tax declarations from 1963 to 1994 in Irenea’s name, and
from 1994 to present, in his name.
3. The Republic assails the CA’s decision on granting the said application.

Issue: Whether or not said property may be registered for having satisfied Sec. 14 (2) of
PD 1529

Held: No. In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership
of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

ALOLINA V FLORES

Facts:

1. In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores

constructed their house/sari sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road
immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino’s house. Since they were
constructing on a municipal road, the respondents could not secure a building
permit. The structure is only about two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back
of Alolino’s house, covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents’
construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously
enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the
rear door of his house.
2. The respondents contend that the said barrio road which they built on was
already converted to patrimonial property of the state and hence they had validly
built their store.

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s contention is correct.

Held: No. To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the LGU to
enact an ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian members,
permanently closing the road. In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance
but merely passed a resolution. Properties of the local government that are devoted to
public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress.
Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate the use of these properties unless specifically
authorized by Congress, as is the case with Section 21 of the LGC. In exercising this
authority, the LGU must comply with the conditions and observe the limitations
prescribed by Congress.

As a barrio road, the subject lot’s purpose is to serve the benefit of the collective
citizenry. It is outside the commerce of man and as a consequence:

(1) it is not alienable or disposable;

(2) it is not subject to registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot be the
subject of a Torrens title;
(3) it is not susceptible to prescription;

(4) it cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract;

(5) it is not subject to attachment and execution; and

(6) it cannot be burdened by any voluntary easements.

As it remained a road, it is within the purview of Sec. 28 of Urban Development and

Housing Act and hence can be demolished.

SUPREMA T. DUMO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G.R. No. 218269, June 06, 2018

Facts:

Petitioner Suprema T. Dumo filed an application for registration of two parcels of land,
covered by Advance Plan of Lot Nos. 400398 and 400399 with a total area of 1,273
square meters (LRC Case No. 270-Bg). Dumo alleged that the lots belonged to her
mother Bernarda M. Trinidad, and that she and her siblings inherited them upon their
mother's death. She further alleged that through a Deed of Partition with Absolute Sale
dated 6 February 1987, she acquired the subject lots from her siblings. Dumo traces her
title from her mother, Trinidad, who purchased the lots from Florencio Mabalay in
August 1951. Mabalay was Dumo's maternal grandfather. Mabalay, on the other hand,
purchased the properties from Carlos Calica.

The heirs of Marcelino Espinas opposed Dumo's application for land registration on the
ground that the properties sought to be registered by Dumo are involved in the accion
reivindicatoria case. Thus, the RTC consolidated the land registration case with the
Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages.

On 2 July 2010, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the subject property
was owned by the heirs of Espinas. The RTC ordered the dismissal of Dumo's land
registration application on the ground of lack of registerable title, and ordered Dumo to
restore ownership and possession of the lots to the heirs of Espinas.

The CA rendered its Decision dated 28 January 2014, affirming the RTC's decision
dismissing the application for land registration of Dumo, and finding that she failed to
demonstrate that she and her predecessors-in¬ interest possessed the property in the
manner required by law to merit the grant of her application for land registration. The
CA, however, modified the decision of the RTC insofar as it found that the Subject
Property belonged to the heirs of Espinas. The CA found that since the property still
belonged to the public domain, and the heirs of Espinas were not able to establish their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under
a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, it was erroneous for the
RTC to declare the heirs of Espinas as the owners of the Subject Property; hence, this
petition.
Issues:

1. Whether Dumo is able to prove that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of public domain
2. Whether the requirement that documents to prove the status of land shall be
based on the land classification approved by the DENR Secretary is not a mere
superfluity.

Ruling:

1. NO, Dumo failed to submit any of the documents required to prove that the land
she seeks to register is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
connection, the Court held that there are two (2) documents which must be
presented: first, a copy of the original classification approved by the Secretary of
the DENR and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records, and second, a certificate of land classification status issued by the
CENRO or the PENRO based on the land classification approved by the DENR
Secretary.

In this case, none of the documents submitted by respondent to the trial court
indicated that the subject property was agricultural or part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. At most, the CENRO Report and
Certification stated that the land was not covered by any kind of public land
application. This was far from an adequate proof of the classification of the land.

Unfortunately for respondent, the evidence submitted clearly falls short of the
requirements for original registration in order to show the alienable character of
the lands subject herein

2. YES, the requirement that documents to prove the status of land shall be based
on the land classification approved by the DENR Secretary is not a mere
superfluity.

This requirement stems from the fact that the alienable and disposable
classification of agricultural land may be made by the President or DENR
Secretary. And while the DENR Secretary may perform this act in the regular
course of business, this does not extend to the CENRO or PENRO – the DENR
Secretary may no longer delegate the power to issue such certification as the
power to classify lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable lands is
in itself a delegated power under CA No. 141 and PD No. 705.