ORIGINAL NA ENGLESKOM

July 1998 Vol.

10, No. 6 (D)
BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA
"A Closed, Dark Place":
Past and Present Human Rights Abuses in Foca

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 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
 SUMMARY
 RECOMMENDATIONS
 WARTIME ABUSES
o Background
o Forces from Serbia and Montenegro
o Detention Centers
 Livade
 KP Dom
 KP Dom Personnel
 Partizan Sports Hall
 The Foca Hospital
 Other Unofficial Camps
o Miljevina
 Other Participants in the Takeover of Miljevina
o The Crisis Committee and Its Leaders
 Petko Cancar- Wartime: Mayor of Foca, Leader of Crisis Committee/ Current:
Republika Srpska Minister of Justice
 Velibor Ostojic - Wartime: Minister of Information for Bosnian Serb-controlled
Territory, Leader of Foca Crisis Committee/ Current: Head of Human Rights
Commission of the Bosnian Parliament
 Vojislav Maksimovic - Wartime: Leader of the Crisis Committee/ Current: Rector of
University of Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska Member of Parliament
 Other Members of the Crisis Committee
o Also Involved in the Takeover
 POST-WAR ABUSES: NONCOMPLIANCE BY FOCA AUTHORITIES IN THE POST-WAR
PERIOD
o Human Rights Abuses Against the Current Population of Foca
 Police Beatings
 Freedom of Expression and Access to Information
o Prevention of the Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons To Foca
o Blocking Inter-Entity Projects
o Obstruction of the Work of the Dayton-Implementing Bodies
 The Pale Connection and Local Police Abuses
 Access to Collective Centers for Displaced Persons
 Improvements
o Harassment of Internationals
 The July 1997 Prijedor Arrests and the Repercussions in Foca
 Harassment of Local Staff of International Organizations
 Other Threats
o International Community's Failure to Hold the Local Authorities Accountable
  Lack of Access to Information from IPTF
o International Reconstruction Assistance and Investment in Foca
 CONCLUSION
 APPENDIX I: "Concentration Camp in Foca": KP Dom Foca
 APPENDIX II: Events Following the Arrest of Milorad Krnojelac
 APPENDIX III: Excerpts from the ICTY Indictment Against Gagovic et al.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report is based upon research conducted in Bosnia and Hercegovina, in particular in the region of Foca, in
April 1997 and from December 1997 until February 1998. Sources for wartime abuses included research
conducted by Human Rights Watch during the war. The report was edited by Holly Cartner, executive director of
the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch. Special thanks go to Dinah PoKempner and
Michael McClintock. Crucial assistance in the preparation of the report was provided by Emily Shaw. Human
Rights Watch would like to acknowledge and thank many individuals whose contributions to the research made
this report possible, yet who cannot be named. They risked their own safety and the safety of their families to
expose the truth, in the hopes that their perpetrators will be brought to justice.

SUMMARY

The Foca municipality was the site of some of the most brutal crimes committed during the 1992-1995 war in
Bosnia and Hercegovina.(1) Bosnian Serb civilian, police, and military officials, in collaboration with
paramilitary troops and former Yugoslav Army reservists called in from Serbia and Montenegro, took over Foca
in April 1992. They established a wartime government called the "Crisis Committee," much like those
established in many towns in Bosnian Serb-controlled territory, to plan and carry out the expulsion of the non-
Serb population. Using a thorough propaganda campaign to convince the local Bosnian Serb population that they
were under threat of a Muslim fundamentalist coup, the Crisis Committee established a network of detention
centers, where non-Serb civilians were detained, tortured, raped, and either expelled, killed, or "disappeared,"
leaving the town as it is today, almost completely ethnically Serb. Businesses and properties of non-Serbs were
expropriated or destroyed.

The persons alleged by many sources to be responsible for the crimes committed in Foca during the war continue
to wield power in the town. In many cases, they are in governmental or police positions. In other cases, they hold
even higher-ranking positions in the Republika Srpska or Bosnian government. In these positions they may have
been identified by international observers as responsible for protracted noncompliance with the provisions of the
Dayton Accords, as well as systematic human rights abuses in the post-war period. In Foca, where the authorities
and police remain loyal to the indicted Radovan Karadzic, there has been no refugee return, there is no freedom
of movement or expression, there has been absolutely no vetting of the police, and there are six publicly indicted
war criminals known to be harbored in the town. French NATO troops stationed in the town since late 1995
refused to arrest a single indicted person until recently, when on June 15, 1998, they arrested Milorad Krnojelac
based upon a sealed indictment. Six publicly indicted persons, however, remain in Foca. The International Police
Task Force (IPTF), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European
Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) work in Foca as if it were any other town, turning a blind eye to past
and current abuses, in favor of "peaceful relations." The failure to hold officials accountable for past and present
abuses in Foca, however, has not brought compliance with the Dayton agreement; there has been no return of
refugees or displaced persons, no screening or vetting of the local police, freedom of expression, association, and
movement remain severely restricted, and there have been numerous cases of attacks and harassment against
international journalists and other members of the international community, and against local citizens who do not
agree with the authorities. Yet multilateral institutions and donor governments have considered granting--and in
some cases, granted--considerable sums of economic assistance to the Foca area. In fact, several donor countries
and organizations, including the Italian government and the World Bank, the European Union (E.U.), the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) have invested in the Foca area in the past year. In December, the World Bank turned down a
proposal to send additional assistance to Foca only after nongovernmental organizations protested to donor
governments. Human Rights Watch is seriously concerned that in the current atmosphere of impunity and
noncooperation described in this report, this money is likely only to enrich and empower those officials
responsible for ongoing violations of human rights and systematic obstruction of the implementation of the
Dayton Peace Agreement. (For more details, see section on International Investment in Foca.)

Further, the failure of the international organizations in Foca to report publicly on abuses, and to press for
alleged perpetrators to be brought to justice, has given a false impression of a town described recently to Human
Rights Watch as "very calm." Accountability has been cast aside in Foca for so long that indictees and persons
alleged to be responsible for heinous crimes remain in control, ruling with total impunity. In the current climate
in Foca, any international economic aid which would be granted to the town would serve to line the pockets of
these individuals.

The military takeover of Foca began on April 7, 1992. The takeover was a coordinated effort between Serb
irregulars from Serbia proper and Montenegro, and paramilitary forces of the Bosnian Serb army. They quickly
established the Crisis Committee, which worked in collaboration with military and police officials in the
planning and execution of the takeover. The Bosnian Serb army inherited weapons and other military supplies
from the former Yugoslav National Army (Jugoslav Narodna Armija, JNA), and paramilitary troops from Serbia
and Montenegro were promptly brought in. What took place in the Foca municipality after the Bosnian Serbs
were firmly in control was beyond anyone's worst nightmare.

Once the Bosnian Serb and Serb forces had completely occupied the Foca municipality, they began rounding up
all non-Serb civilians from the surrounding villages, separating the men from the women, and imprisoning them
in numerous detention facilities. The Foca police worked closely with the Serb military forces occupying the
municipality and played primary and direct roles in the arrest, expulsion, detention, rape, torture, and murder of
the non-Serb population of the town. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was denied access to
Foca from the time of the takeover on April 7, 1992, until the beginning of October of that year. By the time they
gained access, it was too late for thousands of non-Serbs from Foca who had been imprisoned and subsequently
either expelled or killed. By the time the ICRC entered, few non-Serbs were left alive in the municipality.

The takeover of Foca was planned and managed by a crisis committee, similar to committees that were formed in
other areas of the Serb territory. The leaders of the Crisis Committee in Foca have been identified by residents of
Foca and others as Velibor Ostojic, Vojislav "Vojo" Maksimovic, and Petar "Petko" Cancar. Under the authority
of the Crisis Committee, military and paramilitary forces from the Serb-controlled territory in Bosnia and from
Serbia and Montenegro carried out "disappearances," detentions, expulsions, torture, executions, and rape, with
the assistance of the local police. Businesses and factories, as well as private property belonging to non-Serbs,
were expropriated and the former owners and directors either imprisoned, expelled, or "disappeared." Bosnian
Muslim (hereafter "Bosniak") and Croat men were sent, often via the short-term detention center "Livade," to the
central Foca prison, called the "Kazneno-Popravni Dom" or "KP Dom" (Home for Criminal Rehabilitation),
where they were tortured and many "disappeared." KP Dom is mentioned in the indictments against Radovan
Karadzic, then leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and Ratko Mladic, then commander of the Bosnian Serb army. Non-
Serb women in Foca were taken from their homes, separated from their husbands, and many were held in short
or long-term detention centers. The Partizan Sports Hall, located in the center of the town very near to the
municipality building and the central police station, is where women were held and systematically raped or
otherwise sexually assaulted as part of the Serb campaign. The Crisis Committee headquarters was in Velecevo,
on the edge of the town of Foca, which also later became the sight of a detention camp where non-Serb women
were sexually assaulted as part of the "ethnic cleansing" campaign. Other rape camps were established in Buk
Bijela and in private houses and apartments in town. There are also allegations that women were detained and
sexually assaulted in the Foca high school during the takeover in 1992.

Nine individuals--Dragan Gagovic, Gojko Jankovic, Janko Janjic, Dragan Zelenovic, Zoran Vukovic, Dragoljub
Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, Radovan Stankovic, and Milorad Krnojelac--are publicly indicted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for their involvement in the "ethnic cleansing" in Foca.
They are indicted for crimes against humanity, including rape, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and
violations of the laws or customs of war. These indictments are the first in history in which persons were
indicted for rape as a war crime.
Seven of the nine public indictees remain at large, and six are known to be living in the Foca municipality. They
have been living freely, under no apparent fear of arrest by the French SFOR (the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization-- NATO--troops in the region are called the Stabilization Force, or SFOR) troops stationed in the
region, until recently the only SFOR sector in Bosnia in which no arrests had taken place. These indicted persons
can often be seen in public places such as bars and restaurants, which are also frequented by SFOR troops.
According to a February 20, 1998 article in the Dutch newspaper Nieuwsblad,

Take for instance Janko Janjic, one of the Serbs on the list, who drinks coffee and rakija in the "Merkur," the
"Passager" or the "Krsma" every morning around nine. All three bars are located near the bus station in the
center of the town....Should French SFOR troops decide to arrest Janko Janjic while he is sipping his rakija in the
"Krsma" bar, they could make a second arrest in the process: the owner of this bar, Dragan Gagovic, also
features on the Hague's list.

Aside from those individuals who have been publicly indicted by the Tribunal, many individuals who are not yet
publicly indicted but are alleged to have been responsible for war crimes and human rights abuses during the war
still hold positions of power. These persons, in their current influential roles in the government, infrastructure,
and police of Foca use their continued influence to block the implementation of the Dayton Accords, including
in particular those provisions relating to human rights guarantees and the return of refugees. They severely and
actively restrict freedom of movement; they block all attempts at freedom of expression by local civilians; and
they blatantly prevent any discussion of the return of displaced persons and refugees. Furthermore, since the
signing of the Dayton Accords, the "unindicted" have frequently blocked the work of the international
community by refusing to attend meetings to discuss Dayton implementation, and by obstructing projects which
they felt would threaten their stranglehold on society. International journalists who visit have been threatened.
Volunteers who came to work with the teenagers in the town have been harassed and kicked out of the town.
Micro-credit projects which could assist the women in Foca by offering them opportunities for income
generation have been halted by the authorities. Residents of Foca who interact or work with organizations that
the authorities perceive as a threat to their power have been harassed and threatened. "Foca is a closed, dark
place," people who have worked there say, time and again.

To date, efforts by the international community to obtain compliance with the provisions of Dayton have been
unsuccessful in Foca. In the two and a half years since the signing of the Dayton Accords, any officials within
Foca who have attempted to cooperate with the international community have eventually been replaced by their
more radical, nationalistic, and isolationist colleagues.

The June 15, 1998 arrest by French SFOR troops was the very first time French SFOR troops had arrested any
indictees in Bosnia, and though late in coming, it was a welcome step.

However, the failure of French SFOR to arrest the six individuals publicly indicted by the ICTY who still
wander free in Foca is just a small part of the picture of an international community that is prepared to let
bygones be bygones. It is no longer an unusual sight, nor does it even seem strange any more to see international
armed troops patrolling in Foca, sitting in its cafes, eating in its restaurants, drinking in its bars, "keeping the
peace." As a result of the international community's failure to insist, from the outset, on compliance by the Foca
authorities with the provisions of the Dayton Accords, and as a result of the failure of the French NATO troops
to arrest anyone responsible for war crimes in Foca for two and a half years, individuals allegedly responsible for
mass murder and rape have been free to rule the town they conquered with complete and total impunity. And
they have succeeded splendidly: three of the individuals linked to overseeing the planning, organization, and
execution of the massive "ethnic cleansing" in the Foca municipality, namely Petar Cancar, Vojislav
Maksimovic, and Velibor Ostojic, have been rewarded for their efforts. Cancar has been promoted from mayor
of Foca to minister of justice of the Republika Srpska. Maksimovic sits on the Republika Srpska National
Assembly and remains in his post as rector of the Philosophy Faculty in the Serb-controlled part of Sarajevo.
Even more shocking is that Ostojic was appointed head of a state human rights commission in the Bosnian
Parliament.

Despite the Foca authorities' systematic obstruction of the peace accords, and their ongoing loyalty to Radovan
Karadzic, bilateral and international donors have targeted Foca for reconstruction assistance. In December 1997,
nongovernmental organizations raised objections to a planned World Bank project in the area, and as a result,
that project did not receive final approval. Nonetheless, other reconstruction projects in Foca, financed by
bilateral donors including Italy, multilateral donors, including the World Bank, the EBRD, the E.U., and the
UNHCR, have gone forward. Donor organizations appear eager to give economic aid to Foca, apparently under
the misguided notions that such aid would coax compliance from the local authorities, and that the donor's
vetting procedures can adequately ensure that war crimes suspects and Dayton obstructionists would not benefit.
To the contrary, any international funding that would enter Foca in the current atmosphere would be almost
impossible to track. In Foca, where even the local Serb population cannot speak freely against its authorities;
where the international staff and SFOR troops based in the town are under pressure to be completely uncritical in
order to maintain peaceful relations and in order to live there in safety; and where access is severely limited for
persons who wish to investigate and report on the reality in the town, any mechanisms established to track
economic aid would fail. The authorities block access to information on companies, individuals, and local
institutions in Foca. This information would be crucial to any vetting system to prevent aid from enriching
indicted war crimes suspects and those allegedly responsible for human rights abuses. For this reason, it is highly
unlikely that aid granted to the municipality will reach its target beneficiaries.

It is the obligation of international donor institutions and countries to prevent money from flowing into the hands
of persons who may be responsible for war crimes and serious and widespread human rights abuses during and
after the war, or who are responsible for ongoing obstruction of the implementation of the Dayton Accords in
Foca and throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina. It is also their obligation to ensure that international economic aid
is not used in ways that would strengthen the political power base of such individuals.

This report should serve as a resource for information on the crimes that were perpetrated against the Bosniak
and Croat population in Foca during the war, as well as on persons who have either been indicted for these
crimes by the ICTY or whose responsibility for these crimes should be further investigated.

Over twenty persons have been named in this report in connection with human rights abuses committed in Foca.
We have named individuals where we have found some evidence that they may have played a role in the
institutions or processes that contributed to the gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law that took
place. Human Rights Watch does not state or imply that named individuals are necessarily responsible for these
violations; however, in these cases we believe that further investigation is warranted. Where it is at all possible,
we have provided the names of witnesses and sources of information; however, many witnesses, both residents
of Foca and international journalists and observers, have specifically requested that their identities be withheld
because of genuine fears of retaliation.

Lastly, but most importantly, this report exposes the suffering of the survivors of the "ethnic cleansing" in Foca
and is therefore a plea from them for accountability. Their risk in sharing information from their experiences
must not go unnoticed, especially in the atmosphere of impunity that reigns in Bosnia and Hercegovina. They
shared their tragic stories with great pain, but also with the hope that in recalling their nightmares, and in naming
their abusers, the world would not forget, and those responsible would be brought to justice. Their wish,
universally, was to go home to Foca.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Human Rights Watch urges the Foca municipal authorities and police to:

 arrest and surrender all indicted persons present in Foca to the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia for trial in the Hague;
 immediately cease any and all obstruction of the Dayton agreement, including in particular restrictions
on freedom of movement, and freedom of expression and association;
 immediately cease any and all attacks and harassment against the local population, including that which
is based upon their ethnicity, political opinion or affiliation and against representatives of the
international community, and investigate and prosecute those alleged to be responsible for such attacks
and harassment;

 guarantee the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to Foca and ensure the security of
persons who choose to return;
 comply with IPTF procedures for screening and vetting the police based on human rights criteria. As a
first step at rectifying the failure to do so for two and a half years, immediately provide IPTF with a
 complete list of all police officers, including secret and special police as well as trainers and teachers in
the special police training school in Tjentiste, and of all staff and personnel in the KP Dom prison;
 immediately provide international organizations with any and all information regarding persons missing
from the Foca municipality and grant complete access to any organizations charged with the task of
investigating the fate of people who "disappeared" or are otherwise unaccounted for;
 immediately implement the results of the September 1997 municipal elections, allowing those elected to
assume their offices, and provide protection for all representatives who have been elected when they
travel to Foca for assembly sessions.

Human Rights Watch calls upon Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik to:

 dismiss Petko Cancar from his post as minister of justice of Republika Srpska, pending investigation by
the ICTY of substantive allegations of his responsibility for war crimes committed under his authority
during the war in Foca;
 insist that the authorities in places such as Foca, which remain under the influence of the indicted
Radovan Karadzic, implement the provisions of the Dayton Accords. Specifically, insist that the Foca
authorities grant full freedom of movement, allow refugees and displaced persons to return to their
homes, guarantee freedom of expression and association, immediately cease any and all attacks and
harassment based upon political opinion or affiliation, and implement the September 1997 municipal
election results;
 immediately transfer to the custody of the ICTY any and all publicly indicted individuals, including
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, and including the six public indictees who roam freely in Foca;
 ensure that anyone who holds a position of authority in the Republika Srpska government has been
cleared of any serious, credible allegations of wartime atrocities;
 arrest, prosecute, and punish persons responsible for human rights abuses.

Human Rights Watch urges the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the
European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), and the International Police Task Force (IPTF),
which have bases in Foca, and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and SFOR, which operate in Foca to:

 articulate clearly a duty of their representatives to expose publicly instances of serious or continuing
human rights abuses and protracted noncompliance with the Dayton agreement, as well as to name
those found responsible. While sources and information that would directly endanger witnesses must
obviously be protected, reports of human rights abuses should not be withheld from the public for
political reasons, and disclosure should be timely. Further, investigations of human rights abuses must
not be delayed or prevented for political reasons;
 continue to exert pressure on local authorities to exclude from official positions individuals alleged to
be responsible for war crimes and serious human rights violations, including in particular Velibor
Ostojic, Petko Cancar, and Vojislav Maksimovic, until such time as they have been investigated and
cleared of such allegations. Refuse to afford these individuals political or diplomatic recognition or to
interact with them in any official capacity until such time as they have been investigated and cleared of
the serious allegations that they were responsible for war crimes in the Foca municipality;
 continue to devote resources, both financial and material, to the resolution of the missing persons issue
in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Though much is being done in this realm already, more remains to be
accomplished. A resolution to this issue is a crucial basis on which future stability in Bosnia and
Hercegovina depends;
 continue to devote attention and resources to restore freedom of expression and association, with a
particular focus on isolated areas in Eastern Republika Srpska such as Foca;
 conduct a special investigation into the fate of the persons who "disappeared" from Foca, specifically
from the KP Dom prison, during the war. The first step in such an investigation should include a
background check of all current prisoners being held there, beyond the routine perusal of the list of
detainees regularly performed by IPTF, to ensure that no non-Serbs are being held under false Serb
names. The same investigation to ensure non-Serbs are not being concealed in detention centers should
be undertaken in other places within the Foca municipality, such as the Miljevina coal mine, the
Tjentiste region, Buk Bijela, and any and all military facilities;
  consider the establishment of an Office of the Ombudsman in the Republika Srpska similar to the one
operating in the Federation entity of Bosnia and Hercegovina, to act as a legal representative for
individual victims of human rights abuses and charged with obtaining remedies for such abuses from
governmental authorities, in liaison with the International Office of the Ombudsperson established by
the Dayton agreement;
 insist on full implementation of the results of the September 1997 municipal election results, and the
protection of representatives who have been elected.

Human Rights Watch calls on the International Police Task Force, in addition, to:

 link all financial support for the restructuring of the local police with the final completion of the full
IPTF screening/vetting process;
 share all information related to local police involvement in war crimes or serious human rights abuses
with the ICTY, with an agreement on the effective and timely exchange of information in ICTY records
on police officials, politicians, and members of paramilitary groups in the area;
 provide any and all information known to IPTF monitors regarding the locations of persons publicly
indicted for war crimes to IPTF headquarters, and to the other international organizations based in Foca,
in particular to SFOR, and to the ICTY, to facilitate the arrests of these individuals;
 respond with action to reports that unacknowledged prisoners are still being held secretly in official and
unofficial places of detention in the Foca municipality, and perform surprise searches of any and all
such locations on an ongoing basis. In a collaborative effort with SFOR and without prior notice to or
the presence of local police or military, routinely search KP Dom, the Miljevina mine, Buk Bijela, the
Tjentiste area, the Zinc mine at Suplja Stijena, and any and all military or police facilities;
 pressure the police authorities, in particular those employed in the KP Dom prison, to provide
information on the individuals missing from Foca as a result of the Serb takeover and the "ethnic
cleansing" that took place during the war;
 routinely check the list of police officers in the civilian police force, special police forces, and secret
police in order to ensure that those indicted for war crimes are not working as police officers anywhere
in the Foca municipality;
 urge the local police to investigate thoroughly any human rights violations that occur in the Foca
municipality and monitor and report on the ongoing progress of such investigations. The results of such
investigations should be made public. In cases where incidents are inadequately investigated, IPTF
should publicize this fact, and hold the local police accountable through the filing of "noncompliance
reports"--IPTF reports on police noncompliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement. Accountability
should also include making sure that such units do not benefit from international aid;
 if there are cases of reported participation in or instigation of violations of human rights by the local
police, IPTF should file noncompliance reports, publicize these cases, and, in collaboration with other
international organizations on the ground, should take all possible steps to ensure that the perpetrators
are brought to justice. One such case is the alleged police beating of a local Serb civilian in the Foca
central police station in December 1997. The results of this investigation should be made public;
 ensure that all police officers responsible for post-Dayton human rights abuses, or who have failed to
investigate and punish those responsible for human rights abuses committed under their jurisdiction, be
ineligible for police posts and be removed from their current police positions. Acts of noncompliance
with the Dayton Peace Agreement should be understood to include, but should not be limited to, the
obstruction of freedom of movement, failure to protect the right to remain, violations of freedom of
expression and association, and harassment and intimidation of minorities or opposition members.
Police officials or officers who have threatened or committed acts of violence against IPTF should also
be ineligible for police posts and should be removed from their positions and prosecuted when criminal
acts have been committed;
 ensure that the local police provide security and protection for municipal assembly representatives and
for returnees.

Human Rights Watch urges the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR), specifically the French troops based
in the Foca area to:

 arrest immediately those indicted for war crimes who live in or visit the Foca municipality. According
to the latest information obtained by Human Rights Watch, those publicly indicted by the ICTY and
currently living in Foca include Radovan Stankovic, Dragan Zelenovic, Dragan Gagovic, Janko Janjic,
Gojko Jankovic, and Radomir Kovac;(2)
  conduct routine searches of any and all military facilities to ensure that they are not being used as places
of detention, and to ensure that the stock of weapons is in accordance with the limitations outlined by
the Dayton agreement;
 conduct routine searches, in collaboration with IPTF, of any sites in which detainees may be held. (See
IPTF recommendations above for specific locations.)

Human Rights Watch urges all nongovernmental and other international humanitarian organizations
working in the region, including the International Rescue Committee, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Equilibre, and Oxfam and all others who have been involved in efforts to
provide programming and assistance in Foca to:

 continue their consistent and dedicated efforts to bring opportunities for cooperation between the
populations of Foca (Republika Srpska) and Gorazde (Federation). However, in doing so, exercise
extreme caution regarding distribution of funding or in-kind assistance in order to prevent the
perpetrators of war crimes or human rights abuses from benefiting in any way from the assistance;
 make every effort within their mandates to ensure that the perpetrators of war crimes and human rights
abuses do not benefit from economic aid.

Human Rights Watch urges the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
the European Community Humanitarian Organization, and other donor institutions and governments to:

 withhold from organizations and institutions located in the Foca municipality, as well as throughout
Bosnia and Hercegovina, any reconstruction assistance, with the exception of emergency humanitarian
aid, that cannot be adequately and meticulously tracked to ensure that those indicted for war crimes, as
well as those alleged to be responsible for war crimes and/or human rights abuses, do not benefit
politically or economically from this assistance. Assistance to municipal authorities should be
conditioned on their full cooperation with the ICTY, respect for human rights, full implementation of
the results of the municipal elections, and concrete actions to assist refugees and displaced persons who
seek to return to their homes. Donors should require that assistance be disbursed in a nondiscriminatory
manner, to all needy persons regardless of ethnicity or gender. Further, with respect to assistance
channeled through private for-profit or nonprofit enterprises, donors should investigate the ownership
and control of companies, organizations, and institutions prior to making loans or grants or awarding
contracts, to ensure that persons indicted for or implicated in war crimes, human rights abuses, or
obstruction of implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement do not benefit. Such investigations
should include inquiries into whether current directors, owners, or managers were involved in the
murder, imprisonment, "disappearance," or discriminatory dismissal of previous directors, owners, or
managers;
 investigate carefully any plans for assistance to entities located in towns such as Foca within the
Republika Srpska and in other places in Bosnia where persons already publicly indicted maintain
significant influence, where persons allegedly responsible for human rights abuses and war crimes are
in positions of power, and where the local authorities have consistently obstructed the implementation
of the provisions of the Dayton agreement. Among the towns which should be of great concern in this
regard, aside from Foca, are Bijeljina, Bratunac, Rogatica, Visegrad, Prijedor, Zvornik, Stolac,
Capljina, Gradiska, Doboj, Teslic, West Mostar, Livno, Tomislavgrad, Drvar. Withhold any such
assistance that cannot be adequately and meticulously tracked to ensure that those responsible for war
crimes, as well as those alleged to be responsible for war crimes and/or human rights abuses, do not
benefit politically or economically from this assistance;
 withhold any assistance to the local police until the full IPTF screening and vetting process has been
finally completed;
 as part of the vetting process for all potential aid projects, seek information from the organizations and
governments involved in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, concerning the human rights
records of government officials, including police officials who may play a direct or indirect role in the
projects;
 provide crucial financial and material support for the ICTY to enable the continued investigations of
war crimes. We strongly encourage support for investigations into the wartime activities of the persons
named in this report as alleged perpetrators of gross abuses, in particular, of Velibor Ostojic, Petar
"Petko" Cancar, Vojislav Maksimovic, Miroslav Stanic, Radojica Mladjenovic, and Mico Olovic.
WARTIME ABUSES IN FOCA

Background

Foca is a town in southeastern Bosnia and Hercegovina, in the entity known as the Republika Srpska (Bosnian-
Serb controlled territory). According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population of Foca municipality was
40,513, of which 51.6 percent were Bosniak, 45.3 percent were Bosnian Serbs, and 3.1 percent other. Before the
war, there were fourteen mosques in the area, including the Aladza mosque, built in 1550 and the Ustikolina
mosque, built in 1448. All fourteen were destroyed by Bosnian Serb, Serbian, and Montenegrin forces during
their takeover of the region, and all traces of their existence removed. International monitors in the region
estimate that the current population of Foca municipality is approximately 24,000, and that fewer than one
hundred non-Serbs remain in the Foca municipality today out of a pre-war population of more than 20,000.

The actual takeover of Foca began on April 7, 1992. However, Bosnian Serb civilian, police, and military
officials had been preparing for the attack for many months, gathering weapons they had inherited from the
former JNA. I.H., once a prominent and well-connected professional in Foca and now living in exile, described
the time leading up to the takeover to a Human Rights Watch representative:

At the end of February and the beginning of March 1992, especially after the referendum of Bosnia, they [the
Serbs] just gathered technical equipment in preparation for war. These preparations were done in all
municipalities in Bosnia and Hercegovina, especially in municipalities where Serbs formed half or more of the
population, knowing that Bosniaks did not have any weapons at all, and with promises of assistance from
Milosevic and the JNA. They rejected a dialogue and decided to fight a war.(3)

Bosnian Serb leaders in Foca formed the Crisis Committee, similar to those which were formed in other regions
of Bosnian Serb controlled territory to oversee the takeover and "ethnic cleansing" campaigns (see below for
details). The Crisis Committee in Foca was charged with the organization, planning, and carrying out of the Serb
takeover of Foca. The Crisis Committee supervised all aspects of the attack on Foca, including the activities of
the local police, and worked in close collaboration with the Bosnian Serb army. To assist them in the takeover,
the Crisis Committee called in paramilitary troops and reservists from neighboring Serbia and Montenegro.
Many non-Serbs were violently expelled from Foca, and others were imprisoned in one of the network of
detention centers which the Crisis Committee organized for this purpose throughout the municipality. The
property of non-Serbs was confiscated and expropriated by the conquering Serb forces.

The military takeover of Foca took only nine days, yet the suffering inflicted on the non-Serbs who remained in
Foca after the initial attack lasted for months thereafter. Non-Serb men were imprisoned in abominable
conditions in detention centers, where they were routinely tortured, beaten, and terrorized. Scores died in the
process, or were summarily executed by Serb forces. Many non-Serb women were held in rape camps
throughout the municipality, where they were systematically sexually assaulted. The ICRC estimates that there
are 588 persons missing from the Foca municipality.(4)The ICTY has publicly indicted nine individuals for rape
as a war crime, and genocide, committed in Foca.(5) Many others who have not yet been indicted were involved
in the planning and commission of war crimes and other systematic human rights abuses in Foca. Many of these
individuals are currently in positions of power in the municipality.

Forces from Serbia and Montenegro

During March 1992, ethnic Serb paramilitary units were arming themselves with the assistance of Serbia and
Montenegro. These units were under the direction and instructions of the Crisis Committee and called
themselves "Serb territorials." The Crisis Committee knew that the local Bosnian Serb forces would not be
strong enough to achieve their aims without outside support, and so arranged for reservists, paramilitaries, and
even regular army units of what was previously called the Yugoslav People's Army from Serbia and Montenegro
to assist the Bosnian Serb forces in conquering the region, and driving out all non-Serbs. Witnesses interviewed
by Human Rights Watch all said that Serbs from outside Bosnia were among the soldiers who were involved in
their arrest, expulsion, detention, or abuse. Numerous victims reported hearing their accents, which were clearly
not the Bosnian "Ijekavski" dialect, but were the Montenegrin or Serbian "Ekavski" dialect, and they described
their different uniforms. Many described the paramilitary soldiers as "Cetniks," (6) with long beards and square
hats. According to the Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992):(7)

Several individuals have been identified in the source materials as those primarily responsible for the attack upon
and ethnic cleansing of Foca. One of them apparently called in additional forces from Niksic, Montenegro.
Bringing the total number of Serbian forces in and around Foca to about 4,000 by the end of April [1992].[sic] (8)

The U. N. Commission of Experts report describes the reported involvement of forces under the direction of
Zeljko Raznatovic "Arkan" and Vojislav Seselj, two extremist paramilitary and political leaders renowned for
having carried out mass murders and brutal "ethnic cleansing" campaigns. The report states:

Arkan and Seselj reportedly deployed soldiers in the county of Foca. Reports also indicate the presence of
Commander Turtle's Units, the Montenegro Guard, the Uzice Corps, and Pero Elez. During the occupation of
Foca by Arkan's men in late April 1992, many bodies were thrown into the river...Seselj's forces and volunteers
were said to have participated in the fighting in the city of Foca, as assistance to the Serbian Democratic Party
forces.(9)

L.K., a woman from Miljevina, a village outside the town of Foca but within the Foca municipality, told Human
Rights Watch that "there were lots of different army groups in the area." L.K. was taken from her home in
Miljevina to the Partizan Sports Hall,(10) where she reported that "groups of Serbs came at night, many Serbs
from Foca, and also many Serbs from Serbia." (11)

E.D., a Bosniak from Foca, reported that he and his family were taken from their house in Foca by Serb
neighbors, on April 13, 1992, and imprisoned in a private house with approximately fifty-five other persons.
After being held captive for five days in this house, E.D. reported that seven or eight men from Montenegro, in
uniforms, took twenty-five of them to the KP Dom prison. E.D. said that he knew that these men were from
Montenegro by their pronunciation and by the fact that he did not recognize any of them. He claimed that the
uniforms the Montenegrin troops were wearing were newer than those of the local Bosnian Serb forces and that
they had all kinds of equipment, including knives, bombs on their belts, and automatic rifles, whereas the local
Bosnian Serb forces did not have such equipment and had old uniforms. (12) G.F., a Bosniak woman from Foca,
reported that she was taken from her home and detained in the Partizan Sports Hall in September 1992 by
"reservists" in uniforms. She said they wore gloves and hats, were speaking the Serbian dialect, and she deduced
they were thus not from Bosnia. According to G.F., these reservists were well armed and there were female
soldiers among them.

We were held for half a day in Partizan, and then [one of ] these Serbs from Serbia told us he was sorry that we
are all "children" because he will have to kill us. They confiscated all our jewelry. We were hugging each other
and very scared. They said, "Now Balija [a derogatory term for Muslims] you will go swim in the Drina."...They
took us to Mrdalici, and there we met Cetniks with long beards.(13)

Detention Centers

Once the military takeover in Foca was underway, a campaign of terror was unleashed on the non-Serb civilian
population. Large numbers of Muslims and Croats were tortured, "disappeared," raped, or executed and those
who survived were expelled from their homes.

Livade

According to several witnesses, when the aggression began, most non-Serb men were first taken to Livade, a
military facility in Foca which was the former JNA headquarters. Livade is near the village of Aladza, the site of
the Aladza mosque. I.H., who was also a survivor of the Livade detention center, explained:

The program of attack on Foca started from a few directions. Most important is from the direction of Livade,
where they established their military garrison, and in this garrison was the first camp. From April 11 to April 17,
1992, they started bringing people from the town and most from the local community of Aladza. The first
prisoners in Foca, including myself and approximately 150-200 others, spent these first five days in Livade, and
then we were all taken from there to KP Dom.(14)
According to I.H., Veselin Cancar was the commander of the facility during his imprisonment.

Livade was used during the whole time between April 1992 and August or September 1992 as a transit center
where prisoners were taken for a few days and then transferred to other camps or transit centers...the whole
offensive came from that direction....Life in Livade was very difficult. We had no organized meals, food was
distributed randomly. There were no hygienic conditions, and the accommodations were wet and full of water.
When they first brought people to Livade, they separated the men, women, and children. Later, the men were
taken to KP Dom and the women were prepared to be sent out of Foca. Veselin [Cancar] was the commander,
but the Serb Guard was there, as were Serb territorials and reservists from the former JNA. (15)

I.H. said Veselin Cancar was also the commander of the local Serbian territorial forces, which were involved in
the main offensive against Foca. Veselin Cancar was arrested by the Bosnian government after the war and tried
on charges of war crimes. He was sentenced to eleven years in prison for his involvement in the crimes in Foca
and is currently serving his sentence in the Sarajevo Central Prison.

KP Dom

The central prison in Foca, called the Kazneno-Popravni Dom (KP Dom--Home for Criminal Rehabilitation)
was, prior to the war, the central prison for the entire southeastern region of Bosnia and Hercegovina and one of
the largest prisons in the former Yugoslavia. The Crisis Committee decided that the prison would serve as an
appropriate detention facility and, by the middle of April 1992, non-Serb men from all over the Foca
municipality and surrounding areas, as well as some Serb men who opposed the takeover, had been arrested and
were being brutalized in this prison.

The office of Mayor Ibro Poplata, the exiled Bosniak mayor of Foca, reported that there are 456 missing persons
whom the municipal government-in-exile knows are missing from the Foca municipality,(16) however, the ICRC
has received 588 reports of missing relatives from survivors. (17) The vast majority of these missing persons--
some 354 men according to the Foca municipal government-in-exile, which represents the former residents of
Foca--were "disappeared" from KP Dom.

Reports from survivors of KP Dom are laden with gruesome tales of starvation, torture, intimidation and threats,
beatings, and "disappearances." E.D., a survivor of KP Dom, reported to Human Rights Watch:

I was taken to KP Dom on April 17. Every night at 8:00 they would come to the rooms to take people for
interrogations. There were 730 people in KP Dom during the time I was there....Miodrag Koprivica came with
two other guards and police officers to people's rooms every night at 8:00 and called people's names from a
list...They would take some people to the former meeting room and beat them, and around 12 midnight we heard
shooting and these people usually never returned...Of the eighteen men in my room, only eight were left at the
end. On average more that half of each room was killed or "disappeared." (18)

I.H., who was imprisoned in KP Dom for more than six months, described his experience:

KP Dom opened [as a detention center] on April 18. Men from the ages of seventeen to eighty-five were held
there. When I was brought there, there were already a hundred to 150 there. They were mostly from Donje Polje,
the area around KP Dom....During April and May, they brought around 600 men to KP Dom. Around 400 of
them were taken away and "disappeared." I think they were all killed. This happened between April and
December 1992. They were taken away in small groups, mostly at night, and sometimes during the day by the
guards, with the excuse of taking them to be exchanged....The army made decisions about what would take
place. There were lists of people and prisoners were taken from the lists. (19)

I.H. told Human Rights Watch that one copy of the list of prisoners was in the hands of the director of the
facility. He further told Human Rights Watch that the military decided who would be taken away. I.H. also said
that Milorad Krnojelac was the manager (upravnik) of the facility and that sometimes the police from the town,
then under the command of Dragan Gagovic (indicted by the ICTY), came to take people away:

Regarding prisoners, civilian and military structures collaborated closely. For example, for each Serb soldier
who was killed on the front line, a few Muslim prisoners would be taken away and killed...The days Serb
soldiers were killed on the front line, the Serb soldiers were very angry. These were the worst days. We got less
food. We knew what had happened by the way they treated us. After a couple of days burying their soldiers, they
took [away] prisoners.

We had very poor food, a little tea and a little bread, three times per day, and some macaroni in water....There
were no washing facilities. We lost weight, and had psychophysical symptoms. We had difficulty walking, pain
in our muscles, and dizziness. When this happened, the guards would joke.

People were consistently taken away in small or big groups. The first big group was between June 13 and 30,
1992. Thirty-five people were taken at night. Before that men were taken at night and tortured. After that they
"disappeared." Some of the men [who "disappeared" in that time period] were Krunoslav Marjanovic, a Croat
reporter and television mechanic, Mate Ivanovic, who was a nurse, and Adil Granov. There were prisoners with
heart diseases, there were minors, there were elderly....During the nights, when people were brought to the
prison, some of them were in torture chambers, and when they were taken away, they were also tortured. The
guards and military police were torturing them.(20)

The torture rooms which I.H. spoke of are shown on a map of the layout of the KP Dom prison, provided to
Human Rights Watch by a former Foca official and attached as Appendix I to this report. The U.S. Department
of State reported in its Seventh Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia about a fifty-nine-year-old
Bosniak male who was taken with his son and eighteen others to KP Dom:

A 59-year old Bosnian Muslim from Foca was at home on April 27, 1992, when Serbian special forces entered
his home and forced him and his son outside. The soldiers wore camouflage uniforms and black headbands and
were complete strangers to him. He assumed they came from Serbia because they spoke in Ekavski dialect. The
witness, his son, and eighteen other men from the neighborhood were taken by buses to the local KP Dom.....The
Serbs running the camp kept written records and biographic files on all those interned....Those running the center
instilled fear in the Muslim prisoners by selecting certain prisoners for beatings. From his window in Room 13,
the witness saw prisoners regularly being taken to a building where beatings were conducted. The building was
close enough for him to hear the screams of those who were being beaten....From his window in Room 13, he
saw prisoners covered with blood, leaving the building.(21)

F.E., another Bosniak survivor of KP Dom, told Human Rights Watch he fled from his home in a village outside
Foca when the Serb forces took over the Foca municipality. When he and his son returned a few weeks later they
found their house had been burned down:(22)

A Serb army tank was going by, with buses and cars behind it. We tried to hide behind the house. The last car
stopped and four men got out of the car. They were all in black, they had bombs on them and masks on their
faces. They said "hands up!" and they asked us "what the fuck are you doing here, you Ustashe, (23) where all is
burned down?" They put us in the car and brought us to Ustlikolina.

The four men [in black] brought me before [the police commander], who knows me from before because I had a
little cafe in Ustikolina before the war. My son had escaped via the bridge and had fled back to Gorazde. [One
man] was wearing his police uniform...his younger brother was there with him, also wearing a police
uniform...they told me to get into the car. [He] said, "we have to take you to KP Dom for interrogation." They
took me to KP Dom on May 15.

One woman and two men in civilian clothing interrogated me in KP Dom. They asked me questions about the
army in Gorazde and how I got back to my house from there...They had all my documentation in front of
them....They took me to room 18 and did not mistreat me. There were eighty people in room 18, and it was full. I
heard at the time that there were 713 people in KP Dom. I knew everyone in the room...On September 17, they
took thirty-five people ostensibly to pick plums, and they never came back. On September 25, they took twenty-
five people, and they never came back. Among those who did not come back were Husein Cengic, Eso Dzano,
Rasim Muslic, whose father they had killed in his home. Later they took Muradif Music and nineteen others.
That was on October 9, 1992. They never came back...Those who were known to have been in the army in
Gorazde were beaten. The others were not beaten. They did not beat me.

My friend had been taken to the basement where he was beaten. I asked...one of the guards if I could see my
friend. He said yes. He was a friend of my brother and that is why he did this favor. He said I can see him for
two minutes. He [the friend] was all bruised and black....[the guard] was next to me. [My friend] put his hand in
his pocket and gave me money for cigarettes. They had not taken his money from him. In the same room where
[my friend] was, there was one guy hanging one meter off the floor at the wall. Ropes held him up there and on
one side there was hot water falling on one of his shoulders and on the other side there was cold water and he
was crying. I did not know him but he was suffering a lot. It was really hot water, and he was really suffering
and he was screaming. [The guard] told me not to tell anyone what I saw. (24)

The United Nations Commission of Experts report describes the KP Dom detention facility in detail, including
the physical facility, the number of guards and the uniforms worn, and confirms the allegations of
"disappearances."

One source reported that on 19 May 1992, there were 130 Muslim detainees in the Foca men's prison, and
between 19 and 25 May, 400 new detainees were brought in. Inmates estimated at least 36 prisoners were killed
by guards in June. Guards would typically enter a cell between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., call out inmates'
names, inform them that they were to be exchanged, and take them away. These prisoners were never heard from
again. Approximately 200 inmates were taken from the prison for unknown reasons in late August, most inmates
believed they were killed by guards. Thirty-five prisoners were taken away on 15 September and 12 more at the
end of the same month, allegedly for prisoner exchange. Prisoners released since that time failed to locate any of
these men. Prisoners on the fourth floor observed guards carrying blankets containing what seemed to be human
bodies and dumping them in the Drina River.(25)

The United States submitted information on violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions in the Foca region to the U.N. Security Council on October 22, 1992. In their Seventh
Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, the U.S. Department of State reports on the case of a forty-
year-old woman witness to the killing of Bosniaks from Foca in early July 1992:

One night at 9 PM, the witness saw Serbs leading a group of seven people up to the "Tito" sign on a hill
overlooking Foca. She said [that] group was driven up the hill in a yellow mini-van...She saw the Serbs make the
group strip, take their money and the identification cards, and murder them with knives. The bodies were thrown
in the Drina River. During the next four to five days, the witness saw the same yellow mini-van bringing people
to the same site where they were slaughtered in the same fashion. She saw some bodies thrown in the Drina, and
others thrown into [a] truck that were driven away. The witness said the van came from the direction of the men's
prison at the KP Dom and she suspected [that] the victims were prisoners from that camp. She believes there is a
mass grave under the "Tito" sign, and two or three mass graves near the outdoor stadium in Foca. (26)

KP Dom Personnel

Milorad Krnojelac - Wartime: Manager ("Upravnik") of KP Dom (April 1992-September 1993)

/ Current: Indicted, Arrested by SFOR troops on June 15, 1998 and transferred to the Tribunal in The Hague

According to reports survivors of KP Dom, Krnojelac, a teacher of mathematics by profession, was the manager
of KP Dom until September 1993.(27) Human Rights Watch estimates that a large proportion of those who
"disappeared" from KP Dom (estimated at 354 by former Foca municipal leaders in exile,) "disappeared" during
the time of Krnojelac's tenure. (28)

I.H. informed Human Rights Watch that Krnojelac had substantial decision-making power during the period
between April 18, 1992 and September 1993.(29) Similarly, the Bosnian government State Commission for
Gathering Facts on War Crimes (hereinafter State War Crimes Commission), which conducted extensive
interviews with survivors of the takeover of Foca as they were fleeing the town, identified Krnojelac as the
manager of KP Dom during this time period.(30) Krnojelac, a teacher in a primary school in Foca until June 15,
1998, was arrested by French SFOR troops on that date, based on a sealed indictment by ICTY in the Hague. He
is currently in the Hague awaiting trial.(31)

Miodrag Koprivica - Wartime: Interrogator in KP Dom / Current: Police Inspector

Three survivors of the KP Dom detention center, E.D., F.E., and I.H., identified Koprivica to Human Rights
Watch as an interrogator in KP Dom during their detention there.(37) Interrogations were a routine part of daily
life in KP Dom, and all of the KP Dom survivors interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported having been
interrogated repeatedly. Someone in the position of routinely interrogating prisoners in KP Dom would have
been likely to know the identities of many of the detainees, and would also have been in a position to know
about the fates of many of those who "disappeared." E.D. informed Human Rights Watch that, "Koprivica came
every night at eight [and] called people's names from a list, and those never came back." (38)

I.H. told Human Rights Watch that he was in the next room when Koprivica was interrogating and beating a
Bosniak prisoner named Adnan Berbergic. I.H. said that when Berbergic emerged from the interrogation room,
he saw that he was badly injured by the beating and that later Berbergic told him that Koprivica had beaten him.
Berbergic later "disappeared." Koprivica is currently a police inspector in Foca and is one of the suspects
interviewed by IPTF for having allegedly participated in the beatings of two individuals in detention in
December 1997. No arrests have been made in connection with that case. (For details, see Zoran Vladicic below,
and also section on Human Rights Abuses Against the Current Population of Foca.) (39)

Vojo Starevic - Wartime: Criminal police inspector, interrogator in KP Dom / Current: Police officer

According to one source, Starevic was a criminal police inspector prior to the war and was the chief of the
criminal police department during the war as well.(40) According to E.D. and F.E., two survivors of KP Dom,
Starevic interrogated prisoners in KP Dom during the period of their detention. (41)It is likely he would have been
in a position to know about the fate of many of the prisoners who "disappeared" from the detention center.
According to two staff members of international organizations in the region, Starevic is still working as a police
officer in Foca.(42)

Miro Burilo - Wartime: Guard, KP Dom / Current: Uncertain; Possibly Same

According to four witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, Burilo was a guard at KP Dom during the
time of their detention. F.E., who was imprisoned in KP Dom, reported that Burilo was in the interrogation room
when he was brought to KP Dom in 1992. According to F.E., Burilo and two other guards told him to empty his
pockets, and took 300 DM, some food, his ring, and his watch. Then Burilo and the other guards took F.E. to a
room where he was kept during his detention in KP Dom. F.E. said he encountered Burilo many times during his
stay in the detention center:

Burilo was the worst one in KP Dom. He couldn't wait for someone to beat up. I saw when Burilo brought
Fikret(43) into KP Dom....Fikret was taken later to the basement and beaten...I heard that Burilo is still working in
KP Dom...In August 1992 at 9 p.m. [nightly] Zoran [name withheld] and Burilo called many people from many
rooms. They took people and beat them, we heard them scream. For more than one hour they beat them. They
were beating people always in the basement, so you could hear them screaming. We were sitting in the corner
afraid in our room. After more than one hour everything stopped and was quiet. We never slept at night because
we were so scared. One morning they took us room by room out to the bridge and those people who had been
taken that night all had their heads cut off. There were nine bodies and the heads were separated from the
bodies....I recognized some of them as Munib Vejz, Salem Bico, and Ekrem Dzelilovic. (44)

E.D., who was detained in KP Dom and witnessed the abuses which took place there, named Burilo as "one of
the most ugly. He mistreated everyone." (45) Another Bosniak survivor also reported that Burilo was one of the
guards in the detention center during his entire imprisonment there, which was for fifteen months. (46) H.G., a
witness who was in KP Dom during late 1995 and early 1996, said Burilo was still a guard there during his
imprisonment.(47) According to two witnesses from Foca, Burilo is still a guard in KP Dom today.(48) Human
Rights Watch was unable to corroborate this allegation.

Slavko Koroman - Wartime: Commander of Guards in KP Dom / Current: Uncertain; Possibly Police Officer

According to E.D., H.G., and I.H., all survivors of KP Dom who were interviewed by Human Rights Watch,
Koroman was a police officer who worked in the KP Dom prison before the war. During the war, according to
these witnesses, Koroman was the commander of the guards in KP Dom.(49)Someone in the position of
supervisor of the guards in KP Dom would be responsible for overseeing their actions, which often included
mistreatment, torture, and beatings as described in the above section. By the end of the war, according to H.G.,
who was imprisoned in late 1995 and remained in KP Dom until April 1996, Koroman was no longer working as
a guard, but instead returned to his position in the police in Foca, yet continued to visit KP Dom. (50) The Bosnian
government State War Crimes Commission alleges that Koroman was the commander of the guards in KP Dom
in its bulletin of 1993, and includes Koroman in its list of persons allegedly responsible for war crimes in Foca.
Human Rights Watch was unable to confirm that Koroman is still a police officer in Foca. According to B.A., a
staff member of an international organization in the region, he owns the "Roma" coffeehouse in the town. (51)

Zoran Vladicic - Wartime: Police Interrogator in KP Dom / Current: Head of Criminal Investigations Unit for
Regional Public Security Center (Ministry of the Interior)

H.G., a survivor of KP Dom who was imprisoned there late in the war, told Human Rights Watch that Vladicic
was a police inspector in the prison during his time there. He said Vladicic and other police officers who worked
in the prison transported the prisoners back and forth between the prison and Brioni, a farm where prisoners were
used as forced labor.(52) E.D., an inmate of KP Dom from April 1992 until the end of the year, told Human
Rights Watch that Vladicic interrogated the prisoners in KP Dom. E.D. believed that Vladicic had interrogated
all prisoners in the detention center at least once if not more often. He stated:

All prisoners had interrogations with Zoran. He did not beat me during interrogations because his father worked
where I worked [before the war]. But others came back bloody... Prisoners would have to go to interrogations
many times, but I only had to go once.(53)

The Bosnian government State War Crimes Commission also alleges that Vladicic was an "interrogator in Foca
prison."(54)

Vladicic is reportedly responsible, along with Miodrag Koprivica (see above), for the beatings of two detainees
in the Foca police station in December 1997. One of the detainees was severely wounded by the beatings, and
neither received medical assistance until three days later, when IPTF interviewed them during a routine
inspection of the prison. Human Rights Watch viewed photographs of this detainee, taken by IPTF three days
after his beating, in which the detainee's entire back from his head to his knees was severely bruised and bloody.
IPTF informed Human Rights Watch that it had identified Vladicic as one of those who committed the beatings.
According to the IPTF monitor, Vladicic claimed that he and Koprivica were in Montenegro on the day of the
beatings. However, IPTF requested proof from the border police at the Montenegrin border and was informed
that there was no record of their crossing. IPTF plans to present its findings in this investigation to the court in
Trebinje. (For more details of this case, see section on Attacks Against the Current Foca Population, below.) (55)

Partizan Sports Hall

The Partizan Sports Hall was originally used as a staging area for women and children who were to be deported
from Foca; however, for at least several months in 1992, the hall became a rape camp where women endured
being raped dozens, if not hundreds, of times over the period of their detention. Located next to the police station
in the center of town, residents of Foca soon began to realize that Partizan was being used as the site of torture
and killings by Bosnian Serb "guards"; though many reported alerting officers at the police station about what
was happening in the building next door, local police, rather than intervening, continued to send citizens to the
sports hall as if it were still merely a deportation center. (56) "Women who were kept there were taken to be raped
every evening," one survivor who spent two months in "Partizan" reported. "What they went through can simply
not be described."(57)

Women and girls were also held in the Foca high school for different periods of time during the summer of 1992,
from where they were usually transferred to Partizan. According to the U.N. Commission of Experts report:

On or about 3 July, 500 "Cetniks" surrounded the forest near Mesaje, where the remaining Muslims [after the
April takeover and the mass imprisonment of non-Serb men] had fled, and killed and captured those within.
Approximately seventy women and children and five old men were taken to a collection camp located in the
high school in Foca....All seventy were kept there from 3 July to 17 July 1992. All were forced to stay in a
former classroom ten meters by ten meters. They were able to use mattresses and blankets left behind by Serbian
soldiers who had occupied the school earlier.....All women between ages fifteen and forty-five were continuously
raped by Serbian military members.....On 17 July all those detained at the high school were transferred to the
Partizan Sports Hall in the centre of Foca on Samoborska Street....They slept on the floor without mattresses or
blankets.... "Cetniks" continued to rape women as they did earlier at the school. (58)

According to the U.S. Department of State's Seventh Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, on July 3,
1992, approximately thirty-six women were reportedly taken from their village in the Foca municipality to Buk
Bijela, which was a construction site with barracks for workers, where they were systematically raped. One of
the women reported that, after having been held there for several hours and raped:

The group was then taken to Foca high school where they spent eight days. Every night, three to five women
were taken away and often returned severely beaten. They were taken by truck to the Partisan sport center in the
middle of downtown Foca for forty days....This group from [this village] was the first group to be interned at
Partisan, but more came later, eventually totaling seventy-four detainees....During her time at Partisan, the
witness [said] the "soldiers" entered day and night to led [sic] away young women. One twenty-four-year-old
woman was raped in front of the entire group of detainees. [sic] (59)

G.F., a Bosniak woman from Miljevina, told Human Rights Watch that she remained in her house until
September 3, 1992. On that date:

They took 250 of us, women and children, to Partizan. We were taken there by bus. Reservists came to get us, in
uniforms. They wore gloves and hats. Those who took us were Serbs from Serbia speaking the Serb dialect.
They were well armed. There were women among the soldiers well armed as well. I was in Partizan only from
12 noon until 4 p.m. the next day.(60)

In a separate interview, L.K., another woman taken with G.F. to Partizan, described in greater detail what they
witnessed in Partizan during their brief stay there:(61)

They took us by bus into [downtown] Foca to Partizan. "Zeko" Vukovic (62) was the leader of the group which
took us to Partizan at 12 noon on September 3. Two hundred and fifty women, children, elderly and disabled.
Our imprisonment was because they [the Serbs] had lost territory near Gorazde and wanted revenge. We
received news that another group of Muslim civilians were killed in "Focanske Jabuka." They kept us alive.

Partizan was a sports hall, they beat us, raped us, no electricity, no water, we slept on the floor. (63) Groups of
Serbs came at night. There were many Foca Serbs and also many Serbs from Serbia. [They] mistreated women,
beat women, tortured us. One woman recognized a Serb from Foca and asked him for help, he said to get some
women together and he will take care of them the next day. They took these women the next day up to Velecevo
in Brioni and mistreated them, raped them. There were five of them. Four returned, but the fifth did not.

Survivors of Partizan who were later interviewed in refugee camps outside of Bosnia described experiencing
rape as a systematic ritual. Several of these women reported that they had been raped over one hundred times
during the period of their imprisonment. One woman told Newsday journalist Roy Gutman that she had been
raped approximately one hundred and fifty times during her detention in Partizan. Another reported having been
raped up to six times a night.(64) Though women were sometimes raped in front of other prisoners in the hall,
they were routinely taken to locations outside the hall to be gang-raped by groups of soldiers, often in deserted
houses or apartments nearby. One woman who hid in an apartment close to the hall witnessed the same soldiers
removing women from the hall every day; she estimated that there were fifty soldiers involved in the daily
raping of prisoners.(65) Another woman tells of being taken to an outdoor stadium where she was gang-raped by
uniformed soldiers. "I counted 29 of them. Then I lost consciousness."(66) When she woke up, she was taken back
to the camp; one woman in a refugee camp in Kirklareli, Turkey, however, remembered four young girls, three
of whom were teenagers, who never returned to Partizan after having been taken out one night. "When they take
you away, they may kill you. So if you are raped, you feel lucky. At least you're alive." (67)

Partizan was an active rape camp for several months during mid-1992, and though there were many warnings
about the existence of the camp, the reports were ignored. Locally, according to international journalists,
complaints made by citizens to the police station next door were noted but never acted upon. One woman who
was raped was told directly, "Get out, we can't help you," by a Bosnian Serb police officer in the station. (68) On a
grander scale, the international community also turned a blind eye. At the same time that Partizan became a rape
camp, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic asked French President Francois Mitterrand to see to it that the
international community investigated the rape camps in Foca. The request was met with silence. Later,
Mitterrand denied that such an appeal had ever been made. (69)

The practice of rape as "ethnic cleansing" made the Bosniak women of Foca into a deliberately targeted group.
One woman interviewed in a refugee camp noted that the group of men who raped her and thirteen other women
with whom she was imprisoned, "were a kind of military police [that] did nothing but rape. It was all organized;
they had a group for raping and a group for killing." (70)

Human Rights Watch is aware of allegations of rape occurring at the camp at least until September 1992.

The Foca Hospital

One witness who worked in the Foca hospital reported to Human Rights Watch that many people in Foca fled to
the hospital when the attack started, thinking that the hospital would be a safe place:

However, the "Serb territorials" supported by the Cetniks from Serbia occupied even the hospital around April
15, 1992, and did not allow anyone to leave the hospital, so that all men of military ability were taken from the
hospital to KP Dom--doctors, nurses, and patients. The process of taking male patients from the hospital to KP
Dom lasted until September 1992.... From the hospital, they took seven male nurses, and four doctors, and many
other men....Among them was Dr. Aziz Torlak, who "disappeared" from KP Dom on July 7, 1993...A number of
other medical staff stayed in the hospital for a longer time until June or July 1992, and after were taken to home
detention, and later deported through Montenegro. Many of them survived. (71)

Former staff of the Foca hospital told Human Rights Watch that as early as one month before the takeover, the
Bosnian Serb medical staff of the hospital began transferring medical supplies from the warehouse of the main
hospital to a medical clinic that they were setting up exclusively for Serbs, in anticipation of what was to come.
The Serb hospital was set up in Velecevo,(72) the site of the headquarters of the Crisis Committee, and later the
sight of the detention center for women. According to reports of former hospital personnel, Dr. Radovan Mandic,
who before the war was a doctor in the Foca hospital, was director of this ad hoc Serb hospital.

N.M, a nurse from Foca who was forced to stay in the hospital when Serb paramilitary forces took it over, told
Human Rights Watch that:

From April 8 until April 12 the "Cetniks" entered and took over the hospital. Until that day we worked relatively
normally, we had some reserve, we did not have any information about what was going on outside. We did not
know anything, we were all in the hospital and did not go anywhere....the hospital was out of control. There were
sixty children and many mothers. There were thirteen babies without mothers each around two or three months
old. Seven kids were separated from their families. All the rest were mothers and children...The mothers were
sleeping on the floor. They did not have anything. There were four nurses working for all those children. We
could not take care of all of them....We were hungry, there was very little food. The bread was so hard that the
kids lost their teeth while trying to eat it...we could hear the shooting. (73)

N.M. reported that several Bosniaks had been killed by Serbs behind the hospital. Similarly, the U.N.
Commission of Experts, in a special report on mass graves in the Foca municipality, also reported that:

On 20 April [1992], several Muslims were taken behind the hospital, executed, after being found guilty of
possessing weapons, and buried in a grass field behind the hospital. Muslim Foca residents believe that because
the field had an unbroken grass surface before hostilities, and afterward it was full of overturned sod, the soldiers
were using the area to bury numerous bodies.(74)

According to two former hospital employees, Dr. Radovan Mandic became director of the hospital for Serbs that
was set up near Velecevo in Foca prior to and during the takeover in March and April 1992. Dr. Mandic and his
associates began transporting medical supplies from the main hospital in Foca up to this then-newly established
facility in March 1992, in preparation for the Serb takeover of Foca and the subsequent takeover of the hospital.
This Serb hospital was set up to ensure that Serbs would get medical care, while the main hospital was taken
over by Serb forces on April 15, 1992. The Bosniak medical staff and patients were held in the hospital for days
on end, and many of the Bosniak male patients and staff were transferred to KP Dom, from where many
"disappeared."(75) One former staff member of the hospital in Foca did claim that Dr. Mandic was responsible for
overseeing the transfer to detention centers such as KP Dom and Partizan of all the non-Serb medical staff of the
Foca hospital.(76) (For details on crimes committed in the Foca hospital, see above.) Human Rights Watch was
unable to ascertain whether Dr. Mandic left Bosniak staff and medical patients in the hospital on his own accord
or under duress.
The Bosnian government State War Crimes Commission alleges that Dr. Mandic was a "member of the SDS war
HQ" (what Human Rights Watch refers to as the Crisis Committee), but Human Rights Watch was unable to
corroborate this allegation.(77) Mandic was a candidate in the September 1997 Foca municipal elections, and,
according to one local and one international source, is currently working as a specialist in the Foca hospital.

Other Unofficial Camps

Aside from the larger public detention centers and several well-known private detention centers, there were
many cases of detention of non-Serbs which have gone unreported. Several witnesses reported to Human Rights
Watch that they were held in a house for short periods of time ranging from a few days to a few weeks before
being transferred either to KP Dom or to the Partizan Sports Hall, or before being expelled from Foca. For
example, E.D., a Bosniak from Foca, reported that

I was imprisoned on April 13, 1992. I was arrested from my cousin's house, where I was living temporarily. It
was close to my house. Our Serb neighbors gathered us from the area and put my whole family in a house with
fifty to fifty-five others. There were four or five men, all in Serb army uniforms. The boss of these men was
Zoran Milicevic. I knew him because he was my neighbor. We spent altogether five days in that house. On the
sixth night they separated the women and children and sent them home, telling them not to move anywhere but
to go directly home. The men stayed alone in the house. The next morning, seven or eight Montenegrin men in
uniforms came and took twenty-five of us to KP Dom. The house where we had been held was called the "Zait
Sandal" house, after the owner, who was not there while we were held there.(78)

In the U.S. Department of State's Seventh Report, a Bosniak woman from Foca states that:

A forty-year-old Muslim woman was at home on July 14, 1992, in Foca when twenty-six Serbian soldiers--
claiming to be Seseljovci(79) from Trebinje--came to her door. She said that she did not know most of the soldiers
because their accents were not local, but that two Foca Serbs had led them to the Muslim homes. The soldiers hit
the witness on the head twice with a police truncheon, asked for her husband, and ordered her to go outside.
They sliced the neck of a 16-year-old boy with a rusty knife while asking for his father; the boy was not
seriously injured. Then they ordered the Muslims to kiss an Orthodox cross, which they all did.

After separating the men from the women and children, they took the later group to the police station. As the
group was leaving, the soldiers burned the Muslim houses. The women and children were separated into four
groups at the police station and taken to separate houses confiscated from Muslim owners. The witness was
placed with a group of 28 women...They were kept in this house for 27 days.

Day and night, soldiers came to the house taking two to three women at a time. They were four to five guards at
all times, all local Foca Serbs.....the women were ordered to strip and soldiers entered the homes taking the ones
they wanted. The age of women ranged from 12 to 60. Frequently the soldiers would seek out mother and
daughter combinations. Many of the women were severely beaten during the rapes.

The witness was selected twice.....While the witness was being raped, her rapist told her, "You should have
already left this town. We'll make you have Serbian babies who will be Christians." Two soldiers raped her at
that time; five soldiers raped [an] 18-year-old girl in full view of the witness.....The witness also said she was
forced to drink alcohol and eat pork at the rape house.[sic](80)

Miljevina

Miljevina is a village in the Foca municipality, where many war crimes and gross human rights abuses
reportedly took place during the takeover. According to several persons from the town who were interviewed by
Human Rights Watch, Miljevina had its own power structure which, although under the authority of the Crisis
Committee in central Foca, also made decisions on its own regarding the "ethnic cleansing" of the non-Serb
residents of Miljevina. Bosniak and Croat citizens of Miljevina were arrested and detained for short periods of
time in the Miljevina police station.

Miljevina is the site of the Miljevina coal mine, which prior to the war provided coal for most of the surrounding
region. Prisoners from KP Dom were allegedly taken to work in the coal mine during the war. In late 1996,
Human Rights Watch received allegations that non-Serb individuals were still being held prisoner at several
locations in the Foca municipality, one of which was the Miljevina mine. The allegations suggested that such
persons may have been or may be held under false Serb names in order to hide their identities. In-depth
investigations into these allegations not only in Miljevina but in the entire region were inconclusive. However, as
long as the Foca authorities continue to obstruct SFOR's and IPTF's free and unlimited access to any and all
alleged places of detention--access they are required to provide under the Dayton Accords--these allegations may
never be totally disproven and the possibility, though slight, remains that persons may still be held.

Four witnesses from Miljevina reported that Pero Elez (81) was the head of the Bosnian Serb military in Miljevina.
They also said that a local crisis committee was established in Miljevina to organize and direct the "ethnic
cleansing" campaign and the takeover of Miljevina, and that the committee headquarters was located in the
Motel Miljevina.

K.J., a man from the village of "Poljica," located very near Miljevina, informed Human Rights Watch that
although he escaped from the village as it was being attacked, his aunt and cousin remained in the village and
witnessed the attack. Although these relatives of K.J. refused to speak to Human Rights Watch representatives
out of fear, K.J. alleged that his aunt had seen dead bodies of eleven civilians, which remained in the village after
the Serb army pulled out. The aunt and cousin both alleged to K.J. that fifteen elderly persons had stayed in the
village, unable to escape, and were never heard from again.

Mico Olovic - Wartime: Miljevina Chief of Police, Current: Same

Olovic was the chief of police of Miljevina during the war. According to G.F., L.K., K.J., and M.L., (82) all former
residents of Miljevina interviewed by Human Rights Watch, Olovic, as the chief of police, supervised the
Miljevina police in their round up of non-Serbs. Those detained were frequently beaten in the Miljevina police
station/jailhouse and transferred to various detention centers that had been established in the Foca municipality.
Others were expelled from the region. According to reports from these survivors, those non-Serbs from
Miljevina who were expelled or transferred to detention facilities first passed through the Miljevina police
station/jailhouse. As chief of police, Olovic held a position in which he would be expected to have been aware of
and directly involved in organizing such transfers. The fact that serious crimes may have been committed by
those under Olovic's command raises concerns about Olovic's own knowledge of or larger role in those crimes,
thereby necessitating a thorough investigation.

G.F., a woman from Miljevina, described the first few days of the takeover of Miljevina.

The Serbs surrounded us in all our houses. They told my husband he could not leave the house. On April 8 and 9,
I was with my daughter, son-in-law, and grandchild. We could not go out. We stayed in the house. My husband
stayed in the house for ten days. Mico Olovic was the commander of the police, but he did not come. I can't
remember the name of the guy who took my husband. Two [men] came to take my husband...on May 2,
1992...one was a policeman and one was a reservist. They took my husband in a police car. Fifteen days later we
went to visit him [in KP Dom]. We saw him for five minutes and a guard was with him. (83)

G.F. never saw her husband again.

L.K., another witness from Miljevina, reported to Human Rights Watch that after her father was arrested and
taken to KP Dom, she hid her own husband in the basement:

Krsto and Zeljko Skakavac came to arrest my husband on June 9, 1992. They were police, under ...Mico
Olovic....On June 8, Serbs died in a mine field. On June 9, because of that, under Mico's orders, they arrested
thirty-eight people immediately. This always happened each time they lost some of their people....They took my
husband to the police station and later I heard that they transported all of them in private cars and killed all of
them. All thirty-eight were men, fathers and sons. Mico Olovic was in charge of all of this. I don't know under
whose orders [Olovic worked]. He was so good before the war....I never heard anything about my husband again.
I suspect [they are in] a mass grave in Mitrino Vrelo. I was in contact with these women whose husbands and
sons were taken that day. No one got any information about the group. (84)

M.L., another woman from Miljevina, told Human Rights Watch that:
On May 2, 1992, thirty men were taken away from Miljevina. Seventeen of them returned, and the others did
not. The seventeen who returned were taken away for good on May 9, 1992. We know nothing about them after
that.(85)

L.K., whose father was among the thirty men taken from Miljevina on May 2, 1992, described his arrest, which
she witnessed:

My father was arrested on May 2, 1992. Dragan Jovanovic arrested my father. He [Jovanovic] was originally
from Montenegro, but had worked as a cop in Miljevina since a few years before the war. He [my father] was
taken to the police station in Miljevina and from there to KP Dom. On May 15, I got permission from my firm
and from Mico Olovic [chief of police in Miljevina] to visit my father. With me was another woman who was
going to visit her husband and son [in KP Dom]. Her name was Ramiza and her husband's name was Zaim, and
her son's name Zikro. [She was] killed ...in her apartment a couple of days later. Her son and husband are
missing...I saw my father in KP Dom that day. He did not dare to say anything. He was very pale, and I only
stayed five minutes. They did not let me give him the food I'd brought for him. There was a cop standing with us
at the time.....I never saw my father again.(86)

Two other witnesses from Miljevina, K.J., and M.L., named Rade Draskovic as one of the police officers in
Miljevina working under the authority of Mico Olovic. (87) K.J., a Bosniak man from a village just outside
Miljevina, informed Human Rights Watch that his father told him he had been arrested by Draskovic, a police
officer in Miljevina, who took him to the police station in Miljevina, from where he was imprisoned in KP
Dom. K.J.'s father survived his detention, but was unwilling to meet with Human Rights Watch in person. (88)

L.K. described the power structure in Miljevina during the takeover, stating that,

Mico Olovic was the head, he was the chief of police in Miljevina. Krsto and Zeljko Skakavac [worked as police
officers] under...Olovic...Rade Skakavac was a reservist who also worked under Olovic. Olovic was the chief of
police before the war as well. Later on, women were involved too. Ruza Medjo worked under Olovic, as did
Vera Skakavac, who took away people, but who was working under and with Tuta [Janko Janjic, indicted by the
ICTY] and Pero Elez. There was a public house where Vera collected girls, in Miljevina, this was the Karaman
House. (89)

The Karaman House (referred to by the U.N. as the Miljevina Bordello) was used as a detention center in
Miljevina where non-Serb women were allegedly held and systematically raped. The U.N. Commission of
Experts report describes the Karaman House and the involvement of the military under the local command of
Pero Elez.

According to one woman, Pero Elez was the "main Cetnik" in Miljevina. According to her, he knew everyone in
the village and therefore did no harm; however, his soldiers were criminal, and among them the Montenegrins
were supposedly the worst. She stated, though, that it was understood that Elez took five 12 year old girls from
Kalinovik and brought them to what the witness reported as Elez's bordello in Miljevina where they were kept as
concubines.

Another woman describes being taken to a Nusret Karaman's house and held there six months with other young
women and raped. According to another woman, the Miljevina bordello was located in a three story white house
with an orange tile roof, owned by Nusret Karaman, a Muslim who worked in Germany. The bordello was 50
meters from her window across the Bistrica River. Another woman confirmed the existence of the bordello. She,
too, could see it from her home. According to another source, by 3 September 1992, the only Muslims left in
Miljevina were bordello girls. Another source reported that on or about 2 September 1992, 10 girls 12 years-old
or less were being held in the brothel in Miljevina.(90)

According to the Foca municipal government-in-exile, eighty people, including women and children, were killed
in Miljevina during the Serb takeover of the town between April and December 1992. All of these people,
according to the exiled municipal authorities, passed through the Miljevina police station before being sent to
meet their fates. Mico Olovic, as chief of police during that time, should have known about the fate of many of
the eighty, as would anyone in his position.(91)
In fact, the Miljevina police station, under the authority of Olovic, was used as a detention facility itself.
According to the United Nations Commission of Experts,

As in all other villages conquered by the Serb forces, Muslims [in Miljevina] were rounded up and placed in
detention for various amounts of time. Reportedly, the Serbs used the Miljevina jailhouse to imprison all the men
of the village on 11 June 1992....On 20 June 1992, a man was imprisoned at the Miljevina jail and held for seven
days and beaten after which he was used to clear mines. He was forced to drive a car in front of a convoy to clear
a path or at least ensure the location of a safe path through minefields for Serb forces. He was later imprisoned in
KP Dom.(92)

According to international monitors in the region, Mico Olovic is still the chief of police in Miljevina.

Other Participants in the Takeover of Miljevina

Milenko "Zeka" Vukovic - Wartime: Guard at Partizan Sports Hall, Soldier / Current: Uncertain; Possibly
Member of Municipal Executive Board

Prior to the war, Vukovic worked in the coal mine in Miljevina in the accounting department. L.K. and G.F., two
witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, alleged that Vukovic rounded up women and transported them
to the Partizan Sports Hall as part of the "ethnic cleansing" of the non-Serb population in Miljevina during the
war, under the authority of Pero Elez. L.K., a woman from Miljevina, reported that Vukovic headed a group of
Serb soldiers who arrested her and 250 other women, children, elderly, and disabled non-Serbs from Miljevina at
the beginning of September 1992 and transported them to the Partizan Hall, where many were raped and
tortured. She said Zeka Vukovic thereafter stood guard in the hall and that he appeared to be in a position of
authority. She also said that she witnessed five women being taken away on Vukovic's orders on September 4,
1992, from Partizan up to Velecevo, another detention center for women, where she later heard they had been
raped and otherwise mistreated. Four of the five returned to tell the tale. The fifth is missing. (93)

A list of current officials in the Foca municipal government provided to Human Rights Watch by U.N. Civil
Affairs lists a "Milenko Vukovic" as a member of the municipal executive board under President Radojica
Tesevic. Human Rights Watch was unable to confirm that the person is the same as described above. (94)

Nedzo Golubovic - Wartime: Soldier / Current: Unknown

M.L., a Bosniak from a village near Miljevina, alleged Golubovic arrested four Bosniak neighbors, took
them away, and later brought their bodies back to the village where M.L. and other residents of this
village buried them. Although M.L. said she saw Golubovic take away the four Bosniaks and bring back
their bodies, she could not confirm that Golubvovic actually committed the murders. According to M.L.,
these murders took place in May 1992, when Pero Elez was commander of the Bosnian Serb army in
Miljevina. M.L. gave Human Rights Watch the names of the four who were murdered, but for reasons of
security asked that we not name the victims or the village in this report.(95)

Vera Skakavac - Wartime: Officer / Current: Civilian in Miljevina

Vera Skakavac was allegedly involved in arresting women in Miljevina and taking them to the Karaman House
detention center for women. The women held there were allegedly raped systematically during their detention.
K.J., a Bosniak from Miljevina, claimed that Vera Skakavac "gathered girls and took them to the Karaman
detention center."(96) According to a former Miljevina resident, Vera Skakavac worked under and with Tuta
(Janko Janjic, indicted by the ICTY) and Pero Elez in arresting people. This witness said "there was a public
house where Vera collected girls, in Miljevina, the Karaman House." (97) M.L., another witness from Miljevina,
also said that Vera "took young women away to detention centers." (98)

According to a witness from Foca who participated in the September 1997 municipal elections as a member of
the local election commission, Vera Skakavac is still living in Miljevina with her parents.(99)

The Crisis Committee and Its Leaders

In early April 1992, the Crisis Committee for the Municipality of Foca was established with specific
responsibility for planning and carrying out the takeover of the municipality. According
to Newsday correspondent Roy Gutman, the leadership of the Crisis Committee was composed of:

three top associates of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. Velibor Ostojic, a minister in Karadzic's
breakaway government, and two other close aides, Vojislav Maksimovic and Petar Cancar, organized the
military assault in Foca in April 1992 and took charge of the town, even stationing their own guards in front of
the police station.(100)

The crisis committee (Krizni Stab) was a body frequently established in towns throughout the Serb-controlled
territory of Bosnia to coordinate first the takeover of towns by Serbian and Bosnian Serb military forces, and
later the systematic "cleansing" of non-Serb residents from the towns. Crisis committees, made up of Serb
community leaders (typically SDS activists), played a number of roles in facilitating the transition from the
multi-ethnic nature of these towns to "ethnically pure" Bosnian Serb towns. The responsibility of the crisis
committees ranged from organizing the expulsion or "disappearance" of legitimate elected non-Serb officials and
community leaders, to the expropriation of the property of the non-Serb citizens of the town. The actions of the
Prijedor Crisis Committee (Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor) are particularly well documented, and this
committee is the model for the U.N. Commission of Experts' detailing the role of crisis committees within the
context of the takeovers:

I. The concept of the Krizni Štab existed already in military strategic theory in the former Yugoslavia prior to the
wars. The military as such was in a sense always afraid of the people. The military were above the people and
had privileges which easily could lead to the people turning against the military. The military consisted of rather
conservative or reactionary Communists, whereas the people seemed to be progressing towards democracy. The
military wanted to control the people and thus needed to give the people the impression that in actual fact, the
people controlled the military. In this the military, generally speaking, succeeded. The worst case scenario
contained the plan that the military would establish the Krizni Štab. Thus, the military would make sure to have
included in the Krizni Štab people whom they trusted. Trust in this context means loyalty and subordination.

ii. The Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor was involved in the logistic support and production for the army.
The Krizni Štab was an instrument of gaining complete control of the entirety of Opština Prijedor (or over any
other geographic area where a Krizni Štab was proclaimed). Soldiers who worked for the interests of the army
were posted also in industry and other production units to control the production, to gain support, and to control
civilians.

iii. The Krizni Štab also had as its function to arm the Serbs within its operational area. Other functions were to
block communications and make provocations within mixed ethnic settings. The pivotal function, however, was
to voice that the Serbian people as such were threatened by the non-Serbs, the consequence of which was the
urgent need for the JNA to act to protect the people. The idea was to be able to mobilize strategically with the
consent of the people, i.e. to take up positions with artillery and tanks, etc. and soldiers to "defend" the Serbian
people.(101)

Frequently, crisis committees were composed of a combination of military and civilian officials, as was the case
both in Prijedor and in Foca. The civilians were either loyal SDS members, or pre-war officials themselves, or,
in the case of Foca, they were allegedly close associates of then-Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic, who
appointed them to their positions in the Foca Crisis Committee.

In the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights' report to the U.N. Commission of Experts on the fall of
Zvornik,(102) a clear picture of the crisis committee as the administrative center of "ethnic cleansing" emerges.
Before the military takeover of Zvornik, the SDS declared Zvornik a part of the "Autonomous Serbian Region of
Semberija and Majevica" and facilitated through its members the delivery of arms and other military supplies.
This group of activists also formed a "territorial defense" militia which, alongside other official military and
paramilitary groups, terrorized and attacked residents in order to obtain control of the town. Shortly before or
during the military attack, this group of activists became the Crisis Committee of the "Serbian District of
Zvornik."(103)

Following the attack, the "Serbian District of Zvornik" appealed through media outlets to the residents who had
fled, telling them that the violence was over and, less congenially, that they had to return within a matter of
weeks or their property would be turned over to the "Serbian District of Zvornik." Once Bosniaks returned, they
were forced to register their property and from that point, the "Serbian District of Zvornik" operated hand-in-
hand with the "territorial defense" officially to confiscate property, terrorize minority residents, and collect and
deport them from Zvornik.(104) A number of documents were necessary in order for the resident to be able to
leave, all of which were prepared and provided by the "Serbian District of Zvornik." (105)

The Prijedor Crisis Committee achieved a similar degree of coordinated administrative and military control over
Prijedor and surrounding towns. It was sufficiently integrated into that region's military structures to deliver
ultimatums to several villages--including Kozarac and Hambarine--to the effect that unless its various demands
for surrender of arms, a Bosniak police officer, and signatures to a "loyalty pledge" were complied with, the
town would come under military attack. Following noncompliance with the Crisis Committee's ultimatums, both
Kozarac and Hambarine were attacked.(106)The Prijedor Crisis Committee's power extended far beyond the
specifically military, however, ranging from the ability to censor and spread propaganda via local media outlets,
to controlling detention camps. (For a further discussion of the Prijedor Crisis Committee, see Human Rights
Watch/Helsinki (now Human Rights Watch, Europe and Central Asia Division), "The Unindicted: Reaping the
Rewards of 'Ethnic Cleansing,'"A Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 9, no. 1, January 1997.)

The Foca Crisis Committee was no exception. Taking and maintaining control of the town throughout the war, it
acted as the administrative organ for "ethnic cleansing." In April 1993, Karadzic confirmed that Ostojic,
Maksimovic and Cancar "influenced the establishment of civilian authorities" in Foca. (107) According to
interviews with survivors conducted by Human Rights Watch and reports of international journalists, other
members of the Crisis Committee in Foca included Radojica Mladjenovic, president of the Executive Board of
the Foca municipality for most of the post-war period, until the November 1997 Republika Srpska parliamentary
elections; Vojo Bodiroga, civil engineer who was a member of Karadzic's Serb Democratic Party (SDS) in Foca;
and Miro Stanic, who was president of the SDS in Foca. The Crisis Committee reportedly worked in
collaboration with an ex-JNA Colonel Marko Kovac, who was one of the military commanders in the area, and
with Branislav Cosovic, the local commander of the military police.

Under the authority of the Foca Crisis Committee, smaller local crisis committees were set up throughout other
towns and villages in the Foca municipality. Human Rights Watch is aware of other local crisis committees in
Ustikolina and in Miljevina.(108)

As discussed above, the Foca Crisis Committee was established with specific responsibility for organizing and
supervising the takeover of the municipality. Widespread abuses--including summary executions, torture, rape,
"disappearances," and mass expulsions--were essential tools for achieving the goal of an ethnically pure Bosnian
Serb Foca. In other words, terror was the means used to achieve "ethnic cleansing." The members of the Crisis
Committee have been identified by numerous former residents of Foca, as well as by international journalists
who reported on the war, as having overseen actions of the military and civil forces that generated this terror.

While Human Rights Watch is not able to exclude the possibility that individual members of the committee may
have themselves perpetrated abuses, we have obtained no first-hand evidence that would confirm such conduct.
Instead, most of the atrocities were committed by individuals who would have been under the military and/or
political command of the Crisis Committee members.

Membership in the Crisis Committee is a strong indicator that the participating individuals knew or should have
known of the widespread and severe abuses being committed under their watch, and indeed that they may have
been issuing direct orders for the commission of these abuses.

Petko Cancar- Wartime: Mayor of Foca, Leader of Crisis Committee/ Current: Republika Srpska
Minister of Justice

Petar "Petko" Cancar is an attorney by profession. Prior to the war, Cancar was head of the chamber of
municipalities of the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina. He was the wartime mayor of Foca,
and remained in that position until April 1997, when he was appointed judge in the Republika Srpska
constitutional court in Pale. At the time, he was also appointed chairman of the Republika Srpska electoral
commission.

As mayor of Foca during the war, Cancar played a direct and leading role in the planning and execution of the
brutal campaign of terror which took place in Foca. Cancar himself acknowledged that he was a member of the
Foca Crisis Committee and that he was involved in setting up a "Serb" municipality. In 1996, Cancar was
interviewed by a journalist about his involvement in the war:

I came from Sarajevo to Foca on April 4 [1992] before Easter. Already on April 6, the international community
recognized Bosnia as a state. In Foca, Muslims were partying and celebrating....we already knew what was about
to happen, that Foca was meant to be a guinea-pig, a trial case for the establishment of the green route from
Kosovo, through Sandzak to Sarajevo(109)...We formed a parallel Serb municipality in order to stop the threat of
Islam along the Drina. We took care of everything, the defense, the presidency, the Crisis Committee. I was
prepared, in the worst case scenario, to seize power. There were fifteen of us in that Crisis Committee and we
communicated with their headquarters [of the Muslims], but then we took power in order to protect the civilians,
to prevent another genocide like in World War II. This war was caused by Muslims. Just like in World War II,
chaos reigned, but we liberated the town in eight days....I think that the Muslim residents left in the most
civilized way to Montenegro and Macedonia. That was better for both sides. Now all sides have their own leader,
and their own territory, and I would rather not remember everything that happened. (110)

On November 28, 1993, Charlotte Eagar of the Observer (London) met Petko Cancar in his office and spoke to
him about the then-upcoming referendum to be held in Republika Srpska on the Vance-Owen plan.

"We've got fifty-two Muslims here now and they're in the jail [referring to KP Dom]," said the mayor, Petko
Cancar. "Five Serbian soldiers died in the fighting. Ask him. He lost his house; he is here to try to get a new
apartment." Cancar pointed to a dentist waiting in the corner. Eye witness accounts described hundreds slain and
their bodies hurled into the River Drina to float down through Gorazde. "From history, it's a tradition here. For
five years we wouldn't eat fish from the Drina because of the dead Serbian bodies which floated there,' said the
mayor, talking of ancient uprisings and the Second World War. "We are not eating fish at the moment, but that's
because we are too busy to catch any." (111)

The Bosnian government War Crimes Commission regards Cancar as one of the main organizers of the attack on
Foca, along with Maksimovic, Ostojic, and Miro Stanic, SDS president in Foca at the time of the takeover. In
April 1995, Hina News Agency reported that the Bosnian public prosecutor's office had launched investigations
against a list of approximately 100 individuals alleged to be responsible for war crimes, including Cancar, and
that the material collected was reportedly sent to the ICTY in the Hague. (112)

Cancar himself readily admits having been an active member of the Foca Crisis Committee--a committee that
had primary responsibility for organizing and overseeing the Bosnian Serb takeover of Foca, during which the
non-Serb population of Foca was tortured, raped and otherwise mistreated, executed, "disappeared," or expelled
from the municipality. While membership in the Crisis Committee is not, in and of itself, proof of criminal
conduct, it is a strong indicator that Cancar and the other members were likely aware of and condoned the abuses
being perpetrated to fulfill their plan, and indeed may have been issuing direct orders that these abuses be carried
out.

In the post-war period, while Cancar remained in office as mayor, according to international personnel working
in the Foca region during his time in office, Cancar refused to comply with the provisions of the Dayton
agreement.(113) Human Rights Watch conducted interviews with international personnel working for four
different institutions in the region during the time Cancar was in office. According to their reports, Cancar
consistently blocked freedom of movement, restricted freedom of expression and association, prevented
international agencies from fulfilling their mandates, and systematically blocked any discussion of the return of
refugees and displaced persons. (For more details on the post-war situation in Foca, see below.) Cancar did his
best to maintain an atmosphere of intimidation and fear in Foca that was felt by both international personnel and
the local population alike. This atmosphere has been maintained by the officials who took over after Cancar's
defection to Biljana Plavsic's SNS party in early summer 1997.

In January 1998, the new Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik appointed Petko Cancar as Republika
Srpska minister of justice. This appointment by the otherwise more moderate Dodik was a surprise to many, and
there were rumors at the time that Dodik was under pressure from hardliners to appoint Cancar. Despite serious
questions about Cancar's conduct during the war, as well as substantial evidence that he has obstructed
implementation of the Dayton agreement, the international community has not sought his removal from office.

Velibor Ostojic - Wartime: Minister of Information for Bosnian Serb-controlled Territory, Leader of
Foca Crisis Committee/ Current: Head of Human Rights Commission of the Bosnian Parliament
Velibor Ostojic was born on August 8, 1945, in a village in Foca and is a professor of literature by profession.
Ostojic was the minister of information for the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina prior to the war, and held
the same post in areas under the control of Radovan Karadzic during the war. According to the reports of three
well-known international journalists, at least three highly placed witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch,
and representatives of local human rights organizations in the region, Ostojic was also an active member of the
Crisis Committee in Foca. From the beginning of the war, as demonstrated by his public statements at the time,
Ostojic was a staunch supporter of an "ethnically clean" Bosnian Serb Republic, in July 1992 even going as far
as to define the "indisputable borders of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina," and drawing these
borders on the basis of ethnic majority areas.(114)

As stated above, the leaders of the Crisis Committee played a central role in the takeover of Foca. As one of the
three main leaders of the Crisis Committee in Foca, Ostojic was in a decision-making position within the
committee. Several witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, numerous international journalists who have
worked extensively in the region, and the Bosnian War Crimes Commission allege that Ostojic organized
weapons and training for members of Karadzic's SDS party in the region and also coordinated the arrival of
paramilitary troops from Serbia to assist the Bosnian Serb army in its military campaign within Bosnia.

According to the U.N. Commission of Experts report, "A concentration camp was established in Foca in the
former prison, and was run by Velibor Ostojic." (115) Although Human Rights Watch has not been able to confirm
this fact, as a leader of the Crisis Committee, Ostojic is directly implicated in planning and carrying out the
takeover of Foca, during which the war crimes and gross abuses of human rights described in the above sections
took place. What is more, survivors interviewed by Human Rights Watch identified Velibor Ostojic as one of the
three individuals responsible for the "ethnic cleansing" campaign in the Foca municipality, along with Vojislav
Maksimovic and Petar Cancar.

In 1993, Roy Gutman of Newsday conducted a three month investigation into the "ethnic cleansing" campaign in
Foca. He concluded that:

Those directing the process [of "ethnic cleansing"] were members of Karadzic's inner circle. They called in
paramilitary troops to conquer the town and gave the orders to "cleanse" Foca of all non-Serbs, a broad array of
witnesses said. They set up concentration camps and rape camps, and on their orders, Serb forces destroyed the
mosques and nearly every other sign of half a millennium of Muslim culture...[in a telephone interview,
Karadzic] confirmed that Ostojic, Maksimovic and Cancar "influenced the establishment of civilian authorities"
at the time of the military assault one year ago and took control of Foca.(116)

Gutman testified to these findings before a hearing of the Fourth Congress of the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Washington, D.C., on April 4, 1995. In his testimony, referring again to
Ostojic, Maksimovic, and Cancar, he stated:

I, myself, have reported on one of the rape camps in Foca, and it was possible through an interview with Mr.
Karadzic which I had on the telephone, to confirm that the people running Foca were his very closest associates,
including a minister in his own government [Ostojic, minister of information]. And, he said they were
responsible for everything that took place in Foca. The witnesses whom I interviewed from Foca, three or four
women who were in a refugee camp in Turkey, made it very clear what happened in Foca. They were being
raped daily in the Partizan Hall in the center of the town, right next to the police station, right under the eyes of
the authorities....So, there is this very direct connection to the leadership. (117)

As part of his investigation, Gutman interviewed Enver Pilaff, who was president of the Bosniak Party for
Democratic Action (SDA) in Foca in 1992, just after he fled to Sarajevo. Mr. Pilaff alleged that Ostojic entered
Foca three days before the Serb takeover. Pilaff reported to Gutman that he attended a public meeting where:

Ostojic demanded that Muslims give up all weapons of self-defense and concede Foca was a Serbian territory.
"He gave the Muslims fifteen minutes to think it over."...Ostojic then demanded that all Muslims leave Foca for
a concentration camp at nearby Jabuka mountain "or else the last Muslim seed will be destroyed in Foca,"
according to a public statement cited by the Bosnian Interior Ministry....Ostojic's forces also began rounding up
Muslim civilians, taking them to the state correctional prison in Foca...[sic.] (118)
In his simultaneous role as minister of information, Ostojic was responsible for control of the media, which was
a powerful tool used by the authorities to instill fear in the minds of the population and crush any possible
internal opposition to the brutal plan of "ethnic cleansing." As minister of information, Ostojic often issued false
reports of abuses being committed against ethnic Serbs, when testimonies of Muslim and Croat survivors, reports
of journalists, and United Nations investigators provided ample evidence that the most brutal crimes in Foca
were being committed by Bosnian Serbs against non-Serbs, under the authority of the Crisis Committee Ostojic
was a part of. Radio Free Europe reported on August 5, 1992, that:

Velibor Ostojic, minister for information of the self-proclaimed "Serb Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina,"
stated that about 42,000 Serbs are being detained in more than 20 camps in Bosnia-Hercegovina, adding that in
Sarajevo alone, there are another 22 camps for Serbs. He denied the existence of Serb death camps for Muslims
and Croats explaining that Serbs have only set up "prisons for captured Muslim fighters." (119)

During the takeover of Foca, while Muslims and Croats were being arrested, detained, and brutalized under
Ostojic's orders, Ostojic reportedly often traveled to Pale for "consultations" with Karadzic. (120) In December
1995, Radovan Karadzic replaced some of his cabinet members with more hard-line officials who were closer to
his nationalist ideology. In what appeared to be a demonstration of recognition of Ostojic's outspoken
nationalism, and in support for his role in the "cleansing" of Foca, Ostojic was promoted by Karadzic to deputy
prime minister of the Republika Srpska.

Velibor Ostojic is currently head of a commission for human rights of the Bosnian Parliament, a position he has
held since September 1997. Following his election into this position, The Los Angeles Times wrote:

Velibor Ostojic has not been publicly indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
in The Hague. But the senior Bosnian Serb official is remembered by survivors for having ordered the purge of
thousands of Muslims from southeastern towns at the start of the Bosnian war in 1992. His name is especially
associated with the once-Muslim municipality of Foca...as a member of top war crimes suspect Radovan
Karadzic's inner circle, Ostojic seized control of Foca in April 1992. (121)

According to the same article, the Association of Citizens of the Bosansko-Podrinje Canton, which includes
displaced persons from Foca, stated that the installment of Ostojic in this position "is a humiliation for tens of
thousands of people killed and banished from eastern Bosnia who are victims of Ostojic and those like him." (122)

Vojislav Maksimovic - Wartime: Leader of the Crisis Committee/ Current: Rector of University of
Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska Member of Parliament

Vojislav "Vojo" Maksimovic was born on August 4, 1935. He was a professor of literature at the University of
Sarajevo and head of the SDS in the Bosnian parliament before the war. As one of the three leaders of the Foca
Crisis Committee, Maksimovic is alleged, by international journalists, and by several witnesses interviewed by
Human Rights Watch, to have participated in planning and organizing the takeover of the Foca municipality.

According to Newsday's Roy Gutman, Enver Pilaff told him that the day after Ostojic came to Foca on April 5,
1992:

Ostojic, Maksimovic and Cancar met at their favorite restaurant, the Ribarski Dom [Fish House]. "I was outside
when Maksimovic came out and told his people that if they would not take up arms and start shooting Muslims,
he would call for reinforcements from Serbia," Pilaff said. In the presence of his two associates, Maksimovic
went to the telephone and "invited in" troops from nearby cities of Niksic in Montenegro, and Uzice in Serbia,
Pilaff said. Pilaff said he heard the call through the open door. (123)

Gutman goes on to report that "according to other Bosnian state and Muslim party sources, Ostojic, Maksimovic
and Cancar decided the fate of hundreds of Muslims in the area, whether they would be executed by the
paramilitary forces or sent to the concentration camp at Foca prison." (124)

In 1995, Maksimovic was the mayor of the Serb part of Sarajevo and remained in this position until March 1996,
when official control of the Sarajevo suburbs was transferred to the Bosniak-Croat Federation. Maksimovic, as
mayor of Serb Sarajevo during the transfer of authority of the suburbs, failed to use his position to encourage the
ethnic Serb population of Sarajevo to stay.(125)
The Bosnian government's State War Crimes Commission alleges that Maksimovic was involved in:

[the supplying] of weapons, training of the SDS members, arrival of the irregulars from Serbia, all for the
purpose of occupation by arms [of] a large part of the RB&H [Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina] territory
and ethnic "cleansing" of that territory, carrying out terror, intimidation, dismissals, looting, humiliation,
eviction, imprisonment, torture and killing.[sic](126)

After the war, Maksimovic retained his position as head of the SDS deputies in the Republika Srpska Parliament.
In August 1997, the Serb parliament announced that it was considering Maksimovic as a potential candidate for
Republika Srpska president in the next national elections, scheduled for September 1998. In
response, Gradjanin, a Belgrade news agency, reported that "recently [Maksimovic's] name was mentioned as
being on the list of Serb officials on the secret list for The Hague, due to supposed war crimes committed in
Foca."(127)

Maksimovic has retained his political position and influence in Foca and has remained committed to Radovan
Karadzic's Serb Democratic Party, which has consistently and blatantly violated the provisions of the Dayton
agreement. In November 1997, Maksimovic was disqualified as a candidate for the Republika Srpska
parliamentary elections by the OSCE as a result of the SDS party's failure to remove party posters which showed
pictures of the indicted Radovan Karadzic.

Maksimovic is currently the rector of the University of Serb Sarajevo, now called the "University of the Serb
Republic," which is based in the part of Sarajevo that is in Republika Srpska. He is also still a member of the
Republika Srpska National Assembly. One current resident of Foca, told Human Rights Watch that Maksimovic
has "an apartment in Pale, one in Foca, and a house in the forest around Foca." (128)

Other Members of the Crisis Committee

Radojica Mladjenovic - Wartime: High Level SDS Leader / Post-War: President of the Executive Board of
Foca Municipality / Current: Delegate to Republika Srpska National Assembly

According to B.A., a staff member of an international organization who has been working in the Foca region
throughout the war and into the post-war period, Mladjenovic was both one of the top leaders of the SDS in
Foca, and a member of the local Crisis Committee.(129) Mladjenovic's official role has been reported as president
of the Executive Board of the Foca municipality,(130) a position which is very closely linked with the mayor of
the town. According to B.K., an international journalist who has done extensive work in Foca and who spoke on
condition of anonymity:

Mladjenovic...immediately [became] one of the leaders of [the] SDS in Foca...President of local government in
1992 and later, still lives in Foca. [He is] one of the people who organized "ethnic cleansing" in Foca. He was in
charge [of] civilian affairs, his name is on all permissions which Muslims needed to leave Foca [between] June
and August [1992].[sic](131)

One witness who was a candidate in the 1991 parliamentary elections in Foca named Mladjenovic as a member
of the Crisis Committee.(132) Mladjenovic remained in his position as president of the executive board in Foca
until he joined Biljana Plavsic's SNS party in mid-1997. Currently, Mladjenovic is a delegate to the Republika
Srpska National Assembly. He ran as a candidate in the September 1997 Foca municipal elections, but the Serb
Radical Party won.

Miroslav Stanic (Miro) - Wartime: Alleged to be SDS President in Foca / Current: Unknown

As president of the Foca SDS (Karadzic's political party), Stanic was allegedly one of the primary members of
the Foca Crisis Committee. A Bosnian Serb soldier from Foca, who was in Foca during the entire war and
remains there today claimed that Stanic, in collaboration with Vojislav Maksimovic, gave the high level orders
under which the guards in the KP Dom detention facility functioned. (133) A former high-level Foca official,
according to S.D., named Stanic as a member of the Crisis Committee, and as the one who was in charge of all
paramilitary activities during the takeover.(134) B.K., another international journalist, speaking of the situation in
Foca in 1996, after the war but while Cancar was still mayor, said:
President of the former Crisis Headquarters [Crisis Committee], Miro Stanic, is the leader of (Karadzic's) Serb
Democratic Party, the only party in Foca [sic].(135)

Petko Cancar himself, in an interview with B.K., names Stanic as one of the main members of the Crisis
Committee. Cancar stated:

By April 17 [1992] we came to the municipality building and started organizing the civilian authority, while
Stanic Miro(136) was at the head of the Crisis Committee and led the military authorities and the liberation. (137)

The United States Department of State Seventh Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia quotes a thirty-
four-year-old Muslim male as stating:

Shortly after Bosnia declared its independence on April 8, the head of the local branch of the Serbian Democratic
Party (SDS), became leader of the Foca area Serbs and ordered that the Muslim population of the city be
rounded up and deported to various camps.(138)

B.K. alleged to Human Rights Watch that Stanic was:

president [of the] SDS party since [the] beginning, organizer of ethnic cleansing together with Mladjenovic,
Petko Cancar, Velibor Ostojic and Vojo Maksimovic.(139)

The Bosnian War Crimes Commission states of Stanic that "he and Vojislav Maksimovic were direct
commanders of the artillery and infantry attack on Foca." (140)

Vojo Bodiroga - Wartime: Crisis Committee Member / Current: Director of local Branch of Electric Company
"Elektrodistribucija"

According to Faik Tafro, a Bosniak journalist from Foca whose diaries about the Serb takeover of Foca were
published by Dani, an independent journal in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bodiroga was a member of the Crisis
Committee in Foca.(141) I.H. also named Vojo Bodiroga as a member of the SDS in Foca. (142) According to the
Foca municipal government-in-exile, Bodiroga is currently the director of the local branch of the state electric
company "Electrodistribucija." (143) This was corroborated by the European Community Monitoring Mission
(ECMM).(144)

Simo Mojevic - Wartime: Member of Ustikolina Crisis Committee / Current: Director of Primary School

Prior to the war, Mojevic was the director of the school in Ustikolina, a village on the road between Foca and
Gorazde, that is part of the Foca municipality. Ustikolina was transferred from Serb to Federation control by the
Dayton agreement. During the war, according to O.N. and T.R., two witnesses from Ustikolina, Mojevic was a
member of the local Crisis Committee in Ustikolina, and Tafro names him as the deputy commander of the
"army and Chetniks in Previla," a village in Ustikolina. (145) T.R. reported to Human Rights Watch that Mojevic,
supported by Petar Mihajlovic in his role as SDS president in Ustikolina, was the commander of a Serb military
battalion in Ustikolina, and that in this position he supervised the Bosnian Serb army's "ethnic cleansing" of
Ustikolina, which was part of the takeover of the Foca municipality. (146) T.R. reported that Mojevic interrogated
fifty men, including T.R., who were detained briefly in March 1992 on the road between Ustikolina and a village
called Jabuka. Most of these men were imprisoned thereafter and were then "taken away" by the
JNA.(147) According to two international persons currently working in the region, Mojevic is currently director of
the Foca primary school "Sveti Sava."(148)

Also Involved in the Takeover

Colonel Marko Kovac - Wartime: Commander of Bosnian Serb Army in Foca Region / Current: Unknown

Kovac, a colonel in the former JNA, was the commander of the Bosnian Serb military in Foca during the
takeover. As commander of the Bosnian Serb army, Kovac would have been in a position to oversee the military
aspects of the expulsion of the Bosniak population from Foca, during which Bosniaks "disappeared." The
military commander would also have been responsible for the conduct of the troops under his command who
carried out the arrest, imprisonment, expulsion, and in many cases, executions, of the non-Serb population in
Foca.

Maggie O'Kane,a journalist for The Guardian, interviewed Commander Kovac in the summer of 1992. She
writes:

"Six hundred Muslims are being kept in two prisons in the town, for their own safety," says the commandant
[Kovac]. The women and children are held together in what looks like the old town hall. They have been in there
for three months. "They live in peace, we protect the children from the Muslims in the hills and we provide
sanitary services," says the town's commandant Marko Kovac, "we are fighting to take back what is ours. We do
not want to live in an Islamic republic."

A highly-placed former Foca resident alleged that:

[Kovac] commanded the Serb army in the expulsion of Bosniaks from Foca, "disappearance" of war prisoners
from KP Dom to unknown places. Kovac was the commander of the city defense, thus the commander of the
Serb army in this area. Kovac himself was one of the members of the Crisis Committee. (149)

An international source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, reported to Human Rights Watch that if local
Serbs wanted to leave Foca during the takeover, they had to have permission either from Kovac, or from the
local chief of police. Kovac repeatedly went on the record to foreign journalists with inflammatory justifications
for the actions of the soldiers under his command, including statements that Muslims "kill new-born Serbian
babies and drown them in the River Drina...sexually assault Serbian children...and they cut off Serbian men's
penises,"(150) and that Bosniaks "started the war with the aim of carrying out genocide and throwing the Serbs out
of their hearth and home."(151)

Branislav Cosovic - Wartime: Commander of "Cosa's Guards" / Current: Police Officer

According to B.K., an international journalist, Cosovic, local commander of the military police in Foca during
the takeover, organized his own paramilitary unit, in which Janko Janjic "Tuta" (152) (indicted) and Zoran
Vukovic(153) (indicted) fought.(154) According to S.D., another international journalist, a former high-level Foca
official named Cosovic as the key paramilitary leader in Foca during the takeover, and the "key link between
paramilitary forces and the Crisis Committee." (155)

A survivor of KP Dom, reported to Human Rights Watch that, on a daily basis, he saw "Cosa's Guards" taking
prisoners away from KP Dom, after which they were never seen or heard from again. (156) The ICTY indictment
for rape as a war crime against the eight publicly indicted persons from Foca says, in speaking about crimes
committed at the Foca High School, that:

[One witness], together with at least 72 other Muslim inhabitants of Foca, was transferred to Foca High School.
[This witness] was one of several women who, from the second day of their detention, were sexually assaulted,
including gang-raped every evening, by groups of soldiers, either in the class-rooms or in nearby apartments.
The soldiers consisted of members of the military police and referred to themselves as "Cosa's Guards," after the
local commander of the military police, Cosovic.

Referring to the rape detention center in the Partizan Sports Hall, the indictment reads:

Two groups of perpetrators operated at Partizan. One group described themselves as "Cosa's Guards," which
operated at the Foca High School also operated at Partizan. (157)

According to S.D., Cosovic was still functioning as a uniformed police officer in Foca, as of May 1998.(158)

POST-WAR ABUSES: NONCOMPLIANCE BY FOCA AUTHORITIES IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The individuals described in the first two sections of this report are not simply faces from the past in Foca. They
have not been indicted for the crimes for which they are allegedly responsible and they have not been excluded
from the post-war political process. Many of them remain in positions of influence locally within Foca, or, as we
have seen with Ostojic, Cancar, and Maksimovic, they have been rewarded for their leading roles during the war
by being promoted to Bosnian or Republika Srpska-wide positions. Many were candidates in the municipal
elections which took place in September 1997 and many will be candidates in elections which are upcoming.

The following section demonstrates the Foca authorities' systematic effort to restrict the rights of the current
residents of Foca by preventing inter-entity movement or projects designed to foster communication between the
residents of Foca and persons in the Federation, and by blocking the free flow of information by censoring the
media. They have regularly blocked all efforts by the international community to establish inter-entity contact
through harassing representatives of international organizations who attempt to establish such projects. Through
a pattern of intimidation and threats they have made every effort to ensure that the local population does not
break the wall of isolation which surrounds Foca by engaging in any inter-entity activities. They have
systematically blocked any discussion of the return of refugees and displaced persons to Foca; they have failed to
allow freedom of movement or expression; they have denied the international community any information on the
persons who were "disappeared" during the war, denying even that a campaign of "ethnic cleansing" took place
in Foca; they have prevented Bosniaks who fled from Foca from having access to documents, such as marriage
and birth certificates, drivers licenses, and educational transcripts, which are held by the Foca municipal
authorities; they have attacked and threatened foreign journalists and international staff they feel might have
come to Foca to expose the dark truth about what happened during the war. In addition, they have prevented
Serb displaced persons from areas now in the Federation from returning to their homes. The Foca authorities
have created an atmosphere of fear in Foca, palpable to anyone who spends even a brief period of time there.
Those who oppose the tight control of the local authorities risk their safety, security, and access to public
services, including humanitarian assistance, and even their pensions, which are much needed in the post-war
economic struggle.

Though this report focuses primarily on the "unindicted," the ongoing presence of persons indicted for rape as a
war crime and other violations of the Geneva Conventions is a fact which permeates the current situation in
Foca. The current officials are sheltering these individuals, allowing them complete freedom to influence society.
One must bear in mind that the post-war human rights abuses that occur in Foca are committed in a collaborative
effort of the indicted and unindicted, under the clear instructions of the Pale authorities. The current Foca
authorities are not only responsible for the abuses that they themselves commit--they must also take
responsibility for abuses committed by those operating under their authority. What is more, these officials have
an obligation to prevent such abuses and to punish those responsible for them; and they must be held accountable
when they fail to do so. These Foca authorities must also be held responsible for sheltering individuals indicted
by the ICTY.

Human Rights Abuses Against the Current Population of Foca

The tight control that the Foca authorities maintain over the local population has created such an atmosphere of
fear that it is almost impossible for a human rights organization to find Foca citizens who are willing to speak
out against the authorities, even with assurances of anonymity. Despite the local authorities dismal wartime
human rights record and mounting evidence of serious abuses in the post-Dayton period, Human Rights Watch
was unable to find local Serb civilians, except in very few cases, who are willing to talk about their problems. A
few courageous individuals did share information with Human Rights Watch, as did international personnel who
have worked in Foca at different times during the post-war period. Their stories have informed this section of the
report.

One courageous Bosnian Serb woman who lives in Foca today expressed outrage at the local authorities and
their mistreatment of the local population: "Every man will tell you all that I will tell you now. There are no
rights here at all." This woman, who shall be referred to for the purposes of this report as S.R., is a displaced
person from a village on the edge of the Foca municipality which was granted to the Federation under the
Dayton agreement:

We have three houses in [former village]. We had to leave when Dayton left [the village] in the hands of the
Federation. We have three houses, land, gardens, I had all that...In December 1995, our municipality called us to
a public meeting to tell us all to leave [the village] because it belongs to the Muslims. [Among the officials were]
Miro Stanic, Vojo Maksimovic, Radojica Mladjenovic, Velibor Ostojic, and Petko Cancar....They did not give us
the option of staying there...we had to leave our houses...We stayed until February 10, 1996..a Serb soldier came
and asked us "why are you still here? You want to live with the Muslims? What are you waiting for?"

Feeling that she had no choice but to leave her home, S.R. went to visit the ministry for refugees in Foca in order
to find a place to live in town, but she received no assistance. "We found this house which had pigs in it. It was
destroyed, no roof, and they had kept pigs here and chickens for four years." (159)

The stench of the pigs was still palpable sitting in the cold room, the one room, where S.R. lives with her
husband and her two grandchildren. In the summer of 1997, S.R. announced to the authorities her intention to
return to her village, which she told Human Rights Watch she is willing to do, regardless of the fact that it is now
in Federation territory. Since the day she announced to the Foca authorities her intention to return to her home in
the Federation, they have denied her and her husband any humanitarian assistance. Referring to the social
assistance card which displaced persons who receive humanitarian aid must hold, S.R. told Human Rights
Watch:

I don't have this card because I announced to the authorities that I want to go home...So I do not get aid and I
have to pay electricity, even though I am a displaced person....people hated me. They would not have given me a
glass of water. They are afraid they will have to go home [too]. They have good lives here in town, better than in
their villages. They have the nice houses of the Muslims....all the authorities tell me there are no more refugees
here. What am I then?(160)

S.R. described the situation prior to the September 1997 municipal elections in Foca, reporting that persons who
join Karadzic's Serb Democratic Party (SDS) or the Serb Radical Party of Vojislav Seselj are taken care of by
the Foca authorities:

The SDS said that if we vote for them, we can get two pensions. People got pensions after they voted for the
SDS. Seselj came to Foca before the municipal elections [September 1997] and gave out coffee to everyone to
get them to vote for the SRS. .. Anyone who has SDS membership will have work and have a place to live. My
[...] had to join the SDS to get his job. If he had not joined, he would not have gotten a job.

When Human Rights Watch asked S.R. why she is so willing to speak, she replied simply, "I dare to speak
because I just want to live freely." (161)

Police Beatings

There are numerous reports of physical abuse and harassment by the local police in Foca. In one case, five
Bosnian Serb men reportedly robbed a disabled man near Foca, allegedly beating and seriously injuring him.
According to the IPTF, the perpetrators were allegedly part of a "mafia-type gang" with a history of violent
robberies. The five men were arrested by the Foca local police on December 9, 1997, and were taken to the local
police station, where two of the suspects were reportedly beaten by the local police. One of the suspects who was
most severely beaten claimed that he was interrogated and beaten by the police for more than five hours, and that
once he lost consciousness during the beatings. This suspect identified three police officers as having been
involved in the beating. IPTF took photographs of the suspect's injuries, taken three days after the interrogation,
and one IPTF monitor reported that, "You could ask all IPTF officers in Bosnia, and over 90 percent would say
they had never seen somebody beaten that badly in their lives." (162) The suspect's back was completely bruised,
from his neck down to his thighs, and it was dark blue and black, with "hardly a normal spot of skin
left."(163) According to the IPTF monitor who took the photos, the bruises were the result of being struck with a
blunt instrument. The suspect also had bruises on his arms and a black eye. The other suspect had bruises on his
neck as if he had been grabbed by the neck, or as if the police had tried to strangle him. The two were reportedly
beaten in order to obtain a confession. (The other three suspects did not report having been beaten.) After the
first had been beaten so severely, the police allegedly brought in the second suspect to see his injuries, and told
him that the same would happen to him if he failed to confess. According to IPTF, the suspect thereafter
confessed.

After this interrogation and beating, the suspects were taken to the court in Trebinje, where the investigative
judge decided there was enough evidence to transfer them to the prison in Foca. They arrived in the Foca prison
on December 12, 1997, on the day IPTF made a routine visit. The suspect who had been severely beaten
requested a meeting with IPTF, and after IPTF viewed his wounds and heard his story, the monitors took the two
suspects to the Foca hospital. This was the first medical exam the two had had. One guard from the prison
accompanied them to the hospital; but soon after they arrived there, a police officer allegedly involved in the
beating and two other plainclothed men arrived at the hospital. The officer accused IPTF of "protecting
criminals," and said that the news that the suspects had been taken to the hospital had "hit them like a bomb." In
the hospital, the officer threatened one of the suspects in the presence of IPTF and allegedly said to him, "you
did not have to do this, why did you do this, now we are going to charge you with everything we have." (164)

The local police, under the authority of Zoran Mandic, chief of public security, and local Chief of Police Milun
Milanovic, have failed to conduct an investigation, according to IPTF. The police claim that the suspects were
beaten in the course of resisting arrest. However, the IPTF member told Human Rights Watch "It is kind of
strange to put up a fight with your back towards the officers." Both suspects are currently still in detention in the
Foca prison.

IPTF arranged for the suspects to get legal counsel, through UNHCR's legal aid center (see section on Blocking
Inter-Entity Projects, below), but the suspects did not want to file a complaint with the court. IPTF then asked for
all information on the arrest from the Foca authorities and requested that a prosecutor be informed; while they
got the information they requested quickly, to their knowledge the prosecutor was never informed of the incident
or allegations. IPTF then initiated its own investigation.

According to IPTF's investigation, all three officers accused by the suspects of having beaten them are officers in
the Foca criminal investigation unit, headed by Zoran Vladicic (see section above on KP Dom Personnel for
background on Zoran Vladicic). IPTF informed Human Rights Watch that Vladicic himself was one of those
allegedly involved in the beatings, as was Miodrag Koprivica. (Both men are mentioned above in connection
with their involvement in the KP Dom detention center during the war.) The accused officers alleged that they
were in Montenegro on that day. IPTF later received confirmation from the Montenegrin border police that they
had no record of the officers crossing the border. No sanctions have been reported against the officers involved
in the beatings, who remain at their posts.(165)

According to IPTF, cooperation by the local authorities, in particular the local police, did not extend beyond the
bare minimum required, "unless it suited the local police."

IPTF is charged with responsibility for restructuring local police forces under Dayton (and the screening and
vetting procedures outlined in the September 24, 1997 agreement on the restructuring of police forces in the
Republika Srpska). As part of the IPTF mandate in Bosnia and Hercegovina, they are supposed to screen the
local police to remove from the force any police officers responsible for war crimes or human rights abuses. As
part of the vetting process, advertisements should be placed in local papers to encourage the local population to
report relevant information about police officers' backgrounds to IPTF. After the background check, the police
are given psychological testing and training. IPTF informed Human Rights Watch that local police personnel had
received preliminary certification by IPTF, and that police had finished a preliminary training course and had
had their psychological tests. But one IPTF monitor informed Human Rights Watch that he was unaware of any
background check having been done, and was also unaware that any advertisements to solicit background
information on police candidates had been placed in the local papers. As of June 1998, according to an IPTF
monitor familiar with the situation in Foca, no screening or vetting had been done in Foca. In fact, according to
this monitor, the process "has come to a grinding halt." This monitor also was unaware of any advertisements
having been placed in local papers.(166)

A representative of an international organization reported to Human Rights Watch, when asked what steps the
local authorities have taken to prevent or prosecute post-war human rights violations, that "usually the local
authorities did not really take any step to stop, investigat[e] or prosecut[e] those responsible of [sic] human rights
violations; very often if not always, they were responsible for human rights abuses." (167)

When the local authorities fail to comply with the provisions of the Dayton agreement, the local population is
prevented from reaping the benefits of cooperation--freedom of movement, expression and association;
opportunities to reunite with friends and family who have been separated by the war; opportunities to participate
in projects which the international community is implementing; opportunities to return to their pre-war home; a
chance to take part in rebuilding a country based on openness and tolerance. The Foca authorities rely upon the
closed and restricted society which exists there to maintain their power and their vision of ethnic division. The
people in Foca have yet to be given the opportunity to express an opinion on the inter-entity contact (between the
Federation and the Republika Srpska) which could bring improvements in the local economic situation, and
eventually, could actually bring lasting peace.

Freedom of Expression and Access to Information

In Foca, there is no independent media, and to the best of our knowledge, no one has dared to attempt to
establish independent media of any sort in the town. Access to information for the residents of Foca is severely
restricted, and is almost exclusively limited to Republika Srpska state radio and television. Due to this closed
situation, the population is uninformed and almost completely ignorant of the world outside Foca. The restriction
on information has played a significant role in the efforts of the Foca authorities to maintain strict control over
the population.

One Foca resident told Human Rights Watch that he was too afraid to tell us what he knows about the town and
the persons responsible for wartime abuses. "I don't want to have any problems," he told Human Rights Watch,
"so I can't talk with you, not yet. It's true that things are changing very slowly here, not as fast as I'd like them to,
but the time has not come yet for me to be able to talk. One day, maybe, but not yet." He did say, though, that
"there is no outside information..the media is closed. We live in darkness here."(168)

An IPTF report dated July 2, 1997, describes the restrictions on freedom of expression in Foca, in speaking about
the public reactions to the political changes that were occurring in the Republika Srpska at the time. Around this
time, Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic was in a political struggle with the SDS leadership loyal to
indicted Radovan Karadzic. The report describes the local reaction in Foca to this rift.

Most ordinary people are unaware of the power struggles, or even if they are, the citizens expressed a nonchalant
attitude to the situation. The population is not informed through the local electronic or print media. Most of what
people know is gathered from reports in the international media, which is available only to a small number of
persons in the society....That lack of information is responsible for the nonchalant attitude of the people...a
combination of fear, bad economic condition, and insufficient information is responsible for the indifference. (169)

Another international representative who works in the region told Human Rights Watch that he asked a local
Bosnian Serb woman in Foca what she knew about what had happened in Srebrenica. The woman replied, "Very
little." The person asked if the woman wanted to know, and when the woman responded affirmatively, explained
what had occurred in Srebrenica: that all non-Serb women had been expelled and over 8,000 non-Serb men are
missing and supposed slaughtered in the hills around Srebrenica. When the woman heard this, she reportedly
began to shake, and, with visible shock, told the person, "if this is true, then it is absolutely
awful."(170) Srebrenica is no more than two hours' drive from Foca.

Prevention of the Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons To Foca

UNHCR has encountered consistent opposition to its attempts to facilitate the return of refugees and displaced
persons to Foca. In early 1997, UNHCR was working on two pilot projects for the return of Bosniaks to the
villages of Filipovici and Paonci, both in the Foca municipality. According to UNHCR, twenty Bosniak families
wanted to return to their homes in Paonci, a village in the zone of separation controlled by the Foca municipality,
yet totally empty and abandoned since the war. At an inter-agency meeting held in Foca on April 17, 1997,
which Human Rights Watch attended, Radojica Mladjenovic, then president of the executive board in Foca,
stated that "If there are requests for return, then the Municipality should be informed and the procedure should
be followed in accordance with the Dayton agreement."(171) In order to take advantage of Mladjenovic's stated
willingness to cooperate on returns, on May 30, 1997, UNHCR offered to rebuild ten of the twenty-seven
apartments that had been damaged in the war in a building in the center of Foca; in exchange, Mladjenovic was
asked to allow the twenty families to return to Paonci. Mladjenovic's response, according to UNHCR, seemed to
be positive. He reportedly told UNHCR that he would have to consult his superiors, and that he would write
them a letter stating that the Foca authorities support this return project. (According to UNHCR, Mladjenovic
also made an announcement on the Foca radio stating that refugees should be allowed to return to Foca.)
However, this letter was never written, and the pilot project was never initiated: after this meeting, Mladjenovic
was removed from his position as president of the executive board, just one of several members of the
government replaced suddenly in Foca. Reports at the time indicated that Mladjenovic's more hardline superiors
viewed him as too cooperative with the international community. Mladjenovic was replaced by Radojica
Tesevic, and has reportedly joined Biljana Plavsic's political party. UNHCR reported that at a later meeting with
Foca officials, which took place around the time of the July SFOR arrest in Prijedor, which left one indictee dead
and another transferred to the ICTY for trial, they were told by the current officials, "I can't talk to you because
you are the enemy."(172) UNHCR staff reported that they had several meetings with Radojica Tesevic, the current
president of the executive board, in the summer of 1997, but that he refused to allow Bosniaks to return to Foca
at that time.

Mayor Milos Lazovic, the former director of the post office, took over from Petko Cancar in June 1997. When
UNHCR approached Lazovic to discuss the pilot return project to Paonci, explaining again that in exchange
UNHCR would rebuild the twenty-seven apartments in downtown Foca, Lazovic reportedly replied, "No. First
give [us] 270,000 DM and then I will trust you." The pilot project was not implemented. (173)

Another return pilot project was planned soon after, in June 1997. It was to involve the two-way return of
Bosnian Serbs to the village of Nekupi in the Federation and Bosniaks to the village of Marevci, in the Serb
territory. UNHCR organized an assessment visit to these villages. According to UNHCR, six Bosnian Serbs
visited Nekupi under their auspices. The visit was successful. However, soon after the visit, all but one of the six
backed out of the project, stating that they were no longer interested in returning to their homes in Federation
territory. According to UNHCR, one of the six was beaten up, and the others were threatened in Foca. According
to UNHCR, shortly after a visit by a UNHCR staff person, one of the Bosnian Serbs was visited twice by the
local Foca police, who interrogated him and asked for the name and other information about the UNHCR staff
person who had visited. Following these incidents, the individual pulled out of the return project. (174)

Ljubo Veljovic, a member of Vojislav Seselj's Serb Radical Party, has been the de facto mayor of Foca since
November 1997.(175) According to representatives of international organizations based in Foca, he is alleged to
have permitted and encouraged systematic harassment and attacks against international personnel and on local
people based for their political opinion, and is reportedly responsible for the consistent failure to comply with the
provisions of the Dayton agreement, including blocking all discussion of the return of refugees and displaced
persons, and obstructing the exercise of freedom of movement, expression and association. Veljovic has been
even more adamantly against cooperation with UNHCR on return issues than his predecessor. During a meeting
between Veljovic and UNHCR representatives at the end of January 1998, UNHCR staff reportedly did not even
mention the issue of return, thinking it was too sensitive. They did, however, mention the issue of the exchange
of personal documents, such as drivers licenses and birth and marriage certificates, between the entities.
However, the mayor said this should not be done in person (i.e. individuals should not travel inter-entity to
obtain the documents.) He reportedly told UNHCR staff that he would not guarantee the security of any
displaced persons who come to Foca to obtain legal documents from the authorities. According to UNHCR staff,
Veljovic reportedly asked them at this meeting why UNHCR is trying to bring the populations back together
again, and why UNHCR is trying to start another war. He reportedly told the UNHCR staff person leading the
meeting to leave Foca immediately, and to go back to his/her home. (176)

Not a single non-Serb from Foca has returned to the town since the war ended in December 1995.

Blocking Inter-Entity Projects

In December 1996, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) arranged for the purchase of coal from the
Miljevina mine in the Foca municipality by the authorities of Gorazde, in the Bosnian Federation. Five transport
companies were hired by IRC to transport the coal, four of them from Gorazde and one from Foca. The day
before the first coal delivery, December 18, 1996, the tires of the vehicles of the one transport company from
Foca were slashed in an obvious effort to stop the Serb company from participating in inter-entity trade. The
night of the delivery, an IRC vehicle was blown up in Foca in front of the OSCE office. Nevertheless, the coal
delivery was successful, and one OSCE staff person reported to Human Rights Watch at the time that when the
Bosniak drivers arrived at the Miljevina mine and met some of the workers there, they all cried, and asked about
the "other side," wishing to know everything, having been cut off from any information from outside. (177) The
Miljevina coal mine directors did not want to cross the inter-entity boundary line to enter Gorazde to receive
their payment by the IRC, apparently due to a fear of crossing into Federation territory. Radojica Mladjenovic,
then president of the executive board, went to Gorazde to get the money. IRC staff told Human Rights Watch
that after his visit to Gorazde and his return to Foca Mladjenovic was threatened, though they were unable to
identify who had threatened him.(178)

Mladjenovic seemed to be the most cooperative of the Foca authorities. In fact, he reportedly met with
authorities from Gorazde in Foca on June 1, 1997, to discuss questions of infrastructure between the two towns.
A positive atmosphere seemed to be developing until Milos Lazovic took over as mayor. From that time on, all
inter-entity cooperation ceased. De facto Mayor Ljubo Veljovic has continued to pursue a policy of isolation and
obstruct obligations under the Dayton agreement.

In September 1997, the IRC attempted to provide the women in Foca with access to micro-credits through the
Bosnian Women's Initiative (BWI), which was a grant by the U.S. government to provide Bosnian women with
an opportunity to use their skills for small income-generating projects. They had already successfully begun
BWI-funded projects in Gorazde, a nearby Federation town, and wanted to offer access to these funds to the
women in Foca.

IRC, through the assistance of the OSCE office in Foca, made a public announcement that they would visit Foca
to explain the project, and that those women who wanted to find out about the project should attend the meeting.
According to the IRC, fifty women attended this first meeting, and they came full of ideas and energy. The IRC
described the project and set a date to return one week later, announcing that they would bring the appropriate
forms with them and assist the women in applying for the funding. When they returned the following week, only
one woman showed up. International staff in Foca alleged that the women had been threatened by the local
authorities and had been afraid to participate in the project. The one woman who showed up had apparently not
heard the warning. The project was never initiated.

One IRC staff member reported to Human Rights Watch that the women were "pushed by the authorities" not to
take part in this project. This person alleged that the women were interrogated by the authorities following the
first meeting.(179) Other international representatives also reported that the women had been pressured by the
authorities not to participate in the project.

Obstruction of the Work of the Dayton-Implementing Bodies

The Pale Connection and Local Police Abuses

In the post-war period in Foca, the authorities have consistently obstructed the work of the international
organizations permanently based in the town. According to several IPTF sources in the Foca region, one reason
their work is so difficult in Foca is that the local police still have very strong ties with Pale, from which Radovan
Karadzic commands the police who are still loyal to him. In one example of this, an IPTF source who spoke on
condition of anonymity said that IPTF requested that security be guaranteed for one Bosniak who had been
elected to the Foca municipal parliamentary assembly, so that the member could travel to Foca for the assembly
meetings. When Milun Milanovic, local chief of police, was asked if he could provide such security, he
reportedly replied that "I guarantee it but I have to check with Pale." The IPTF source went on to say that "Pale
is above everything. They never agree to anything without authorization from Pale."(180)

An IPTF report from July 1997 also describes the close relationship between the Foca authorities and the Pale
government loyal to the indicted Karadzic. The report talks about the fear that this connection causes among the
population in the town, in this case a fear of supporting Biljana Plavsic's political party, which is in opposition to
Karadzic's hardliners, and which is gaining strength in other parts of Republika Srpska:

Out of sheer fear nobody can dare at Srbinje/Foca come out openly to support the President [Plavsic] if it would
be contrary to Pale line. There is much connection between Pale and the officials at Srbinje/Foca. (181)

The IPTF monitor responsible for advising several of the local chiefs of police in the Foca region during the
research for this report informed Human Rights Watch that the police in Foca continue even today to "depend on
Pale." When asked whether IPTF has raised the issue of vetting with the local police, the monitor replied that
"they know about the vetting process, but there are no orders from Pale." Even meeting with the Foca police
officials can be difficult, according to an anonymous IPTF source. The IPTF source said that on a daily basis, the
obstruction of the local police is demonstrated by the difficulty IPTF has in meeting with the current local chief
of police, Milun Milanovic, or with the chief of public security, Zoran Mandic. "We meet them once a week on
Wednesdays, but we have to confirm it a few times before Wednesday in order to ensure that they will be there,"
the source reported to Human Rights Watch, "And yet still sometimes we show up, and they say they have other
obligations and leave, even though we confirmed it three times ahead of time that they would be there." (182)
Zoran Mandic is currently the chief of public security, the highest local police official, a position also often
referred to as the local minister of the interior, for seven municipalities, including Foca, Rudo, Cajnica,
Kalinovik, Visegrad, Serb Gorazde (Kopaci), and Serb Trnovo. Using his position as chief of public security,
Mandic has obstructed the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement, refusing to cooperate with the IPTF
vetting process even by providing the IPTF with a list of police officers in the municipalities under his authority.
There is also substantial evidence to suggest that Mandic has employed indicted persons in his police force and
in the police training school in the post-war period. Under Mandic's and Milanovic's authority, a Bosnian Serb
man was severely beaten by the local police in the central police station in Foca in December 1997 (see above).
He, in collaboration with local Chief of Police Milun Milanovic, has failed to prevent ongoing harassment and
attacks against local persons for their political opinions, and has blocked investigations into the threats and
attacks against international personnel and journalists (see section on Harassment of Internationals). In addition,
Mandic has obstructed the return of refugees through failing to provide guarantees of security, and has prevented
the establishment of inter-entity projects in the town during the post-war period.

Access to Collective Centers for Displaced Persons

Under the influence and strict control of the Pale authorities, the Foca authorities have made every effort to block
international agencies from working in Foca to assist the local population. For example, in 1997 UNHCR was
denied access to collective centers for displaced persons. UNHCR staff reported that during the first half of
1997, while Petko Cancar was still mayor of Foca, they were frequently denied access to the collective centers.
This was despite the fact that UNHCR was implementing the USAID-funded cash aid program (in the amount of
$1.65 million for 1997). UNHCR was providing this funding to the Commission on Refugees and Displaced
Persons, the Republika Srpska government office that handles issues relating to refugees and displaced persons
in the Republika Srpska, for the care of the approximately 9,000 displaced persons living in collective centers in
the Republika Srpska.

In September 1997, UNHCR in Gorazde received a letter from the government of Republika Srpska prohibiting
its staff from talking to displaced persons in the collective centers and claiming they had been "bothering
people." They were told to speak to the directors and local employees of the Republika Srpska Commission on
Refugees for information, and not directly to the displaced persons housed in the collective centers. In April
1997, IRC access to collective centers in Foca was also a problem. In recent months, according to UNHCR, the
problem of access by NGOs to the collective centers has been ameliorated. However, a UNHCR staff member
added that "they are always willing to talk about food as long as you don't ask anything else." (183)

Improvements

There have been some small improvements recently. In the past eight months, UNHCR and IRC have opened
legal aid centers in Foca and in other towns in the region such as Rogatica, Visegrad, and Pale. These centers are
responsible for helping the local population with property issues, occupancy rights, pensions, and helping
displaced persons to gain access to documents held in the government offices of the Federation. The legal aid
centers are primarily funded by the European Community Humanitarian Organization (ECHO) but are
administered by IRC and UNHCR. OSCE has a facilitating role as well. (184) The centers also provide information
on return to their places of origin to the local population, and all legal services are free of charge. The legal aid
center in Foca has succeeded in gaining access to personal documents for Bosnian Serbs from Gorazde Canton.
However, the Foca authorities, according to the Foca municipal government-in-exile, have refused to provide
any of the more than 570 documents requested by Bosniaks from Foca now living in the Federation.

Although the legal aid center is functioning, interpreters working with several international organizations in the
region reported that they have more trouble traveling to Foca than to any other town in the Republika Srpska,
and all experienced verbal harassment, including ethnic slurs and threats of physical violence. One interpreter
reported that s/he goes into the town, takes care of his/her responsibilities quickly, and leaves as soon as
possible.(185)

Harassment of Internationals

The July 1997 Prijedor Arrests and the Repercussions in Foca

Representatives of international organizations based in or working in Foca--OSCE, IRC, and IPTF--have faced
numerous instances of harassment and violence in the post-Dayton period. For example, following the July 1997
SFOR arrest in Prijedor, which left one indictee dead and another transferred to the ICTY for trial, international
representatives were harassed and were refused service in local restaurants and shops.

During this period, posters appeared throughout the Republika Srpska, including in Foca, with pictures of
Radovan Karadzic reading, in English, "Don't Touch Him. He Means Peace." Similarly, other posters called on
the population of Foca to "stand in defense of our people, and behave like that in defense of our state, as well,
using all possible means" if a similar arrest effort should be carried out in Foca. ECMM reported that, on July
18, 1997, there was an explosion near the lodgings of two IPTF monitors in Foca. During that night, an ECMM
vehicle was vandalized and severely damaged. ECMM asked SFOR to keep the vehicle at their base in
Filipovici, in the Foca municipality, to prevent further damages from occurring. The next morning, according to
a report by ECMM,

the owners and the managers of the shops, bars and restaurants received the visit of two men who gave them a
message to attend a meeting on Saturday afternoon. In this message, it was written, "The owner of this company
is invited to attend a meeting today at 1500, in the gymnasium of the primary school. The subject will be the
attitude you must have towards the IC [international community] representatives. If the owner or the manager
cannot be present, an authorised person should be sent. The participation in this meeting is compulsory." Srbinje,
the 19/7/97. No signature [sic].(186)

According to U.N. Civil Affairs, this meeting was compulsory and was followed by a rash of threats against
international personnel. On the evening of July 19, 1997, an IPTF monitor from India "received an anonymous
phone call in his accommodation. The message was repeated several times. It was: 'tomorrow morning go to
Sarajevo Bamboula!'"(187) On the same night, and the following night, the house of Shin Yasui, program
coordinator of Youthspace, a youth center in Foca, was stoned several times. (188)

ECMM had a meeting with Mayor Milos Lazovic(189) soon after these incidents. According to a report on the
meeting:

This meeting was not a friendly meeting as usual in this town....Concerning the last events in the town, Mr. L.
first expressed his astonishment asking what events. [ECMM] reminds him of the posters of Mr. Karadzic and
destroyed car of [ECMM]. Mr. L. answers that, here, in RS [Republika Srpska], the persons are free to put on
walls a few posters of the persons they like. No comment about the car. Concerning the fact that [a] few bars
refused to serve us, Mr. L. answers that in RS the owner of a private bar is free to do whatever he wants....About
the eventuality of a trade link between Federation and RS, Mr. L. told that the former executive board in the
MUN [municipality] was totally wrong when they started such things. As pres. of MUN, he has to obey the
orders coming from the higher level of the government of RS...trade with Gorazde is unauthorised...Mr. [L.] told
that representatives of IC [international community] are not invited guests in the town. All of them parade in the
town and have 'sweet life' in restaurants...Mr. L. ended this meeting telling that the best thing that IC could do, is
to leave the country and to leave the inhabitants quiet.(190)

In the weeks before the municipal elections of September 1997, an election observer with the OSCE, Takis
Michas from Greece, was harassed in Foca by the indicted Janko Janjic, otherwise known by his nickname,
"Tuta," in the presence of two uniformed Foca policemen. In an article written by the election observer and
published in the Wall Street Journal Europe a few weeks later, Michas writes that while on the streets in Foca,

An individual suddenly appeared, ordered me to stop taking pictures and, in a threatening manner, demanded to
see my identity documents. This happened in the presence of two local Bosnian Serb policemen who nodded
approvingly. Assuming by his demeanor that he was a local official, I obeyed. Only later did I discover that he
was wanted by the International War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague....We met [him] on the street once more, and
when we turned down his demand for money he threatened to have us both killed for, as he put it, "not showing
him respect."(191)

Harassment of Local Staff of International Organizations

The staff of an international organization active in the Foca region, who shared this information on request of
anonymity, reported that a Bosnian Serb interpreter who works for them in the region was severely harassed and
threatened by the authorities in Foca in late 1996 and early 1997. The organization for whom this person works
reported that s/he felt extremely unsafe, and requested special measures to ensure his/her safety. (192) In a separate
case, UNHCR reported that the driver and interpreter on the UNHCR bus that runs between Foca and Visegrad
asked for the bus route to start in Visegrad and end there, rather than in Foca, because they were being
threatened in Foca.(193) The driver of the UNHCR bus had reportedly been harassed before; once he was injured
when the bus was attacked by angry civilians throwing stones. (194)

Other Threats

On August 23, 1997, a member of the international community walking on the street in Foca was stopped by
Zoran Mandic, chief of public security, asked for registration papers and threatened with expulsion from the
town if he failed to provide them. On August 26, 1997, an IPTF monitor was threatened in Foca by a group of
five civilians. According to an ECMM report on the incident,

when he was returning to his accommodation after his shift five men surrounded him and put a hand grenade in
front of his face. Later returned to his accommodation. The local police was [sic] notified about this incident.
[The monitor] told [ECMM] that the local [chief of police] stated that some people can not forget what
happened.(195)

Attacks against persons who attempt to report on the truth about Foca are not limited to the Foca region itself. In
an incident that demonstrates the ongoing close connection between the Republika Srpska police and the Serbian
police in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Gordana Igric, a Serbian journalist who worked with a CBS
television crew investigating the presence of indictees in Foca and the failure of French SFOR to arrest them,
was harassed and threatened upon her return to Belgrade, her home, in October 1997. The Committee to Protect
Journalists reported at the time that:

Gordana Igric, a prominent Serbian freelance journalist, has been forced into hiding by a series of death threats
against her for a recent report broadcast on the U.S. television station CBS about indicted war criminals at large
in the Bosnian town of Foca....The telephone calls that Igric received at home shortly after independent local and
foreign media throughout Serbia and Bosnia broadcast excerpts of her interview featured the sounds of gunfire
and the ticking of a time bomb. The journalist, who is writing a book about war crimes in Foca, hid in another
location outside Belgrade. However, the threatening telephone calls continued to plague her in her hiding place,
forcing her to move again with her two children.(196)

International Community's Failure to Hold the Local Authorities Accountable

The incidents of harassment and noncompliance described above have not brought strong responses from the
international organizations involved in the implementation of the Dayton agreement. The threats against Takis
Michas, described above, led the international organizations in the region to ask the local Serb police to please
tell Janko Janjic, [the indicted person who threatened Michas' life] not to harass foreigners. (197) Incidents such as
this should have brought a strong condemnation from the international community.

The French SFOR troops in Foca continued peacefully to co-exist with the indictees throughout much of 1998.
The IPTF failed to expose publicly the human rights abuses being committed by and under the auspices of the
local police. And Robert Frowick, then-head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia, surrendered one of its most
important tools against the ongoing influence of the Karadzic loyalists. When the Election Appeals Sub-
Commission (EASC) struck the SDS party from the ballot for the September 1997 municipal elections for
violating the rule that prohibits persons indicted by the ICTY from appearing on posters as leaders of political
parties, Frowick overruled the decision. From that point on, the international community has squandered its
leverage to effect compliance with the Dayton agreement. The election decision had severe consequences for
places such as Foca, where the SDS leadership continues, in close collaboration since the November 1997
parliamentary elections, with the Serb Radical Party (SRS), to rule with unchecked and uncontested authority.
This has often resulted in severe restrictions on political and civil rights for the present population as well as for
those who were displaced from Foca during the war. From that point on, these authorities realized that the
international community would back down when threatened.

Takis Michas, the Greek journalist and OSCE election observer in Foca, described the inaction of the
international organizations in Foca:
The incident was only the latest, and by no means the most serious, of a whole series of aggressive acts that have
gone unanswered in Foca during the last year. In December, two cars belonging to the OSCE were blown up. In
July, a car belonging to the European Community Monitoring Mission was blown up by a hand grenade. In
August, an Italian member of a nongovernmental organization was dragged out of his car in the middle of the
city by a group that included some of the indicted war criminals and beaten up in full view of an IPTF officer
who did nothing. In August, an IPTF policeman was stopped by the same group and they placed a hand grenade
under his armpit "for fun." In all these incidents, according to witnesses, the same group of indicted war
criminals was involved. Yet no action was taken against them. (198)

Lack of Access to Information from IPTF

Human Rights Watch was unable to gather information on post-war police abuses in the Foca municipality from
the IPTF, because its officials both in the field and in its headquarters generally refused to provide such
information. In December 1997, when Human Rights Watch first visited the Foca area and the IPTF stations in
the region, the IPTF monitors expressed their hope that our report would be able to expose the police abuses that
are going on in Foca. They reported in very general terms to Human Rights Watch that there had recently been a
beating case by the local police in the central police station, that IPTF had pictures of the victim's wounds, and
that there was allegedly some high-level police involvement in the incident. However, Human Rights Watch was
unable to learn more details about the case, because the monitors had apparently received an order. It is unclear
who the order came from.

Human Rights Watch subsequently made numerous efforts to obtain information on specific cases of police
abuse in Foca from the Human Rights Office at IPTF headquarters in Sarajevo. Although the head of the Human
Rights Office, Claudio Cordone, appeared willing to authorize the monitors in the Foca region to share
information, Human Rights Watch was later informed by staff that ultimately only the regional commander has
the authority to authorize monitors to talk to Human Rights Watch. (199) The regional commander at the time,
however, had been willing to share information only regarding IPTF's mandate and role in Bosnia and
Hercegovina, and no more. A staff member told Human Rights Watch that even when the Human Rights Office
needs information, it cannot make requests directly to the IPTF field offices; it must go through the regional
commander.(200)

Ultimately, on March 9, 1998, Human Rights Watch received a letter from another IPTF human rights officer
informing us that the IPTF field monitor had received authorization from the Human Rights Office to speak with
Human Rights Watch, but only about the one beating incident from December 1997. Human Rights Watch spoke
with the monitor on April 26, 1998. A report on the incident was never completed by IPTF, however, and the
IPTF monitor was hesitant to share details about any other cases of human rights abuse by the police in Foca.

International Reconstruction Assistance and Investment in Foca

According to the International Management Group (IMG), an organization that maintains a detailed database of
all reconstruction projects throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina and the progress of their implementation, within
the past two years, various donor governments and institutions have planned for, investigated, and implemented
projects in Foca involving the influx of thousands, in some case millions, of German marks into the area. Policy
makers justify such assistance, notwithstanding ongoing human rights violations and the obstruction of the peace
process, as necessary in order to coax compliance out of the local authorities. While such policies may be
effective in communities where there are local moderate leaders who need international support and
encouragement, they risk backfiring in areas such as Foca that remain dominated by hardline extremists and war
crimes suspects. Even worse, they risk providing funds to administrators who will divert them to uses intended to
consolidate their wartime achievements.

Throughout Bosnia, donors must use extreme care to avoid rewarding the architects of "ethnic cleansing."
Nowhere is this more apparent than in Foca, where, as detailed in this report, the entire community--not only
local government, but also local companies, the hospital, and other institutions--were "ethnically cleansed" and
many of those responsible are still running the show. To ensure that they do not benefit from or sabotage
reconstruction assistance efforts, international donors must carefully vet the recipients of their aid and monitor
and audit every aspect of project implementation. Under the current political and economic power structure of
Foca, which even SFOR is disinclined to challenge, such scrutiny is not possible. Therefore, until the
international community arrests the indicted war crimes suspects at large in Foca and insists on justice for other
human rights abusers, as well as compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement, it risks at best wasting donor
resources and at worst enriching and empowering the enemies of the peace process and contributing to
reinforcement of a social order founded on injustice. A number of reconstruction projects currently underway or
recently completed in the Foca area that are detailed in the IMG report illustrate this danger.

According to IMG, UNHCR contributed 204,000 DM ($113,000), for the repair of seventy houses in Foca. The
IMG report indicates that this project was implemented by the Republika Srpska Ministry of Refugees and
completed in 1997. In response to Human Rights Watch's inquiries, UNHCR officials denied that it had funded
this project in Foca. The IMG also reported that the Italian government contributed bilateral aid in the sum of
190,000 German marks ($105,500) to repair twelve residential flats in Foca, and that this project was completed
in 1997. Notwithstanding this assistance, the Foca authorities have publicly refused to permit the return of
Bosniak refugees. The funds expended by UNHCR and the Italian government have accomplished nothing in
terms of encouraging a more receptive attitude toward returning refugees. And particularly in the case of the
UNHCR project, which was administered by Bosnian Serb government officials, there was a substantial risk that
the intended repairs were never made. To the extent that the funds spent by UNHCR and the Italian government
on housing reconstruction in Foca were even expended for that cause, they almost certainly did nothing to
facilitate the right of any refugees or displaced persons to return to their pre-war homes, as the Dayton Peace
Agreement promised.

In another example of misguided reconstruction assistance, the IMG report indicates that the Italian government
invested 110,000 German marks ($61,100) for the repair of the collective refugee center in the Hotel Zelengora,
in downtown Foca. According to the Italian organization responsible for implementing these projects, they were
completed in 1997.(201) Human Rights Watch representatives visited the Hotel Zelengora collective center in
January of 1998, and found the facility terribly rundown, with visible remaining war damage, freezing cold, and
with a stench of sewage pervading the building. On June 11, 1998, Human Rights Watch representatives
revisited the facility and found displaced persons still living in the same squalid conditions as in January. The
facility did not appear to have benefited from repairs reflecting the grant of 110,000 German marks, an enormous
sum of money in Republika Srpska today. An IPTF monitor who worked in the region during the period between
October 1997 and early 1998 confirmed to Human Rights Watch that no significant repairs were done on the
collective center during his time in Foca. The IPTF station in Foca is also located in the Hotel Zelengora, and the
conditions of the bathrooms in the station, shared with the displaced persons who are housed there, are so
intolerable that the IPTF station will be moving its location out of the hotel.

Similar concerns are raised by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank projects
currently under way. According to IMG, the World Bank is in the investigative phases of projects they have
planned for reconstruction of a Foca-area bridge that was destroyed by NATO forces during the war, in a last
minute effort to hinder Serb attacks in southeastern Bosnia. The IMG report indicates that the World Bank has
allocated 1.38 million German marks ($766,600) to finance reconstruction of the bridge. The EBRD confirmed
to Human Rights Watch that it also has plans to finance infrastructure projects in the Foca area.(202) The first
project is, like the World Bank's, a bridge reconstruction project, for which the EBRD originally budgeted $3
million, an estimate that has now been reduced to $1.5 million.(204) The second EBRD project in the area is for
rehabilitation of the road between Foca and Ustipraca, at an estimated cost of $5.6 million. (205) All three
infrastructure projects are to be implemented by the Republika Srpska Ministry of Transport in Banja Luka.
According to the EBRD, contracts for its projects were supposed to have been awarded in July 1997, but both
were delayed because of "the move of the seat of [the Republika Sprska] government to Banja Luka and
logistical problems in the operation of the Project Implementation Directorate [of the Republika Srpska Ministry
of Transport]."(206) The EBRD now expects to have these contracts mobilized by August 1998. In doing so, the
Bank and the Ministry of Transport should carefully vet contractors and subcontractors to ensure that they are
not owned or managed by those responsible for ethnically motivated dismissals, "disappearances," or "ethnic
cleansing." In response to Human Rights Watch's inquiries about such vetting, the EBRD replied that its
procurement policy is to "ensure that project funding is not applied in contravention of Section VII of the Charter
of the United Nations"(207): provisions of the charter binding U.N. members to apply sanctions adopted by the
Security Council in response to threats to the peace. There are no sanctions that preclude economic relations with
Bosnian entities or individuals implicated in war crimes or obstruction of the Dayton Agreement, so this policy
alone is insufficient to ensure that EBRD's reconstruction projects in the Foca area will not benefit the architects
of "ethnic cleansing."

Problems also arise in connection with international organizations' efforts to lease space from which to work in
the area. In Foca, both the OSCE and the IPTF rent facilities for their offices from the local authorities. In 1997,
the OSCE office moved from a private accommodation to a facility owned by the local government. The IPTF
office, currently in the Hotel Zelengora (owned by local government), is planning to move its station to a space
above a restaurant that is part of the KP Dom prison facility. The prison and the restaurant are owned by the
Foca municipality, and thus the IPTF will continue to pay rent to the Foca authorities. According to IPTF, their
rent for

this space will exceed 2,000 DM per month ($1,110). Notwithstanding this patronage, representatives of these
organizations face harassment and obstruction of their work.

In Foca and other similar communities, efforts to use reconstruction assistance as a carrot to encourage
cooperation are clearly ill-fated. In terms of such cooperation, the international community has little to show for
its investment to date in the Foca area. In the same vein, even the most rigorous vetting and auditing procedures
cannot ensure that reconstruction projects in Foca will serve their intended purposes, without enriching and
empowering corrupt and abusive local elites. The answer in Foca and other similar communities must be action
by the international community to arrest indicted war criminals and enforce the Dayton Peace Agreement.

CONCLUSION

Human Rights Watch is concerned that the international organizations in the Foca region, and in Foca itself, may
not be doing all that is within their respective briefs and capacities to hold the local authorities responsible for
past and present abuses and for noncompliance with the provisions of the Dayton agreement. This is likely
related to a fundamental contradiction between attempts to maintain cordial relations and the idea of gently
"coaxing" the local authorities into complying, and the duty to arrest some among them, while monitoring
continuing human rights abuses, with a view to bringing the perpetrators to justice.

There are many reasons the staff of international organizations in towns like Foca might be unwilling to
challenge local authorities that fail to comply with the Dayton agreement, not least of which is the risk of
harassment, attacks, threats, or even of being "evicted" from the town that anyone who challenges the local
authorities may face. The examples described above demonstrate clearly what has happened when international
personnel have attempted to engage in activities or programs which the local authorities believe threaten their
control in the town. But the tactic of reticence in withholding criticism of the local authorities in Foca has neither
won friends nor made them more compliant; it has not brought freedom of expression or association; it has not
opened Foca to the return of refugees and displaced persons; it has brought about a vetted police force that
protects human rights; it has not even led to the permanent resettling of displaced Serbs who live in atrocious
conditions. The international organizations have turned a blind eye not only to the connection between the brutal
crimes which occurred in Foca during the war and the current leadership of the town, but also to their current
noncompliance with the most basic principles of the Dayton agreement.

The failure of the international organizations in Foca, including OSCE, IPTF, and ECMM, and those whose
mandates cover Foca and other towns, such as U.N. Civil Affairs, to report publicly on the lack of cooperation of
the Foca authorities has accomplished nothing but, as one OSCE staff person reported to Human Rights Watch,
to present the illusion that "things are very peaceful in Srbinje." This portrayal of a town where indictees roam
free, returnees face bodily harm, and where the local population may be denied humanitarian assistance because
of their beliefs is dangerous and misleading. It is possibly because of the lack of open and public reporting on the
actual situation in Foca that the World Bank and the U.S. government could have considered investing large
sums of money in the town, which, under present conditions, would serve to entrench the power of those who are
responsible for war crimes and post-war noncompliance. It is imperative that the perpetrators of war crimes and
other gross abuses be held accountable for their crimes and that obstructionist authorities be pressured into
compliance with the Dayton agreement. Most importantly, it is crucial that these persons do not benefit from
economic aid in their efforts to build walls to permanently separate Foca's divided people. It is the responsibility
of the international organizations present in the region to ensure accountability.
APPENDIX I: "Concentration Camp in Foca": KP Dom Foca

Legend

1) - building for "inmates" (I)

- ground floor solitary confinement cell

- upper floor inmate cells number 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15

- hospital and pharmacy in the attic

2) - building for inmates (II)

- ground floor solitary confinement cell

- upper floor inmate cells number 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23

3) -furniture factory

4) - shack for building materials

5) - guards room (torture chamber)

6) - radio station

7) - solitary confinement cell (torture chamber)

8) - solitary confinement cell (torture chamber)

9) - visitors room (torture chamber)

10-14) - machine guns rooms

15) - cafeteria (movie room on the upper floor)

16) - kitchen

17) - cafeteria (school on the upper floor)

18) - bakery

19) - furniture store

20-23) - guards quarters

24) - entrance to KP Dom

25) - transport gate

26) - coffee shop

27) - KP Dom management

28) - KP Dom guard on duty

29) - entrance to the engine room

30) - iron bridge over the Drina river

K1-K5 - watch towers

APPENDIX II: Events Following the Arrest of Milorad Krnojelac

On June 15, 1998, Milorad Krnojelac was arrested by SFOR troops in accordance with a sealed
indictment accusing Krnojelac of beatings, murder, willful killing, willfully causing serious injury, cruel
treatment and inhumane acts towards prisoners in the KP Dom prison camp in Foca. Following the
arrest, a series of "spontaneous" demonstrations took place in Foca. They were characterized by Agence
France Presse as "violent,"(208) and indeed resulted in the U.S. Consulate issuing an advisory to citizens on
June 17 "to avoid the Foca area until further notice...[and that] U.S. citizens should remain alert to the
security situation and exercise caution regarding their personal security."

On June 16, demonstrators in Foca attacked local OSCE and IPTF stations, breaking into and damaging
the offices as well as taking office equipment. One car belonging to IPTF was overturned during the
protest. As the offices had taken the precaution of evacuating the town immediately following the arrest
action, no international staff was injured.

However, Human Rights Watch learned that personal threats were delivered to representatives of
international organizations immediately following the attacks on the offices. In one instance, when a
representative who had evacuated the town following the arrest returned to his/her residence in Foca, s/he
found that his/her landlady and her children had been threatened and did not feel safe with the
representative remaining in her building. This international staff person reported that s/he and the
landlady had been threatened repeatedly over the three months prior to the arrest of Krnojelac, but that
the threats became too serious for him/her to remain in this residence.

Further, while local police were praised by U.N. representatives for their role in breaking up the protest,
the role of local authorities in instigating the demonstrations and attacks against international
representatives remains unclear. According to Bosnian Serb radio, de facto Mayor Ljubo Veljovic spoke
out publicly at a rally against the international community for undertaking the arrest. (209) Duncan
Bullivant, spokesman for the Office of the High Representative (OHR), later appealed directly to Veljovic
to stop the rallies and announced that "the mayor of Srbinje will be responsible for possible incidents in
this town."(210) Human Rights Watch has also received reports that OSCE has asked the mayor for
compensation for the equipment that was damaged during the attack. These reports indicate that, at
minimum, the international representatives present during the demonstrations believe that the
"spontaneous" events were actually orchestrated by local authorities. If it were true that the local Foca
authorities were responsible for the covert incitement of crowds of citizens into "unplanned"
demonstrations, this would fit into a pattern of similar behavior long-noted throughout the war and post-
war period in Bosnia--tactics popular because they sucessfully further the interests of hardline officials
without directly implicating them in the violence that inevitably erupts during such incidents.

APPENDIX III: Excerpts from the ICTY Indictment Against Gagovic et al.

The following were indicted by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former
Yugoslavia:

Dragan Gagovic

Gojko Jankovic

Janko Janjic

Radomir Kovac

Zoran Vukovic

Dragan Zelenovic
Dragoljub Kunarac

(surrendered to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on March 4, 1998)

Radovan Stankovic

with CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, GRAVE BREACHES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

(HEREAFTER GRAVE BREACHES) and VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as
set forth below:

In the case of Torture and Rape at Buk Bijela,

GOJKO JANKOVIC indicted for:

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

DRAGAN ZELENOVIC indicted for:

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

JANKO JANIC indicted for:

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

In the case of Torture and Rape at Foca High School,

DRAGAN ZELENOVIC indicted for:

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

JANKO JANJIC indicted for:

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

ZORAN VUKOVIC indicted for:

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

GOJKO JANKOVIC indicted for:

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OFWAR;

In the case of persecution in Partizan Sports Hall,

DRAGAN GAGOVIC indicted for:

persecution on political, racial and/or religious grounds as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

wilfully causing great suffering as a GRAVE BREACH;

outrages upon personal dignity as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

In the case of Torture and Rape of FWS-48 at Partizan Sports Hall,

DRAGAN GAGOVIC indicted for:

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

In the case of Torture and Rape of FWS-48, FWS-50, FWS-75, FWS-87, FWS-95 and other women at
Partizan Sports Hall,

JANKO JANJIC indicted for:

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

DRAGOLJUB KUNARAC surrendered to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
on March 4, 1998 on charges of:

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

ZORAN VUKOVIC indicted for :

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

GOJKO JANKOVIC indicted for:

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

DRAGAN ZELENOVIC indicted for:

torture as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

torture as a GRAVE BREACH;

torture as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

In the case of Enslavement and Rape of FWS-75, FWS-87 and Seven Other Women in the House of
Nusret Karaman,

RADOVAN STANKOVIC indicted for:

enslavement as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

inhuman treatment as a GRAVE BREACH;

outrages upon personal dignity as a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR;

In the case of Rape of FWS-75 and FWS-87 and Two Other Women,

GOJKO JANKOVIC, DRAGAN ZELENOVIC and JANKO JANJIC indicted for:

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

In the case of Enslavement and Rape of FWS-75 and FWS-87 in a Brena Apartment,

RADOMIR KOVAC indicted for:

enslavement as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY;

rape as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY.

1. After the war was over, Bosnian Serb authorities in Foca renamed the town "Srbinje." Out of respect for the
thousands of victims tortured and murdered by these same Bosnian Serb authorities, the town will be referred to
by its traditional name, Foca, in this report.

2. Zoran Vukovic is alleged to be living in the Prijedor area.

3. Human Rights Watch interview, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1997. The Serbs chose to attack Foca on
April 7, 1992, the third day of the Muslim holiday of Bajram, which comes at the end of Ramadan, the month of
fasting.

4. ICRC Special Report, "The Issue of Missing Persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia," February 1, 1998.

5. The SFOR troops in Bosnia and Hercegovina are divided into three sectors: British, American, and French.
British SFOR troops, in an action in the Prijedor region in July 1997, arrested one secretly indicted person and
killed a second when he resisted arrest. Dutch SFOR troops arrested Vlatko Kupreskic, who was publicly
indicted, and Anto Furundzija, whose indictment was sealed, in Vitez in December 1997. American SFOR
troops arrested the publicly indicted Goran Jelisic in Bijeljina in January 1998. British troops also arrested
Miroslav Kvocka and Mladen Radic--both publicly indicted--in Omarska, near Prijedor, in April 1998. French
SFOR troops did not attempt to arrest any of the indictees in their region, in which Radovan Karadzic also
allegedly resides, until June 15, 1998, when they arrested Milorad Krnojelac, under sealed indictment for his role
as manager of the KP Dom detention center. For more details of KP Dom and on Krnojelac's role, see below.

6. During the Second World War, the Cetniks fought against the occupying Axis powers and called for the
restoration of the Serbian monarchy and the creation of a Greater Serbia. The Cetniks also fought against the
pro-Nazi Ustasa forces of Croatia and Tito's communist Partisans and were responsible for widespread atrocities
against Muslims and Croats, primarily in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Croats and Muslims both in Croatia and
Bosnia commonly refer to Serbian military and paramilitary forces engaged in the recent war in Bosnia as
"Cetniks" in a derogatory sense. Though some military institutions in Serbia and the Republika Srpska
vehemently reject the label "Cetnik," claiming they are merely defenders of their people and their land and that
they are not extremists, others, such as those loyal to the ultra-right wing leader of the Serbian Radical Party,
Vojislav Seselj, commonly refer to themselves as Cetniks.

7. Hereinafter referred to as the U.N. Commission of Experts.

8. United Nations, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, established pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (New York: United Nations, 1992), S/1994/674/Annex III.A., 17. 746, 413, p. 136.
9. United Nations, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Annex III. A., 17. 746, 413, p.
169.

10. For details of the crimes committed in the Partizan Sports Hall rape camp for women, please see section on
detention centers.

11. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 4, 1998.

12. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 21, 1997.

13. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 22, 1997.

14. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1997.

15. Human Rights Watch interview, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 1998.

16. Human Rights Watch interview with Foca municipal government-in-exile, Ustikolina, Bosnia and
Hercegovina, January 14, 1998.

17. ICRC Special Report, "The Issue of Missing Persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia," February 1, 1998.

18. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 21, 1997.

19. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 1998.

20. Ibid.

21. United States Department of State, "Seventh Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia,"
Supplemental United States Submission of information to the United Nations Security Council in Accordance
with Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992), dated April 12, 1993, (17)
April-August 1992.

22. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 22, 1997. At the time, Ustikolina,
which is on the road between Gorazde and Foca, was under Bosnian Serb control. After the war, it was
transferred to the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

23. "Ustashe" is the name for the Croatian forces which joined sides with the Nazis during World War II. It is a
term currently used to describe nationalist fascist Croats, both by themselves and by others. In this case, the term
is meant simply as a slur.

24. Human Rights Watch interview, December 22, 1997.

25. United Nations, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts...,Annex VIII, p. 139.

26. United States Department of State, "Seventh Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia," (4) July
1992.

27. Human Rights Watch interviews, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 1997 and January 1998.

28. Human Rights Watch was unable to determine the precise number of persons who "disappeared" before
September 1993. However, extensive interviews with survivors, former officials, and journalists working in the
region during the war have shown the period of Krnojelac's management, April 1992-September 1993, to have
been the period during which the greatest number of non-Serbs were detained in KP Dom, tortured and
mistreated, and "disappeared."
29. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1997.

30. "Persons Accused of Having Committed War Crimes," State Commission for Gathering Facts on War
Crimes, Bulletin no.4, Sarajevo, April 1993.

31. See Appendix II for details on Krnojelac's indictment.

32. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 4, 1998.

33. Human Rights Watch interview, December 22, 1997.

34. Ibid.

35. Human Rights Watch interview, December 20, 1997.

36. List of personalities of the Area of Responsibility (AOR), European Community Monitoring Mission
(ECMM), June 16, 1997, and interview with ECMM/Foca, January 13, 1998.

37. Human Rights Watch interviews with survivors of KP Dom, namely E.D., interview December 21, 1997,
F.E., interview December 22, 1997, and I.H., interviews 1997 and 1998.

38. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 21, 1997.

39. Human Rights Watch interview with IPTF, Bosnia and Hercegovina, May 30, 1998.

40. Human Rights Watch interview with staff member of an international institution which has been functioning
in the region of Foca throughout the war and in the post-Dayton period, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December
1997.

41. Human Rights Watch interviews, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 21, 1997 and December 22, 1997.

42. Human Rights Watch interviews, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 1997 and May 1998.

43. This is a pseudonym for the witness' friend, because naming the friend might enable someone to identify the
witness, who wished to remain anonymous.

44. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 22, 1997.

45. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 21, 1997.

46. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1997.

47. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 22, 1997.

48. Human Rights Watch interviews, December 22, 1997.

49. Human Rights Watch interviews, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1997 and 1998.

50. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 22, 1997.

51. Human Rights Watch interview, December 1997.

52. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 22, 1997.

53. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 21, 1997.
54. "Persons Accused of Having Committed War Crimes," State Commission for Gathering Facts on War
Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulletin no. 4, Sarajevo, April 1993.

55. Human Rights Watch interview with IPTF, Bosnia and Hercegovina, May 30, 1998.

56. Roy Gutman, "A Daily Ritual of Sex Abuse," Newsday, April 19, 1993.

57. "Refugee Days," Vreme News Digest Agency, March 29, 1993.

58. United Nations, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Annex VIII, p. 146.

59. United States Department of State, "Seventh Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia," (21) July-
August 1992.

60. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 22, 1997.

61. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 4, 1998.

62. For details on Milenko "Zeko" Vukovic, see section on Miljevina below.

63. This witness spoke in terms of the abuses that occurred in Partizan as they were told to her by other women
during her brief stay there, not exclusively about her own experiences there, since she was imprisoned there for
only one night.

64. Roy Gutman, "Rape Camps: Evidence Serb Leaders in Bosnia OKd attacks," Newsday, April 19, 1993.

65. Gutman, "A Daily Ritual...," Newsday.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Victoria Clark, "Rape Thy Neighbour," Observer (London), February 21, 1993.

69. Roy Gutman, "Bosnian Camp Plea Unheeded; Mitterand alerted early to killings, witnesses say, but
remained passive," Newsday, May 11, 1994, p. 6.

70. Clark, "Rape Thy Neighbour," Observer.

71. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 1997.

72. The United Nations Commission of Experts report says of Velecevo that "Serb forces allegedly used the
Velecevo women's prison in Foca as a concentration camp for Muslim women. Women were reportedly held
there as late as April 1993." United Nations, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Annex
VIII, p. 147.

73. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 1998.

74. United Nations, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Annex X, Mass Graves,
December 28, 1994.

75. Human Rights Watch interviews, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 1997 and January 1998.

76. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina.

77. "Persons Accused of Having Committed War Crimes," State Commission for Gathering Facts on War
Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulletin no. 4, Sarajevo, April 1993.

78. Human Rights Watch interview, Gorazde, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 21, 1997.

79. The name for soldiers loyal to Serbian Radical Vojislav Seselj, widely known as one of the most brutal Serb
leaders in the former Yugoslavia. Seselj won the 1997 presidential elections in Serbia, but the results were
annulled due to supposed election fraud. (When the election was reheld, SPS candidate Milan Milutinovic was
elected president by a narrow margin.) In March 1998, however, Seselj was appointed to the position of deputy
prime minister of Serbia as a reflection of the significant percentage of seats won by his Serbian Radical Party in
the 1998 federal elections.

80. United States Department of State, "Seventh Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia," (20) July-
August 1992.

81. According to the Foca municipal government-in-exile, Pero Elez is deceased.

82. Human Rights Watch interviews, Bosnia and Hercegovina, respectively, December 22, 1997 and January 4,
1998 (K.J. and L.K.), and January 5, 1998.

83. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 22, 1997.

84. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 4, 1998.

85. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 5, 1998.

86. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 4, 1998.

87. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 5, 1998.

88. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 4, 1998

89. Ibid.

90. United Nations, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, S/1994/674/Annex VIII, pp.
147-8. The Karaman House is not the only private accommodation that was used as a detention and rape center
for women. In fact, Human Rights Watch's interviews and the U.N. Commission of Experts report both have
produced evidence that many houses and apartments which were confiscated by Serb forces during the Foca
takeover were used as private rape camps. See U.N. Commission of Experts report, p. 144.

91. Human Rights Watch interview with Foca municipal government-in-exile, Ustikolina, Bosnia and
Hercegovina, January 14, 1998.

92. United Nations, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Annex VIII, p. 144.

93. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 4, 1998.

94. One witness interviewed alleged to Human Rights Watch that Milenko Vukovic is deceased, however, we
have received contradictory information regarding this question, and have therefore included him in the list.

95. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 5, 1998.

96. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 4, 1998.

97. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 4, 1998.
98. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 5, 1998.

99. Human Rights Watch interview with Bosniak from Miljevina, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 14, 1998.

100. Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1993), p. 157.

101. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780
(1992), Annex V: "The Prijedor Report" (New York: United Nations, 1995) pp.49-50.

102. Hannes Tretter, Stephan Muller, Roswitha Schwanke, Paul Angeli, and Andreas Richter, 'Ethnic Cleansing
Operations' in the northeast-Bosnian City of Zvornik from April through June 1992 (Vienna: Ludwig Boltzmann
Institute for Human Rights, 1994).

103. Also referred to in the Ludwig Boltzmann report and the Final Report of the Commission of Experts as the
"emergency staff."

104. Final Report of the Commission of Experts, Annex IV: "The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing"; Tretter et
al., "Ethnic Cleansing Operations" in the northeast-Bosnian City of Zvornik from April through June 1992.

105. One of these documents was a certification that the male resident had "donated" blood. Blood was taken
from detainees at some regional camps; additionally, some witnesses report that deaths occurred in the Zvornik
hospital as a result of people being literally bled to death. Final Report of the Commission of Experts, Annex IV,
n. 324.

106. Final Report of the Commission of Experts, Annex IV.

107. Roy Gutman, "Rape Camps; Evidence Serb leaders in Bosnia Okd Attacks," Newsday, April 19, 1993.

108. Simo Mojevic was allegedly a member of the Ustikolina Crisis Committee. For details see below.

109. Green is a color used to indicate Muslim influence or control. Here, Cancar is referring to a commonly used
propaganda tool, which alleges that the Bosnian Muslims were involved in a plot to connect different regions of
the former Yugoslavia where there is a large Muslim population. The Serb authorities often described this "plot"
in order to encourage the Bosnian Serb population to "defend itself" against the "Muslim expansionist threat."

110. Transcript of interview with Petko Cancar, 1996. Transcript was provided to Human Rights Watch by the
journalist on condition of anonymity. To date, the interview has not been published.

111. Charlotte Eagar, "Bosnia: Cavalier Doctor Plots Carve-Up From His Lair," Observer, November 28, 1993.

112. "Bosnia: Authorities To Send Documents On War Crimes to Hague," Hina News Agency, Zagreb in
English, 1650 gmt, April 26, 1995.

113. See section on Noncompliance by Foca Authorities in the Post-War Period.

114. Radio Free Europe, "Bosnian Serbs Define Borders," no. 142, July 28, 1992.

115. United Nations, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Annex III. A., 17. 746, 413, p.
169.

116. Roy Gutman, "Rape Camps...," Newsday.

117. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Genocide in Bosnia Hearing, Fourth Congress, First
Session, CSCE 104-1-4, Washington, D.C., Tuesday, April 4, 1995.

118. Roy Gutman, "Rape Camps...," Newsday.

119. Radio Free Europe, "Bosnian Serbs Claim Thousands Executed in Croat-Muslim Camps," August 5, 1992.

120. Roy Gutman, "Rape Camps...," Newsday. Gutman reported that he received confirmation of this fact from
Bosnian Serb sources, who shared the information on condition of anonymity.

121. Tracy Wilkinson, "Harsh Light Shines on Dark Bosnian Corner," Los Angeles Times, September 27, 1997.

122. Ibid.

123. Roy Gutman, "Rape Camps...," Newsday.

124. Ibid.

125. When the Sarajevo suburbs were transferred to Federation control in March 1996, most of the ethnic Serb
population of these suburbs abandoned their homes to settle into temporary accommodations throughout
Republika Srpska. Federation authorities failed to ensure the security of those Bosnian Serbs who wished to
remain in their homes in Sarajevo. In addition, the Bosnian Serb authorities played a key role in encouraging the
Bosnian Serb population to leave, frequently offering them incentives for resettling in Republika Srpska, a tactic
that was part of Bosnian Serb efforts to move populations in order to cement the ethnic divide.

126. State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulletin
No. 4, April 1993, p. 28.

127. "Bosnia: Ruling Party Reportedly Grooming Successor to President Plavsic," Gradjanin, Belgrade, in
Serbo-Croat, 1218 gmt, August 11, 1997.

128. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, February 1998.

129. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 1997.

130. Faik Tafro, "Krvavi Bajram," Dani, December 8, 1997

131. Human Rights Watch telephone interview, April 1998.

132. Human Rights Watch interview, January 1998.

133. Testimony of Bosnian Serb soldier from Foca, provided to Human Rights Watch under condition of
anonymity by S.D., an international journalist.

134. Human Rights Watch interview, June 1998.

135. Human Rights Watch telephone interview, April 1998.

136. Bosnian names are frequently written in last-name-first order.

137. Transcript of interview with Petko Cancar, in Bosnian, 1996. Transcript was provided to Human Rights
Watch by the journalist on condition of anonymity.

138. United States Department of State, "Seventh Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia," (47) April
92.

139. Human Rights Watch interview, April 1998.

140. "Persons Accused of Having Committed War Crimes," State Commission for Gathering Facts on War
Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulletin no. 4, Sarajevo, April 1993.
141. Faik Tafro, "Kravni Bajram," Dani.

142. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1997.

143. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 1998.

144. List of personalities of the AOR, European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), June 16, 1997.

145. Faik Tafro, "Spavaona Broj 15," Dani, January 19, 1998.

146. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 1998.

147. Ibid.

148. Human Rights Watch interviews, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 1998.

149. Human Rights Watch interview, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 1998.

150. Ibid.

151. Hugh Pain, "Bosnia: Moslem Culture Destroyed in Bosnian Town." Reuters News Service. September 25,
1992.

152. Janjo Janjic was indicted on June 26, 1996, for his role in the attack on Foca, for arresting and detaining
civilians, and raping women in detention and under interrogation.

153. Zoran Vukovic was indicted on June 26, 1996, for his role in the attack on Foca, for arresting and detaining
civilians, and raping women in detention.

154. Human Rights Watch telephone interview, April 1998.

155. Human Rights Watch telephone interview, June 1998.

156. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 1997.

157. Indictment against Dragan Gagovic, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 26,
1996.

158. Human Rights Watch telephone interview, June 1998.

159. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, February 1998.

160. Ibid.

161. Ibid.

162. Human Rights Watch interview with IPTF, Bosnia and Hercegovina, May 1998.

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid.

165. Human Rights Watch interview with IPTF, Bosnia and Hercegovina, May 30, 1998.

166. Human Rights Watch interview, June 1998.

167. Human Rights Watch written interview, November 1997.

168. Human Rights Watch interview, January 1998.

169. "Public Reactions at Srbinje/Foca Municipality on the Political Struggles in the RS," IPTF Gorazde, July 2,
1997.

170. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, May 16, 1998.

171. "Minutes of Inter-Agency Meeting Held in Foca/Srbinje on 17.4.1997," UNHCR/Gorazde, Bosnia and
Hercegovina, April 1997.

172. Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR staff, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 5 and 14, 1998.

173. Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR staff, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 13, 1998.

174. Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR staff, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 5 and 14, 1998.

175. Mayors of municipalities in Bosnia have been chosen by the municipal assemblies, whose members were
elected in the September 1997 municipal elections. Due to the fact that the municipal assembly of Foca, in which
the Bosniaks won a majority, has never been permitted to take its seat in the Foca government, the OSCE has not
yet certified the Foca municipal election results. Thus, under the OSCE's Provisional Election Commission rules
and regulations, Ljubo Veljovic is not the legitimate mayor of Foca.

176. Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR staff, Bosnia and Hercegovina, February 6, 1998.

177. Human Rights Watch interview with OSCE staff in Foca, April 1997.

178. Human Rights Watch interview with IRC staff in Gorazde, April 1997.

179. Human Rights Watch interview with IRC, Bosnia and Hercegovina, February 5, 1998.

180. Human Rights Watch interview with IPTF staff member, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 1998.

181. "Public Reactions at Srbinje/Foca Municipality on the Political Struggles in the RS," IPTF Gorazde, July 2,
1997.

182. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, December 21, 1997.

183. Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 5, 1998.

184. The legal aid center in Foca is in the Hotel Zelengora, as is the IPTF station. Since the Hotel Zelengora is a
publicly owned building, the Foca authorities receive the rent paid for the spaces. This may be one reason why
the authorities have allowed the centers to open.

185. Human Rights Watch interviews with interpreters, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January and February 1998.

186. ECMM report on the general situation in the AOR, July 21, 1997.

187. Ibid. A derogatory term for Muslim.

188. ECMM report on the general situation in the AOR, July 21, 1997.

189. Milos Lazovic was the mayor of Foca between April and November 1997. He also ran as a candidate in the
September 1997 municipal elections. He was once the director of the main post office in Sarajevo, and during
the war, director of the Foca post office. Lazovic replaced Cancar as mayor. According to U.N. Civil Affairs,
Lazovic is currently president of a local governmental committee.

190. ECMM Daily Report, July 29, 1997.

191. Takis Michas, "Appeasing Criminals in Bosnia," Wall Street Journal Europe, September 24, 1997.

192. Human Rights Watch interview, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 1998.

193. Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR, Bosnia and Hercegovina, January 14, 1998.

194. It is unclear whether this was the same individual.

195. ECMM/Srbinje report, August 27, 1997.

196. Action Alert - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia), "Serbian Journalist Threatened With Death,"
Committee to Protect Journalists, October 29, 1997.

197. Takis Michas, "Appeasing Criminals In Bosnia," Wall Street Journal Europe, September 24, 1997.

198. Takis Michas, "Appeasing Criminals In Bosnia," Wall Street Journal Europe, September 24, 1997.

199. Human Rights Watch interview with a staff member of the Human Rights Office of IPTF, Sarajevo,
January 1998.

200. Ibid.

201. Human Rights Watch telephone interview, June 25, 1998.

202. (203)

203.

204. Ibid.

205. Ibid.

206. Ibid.

207. Ibid.

208. Jacqueline Pietsch, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: AFP Gives Details of Krnojelac Indictment," Paris AFP (North
European Service), June 18, 1998.

209. "Rally Held Over Bosnian Serb's Arrest for War Crimes," Pale SRNA (in Serbo-Croatian), June 15, 1998,
15:10 GMT.

210. Mihajlo Orlovic report, Banja Luka Srpska Televizija (in Serbo-Croatian), June 17, 1998, 17:30 GMT.
Ovo je GOOGLE NAKARADNI PREVOD sa engleskog.
A Closed, Dark Place
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/foca/
Srpanj 1998. 10, br. 6 (D)
BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
"Zatvoreno, tamno mjesto":
Prošlost i sadašnjost kršenja ljudskih prava u reda Foca

Online

 ZAHVALE
 SAŢETAK
 PREPORUKE
 WARTIME ABUSES
o pozadina
o Snage iz Srbije i Crne Gore
o Centri za pritvor
 Livade
 KP Dom
 Osoblje KP Doma
 Sportska dvorana Partizan
 Bolnica u Foĉi
 Ostali nesluţbeni logori
o Miljevina
 Ostali sudionici u preuzimanju Miljevine
o Krizni odbor i njegovi voĊe
 Petko Cancar - Ratno vrijeme: gradonaĉelnik Foĉe, voditelj Kriznog odbora /
Aktualni: Ministar pravde Republike Srpske
 Velibor Ostojić - Ratno vrijeme: ministar informiranja za teritorij pod kontrolom
bosanskih Srba, voĊa Kriznog odbora u Foĉi / Aktualno: Šef Komisije za ljudska
prava Parlamenta BiH
 Vojislav Maksimovic - Ratno vrijeme: voditelj Kriznog odbora / Aktualno: Rektor
Sveuĉilišta Republike Srpske, Republika Srpska
 Ostali ĉlanovi Kriznog odbora
o TakoĊer je ukljuĉen u preuzimanje
 NAKON RATNIH ZLOSTAVLJANJA: NESPOSOBLJENOST FOKACIJSKIH VLASTI U
POSLIJERATNOM RAZDOBLJU
o Zlouporaba ljudskih prava protiv sadašnjeg stanovništva Foĉe
 Premlaćivanje policije
 Sloboda izraţavanja i pristup informacijama
o Sprjeĉavanje povratka izbjeglica i raseljenih osoba u Foĉu
o Blokiranje meĊuentitetskih projekata
o Ometanje rada tijela koja provode Daytonski sporazum
 Zlostavljanje Pale i lokalna policija
 Pristup kolektivnim centrima za raseljene osobe
 poboljšanja
o Uznemiravanje meĊunarodnih organizacija
 Prijedor je u srpnju 1997. uhapsio i ponovio posljedice u Foĉi
 Uznemiravanje lokalnog osoblja meĊunarodnih organizacija
 Ostale prijetnje
 oNeuspjeh meĊunarodne zajednice da lokalne vlasti preuzmu odgovornost
 Nedostatak pristupa informacijama iz IPTF-a
o MeĊunarodna pomoć u obnovi i ulaganje u Foĉi
 ZAKLJUĈAK
 DODATAK I: "Koncentracioni logor u Foĉi": KP Dom Foĉa
 DODATAK II: DogaĊaji nakon uhićenja Milorada Krnojelca
 PRILOG III: Izvodi iz optuţnice MKSJ-a protiv Gagovića i dr.

ZAHVALE

Ovo izvješće temelji se na istraţivanju provedenom u Bosni i Hercegovini, posebice u regiji Foĉe, u travnju
1997. i od prosinca 1997. do veljaĉe 1998. Izvori za ratne zlostavljanja ukljuĉivali su istraţivanje koje je Human
Rights Watch proveo tijekom rata. Izvješće je uredila Holly Cartner, izvršna direktorica odjela Human Rights
Watch Europe i Središnje Azije. Posebno se zahvaljujemo Dinah PoKempner i Michaelu McClintocku. Kljuĉnu
pomoć u pripremi izvješća pruţila je Emily Shaw. Human Rights Watch ţeli zahvaliti i zahvaliti mnogim
pojedincima ĉiji je doprinos istraţivanju omogućio ovo izvješće, ali koji se ne mogu imenovati. Rizikovali su
vlastitu sigurnost i sigurnost svojih obitelji kako bi razotkrili istinu, u nadi da će njihovi poĉinitelji biti izvedeni
pred lice pravde.

SAŢETAK

Općina Foĉa bila je mjesto nekih od najbrutalnijih zloĉina poĉinjenih tijekom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini 1992-
1995. (1) Civilni, policijski i vojni duţnosnici bosanskih Srba, u suradnji s paravojnim postrojbama i rezervistima
bivše Jugoslavenske vojske koji su pozvani iz Srbije i Crne Gore, preuzeli su Foĉu u travnju 1992. godine. u
mnogim gradovima na teritoriju pod kontrolom bosanskih Srba, da planiraju i provode protjerivanje nesrpskog
stanovništva. Koristeći temeljitu propagandnu kampanju kako bi uvjerili lokalno stanovništvo bosanskih Srba da
su pod prijetnjom muslimanskog fundamentalistiĉkog drţavnog udara, Krizni je odbor uspostavio mreţu
zatoĉeniĉkih centara, gdje su nesrpski civili bili zatoĉeni, muĉeni, silovani i protjerani, ubijani ili "nestao",
napuštajući grad kakav je danas, gotovo u potpunosti etniĉki srpski.

Osobe za koje mnogi izvori tvrde da su odgovorni za zloĉine poĉinjene u Foĉi tijekom rata i dalje imaju moć u
gradu. U mnogim sluĉajevima, oni su u drţavnim ili policijskim poloţajima. U drugim sluĉajevima, oni drţe ĉak
i više pozicije u Republici Srpskoj ili vladi Bosne i Hercegovine. Na tim pozicijama meĊunarodni promatraĉi su
ih mogli prepoznati kao odgovorne za dugotrajno nepoštivanje odredbi Daytonskog sporazuma, kao i za sustavna
kršenja ljudskih prava u poslijeratnom razdoblju. U Foĉi, gdje vlasti i policija ostaju vjerni optuţenom Radovanu
Karadţiću, nije bilo povratka izbjeglica, nema slobode kretanja ili izraţavanja, policija nije imala nikakvu
provjeru, a šest je optuţenih za ratne zloĉine. Poznato je da se nalazi u gradu. Francuske trupe NATO-a
stacionirane u gradu od konca 1995. godine odbile su uhititi jednu optuţenu osobu sve do nedavno, kada su 15.
lipnja 1998. uhitile Milorada Krnojelca na temelju zapeĉaćene optuţnice. Šest javno optuţenih osoba, meĊutim,
ostaju u Foĉi. MeĊunarodne policijske snage (IPTF), Organizacija za sigurnost i suradnju u Europi (OSCE) i
Nadzorna misija Europske zajednice (ECMM) rade u Foĉi kao da je bilo koji drugi grad, zatvarajući oĉi pred
prošlim i sadašnjim zlostavljanjima. , u korist "miroljubivih odnosa". Neuspjeh da se zvaniĉnici uĉine
odgovornima za prošle i sadašnje zloupotrebe u Foĉi, meĊutim, nije doveo do poštivanja Daytonskog
sporazuma; nije bilo povratka izbjeglica ili raseljenih osoba, bez provjere ili provjere lokalne policije, slobode
izraţavanja, udruţivanja, i kretanje je i dalje strogo ograniĉeno, a bilo je i brojnih sluĉajeva napada i
uznemiravanja meĊunarodnih novinara i drugih ĉlanova meĊunarodne zajednice, te protiv lokalnih graĊana koji
se ne slaţu s vlastima. Ipak, multilateralne institucije i vlade donatora razmotrile su odobravanje - au nekim
sluĉajevima i odobravanje - znatnih iznosa ekonomske pomoći podruĉju Foĉe. U stvari, nekoliko zemalja i
organizacija donatora, ukljuĉujući talijansku vladu i Svjetsku banku, Europsku uniju (EU), Europsku banku za
obnovu i razvoj (EBRD) i Visoko povjerenstvo Ujedinjenih naroda za izbjeglice (UNHCR) uloţili su u podruĉju
Foĉe u protekloj godini. U prosincu, Svjetska banka odbila je prijedlog za dodatnu pomoć Foĉi tek nakon što su
nevladine organizacije protestirale protiv donatorskih vlada. Human Rights Watch je ozbiljno zabrinut što je u
sadašnjoj atmosferi nekaţnjivosti i nesuradnje opisane u ovom izvješću, taj novac vjerojatno samo obogatio i
osnaţio one sluţbenike odgovorne za stalne povrede ljudskih prava i sustavnu opstrukciju provedbe Daytonskog
mirovnog sporazuma. (Za više detalja pogledajte odjeljak o meĊunarodnim ulaganjima u Foĉi.) taj novac će
vjerojatno samo obogatiti i osnaţiti one duţnosnike odgovorne za stalne povrede ljudskih prava i sustavno
opstruiranje provedbe Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma. (Za više detalja pogledajte odjeljak o meĊunarodnim
ulaganjima u Foĉi.) taj novac će vjerojatno samo obogatiti i osnaţiti one duţnosnike odgovorne za stalne
povrede ljudskih prava i sustavno opstruiranje provedbe Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma. (Za više detalja
pogledajte odjeljak o meĊunarodnim ulaganjima u Foĉi.)

Nadalje, neuspjeh meĊunarodnih organizacija u Foĉi da javno izvijeste o zlouporabama i da pritisnu za navodne
poĉinitelje da budu izvedene pred lice pravde, dao je laţni dojam o gradu koji je nedavno opisan Human Rights
Watchu kao "vrlo smiren". Odgovornost je u Foĉi odbaĉena toliko dugo da optuţeni i osobe za koje se tvrdi da
su odgovorni za gnusne zloĉine ostaju pod kontrolom, vladaju s potpunom nekaţnjivošću. U trenutaĉnoj klimi u
Foĉi, svaka meĊunarodna ekonomska pomoć koja bi se dodijelila gradu sluţila bi za isticanje dţepova tih
pojedinaca.

Vojno preuzimanje Foĉe poĉelo je 7. travnja 1992. godine. Preuzimanje je bilo usklaĊeno djelovanje srpskih
neregularnih snaga iz Srbije i Crne Gore i paravojnih snaga vojske bosanskih Srba. Brzo su osnovali Krizni
odbor, koji je radio u suradnji s vojnim i policijskim sluţbenicima u planiranju i izvršenju preuzimanja. Vojska
bosanskih Srba naslijedila oruţje i druge vojne pomagala iz bivše Jugoslavenske narodne armije ( Jugoslav
Narodna Armija , JNA) i paravojne postrojbe iz Srbije i Crne Gore odmah su donijeli u. Što je odrţan u općini
Foĉa nakon što su bosanski Srbi bili ĉvrsto kontrola je bila iznad neĉije najgore noćne more.

Nakon što su snage bosanskih Srba i srpskih snaga u potpunosti zauzele općinu Foĉa, poĉele su okupljati sve
nesrpske civile iz okolnih sela, odvajajući muškarce od ţena i zatvarajući ih u brojne zatoĉeniĉke
objekte. Policija u Foĉi blisko je suraĊivala sa srpskim vojnim snagama koje su okupirale općinu i igrale su
primarne i izravne uloge u hapšenju, protjerivanju, zatvaranju, silovanju, muĉenju i ubijanju nesrpskog
stanovništva grada. MeĊunarodnom odboru Crvenog kriţa (MKCK) uskraćen je pristup Foĉi od trenutka
preuzimanja 7. travnja 1992. do poĉetka listopada te godine. Do trenutka kada su dobili pristup, bilo je prekasno
za tisuće ne-Srba iz Foĉe koji su bili zatvoreni, a potom ili protjerani ili ubijeni. U vrijeme kada je ICRC ušao,

Preuzimanje Foĉe bilo je planirano i voĊeno od strane kriznog odbora, sliĉno odborima koji su formirani u
drugim podruĉjima srpskog teritorija. Vodje Kriznog štaba u Foĉi su identificirali stanovnici Foĉe i drugih kao
Velibor Ostojić, Vojislav "Vojo" Maksimović i Petar "Petko" Ĉanĉar. Pod nadleţnošću Kriznog štaba, vojne i
paravojne snage sa teritorije pod kontrolom Srba u Bosni i iz Srbije i Crne Gore izvršile su "nestanke", zatoĉenja,
protjerivanja, muĉenja, pogubljenja i silovanja, uz pomoć lokalne policije. Tvrtke i tvornice, kao i privatna
imovina nesrba, bili su izvlašteni, a bivši vlasnici i direktori su ili zatvoreni, protjerani ili "nestali". Bosanski
Musliman (u daljnjem tekstu: Bošnjak) ) i Hrvati Hrvati, ĉesto preko zatoĉeniĉkog centra "Livade", u središnji
zatvor u Foĉi, nazvani "Kazneno-Popravni dom" ili "KP dom", gdje su muĉeni i mnogi su "nestali". KP dom se
spominje u optuţnicama protiv Radovana Karadţića, tadašnjeg voĊe bosanskih Srba, i Ratka Mladića, tadašnjeg
zapovjednika vojske bosanskih Srba. Nesrpske ţene u Foĉi odvedene su iz svojih domova, odvojene od svojih
muţeva, a mnoge su drţane u kratkoroĉnim ili dugotrajnim pritvornim centrima. Sportska dvorana Partizan,
smještena u središtu grada u neposrednoj blizini zgrade općine i središnje policijske postaje, u kojoj su ţene
drţane i sustavno silovane ili na drugi naĉin seksualno zlostavljane u sklopu srpske kampanje. Sjedište Kriznog
štaba bilo je u Veleĉevu, na rubu grada Foĉe, koje je kasnije postalo i oĉevidac u logoru u kojem su nesrpske
ţene seksualno zlostavljane u sklopu kampanje "etniĉkog ĉišćenja". Ostali kampovi za silovanje osnovani su u
Buk Bijeloj i privatnim kućama i stanovima u gradu. Postoje i optuţbe da su ţene bile zarobljene i seksualno
zlostavljane u srednjoj školi u Foĉi tijekom preuzimanja vlasti 1992. godine.

Devet osoba - Dragan Gagović, Gojko Janković, Janko Janjić, Dragan Zelenović, Zoran Vuković, Dragoljub
Kunarac, Radomir Kovaĉ, Radovan Stanković i Milorad Krnojelac - javno su optuţeni pred MeĊunarodnim
kaznenim sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju (ICTY) sudjelovanje u "etniĉkom ĉišćenju" u Foĉi. Optuţeni su za zloĉine
protiv ĉovjeĉnosti, ukljuĉujući silovanje, teške povrede Ţenevskih konvencija i kršenje zakona i obiĉaja
ratovanja. Te optuţnice su prve u povijesti u kojima su osobe optuţene za silovanje kao ratni zloĉin.

Sedam od devet javnih optuţenika i dalje je na slobodi, a šest se zna da ţive u općini Foĉa. Oni slobodno ţive,
bez ikakvog straha od uhićenja od strane francuskog SFOR-a (Organizacije Sjevernoatlantskog saveza - NATO-
a - trupe u regiji nazivaju se Stabilizacijskim snagama, ili SFOR-om) vojnika stacioniranih u regiji, sve
donedavno Sektor SFOR-a u Bosni u kojem nije bilo uhićenja. Te optuţene osobe ĉesto se mogu vidjeti na
javnim mjestima kao što su kafići i restorani, koje takoĊer posjećuju pripadnici SFOR-a. Prema ĉlanku od 20.
veljaĉe 1998. u nizozemskim novinama Nieuwsblad ,

Uzmimo na primjer Janka Janjića, jednog od Srba na popisu, koji pije kavu i rakiju u "Merkuru", "Passager" ili
"Krsma" svako jutro oko devet. Sva tri bara nalaze se u blizini autobusnog kolodvora u središtu grada ....
Ukoliko francuski pripadnici SFOR-a odluĉe uhititi Janka Janjića dok pijuckaju svoju rakiju u baru "Krsma",
mogli bi u tom procesu još jednom uhititi. : Vlasnik ovog bara, Dragan Gagović, takoĊer se nalazi na popisu u
Haagu.

Osim onih osoba koje je Tribunal javno optuţio, mnogi pojedinci koji još nisu javno optuţeni, ali su navodno
odgovorni za ratne zloĉine i kršenja ljudskih prava tijekom rata i dalje drţe pozicije vlasti. Te osobe, u svojim
trenutnim utjecajnim ulogama u vladi, infrastrukturi i policiji Foĉe, koriste svoj kontinuirani utjecaj da blokiraju
provedbu Daytonskog sporazuma, ukljuĉujući posebno one odredbe koje se odnose na jamstva ljudskih prava i
povratak izbjeglica. Oni strogo i aktivno ograniĉavaju slobodu kretanja; oni blokiraju sve pokušaje slobode
izraţavanja od strane lokalnih civila; i oĉigledno sprjeĉavaju bilo kakvu raspravu o povratku raseljenih osoba i
izbjeglica. Nadalje, od potpisivanja Dejtonskog sporazuma, "neupućeni" ĉesto su blokirali rad meĊunarodne
zajednice odbijanjem da prisustvuju sastancima kako bi razgovarali o provedbi Daytona i opstruirali projekte za
koje su smatrali da bi mogli ugroziti njihovo društvo. MeĊunarodnim novinarima koji su posjetili prijetili
su. Volonteri koji su došli raditi s tinejdţerima u gradu bili su maltretirani i izbaĉeni iz grada. Vlasti su zaustavile
projekte mikrokreditiranja koji bi mogli pomoći ţenama u Foĉi nudeći im prilike za stvaranje
prihoda. Stanovnici Foĉe koji komuniciraju ili rade s organizacijama koje vlasti vide kao prijetnju njihovoj moći,
uznemiravani su i ugroţeni. "Foca je zatvoreno, tamno mjesto," ljudi koji su tamo radili i govore, opet i opet.

Do sada su napori meĊunarodne zajednice u postizanju poštivanja odredbi Daytona bili neuspješni u Foĉi. U
dvije i pol godine od potpisivanja Daytonskog sporazuma, svi duţnosnici u Foĉi koji su pokušali suraĊivati s
meĊunarodnom zajednicom na kraju su zamijenjeni radikalnijim, nacionalistiĉkim i izolacionistiĉkim kolegama.

Hapšenje francuskih snaga SFOR-a 15. lipnja 1998. bilo je prvi put da su francuske postrojbe SFOR-a uhitile sve
optuţenike u Bosni, i iako je kasno stiglo, to je bio dobrodošao korak.

MeĊutim, neuspjeh francuskog SFOR-a da uhiti šest osoba koje je ICTY javno optuţio, a koji još uvijek
slobodno lutaju u Foĉi, samo je mali dio slike meĊunarodne zajednice koja je spremna dopustiti da se prošlost
završi. To više nije neobiĉan prizor, niti se više ĉini ĉudnim vidjeti meĊunarodne oruţane postrojbe kako
patroliraju u Foĉi, sjedeći u kafićima, jedući u svojim restoranima, pijući u barovima, "ĉuvajući mir". Kao
rezultat neuspjeha meĊunarodne zajednice da od samog poĉetka inzistira na poštivanju odredbi Daytonskog
sporazuma od strane vlasti u Foĉi, kao i zbog toga što francuske trupe NATO-a nisu uhitile nikoga odgovornog
za ratne zloĉine u Foĉi. dvije i pol godine, pojedinci koji su navodno odgovorni za masovna ubojstva i silovanja
mogli su slobodno vladati gradom kojeg su osvojili s potpunom i potpunom nekaţnjivošću. I uspjeli su sjajno: tri
osobe povezane s nadgledanjem planiranja, organizacije i izvršenja masovnog "etniĉkog ĉišćenja" u općini Foĉa,
Petar Ĉanĉar, Vojislav Maksimović i Velibor Ostojić, nagraĊene su za svoje napore. Cancar je promaknut iz
gradonaĉelnika Foĉe na ministra pravosuĊa Republike Srpske. Maksimović sjedi u Narodnoj skupštini Republike
Srpske i ostaje na mjestu rektora Filozofskog fakulteta u dijelu Sarajeva pod srpskom kontrolom. Još više
šokantno je to što je Ostojić imenovan za šefa drţavne komisije za ljudska prava u bosanskom parlamentu. I
uspjeli su sjajno: tri osobe povezane s nadgledanjem planiranja, organizacije i izvršenja masovnog "etniĉkog
ĉišćenja" u općini Foĉa, Petar Ĉanĉar, Vojislav Maksimović i Velibor Ostojić, nagraĊene su za svoje
napore. Cancar je promaknut iz gradonaĉelnika Foĉe na ministra pravosuĊa Republike Srpske. Maksimović sjedi
u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srpske i ostaje na mjestu rektora Filozofskog fakulteta u dijelu Sarajeva pod
srpskom kontrolom. Još više šokantno je to što je Ostojić imenovan za šefa drţavne komisije za ljudska prava u
bosanskom parlamentu. I uspjeli su sjajno: tri osobe povezane s nadgledanjem planiranja, organizacije i izvršenja
masovnog "etniĉkog ĉišćenja" u općini Foĉa, Petar Ĉanĉar, Vojislav Maksimović i Velibor Ostojić, nagraĊene su
za svoj trud. Cancar je promaknut iz gradonaĉelnika Foĉe na ministra pravosuĊa Republike Srpske. Maksimović
sjedi u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srpske i ostaje na mjestu rektora Filozofskog fakulteta u dijelu Sarajeva
pod srpskom kontrolom. Još više šokantno je to što je Ostojić imenovan za šefa drţavne komisije za ljudska
prava u bosanskom parlamentu. Petar Ĉanĉar, Vojislav Maksimović i Velibor Ostojić bili su nagraĊeni za svoje
napore. Cancar je promaknut iz gradonaĉelnika Foĉe na ministra pravosuĊa Republike Srpske. Maksimović sjedi
u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srpske i ostaje na mjestu rektora Filozofskog fakulteta u dijelu Sarajeva pod
srpskom kontrolom. Još više šokantno je to što je Ostojić imenovan za šefa drţavne komisije za ljudska prava u
bosanskom parlamentu. Petar Ĉanĉar, Vojislav Maksimović i Velibor Ostojić bili su nagraĊeni za svoje
napore. Cancar je promaknut iz gradonaĉelnika Foĉe na ministra pravosuĊa Republike Srpske. Maksimović sjedi
u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srpske i ostaje na mjestu rektora Filozofskog fakulteta u dijelu Sarajeva pod
srpskom kontrolom. Još više šokantno je to što je Ostojić imenovan za šefa drţavne komisije za ljudska prava u
bosanskom parlamentu.

Unatoĉ sustavnoj opstrukciji mirovnih sporazuma od strane vlasti u Foĉi i njihovoj stalnoj odanosti Radovanu
Karadţiću, bilateralni i meĊunarodni donatori usmjerili su Foĉu na pomoć u obnovi. U prosincu 1997. godine
nevladine organizacije iznijele su primjedbe na planirani projekt Svjetske banke na tom podruĉju, i kao rezultat
toga, taj projekt nije dobio konaĉnu suglasnost. Ipak, ostali projekti rekonstrukcije u Foĉi, koje su financirali
bilateralni donatori, ukljuĉujući Italiju, multilateralne donatore, ukljuĉujući Svjetsku banku, EBRD, EU i
UNHCR, krenuli su naprijed. Donatorske organizacije izgledaju ţeljne pruţiti ekonomsku pomoć Foĉi, oĉito pod
pogrešnom predodţbom da bi takva pomoć nagovorila lokalne vlasti, i da je donator Postupci provjere mogu
adekvatno osigurati da osumnjiĉeni za ratne zloĉine i opstrukcionisti iz Daytona ne bi imali koristi. Naprotiv,
bilo koje meĊunarodno financiranje koje bi ušlo u Foĉu u sadašnjoj atmosferi bilo bi gotovo nemoguće pratiti. U
Foĉi, gdje ĉak i lokalno srpsko stanovništvo ne moţe slobodno govoriti protiv svojih vlasti; gdje su
meĊunarodno osoblje i trupe SFOR-a sa sjedištem u gradu pod pritiskom da budu potpuno nekritiĉni kako bi
odrţali mirne odnose i da bi tamo ţivjeli u sigurnosti; i gdje je pristup ozbiljno ograniĉen za osobe koje ţele
istraţiti i izvijestiti o stvarnosti u gradu, svi mehanizmi uspostavljeni za praćenje gospodarske pomoći neće
uspjeti. Vlasti blokiraju pristup informacijama o tvrtkama, pojedincima i lokalnim institucijama u Foĉi. Te bi
informacije bile presudne za bilo koji sustav provjere kako bi se sprijeĉilo da pomoć obogati optuţenike
osumnjiĉene za ratne zloĉine i one koji su navodno odgovorni za kršenja ljudskih prava. Zbog toga je vrlo malo
vjerojatno da će pomoć dodijeljena općini dosegnuti svoje ciljne korisnike.

Obveza je meĊunarodnih donatorskih institucija i zemalja da sprijeĉe ulazak novca u ruke osoba koje mogu biti
odgovorne za ratne zloĉine i ozbiljna i rasprostranjena kršenja ljudskih prava tijekom i nakon rata, ili koji su
odgovorni za kontinuirano ometanje provedbe Daytonskog sporazuma u Foĉi i širom Bosne i
Hercegovine. TakoĊer je njihova obveza osigurati da se meĊunarodna ekonomska pomoć ne koristi na naĉin koji
bi ojaĉao politiĉku osnovu tih pojedinaca.

Ovo izvješće trebalo bi posluţiti kao izvor informacija o zloĉinima koji su poĉinjeni nad bošnjaĉkim i hrvatskim
stanovništvom u Foĉi tijekom rata, kao i osobama koje je MKSJ optuţio za te zloĉine ili ĉija je odgovornost za te
zloĉine trebala dalje istraţiti.

Više od dvadeset osoba imenovano je u ovom izvješću u svezi s kršenjem ljudskih prava u Foĉi. Imenovali smo
pojedince gdje smo pronašli neke dokaze da su oni moţda odigrali ulogu u institucijama ili procesima koji su
doprinijeli grubim kršenjima ljudskih prava i humanitarnog prava koja su se dogodila. Human Rights Watch ne
navodi niti implicira da su imenovani pojedinci nuţno odgovorni za te povrede; meĊutim, u tim sluĉajevima
smatramo da je daljnja istraga opravdana. Gdje je to uopće moguće, dali smo imena svjedoka i izvore
informacija; meĊutim, mnogi svjedoci, stanovnici Foĉe i meĊunarodni novinari i promatraĉi, izriĉito su zatraţili
da im se uskrati identitet zbog istinskog straha od odmazde.

Konaĉno, ali najvaţnije, ovo izvješće izlaţe patnju preţivjelih od "etniĉkog ĉišćenja" u Foĉi i stoga je od njih
zahtjev za odgovornost. Njihov rizik dijeljenja informacija iz njihovih iskustava ne smije proći neopaţeno,
posebno u atmosferi nekaţnjivosti koja vlada u Bosni i Hercegovini. Svoje su tragiĉne priĉe podijelili s velikom
boli, ali i s nadom da će u podsjećanju na svoje noćne more i imenovanju svojih zlostavljaĉa svijet ne zaboraviti,
a odgovorni će biti izvedeni pred lice pravde. Njihova ţelja, univerzalno, bila je da se vrate kući u Foĉu.

PREPORUKE

Human Rights Watch poziva općinske vlasti i policiju u Foĉi da:

 hapšenje i predaju svih optuţenih osoba prisutnih u Foĉi MeĊunarodnom kriviĉnom sudu za bivšu
Jugoslaviju na suĊenju u Haagu;
 odmah obustaviti bilo koju i svu opstrukciju Daytonskog sporazuma, ukljuĉujući posebno ograniĉenja
slobode kretanja i slobode izraţavanja i udruţivanja;
 odmah prestati sa svim napadima i uznemiravanjem lokalnog stanovništva, ukljuĉujući i one koji se
temelje na njihovoj etniĉkoj pripadnosti, politiĉkom mišljenju ili pripadnosti te protiv predstavnika
 meĊunarodne zajednice, te istraţuju i procesuiraju one koji su odgovorni za takve napade i
uznemiravanje;

 jamĉiti pravo izbjeglica i raseljenih osoba na povratak u Foĉu i osigurati sigurnost osoba koje se odluĉe
vratiti;
 postupati u skladu s postupcima IPTF-a za provjeru i provjeru policije na temelju kriterija za ljudska
prava. Kao prvi korak u otklanjanju neuspjeha da to uĉine dvije i pol godine, odmah pruţite IPTF-u
kompletan popis svih policijskih sluţbenika, ukljuĉujući tajnu i specijalnu policiju, kao i trenere i
uĉitelje u specijalnoj školi za obuku policije u Tjentištu, i cijelog osoblja i osoblja u KP domu KP;
 odmah pruţiti meĊunarodnim organizacijama sve informacije o osobama nestalim iz općine Foĉa i dati
potpun pristup svim organizacijama zaduţenim za istraţivanje sudbine ljudi koji su "nestali" ili su na
drugi naĉin nestali;
 odmah primijeniti rezultate općinskih izbora u rujnu 1997. godine, omogućujući onima koji su izabrani
da preuzmu njihove duţnosti, te pruţiti zaštitu svim predstavnicima koji su izabrani kada putuju u Foĉu
na sjednice skupštine.

Human Rights Watch poziva premijera Republike Srpske Milorada Dodika na:

 smijeniti Petka Canĉara s duţnosti ministra pravosuĊa Republike Srpske, dok ICTY ne istraţi
materijalne navode o njegovoj odgovornosti za ratne zloĉine poĉinjene pod njegovom vlašću tijekom
rata u Foĉi;
 inzistirati na tome da vlasti na mjestima kao što su Foĉa, koje su i dalje pod utjecajem optuţenog
Radovana Karadţića, provode odredbe Daytonskog sporazuma. Konkretno, inzistirati na tome da vlasti
u Foĉi pruţe punu slobodu kretanja, omoguće izbjeglicama i raseljenim osobama da se vrate u svoje
domove, jamĉe slobodu izraţavanja i udruţivanja, odmah prestanu sve i sve napade i uznemiravanja na
temelju politiĉkog mišljenja ili pripadnosti te provode septembar Rezultati općinskih izbora 1997.
godine;
 odmah prebaciti u pritvor ICTY-a bilo koga i sve javno optuţene pojedince, ukljuĉujući Radovana
Karadţića i Ratka Mladića, ukljuĉujući i šest javnih optuţenika koji slobodno lutaju u Foĉi;
 osigurati da je svatko tko je na vlasti u Vladi Republike Srpske osloboĊen svih ozbiljnih, vjerodostojnih
optuţbi o ratnim zloĉinima;
 uhićenje, procesuiranje i kaţnjavanje osoba odgovornih za kršenje ljudskih prava.

Human Rights Watch poziva Organizaciju za sigurnost i suradnju u Europi (OSCE), Promatraĉku misiju
Europske zajednice (ECMM) i MeĊunarodne policijske snage (IPTF), koje imaju baze u Foĉi, i Ured
visokog predstavnika (OHR). ), Visokog povjerenika Ujedinjenih naroda za izbjeglice (UNHCR) i SFOR-
a, koji djeluju u Foĉi:

 jasno izraziti duţnost svojih zastupnika da javno izloţe sluĉajeve ozbiljnih ili stalnih kršenja ljudskih
prava i dugotrajnog nepoštivanja Dejtonskog sporazuma, kao i da navedu odgovorne. Iako izvori i
informacije koji bi izravno ugrozili svjedoke, oĉigledno moraju biti zaštićeni, izvješća o kršenju
ljudskih prava ne bi trebala biti uskraćena javnosti iz politiĉkih razloga, a otkrivanje bi trebalo biti
pravodobno. Nadalje, istrage kršenja ljudskih prava ne smiju se odgoditi ili sprijeĉiti iz politiĉkih
razloga;
 i dalje vršiti pritisak na lokalne vlasti da iskljuĉe iz sluţbenih poloţaja pojedince za koje se tvrdi da su
odgovorni za ratne zloĉine i teška kršenja ljudskih prava, ukljuĉujući Velibora Ostojića, Petka Ĉanĉara i
Vojislava Maksimovića, sve dok se ne istraţe i oĉiste takve tvrdnje. Odbiti dati tim pojedincima
politiĉko ili diplomatsko priznanje ili interakciju s njima u bilo kojem sluţbenom svojstvu sve dok ne
budu istraţeni i oĉišćeni od ozbiljnih optuţbi da su odgovorni za ratne zloĉine u općini Foĉa;
 nastavljaju posvetiti resurse, kako financijske tako i materijalne, rješavanju pitanja nestalih osoba u
Bosni i Hercegovini. Iako se u ovom podruĉju već mnogo toga radi, još je još potrebno uĉiniti. Rješenje
ovog pitanja kljuĉna je osnova na kojoj ovisi buduća stabilnost u Bosni i Hercegovini;
 i dalje posvećivati pozornost i sredstva za vraćanje slobode izraţavanja i udruţivanja, s posebnim
naglaskom na izolirana podruĉja u istoĉnoj Republici Srpskoj, poput Foĉe;
 provesti posebnu istragu o sudbini osoba koje su "nestale" iz Foĉe, posebno iz zatvora u KP domu, za
vrijeme rata. Prvi korak u takvoj istrazi trebao bi ukljuĉivati provjeru svih trenutnih zatvorenika koji se
 tamo drţe, osim rutinskog ĉitanja popisa zatoĉenika koje redovito provodi IPTF, kako bi se osiguralo da
se ne-Srbi ne drţe pod laţnim srpskim imenima. Ista istraga kojom bi se osiguralo da se ne-Srbi ne
skrivaju u pritvorskim centrima treba poduzeti na drugim mjestima u općini Foĉa, kao što su rudnik
uglja Miljevina, regija Tjentište, Buk Bijela, i svi vojni objekti;

 razmotriti osnivanje Ureda puĉkog pravobranitelja u Republici Srpskoj sliĉnog onome koji djeluje u
entitetu Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine, da djeluje kao zakonski zastupnik za pojedinaĉne ţrtve kršenja
ljudskih prava i optuţen za pribavljanje pravnih sredstava za takva zlostavljanja od strane vladinih u
suradnji s MeĊunarodnim uredom pravobranitelja, uspostavljenim Daytonskim sporazumom;
 inzistirati na punoj provedbi rezultata općinskih izbora u rujnu 1997. i na zaštitu zastupnika koji su
izabrani.

Human Rights Watch takoĊer poziva MeĊunarodne policijske snage da:

 povezati svu financijsku potporu za restrukturiranje lokalne policije s konaĉnim završetkom

cjelokupnog IPTF postupka provjere / provjere;
 podijeliti s ICTY-em sve informacije vezane za sudjelovanje lokalne policije u ratnim zloĉinima ili
teškim kršenjima ljudskih prava, uz dogovor o uĉinkovitoj i pravovremenoj razmjeni informacija u
evidencijama MKSJ-a o policijskim sluţbenicima, politiĉarima i pripadnicima paravojnih skupina u
tom podruĉju;
 pruţiti sve informacije poznate promatraĉima IPTF-a u vezi s lokacijama osoba koje su javno optuţene
za ratne zloĉine u sjedištu IPTF-a, te drugim meĊunarodnim organizacijama sa sjedištem u Foĉi,
posebno SFOR-u i MKSJ-u, kako bi se olakšalo uhićenje tih osoba ;
 reagirajući na izvješća da se nepriznati zatvorenici još uvijek tajno drţe u sluţbenim i nesluţbenim
mjestima zatoĉenja u općini Foĉa, te da stalno provode pretraţivanja iznenaĊenja na svim takvim
mjestima. U suradnji sa SFOR-om i bez prethodne najave ili nazoĉnosti lokalne policije ili vojske,
rutinski pretresali KP dom, rudnik Miljevina, Buk Bijela, podruĉje Tjentišta, rudnik cinka u Suplji
Stijeni, i sve vojne ili policijske snage objekti;
 vrše pritisak na policijske vlasti, posebno one zaposlene u KP domu, da pruţe informacije o osobama
nestalim u Foĉi kao rezultat srpskog preuzimanja vlasti i "etniĉkog ĉišćenja" koje se dogodilo tijekom
rata;
 rutinski provjeravati popis policijskih sluţbenika u civilnim policijskim snagama, specijalnim
policijskim snagama i tajnoj policiji kako bi se osiguralo da oni koji su optuţeni za ratne zloĉine ne rade
kao policijski sluţbenici bilo gdje u općini Foĉa;
 potaknuti lokalnu policiju da temeljito istraţi sva kršenja ljudskih prava koja se dogaĊaju u općini Foĉa
i da prati i izvješćuje o tijeku takvih istraga. Rezultate takvih istraga treba objaviti. U sluĉajevima u
kojima su incidenti nedovoljno istraţeni, IPTF bi trebao objaviti tu ĉinjenicu i smatrati lokalnu policiju
odgovornom podnošenjem "izvješća o neusklaĊenosti" - izvješća IPTF-a o policijskom nepoštivanju
Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma. Odgovornost bi takoĊer trebala ukljuĉivati i osiguranje da takve
jedinice nemaju koristi od meĊunarodne pomoći;
 ako postoje sluĉajevi prijavljenog sudjelovanja ili poticanja kršenja ljudskih prava od strane lokalne
policije, IPTF bi trebao podnijeti izvješća o nepoštivanju, objaviti te sluĉajeve i, u suradnji s drugim
meĊunarodnim organizacijama na terenu, poduzeti sve moguće korake kako bi se osiguralo da
poĉinitelji su privedeni pravdi. Jedan takav sluĉaj je navodno premlaćivanje lokalnog srpskog civila u
središnjoj policijskoj postaji u Foĉi u prosincu 1997. Rezultati ove istrage trebali bi biti objavljeni;
 osigurati da svi policijski sluţbenici odgovorni za post-Daytonska kršenja ljudskih prava, ili koji nisu
istraţili i kazne odgovorne za kršenja ljudskih prava poĉinjena pod njihovom jurisdikcijom, ne
ispunjavaju uvjete za policijska mjesta i da budu uklonjeni sa svojih trenutnih policijskih poloţaja. Akte
neusklaĊenosti s Daytonskim mirovnim sporazumom treba shvatiti tako da ukljuĉuju, ali ne bi trebali
biti ograniĉeni na, ometanje slobode kretanja, nepruţanje zaštite prava na ostanak, kršenje slobode
izraţavanja i udruţivanja te uznemiravanje i zastrašivanje manjina ili oporbe. Policijski sluţbenici ili
sluţbenici koji su prijetili ili poĉinili djela nasilja nad IPTF-om takoĊer bi trebali biti nepodobni za
policijska mjesta i trebali bi biti uklonjeni sa svojih poloţaja i procesuirani kada su poĉinjena kaznena
djela;
 osigurati da lokalna policija pruţa sigurnost i zaštitu predstavnicima općinskih skupština i povratnicima.

Human Rights Watch poziva Stabilizacijske snage NATO-a (SFOR), posebice francuske postrojbe na
podruĉju Foĉe:
  odmah uhiti one koji su optuţeni za ratne zloĉine koji ţive u općini Foĉa. Prema najnovijim
informacijama koje je dobio od Human Rights Watcha, oni koji su javno optuţeni od strane MKSJ-a, a
trenutno ţive u Foĉi, ukljuĉuju Radovana Stankovića, Dragana Zelenovića, Dragana Gagovića, Janka
Janjića, Gojka Jankovića i Radomira Kovaĉa; (2)
 provoditi rutinske pretrage svih vojnih objekata kako bi se osiguralo da se ne koriste kao mjesta
zatoĉenja, te da se osigura da je zaliha oruţja u skladu s ograniĉenjima predviĊenim Daytonskim
sporazumom;
 provode rutinske pretrage, u suradnji s IPTF-om, bilo kojih mjesta na kojima se pritvorenici mogu
drţati. (Pogledajte preporuke IPTF-a za odreĊene lokacije.)

Human Rights Watch poziva sve nevladine i druge meĊunarodne humanitarne organizacije koje rade u
regiji, ukljuĉujući MeĊunarodni odbor za spašavanje, Visoki povjerenik Ujedinjenih naroda za izbjeglice,
Equilibre i Oxfam i sve ostale koji su bili ukljuĉeni u napore za pruţanje programiranja i pomoći u Foĉi.
na :

 nastaviti dosljedne i predane napore kako bi se stvorila prilika za suradnju izmeĊu stanovništva Foĉe
(Republika Srpska) i Goraţda (Federacija). Meñutim, pri tome, moraju biti izuzetno oprezni glede
raspodjele sredstava ili pomoći u naturi kako bi se sprijeĉilo da poĉinitelji ratnih zloĉina ili kršenja
ljudskih prava na bilo koji naĉin imaju koristi od pomoći;
 uloţiti svaki napor u okviru svojih ovlasti kako bi se osiguralo da poĉinitelji ratnih zloĉina i kršenja
ljudskih prava nemaju koristi od ekonomske pomoći.

Human Rights Watch poziva Svjetsku banku, Europsku banku za obnovu i razvoj, Humanitarnu
organizaciju Europske zajednice i druge donatorske institucije i vlade da:

 uskratiti organizacijama i institucijama smještenim u općini Foĉa, kao iu cijeloj Bosni i Hercegovini,
bilo kakvu pomoć u obnovi, s izuzetkom hitne humanitarne pomoći, koja se ne moţe adekvatno i
precizno pratiti kako bi se osiguralo da oni koji su optuţeni za ratne zloĉine, kao i oni koji su odgovorni
za ratne zloĉine i / ili kršenja ljudskih prava, ne dobivaju politiĉku ili ekonomsku korist od te
pomoći. Pomoć općinskim vlastima trebala bi biti uvjetovana njihovom punom suradnjom s ICTY-jem,
poštovanjem ljudskih prava, potpunom provedbom rezultata općinskih izbora i konkretnim
aktivnostima za pomoć izbjeglicama i raseljenim osobama koje se ţele vratiti svojim kućama. Donatori
bi trebali zahtijevati da se pomoć isplaćuje na nediskriminacijski naĉin, svim potrebitima bez obzira na
etniĉku ili spolnu pripadnost. Nadalje, u pogledu pomoći koja se usmjerava kroz privatna profitna ili
neprofitna poduzeća, donatori bi trebali istraţiti vlasništvo i kontrolu nad poduzećima, organizacijama i
institucijama prije davanja zajmova ili darovnica ili dodjele ugovora, kako bi se osiguralo da osobe
optuţene ili ukljuĉene u rat zloĉinima, kršenjima ljudskih prava ili opstrukciji provedbe Daytonskog
mirovnog sporazuma. Takve bi istrage trebale ukljuĉivati istrage o tome jesu li sadašnji direktori,
vlasnici ili menadţeri bili umiješani u ubojstvo, zatvaranje, "nestanak", ili diskriminatorno otpuštanje
prethodnih direktora, vlasnika ili menadţera; donatori trebaju istraţiti vlasništvo i kontrolu nad
tvrtkama, organizacijama i institucijama prije nego što daju zajmove ili potpore ili dodjeljuju ugovore,
kako bi osigurali da osobe optuţene za ili umiješane u ratne zloĉine, kršenja ljudskih prava ili ometanje
provedbe Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma ne koristi. Takve bi istrage trebale ukljuĉivati istrage o
tome jesu li sadašnji direktori, vlasnici ili menadţeri bili umiješani u ubojstvo, zatvaranje, "nestanak",
ili diskriminatorno otpuštanje prethodnih direktora, vlasnika ili menadţera; donatori trebaju istraţiti
vlasništvo i kontrolu nad tvrtkama, organizacijama i institucijama prije nego što daju zajmove ili
potpore ili dodjeljuju ugovore, kako bi osigurali da osobe optuţene za ili umiješane u ratne zloĉine,
kršenja ljudskih prava ili ometanje provedbe Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma ne koristi. Takve bi
istrage trebale ukljuĉivati istrage o tome jesu li sadašnji direktori, vlasnici ili menadţeri bili umiješani u
ubojstvo, zatvaranje, "nestanak", ili diskriminatorno otpuštanje prethodnih direktora, vlasnika ili
menadţera;
 paţljivo ispitati sve planove za pomoć entitetima u gradovima kao što su Foĉa u Republici Srpskoj i
drugim mjestima u Bosni gdje su osobe koje su već javno optuţene imale znaĉajan utjecaj, gdje su
osobe koje su navodno odgovorne za kršenja ljudskih prava i ratne zloĉine na poloţajima moći, i gdje
su lokalne vlasti dosljedno ometale provedbu odredbi Daytonskog sporazuma. MeĊu gradovima koji bi
u tom pogledu trebali biti od velike vaţnosti, osim Foĉe, su Bijeljina, Bratunac, Rogatica, Višegrad,
Prijedor, Zvornik, Stolac, Ĉapljina, Gradiška, Doboj, Teslić, Zapadni Mostar, Livno, Tomislavgrad,
 Drvar. Uskrati takvu pomoć koja se ne moţe adekvatno i precizno pratiti kako bi se osiguralo da
odgovorni za ratne zloĉine,
 uskratiti bilo kakvu pomoć lokalnoj policiji dok se ne dovrši cjeloviti postupak provjere i provjere
IPTF-a;
 kao dio procesa provjere svih potencijalnih projekata pomoći, zatraţiti informacije od organizacija i
vlada ukljuĉenih u provedbu Daytonskog sporazuma, u vezi s podacima o ljudskim pravima drţavnih
sluţbenika, ukljuĉujući policijske sluţbenike koji mogu imati izravnu ili neizravnu ulogu u projekti;
 pruţiti kljuĉnu financijsku i materijalnu potporu MKSJ-u kako bi se omogućilo daljnje istrage ratnih
zloĉina. Ohrabrujemo potporu istragama ratnih aktivnosti osoba navedenih u ovom izvješću kao
navodnih poĉinitelja grubih zlostavljanja, posebno Velibora Ostojića, Petra "Petka" Ĉanĉara, Vojislava
Maksimovića, Miroslava Stanića, Radojice MlaĊenovića i Miće Olovića.

ZLOSTAVLJANJE U FOĈI

pozadina

Foĉa je grad u jugoistoĉnoj Bosni i Hercegovini, u entitetu zvanom Republika Srpska (podruĉje pod kontrolom
bosanskih Srba). Prema popisu stanovništva iz 1991. godine, prijeratno stanovništvo općine Foĉa bilo je 40.513,
od ĉega 51,6 posto Bošnjaka, 45,3 posto bosanskih Srba i 3,1 posto ostalih. Prije rata na tom podruĉju bilo je
ĉetrnaest dţamija, ukljuĉujući dţamiju Aladza, sagraĊenu 1550. godine i Ustikolinu dţamiju, izgraĊenu 1448.
godine. uklonjeni su svi tragovi njihova postojanja. MeĊunarodni promatraĉi u regiji procjenjuju da je trenutaĉno
stanovništvo općine Foĉa oko 24.000, te da je u općini Foĉa danas ostalo manje od stotinu ne-Srba od prijeratnog
stanovništva od preko 20 godina,

Stvarno preuzimanje Foĉe poĉelo je 7. travnja 1992. MeĊutim, civilni, policijski i vojni duţnosnici bosanskih
Srba pripremali su se za napad već mnogo mjeseci, skupljajući oruţje koje su naslijedili od bivše JNA. IH, nekoć
istaknuti i dobro povezan profesionalac u Foĉi i sada ţivi u izgnanstvu, opisao je vrijeme do preuzimanja
predstavnika Human Rights Watcha:

Krajem veljaĉe i poĉetkom oţujka 1992., pogotovo nakon referenduma u Bosni, oni su [Srbi] okupili tehniĉku
opremu u pripremi za rat. Te su pripreme obavljene u svim općinama u Bosni i Hercegovini, posebno u
općinama u kojima su Srbi ĉinili pola ili više stanovnika, znajući da Bošnjaci uopće nemaju oruţje, a obećali su
pomoć Miloševića i JNA. Odbili su dijalog i odluĉili se boriti protiv rata. (3)

VoĊe bosanskih Srba u Foĉi formirali su Krizni odbor, sliĉan onima koji su formirani u drugim regijama
teritorije pod kontrolom bosanskih Srba kako bi nadgledali akcije preuzimanja i "etniĉkog ĉišćenja" (vidi detalje
u nastavku). Krizni štab u Foĉi optuţen je za organizaciju, planiranje i provoĊenje srpskog preuzimanja
Foĉe. Krizni je odbor nadzirao sve aspekte napada na Foĉu, ukljuĉujući aktivnosti lokalne policije, i radio u
bliskoj suradnji s vojskom bosanskih Srba. Kako bi im pomogla u preuzimanju, Krizni je odbor pozvao
paravojne postrojbe i rezerviste iz susjedne Srbije i Crne Gore. Mnogi nesrbi su nasilno protjerani iz Foĉe, i
drugi su zatvoreni u jednoj od mreţa pritvorskih centara koje je Krizni štab organizirao u tu svrhu u cijeloj
općini. Imovinu nesrba zaplijenile su i oduzele srpske snage.

Vojno preuzimanje Foĉe trajalo je samo devet dana, no patnje koje su nanesene nesrbima koji su ostali u Foĉi
nakon poĉetnog napada trajali su mjesecima nakon toga. Muškarci nesrpske nacionalnosti bili su zatoĉeni u
odvratnim uvjetima u pritvorskim centrima, gdje su ih rutinski muĉili, tukli i terorisali. U tom procesu poginule
su ocjene ili su ih srpske snage po prijekom postupku pogubile. Mnoge su nesrpske ţene drţane u logorima za
silovanja u cijeloj općini, gdje su sustavno seksualno zlostavljane. ICRC procjenjuje da je 588 osoba nestalo iz
općine Foĉa. (4) ICTY je javno optuţio devet osoba za silovanje kao ratni zloĉin i genocid poĉinjen u
Foĉi. (5)Mnogi drugi koji još nisu optuţeni bili su ukljuĉeni u planiranje i poĉinjenje ratnih zloĉina i drugih
sustavnih kršenja ljudskih prava u Foĉi. Mnoge od tih osoba trenutno su na pozicijama moći u općini.

Snage iz Srbije i Crne Gore

Tijekom oţujka 1992., srpske paravojne postrojbe naoruţavale su se uz pomoć Srbije i Crne Gore. Te su jedinice
bile pod vodstvom i uputama Kriznog štaba i nazivale se "srpskim teritorijalcima". Krizni je odbor znao da
lokalne snage bosanskih Srba neće biti dovoljno jake da ostvare svoje ciljeve bez vanjske podrške, i tako ureĊene
za rezerviste, paravojne snage, pa ĉak i za regularne vojne jedinice onoga što se ranije nazivalo Jugoslavenska
narodna armija iz Srbije i Crne Gore. pomoći snagama bosanskih Srba u osvajanju regije i istjerivanju svih
nesrba. Svjedoci s kojima je razgovarao Human Rights Watch rekli su da su Srbi izvan Bosne bili meĊu
vojnicima koji su bili ukljuĉeni u njihovo uhićenje, protjerivanje, zatoĉenje ili zlostavljanje. Brojne ţrtve
prijavile su da su ĉule njihove akcente, koji oĉito nisu bili bosanski dijalekt "Ijekavski", već crnogorski ili srpski
"Ekavski" dijalekt, i opisivali su razliĉite uniforme. Mnogi su opisali paravojne vojnike kao "cetnike".(6) s dugim
bradama i ĉetvrtastim šeširima. Prema završnom izvješću Povjerenstva struĉnjaka utemeljene na Rezoluciji 780
(1992) Vijeća sigurnosti: (7)

Nekoliko pojedinaca identificirano je u izvornim materijalima kao oni koji su primarno odgovorni za napad i
etniĉko ĉišćenje Foĉe. Jedan od njih navodno je pozvao dodatne snage iz Nikšića, Crna Gora. DovoĊenje
ukupnog broja srpskih snaga ui oko Foĉe na oko 4000 do kraja travnja [1992]. [ 8]

U izvještaju struĉnjaka UN-a opisano je prijavljeno ukljuĉivanje snaga pod vodstvom Ţeljka Raţnatovića
"Arkana" i Vojislava Šešelja, dvojice ekstremistiĉkih paravojnih i politiĉkih lidera poznatih po tome što su
izvršili masovna ubojstva i brutalne "etniĉke akcije". U izvješću se navodi:

Arkan i Šešelj navodno su rasporedili vojnike u okrugu Foĉa. U izvješćima se takoĊer ukazuje na prisutnost
jedinica zapovjednika Turtlea, straţe Crne Gore, Uţiĉkog korpusa i Pere Eleza. Za vrijeme okupacije Foĉe od
strane Arkanovih ljudi krajem aprila 1992. godine, mnoga tijela su baĉena u rijeku ... Šešeljeve snage i
(9)
dobrovoljci navodno su sudjelovali u borbama u gradu Foĉi, kao pomoć snagama Srpske demokratske stranke.

LK, ţena iz Miljevine, sela izvan grada Foĉe, ali u općini Foĉa, izjavila je za Human Rights Watch da "je bilo
mnogo razliĉitih vojnih skupina u tom podruĉju". LK je odveden iz njezine kuće u Miljevini u sportsku dvoranu
Partizan, (10) gdje je izvijestila da su "noću došle grupe Srba, mnogi Srbi iz Foĉe, kao i mnogi Srbi iz Srbije". (11)

ED, Bošnjak iz Foĉe, izvijestio je da su on i njegova obitelj od svojih susjeda u Foĉi 13. travnja 1992. godine
odvedeni iz njihove kuće u Foĉi, a zatvoreni su u privatnoj kući s oko pedeset pet drugih osoba. Nakon pet dana
zatoĉeništva u ovoj kući, ED je izvijestila da je sedam ili osam muškaraca iz Crne Gore, u uniformama, odvelo
dvadeset i pet njih u zatvor KP Doma. ED je rekao da zna da su ti ljudi iz Crne Gore svojim izgovorom i
ĉinjenicom da nije prepoznao nijednog od njih. Tvrdio je da su uniforme koje su crnogorske trupe nosile bile
novije od onih u lokalnim snagama bosanskih Srba i da su imali sve vrste opreme, ukljuĉujući noţeve, bombe na
pojasevima i automatske puške, dok lokalne snage bosanskih Srba nisu imale opremu i starim
uniformama. (12)GF, bošnjaĉka ţena iz Foĉe, izvijestila je da su je odveli iz kuće i zatvorili u sportskoj dvorani
Partizan u rujnu 1992. godine od strane "rezervista" u uniformama. Rekla je da su nosili rukavice i šešire,
govorili su srpski dijalekt, i zakljuĉila je da oni nisu iz Bosne. Prema GF-u, ti su rezervisti bili dobro naoruţani, a
meĊu njima je bilo i ţena vojnika.

Drţali su nas pola dana u Partizanu, a onda su nam ti Srbi iz Srbije rekli da mu je ţao što smo svi "djeca" jer će
nas morati ubiti. Zaplijenili su sav naš nakit. Mi smo se grlili i jako se bojali. Rekli su: "Sada Balija [pogrdan
izraz za muslimane] idete plivati u Drini." ... Odveli su nas u Mrdaliće i tamo smo sreli ĉetnike s dugim
bradama. (13)

Centri za pritvor

Nakon što je vojno preuzimanje u Foĉi bilo u tijeku, kampanja terora oslobodila se nesrpskog civilnog
stanovništva. Veliki broj Muslimana i Hrvata bio je muĉen, "nestao", silovan ili pogubljen, a oni koji su
preţivjeli bili su protjerani iz svojih domova.

Livade

Prema tvrdnjama nekoliko svjedoka, kada je agresija poĉela, većina muškaraca nesrpske nacionalnosti prvo je
odvedena u Livade, vojni objekt u Foĉi koji je bio bivši štab JNA. Livade su u blizini sela Aladza, mjesta Aladza
dţamije. IH, koji je takoĊer preţivio zatoĉeniĉki centar Livade, objasnio je:

Program napada na Foĉu krenuo je iz nekoliko smjerova. Najvaţnije je iz smjera Livada, gdje su osnovali svoju
vojnu posadu, au toj je posadi bio i prvi logor. Od 11. do 17. travnja 1992. poĉeli su dovoditi ljude iz grada, a
najviše iz lokalne zajednice Aladza. Prvi zarobljenici u Foĉi, ukljuĉujući mene i otprilike 150 do 200 drugih,
proveli su prvih pet dana u Livadama, a zatim su nas odveli u KP dom. (14)

Prema IH, Veselin Cancar je bio zapovjednik objekta tijekom njegova zatvora.

Livade su cijelo vrijeme korištene od travnja 1992. do kolovoza ili rujna 1992. kao tranzitno središte gdje su
zatvorenici odvoĊeni na nekoliko dana, a zatim prebaĉeni u druge logore ili tranzitne centre ... cijela ofenziva je
došla iz tog smjera. Ţivot u Livadama bio je vrlo teţak. Nismo imali organizirane obroke, hrana je bila
rasporeĊena sluĉajno. Nije bilo higijenskih uvjeta, a smještaj je bio mokar i pun vode. Kada su prvi put doveli
ljude u Livade, odvojili su muškarce, ţene i djecu. Kasnije su muškarce odveli u KP dom, a ţene su bile spremne
za slanje iz Foĉe. Veselin je bio zapovjednik, ali tamo je bila srpska garda, kao i srpski teritorijalci i rezervisti iz
bivše JNA. (15)

IH je izjavio kako je Veselin Cancar bio i zapovjednik lokalnih srpskih teritorijalnih snaga, koje su bile
ukljuĉene u glavnu ofenzivu protiv Foĉe. Nakon rata Veselin Cancar uhitila je bosanska vlada i sudila je za ratne
zloĉine. OsuĊen je na jedanaest godina zatvora zbog svoje umiješanosti u zloĉine u Foĉi i trenutno sluţi kaznu u
Centralnom zatvoru u Sarajevu.

KP Dom

Središnji zatvor u Foĉi, nazvan Kazneno-Popravni dom (KP Dom - Dom za kriminalistiĉku rehabilitaciju), bio je
prije rata središnji zatvor za cijelu jugoistoĉnu regiju Bosne i Hercegovine i jedan od najvećih zatvora u bivšoj
regiji. Jugoslavija. Krizni je odbor odluĉio da će zatvor sluţiti kao prikladan zatvor, a do sredine travnja 1992.
muškarci nesrba iz cijele opštine Foĉa i okolnih podruĉja, kao i neki muškarci srpske nacionalnosti koji su se
protivili preuzimanju, bili su uhićeni i bili su okrutni u ovom zatvoru.

Ured gradonaĉelnika Ibra Poplate, prognani bošnjaĉki gradonaĉelnik u Foĉi, izvijestio je da 456 nestalih osoba
koje općinska vlada u egzilu znaju nedostaju u općini Foĉa (16), meĊutim, ICRC je primio 588 prijava nestanka
rodbina preţivjelih. (17) Velika većina ovih nestalih osoba - oko 354 muškarca prema općinskoj vladi u Foĉi, koja
predstavlja bivše stanovnike Foĉe - bila je "nestala" iz KP doma.

Izvještaji preţivjelih u KP domu opterećeni su groznim priĉama o gladi, muĉenju, zastrašivanju i prijetnjama,
premlaćivanju i "nestancima". ED, preţivjela osoba u KP Domu, izvijestila je Human Rights Watch:

Odveden sam u KP Dom 17. travnja. Svake noći u 8 sati dolazili su u sobe kako bi odveli ljude na ispitivanje. U
KP domu je bilo 730 ljudi u vrijeme dok sam ja bio tamo .... Miodrag Koprivica je s još dva straţara i policajca
dolazio svake noći u 8 sati u sobe ljudi i zvao imena ljudi s popisa ... Uzeli bi neke ljudi u bivšu sobu za sastanke
i tukli ih, a oko 12 ponoći ĉuli smo pucnjavu i ti se ljudi obiĉno nisu nikad vratili ... Od osamnaest muškaraca u
mojoj sobi, samo ih je osam ostalo na kraju. U prosjeku je više od polovice svake sobe ubijeno ili "nestalo". (18)

IH, koji je bio zatvoren u KP domu više od šest mjeseci, opisao je svoje iskustvo:

KP Dom je otvoren [kao pritvorski centar] 18. travnja. Muškarci od 17 do 80 godina bili su tamo. Kada su me
doveli tamo, bilo ih je već stotinu do 150. Uglavnom su bili iz Donjeg Polja, podruĉja oko KP Doma .... Tijekom
travnja i svibnja doveli su oko 600 muškaraca u KP dom. Oko 400 ih je odvedeno i "nestalo". Mislim da su svi
ubijeni. To se dogodilo u razdoblju od travnja do prosinca 1992. godine. Odveli su ih u malim skupinama,
uglavnom noću, a ponekad i tijekom dana od strane straţara, uz izgovor da ih odvedu na razmjenu .... Vojska je
donosila odluke o tome što će poduzeti mjesto. S popisa je bilo popisa ljudi i zatvorenika. (19)

IH je Human Rights Watchu rekao da je jedan primjerak popisa zatvorenika u rukama ravnatelja
ustanove. Nadalje je rekao Human Rights Watchu da je vojska odluĉila tko će biti odveden. IH je takoĊer rekao
da je Milorad Krnojelac bio upravitelj ( upravnik ) objekta i da su ponekad policajci iz grada, zatim pod
zapovjedništvom Dragana Gagovića (optuţeni od strane MKSJ-a) došli odvesti ljude:

Što se tiĉe zatvorenika, civilne i vojne strukture blisko su suraĊivale. Na primjer, za svakog srpskog vojnika koji
je ubijen na liniji fronta, nekoliko muslimanskih zarobljenika će biti odvedeno i ubijeno ... U danima kada su
srpski vojnici ubijeni na liniji fronta, srpski vojnici bili su vrlo ljuti. To su bili najgori dani. Imamo manje
hrane. Znali smo što se dogodilo na naĉin na koji su nas tretirali. Nakon nekoliko dana pokopali su svoje
vojnike, odveli su zatvorenike.

Imali smo vrlo siromašnu hranu, malo ĉaja i malo kruha, tri puta dnevno, a neke makarone u vodi ... Nije bilo
pranja. Izgubili smo teţinu i imali psihofiziĉke simptome. Imali smo poteškoća u hodanju, bol u mišićima i
vrtoglavicu. Kad se to dogodilo, straţari bi se šalili.

Ljudi su dosljedno odvoĊeni u male ili velike skupine. Prva velika skupina bila je izmeĊu 13. i 30. lipnja 1992.
Trideset i pet osoba je odvedeno noću. Prije toga muškarci su noću odvoĊeni i muĉeni. Nakon toga su
"nestali". Neki od muškaraca koji su "nestali" u tom razdoblju bili su Krunoslav Marjanović, hrvatski novinar i
televizijski mehaniĉar, Mate Ivanović, medicinska sestra, i Adil Granov. Bilo je zatvorenika sa srĉanim
bolestima, bilo je maloljetnika, bilo je starijih .... Tijekom noći, kada su ljudi dolazili u zatvor, neki od njih bili
su u prostorijama za muĉenje, a kad su ih odveli, takoĊer su ih muĉili. Straţari i vojna policija su ih muĉili. (20)

Prostorije za muĉenje o kojima je IH govorio prikazane su na karti rasporeda zatvora u KP domu, koju je bivši
duţnosnik Foca dostavio Human Rights Watchu i priloţen kao Dodatak I ovom izvješću. Ameriĉko ministarstvo
vanjskih poslova izvijestilo je u svom Sedmom izvješću o ratnim zloĉinima u bivšoj Jugoslaviji o
pedesetdevetogodišnjem Bošnjaĉkom muškarcu koji je sa svojim sinom i osamnaest drugih odveden u KP Dom:

59-godišnji bosanski Musliman iz Foĉe bio je kod kuće 27. travnja 1992. godine, kada su srpske specijalne snage
ušle u njegov dom i prisilile njega i njegova sina vani. Vojnici su nosili maskirne uniforme i crne trake i bili su
mu potpuno nepoznati. Pretpostavio je da su došli iz Srbije jer su govorili na ekavskom narjeĉju. Svjedok,
njegov sin i osamnaest drugih muškaraca iz susjedstva odvezeni su autobusima u mjesni KP dom ... Srbi koji su
vodili logor ĉuvali su pisane zapise i biografske podatke o svim interniranim osobama. usadili strah
muslimanskim zatvorenicima odabirom odreĊenih zatvorenika zbog premlaćivanja. Iz njegovog prozora u sobi
13 svjedok je vidio kako se zatvorenici redovito odvode u zgradu u kojoj su vršena premlaćivanja. Zgrada je bila
dovoljno blizu da ĉuje krikove onih koji su bili tuĉeni.(21)

FE, još jedan Bošnjak preţivjelih u KP domu, rekao je Human Rights Watchu da je pobjegao iz svog doma u
selu izvan Foĉe kada su srpske snage preuzele općinu Foĉa. Kada su se on i njegov sin vratili nekoliko tjedana
kasnije, otkrili su da je njihova kuća spaljena: (22)

Prolazio je tenk srpske vojske, s autobusima i automobilima. Pokušali smo se sakriti iza kuće. Posljednji
automobil zaustavio se, a ĉetvorica su izašla iz automobila. Svi su bili u crnom, imali su bombe na njima i maske
na licima. Rekli su "ruke gore!" i pitali su nas "što, jebote, radite ovdje, ustaše, (23) gdje je sve spaljeno?" Stavili
su nas u auto i odveli u Ustlikolinu.

Ĉetvorica muškaraca [u crnom] dovela su me prije [zapovjednika policije], koji me poznaje od prije, jer sam
prije rata u Ustikolini imao mali kafić. Moj sin je pobjegao preko mosta i pobjegao natrag u Goraţde. [Jedan
ĉovjek] je nosio svoju policijsku odoru ... njegov mlaĊi brat je bio s njim, takoĊer u policijskoj uniformi ... rekli
su mi da uĊem u auto. Rekao je: "moramo vas odvesti u KP Dom na ispitivanje." Odveli su me u KP Dom 15.
svibnja.

Jedna ţena i dvojica muškaraca u civilnoj odjeći ispitivali su me u KP domu. Pitali su me o vojsci u Goraţdu i
odatle sam se vratio u svoju kuću ... Pred sobom su imali svu moju dokumentaciju ... Odveli su me u sobu 18 i
nisu me maltretirali. U sobi 18 bilo je osamdeset ljudi, i bilo je puno. Tada sam ĉuo da je u KP domu bilo 713
ljudi. Znala sam sve u sobi ... 17. rujna, navodno su uzeli trideset pet ljudi kako bi pokupili šljive, i nikada se
nisu vratili. 25. rujna uzeli su dvadeset i pet ljudi i nikada se nisu vratili. MeĊu onima koji se nisu vratili bili su
Husein Ĉengić, Eso Dzano, Rasim Muslić, ĉiji je otac ubio u njegovu domu. Kasnije su uzeli Muradif Music i
devetnaest drugih. To je bilo 9. listopada 1992. Nikad se nisu vratili ... Oni koji su znali da su bili u vojsci u
Goraţdu bili su pretuĉeni. Ostali nisu pretuĉeni. Nisu me tukli.

Moj prijatelj je odveden u podrum gdje su ga tukli. Pitao sam ... jednog od straţara da vidim prijatelja. Rekao je
da. Bio je prijatelj mog brata i zato je uĉinio tu uslugu. Rekao je da ga mogu vidjeti dvije minute. On [prijatelj] je
bio potpuno modar i crn ... [straţar] je bio pored mene. (Moj prijatelj) stavio je ruku u dţep i dao mi novac za
cigarete. Nisu mu oduzeli novac. U istoj sobi u kojoj je bio moj prijatelj, jedan je ĉovjek visio jedan metar od
poda na zidu. Uţe su ga drţale gore, a na jednoj je strani vrela voda padala na jedno od njegovih ramena, a na
drugoj strani bila je hladna voda i on je plakao. Nisam ga poznavao, ali je mnogo patio. Bila je to stvarno topla
voda, i on je stvarno patio i vrištao je. [Straţar] mi je rekao da nikome ne kaţem što sam vidio.(24)

Komisija struĉnjaka Ujedinjenih naroda u izvješću detaljno opisuje zatoĉeniĉki objekt u KP domu, ukljuĉujući
fiziĉku ustanovu, broj straţara i uniforme koje nosi, i potvrĊuje navode o "nestancima".

Jedan izvor izvijestio je da je 19. svibnja 1992. u muškom zatvoru u Foĉi bilo 130 muslimanskih zatoĉenika, a
od 19. do 25. svibnja dovedeno je 400 novih zatoĉenika. Straţari obiĉno ulaze u ćeliju izmeĊu 20:00 i 22:00,
pozivaju imena zatvorenika, obavještavaju ih da ih treba razmijeniti i odvesti. Od tih zarobljenika više se nikada
nije ĉuo. Otprilike 200 zatvorenika izvuĉeno je iz zatvora iz nepoznatih razloga krajem kolovoza, većina
zatvorenika vjerovala je da su ih ubili straţari. Trideset i pet zatvorenika odvedeno je 15. rujna i još 12 na kraju
istog mjeseca, navodno radi razmjene zatvorenika. Zatvorenici otpušteni od tada nisu uspjeli pronaći nijednog od
tih ljudi.(25)

Sjedinjene Drţave dostavile su Vijeću sigurnosti UN-a 22. listopada 1992. godine Vijeću sigurnosti UN-a
informacije o kršenjima humanitarnog prava, ukljuĉujući teške povrede Ţenevskih konvencija u Foĉkoj regiji.
izvješće o sluĉaju ĉetrdesetogodišnje svjedokinje ubojstva Bošnjaka iz Foĉe poĉetkom srpnja 1992:

Jedne noći u 21 sat svjedok je vidio kako Srbi vode grupu od sedam ljudi do znaka "Tito" na brdu iznad
Foĉe. Rekla je da je ta grupa u ţutom kombiju odvezena uz brdo ... Vidjela je kako Srbi skupljaju grupu, uzimaju
novac i identifikacijske kartice, te ih ubijaju noţevima. Tijela su baĉena u rijeku Drinu. Tijekom sljedećih ĉetiri
do pet dana, svjedok je vidio isti ţuti mini-kombi koji je dovodio ljude na isto mjesto gdje su bili ubijeni na isti
naĉin. Vidjela je neka tijela baĉena u Drinu, a druga baĉena u kamion koji su odvezeni. Svjedok je rekao da je
kombi došao iz smjera muškog zatvora u KP domu, a ona je sumnjala da su ţrtve bili zatvorenici iz tog
logora. Ona vjeruje da postoji masovna grobnica ispod znaka "Tito", (26)

Osoblje KP Doma

Milorad Krnojelac - Ratno: Upravitelj (KPD) u KP Domu (travanj 1992. - rujan 1993.) / Aktualno: Optužen,
uhićen od strane snaga SFOR-a 15. lipnja 1998. i prebačen u Haag

Prema izvješćima koje su preţivjele KP doma, Krnojelac, profesor matematike po zanimanju, bio je direktor KP
doma do rujna 1993. godine (27) Human Rights Watch procjenjuje da je veliki dio onih koji su „nestali” iz KP
doma (procjenjuje se na 354 bivših općinskih ĉelnika Foĉe u egzilu), “nestao” je za vrijeme Krnojelĉeva
mandata. (28)

H obaviješteni Human Rights Watch da Krnojelac je znatnu moć donošenja odluka u razdoblju izmeĊu 18.
travnja 1992. i rujna 1993. godine (29) Isto tako, bosanska vlada Drţavna komisija za prikupljanje ĉinjenica o
ratnim zloĉinima (DKOM zloĉine u daljnjem rata), koji proveli opseţne intervjue s preţivjelim od preuzimanja
Foĉe dok su bjeţali iz grada, identificirali Krnojelca kao upravitelja KP doma u tom razdoblju. (30) Krnojelac,
uĉitelj u osnovnoj školi u Foĉi do 15. lipnja 1998. godine, uhićene su od strane francuskih snaga SFOR-a tog
dana, na temelju zapeĉaćene optuţnice koju je podigao ICTY u Haagu. On se trenutno nalazi u Haagu i ĉeka
suĊenje. (31)

Miodrag Koprivica - Ratno vrijeme: Ispitivač u KP Domu / Aktualno: Policijski inspektor

Troje preţivjelih zatoĉeniĉkih objekata u KP domu, ED, FE i IH identificirali su Koprivicu kao Human Rights
Watch kao ispitivaĉ u KP domu tijekom njihovog zatoĉenja. (37) Ispitivanja su bila rutinski dio svakodnevnog
ţivota u KP domu, a svi preţivjeli u KP domu, koje je intervjuirao Human Rights Watch, izvijestili su o tome da
su ih više puta ispitivali. Netko u poziciji da rutinski ispituje zatvorenike u KP domu vjerojatno bi znao identitete
mnogih zatoĉenika, te bi takoĊer bio u stanju znati za sudbine mnogih onih koji su "nestali". ED je izvijestio
Human Rights Watch da je "Koprivica svake veĉeri dolazila u osam [i] nazivala ljude s popisa, a oni se nikada
nisu vratili". (38)

IH je kazao Human Rights Watchu da je bio u susjednoj sobi kad je Koprivica ispitivao i tukao bošnjaĉkog
zarobljenika Adnana Berbergica. IH je rekao da je Berbergić, kada je izašao iz sobe za ispitivanje, vidio da ga je
premlaćivanje teško povrijedilo i da mu je kasnije Berbergić rekao da ga je Koprivica tukla. Berbergic je kasnije
"nestao". Koprivica je trenutno policijski inspektor u Foĉi i jedan je od osumnjiĉenika koje je intervjuirao IPTF
jer je navodno sudjelovao u premlaćivanju dviju osoba u pritvoru u prosincu 1997. godine. U vezi s tim sluĉajem
nije bilo uhićenja. (Za detalje, vidi Zoran Vladiĉić u nastavku, a takoĊer i odjeljak o Zlouporabi ljudskih prava
protiv sadašnjeg stanovništva Foĉe.) (39)

Vojo Starević - Ratno: Inspektor kriminalističke policije, ispitivač u KP Domu / Aktualno: Policijski službenik

Prema jednom izvoru, Starević je prije rata bio inspektor kriminalistiĉke policije, a tijekom rata bio je i naĉelnik
kriminalistiĉke policije. (40) Prema ED i FE, dvojica preţivjelih u KP domu, Starević su ispitivali zatvorenike u
KP domu tijekom razdoblja njihovog pritvora. (41) To je vjerojatno da će biti u poziciji da znaju o sudbini mnogih
zatvorenika koji su „nestali” iz pritvora. Prema rijeĉima dvojice djelatnika meĊunarodnih organizacija u regiji,
Starević i dalje radi kao policajac u Foĉi. (42)

Miro Burilo - ratno vrijeme: straža, KP Dom / struja: nesigurno; Možda isto

Prema ĉetvorici svjedoka s kojima je razgovarao Human Rights Watch, Burilo je bio straţar u KP domu za
vrijeme njihovog pritvora. FE, koji je bio zatvoren u KP Domu, izvijestio je da je Burilo bio u sobi za ispitivanje
kad je 1992. godine doveden u KP dom. Prema FE, Burilo i još dvojica straţara su mu rekli da isprazni dţepove i
uzeo 300 DM, nešto hrane , njegov prsten i sat. Tada su Burilo i ostali straţari odveli FE u sobu u kojoj su ga
drţali tijekom pritvora u KP Domu. FE je kazao kako se Burilo susreo mnogo puta tijekom boravka u
pritvorskom centru:

Burilo je bio najgori u KP domu. Nije mogao ĉekati da ga netko pretuĉe. Vidio sam kad je Burilo donio
Fikreta (43) u KP dom .... Fikreta su kasnije odveli u podrum i pretukli ... Ĉuo sam da Burilo i dalje radi u KP
Domu ... U kolovozu 1992. u 21 sat [noćni] Zoran [ime zadrţava] i Burilo naziva mnoge ljudi iz mnogih
soba. Vodili su ljude i tukli ih, ĉuli smo ih kako vrište. Više od sat vremena su ih tukli. Tukli su ljude uvijek u
podrumu, tako da ste ih ĉuli kako vrište. Sjedili smo u kutu i bojali se u našoj sobi. Nakon više od jednog sata
sve se zaustavilo i bilo je tiho. Nikad nismo spavali noću jer smo bili tako uplašeni. Jedno jutro odveli su nas po
sobu do mosta, a oni ljudi koji su bili odvedeni te noći imali su odsjeĉene glave. Bilo je devet tijela, a glave su
bile odvojene od tijela .... Neke od njih sam prepoznao kao Muniba Veiza, Salema Bica i Ekrema Dţelilovića. (44)

ED, koji je bio zatoĉen u KP domu i svjedoĉio zlostavljanjima koja su se tamo dogodila, nazvao je Burila
"jednim od najgorih. (45) Drugi bošnjaĉki preţivjeli takoĊer je izvijestio da je Burilo bio jedan od straţara u
pritvorskom centru tijekom cijelog njegovog zatoĉeništva, što je trajalo petnaest mjeseci. (46) HG, svjedokinja
koja je krajem 1995. i poĉetkom 1996. bila u KP domu, rekla je da je Burilo još uvijek bio straţar u
zatvoru. (47) U skladu s dvoje svjedoka iz Foĉe, Burilo je i dalje straţar u KP domu danas. (48) Human Rights
Watch nije mogao potvrditi ovu tvrdnju.

Slavko Koroman - ratno: zapovjednik straže u KP Domu / Aktualno: Neizvjestan; Možda policajac

Prema ED, HG i IH, svi preţivjeli u KP domu koje je intervjuirao Human Rights Watch, Koroman je bio
policajac koji je prije rata radio u zatvoru KP doma. Za vrijeme rata, prema ovim svjedocima, Koroman je bio
zapovjednik straţe u KP domu. (49) Netko na mjestu nadzornika straţara u KP Domu bio bi odgovoran za nadzor
njihovih postupaka, koji su ĉesto ukljuĉivali zlostavljanje, muĉenje i premlaćivanje, kako je opisano u gornjem
dijelu. Do kraja rata, prema HG-u, koji je bio zatvoren krajem 1995. i ostao u KP domu do travnja 1996.,
Koroman više nije radio kao straţar, već se vratio na poloţaj u policiji u Foĉi, ali je nastavio posjetite KP
Dom. (50)Drţavna komisija za ratne zloĉine bosanske vlade navodi da je Koroman bio zapovjednik straţe u KP
domu u svom biltenu iz 1993. godine, a Koroman je na popisu osoba navodno odgovornih za ratne zloĉine u
Foĉi. Human Rights Watch nije mogao potvrditi da je Koroman još uvijek policajac u Foĉi. Prema BA,
zaposleniku jedne meĊunarodne organizacije u regiji, vlasnik je kavane "Roma" u gradu. (51)

Zoran Vladiĉić - Ratno: Policijski ispitivač u KP Domu / Aktualno: načelnik Odjela za kriminalističke istrage
Regionalnog centra javne sigurnosti (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova)

HG, preţivjela u KP domu koja je tamo bila u zatvoru kasno u ratu, izjavila je za Human Rights Watch da je
Vladiĉić bio policijski inspektor u zatvoru tijekom njegova boravka u njemu. Kazao je kako su Vladiĉić i drugi
policajci koji su radili u zatvoru prebacivali zatvorenike naprijed-natrag izmeĊu zatvora i Brionija, farme na
kojoj su zatvorenici korišteni kao prisilni rad. (52) ED, zatvorenik KP doma od travnja 1992. do kraja godine,
izjavio je za Human Rights Watch da je Vladiĉić ispitivao zatvorenike u KP domu. ED je vjerovao da je Vladiĉić
barem jednom, ako ne i ĉešće, ispitivao sve zatvorenike u pritvoru. Izjavio je:

Svi zatvorenici imali su saslušanja kod Zorana. Nije me tukao tijekom ispitivanja, jer je njegov otac radio prije
nego sam radio [prije rata]. Ali drugi su se vratili krvavo ... Zatvorenici bi morali mnogo puta ići na ispitivanja,
ali ja sam samo jednom morao ići. (53)

Drţavna komisija za ratne zloĉine bosanske vlade takoĊer tvrdi da je Vladiĉić bio "ispitivaĉ u zatvoru u
Foĉi". (54)

Vladiĉić je, kako se izvješćuje, zajedno s Miodragom Koprivicom (vidi gore) odgovoran za premlaćivanje dvoje
zatoĉenika u policijskoj postaji u Foĉi u prosincu 1997. godine. kada ih je IPTF intervjuirao tijekom rutinske
inspekcije zatvora. Human Rights Watch pregledao je fotografije tog zatoĉenika, koje je IPTF preuzeo tri dana
nakon što je pretuĉen, u kojem je cijela leĊa pritvorenika od njegove glave do koljena bila jako modrena i
krvava. IPTF je obavijestio Human Rights Watch da je identificirao Vladiĉića kao jednog od onih koji su
poĉinili premlaćivanja. Prema rijeĉima monitora IPTF-a, Vladiĉić je tvrdio da su on i Koprivica bili u Crnoj Gori
na dan premlaćivanja. MeĊutim, IPTF je zatraţio dokaz od graniĉne policije na crnogorskoj granici i obaviješten
je da nema evidencije o njihovom prelasku. IPTF planira svoje nalaze iz ove istrage predstaviti sudu u
Trebinju. (Za više detalja o ovom sluĉaju, pogledajte odjeljak o napadima na sadašnju foĉansku populaciju,
dolje.)(55)

Sportska dvorana Partizan

Sportska dvorana Partizan prvotno se koristila kao prostor za ţene i djecu koji su bili deportirani iz
Foĉe; meĊutim, barem nekoliko mjeseci 1992. godine, dvorana je postala kamp za silovanje u kojem su ţene
pretrpjele silovanje desetaka, ako ne i stotina puta, tijekom razdoblja njihovog pritvora. Smješteni uz policijsku
postaju u središtu grada, stanovnici Foĉe uskoro su poĉeli shvaćati da se Partizan koristi kao mjesto muĉenja i
ubijanja od strane "straţara" bosanskih Srba; iako su mnogi izvijestili da su policajci upozorili policajce o tome
što se dogaĊa u susjednoj zgradi, lokalna policija, umjesto da intervenira, nastavila je slati graĊane u sportsku
dvoranu kao da je još samo centar za deportaciju. (56)"Ţene koje su tamo bile drţane odvoĊene su na silovanje
svake veĉeri", izvijestio je jedan preţivjeli koji je proveo dva mjeseca u "Partizanu". "Ono što su prošli
jednostavno se ne moţe opisati." (57)

Ţene i djevojke takoĊer su u ljetnjoj školi u srednjoj školi u Foĉi boravile tijekom ljeta 1992., odakle su obiĉno
prebaĉene u Partizan. Prema izvješću struĉnjaka UN-a:

Dana 3. srpnja ili oko tog datuma, 500 "cetnika" opkolilo je šumu u blizini Mesajea, gdje su preostali muslimani
[nakon preuzimanja i masovnog zatoĉenja nesrpskih muškaraca u travnju] pobjegli i ubili i zarobili one
unutar. Otprilike sedamdeset ţena i djece i pet staraca odvedeno je u sabirni logor u srednjoj školi u Foĉi. Svih
sedamdeset ih je drţano od 3. srpnja do 17. srpnja 1992. godine. Svi su bili prisiljeni ostati u nekadašnjoj
uĉionici deset metara. za deset metara. Uspjeli su koristiti madrace i pokrivaĉe koje su ostavili srpski vojnici koji
su ranije okupirali školu ... Sve ţene izmeĊu petnaest i ĉetrdeset pet godina kontinuirano su silovale srpske vojne
ĉlanice ..... 17. srpnja sve zatoĉeni u srednjoj školi prebaĉeni su u sportsku dvoranu Partizan u središtu Foĉe u
Samoborskoj ulici.(58)

Prema sedmom izvješću ameriĉkog State Departmenta o ratnim zloĉinima u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, 3. srpnja 1992.,
otprilike trideset šest ţena je, kako se izvješćuje, odvedeno iz njihovog sela u općini Foĉa u Buk Bijelu, što je
bilo gradilište s vojarnama za radnika, gdje su sustavno silovane. Jedna od ţena izjavila je da je, nakon što je
tamo nekoliko sati drţana i silovana:

Grupa je zatim odvedena u srednju školu u Foĉi gdje su proveli osam dana. Svake noći, tri do pet ţena su
odvedene i ĉesto vraćene teško pretuĉene. Ĉetrdeset dana su ih kamionom odveli u partizanski sportski centar
usred središta Foĉe ... Ova grupa iz [ovog sela] bila je prva grupa koja je internirana u partizanima, ali više je
došlo kasnije, s vremenom ukupno sedamdeset ĉetiri. zatoĉenici .... Za vrijeme dok je bio u partizanu, svjedok je
[rekao] da su "vojnici" danju i noću ulazili u vodstvo mladih ţena. Jednu dvadesetĉetvorogodišnju ţenu silovala
je pred cijelom grupom zatoĉenika. [sic] (59)

GF, Bošnjakinja iz Miljevine, rekla je Human Rights Watchu da je ostala u svojoj kući do 3. rujna 1992. godine.
Odveli su 250 nas, ţena i djece, u Partizan. Odvezli su nas autobusom. Rezervisti su došli po nas, u
uniformama. Nosili su rukavice i šešire. Oni koji su nas odveli bili su Srbi iz Srbije koji su govorili srpski
dijalekt. Bili su dobro naoruţani. MeĊu vojnicima je bilo i ţena dobro naoruţanih. Bio sam u Partizanu tek od 12
sati do 16 sati sljedećeg dana. (60)

U odvojenom intervjuu, LK, još jedna ţena odvedena s GF-om u Partizan, detaljnije je opisala ono što su vidjeli
u Partizanu tijekom njihovog kratkog boravka u njemu: (61)

Odveli su nas autobusom u Foĉu do Partizana. "Zeko" Vuković (62) bio je voĊa grupe koja nas je dovela u
Partizan u 12 sati 3. rujna. Dvjesto pedeset ţena, djece, staraca i invalida. Naše zatoĉenje je bilo zbog toga što su
oni [Srbi] izgubili teritorij u blizini Goraţda i htjeli su se osvetiti. Dobili smo vijest da je druga grupa
muslimanskih civila ubijena u "Focanskim Jabukom". Drţali su nas na ţivotu.

Partizan je bio sportska dvorana, tukli su nas, silovali, bez struje, bez vode, spavali smo na podu. (63) Grupe Srba
došle su noću. Bilo je mnogo foĉanskih Srba, ali i mnogo Srba iz Srbije. [Oni] su maltretirali ţene, tukli ţene,
muĉili nas. Jedna je ţena prepoznala Srbina iz Foĉe i zamolila ga da mu pomogne, rekao je da okupi neke ţene i
on će se pobrinuti za njih sljedećeg dana. Sljedeće su ih dana odveli u Veleĉevo na Brionima i zlostavljali ih,
silovali. Bilo ih je pet. Ĉetiri su se vratile, ali peti nije.

Preţivjeli iz Partizana koji su kasnije bili intervjuirani u izbjegliĉkim kampovima izvan Bosne opisali su
doţivljavanje silovanja kao sustavni ritual. Neke od tih ţena izvijestile su da su tijekom razdoblja zatoĉeništva
silovane više od stotinu puta. Jedna je ţena novinaru Newsdaya Royu Gutmanu ispriĉala da je tijekom svog
zatoĉeništva u Partizanu silovana otprilike sto i pedeset puta. Drugi su izvijestili da su bili silovani do šest puta
na noć. (64) Iako su ţene ponekad bile silovane pred ostalim zatvorenicima u dvorani, rutinski su ih odvodili na
lokacije izvan dvorane kako bi ih grupno silovale grupe vojnika, ĉesto u napuštenim kućama ili stanovima u
blizini. Jedna ţena koja se skrivala u stanu u blizini dvorane svjedoĉila je da isti vojnici svakodnevno odvode
ţene iz dvorane; procjenjuje da je u svakodnevnom silovanju zarobljenika bilo ukljuĉeno pedeset
vojnika. (65) Druga ţena priĉa da su je odveli na otvoreni stadion gdje su je vojnici uniformisani
silovali. "Izbrojao sam ih 29. Onda sam izgubio svijest." (66) Kad se probudila, vratili su je natrag u logor; jedna
ţena u izbjegliĉkom kampu u Kirklareliju u Turskoj, meĊutim, sjetila se ĉetiri mlade djevojke, od kojih su troje
bile tinejdţeri, koji se nisu vratili u Partizan nakon što su ih izveli jedne noći. "Kada te odvedu, mogu te ubiti.
Dakle, ako si silovan, osjećaš se sretnom. Barem si ţiv." (67)

Partizan je bio aktivni logor silovanja nekoliko mjeseci sredinom 1992. godine, i iako je bilo mnogo upozorenja
o postojanju logora, izvješća su ignorirana. Lokalno, prema navodima meĊunarodnih novinara, prituţbe graĊana
na susjednu policijsku postaju bile su zabiljeţene, ali nikada nisu postupane. Jednoj silovanoj ţeni izravno je
rekao: "Izlazi, ne moţemo vam pomoći", policijski sluţbenik bosanskih Srba u postaji. (68) U većoj mjeri,
meĊunarodna zajednica je takoĊer zatvorila oĉi. U isto vrijeme kada je Partizan postao kamp za silovanje,
bosanski predsjednik Alija Izetbegović zatraţio je od francuskog predsjednika Francoisa Mitterranda da se
pobrine da meĊunarodna zajednica istraţi logore silovanja u Foĉi. Zahtjev je ispunjen šutnjom. Kasnije je
Mitterrand zanijekao da je takav poziv ikada bio podnesen. (69)

Praksa silovanja kao "etniĉkog ĉišćenja" uĉinila je bošnjaĉke ţene Foĉe u namjerno ciljanu skupinu. Jedna ţena
ispitana u izbjegliĉkom kampu primijetila je da je skupina muškaraca koji su je silovali i trinaest drugih ţena s
kojima je bila zatoĉena "bila neka vrsta vojne policije [koja] nije ĉinila ništa osim silovanja. Sve je bilo
organizirano; za silovanje i grupu za ubojstvo. " (70)

Human Rights Watch svjestan je navoda o silovanju koje su se dogodile u logoru barem do rujna 1992.

Bolnica u Foĉi

Jedan svjedok koji je radio u bolnici u Foĉi prijavio je Human Rights Watchu da je mnogo ljudi u Foĉi pobjeglo
u bolnicu kada je napad poĉeo, misleći da će bolnica biti sigurno mjesto:

MeĊutim, "srpski teritorijalci" koje su podrţavali cetnici iz Srbije okupirali su ĉak i bolnicu oko 15. travnja
1992. godine i nisu dopustili nikome da napusti bolnicu, tako da su svi vojno sposobni ljudi odvedeni iz bolnice
u KP Dom-- lijeĉnicima, medicinskim sestrama i pacijentima. Proces odvoĊenja muških pacijenata iz bolnice u
KP Dom trajao je sve do rujna 1992. godine. Iz bolnice su odveli sedam medicinskih sestara, ĉetiri lijeĉnika i
mnoge druge muškarce .... MeĊu njima je bio dr. Aziz Torlak, koji je "nestao" iz KP Doma 7. srpnja 1993.
godine ... Jedan broj drugog medicinskog osoblja ostao je u bolnici duţe vrijeme do lipnja ili srpnja 1992., a
nakon toga odveden u kućni pritvor, a kasnije deportiran kroz Crnu Goru. Mnogi od njih su preţivjeli. (71)

Bivši djelatnici bolnice u Foĉi rekli su Human Rights Watchu da je medicinsko osoblje bosanskih Srba iz bolnice
već mjesec dana prije preuzimanja poĉelo prebacivanje medicinskog materijala iz skladišta glavne bolnice u
medicinsku kliniku koju su postavljali iskljuĉivo za Srba, u oĉekivanju onoga što će doći. Srpska bolnica
osnovana je u Veleĉevu, (72) na mjestu sjedišta Kriznog štaba, a kasnije i na pritvoru za ţene. Prema izvješćima
bivšeg bolniĉkog osoblja, dr. Radovan Mandić, koji je prije rata bio lijeĉnik u bolnici u Foĉi, bio je direktor te ad
hoc srpske bolnice.

NM, medicinska sestra iz Foĉe, koja je bila prisiljena ostati u bolnici kada su ga preuzele srpske paravojne snage,
rekla je Human Rights Watchu:

Od 8. travnja do 12. travnja "cetnici" su ušli i preuzeli bolnicu. Do tog dana radili smo relativno normalno, imali
smo rezervu, nismo imali nikakvih informacija o tome što se dogaĊa vani. Ništa nismo znali, svi smo bili u
bolnici i nigdje nismo išli ... bolnica je bila izvan kontrole. Bilo je šezdeset djece i mnogo majki. Bilo je trinaest
beba bez majki koje su bile stare oko dva ili tri mjeseca. Sedam djece je odvojeno od njihovih obitelji. Sve ostale
su bile majke i djeca ... Majke su spavale na podu. Nisu imali ništa. Ĉetiri sestre rade za svu djecu. Nismo se
mogli pobrinuti za sve njih .... Bili smo gladni, bilo je vrlo malo hrane. Kruh je bio tako teţak da su djeca
izgubila zube dok su pokušavala jesti ... mogli smo ĉuti pucnjavu. (73)

NM je izvijestio da su Srbi iza bolnice ubili nekoliko Bošnjaka. Sliĉno tome, Komisija struĉnjaka UN-a, u
posebnom izvješću o masovnim grobnicama u općini Foĉa, takoĊer je izvijestila da:

20. travnja 1992. nekoliko je muslimana odvedeno iza bolnice, pogubljeno, nakon što su proglašeni krivima za
posjedovanje oruţja i zakopani u travnjaku iza bolnice. Stanovnici muslimanskih Foĉa vjeruju da je to polje bilo
neprekidno travnato prije neprijateljstava, a nakon toga bilo je puno prevrnutih grobova, a vojnici su koristili to
podruĉje kako bi zakopali mnoga tijela. (74)

Prema rijeĉima dvojice bivših djelatnika bolnice, dr. Radovan Mandić postao je direktor bolnice za Srbe koja je
postavljena u blizini Veleĉeva u Foĉi prije i tijekom preuzimanja u oţujku i travnju 1992. godine. Dr. Mandić i
njegovi suradnici poĉeli su transportirati medicinske potrepštine glavna bolnica u Foĉi do tog tada
novoosnovanog objekta u oţujku 1992. godine, u pripremi za srpsko preuzimanje Foĉe i naknadno preuzimanje
bolnice. Ova srpska bolnica osnovana je kako bi osigurala da Srbi dobiju medicinsku skrb, dok su glavnu bolnicu
preuzele srpske snage 15. travnja 1992. godine. Bošnjaĉko medicinsko osoblje i pacijenti drţani su u bolnici
danima, a mnogi od njih bošnjaĉki muški pacijenti i osoblje prebaĉeni su u KP Dom, odakle su mnogi
"nestali". (75) Jedan bivši djelatnik bolnice u Foĉi tvrdio je da je dr. Mandić bio odgovoran za nadzor transfera u
pritvorske centre kao što su KP Dom i Partizan od svih nesrpskih medicinskih djelatnika bolnice u Foĉi. (76) (Za
detalje o zloĉinima u bolnici u Foĉi, vidi gore.) Human Rights Watch nije bio u mogućnosti utvrditi je li dr.
Mandić napustio bošnjaĉko osoblje i medicinske pacijente u bolnici na vlastitu volju ili pod prisilom.

Drţavna komisija za ratne zloĉine bosanske vlade navodi da je dr. Mandić bio "ĉlan ratnog štaba SDS-a" (ono
što Human Rights Watch naziva Kriznim štabom), ali Human Rights Watch nije mogao potvrditi ovu
tvrdnju. (77) Mandić je bio kandidat na općinskim izborima u Foĉi u rujnu 1997. godine i, prema jednom
lokalnom i jednom meĊunarodnom izvoru, trenutno radi kao specijalist u bolnici u Foĉi.

Ostali nesluţbeni logori

Osim većih javnih pritvorskih centara i nekoliko poznatih privatnih zatoĉeniĉkih centara, bilo je mnogo
sluĉajeva pritvaranja nesrba koji su ostali neprijavljeni. Nekoliko svjedoka izvijestilo je Human Rights Watch da
su ih drţali u kući na kratko vrijeme, u rasponu od nekoliko dana do nekoliko tjedana, prije nego što su bili
prebaĉeni u KP dom ili u sportsku dvoranu Partizan, ili prije nego što su protjerani iz Foĉe. Primjerice, ED,
Bošnjak iz Foĉe, to je izvijestio

Bio sam zatvoren 13. travnja 1992. godine. Uhićen sam iz kuće roĊaka, gdje sam privremeno ţivio. Bila je blizu
moje kuće. Naši su susjedi Srbi okupili nas s tog podruĉja i stavili cijelu svoju obitelj u kuću s pedeset do
pedeset pet drugih. Bilo je ĉetiri ili pet muškaraca, svi u uniformama srpske vojske. Šef tih ljudi bio je Zoran
Milićević. Poznavao sam ga jer je on bio moj susjed. Proveli smo ukupno pet dana u toj kući. Šestu noć
razdvojili su ţene i djecu i poslali ih kući, govoreći im da se ne kreću nikuda osim da odu izravno kući. Muškarci
su ostali sami u kući. Sljedećeg jutra došlo je sedam ili osam crnogorskih muškaraca u uniformama i odveli nas
dvadeset i pet u KP Dom. Kuća u kojoj smo se nalazili nazvana je kuća "Zait Sandal", nakon vlasnika, koji nije
bio tamo dok smo bili tamo.(78)

U Sedmom izvješću ameriĉkog State Departmenta, Bošnjakinja iz Foĉe navodi da:

Ĉetrdesetogodišnja muslimanka bila je kod kuće 14. srpnja 1992. godine u Foĉi kada je dvadeset šest srpskih
vojnika - koji su tvrdili da su Šešeljovci (79) iz Trebinja - došli na njezina vrata. Rekla je da većinu vojnika nije
poznavala jer njihovi naglasci nisu bili lokalni, ali da su ih dva foĉanska Srbina dovela u muslimanske
domove. Vojnici su dva puta udarili svjedoka po glavi policijskom palicom, pitali za supruga i naredili joj da
izaĊe van. Rezali su vrat 16-godišnjeg djeĉaka zapuštenim noţem dok su traţili njegovog oca; djeĉak nije bio
ozbiljno ozlijeĊen. Zatim su muslimanima naredili da poljube pravoslavni kriţ, što su svi uĉinili.

Nakon što su odvojili muškarce od ţena i djece, kasnije su odveli skupinu u policijsku postaju. Dok je grupa
odlazila, vojnici su palili muslimanske kuće. Ţene i djeca su u policijskoj postaji podijeljeni u ĉetiri skupine i
odvedeni u odvojene kuće konfiskovane od muslimanskih vlasnika. Svjedok je smješten sa skupinom od 28 ţena
... Drţali su se u ovoj kući 27 dana.

Dan i noć vojnici su dolazili u kuću i vodili dvije do tri ţene odjednom. Bili su ĉetiri do pet straţara u svako
doba, svi lokalni Foĉani Srbi ... ... ţenama je nareĊeno da se skinu, a vojnici su ušli u kuće uzimajući one koje su
htjeli. Dob ţena kretala se od 12 do 60 godina. Ĉesto su vojnici traţili kombinacije majke i kćeri. Mnoge ţene su
teško pretuĉene tijekom silovanja.

Svjedok je dva puta odabran ..... Dok je svjedok silovao, njezin silovatelj joj je rekao: "Trebao si već napustiti
ovaj grad. Mi ćemo te natjerati da imaš srpske bebe koje će biti kršćani". U to su je vrijeme silovali dva
vojnika; pet vojnika silovalo je 18-godišnju djevojĉicu u punom pogledu na svjedoka ..... Svjedok je takoĊer
rekao da je bila prisiljena piti alkohol i jesti svinjetinu u kući za silovanje. [ 80]

Miljevina

Miljevina je selo u općini Foĉa, gdje se, kako se izvješćuje, dogodilo mnogo ratnih zloĉina i kršenja ljudskih
prava. Prema rijeĉima nekoliko osoba iz grada koje je intervjuirao Human Rights Watch, Miljevina je imala
svoju vlastitu strukturu moći koja je, iako je bila u nadleţnosti Kriznog štaba u središnjoj Foĉi, sama donosila
odluke o "etniĉkom ĉišćenju" ne - Seljani Miljevine. Bošnjaĉki i hrvatski graĊani Miljevine uhićeni su i kratko
zadrţani u policijskoj postaji Miljevina.

Miljevina je mjesto rudnika ugljena Miljevina, koji je prije rata osigurao ugljen za većinu okolne
regije. Zatvorenici iz KP Doma navodno su tijekom rata odvoĊeni na rad u rudnik ugljena. Krajem 1996. godine,
Human Rights Watch je primio tvrdnje da su nesrpski pojedinci još uvijek bili zatvoreni na nekoliko mjesta u
općini Foĉa, od kojih je jedan bio rudnik Miljevina. Navodi su navodili da su takve osobe moţda bile ili bi
mogle biti drţane pod laţnim srpskim imenima kako bi se sakrili njihovi identiteti. Duboke istrage tih navoda ne
samo u Miljevini, nego iu cijeloj regiji bile su neuvjerljive. MeĊutim, sve dok vlasti u Foĉi i dalje opstruiraju
SFOR i IPTF

Ĉetiri svjedoka iz Miljevine izvijestila su da je Pero Elez (81) bio na ĉelu vojske bosanskih Srba u
Miljevini. TakoĊer su rekli da je u Miljevini osnovan lokalni krizni odbor za organiziranje i voĊenje kampanje
"etniĉkog ĉišćenja" i za preuzimanje Miljevine, te da je sjedište odbora bilo u motelu Miljevina.

KJ, ĉovjek iz sela "Poljica", smješten u neposrednoj blizini Miljevine, obavijestio je Human Rights Watch da je,
iako je pobjegao iz sela dok je bio napadnut, njegova tetka i roĊak ostali u selu i bili svjedoci napada. Iako su ti
roĊaci KJ odbili razgovarati s predstavnicima Human Rights Watcha iz straha, KJ je tvrdio da je njegova tetka
vidjela mrtva tijela jedanaest civila, koji su ostali u selu nakon što je srpska vojska izašla. I teta i roĊak su tvrdili
KJ-u da je u selu boravilo petnaest starijih osoba koje nisu mogle pobjeći i da više nisu ĉule.

Mico Olović - Ratno vrijeme: Miljevina načelnik policije, struja: isto

Olović je tijekom rata bio naĉelnik policije Miljevine. Prema GF, LK, KJ i ML, (82) svi bivši stanovnici
Miljevine, koje je intervjuirao Human Rights Watch, Olović, kao šef policije, nadzirao je Miljevinsku policiju u
njihovom okupljanju nesrba. Zatoĉene su ĉesto tukli u policijskoj stanici / zatvoru u Miljevini i prebacivali u
razliĉite zatoĉeniĉke centre koji su osnovani u općini Foĉa. Ostali su protjerani iz regije. Prema izvješćima tih
preţivjelih, ne-Srbi iz Miljevine koji su protjerani ili premješteni u zatoĉeniĉke objekte prvo su prošli policijsku
postaju / zatvor u Miljevini. Kao šef policije, Olović je bio na poloţaju na kojem bi se od njega oĉekivalo da
bude svjestan i izravno ukljuĉen u organiziranje takvih transfera. Ĉinjenica da su oni pod Olovićevom
komandom poĉinili teške zloĉine izaziva zabrinutost zbog Olovića.

GF, ţena iz Miljevine, opisala je prvih nekoliko dana od preuzimanja Miljevine.

Srbi su nas okruţili u svim našim kućama. Rekli su mom suprugu da ne moţe napustiti kuću. 8. i 9. travnja bio
sam sa svojom kćeri, zetom i unukom. Nismo mogli izaći. Ostali smo u kući. Moj muţ je ostao u kući deset
dana. Mico Olović je bio zapovjednik policije, ali nije došao. Ne mogu se sjetiti imena tipa koji je uzeo mog
muţa. Dva [muškarca] su došla po mog muţa ... 2. svibnja 1992 ... jedan je bio policajac, a jedan
rezervista. Odveli su mog muţa u policijski auto. Petnaest dana kasnije otišli smo ga posjetiti [u KP
Domu]. Vidjeli smo ga pet minuta i straţar je bio s njim. (83)

GF nikad više nije vidjela svoga muţa.

LK, još jedan svjedok iz Miljevine, izvijestio je Human Rights Watch da je, nakon što je njezin otac uhićen i
odveden u KP dom, sakrila vlastitog supruga u podrum:

Krsto i Ţeljko Skakavac došli su uhititi mog muţa 9. lipnja 1992. godine. Oni su bili policajci pod ... Mićom
Olovićem .... Srbi su 8. lipnja poginuli na minskom polju. 9. lipnja zbog toga, pod Micoovim naredbama, odmah
su uhitili trideset osam ljudi. To se uvijek dogodilo svaki put kad bi izgubili neke od svojih ljudi .... Odveli su
mog muţa u policijsku postaju, a kasnije sam ĉuo da su ih sve prevezli u osobne automobile i sve ih ubili. Svih
trideset i osam bili su muškarci, oĉevi i sinovi. Za sve je to bio zaduţen Mico Olović. Ne znam pod ĉijim je
nareĊenjima [Olović radio]. Bio je tako dobar prije rata ... Nikad više nisam ĉuo ništa o svom
suprugu. Pretpostavljam da su u masovnoj grobnici u Mitrinu Vrelu. Bio sam u kontaktu s tim ţenama ĉiji su
muţevi i sinovi bili odvedeni tog dana. Nitko nije dobio nikakve informacije o grupi. (84)

ML, još jedna ţena iz Miljevine, rekla je Human Rights Watchu kako:

Dana 2. svibnja 1992. iz Miljevine je odvedeno trideset ljudi. Sedamnaest se vratilo, a drugi
nisu. Sedamnaestorica koji su se vratili zauvijek su odvedeni 9. svibnja 1992. godine. Ne znamo ništa o njima
nakon toga. (85)

LK, ĉiji je otac bio meĊu trideset muškaraca odvedenih iz Miljevine 2. svibnja 1992., opisao je svoje uhićenje,
koje je svjedoĉila:

Moj je otac uhićen 2. svibnja 1992. godine. Dragan Jovanović uhitio je mog oca. Jovanović je podrijetlom iz
Crne Gore, ali je radio kao policajac u Miljevini nekoliko godina prije rata. On (moj otac) je odveden u
policijsku postaju u Miljevini, a odatle u KP dom. 15. svibnja dobio sam dopuštenje od moje tvrtke i od Mića
Olovića [naĉelnika policije u Miljevini] da posjetim oca. Sa mnom je bila još jedna ţena koja je trebala posjetiti
svog muţa i sina [u KP Domu]. Zvala se Ramiza, a muţ joj se zvao Zaim, a sin joj se zvao Zikro. Ubijena je ... u
njezinu stanu nekoliko dana kasnije. Njezin sin i muţ su nestali ... Vidjela sam oca tog dana u KP Domu. Nije se
usudio ništa reći. Bio je vrlo blijed i ostao sam samo pet minuta. Nisu mi dopustili da mu dam hranu koju sam
mu donio.(86)

Dva druga svjedoka iz Miljevine, KJ i ML imenovala su Radea Draškovića kao jednog od policajaca u Miljevini
koji je radio pod nadzorom Miće Olovića. (87) KJ, bošnjaĉki muškarac iz sela nedaleko od Miljevine, obavijestio
je Human Rights Watch da mu je otac rekao da ga je uhitio Drašković, policijski sluţbenik u Miljevini, koji ga je
odveo u policijsku postaju u Miljevini, odakle ga je odveo u policijsku postaju u Miljevini. u KP domu. Otac KJ
preţivio je njegov pritvor, ali se nije htio osobno sastati s Human Rights Watchom. (88)

LK je opisao strukturu moći u Miljevini tijekom preuzimanja, navodeći da,

Mico Olović je bio na ĉelu, bio je naĉelnik policije u Miljevini. Krsto i Ţeljko Skakavac [radili su kao policajci]
pod ... Olović ... Rade Skakavac bio je rezervista koji je takoĊer radio pod Olovićem. Olović je prije rata bio šef
policije. Kasnije su i ţene bile ukljuĉene. Ruza Medjo radila je pod Olovićem, kao i Vera Skakavac, koja je
odvodila ljude, ali pod kojim je radila i s Tutom [Janko Janjić, optuţen od strane MKSJ] i Pero Elez. U Miljevini
je bila javna kuća u kojoj je Vera skupljala djevojĉice, to je bila Karamanova kuća. (89)

Kuća Karaman (koju su UN nazivali Miljevina Bordello) sluţila je kao pritvorski centar u Miljevini gdje su
navodno drţane i sustavno silovane nesrpske ţene. Izvješće struĉnjaka UN-a opisuje Karamanovu kuću i
sudjelovanje vojske pod lokalnim zapovjedništvom Pere Eleza.

Prema jednoj ţeni, Pero Elez je bio "glavni Cetnik" u Miljevini. Prema njezinim rijeĉima, poznavao je sve u selu
i stoga nije štetio; meĊutim, njegovi vojnici bili su zloĉinci, a meĊu njima Crnogorci su navodno bili
najgori. Istaknula je, meĊutim, da je shvaćeno da je Elez odveo petoricu 12-godišnjih djevojĉica iz Kalinovika i
doveo ih do onoga što je svjedokinja izvijestila kao Elezov bordel u Miljevini gdje su ih drţali kao konkubine.

Druga ţena opisuje kako su je odveli u kuću Nusreta Karamana i tamo drţali šest mjeseci s drugim mladim
ţenama i silovali. Prema još jednoj ţeni, Miljevina bordello nalazila se u trokatnoj bijeloj kući s naranĉastim
krovom, u vlasništvu muslimana Nusreta Karamana koji je radio u Njemaĉkoj. Bordello je bio udaljen 50 metara
od njezina prozora preko rijeke Bistrice. Druga ţena potvrdila je postojanje bordela. I ona je to mogla vidjeti iz
svog doma. Prema drugom izvoru, do 3. rujna 1992. u Miljevini su ostali samo Muslimani. Drugi izvor je
izvijestio da je 2. rujna 1992. ili pribliţno tog datuma, 10 djevojĉica starih 12 godina ili manje drţano u bordelu
u Miljevini. (90)

Prema rijeĉima općinske vlade u izgnanstvu u Foĉi, osamdeset osoba, ukljuĉujući ţene i djecu, ubijeno je u
Miljevini za vrijeme srpskog preuzimanja grada od travnja do prosinca 1992. godine. policijskoj postaji
Miljevina prije nego što su poslani da ispune svoje sudbine. Mico Olović, kao šef policije u to vrijeme, trebao je
znati o sudbini mnogih od osamdeset, kao i svatko na njegovom poloţaju. (91)

Zapravo, policijska postaja Miljevina, pod upravom Olovića, korištena je kao zatvorski objekt. Prema Struĉnom
povjerenstvu Ujedinjenih naroda,

Kao iu svim drugim selima koje su osvojile srpske snage, muslimani su u Miljevini bili zarobljeni i smješteni u
pritvor za razliĉito vrijeme. Navodno, Srbi su koristili zatvor u Miljevini kako bi zarobili sve muškarce u selu 11.
lipnja 1992. godine. 20. lipnja 1992., jedan muškarac je bio zatvoren u zatvor u Miljevini i drţan je sedam dana i
pretuĉen nakon ĉega je naviknut oĉistiti mine. Bio je prisiljen voziti automobil ispred konvoja kako bi oĉistio
stazu ili barem osigurao mjesto sigurnog puta kroz minska polja za srpske snage. Kasnije je bio zatvoren u KP
domu. (92)

Prema meĊunarodnim promatraĉima u regiji, Mico Olović je i dalje šef policije u Miljevini.

Ostali sudionici u preuzimanju Miljevine

Milenko "Zeka" Vuković - ratno: stražar u sportskoj dvorani Partizan, vojnik / struja: nesigurno; Vjerojatno
je član izvršnog odbora općine

Vuković je prije rata radio u rudniku ugljena u Miljevini u raĉunovodstvu. LK i GF, dva svjedoka koja je
intervjuirala Human Rights Watch, tvrdili su da je Vuković zarobio ţene i prevezao ih u Sportsku dvoranu
Partizan u sklopu "etniĉkog ĉišćenja" nesrpskog stanovništva u Miljevini tijekom rata, Pero Elez. LK, ţena iz
Miljevine, izvijestila je da je Vuković vodio grupu srpskih vojnika koji su je uhitili i 250 drugih ţena, djece,
starijih osoba i osoba s invaliditetom nesrpske nacionalnosti iz Miljevine poĉetkom rujna 1992. i prevezli ih u
dvoranu Partizan, mnoge su silovane i muĉene. Rekla je da je nakon toga Zeka Vuković straţarila u hodniku i da
je izgledao kao da je na vlasti. TakoĊer je rekla da je svjedoĉila kako je pet ţena odvedeno u Vuković. godine,
od Partizana do Veleĉeva, još jednog zatoĉeniĉkog centra za ţene, gdje je kasnije ĉula da su silovane i na drugi
naĉin zlostavljane. Ĉetvorica od petorice vratila su se ispriĉati priĉu. Nedostaje peti.(93)

Popis trenutnih duţnosnika u općinskoj vladi u Foĉi koji su UN-ovim civilnim poslovima dostavili Human
Rights Watchu navodi "Milenka Vukovića" kao ĉlana općinskog izvršnog odbora predsjednika Radojice
Teševića. Human Rights Watch nije mogao potvrditi da je osoba ista kao što je gore opisano. (94)
Nedzo Golubovic - Ratno vrijeme: Soldier / Current: Nepoznato

ML, Bošnjak iz sela u blizini Miljevine, navodno je Golubović uhitio ĉetiri susjeda Bošnjaka, odveo ih i
kasnije vratio njihova tijela natrag u selo gdje su ih pokopali ML i drugi stanovnici ovog sela. Iako je ML
rekla da je vidjela Golubovića kako odvodi ĉetvoricu Bošnjaka i vraća njihova tijela, nije mogla potvrditi
da je Golubvović zapravo poĉinio ubojstva. Prema ML, ta ubojstva su se dogodila u svibnju 1992., kada je
Pero Elez bio zapovjednik vojske bosanskih Srba u Miljevini. ML je Human Rights Watchu dao imena
ĉetvorice ubijenih, ali iz sigurnosnih razloga zatraţio je da u ovom izvješću ne navedemo ţrtve ili selo. (95)

Vera Skakavac - ratno vrijeme: časnik / struja: civil u Miljevini

Vera Skakavac navodno je bila umiješana u uhićenje ţena u Miljevini i odvoĊenja u zatoĉeniĉki centar Karaman
House za ţene. Ţene koje su tamo drţane navodno su sustavno silovane tijekom njihovog pritvora. KJ, Bošnjak
iz Miljevine, tvrdio je da je Vera Skakavac "okupila djevojke i odvela ih u Karaman centar za pritvor". (96) Prema
rijeĉima bivše stanovnice Miljevine, Vera Skakavac je radila pod i s Tutom (Janko Janjić, optuţen od strane
MKSJ-a) i Pero Elez u uhićenju ljudi. Ovaj svjedok je rekao da je u Miljevini, u Karaman kući, postojala javna
kuća u kojoj je Vera skupljala djevojĉice. (97) ML, još jedan svjedok iz Miljevine, takoĊer je rekao da je Vera
"odvela mlade ţene u pritvorske centre". (98)

Prema rijeĉima svjedoka iz Foĉe koji je sudjelovao na općinskim izborima u rujnu 1997. godine kao ĉlan
lokalnog izbornog povjerenstva, Vera Skakavac još uvijek ţivi u Miljevini sa svojim roditeljima. (99)

Krizni odbor i njegovi voĊe

Poĉetkom travnja 1992. osnovan je Krizni odbor za općinu Foĉa koji je imao posebnu odgovornost za planiranje
i provedbu preuzimanja općine. Prema dopisniku Newsdaya Royu Gutmanu, vodstvo Kriznog odbora sastojalo
se od:

trojica vrhunskih suradnika ĉelnika bosanskih Srba Radovana Karadţića. Velibor Ostojić, ministar u
Karadţićevoj odcijepljenoj vladi, i druga dva bliska suradnika, Vojislav Maksimović i Petar Ĉanĉar, organizirali
su vojni napad u Foĉi u travnju 1992. i preuzeli grad, ĉak su i straţare postavili ispred policijske postaje. (100)

Krizni odbor ( Krizni Stab) je ĉesto uspostavljano tijelo u gradovima na teritoriju Bosne koje je pod srpskom
kontrolom, prvo koordinirati preuzimanje gradova od strane srpskih i vojnih snaga bosanskih Srba, a kasnije i
sustavno "ĉišćenje" nesrpskih stanovnika iz gradova. Krizni odbori, sastavljeni od voĊa srpske zajednice (obiĉno
aktivisti SDS-a), odigrali su brojne uloge u olakšavanju prijelaza iz multietniĉke prirode tih gradova u "etniĉki
ĉiste" gradove bosanskih Srba. Odgovornost kriznih odbora kretala se od organiziranja protjerivanja ili
"nestanka" legitimnih izabranih nesrpskih duţnosnika i voĊa zajednica, do eksproprijacije imovine nesrpskih
graĊana grada.

I. Pojam Krizni štab već je prije ratova postojao u vojno-strateškoj teoriji u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Vojska se kao
takva uvijek na neki naĉin bojala ljudi. Vojska je bila iznad ljudi i imala privilegije koje su lako mogle dovesti
do toga da se ljudi okrenu protiv vojske. Vojska se sastojala od priliĉno konzervativnih ili reakcionarnih
komunista, dok se ĉinilo da ljudi napreduju prema demokraciji. Vojska je htjela kontrolirati ljude i stoga je
trebala ljudima dati dojam da ljudi zapravo kontroliraju vojsku. U tome je vojska, općenito govoreći, uspjela. U
najgorem sluĉaju, plan je bio da vojska osnuje Krizni štab, Tako bi vojska bila sigurna da je ukljuĉila u Krizni
štab ljudi kojima su vjerovali. Povjerenje u ovom kontekstu znaĉi odanost i podreĊenost.

ii. Kriţni Stab Srpske Opštine Prijedor je bio ukljuĉen u logistiĉkom podrškom i proizvodnje za vojsku. Kriţni
Stab je instrument stjecanja potpunu kontrolu nad cjelinom Opština Prijedor (ili preko bilo kojeg drugog
geografskog podruĉja gdje Kriţni Stab je proglašena). Vojnici koji su radili za interese vojske bili su postavljeni
iu industriji i drugim proizvodnim jedinicama kako bi kontrolirali proizvodnju, dobili podršku i kontrolirali
civile.

iii. Kriţni Stab je takoĊer imalo je funkciju naoruţati Srbe u svom operativnom podruĉju. Ostale su funkcije bile
blokiranje komunikacija i provokacije unutar mješovitih etniĉkih zajednica. Kljuĉna je funkcija, meĊutim, glasila
da su srpski narod kao takvi bili ugroţeni od strane ne-Srba, što je za posljedicu imalo hitnu potrebu da JNA
djeluje kako bi zaštitila narod. Ideja je bila da se strateški moţe mobilizirati uz pristanak naroda, odnosno zauzeti
pozicije s artiljerijom i tenkovima i sl., A vojnici "braniti" srpski narod. (101)

Ĉesto su se krizni odbori sastojali od kombinacije vojnih i civilnih duţnosnika, kao što je bio sluĉaj iu Prijedoru
iu Foĉi. Civili su bili ili lojalni ĉlanovi SDS-a, ili sami predratni duţnosnici, ili su, u sluĉaju Foĉe, navodno bili
bliski suradnici tadašnjeg predsjednika bosanskih Srba Radovana Karadţića, koji ih je imenovao na svoja mjesta
u Kriznom odboru Foĉe.

U izvješću Instituta Ludwig Boltzmann Instituta za ljudska prava Komisiji struĉnjaka UN-a o padu
Zvornika (102) javlja se jasna slika o kriznom odboru kao administrativnom središtu "etniĉkog ĉišćenja". Prije
vojnog preuzimanja Zvornika, SDS je Zvornik proglasio dijelom "Autonomne srpske regije Semberija i
Majevica" i preko svojih ĉlanova omogućio isporuku oruţja i druge vojne opreme. Ova skupina aktivista
formirala je i miliciju "teritorijalne obrane" koja je, uz ostale sluţbene vojne i paravojne skupine, terorirala i
napadala stanovnike kako bi dobila kontrolu nad gradom. Neposredno prije ili za vrijeme vojnog napada, ova
skupina aktivista postala je Krizni štab "srpske općine Zvornik".

Nakon napada, "srpski okrug Zvornik" se putem medija oglasio stanovnicima koji su pobjegli, rekavši im da je
nasilje okonĉano i, manje kongeniĉno, da se moraju vratiti u roku od nekoliko tjedana ili će im se vratiti imovina
do "srbijanskog okruga Zvornik". Kada su se Bošnjaci vratili, bili su prisiljeni registrirati svoju imovinu i od tog
trenutka, "srpska općina Zvornik" djelovala je ruku pod ruku s "teritorijalnom obranom" koja je sluţbeno
oduzimala imovinu, terorizirala manjinske stanovnike, te ih skupljala i deportovala iz Zvornik. (104) Da bi
stanovnik mogao otići, potreban je odreĊen broj dokumenata koji su svi pripremili i dostavili "srpski okrug
Zvornik". (105)

Krizni štab Prijedor postigao je sliĉan stupanj koordinirane administrativne i vojne kontrole nad Prijedorom i
okolnim mjestima. Ona je bila dovoljno integrirana u vojne strukture te regije kako bi isporuĉila ultimatume
nekoliko sela - ukljuĉujući Kozarac i Hambarine - u smislu da, osim ako su njegovi razliĉiti zahtjevi za predaju
oruţja, bošnjaĉki policajac i potpisi za "obećanje o odanosti" bili u skladu s tim, grad bi se našao pod vojnim
napadom. Nakon nepridrţavanja ultimatuma Kriznog štaba, napadnuti su i Kozarac i Hambarine. (106) MeĊutim,
moć Prijedorskog kriznog odbora proširila se daleko izvan granica vojske, od mogućnosti cenzure i širenja
propagande preko lokalnih medija do kontrolnih logora. (Za daljnju raspravu o Prijedorskom kriznom odboru,
vidi Human Rights Watch / Helsinki (sada Human Rights Watch, Odjel za Europu i Srednju Aziju), "Neopaţeni:
uzimajući nagrade" etniĉkog ĉišćenja "," Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 9, broj 1, sijeĉanj 1997.)

Krizni odbor u Foĉi nije bio izuzetak. Uzimajući i odrţavajući kontrolu nad gradom tijekom cijelog rata,
djelovala je kao upravni organ za "etniĉko ĉišćenje". U travnju 1993. Karadţić je potvrdio da su Ostojić,
Maksimović i Ĉanĉar "utjecali na uspostavu civilnih vlasti" u Foĉi. (107)Prema intervjuima preţivjelih koje je
proveo Human Rights Watch i izvješćima meĊunarodnih novinara, ostali ĉlanovi Kriznog odbora u Foĉi ukljuĉili
su Radojicu MlaĊenovića, predsjednika Izvršnog odbora općine Foĉa većinu poslijeratnog razdoblja, do
studenog 1997. Parlamentarni izbori u Republici Srpskoj; Vojo Bodiroga, graĊevinski inţenjer koji je bio ĉlan
Karadţićeve Srpske demokratske stranke (SDS) u Foĉi; i Mira Stanića, koji je bio predsjednik SDS-a u
Foĉi. Krizni je odbor navodno radio u suradnji s bivšim pukovnikom JNA Markom Kovaĉem, koji je bio jedan
od vojnih zapovjednika na tom podruĉju, te s Branislavom Cosovićem, lokalnim zapovjednikom vojne policije.

Pod nadleţnošću Kriznog odbora u Foĉi, uspostavljeni su manji lokalni krizni odbori u drugim gradovima i
selima u općini Foĉa. Human Rights Watch svjestan je drugih lokalnih kriznih odbora u Ustikolini i
Miljevini. (108)

Kao što je već spomenuto, Krizni odbor Foĉa osnovan je s posebnom odgovornošću za organiziranje i nadzor
nad preuzimanjem općine. Široko rasprostranjeno zlostavljanje - ukljuĉujući pogubljenja po kratkom postupku,
muĉenje, silovanje, "nestanci" i masovna protjerivanja - bili su kljuĉni alati za postizanje cilja etniĉki ĉistog
bosanskog Srbina Foĉe. Drugim rijeĉima, teror je bio sredstvo kojim se postiţe "etniĉko ĉišćenje". Ĉlanove
Kriznog štaba identificirali su brojni bivši stanovnici Foĉe, kao i meĊunarodni novinari koji su izvještavali o
ratu, jer su nadgledali akcije vojnih i civilnih snaga koje su proizvele taj teror.

Iako Human Rights Watch ne moţe iskljuĉiti mogućnost da su pojedini ĉlanovi odbora i sami poĉinili
zlostavljanje, mi nismo dobili dokaze iz prve ruke koji bi potvrdili takvo ponašanje. Umjesto toga, većinu
zloĉina poĉinili su pojedinci koji bi bili pod vojnom i / ili politiĉkom komandom ĉlanova Kriznog odbora.
Ĉlanstvo u Kriznom odboru snaţan je pokazatelj da su pojedinci koji su sudjelovali u njemu znali ili su trebali
znati za široko rasprostranjene i teške zloupotrebe koje su poĉinili pod njihovim nadzorom, i doista da su moţda
izdavali izravne naredbe za poĉinjenje tih zlouporaba.

Petko Ĉanĉar - ratno vrijeme: gradonaĉelnik Foĉe, voditelj Kriznog odbora / Aktualni: Ministar pravde
Republike Srpske

Petar "Petko" Ĉanĉar je po zanimanju odvjetnik. Prije rata, Cancar je bio na ĉelu komore općina Parlamenta
Republike Bosne i Hercegovine. Bio je ratni gradonaĉelnik Foĉe i na tom poloţaju ostao je do travnja 1997.
godine, kada je imenovan za suca Ustavnog suda Republike Srpske na Palama. U to vrijeme bio je takoĊer
imenovan za predsjednika izborne komisije Republike Srpske.

Kao gradonaĉelnik Foĉe tijekom rata, Cancar je imao izravnu i vodeću ulogu u planiranju i izvršenju brutalne
kampanje terora koja se dogodila u Foĉi. I Cancar je priznao da je ĉlan Kriznog odbora u Foĉi i da je bio
ukljuĉen u osnivanje "srpske" općine. Godine 1996. Cancar je intervjuirao novinar o njegovom sudjelovanju u
ratu:

Došao sam iz Sarajeva u Foĉu 4. travnja 1992. prije Uskrsa. Već 6. travnja meĊunarodna zajednica priznala je
Bosnu kao drţavu. U Foĉi su muslimani zabavljali i slavili .... već smo znali što će se dogoditi, da je Foĉa
zamišljena kao zamorac, suĊenje za uspostavljanje zelene rute od Kosova, preko Sandţaka do Sarajeva ( 109)...
Osnovali smo paralelnu srpsku općinu kako bismo zaustavili prijetnju islama duţ Drine. Pobrinuli smo se za sve,
za obranu, za predsjedništvo, za Krizni štab. Bio sam spreman, u najgorem sluĉaju, preuzeti vlast. Bilo nas je
petnaestak u Kriznom odboru i komunicirali smo sa njihovim sjedištem [muslimanima], ali onda smo preuzeli
vlast kako bismo zaštitili civile, kako bismo sprijeĉili drugi genocid kao u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Ovaj rat su
izazvali muslimani. Kao iu Drugom svjetskom ratu, vladao je kaos, ali smo oslobodili grad za osam dana ....
Mislim da su muslimanski stanovnici na civilizirani naĉin otišli u Crnu Goru i Makedoniju. To je bilo bolje za
obje strane. Sada sve strane imaju svog voĊu i vlastiti teritorij, a ja bih radije da se ne sjećam svega što se
dogodilo. (110)

28. studenoga 1993., Charlotte Eagar iz promatrača (London) susrela je Petka Canĉara u svom uredu i
razgovarala s njim o tadašnjem referendumu koji će se odrţati u Republici Srpskoj na Vance-Owenovom planu.

"Sada imamo ovdje pedeset dva muslimana i oni su u zatvoru [misleći na KP Dom]", rekao je gradonaĉelnik
Petko Ĉanĉar. "Pet srpskih vojnika poginulo je u borbama. Pitajte ga. Izgubio je kuću; on je ovdje da pokuša
dobiti novi stan." Cancar je pokazao na zubara koji je ĉekao u kutu. Prikazi oĉevidaca opisivali su stotine
ubijenih, a njihova tijela baĉena u rijeku Drinu kako bi plutala kroz Goraţde. "Iz povijesti je to tradicija. Pet
godina nismo jeli ribu iz Drine zbog mrtvih srpskih tijela koja su tamo plutala", rekao je gradonaĉelnik, govoreći
o drevnim ustancima i Drugom svjetskom ratu. jesti ribu u ovom trenutku, ali to je zato što smo previše zauzeti
da bi uhvatili bilo koju. " (111)

Komisija za ratne zloĉine bosanske vlade smatra Canĉara jednim od glavnih organizatora napada na Foĉu,
zajedno s Maksimovićem, Ostojićem i Mirom Stanićem, predsjednikom SDS-a u Foĉi u vrijeme preuzimanja
vlasti. U travnju 1995. godine, novinska agencija Hina izvijestila je da je bosansko drţavno odvjetništvo
pokrenulo istrage protiv popisa od oko 100 osoba za koje se tvrdi da su odgovorne za ratne zloĉine, ukljuĉujući i
Cancar, te da je prikupljeni materijal navodno poslan Haškom tribunalu. (112)

Sam Cancar spremno priznaje da je bio aktivni ĉlan Kriznog odbora u Foĉi - povjerenstvo koje je primarno
odgovorno za organiziranje i nadzor nad preuzimanjem bosanskih Srba iz Foĉe, tijekom kojih je nesrpsko
stanovništvo Foĉe bilo muĉeno, silovano i na drugi naĉin zlostavljano, pogubljeni, "nestali" ili protjerani iz
općine. Iako ĉlanstvo u Kriznom odboru samo po sebi nije dokaz o kaţnjivom ponašanju, to je snaţan pokazatelj
da su Cancar i ostali ĉlanovi vjerojatno bili svjesni zlostavljanja koje su poĉinile kako bi se ispunio njihov plan, a
moţda je i bilo izdavanje izravnih naredbi za izvršenje tih zlouporaba.

U poslijeratnom razdoblju, dok je Cancar ostao na duţnosti gradonaĉelnika, prema rijeĉima meĊunarodnog
osoblja koje radi u regiji Foĉe tijekom njegovog mandata, Cancar je odbio poštivati odredbe Daytonskog
sporazuma. (113)Human Rights Watch je obavio razgovore s meĊunarodnim osobljem koje je radilo za ĉetiri
razliĉite institucije u regiji za vrijeme kada je Cancar bio na vlasti. Prema njihovim izvješćima, Cancar je
dosljedno blokirao slobodu kretanja, ograniĉio slobodu izraţavanja i udruţivanja, sprijeĉio meĊunarodne
agencije u ispunjavanju njihovih mandata i sustavno blokirao svaku raspravu o povratku izbjeglica i raseljenih
osoba. (Za više detalja o poslijeratnoj situaciji u Foĉi, vidi dolje.) Cancar je uĉinio sve što je mogao kako bi
odrţao atmosferu zastrašivanja i straha u Foĉi koji su osjetili i meĊunarodno osoblje i lokalno stanovništvo. Ovu
atmosferu odrţali su duţnosnici koji su preuzeli Canĉara poĉetkom ljeta 1997. godine nakon što je Cancar prešao
u SNS-u Biljanu Plavšić.

U sijeĉnju 1998. novi premijer Republike Srpske Milorad Dodik imenovao je Petka Canĉara za ministra
pravosuĊa Republike Srpske. To imenovanje od strane umjerenijeg Dodika bilo je iznenaĊenje za mnoge, au to
vrijeme bilo je i glasina da je Dodik bio pod pritiskom tvrdolinijaša da imenuje Cancar. Unatoĉ ozbiljnim
pitanjima o Cancarovom ponašanju tijekom rata, kao i znaĉajnim dokazima da je on opstruirao provedbu
Daytonskog sporazuma, meĊunarodna zajednica nije traţila njegovo smjenjivanje.

Velibor Ostojić - Ratno vrijeme: ministar informiranja za teritorij pod kontrolom bosanskih Srba, voĊa
Kriznog odbora u Foĉi / Aktualno: Šef Komisije za ljudska prava Parlamenta BiH

Velibor Ostojić roĊen je 8. kolovoza 1945. u jednom selu u Foĉi i profesor je knjiţevnosti. Ostojic je prije rata
bio ministar informiranja za Republiku Bosnu i Hercegovinu, a na istom je mjestu bio i na podrucjima pod
kontrolom Radovana Karadzica tijekom rata. Prema izvješćima trojice poznatih meĊunarodnih novinara,
najmanje triju visoko pozicioniranih svjedoka koje su intervjuirali Human Rights Watch i predstavnicima
lokalnih organizacija za ljudska prava u regiji, Ostojić je takoĊer bio aktivni ĉlan Kriznog odbora u Foĉi. Od
poĉetka rata, kako su ga tada iznosile njegove javne izjave, Ostojić je bio ĉvrst pristaša "etniĉki ĉiste" republike
bosanskih Srba, u julu 1992. godine, ĉak i kada je definitivno definirao ". (114)

Kao što je gore navedeno, ĉelnici Kriznog štaba odigrali su središnju ulogu u preuzimanju Foĉe. Kao jedan od
trojice glavnih voĊa Kriznog štaba u Foĉi, Ostojić je bio na poziciji odluĉivanja u odboru. Nekoliko svjedoka
koje je intervjuirao Human Rights Watch, brojni meĊunarodni novinari koji su intenzivno radili u regiji, i
bosanska Komisija za ratne zloĉine navode da je Ostojić organizirao oruţje i obuku za ĉlanove Karadţićeve SDS
stranke u regiji i koordinirao dolazak paravojnih snaga iz Pomoći vojsci bosanskih Srba u vojnoj kampanji u
Bosni.

Prema izvješću Struĉnog povjerenstva UN-a, "u Foĉi je u bivšem zatvoru osnovan koncentracijski logor, a vodio
ga je Velibor Ostojić." (115) Iako Human Rights Watch nije uspio potvrditi tu ĉinjenicu, kao voĊa Kriznog štaba,
Ostojić je izravno umiješan u planiranje i provoĊenje preuzimanja vlasti u Foĉi, tijekom kojih su opisani ratni
zloĉini i teška kršenja ljudskih prava. u gore navedenim odjeljcima. Štoviše, preţivjeli koje je intervjuirao
Human Rights Watch identificirali su Velibora Ostojića kao jednu od tri osobe odgovorne za kampanju
"etniĉkog ĉišćenja" u općini Foĉa, zajedno s Vojislavom Maksimovićem i Petrom Canĉarom.

Roy Gutman iz Newsdaya 1993. proveo je tromjeseĉnu istragu kampanje "etniĉkog ĉišćenja" u Foĉi. Zakljuĉio je
da:

Oni koji su vodili proces [etniĉkog ĉišćenja] bili su ĉlanovi Karadţićevog unutarnjeg kruga. Pozvali su paravojne
postrojbe da osvoje grad i izdali nareĊenja da se "oĉisti" Foĉu od svih nesrba, kazao je širok spektar
svjedoka. Postavili su koncentracione logore i logore za silovanje, a na njihovu zapovijed srpske snage su
uništile dţamije, a gotovo svaki drugi znak pola tisućljeća muslimanske kulture ... [u telefonskom razgovoru
Karadţić] potvrdio je da su Ostojić, Maksimović i Ĉanĉar “ utjecali na osnivanje civilnih vlasti "u vrijeme
vojnog napada prije godinu dana i preuzeli kontrolu nad Foĉom. (116)

Gutman je svjedoĉio o tim nalazima prije saslušanja Ĉetvrtog kongresa Komisije za sigurnost i suradnju u
Europi (KESS) u Washingtonu DC, 4. travnja 1995. godine. U svom svjedoĉenju, ponovno se pozivajući na
Ostojića, Maksimovića i Ĉanĉara, izjavio je:

Ja sam osobno izvijestio o jednom od logora za silovanje u Foĉi, i bilo je moguće putem razgovora s
gospodinom Karadţićem koji sam imao na telefonu potvrditi da su ljudi koji vode Foĉu njegovi najbliţi
suradnici, ukljuĉujući i ministra u vlastitu vladu [Ostojić, ministar informiranja]. I rekao je da su odgovorni za
sve što se dogodilo u Foĉi. Svjedoci koje sam intervjuirao iz Foĉe, tri ili ĉetiri ţene koje su bile u izbjegliĉkom
kampu u Turskoj, jasno su stavile do znanja što se dogodilo u Foĉi. Svakodnevno su ih silovali u dvorani
Partizan u središtu grada, tik do policijske postaje, toĉno pred oĉima vlasti .... Dakle, postoji vrlo izravna veza s
vodstvom. (117)
Kao dio svoje istrage, Gutman je intervjuirao Envera Pilaffa, koji je bio predsjednik bošnjaĉke Stranke
demokratske akcije (SDA) u Foĉi 1992. godine, odmah nakon što je pobjegao u Sarajevo. G. Pilaff je tvrdio da je
Ostojić ušao u Foĉu tri dana prije srpskog preuzimanja vlasti. Pilaff je izvijestio Gutmana da je prisustvovao
javnom sastanku na kojem:

Ostojić je traţio da muslimani odustanu od oruţja samoobrane i priznaju da je Foĉa srpski teritorij. "On je
muslimanima dao petnaestak minuta da razmisle." ... Ostojić je tada zahtijevao da svi muslimani napuste Foĉu za
koncentracioni logor u blizini planine Jabuka "inaĉe će posljednje muslimansko sjeme biti uništeno u Foĉi",
navodi javnost. izjavu bosanskog ministarstva unutarnjih poslova .... Ostojićeve snage su takoĊer poĉele
okupljati muslimanske civile, odvodivši ih u drţavni zatvor u Foĉi ... [sic.] (118)

U svojoj istovremenoj ulozi ministra za informiranje, Ostojić je bio odgovoran za kontrolu medija, što je bilo
moćno oruĊe koje su vlasti koristile za ubrizgavanje straha u umove stanovništva i uništavanje svakog mogućeg
unutarnjeg protivljenja brutalnom planu "etniĉkog ĉišćenja" „. Kao ministar informacija, Ostojić je ĉesto
objavljivao laţne prijave o zlostavljanju nad etniĉkim Srbima, kada su iskazi muslimanskih i hrvatskih
preţivjelih, izvješća novinara i istraţitelja Ujedinjenih naroda pruţili brojne dokaze da su bosanski Srbi poĉinili
najbrutalnije zloĉine u Foĉi. protiv ne-Srba, u nadleţnosti Kriznog štaba Ostojić je bio dio. Radio Slobodna
Europa izvijestio je 5. kolovoza 1992. da:

Velibor Ostojić, ministar za informiranje samoproglašene "Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine", izjavio je da
se oko 42.000 Srba nalazi u više od 20 logora u Bosni i Hercegovini, te da samo u Sarajevu ima još 22 logora za
Srbi. On je opovrgao postojanje srpskih logora smrti za Muslimane i Hrvate, objašnjavajući kako su Srbi
uspostavili samo "zatvore za zarobljene muslimanske borce". (119)

Tijekom preuzimanja Foĉe, dok su Muslimani i Hrvati bili uhićeni, zatoĉeni i okrutni po Ostojićevim
naredbama, Ostojić je navodno ĉesto putovao na Pale zbog "konzultacija" s Karadţićem. (120) U prosincu 1995.
Radovan Karadţić zamijenio je neke od svojih ĉlanova kabineta s više tvrdokornih duţnosnika koji su bili bliţe
njegovoj nacionalistiĉkoj ideologiji. U onome što se ĉinilo demonstracijom priznanja Ostojićevog otvorenog
nacionalizma, i kao potpora njegovoj ulozi u "ĉišćenju" Foĉe, Ostojić je Karadţić promovirao za zamjenika
premijera Republike Srpske.

Velibor Ostojić je trenutno šef povjerenstva za ljudska prava bosanskog parlamenta, što je on bio na duţnosti od
rujna 1997. godine. Nakon što je izabran na tu duţnost, The Los Angeles Times je napisao:

Velibor Ostojić nije javno optuţen pred MeĊunarodnim kaznenim sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju u
Haagu. MeĊutim, preţivjeli su zapamtili visoki duţnosnici bosanskih Srba jer su na poĉetku bosanskog rata
1992. godine naredili ĉišćenje tisuća Muslimana iz jugoistoĉnih gradova. Njegovo ime posebno je povezano s
nekada muslimanskom općinom Foĉa ... ĉlan najvećeg osumnjiĉenika za ratne zloĉine u krugu Radovana
Karadţića, Ostojić je preuzeo kontrolu nad Foĉom u travnju 1992. (121)

Prema istom ĉlanku, Udruga graĊana Bosansko-podrinjskog kantona, u koju su ukljuĉene i raseljene osobe iz
Foĉe, izjavila je da je uvoĊenje Ostojića na ovo mjesto "poniţavajuće za desetine tisuća ubijenih i protjeranih iz
istoĉne Bosne, ţrtve su Ostojića i onih poput njega. " (122)

Vojislav Maksimovic - Ratno vrijeme: voditelj Kriznog odbora / Aktualno: Rektor Sveuĉilišta Republike
Srpske, Republika Srpska

Vojislav "Vojo" Maksimović roĊen je 4. kolovoza 1935. godine. Bio je profesor knjiţevnosti na Sveuĉilištu u
Sarajevu i šef SDS-a u bosanskom parlamentu prije rata. Kao jedan od trojice voĊa kriznog odbora u Foĉi,
Maksimovića su, kako tvrde meĊunarodni novinari, i nekoliko svjedoka koje je intervjuirao Human Rights
Watch, sudjelovali u planiranju i organiziranju preuzimanja općine Foĉa.

Prema rijeĉima Roya Gutmana iz Newsdaya , Enver Pilaff mu je rekao da je dan nakon što je Ostojić došao u
Foĉu 5. travnja 1992 .:

Ostojić, Maksimović i Cancar susreli su se u svom omiljenom restoranu, Ribarskom domu. "Bio sam vani kad je
izašao Maksimović i rekao njegovim ljudima da će, ako ne uzmu oruţje i poĉeti pucati na muslimane, pozvati
pojaĉanje iz Srbije", rekao je Pilaff. U prisustvu dvojice suradnika, Maksimović je otišao na telefon i "pozvao
vojnike iz obliţnjih gradova Nikšića u Crnoj Gori, a Uţice u Srbiju", rekao je Pilaff. Pilaff je rekao da je ĉuo
poziv kroz otvorena vrata. (123)

Gutman dalje navodi da su "prema drugim bosanskim drţavama i muslimanskim stranaĉkim izvorima, Ostojić,
Maksimović i Ĉanĉar odluĉili o sudbini stotina Muslimana na tom podruĉju, da li će ih pogubiti paravojne snage
ili poslati u logor u Foĉi. zatvor." (124)

Godine 1995. Maksimović je bio gradonaĉelnik srpskog dijela Sarajeva i ostao na tom poloţaju do oţujka 1996.
godine, kada je sluţbena kontrola sarajevskih predgraĊa prenesena na Bošnjaĉko-hrvatsku
federaciju. Maksimović, kao gradonaĉelnik srpskog Sarajeva tijekom prijenosa ovlasti predgraĊa, nije iskoristio
svoj poloţaj kako bi potaknuo etniĉko srpsko stanovništvo Sarajeva da ostane. (125)

Drţavna komisija za ratne zloĉine bosanske vlade navodi da je Maksimović bio ukljuĉen u:

[snabdijevanje] oruţjem, obuka ĉlanova SDS-a, dolazak nepravilnih lica iz Srbije, sve u svrhu okupacije oruţja
[velikog dijela teritorija RBH i Republike] i etniĉkog "ĉišćenja" u tom podruĉju, provoĊenje terora, zastrašivanja
otpuštanja, pljaĉke, poniţenja, iseljenje, zatvaranja, muĉenje i ubijanja. [sic] (126)

Maksimović je nakon rata zadrţao mjesto šefa zastupnika SDS-a u Parlamentu Republike Srpske. U kolovozu
1997. godine, srpski parlament je objavila da je s obzirom na Maksimović kao potencijalnog kandidata za
predsjednika Republike Srpske u narednih općih izbora koji će se odrţati u rujnu 1998. U odgovoru, Gradjanin ,
vijesti agencija Beograd, izvijestio je da je „nedavno [Maksimović je] ime spominje se kako se nalazi na popisu
srpskih duţnosnika na tajnom popisu za Haag, zbog navodnih ratnih zloĉina poĉinjenih u Foĉi. " (127)

Maksimović je zadrţao svoj politiĉki poloţaj i utjecaj u Foĉi i ostao predan Srpskoj demokratskoj stranci
Radovana Karadţića, koja je dosljedno i otvoreno kršila odredbe Daytonskog sporazuma. U studenom 1997.
godine, Maksimović je diskvalificiran kao kandidat za parlamentarne izbore u Republici Srpskoj od strane
OESS-a kao rezultat neuspjeha stranke SDS-a da ukloni plakate koji su pokazivali slike optuţenog Radovana
Karadţića.

Maksimović je trenutno rektor Sveuĉilišta srpskog Sarajeva, sada nazvan "Sveuĉilište srpske republike", koji se
nalazi u dijelu Sarajeva koji se nalazi u Republici Srpskoj. I dalje je ĉlan Narodne skupštine Republike
Srpske. Jedan trenutni stanovnik Foĉe rekao je Human Rights Watchu da Maksimović ima "stan na Palama,
jedan u Foĉi i kuću u šumi oko Foĉe". (128)

Ostali ĉlanovi Kriznog odbora

Radojica Mladjenovic - Ratno: Lider na visokoj razini SDS / Poslije rata: Predsjednik Izvrsnog odbora opcine
Foca / Aktualni: Delegat u Narodnoj skupstini Republike Srpske

Prema BA, ĉlanu meĊunarodne organizacije koja je radila na podruĉju Foĉe tijekom rata i poslijeratnog
razdoblja, Mladjenovic je bio i jedan od najviših ĉelnika SDS-a u Foĉi i ĉlan lokalne zajednice. Krizni
odbor. (129) MlaĊenovićeva sluţbena uloga prijavljena je kao predsjednik Izvršnog odbora općine
Foĉa, (130) poloţaj koji je vrlo usko povezan s gradonaĉelnikom grada. Prema BK-u, meĊunarodni novinar koji je
obavio opseţan posao u Foĉi i koji je govorio pod uvjetom da ostane anoniman:

MlaĊenović ... odmah je postao jedan od ĉelnika SDS-a u Foĉi ... predsjednik lokalne vlasti 1992. i kasnije ţivi u
Foĉi. [On je] jedan od ljudi koji su organizirali "etniĉko ĉišćenje" u Foĉi. Bio je zaduţen za civilne poslove, ime
mu je na svim dozvolama koje su muslimani trebali napustiti iz Foĉe [izmeĊu] lipnja i kolovoza [1992]. [ 131]

Jedan svjedok koji je bio kandidat na parlamentarnim izborima u Foĉi 1991. godine imenovao je Mladjenovića
za ĉlana Kriznog odbora. (132) MlaĊenović je ostao na poloţaju predsjednika izvršnog odbora u Foĉi dok se
sredinom 1997. godine nije pridruţio SNS-u stranke Biljane Plavšić. Trenutno je MlaĊenović delegat u Narodnoj
skupštini Republike Srpske. Kandidirao se na općinskim izborima u Foĉi u rujnu 1997., ali je Srpska radikalna
stranka pobijedila.

Miroslav Stanic (Miro) - Ratno vrijeme: navodno predsjednik SDS-a u Foči / Aktualno: Nepoznato
Kao predsjednik SDS-a u Foĉi (Karadţićeva politiĉka stranka), Stanić je navodno bio jedan od primarnih
ĉlanova Kriznog odbora u Foĉi. Vojnik bosanski Srbin iz Foĉe, koji je tijekom cijelog rata bio u Foĉi, danas je
tvrdio da je Stanić, u suradnji s Vojislavom Maksimovićem, izdao nareĊenja visoke razine po kojima su sluţili
straţari u KP domu. (133) Bivši visoki duţnosnik Foĉe, prema SD-u, imenovao je Stanića za ĉlana Kriznog štaba, i
kao onu koja je bila zaduţena za sve paravojne aktivnosti tijekom preuzimanja. (134) BK, još jedan meĊunarodni
novinar, govoreći o situaciji u Foĉi 1996. godine, nakon rata, ali dok je Cancar još bio gradonaĉelnik, rekao je:

Predsjednik bivšeg Kriznog štaba, Miro Stanić, voĊa je (Karadţićeve) Srpske demokratske stranke, jedine
stranke u Foĉi. (135)

Sam Petko Ĉanĉar u intervjuu za BK imenuje Stanića kao jednog od glavnih ĉlanova Kriznog odbora. Cancar je
izjavio:

Do 17. travnja 1992. došli smo u zgradu općine i poĉeli organizirati civilnu vlast, dok je Stanić Miro (136) bio na
ĉelu Kriznog štaba i vodio vojne vlasti i osloboĊenje. (137)

Sedmi izvještaj Drţavnog ministarstva vanjskih poslova o ratnim zloĉinima u bivšoj Jugoslaviji citira
tridesetĉetverogodišnjeg muslimanskog muškarca koji navodi:

Ubrzo nakon što je Bosna 8. travnja proglasila neovisnost, šef lokalnog ogranka Srpske demokratske stranke
(SDS) postao je voĊa Srba u Foĉi i naredio da se muslimansko stanovništvo grada zaokruţi i deportira u razne
logore. (138)

BK navodi Human Rights Watchu da je Stanić:

predsjednik SDS-a od [poĉetka], organizator etniĉkog ĉišćenja zajedno s Mladjenovićem, Petkom Ĉanĉarom,
Veliborom Ostojićem i Vojom Maksimovićem. (139)

Bosanska komisija za ratne zloĉine navodi Stanića da su "on i Vojislav Maksimović bili direktni zapovjednici
artiljerijskog i pješaĉkog napada na Foĉu". (140)

Vojo Bodiroga - Ratno vrijeme: Član Kriznog odbora / Aktualno: Direktor lokalne podružnice
Elektrodistribucije

Prema Faiku Tafru, bošnjaĉkom novinaru iz Foĉe, ĉiji su dnevnici o srpskom preuzimanju Foĉe
objavili nezavisni ĉasopis Dani u Bosni i Hercegovini, Bodiroga je bio ĉlan Kriznog odbora u Foĉi. (141) IH je
takoĊer imenovao Vojo Bodirogu kao ĉlana SDS-a u Foĉi. (142) Prema rijeĉima općinske vlasti u Foĉi u egzilu,
Bodiroga je trenutno direktor lokalne podruţnice drţavne elektroprivrede "Electrodistribucija". (143) To je
potvrdila Nadzorna misija Europske zajednice (ECMM). (144)

Simo Mojevic - Ratno: Član Kriznog povjerenstva Ustikolina / Aktualno: Direktor osnovne škole

Prije rata, Mojević je bio ravnatelj škole u Ustikolini, selu na putu izmeĊu Foĉe i Goraţda, koji je dio općine
Foĉa. Ustikolina je Daytonskim sporazumom prebaĉena iz srpske u Federacijsku kontrolu. Za vrijeme rata,
prema ON i TR, dva svjedoka iz Ustikoline, Mojević je bio ĉlan Kriznog štaba u Ustikolini, a Tafro ga naziva
zamjenikom komandanta "vojske i ĉetnika u Previli", selu u Ustikolini. (145) TR je izvijestio Human Rights
Watch da je Mojević, uz potporu Petra Mihajlovića u svojstvu predsjednika SDS-a u Ustikolini, bio zapovjednik
srpskog vojnog bataljona u Ustikolini, te da je na tom poloţaju nadzirao "etniĉko ĉišćenje" vojske bosanskih
Srba od Ustikoline , koji je bio dio preuzimanja općine Foĉa. (146) TR je izvijestila da je Mojevic ispitivao
pedeset ljudi, ukljucujuci i TR, koji su nakratko bili zatoceni u martu 1992. godine na putu izmedju Ustikoline i
sela zvanog Jabuka. Većina tih muškaraca nakon toga je bila zatvorena, a JNA ih je tada "odvela". (147) Prema
rijeĉima dviju meĊunarodnih osoba koje trenutno rade u regiji, Mojević je trenutno ravnatelj OŠ "Sveti Sava" u
Foĉi. (148)

TakoĊer je ukljuĉen u preuzimanje

Pukovnik Marko Kovac - Ratno: Zapovjednik vojske bosanskih Srba u Foči / Aktualno: Nepoznato
Kovaĉ, pukovnik u bivšoj JNA, bio je zapovjednik vojske bosanskih Srba u Foĉi tijekom preuzimanja vlasti. Kao
zapovjednik vojske bosanskih Srba, Kovaĉ bi mogao nadzirati vojne aspekte protjerivanja bošnjaĉkog
stanovništva iz Foĉe, tijekom kojeg su Bošnjaci "nestali". Vojni zapovjednik takoĊer bi bio odgovoran za
ponašanje vojnika pod njegovim zapovjedništvom koji su izvršavali uhićenje, zatvaranje, protjerivanje i, u
mnogim sluĉajevima, pogubljenja nesrpskog stanovništva u Foĉi.

Maggie O'Kane, novinarka Guardiana , razgovarala je s komandantom Kovaĉem u ljeto 1992. godine.

"Šest stotina Muslimana drţi se u dva zatvora u gradu, zbog vlastite sigurnosti", kaţe zapovjednik [Kovaĉ]. Ţene
i djeca drţe se zajedno u onome što izgleda kao stara gradska vijećnica. Tamo su već tri mjeseca. "Oni ţive u
miru, štitimo djecu od muslimana u brdima i pruţamo sanitarne usluge", kaţe zapovjednik grada Marko Kovaĉ,
"mi se borimo za uzimanje onoga što je naše. Mi ne ţelimo ţivjeti u islamu republika."

Visoko smješteni bivši stanovnik Foĉe tvrdio je:

[Kovaĉ] je zapovijedao srpskom vojskom u protjerivanju Bošnjaka iz Foĉe, "nestanku" ratnih zarobljenika iz KP
Doma na nepoznata mjesta. Kovaĉ je bio zapovjednik obrane grada, dakle zapovjednik srpske vojske na ovom
podruĉju. Sam Kovac bio je jedan od ĉlanova Kriznog odbora. (149)

MeĊunarodni izvor, koji je govorio pod uvjetom da ostane anoniman, izvijestio je Human Rights Watch da, ako
lokalni Srbi ţele napustiti Foĉu tijekom preuzimanja, moraju imati dopuštenje ili od Kovaĉa, ili od lokalnog šefa
policije. Kovać je u više navrata pisao stranim novinarima s upornim opravdanjima za postupke vojnika pod
njegovim zapovjedništvom, ukljuĉujući i tvrdnje da muslimani "ubijaju novoroĊene srpske bebe i utapaju ih u
rijeku Drinu ... seksualno zlostavljaju srpsku djecu ... i odrezali su srpske muške penise " (150) i da su Bošnjaci"
zapoĉeli rat s ciljem izvršenja genocida i izbacivanja Srba iz njihovog ognjišta i doma. " (151)

Branislav Ćosović - Ratno vrijeme: Zapovjednik "Kosine garde" / Aktualno: Policijski službenik

Prema BK-u, meĊunarodni novinar Cosović, lokalni zapovjednik vojne policije u Foĉi tijekom preuzimanja
vlasti, organizirao je vlastitu paravojnu jedinicu u kojoj su Janko Janjić "Tuta" (152) (optuţen) i Zoran
Vuković (153) (optuţeni). borio. (154) Prema SD-u, još jedan meĊunarodni novinar, bivši visoki duţnosnik u Foĉi,
za vrijeme preuzimanja vlasti imenovao je Ćosovića za kljuĉnog voĊu paravojnih snaga u Foĉi i "kljuĉnu vezu
izmeĊu paravojnih snaga i kriznog odbora". (155)

Preţivjela osoba iz KP doma izvijestila je Human Rights Watchu da je svakodnevno vidio "Cosinu straţu" kako
odvodi zatvorenike iz KP doma, nakon ĉega ih više nikad nisu vidjeli ni ĉuli. (156) Optuţnica MKSJ-a za
silovanje kao ratni zloĉin protiv osam javno optuţenih osoba iz Foĉe kaţe, govoreći o zloĉinima poĉinjenim u
srednjoj školi u Foĉi:

[Jedan svjedok], zajedno s najmanje 72 muslimanska stanovnika Foĉe, prebaĉen je u srednju školu u Foĉi. [Ovaj
svjedok] je bila jedna od nekoliko ţena koje su, od drugog dana pritvora, seksualno zlostavljane, ukljuĉujući i
grupno silovane svake veĉeri, od strane grupa vojnika, bilo u uĉionicama ili u obliţnjim stanovima. Vojnici su se
sastojali od pripadnika vojne policije i nazivali su se "Cosinim straţarima", po lokalnom zapovjedniku vojne
policije Cosoviću.

Pozivajući se na pritvorski centar u Sportskoj dvorani Partizan, optuţnica glasi:

Na Partizanu su djelovale dvije skupine poĉinitelja. Jedna je skupina opisala sebe kao "Cosinu straţu", koja je
djelovala u srednjoj školi u Foĉi, a djelovala je iu Partizanu. (157)

(158)
Prema SD-u, Ĉosović je još od svibnja 1998. godine funkcionirao kao uniformirani policajac u Foĉi.

NAKON RATNIH ZLOSTAVLJANJA: NESPOSOBLJENOST FOKACIJSKIH VLASTI U

POSLIJERATNOM RAZDOBLJU
Osobe opisane u prva dva dijela ovog izvješća nisu samo lica iz prošlosti u Foĉi. Nisu optuţeni za zloĉine za
koje su navodno odgovorni i nisu iskljuĉeni iz poslijeratnog politiĉkog procesa. Mnogi od njih ostaju na
mjestima utjecaja na lokalnoj razini u Foĉi, ili, kao što smo vidjeli kod Ostojića, Ĉanĉara i Maksimovića, bili su
nagraĊeni za svoje vodeće uloge tijekom rata promidţbom na pozicije na bosanskom ili na teritoriji Republike
Srpske. Mnogi su bili kandidati na općinskim izborima koji su se odrţali u rujnu 1997. i mnogi će biti kandidati
na izborima koji su predstojeći.

Sljedeći odjeljak pokazuje sustavne napore vlasti u Foĉi da ograniĉe prava trenutnih stanovnika Foĉe
spreĉavanjem meĊuentitetskog pokreta ili projekata koji su osmišljeni za poticanje komunikacije izmeĊu
stanovnika Foĉe i osoba u Federaciji i blokiranjem slobodnog protoka cenzuriranjem medija. Redovito su
blokirali sve napore meĊunarodne zajednice da uspostave meĊuentitetski kontakt putem uznemiravanja
predstavnika meĊunarodnih organizacija koje pokušavaju uspostaviti takve projekte. Kroz obrazac zastrašivanja
i prijetnji uloţili su sve napore kako bi osigurali da lokalno stanovništvo ne razbije zid izolacije koji okruţuje
Foĉu ukljuĉivanjem u bilo kakve meĊuentitetske aktivnosti. Oni su sustavno blokirali svaku raspravu o povratku
izbjeglica i raseljenih osoba u Foĉu; nisu dopustili slobodu kretanja ili izraţavanja; opovrgli su meĊunarodnoj
zajednici bilo kakve informacije o osobama koje su "nestale" za vrijeme rata, negirajući ĉak i da se u Foĉi vodila
kampanja "etniĉkog ĉišćenja"; sprijeĉili su Bošnjake koji su pobjegli iz Foĉe da imaju pristup dokumentima, kao
što su vjenĉani i rodni listovi, vozaĉke dozvole i obrazovni prijepisi, koje drţe općinske vlasti u Foĉi; Napadali
su i prijetili stranim novinarima i meĊunarodnom osoblju za koje smatraju da bi mogli doći u Foĉu kako bi
razotkrili tamnu istinu o tome što se dogodilo tijekom rata. U Dodatku, sprijeĉili su povratak srpskih raseljenih
osoba iz podruĉja sada u Federaciji u svoje domove. Vlasti u Foĉi stvorile su atmosferu straha u Foĉi, opipljivo
svakome tko tamo provede ĉak i kratko vrijeme. Oni koji se protive strogoj kontroli lokalnih vlasti riskiraju
svoju sigurnost, sigurnost i pristup javnim sluţbama, ukljuĉujući humanitarnu pomoć, pa ĉak i njihove mirovine,
koje su prijeko potrebne u poslijeratnoj ekonomskoj borbi.

Iako se ovo izvješće usredotoĉuje prvenstveno na "neupućene", stalna prisutnost osoba optuţenih za silovanje
kao ratni zloĉin i druga kršenja Ţenevskih konvencija ĉinjenica je koja proţima trenutnu situaciju u
Foĉi. Sadašnji duţnosnici štite te pojedince, dopuštajući im potpunu slobodu da utjeĉu na društvo. Treba imati na
umu da su poslijeratna kršenja ljudskih prava koja se dogaĊaju u Foĉi poĉinjena u zajedniĉkim naporima
optuţenih i neupućenih, prema jasnim uputama vlasti Pala. Sadašnje vlasti u Foĉi nisu odgovorne samo za
zloupotrebe koje su poĉinile - one takoĊer moraju preuzeti odgovornost za zloupotrebe koje su poĉinili oni koji
djeluju pod njihovom vlašću. Štoviše, ti su duţnosnici duţni sprijeĉiti takva zlostavljanja i kazniti odgovorne za
njih; i oni moraju biti pozvani na odgovornost kada to ne uĉine. Ove vlasti u Foĉi takoĊer moraju biti odgovorne
za smještaj osoba optuţenih od strane ICTY-a.

Zlouporaba ljudskih prava protiv sadašnjeg stanovništva Foĉe

Stroga kontrola koju vlasti Foĉe zadrţavaju nad lokalnim stanovništvom stvorila je takvu atmosferu straha da je
gotovo nemoguće da organizacija za ljudska prava pronaĊe graĊane Foĉe koji su voljni govoriti protiv vlasti, ĉak
i uz jamstvo anonimnosti. Unatoĉ tome što su lokalne vlasti uznemirile ratni zapis o ljudskim pravima i sve veće
dokaze o ozbiljnim zlostavljanjima u postdejtonskom razdoblju, Human Rights Watch nije uspio pronaći lokalne
srpske civile, osim u vrlo malom broju sluĉajeva, koji su spremni razgovarati o svojim problemima. Nekoliko
hrabrih pojedinaca dijelilo je informacije s Human Rights Watchom, kao i meĊunarodno osoblje koje je radilo u
Foĉi u razliĉito vrijeme u poslijeratnom razdoblju. Njihove priĉe upućuju na ovaj dio izvješća.

Jedna hrabra bosansko-srpska ţena koja danas ţivi u Foĉi izrazila je ogorĉenje nad lokalnim vlastima i njihovo
zlostavljanje lokalnog stanovništva: "Svaki ĉovjek će vam reći sve što ću vam sada reći. Ovdje uopće nema
prava." Ova ţena, na koju će se u ovom izvješću navesti SR, raseljena je osoba iz sela na rubu općine Foĉa koje
je Federaciji dodijeljeno prema Daytonskom sporazumu:

Imamo tri kuće u [bivšem selu]. Morali smo otići kad je Dayton napustio [selo] u rukama Federacije. Imamo tri
kuće, zemljište, vrtove, sve sam imao ... U prosincu 1995. naša općina nas je pozvala na javni sastanak kako
bismo svi rekli da napustimo selo jer pripada muslimanima. MeĊu sluţbenicima bili su Miro Stanić, Vojo
Maksimović, Radojica MlaĊenović, Velibor Ostojić i Petko Ĉanĉar .... Nisu nam dali mogućnost da ostanemo
tamo ... morali smo napustiti naše kuće ... Ostali smo do 10. veljaĉe 1996. došao je srpski vojnik i pitao nas
"zašto ste još uvijek ovdje? Ţelite ţivjeti s muslimanima? Što ĉekate?"
Osjećajući da nema izbora nego da napusti svoj dom, SR je otišla posjetiti ministarstvo za izbjeglice u Foĉi kako
bi pronašla mjesto za ţivot u gradu, ali nije dobila nikakvu pomoć. "Pronašli smo ovu kuću u kojoj su se nalazile
svinje. Uništena je, nema krova, a ovdje su drţali svinje i piliće ĉetiri godine." (159)

Smrad svinja još je bio opipljiv kako sjedi u hladnoj sobi, u jednoj sobi, gdje SR ţivi s muţem i dvoje unuĉadi. U
ljeto 1997. SR je vlastima priopćila svoju namjeru da se vrati u svoje selo, što je ona rekla Human Rights Watch-
u da je spremna uĉiniti, bez obzira na ĉinjenicu da je sada na teritoriju Federacije. Od dana kada je vlasti Foĉi
najavila svoju namjeru da se vrati u svoju kuću u Federaciji, uskratili su njoj i njenom suprugu humanitarnu
pomoć. Osvrnuvši se na karticu socijalne pomoći koju moraju imati raseljene osobe koje dobivaju humanitarnu
pomoć, SR je kazala Human Rights Watchu:

Nemam ovu karticu jer sam vlastima najavio da ţelim ići kući ... Tako da ne dobivam pomoć i moram platiti
struju, iako sam raseljena osoba .... ljudi me mrze. Ne bi mi dali ĉašu vode. Boje se da će morati ići kući. Imaju
dobre ţivote ovdje u gradu, bolje nego u svojim selima. Imaju lijepe kuće muslimana .... sve vlasti kaţu da ovdje
nema više izbjeglica. Što sam onda? (160)

SR je opisao situaciju prije općinskih izbora u Foĉi u rujnu 1997. godine, navodeći da se osobe koje se
pridruţuju Karadţićevoj Srpskoj demokratskoj stranci (SDS) ili Srpskoj radikalnoj stranci Vojislava Šešelja
brinu vlasti u Foĉi:

SDS je rekao da ako glasamo za njih, moţemo dobiti dvije mirovine. Ljudi su dobili mirovine nakon što su
glasali za SDS. Šešelj je došao u Foĉu prije općinskih izbora [rujan 1997.] i dao svima kavu kako bi ih natjerao
da glasaju za SRS. Svatko tko ima ĉlanstvo u SDS-u će imati posao i imati mjesto za ţivot. Moj [...] se morao
pridruţiti SDS-u da bi dobio posao. Da se nije pridruţio, ne bi dobio posao.

Kad je Human Rights Watch pitao SR zašto je toliko spremna govoriti, ona je jednostavno odgovorila:
"UsuĊujem se govoriti jer samo ţelim ţivjeti slobodno." (161)

Premlaćivanje policije

Postoje brojna izvješća o fiziĉkom zlostavljanju i uznemiravanju od strane lokalne policije u Foĉi. U jednom
sluĉaju, pet muškaraca bosanskih Srba navodno su opljaĉkali ĉovjeka s invaliditetom u blizini Foĉe, koji ga je
navodno prebio i ozbiljno ozlijedio. Prema IPTF-u, poĉinitelji su navodno bili dio "bande mafijaškog tipa" s
poviješću nasilnih pljaĉki. Petoricu muškaraca uhitila je lokalna policija u Foĉi 9. prosinca 1997., a odvedeni su
u lokalnu policijsku stanicu, gdje su dva od osumnjiĉenika pretuĉena od strane lokalne policije. Jedan od
osumnjiĉenika koji je bio najteţe pretuĉen tvrdio je da ga je policija ispitivala i tukla više od pet sati, a da je
nakon premlaćivanja izgubio svijest. Ovaj osumnjiĉeni identificirao je tri policajca koji su bili umiješani u
premlaćivanje. IPTF je fotografirao ozljede osumnjiĉenika,(162) Osumnjiĉenikova leĊa bila su potpuno modrena,
od vrata do bedara, i bilo je tamno plavo i crno, s "gotovo lijevim dijelom koţe". (163) Prema monitoru IPTF-a
koji je snimio fotografije, modrice su rezultat udarca tupim instrumentom. Osumnjiĉeni je takoĊer imao modrice
na rukama i crnom oku. Drugi osumnjiĉeni imao je modrice na vratu, kao da ga je uhvatio vrat, ili kao da ga je
policija pokušala zadaviti. Navodno su njih dvojica pretuĉeni kako bi dobili priznanje. (Ostala trojica
osumnjiĉenih nisu prijavila da su pretuĉena.) Nakon što je prvi pretuĉen tako teško, policija je navodno dovela
drugog osumnjiĉenika da vidi njegove ozljede, te mu je rekla da će se s njim dogoditi i to ako se ne ispovijedi.
, Prema IPTF-u, osumnjiĉeni je nakon toga priznao.

Nakon tog ispitivanja i premlaćivanja, osumnjiĉeni su odvedeni na sud u Trebinju, gdje je istraţni sudac odluĉio
da ima dovoljno dokaza da ih prebaci u zatvor u Foĉi. U zatvor u Foĉi stigli su 12. prosinca 1997. godine, na dan
kada je IPTF obavio rutinsku posjetu. Osumnjiĉeni koji je teško pretuĉen zatraţio je sastanak s IPTF-om, a
nakon što je IPTF pogledao njegove rane i ĉuo njegovu priĉu, promatraĉi su dvojicu osumnjiĉenika odveli u
bolnicu u Foĉi. Ovo je bio prvi medicinski pregled koji su njih dvojica imali. Jedan straţar iz zatvora ih je pratio
u bolnicu; ali ubrzo nakon što su stigli tamo, policajac je navodno bio umiješan u premlaćivanje i još dva
muškarca u civilu stigla u bolnicu. Policajac je optuţio IPTF da "štiti kriminalce", i rekao da je vijest da su
osumnjiĉeni odvedeni u bolnicu "udarila ih poput bombe". U bolnici je policajac zaprijetio jednom od
osumnjiĉenika u nazoĉnosti IPTF-a i navodno mu je rekao: "Nisi to morao uĉiniti, zašto si to uĉinio, sada ćemo
te optuţiti za sve što imamo."(164)
Lokalna policija, pod vodstvom Zorana Mandića, šefa javne sigurnosti i lokalnog naĉelnika policije Miluna
Milanovića, nije provela istragu, prema IPTF-u. Policija tvrdi da su osumnjiĉenike tukli tijekom otpora
uhićenju. MeĊutim, ĉlan IPTF-a izjavio je Human Rights Watchu: "Vrlo je ĉudno boriti se s leĊima prema
ĉasnicima." Oba osumnjiĉenika trenutno su u pritvoru u zatvoru u Foĉi.

IPTF je organizirao da osumnjiĉeni dobiju pravnog savjetnika, preko UNHCR-ovog centra za pravnu pomoć
(vidi odjeljak o blokiranju meĊuentitetskih projekata, dolje), ali osumnjiĉenici nisu ţeljeli podnijeti ţalbu
sudu. IPTF je zatim zatraţio od Foĉinih vlasti sve informacije o uhićenju i zatraţio da se obavijesti tuţitelj; dok
su brzo dobili informacije koje su traţili, prema njihovim saznanjima, tuţitelj nikada nije bio obaviješten o
incidentu ili navodima. IPTF je potom pokrenuo vlastitu istragu.

Prema istrazi IPTF-a, sva tri policajca optuţena od strane osumnjiĉenika da su ih tukli su sluţbenici u jedinici
kriminalistiĉke istrage u Foĉi na ĉijem je ĉelu Zoran Vladiĉić (vidi odjeljak o osoblju KP Doma za pozadinu
Zorana Vladiĉića). IPTF je obavijestio Human Rights Watch da je i sam Vladiĉić bio jedan od onih koji su se
navodno bavili premlaćivanjem, kao i Miodrag Koprivica. (Oba su muškarca spomenuta u vezi s njihovim
sudjelovanjem u KP domu tijekom rata.) Optuţeni su sluţbenici tvrdili da su se tog dana nalazili u Crnoj
Gori. IPTF je kasnije dobio potvrdu od crnogorske graniĉne policije da nisu imali evidenciju da su policajci
prešli granicu. Nisu prijavljene nikakve sankcije protiv policajaca koji su sudjelovali u premlaćivanju, koji ostaju
na svojim poloţajima. (165)

Prema IPTF-u, suradnja lokalnih vlasti, posebice lokalne policije, nije se protezala izvan potrebnog minimuma,
"osim ako je to odgovaralo lokalnoj policiji".

IPTF je odgovoran za restrukturiranje lokalnih policijskih snaga u okviru Daytona (i postupke provjere i provjere
navedenih u sporazumu o restrukturiranju policijskih snaga u Republici Srpskoj 24. rujna 1997.). Kao dio
mandata IPTF-a u Bosni i Hercegovini, oni bi trebali nadzirati lokalnu policiju kako bi uklonili iz policije sve
policijske sluţbenike koji su odgovorni za ratne zloĉine ili kršenja ljudskih prava. Kao dio procesa provjere,
oglasi bi trebali biti postavljeni u lokalne novine kako bi se potaknulo lokalno stanovništvo da prijavi relevantne
informacije o pozadini policijskih sluţbenika IPTF-u. Nakon provjere, policija dobiva psihološka testiranja i
obuku. IPTF je obavijestio Human Rights Watch da je lokalno policijsko osoblje dobilo preliminarnu potvrdu od
strane IPTF-a, i da je policija završila pripremni teĉaj i da je provela psihološke testove. MeĊutim, jedan je
monitor IPTF-a obavijestio Human Rights Watch da nije svjestan bilo kakve pozadinske provjere, a takoĊer nije
bio svjestan da je bilo kakva reklama za prikupljanje informacija o policijskim kandidatima u lokalnim
novinama. Do lipnja 1998., prema izvještaju IPTF-a koji je upoznat sa situacijom u Foĉi, u Foĉi nije provedena
nikakva provjera niti provjera. Zapravo, prema ovom monitoru, proces "je zaustavljen". Ovaj monitor takoĊer
nije bio svjestan da su oglasi objavljeni u lokalnim novinama. i takoĊer nije bio svjestan da je u lokalne novine
stavljen oglas za prikupljanje informacija o policijskim kandidatima. Do lipnja 1998., prema izvještaju IPTF-a
koji je upoznat sa situacijom u Foĉi, u Foĉi nije provedena nikakva provjera niti provjera. Zapravo, prema ovom
monitoru, proces "je zaustavljen". Ovaj monitor takoĊer nije bio svjestan da su oglasi objavljeni u lokalnim
novinama. i takoĊer nije bio svjestan da je u lokalne novine stavljen oglas za prikupljanje informacija o
policijskim kandidatima. Do lipnja 1998., prema izvještaju IPTF-a koji je upoznat sa situacijom u Foĉi, u Foĉi
nije provedena nikakva provjera niti provjera. Zapravo, prema ovom monitoru, proces "je zaustavljen". Ovaj
monitor takoĊer nije bio svjestan da su oglasi objavljeni u lokalnim novinama.(166)

Predstavnik meĊunarodne organizacije izvijestio je Human Rights Watch, kada su ga upitali koje su mjere
lokalne vlasti poduzele kako bi sprijeĉile ili kazneno gonile poslijeratna kršenja ljudskih prava, da "obiĉno
lokalne vlasti zapravo nisu poduzele nikakve korake da zaustave, istraţe [ ] ili kriviĉno goniti one koji su
odgovorni za kršenja ljudskih prava, a ĉesto i ako ne uvijek, odgovorni su za kršenje ljudskih prava. (167)

Kada lokalne vlasti ne poštuju odredbe Daytonskog sporazuma, lokalno stanovništvo je sprijeĉeno da iskoristi
prednosti suradnje - slobodu kretanja, izraţavanja i udruţivanja; mogućnosti za ponovno spajanje s prijateljima i
obitelji koji su bili odvojeni ratom; mogućnosti sudjelovanja u projektima koje meĊunarodna zajednica
provodi; mogućnosti povratka u svoj prijeratni dom; priliku sudjelovati u obnovi zemlje na temelju otvorenosti i
tolerancije. Vlasti Foĉe se oslanjaju na zatvoreno i ograniĉeno društvo koje tamo postoji da bi odrţalo svoju moć
i svoju viziju etniĉke podjele.

Sloboda izraţavanja i pristup informacijama

U Foĉi ne postoje nezavisni mediji, a koliko je nama poznato, nitko se nije usudio pokušati uspostaviti nezavisne
medije bilo koje vrste u gradu. Pristup informacijama za stanovnike Foĉe je strogo ograniĉen i gotovo je
iskljuĉivo ograniĉen na drţavni radio i televiziju Republike Srpske. Zbog te zatvorene situacije, stanovništvo je
neinformirano i gotovo potpuno neupućeno u svijet izvan Foĉe. Ograniĉenje informacija imalo je znaĉajnu ulogu
u naporima vlasti u Foĉi da zadrţe strogu kontrolu nad stanovništvom.

Jedan stanovnik Foĉe rekao je Human Rights Watchu da se previše plaši da nam kaţe što zna o gradu i osobama
odgovornim za zlostavljanje tijekom rata. "Ne ţelim imati nikakvih problema", rekao je Human Rights Watchu,
"tako da ne mogu razgovarati s vama, još ne. Istina je da se stvari ovdje vrlo sporo mijenjaju, ne tako brzo kao
što bih ih volio. ali, još nije došlo vrijeme da mogu razgovarati. Jednoga dana, moţda, ali ne još. " Rekao je,
meĊutim, da "nema vanjskih informacija ... mediji su zatvoreni. Ovdje ţivimo u tami." (168)

Izvješće IPTF-a od 2. srpnja 1997. opisuje ograniĉenja slobode izraţavanja u Foĉi, govoreći o reakcijama
javnosti na politiĉke promjene koje su se tada dogaĊale u Republici Srpskoj. U to vrijeme, predsjednica
Republike Srpske Biljana Plavšić bila je u politiĉkoj borbi s rukovodstvom SDS-a lojalnim optuţenima
Radovanu Karadţiću. Izvješće opisuje lokalnu reakciju u Foĉi na ovaj raskol.

Većina obiĉnih ljudi nije svjesna borbe za moć, ili ĉak i ako jesu, graĊani su izrazili nesklonost prema
situaciji. Stanovništvo nije informirano putem lokalnih elektroniĉkih ili tiskanih medija. Većina onoga što ljudi
znaju prikuplja se iz izvještaja u meĊunarodnim medijima, koji je dostupan samo malom broju osoba u društvu
.... Taj nedostatak informacija odgovoran je za bezbriţan stav ljudi ... kombinacija strah, loše gospodarsko stanje
i nedovoljne informacije odgovorni su za ravnodušnost. (169)

Drugi meĊunarodni predstavnik koji radi u regiji rekao je Human Rights Watchu da je lokalnu bosansko-srpsku
ţenu u Foĉi pitao što zna o onome što se dogodilo u Srebrenici. Ţena odgovori: "Vrlo malo." Osoba je pitala ţeli
li ţena znati, a kada je ţena odgovorila potvrdno, objasnila što se dogodilo u Srebrenici: da su sve nesrpske ţene
bile protjerane i da je više od 8.000 muškaraca nesrba nestalo i trebalo bi zaklati u brdima oko Srebrenice , Kad
je ţena to ĉula, navodno se poĉela tresti i, s vidljivim šokom, rekla je osobi: "Ako je to istina, onda je to
apsolutno uţasno." (170) Srebrenica nije udaljena više od dva sata voţnje od Foĉe.

Sprjeĉavanje povratka izbjeglica i raseljenih osoba u Foĉu

UNHCR se susreo s dosljednim protivljenjem svojim pokušajima da olakša povratak izbjeglica i raseljenih osoba
u Foĉu. Poĉetkom 1997. UNHCR je radio na dva pilot projekta za povratak Bošnjaka u sela Filipovići i Paonci,
oboje u općini Foĉa. Prema UNHCR-u, dvadeset bošnjaĉkih obitelji htjelo se vratiti u svoje domove u Paonci,
selu u zoni razdvajanja pod kontrolom općine Foĉa, ali potpuno prazne i napuštene od rata. Na
meĊuagencijskom sastanku odrţanom u Foĉi 17. travnja 1997. godine, na kojem je prisustvovao Human Rights
Watch, Radojica MlaĊenović, tadašnji predsjednik izvršnog odbora u Foĉi, izjavio je: "Ako postoje zahtjevi za
povratak, onda treba obavijestiti općinu i postupak treba slijediti u skladu s Daytonskim sporazumom.
" (171) Kako bi iskoristio Mladenovićevu izraţenu spremnost na suradnju na povratku, UNHCR je 30. svibnja
1997. ponudio obnovu deset od dvadeset sedam stanova koji su u ratu oštećeni u zgradi u centru Foĉe; u
zamjenu, MlaĊenović je zamoljen da dopusti dvadeset obitelji da se vrate u Paonci. Mladjenovićev odgovor,
prema UNHCR-u, ĉinio se pozitivnim. On je navodno rekao UNHCR-u da će se morati posavjetovati sa svojim
nadreĊenima i da će im napisati pismo u kojem se navodi da vlasti u Foĉi podrţavaju ovaj projekt
povratka. (Prema UNHCR-u, Mladjenović je takoĊer objavio radio u Foĉi u kojem se navodi da izbjeglicama
treba dopustiti povratak u Foĉu.) MeĊutim, ovo pismo nikada nije napisano, a pilot projekt nikada nije pokrenut:
nakon ovog sastanka, MlaĊenović je smijenjen s duţnosti predsjednika izvršnog odbora, samo je jedan od
nekoliko ĉlanova vlade iznenada zamijenjen u Foĉi. Tadašnja izvješća ukazivala su na to da su ga
Mladjenovićevi tvrdokorniji nadreĊeni smatrali previše kooperativnim s meĊunarodnom
zajednicom. MlaĊenovića je zamijenio Radojica Tešević, a navodno se pridruţio i politiĉkoj stranci Biljane
Plavšić. UNHCR je izvijestio da je na kasnijem sastanku s duţnosnicima u Foĉi, koji se dogodio u vrijeme
srpskog uhićenja SFOR-a u Prijedoru, koji je jednog optuţenika ostavio mrtvog, a drugog prebaĉen na MKSJ na
suĊenje, sadašnjim duţnosnicima rekli " Ne razgovaraj s tobom jer si ti neprijatelj. Tadašnja izvješća ukazivala
su na to da su ga Mladjenovićevi tvrdokorniji nadreĊeni smatrali previše kooperativnim s meĊunarodnom
zajednicom. MlaĊenovića je zamijenio Radojica Tešević, a navodno se pridruţio i politiĉkoj stranci Biljane
Plavšić. UNHCR je izvijestio da je na kasnijem sastanku s duţnosnicima u Foĉi, koji se dogodio u vrijeme
srpskog uhićenja SFOR-a u Prijedoru, koji je jednog optuţenika ostavio mrtvog, a drugog prebaĉen na MKSJ na
suĊenje, sadašnjim duţnosnicima rekli: "Mogu Ne razgovaraj s tobom jer si ti neprijatelj. Tadašnja izvješća
ukazivala su na to da su ga Mladjenovićevi tvrdokorniji nadreĊeni smatrali previše kooperativnim s
meĊunarodnom zajednicom. MlaĊenovića je zamijenio Radojica Tešević, a navodno se pridruţio i politiĉkoj
stranci Biljane Plavšić. UNHCR je izvijestio da je na kasnijem sastanku s duţnosnicima u Foĉi, koji se dogodio
u vrijeme srpskog uhićenja SFOR-a u Prijedoru, koji je jednog optuţenika ostavio mrtvog, a drugog prebaĉen na
MKSJ na suĊenje, sadašnjim duţnosnicima rekli: "Mogu Ne razgovaraj s tobom jer si ti
neprijatelj.(172) Zaposlenici UNHCR-a izvijestili su da su imali nekoliko sastanaka s Radojicom Teševićem,
sadašnjim predsjednikom izvršnog odbora, u ljeto 1997. godine, ali da je odbio dopustiti Bošnjacima da se vrate
u Foĉu u to vrijeme.

Gradonaĉelnik Miloš Lazović, bivši direktor pošte, preuzeo je od Petka Canĉara u lipnju 1997. godine. Kada se
UNHCR obratio Lazoviću kako bi razgovarao o pilot projektu povratka Paonciju, objasnio je da će UNHCR u
zamjenu obnoviti dvadeset sedam stanova u centru Foĉe Lazović je, kako se izvješćuje, odgovorio: "Ne. Prvo
dajte nama 270.000 DM, a onda ću vam vjerovati." Pilot projekt nije proveden. (173)

Još jedan pilot-projekt povratka planiran je ubrzo nakon toga, u lipnju 1997. godine. Trebalo je ukljuĉiti
dvosmjerni povratak bosanskih Srba u selo Nekupi u Federaciji i Bošnjaci u selo Marevci, na srpskom
teritoriju. UNHCR je organizirao posjetu za procjenu tih sela. Prema UNHCR-u, šest bosanskih Srba posjetilo je
Nekupi pod svojim pokroviteljstvom. Posjet je bio uspješan. MeĊutim, ubrzo nakon posjeta, svi osim jednog od
šest izostali su iz projekta, navodeći da više nisu zainteresirani za povratak u svoje domove na teritoriju
Federacije. Prema UNHCR-u, jedan od šestorice je pretuĉen, a drugima je prijetila u Foĉi. Prema UNHCR-u,
ubrzo nakon posjeta osoblja UNHCR-a, jedan od bosanskih Srba dvaput je posjetila lokalna policija u Foĉi, koji
ga je ispitivao i traţio ime i druge informacije o osoblju UNHCR-a koji je posjetio. Nakon tih incidenata,
pojedinac se povukao iz projekta povratka.(174)

Ljubo Veljović, ĉlan Srpske radikalne stranke Vojislava Šešelja, de facto je gradonaĉelnik Foĉe od studenog
1997. (175) Prema mišljenju predstavnika meĊunarodnih organizacija sa sjedištem u Foĉi, on je navodno dopustio
i poticao sustavno uznemiravanje i napade na meĊunarodno osoblje i lokalno stanovništvo na temelju njihovog
politiĉkog mišljenja i navodno je odgovoran za dosljedno nepoštivanje odredbi Dejtonski sporazum, ukljuĉujući
blokiranje svih rasprava o povratku izbjeglica i raseljenih osoba, i opstruiranje ostvarivanja slobode kretanja,
izraţavanja i udruţivanja. Veljović se još više odluĉno protivio suradnji s UNHCR-om u pitanjima povratka
nego njegov prethodnik. Tijekom sastanka predstavnika Veljovića i UNHCR-a krajem sijeĉnja 1998. godine,
osoblje UNHCR-a navodno nije spomenula ni pitanje povratka, smatrajući ga preosjetljivim. MeĊutim, oni
su spomenuti pitanje razmjene osobnih dokumenata, kao što su vozaĉke dozvole i potvrde o roĊenju i vjenĉanju,
izmeĊu entiteta. MeĊutim, gradonaĉelnik je rekao da to ne bi trebalo uĉiniti osobno (tj. Pojedinci ne bi trebali
putovati meĊu entitetima kako bi dobili dokumente.) On je navodno rekao osoblju UNHCR-a da neće jamĉiti
sigurnost raseljenih osoba koje dolaze u Foĉu kako bi dobile pravne dokumenata od vlasti. Prema rijeĉima
osoblja UNHCR-a, Veljović ih je na tom sastanku navodno pitao zašto UNHCR pokušava ponovno okupiti
stanovništvo i zašto UNHCR pokušava zapoĉeti novi rat. On je navodno rekao osoblju UNHCR-a koji je vodio
sastanak da odmah napusti Foĉu i da se vrati u svoj dom. MeĊutim, gradonaĉelnik je rekao da to ne bi trebalo
uĉiniti osobno (tj. Pojedinci ne bi trebali putovati meĊu entitetima kako bi dobili dokumente.) On je navodno
rekao osoblju UNHCR-a da neće jamĉiti sigurnost raseljenih osoba koje dolaze u Foĉu kako bi dobile pravne
dokumenata od vlasti. Prema rijeĉima osoblja UNHCR-a, Veljović ih je na tom sastanku navodno pitao zašto
UNHCR pokušava ponovno okupiti stanovništvo i zašto UNHCR pokušava zapoĉeti novi rat. On je navodno
rekao osoblju UNHCR-a koji je vodio sastanak da odmah napusti Foĉu i da se vrati u svoj dom. MeĊutim,
gradonaĉelnik je rekao da to ne bi trebalo uĉiniti osobno (tj. Pojedinci ne bi trebali putovati meĊu entitetima
kako bi dobili dokumente.) On je navodno rekao osoblju UNHCR-a da neće jamĉiti sigurnost raseljenih osoba
koje dolaze u Foĉu kako bi dobile pravne dokumenata od vlasti. Prema rijeĉima osoblja UNHCR-a, Veljović ih
je na tom sastanku navodno pitao zašto UNHCR pokušava ponovno okupiti stanovništvo i zašto UNHCR
pokušava zapoĉeti novi rat. On je navodno rekao osoblju UNHCR-a koji je vodio sastanak da odmah napusti
Foĉu i da se vrati u svoj dom. ) On je, kako se izvješćuje, osoblju UNHCR-a rekao da neće jamĉiti sigurnost
raseljenih osoba koje dolaze u Foĉu kako bi od vlasti dobile pravne dokumente. Prema rijeĉima osoblja
UNHCR-a, Veljović ih je na tom sastanku navodno pitao zašto UNHCR pokušava ponovno okupiti stanovništvo
i zašto UNHCR pokušava zapoĉeti novi rat. On je navodno rekao osoblju UNHCR-a koji je vodio sastanak da
odmah napusti Foĉu i da se vrati u svoj dom. ) On je, kako se izvješćuje, osoblju UNHCR-a rekao da neće
jamĉiti sigurnost raseljenih osoba koje dolaze u Foĉu kako bi od vlasti dobile pravne dokumente. Prema rijeĉima
osoblja UNHCR-a, Veljović ih je na tom sastanku navodno pitao zašto UNHCR pokušava ponovno okupiti
stanovništvo i zašto UNHCR pokušava zapoĉeti novi rat. On je navodno rekao osoblju UNHCR-a koji je vodio
sastanak da odmah napusti Foĉu i da se vrati u svoj dom.(176)

Niti jedan Srbin iz Foĉe se nije vratio u grad od završetka rata u prosincu 1995. godine.
Blokiranje meĊuentitetskih projekata

U prosincu 1996. godine, MeĊunarodni odbor za spašavanje (IRC) organizirao je kupnju ugljena iz rudnika
Miljevina u općini Foĉa od strane vlasti Goraţda, u Federaciji BiH. IRC je angaţirao pet prijevoznih tvrtki za
prijevoz ugljena, od kojih su ĉetiri iz Goraţda i jedna iz Foĉe. Dan prije prve isporuke ugljena, 18. prosinca
1996. godine, gume vozila jedne transportne tvrtke iz Foĉe bile su ubijene oĉiglednim naporom da se sprijeĉi
sudjelovanje srpske tvrtke u meĊuentitetskoj trgovini. U noći isporuke, u Foĉi, ispred ureda OESS-a, dignuto je u
zrak vozilo s IRC-om. Unatoĉ tome, isporuka ugljena je bila uspješna, a jedna osoblje OESS-a prijavilo je
Human Rights Watchu u to vrijeme kada su bošnjaĉki vozaĉi stigli u rudnik Miljevina i susreli se s nekim
radnicima tamo, svi su plakali(177) Ravnatelji rudnika uglja u Miljevini nisu htjeli prijeći liniju meĊu entitetima
kako bi ušli u Goraţde kako bi primili njihovu isplatu od strane IRC-a, oĉito zbog straha od prelaska na teritorij
Federacije. Radojica MlaĊenović, tadašnji predsjednik izvršnog odbora, otišao je u Goraţde da dobije
novac. Osoblje IRC-a izjavilo je Human Rights Watchu da je nakon njegova posjeta Goraţdu i njegovog
povratka u Foĉu prijetio Mladjenović, iako nisu mogli identificirati tko mu je prijetio. (178)

Ĉinilo se da je Mladjenović najzadovoljniji od vlasti u Foĉi. Zapravo, navodno se 1. lipnja 1997. sastao s
vlastima iz Goraţda u Foĉi kako bi razgovarao o pitanjima infrastrukture izmeĊu dva grada. Ĉinilo se da se
pozitivna atmosfera razvijala sve dok Miloš Lazović nije preuzeo duţnost gradonaĉelnika. Od tada je prekinuta
sva meĊuentitetska suradnja. De facto gradonaĉelnik Ljubo Veljović nastavio je provoditi politiku izolacije i
opstruiranja obveza iz Daytonskog sporazuma.

U rujnu 1997. IRC je pokušao ţenama u Foĉi pruţiti pristup mikrokreditima kroz Bosansku ţensku inicijativu
(BWI), što je bila potpora ameriĉke vlade za pruţanje prilike bosanskim ţenama da iskoriste svoje vještine za
male prihode. - generiranje projekata. Oni su već uspješno zapoĉeli projekte koje financira BWI u Goraţdu,
obliţnjem gradu Federacije, i ţeljeli su ponuditi pristup tim sredstvima ţenama u Foĉi.

IRC je, uz pomoć ureda OESS-a u Foĉi, javno objavio da će posjetiti Foĉu kako bi objasnio projekt i da ţene
koje ţele saznati o projektu trebaju prisustvovati sastanku. Prema IRC-u, pedeset ţena je prisustvovalo ovom
prvom sastanku, a oni su došli puni ideja i energije. IRC je opisao projekt i odredio datum za povratak tjedan
dana kasnije, najavivši da će sa sobom donijeti odgovarajuće obrasce i pomoći ţenama da se prijave za
financiranje. Kad su se vratili sljedećeg tjedna, pojavila se samo jedna ţena. MeĊunarodno osoblje u Foĉi tvrdilo
je da su lokalne vlasti prijetile ţenama i da su se bojale sudjelovati u projektu. Jedna ţena koja se pojavila oĉito
nije ĉula upozorenje. Projekt nikada nije pokrenut.

Jedan ĉlan osoblja IRC-a izvijestio je Human Rights Watch da su ţene "potaknute od vlasti" da ne sudjeluju u
ovom projektu. Ta je osoba tvrdila da su vlasti nakon prvog sastanka ispitivale ţene. (179) Ostali me
representativesunarodni predstavnici takoer su izvijestili da su ţene bile prisiljene od vlasti da ne sudjeluju u
projektu.

Ometanje rada tijela koja provode Daytonski sporazum

Zlostavljanje Pale i lokalna policija

U poslijeratnom razdoblju u Foĉi, vlasti su dosljedno opstruirale rad meĊunarodnih organizacija koje su stalno
smještene u gradu. Prema nekim izvorima IPTF-a u Foĉi, jedan od razloga zbog kojeg je njihov rad u Foĉi tako
teţak je to što lokalna policija još uvijek ima vrlo jake veze s Paleom, od ĉega Radovan Karadţić zapovijeda
policiji koja mu je još uvijek odana. U jednom primjeru, izvor IPTF-a koji je govorio pod uvjetom da ostane
anoniman, rekao je da je IPTF zatraţio da se zajamĉi jamstvo za jednog Bošnjaka koji je izabran u
parlamentarnu skupštinu općine Foĉa, kako bi ĉlan mogao putovati u Foĉu na sastanke skupštine. Kada je
Milunu Milanoviću, lokalnom naĉelniku policije, postavljeno pitanje da li moţe pruţiti takvo osiguranje, on je
navodno odgovorio da "jamĉim to, ali moram provjeriti kod Palea." (180)

Izvješće IPTF-a iz srpnja 1997. takoĊer opisuje bliske odnose izmeĊu vlasti u Foĉi i vlada Pala, lojalnih
optuţenom Karadţiću. U izvješću se govori o strahu koji ova povezanost izaziva meĊu stanovništvom u gradu, u
ovom sluĉaju strahom od potpore politiĉkoj stranci Biljane Plavšić, koja je u suprotnosti s Karadţićevim
tvrdolinijašima, a koja dobiva na snazi u drugim dijelovima Republike Srpske:
Iz straha da se niko ne moţe usuditi u Srbinu / Foĉa, otvoreno će izaći kako bi podrţao predsjednika [Plavšića]
ako bi to bilo suprotno Paleovoj liniji. Pale i duţnosnici u Srbinju / Foĉi imaju mnogo veze. (181)

Nadzornik IPTF-a zaduţen za savjetovanje nekoliko lokalnih šefova policije u regiji Foĉe tijekom istraţivanja za
ovo izvješće obavijestio je Human Rights Watch da policija u Foĉi i danas nastavlja "ovisiti o Palama". Na
pitanje je li IPTF pokrenuo pitanje provjere s lokalnom policijom, monitor je odgovorio da "znaju za proces
provjere, ali Pale nema zapovijedi". Ĉak i susret s policijskim sluţbenicima u Foĉi moţe biti teţak, prema
anonimnom izvoru IPTF-a. Izvor IPTF-a je rekao da se svakodnevna opstrukcija lokalne policije oĉituje u
poteškoćama IPTF-a u susretu sa sadašnjim naĉelnikom policije Milunom Milanovićem ili šefom javne
sigurnosti Zoranom Mandićem. "Susrećemo ih jednom tjedno srijedom,(182)

Zoran Mandić je trenutno šef javne sigurnosti, najviši lokalni policijski sluţbenik, na radno mjesto koje se ĉesto
naziva i lokalnim ministrom unutarnjih poslova, za sedam općina, ukljuĉujući Foĉu, Rudo, Ĉajnicu, Kalinovik,
Višegrad, srpski Goraţde (Kopaĉi) i srpsko Trnovo. Mandić je svojom pozicijom šefa javne sigurnosti opstruirao
provedbu Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma, odbijajući suraĊivati s procesom provjere IPTF-a ĉak i ako IPTF-u
dostavi popis policijskih sluţbenika u općinama pod njegovom nadleţnošću. Postoje i znaĉajni dokazi koji
upućuju na to da je Mandić u poslijeratnom razdoblju zaposlio optuţene osobe u svojoj policiji iu školi za
policijsko osposobljavanje. Pod Mandićevim i Milanovićevim ovlastima, lokalni policajci u središnjoj policijskoj
postaji u Foĉi u prosincu 1997. godine teško su pretukli muškarca bosanskog Srbina (vidi gore). On, u suradnji s
lokalnim naĉelnikom policije Milunom Milanovićem, nije uspio sprijeĉiti stalno uznemiravanje i napade na
lokalne osobe zbog njihovih politiĉkih mišljenja, te je blokirao istrage prijetnji i napada na meĊunarodno osoblje
i novinare (vidi odjeljak o maltretiranju meĊunarodnih organizacija). , Osim toga, Mandić je ometao povratak
izbjeglica neuspjehom u pruţanju jamstava sigurnosti, te je sprijeĉio uspostavljanje meĊuentitetskih projekata u
gradu u poslijeratnom razdoblju.

Pristup kolektivnim centrima za raseljene osobe

Pod utjecajem i strogom kontrolom vlasti u Palama, vlasti u Foĉi su uloţile sve napore kako bi sprijeĉile
meĊunarodne agencije da rade u Foĉi kako bi pomogle lokalnom stanovništvu. Na primjer, 1997. UNHCR-u je
uskraćen pristup kolektivnim centrima za raseljene osobe. Osoblje UNHCR-a izvijestilo je da je tijekom prve
polovice 1997. godine, dok je Petko Ĉanĉar još uvijek bio gradonaĉelnik Foĉe, ĉesto uskraćivan pristup
kolektivnim centrima. To se dogodilo unatoĉ ĉinjenici da UNHCR provodi program pomoći u gotovini koji
financira USAID (u iznosu od 1,65 milijuna dolara za 1997. godinu). UNHCR je osiguravao sredstva za
Komisiju za izbjeglice i raseljene osobe, ured Vlade Republike Srpske koji se bavi pitanjima vezanim za
izbjeglice i raseljene osobe u Republici Srpskoj, za brigu oko 9,

U rujnu 1997. godine, UNHCR u Goraţdu dobio je pismo od Vlade Republike Srpske kojim se zaposlenicima
zabranjuje da razgovaraju s raseljenim osobama u kolektivnim centrima i tvrde da su "gnjavili ljude". Reĉeno im
je da razgovaraju s direktorima i lokalnim sluţbenicima Komisije za izbjeglice Republike Srpske radi
informiranja, a ne izravno s raseljenim osobama smještenim u kolektivnim centrima. U travnju 1997. pristup
IRC-u kolektivnim centrima u Foĉi takoĊer je bio problem. Posljednjih mjeseci, prema UNHCR-u, problem
pristupa nevladinih organizacija kolektivnim centrima je poboljšan. MeĊutim, ĉlan osoblja UNHCR-a dodao je
kako su "uvijek spremni razgovarati o hrani sve dok ne pitate ništa drugo". (183)

poboljšanja

Nedavno je došlo do nekih malih poboljšanja. U proteklih osam mjeseci UNHCR i IRC otvorili su centre za
pravnu pomoć u Foĉi i drugim gradovima u regiji kao što su Rogatica, Višegrad i Pale. Ti centri odgovorni su za
pomoć lokalnom stanovništvu u rješavanju imovinskih pitanja, stanarskih prava, mirovina i pomaganju
raseljenim osobama da dobiju pristup dokumentima koji se nalaze u vladinim uredima Federacije. Centre za
pravnu pomoć prvenstveno financira Humanitarna organizacija Europske zajednice (ECHO), ali njima upravljaju
IRC i UNHCR. OESS takoĊer ima ulogu olakšavanja. (184)Centri takoĊer pruţaju informacije o povratku u svoja
mjesta podrijetla lokalnom stanovništvu, a sve pravne usluge su besplatne. Centar za pravnu pomoć u Foĉi uspio
je dobiti pristup osobnim dokumentima za bosanske Srbe iz kantona Goraţde. MeĊutim, vlasti u Foĉi, prema
rijeĉima općinske vlasti u Foĉi u izbjeglištvu, odbile su dati bilo koji od više od 570 dokumenata koje su traţili
Bošnjaci iz Foĉe koji sada ţive u Federaciji.

Iako centar za pravnu pomoć funkcionira, tumaĉi koji rade s nekoliko meĊunarodnih organizacija u regiji
izvijestili su da imaju više poteškoća u putovanju u Foĉu nego u bilo koji drugi grad u Republici Srpskoj, a svi su
doţivjeli verbalno uznemiravanje, ukljuĉujući etniĉke uvrede i prijetnje fiziĉkim nasiljem. , Jedan tumaĉ je
izvijestio da odlazi u grad, brine se o svojim odgovornostima i odlazi što je prije moguće. (185)

Uznemiravanje meĊunarodnih organizacija

Prijedor je u srpnju 1997. uhapsio i ponovio posljedice u Foĉi

Predstavnici meĊunarodnih organizacija sa sjedištem u Foĉi ili s radom u Foĉi - OSCE, IRC i IPTF - suoĉili su
se s brojnim sluĉajevima uznemiravanja i nasilja u postdejtonskom razdoblju. Primjerice, nakon uhićenja SFOR-
a u Prijedoru u srpnju 1997. godine, koji je jednog optuţenika ostavio mrtvog, a drugog prebaĉen na suĊenje
pred MKSJ-om, meĊunarodni predstavnici su uznemiravani i odbijeni su im u lokalnim restoranima i
trgovinama.

U tom razdoblju u cijeloj Republici Srpskoj pojavili su se plakati, ukljuĉujući i Foĉu, sa slikama Radovana
Karadţića, na engleskom, "Ne dirajte ga. On znaĉi mir." Isto tako, drugi su plakati pozvali stanovništvo Foĉe da
"stane u obranu našeg naroda i da se tako ponaša u obrani naše drţave, svim mogućim sredstvima" ako bi se
sliĉan napor uhićenja trebao provesti u Foĉi. ECMM je izvijestila da je 18. srpnja 1997. godine u Foĉi došlo do
eksplozije u blizini smještaja dvaju monitora IPTF-a. Tijekom te noći vozilo ECMM-a je vandalizirano i teško
oštećeno. ECMM je zatraţila od SFOR-a da zadrţi vozilo u svojoj bazi u Filipovićima, u općini Foĉa, kako bi se
sprijeĉile daljnje štete. Sljedeće jutro, prema izvješću ECMM-a,

vlasnici i upravitelji trgovina, barova i restorana primili su posjet dvojici muškaraca koji su im dali poruku da
prisustvuju sastanku u subotu poslijepodne. U ovoj poruci napisano je: "Vlasnik ove tvrtke je pozvan da danas
prisustvuje sastanku u 15 sati u gimnaziji u osnovnoj školi. Predmet će biti stav koji morate imati prema
predstavnicima meĊunarodne zajednice. Ako vlasnik ili upravitelj ne mogu biti prisutni, treba poslati ovlaštenu
osobu. Sudjelovanje na ovom sastanku je obavezno. " Srbinje, 19/7/97. Nema potpisa. (186)

Prema UN-ovim civilnim poslovima, ovaj je sastanak bio obvezan i uslijedio je osip prijetnji meĊunarodnom
osoblju. U veĉernjim satima 19. srpnja 1997., An IPTF monitor iz Indije „primio anonimni telefonski poziv u
svojoj smještaja Poruka je ponovio nekoliko puta Bilo je:.„! Sutra ujutro ide na Sarajevo Bamboula‟” (187) Na isti
Noću, a sljedeće noći, kuća Shin Yasui, koordinatorica programa Youthspacea, centra za mlade u Foĉi, nekoliko
je puta kamenovana. (188)

ECMM se ubrzo nakon tih incidenata sastala s gradonaĉelnikom Milošem Lazovićem (189) . Prema izvješću o
sastanku:

Ovaj sastanak nije bio prijateljski susret kao i obiĉno u ovom gradu .... Što se tiĉe posljednjih dogaĊaja u gradu,
gospodin L. je prvi put izrazio svoje iznenaĊenje pitanjem što se dogaĊa. [ECMM] ga podsjeća na plakate
gospodina Karadţića i uništene automobile [ECMM]. G. odgovara da ovdje, u RS [Republika Srpska], osobe
mogu slobodno staviti na zid nekoliko plakata osoba koje im se sviĊaju. Nema komentara o automobilu. S
obzirom na to da nam je nekoliko barova odbilo sluţiti, gospodin L. odgovara da u RS-u vlasnik privatnog bara
moţe slobodno uĉiniti sve što ţeli .... O mogućoj trgovinskoj vezi izmeĊu Federacije i RS Gospodin L. je rekao
da je bivši izvršni odbor MUN-a bio potpuno pogrešan kada su poĉeli takve stvari. Kao pres. od MUN-a, mora
se pridrţavati naredbi koje dolaze s više razine vlade RS-a ... trgovina s Goraţdom je neovlaštena ... g. [L.] je
rekao da predstavnici meĊunarodne zajednice nisu pozvani u grad. Svi oni parade u gradu i imaju "slatki ţivot" u
restoranima ... L. završio je ovaj sastanak rekavši da je najbolje što IC moţe uĉiniti, napustiti zemlju i ostaviti
stanovnike u tišini.(190)

U tjednima prije općinskih izbora u rujnu 1997., izborni promatraĉ pri OESS-u, Takis Michas iz Grĉke, bio je
uznemiravan u Foĉi od strane optuţenog Janka Janjića, inaĉe poznatog po nadimku "Tuta", u prisustvu dva
uniformisana Foĉa policajci. U ĉlanku koji je nekoliko tjedana kasnije objavio promatraĉ izbora i objavljen
u Wall Street Journal Europe , Michas to piše na ulicama Foĉe,

Odjednom se pojavio pojedinac, naredio mi da prestanem fotografirati i, na prijeteći naĉin, traţio da vidim svoje
osobne dokumente. To se dogodilo u nazoĉnosti dvojice lokalnih policajaca bosanskih Srba koji su
odobravanjem klimali glavom. Pod pretpostavkom da je bio lokalni duţnosnik, poslušao sam ga. Tek kasnije
sam otkrio da ga je traţio MeĊunarodni sud za ratne zloĉine u Haagu ... Upoznali smo [ga] još jednom na ulici, a
kad smo odbili njegov zahtjev za novcem, prijetio nam je da ćemo oboje ubiti za , kako je rekao, "ne pokazuje
mu poštovanje." (191)

Uznemiravanje lokalnog osoblja meĊunarodnih organizacija

Osoblje meĊunarodne organizacije aktivne u regiji Foĉe, koje su podijelile te informacije na zahtjev
anonimnosti, izvijestile su da je prevodilac bosanskih Srba koji radi za njih u regiji teško zlostavljan i prijetio od
vlasti u Foĉi krajem 1996. i poĉetkom 1997. godine Organizacija za koju ta osoba radi izvijestila je da se
osjećala izuzetno nesigurno i zatraţila posebne mjere kako bi osigurala svoju sigurnost. (192) U odvojenom
sluĉaju, UNHCR je izvijestio da je vozaĉ i tumaĉ na autobusu UNHCR-a koji vozi izmeĊu Foĉe i Višegrada
traţio da autobusna linija krene u Višegradu i završi tamo, umjesto u Foĉi, jer su im prijetili u Foĉi , (193)Vozaĉ
autobusa UNHCR-a navodno je prije toga bio maltretiran; kada je bio ozlijeĊen kada su autobus napali ljuti civili
koji su bacali kamenje. (194)

Ostale prijetnje

Dana 23. kolovoza 1997. ĉlan meĊunarodne zajednice koji je šetao ulicom u Foĉi zaustavljen je Zoran Mandić,
naĉelnik javne sigurnosti, zatraţio je registracijske isprave i zaprijetio protjerivanjem iz grada ako ih ne
pruţi. 26. kolovoza 1997. u Foĉi je prijetila skupina od pet civila koja je nadgledala IPTF. Prema izvješću
ECMM-a o incidentu,

kad se vraćao u svoj smještaj nakon što je smjena, petorica su ga okruţila i stavila mu ruĉnu bombu ispred
lica. Kasnije se vratio u svoj smještaj. Lokalna policija bila je obaviještena o ovom incidentu. [Monitor] je rekao
[ECMM] da je lokalni šef policije izjavio da neki ljudi ne mogu zaboraviti što se dogodilo. (195)

Napadi na osobe koje pokušavaju izvijestiti o istini o Foĉi nisu ograniĉene samo na podruĉje Foĉe. U incidentu
koji pokazuje tijesnu vezu izmeĊu policije Republike Srpske i srpske policije u Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji,
Gordana Igrić, srpska novinarka koja je radila s televizijskom ekipom CBS-a i istraţivala prisutnost optuţenika u
Foĉi i neuspjeh francuske policije SFOR ih je uhitio, uznemiravao i prijetio po povratku u Beograd, u svoj dom,
u listopadu 1997. godine. Odbor za zaštitu novinara izvijestio je u to vrijeme da:

Gordana Igrić, istaknuti srpski slobodni novinar, serijom prijetnji smrću protiv nje bila je prisiljena sakriti zbog
nedavnog izvješća koje je na ameriĉkoj televizijskoj postaji CBS objavila o optuţenim ratnim zloĉincima u
bosanskom gradu Foĉi. telefonski pozivi koje je Igrić primio kod kuće ubrzo nakon što su neovisni domaći i
strani mediji diljem Srbije i Bosne emitirali izvatke iz intervjua imali su zvuk pucnjave i otkucavanje vremenske
bombe. Novinar, koji piše knjigu o ratnim zloĉinima u Foĉi, skrivao se na drugom mjestu izvan
Beograda. MeĊutim, prijeteći telefonski pozivi nastavili su je muĉiti u njezinom skrovištu, prisiljavajući je da se
ponovno pokrene s dvoje djece. (196)

Neuspjeh meĊunarodne zajednice da lokalne vlasti preuzmu odgovornost

Gore opisani sluĉajevi uznemiravanja i nepoštivanja nisu donijeli snaţne odgovore meĊunarodnih organizacija
ukljuĉenih u provedbu Daytonskog sporazuma. Opisane prijetnje protiv Takisa Michasa navele su meĊunarodne
organizacije u regiji da od lokalne srpske policije zatraţe da kaţu Janku Janjiću, [optuţeniku koji je prijetio
Michasovu ţivotu] da ne uznemirava strance. (197) Incidenti poput ovog trebali su donijeti snaţnu osudu od strane
meĊunarodne zajednice.

Francuske postrojbe SFOR-a u Foĉi nastavile su mirno suţivjeti s optuţenicima tijekom većeg dijela 1998.
godine. IPTF nije javno izloţio kršenja ljudskih prava poĉinjena od strane i pod okriljem lokalne policije. Robert
Frowick, tadašnji šef misije OESS-a u Bosni, predao je jedan od svojih najvaţnijih alata protiv stalnog utjecaja
Karadţićevih lojalista. Kada je Izborna apelacijska potkomisija (EASC) udario stranku SDS-a od glasovanja za
općinske izbore u rujnu 1997. zbog kršenja pravila koje zabranjuje osobama optuţenim od strane ICTY-a da se
pojave na plakatima kao voĊe politiĉkih stranaka, Frowick je odbacio tu odluku. Od tog trenutka, meĊunarodna
zajednica je potratila svoje utjecaje kako bi ostvarila poštivanje Daytonskog sporazuma. Izborna odluka imala je
ozbiljne posljedice za mjesta kao što je Foĉa, gdje vodstvo SDS-a nastavlja, u bliskoj suradnji od parlamentarnih
izbora u studenom 1997. godine, sa Srpskom radikalnom strankom (SRS), da vlada s neprovjerenim i nespornim
autoritetom. To je ĉesto rezultiralo strogim ograniĉenjima politiĉkih i graĊanskih prava za sadašnje stanovništvo,
kao i za one koji su tijekom rata bili raseljeni iz Foĉe. Od tog trenutka, te su vlasti shvatile da će se meĊunarodna
zajednica povući kada bude prijetila. To je ĉesto rezultiralo strogim ograniĉenjima politiĉkih i graĊanskih prava
za sadašnje stanovništvo, kao i za one koji su tijekom rata bili raseljeni iz Foĉe. Od tog trenutka, te su vlasti
shvatile da će se meĊunarodna zajednica povući kada bude prijetila. To je ĉesto rezultiralo strogim
ograniĉenjima politiĉkih i graĊanskih prava za sadašnje stanovništvo, kao i za one koji su tijekom rata bili
raseljeni iz Foĉe. Od tog trenutka, te su vlasti shvatile da će se meĊunarodna zajednica povući kada bude
prijetila.

Takis Michas, grĉki novinar i promatraĉ OSCE-a u Foĉi, opisao je nedjelovanje meĊunarodnih organizacija u
Foĉi:

Incident je bio samo posljednji, i to nipošto najteţi, ĉitav niz agresivnih radnji koje su prošle godine u Foĉi ostale
bez odgovora. U prosincu su dignuta u zrak dva automobila koja su pripadala OESS-u. U srpnju je automobil
koji je pripadao promatraĉkoj misiji Europske zajednice eksplodirao rukom. U kolovozu, talijanski ĉlan
nevladine organizacije izvuĉen je iz automobila u središtu grada od strane grupe koja je ukljuĉivala neke od
optuţenih ratnih zloĉinaca i pretuĉena u punom pogledu na ĉasnika IPTF-a koji nije uĉinio ništa. U kolovozu je
istu grupu zaustavio policajac IPTF-a i stavili mu rukom bombu pod pazuhom "iz zabave". U svim tim
incidentima, prema svjedocima, bila je ukljuĉena ista skupina optuţenih ratnih zloĉinaca. Ipak, protiv njih nije
poduzeta nikakva akcija. (198)

Nedostatak pristupa informacijama iz IPTF-a

Human Rights Watch nije mogao prikupiti od IPTF-a informacije o poslijeratnim zlouporabama policije u općini
Foĉa, jer su njeni duţnosnici na terenu iu njegovom sjedištu općenito odbijali pruţiti takve informacije. U
prosincu 1997. godine, kada je Human Rights Watch prvi put posjetio podruĉje Foĉe i IPTF-ove postaje u regiji,
promatraĉi IPTF-a izrazili su nadu da će naše izvješće moći otkriti policijske zloupotrebe koje se dogaĊaju u
Foĉi. Oni su u vrlo općenitom smislu izvijestili Human Rights Watch da je nedavno došlo do sluĉaja
premlaćivanja od strane lokalne policije u središnjoj policijskoj postaji, da je IPTF imao slike rana ţrtve, te da je
navodno bila ukljuĉena policija na visokoj razini u incident. MeĊutim, Human Rights Watch nije mogao saznati
više pojedinosti o tom sluĉaju, jer su monitori oĉito primili narudţbu. Nije jasno od koga je došao nalog.

Human Rights Watch je nakon toga uloţio brojne napore kako bi od Ureda za ljudska prava u sjedištu IPTF-a u
Sarajevu dobio informacije o konkretnim sluĉajevima policijskog zlostavljanja u Foĉi. Iako je ĉelnik Ureda za
ljudska prava, Claudio Cordone, bio voljan ovlastiti promatraĉe u regiji Foĉe za razmjenu informacija, Human
Rights Watch kasnije je obaviješten od strane osoblja da na kraju krajeva samo regionalni zapovjednik ima
ovlaštenje ovlastiti promatraĉe da razgovaraju s ljudima Rights Watch. (199) Regionalni zapovjednik je tada bio
spreman dijeliti informacije samo o mandatu i ulozi IPTF-a u Bosni i Hercegovini, i ništa više. Ĉlan osoblja
rekao je Human Rights Watchu da ĉak i kada je Uredu za ljudska prava potrebne informacije, ne moţe izravno
podnositi zahtjeve terenskim uredima IPTF-a; mora proći kroz regionalnog zapovjednika. (200)

Naposljetku, 9. oţujka 1998. Human Rights Watch je primio pismo od drugog sluţbenika za ljudska prava IPTF-
a u kojem nas obavještava da je IPTF-ov terenski monitor dobio odobrenje Ureda za ljudska prava da razgovara
s Human Rights Watchom, ali samo o jednom incidentu koji je pretuĉen iz Prosinca 1997. Human Rights Watch
razgovarao je s monitorom 26. travnja 1998. IPTF, meĊutim, nikada nije dovršio izvješće o tom incidentu, a
monitor IPTF-a oklijevao je podijeliti pojedinosti o bilo kojim drugim sluĉajevima zlostavljanja ljudskih prava
od strane policije u Foĉa.

MeĊunarodna pomoć u obnovi i ulaganje u Foĉi

Prema International Management Group (IMG), organizaciji koja odrţava detaljnu bazu podataka o svim
projektima obnove u cijeloj Bosni i Hercegovini i napretku njihove provedbe, u posljednje dvije godine, razne
vlade i institucije donatori su planirale, istraţile i provodili projekte u Foĉi koji su ukljuĉivali priljev tisuća, u
nekim sluĉajevima milijuna, njemaĉkih maraka u to podruĉje. Kreatori politike opravdavaju takvu pomoć,
unatoĉ trenutaĉnim kršenjima ljudskih prava i opstrukciji mirovnog procesa, ako je to potrebno kako bi se
nagovorila lokalna vlast. Iako takve politike mogu biti uĉinkovite u zajednicama u kojima postoje lokalni
umjereni voĊe kojima je potrebna meĊunarodna podrška i ohrabrenje, oni riskiraju paljbu u podruĉjima kao što
je Foĉa u kojima i dalje dominiraju ekstremisti i osumnjiĉeni za ratne zloĉine. Što je još gore, oni riskiraju da
osiguraju sredstva administratorima koji će ih preusmjeriti na namjenu koja ţeli konsolidirati njihova ratna
postignuća.
Širom Bosne donatori moraju biti krajnje oprezni kako bi izbjegli nagraĊivanje arhitekata "etniĉkog
ĉišćenja". Nigdje to nije oĉiglednije nego u Foĉi, gdje je, kako je detaljno opisano u ovom izvješću, cijela
zajednica - ne samo lokalna vlast, već i lokalne tvrtke, bolnica i druge institucije - "etniĉki oĉišćeni", a mnogi
odgovorni još uvijek vode emisiju. Kako bi se osiguralo da nemaju koristi ili da sabotiraju napore za pomoć u
obnovi, meĊunarodni donatori moraju paţljivo provjeriti primatelje svoje pomoći i pratiti i kontrolirati svaki
aspekt provedbe projekta. Pod trenutnom strukturom politiĉke i ekonomske moći Foĉe, koju ni SFOR nije
spreman izazvati, takvo ispitivanje nije moguće. Stoga, dok meĊunarodna zajednica ne uhiti optuţene za ratne
zloĉine na slobodi u Foĉi i inzistira na pravdi za druge osobe koje krše ljudska prava, kao i na poštivanje
Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma, riskira na najbolji naĉin rasipanje donatorskih sredstava i, u najgorem sluĉaju,
obogaćivanje i jaĉanje neprijatelja mirovnom procesu i doprinosu jaĉanju društvenog poretka utemeljenog na
nepravdi. Brojni projekti rekonstrukcije koji su trenutno u tijeku ili su nedavno dovršeni na podruĉju Foĉe i koji
su detaljno opisani u izvješću IMG-a pokazuju ovu opasnost.

Prema IMG-u, UNHCR je pridonio 204.000 DEM (113.000 USD) za popravak sedamdeset kuća u Foĉi. Izvješće
IMG-a ukazuje da je ovaj projekt proveo Ministarstvo izbjeglica Republike Srpske i dovršen 1997. godine. Kao
odgovor na upite Human Rights Watcha, duţnosnici UNHCR-a zanijekali su da je financirala ovaj projekt u
Foĉi. IMG je takoĊer izvijestila da je talijanska vlada pridonijela bilateralnoj pomoći u iznosu od 190.000
njemaĉkih maraka (105.500 dolara) za popravak dvanaest stambenih stanova u Foĉi, te da je taj projekt završen
1997. godine. povratak bošnjaĉkih izbjeglica. Sredstva koja je potrošio UNHCR i talijanska vlada nisu postigla
ništa u smislu poticanja pozitivnijeg stava prema povratnicima. Osobito u sluĉaju projekta UNHCR-a, koji su
provodili duţnosnici vlasti bosanskih Srba, postojao je znaĉajan rizik da planirane popravke nikada nisu
napravljene. U onoj mjeri u kojoj su sredstva koja je UNHCR i talijanska vlada potrošila na obnovu stambenih
objekata u Foĉi ĉak i potrošena za taj cilj, gotovo sigurno nisu uĉinili ništa kako bi se olakšalo pravo
izbjeglicama ili raseljenim osobama da se vrate u svoje prijeratne domove, obećao Daytonski mirovni sporazum.

U drugom primjeru pogrešne pomoći pri obnovi, izvješće IMG-a pokazuje da je talijanska vlada uloţila 110.000
njemaĉkih maraka (61.100 dolara) za popravak kolektivnog izbjegliĉkog centra u hotelu Zelengora, u centru
Foĉe. Prema talijanskoj organizaciji odgovornoj za provedbu tih projekata, oni su dovršeni
1997. (201) Predstavnici Human Rights Watch-a posjetili su kolektivni centar hotela Zelengora u sijeĉnju 1998.
godine i pronašli objekt u strašnom rasporedu, s vidljivim preostalim ratnim štetama, smrzavanjem i smradom
kanalizacije koja je proţimala zgradu. Predstavnici Human Rights Watcha 11. lipnja 1998. ponovno su posjetili
ustanovu i pronašli raseljene osobe koje još uvijek ţive u istim oĉajnim uvjetima kao u sijeĉnju. Ĉini se da objekt
nije imao koristi od popravaka koji odraţavaju dodjelu 110.000 njemaĉkih maraka, što je danas ogromna svota
novca u Republici Srpskoj. Nadzornik IPTF-a koji je radio u regiji u razdoblju od listopada 1997. do poĉetka
1998. godine potvrdio je Human Rights Watchu da se tijekom njegovog boravka u Foĉi nisu obavili znaĉajniji
popravci na kolektivnom centru. IPTF postaja u Foĉi takoĊer se nalazi u hotelu Zelengora,

Sliĉne zabrinutosti iznose projekti Europske banke za obnovu i razvoj i Svjetske banke koji su trenutno u
tijeku. Prema IMG-u, Svjetska banka nalazi se u istraţnim fazama projekata koje su planirali za rekonstrukciju
mosta na podruĉju Foĉe, koji su u ratu uništile snage NATO-a, u posljednjem trenutku kako bi sprijeĉili srpske
napade u jugoistoĉnoj Bosni. U izvješću IMG-a navodi se kako je Svjetska banka izdvojila 1,38 milijuna
njemaĉkih maraka (766 600 dolara) za financiranje obnove mosta. EBRD je Human Rights Watchu potvrdio da
takoĊer ima planove za financiranje infrastrukturnih projekata na podruĉju Foĉe. (202) Prvi projekt, poput projekta
Svjetske banke za obnovu mosta, za koji je EBRD prvobitno planirala 3 milijuna dolara, procjena je sada
smanjena na 1,5 milijuna dolara. (204) Drugi projekt EBRD-a na tom podruĉju namijenjen je obnovi ceste izmeĊu
Foĉe i Ustipraĉe, s procijenjenom cijenom od 5,6 milijuna USD. (205) Sva tri infrastrukturna projekta provodi
Ministarstvo prometa Republike Srpske u Banja Luci. Prema EBRD-u, ugovori za njegove projekte trebali su biti
dodijeljeni u srpnju 1997. godine, ali su obje odgoĊene zbog "preseljenja sjedišta vlade [Republike Srpske] u
Banja Luku i logistiĉkih problema u radu projekta. Uprava za provedbu [Ministarstva prometa Republike
Srpske].(206) EBRD sada oĉekuje da će se ti ugovori mobilizirati do kolovoza 1998. godine. Na taj naĉin, Banka i
Ministarstvo prometa trebali bi paţljivo provoditi ugovaranje poslova s podizvoĊaĉima i podizvoĊaĉima kako bi
osigurali da oni nisu u vlasništvu ili kojima upravljaju odgovorni za etniĉki motivirane otkaze, "nestanak" ili
"etniĉko ĉišćenje". Kao odgovor na upite Human Rights Watcha o takvoj provjeri, EBRD je odgovorila da je
njezina politika nabave "osigurati da se financiranje projekta ne primjenjuje suprotno Odjeljku VII Povelje
Ujedinjenih naroda" (207): odredbe Povelje obvezujuće ĉlanice UN-a da primjenjuju sankcije koje je usvojilo
Vijeće sigurnosti kao odgovor na prijetnje miru. Nema sankcija koje iskljuĉuju ekonomske odnose s bosanskim
entitetima ili pojedincima koji su umiješani u ratne zloĉine ili opstrukcije Daytonskog sporazuma, tako da sama
ta politika nije dovoljna da osigura da EBRD-ovi projekti obnove na podruĉju Foĉe ne bi koristili arhitektima
"etniĉkog ĉišćenja". "
Problemi se pojavljuju iu vezi s nastojanjima meĊunarodnih organizacija da unajmljuju prostor od kojeg će raditi
na tom podruĉju. U Foĉi, OESS i IPTF iznajmljuju prostorije za svoje urede od lokalnih vlasti. Ured OESS-a se
1997. preselio iz privatnog smještaja u objekt u vlasništvu lokalne samouprave. IPTF

trenutno u hotelu Zelengora (u vlasništvu lokalne vlasti), planira preseliti svoju postaju na prostor iznad
restorana koji je dio zatvorskog objekta KP Doma. Zatvor i restoran su u vlasništvu općine Foĉa, tako da će IPTF
nastaviti plaćati stanarinu vlastima u Foĉi. Prema IPTF-u, njihova najamnina

ovaj prostor će premašiti 2.000 DM mjeseĉno (1.110 USD). Unatoĉ tom pokroviteljstvu, predstavnici tih
organizacija suoĉavaju se s uznemiravanjem i ometanjem njihovog rada.

U Foĉi i drugim sliĉnim zajednicama napori da se pomoć u obnovi iskoristi kao mrkva za poticanje suradnje
oĉito su nesretni. Što se tiĉe takve suradnje, meĊunarodna zajednica ima malo što pokazati za svoja dosadašnja
ulaganja u podruĉju Foĉe. U istom smislu, ĉak i najstroţiji postupci provjere i revizije ne mogu osigurati da
projekti obnove u Foĉi sluţe njihovoj namjeni, bez obogaćivanja i osnaţivanja korumpiranih i uvredljivih
lokalnih elita. Odgovor u Foĉi i drugim sliĉnim zajednicama mora biti akcija meĊunarodne zajednice za uhićenje
optuţenih ratnih zloĉinaca i provedbu Daytonskog mirovnog sporazuma.

ZAKLJUĈAK

Human Rights Watch zabrinut je da meĊunarodne organizacije u regiji Foĉe, kao iu samoj Foĉi, moţda ne ĉine
sve što je u okviru svojih odgovarajućih obveza i kapaciteta da bi lokalne vlasti odgovorne za prošle i sadašnje
zloupotrebe i za nepoštivanje odredbi Daytonskog sporazuma. To je vjerojatno povezano s temeljnim
proturjeĉjem izmeĊu pokušaja odrţavanja srdaĉnih odnosa i ideje o njeţnom "nagovaranju" lokalnih vlasti na
pridrţavanje i duţnosti uhićenja nekih meĊu njima, uz praćenje kontinuiranog kršenja ljudskih prava, s ciljem
dovoĊenja poĉinitelje pravde.

Postoji mnogo razloga zbog kojih osoblje meĊunarodnih organizacija u gradovima kao što je Foĉa nisu voljni
izazvati lokalne vlasti koje ne poštuju Dejtonski sporazum, meĊu kojima je i rizik od uznemiravanja, napada,
prijetnji ili ĉak "iseljenja". iz grada koji se moţe suoĉiti sa svakim tko izaziva lokalne vlasti. Gore opisani
primjeri jasno pokazuju što se dogodilo kada je meĊunarodno osoblje pokušalo sudjelovati u aktivnostima ili
programima za koje lokalne vlasti smatraju da prijete njihovu kontrolu u gradu. Ali taktika suzdrţanosti u
uskraćivanju kritike lokalnih vlasti u Foĉi nije osvojila prijatelje niti ih uĉinila popustljivijima; nije donio
slobodu izraţavanja ili udruţivanja; nije otvorila Foĉu povratku izbjeglica i raseljenih osoba; dovela je do
provjere policijskih snaga koje štite ljudska prava; to ĉak nije ni dovelo do trajnog preseljenja raseljenih Srba
koji ţive u uţasnim uvjetima. MeĊunarodne organizacije su zatvorile oĉi ne samo u vezi izmeĊu brutalnih
zloĉina koji su se dogodili u Foĉi tijekom rata i sadašnjeg vodstva grada, nego i od njihove sadašnje
neusklaĊenosti s najosnovnijim naĉelima Daytonskog sporazuma.

Neuspjeh meĊunarodnih organizacija u Foĉi, ukljuĉujući OSCE, IPTF i ECMM, i one ĉiji mandati pokrivaju
Foĉu i druge gradove, kao što su civilni poslovi UN-a, da javno izvještavaju o nedostatku suradnje vlasti u Foĉi,
nije postigla ništa, ali kao što je jedna osoba iz OESS-a prijavila Human Rights Watchu, kako bi predstavila
iluziju da su "stvari u Srbinju vrlo mirne". Ovaj portret grada u kojem optuţenici slobodno lutaju, povratnici se
suoĉavaju s tjelesnim ozljedama, a lokalnom stanovništvu se moţe uskratiti humanitarna pomoć zbog svojih
uvjerenja opasna je i pogrešna. Vjerojatno je to zbog nedostatka otvorenog i javnog izvještavanja o aktualnoj
situaciji u Foĉi da su Svjetska banka i vlada SAD-a mogle razmisliti o ulaganju velikih iznosa novca u grad, koji,
pod sadašnjim uvjetima, sluţila bi za uĉvršćivanje moći onih koji su odgovorni za ratne zloĉine i poslijeratnu
nesukladnost. Nuţno je da poĉinitelji ratnih zloĉina i drugih grubih zlostavljanja budu odgovorni za svoje
zloĉine i da se na opstrukcionistiĉke vlasti vrši pritisak na poštivanje Daytonskog sporazuma. Ono što je
najvaţnije, kljuĉno je da te osobe ne iskoriste ekonomsku pomoć u svojim naporima da izgrade zidove kako bi
trajno odvojili podijeljene ljude u Foĉi. To je odgovornost meĊunarodnih organizacija prisutnih u regiji da
osiguraju odgovornost. Nuţno je da poĉinitelji ratnih zloĉina i drugih grubih zlostavljanja budu odgovorni za
svoje zloĉine i da se na opstrukcionistiĉke vlasti vrši pritisak na poštivanje Daytonskog sporazuma. Ono što je
najvaţnije, kljuĉno je da te osobe ne iskoriste ekonomsku pomoć u svojim naporima da izgrade zidove kako bi
trajno odvojili podijeljene ljude u Foĉi. To je odgovornost meĊunarodnih organizacija prisutnih u regiji da
osiguraju odgovornost. Nuţno je da poĉinitelji ratnih zloĉina i drugih grubih zlostavljanja budu odgovorni za
svoje zloĉine i da se na opstrukcionistiĉke vlasti vrši pritisak na poštivanje Daytonskog sporazuma. Ono što je
najvaţnije, kljuĉno je da te osobe ne iskoriste ekonomsku pomoć u svojim naporima da izgrade zidove kako bi
trajno odvojili podijeljene ljude u Foĉi. To je odgovornost meĊunarodnih organizacija prisutnih u regiji da
osiguraju odgovornost.

DODATAK I: "Koncentracioni logor u Foĉi": KP Dom Foĉa

Legenda
1) zgrada za "zatvorenike" (I)

- samica u prizemlju

- zatvorene ćelije na katu broj 11, 12, 13, 14 i 15

- bolnica i ljekarna u potkrovlju

2) - zgrada za zatvorenike (II)

- samica u prizemlju

- zatvorene ćelije na katu broj 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 i 23

3) tvornica namještaja

4) - koliba za graĊevinske materijale

5) - soba straţara (komora za muĉenje)

6) - radio postaja

7) - samica (prostorija za muĉenje)

8) - samica (prostorija za muĉenje)

9) - soba za posjetitelje (prostorija za muĉenje)

10-14) - prostorije strojnica

15) - kantina (filmska soba na katu)

16) - kuhinja

17) - kantina (škola na katu)

18) - pekara

19) - prodavaonica namještaja

20-23) - straţari

24) - ulaz u KP Dom

25) - transportna vrata

26) - kafić

27) - Uprava KP doma

28) - Ĉuvar KP doma na duţnosti

29) - ulaz u strojarnicu

30) - ţeljezni most preko rijeke Drine

K1-K5 - tornjevi za straţu

DODATAK II: DogaĊaji nakon uhićenja Milorada Krnojelca

Milorad Krnojelac uhapšen je 15. lipnja 1998. godine od strane postrojbi SFOR-a u skladu sa
zapeĉaćenom optuţnicom kojom se Krnojelac optuţuje za premlaćivanje, ubojstvo, namjerno ubijanje,
namjerno nanošenje teških ozljeda, okrutno postupanje i nehumana djela prema zatvorenicima u logoru
KP Doma u Foĉi. Nakon uhićenja, u Foĉi je odrţan niz "spontanih" demonstracija. Agenciju France
Presse ih je okarakterizirala kao "nasilnu" (208) i dovela do toga da je ameriĉki konzulat 17. lipnja izdao
savjetodavnu sluţbu graĊanima kako bi izbjegli podruĉje Foĉe do daljnjeg ... [i da] drţavljani SAD-a
trebaju ostati upozorite na sigurnosnu situaciju i budite oprezni glede njihove osobne sigurnosti. "

Dana 16. lipnja, demonstranti u Foĉi napali su lokalne postaje OESS-a i IPTF-a, provalili u urede i oštetili
urede, kao i uredsku opremu. Jedan automobil koji je pripadao IPTF-u ukinut je tijekom
prosvjeda. Budući da su uredi poduzeli mjere opreza kako bi evakuirali grad odmah nakon akcije
uhićenja, nije bilo meĊunarodnog osoblja ozlijeĊeno.

MeĊutim, Human Rights Watch je doznao da su osobne prijetnje predstavljene predstavnicima

meĊunarodnih organizacija odmah nakon napada na urede. U jednom sluĉaju, kada se predstavnik koji
je evakuirao grad nakon uhićenja vratio u svoje prebivalište u Foĉi, on / ona je utvrdio da je njegovoj /
njezinoj gazdarici i njezinoj djeci prijetila i da se ne osjećaju sigurno s predstavnikom koji ostaje u njoj
zgrada. Ova osoba iz meĊunarodnog osoblja izvijestila je da je on i gazdarica više puta prijetila tijekom
tri mjeseca prije uhićenja Krnojelca, ali da su prijetnje postale preozbiljne da bi on / ona ostala u tom
prebivalištu.

Nadalje, iako su predstavnici UN-a pohvalili lokalnu policiju zbog njihove uloge u razbijanju prosvjeda,
uloga lokalnih vlasti u poticanju demonstracija i napada na meĊunarodne predstavnike ostaje
nejasna. Prema radiju bosanskih Srba, de facto gradonaĉelnik Ljubo Veljović javno je govorio na skupu
protiv meĊunarodne zajednice zbog poduzimanja uhićenja. (209) Duncan Bullivant, glasnogovornik Ureda
visokog predstavnika (OHR), kasnije se izravno obratio Veljoviću da prekine skupove i najavio da će
"gradonaĉelnik Srbinja biti odgovoran za moguće incidente u ovom gradu". (210) Human Rights Watch
takoĊer je primio izvješća kako je OESS zatraţio od gradonaĉelnika da dobije naknadu za opremu koja je
oštećena tijekom napada. Ta izvješća ukazuju da, barem, meĊunarodni predstavnici prisutni tijekom
demonstracija vjeruju da su "spontane" dogaĊaje zapravo organizirali lokalni organi vlasti. Da je istina
da su lokalne vlasti Foĉe odgovorne za prikriveno poticanje gomile graĊana na "neplanirane"
demonstracije, to bi se uklopilo u obrazac sliĉnog ponašanja koji je dugo biljeţio u ratu i poslijeratnom
razdoblju u Bosni - taktike popularni jer uspješno produbljuju interese tvrdokornih sluţbenika bez
izravnog uplitanja u nasilje koje neizbjeţno izbija tijekom takvih incidenata.

PRILOG III: Izvodi iz optuţnice MKSJ-a protiv Gagovića i dr.

Tuţitelj MeĊunarodnog kaznenog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju optuţio je sljedeće:

Dragan Gagović

Gojko Janković

Janko Janjić

Radomir Kovaĉ

Zoran Vuković
Dragan Zelenović

Dragoljub Kunarac

(predao se MeĊunarodnom kaznenom sudu za bivšu Jugoslaviju 4. oţujka 1998.)

Radovan Stanković

sa ZLOĈINIMA PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI, TEŠKE POVREDE ŢENEVSKIH KONVENCIJA

(HEREAFTO TEŠKE POVREDE) i KRŠENJA ZAKONA I OBIĈAJA RATOVANJA, kako slijedi:

U sluĉaju muĉenja i silovanja u Buk Bijeloj,

GOJKO JANKOVIĆ optuţen za:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE RATNIH ZAKONA ILI OBIĈAJA;

DRAGAN ZELENOVIĆ optuţen za:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE RATNIH ZAKONA ILI OBIĈAJA;

JANKO JANIĆ optuţen za:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE RATNIH ZAKONA ILI OBIĈAJA;

U sluĉaju muĉenja i silovanja u srednjoj školi u Foĉi,

DRAGAN ZELENOVIĆ optuţen za:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE RATNIH ZAKONA ILI OBIĈAJA;

JANKO JANJIĆ optuţen za:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE RATNIH ZAKONA ILI OBIĈAJA;

ZORAN VUKOVIĆ optuţen za:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE RATNIH ZAKONA ILI OBIĈAJA;

GOJKO JANKOVIĆ optuţen za:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE ZAKONA ILI CARINSKOG NAPRIJEDA;

U sluĉaju progona u Sportskoj dvorani Partizan,

DRAGAN GAGOVIĆ optuţen za:

progon na politiĉkoj, rasnoj i / ili vjerskoj osnovi kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

namjerno izaziva veliku patnju kao grobna povreda;

uvreda osobnog dostojanstva kao KRŠENJE ZAKONA I OBIĈAJA RATOVANJA;

U sluĉaju muĉenja i silovanja FWS-48 u sportskoj dvorani Partizan,

DRAGAN GAGOVIĆ optuţen za:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE RATNIH ZAKONA ILI OBIĈAJA;

U sluĉaju muĉenja i silovanja FWS-48, FWS-50, FWS-75, FWS-87, FWS-95 i drugih ţena u Sportskoj
dvorani Partizan,
JANKO JANJIĆ optuţen za:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE RATNIH ZAKONA ILI OBIĈAJA;

DRAGOLJUB KUNARAC predao se MeĊunarodnom kaznenom sudu za bivšu Jugoslaviju 4. oţujka

1998. godine po optuţnici:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE RATNIH ZAKONA ILI OBIĈAJA;

ZORAN VUKOVIĆ optuţen za:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE RATNIH ZAKONA ILI OBIĈAJA;

GOJKO JANKOVIĆ optuţen za:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE RATNIH ZAKONA ILI OBIĈAJA;

DRAGAN ZELENOVIĆ optuţen za:

muĉenje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

muĉenje kao grobna povreda;

muĉenje kao KRŠENJE RATNIH ZAKONA ILI OBIĈAJA;

U sluĉaju porobljavanja i silovanja FWS-75, FWS-87 i sedam drugih ţena u kući Nusreta Karamana,

RADOVAN STANKOVIĆ optuţen za:

porobljavanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

neĉovjeĉno postupanje kao GRAVE POVREDE;

uvreda osobnog dostojanstva kao KRŠENJE ZAKONA I OBIĈAJA RATOVANJA;

U sluĉaju silovanja FWS-75 i FWS-87 i dvije druge ţene,

GOJKO JANKOVIĆ, DRAGAN ZELENOVIĆ i JANKO JANJIĆ, optuţeni za:

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

U sluĉaju porobljavanja i silovanja FWS-75 i FWS-87 u apartmanu Brena,

RADOMIR KOVAC optuţen za:

porobljavanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI;

silovanje kao ZLOĈIN PROTIV ĈOVJEĈNOSTI.

1. Nakon završetka rata vlasti bosanskih Srba u Foĉi preimenovale su grad "Srbinje". Iz poštovanja prema
tisućama ţrtava koje su muĉile i ubile te iste vlasti bosanskih Srba, grad će u ovom izvješću biti nazvan
tradicionalnim imenom Foĉa.

2. Zoran Vuković ţivi na podruĉju Prijedora.

3. Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Sarajevo, Bosna i Hercegovina, 1997. Srbi su odluĉili napasti Foĉu 7. travnja
1992., treći dan muslimanskog blagdana Bajrama, koji dolazi na kraju Ramazana, mjeseca posta.

4. Posebno izvješće MKCK-a, "Pitanje nestalih osoba u Bosni i Hercegovini, Hrvatskoj i Saveznoj Republici
Jugoslaviji", 1. veljaĉe 1998. godine.

5. SFOR-ove postrojbe u Bosni i Hercegovini dijele se na tri sektora: britanski, ameriĉki i francuski. Britanski
pripadnici SFOR-a, u akciji na podruĉju Prijedora u srpnju 1997. godine, uhitili su jednu tajno optuţenu osobu i
ubili sekundu kad se opirao uhićenju. Nizozemske snage SFOR-a uhitile su Vlatka Kupreškića, koji je javno
optuţen, i Antu Furundţije, ĉija je optuţnica zapeĉaćena, u Vitezu u prosincu 1997. godine. Ameriĉki vojnici
SFOR-a uhitili su javno optuţenog Gorana Jelisića u Bijeljini u sijeĉnju 1998. Britanski vojnici takoĊer su uhitili
Miroslava Kvocku i Mladena Radić - koji je javno optuţen - u Omarskoj, u blizini Prijedora, u travnju 1998.
Francuske postrojbe SFOR-a nisu pokušavale uhititi nijednog optuţenog u njihovoj regiji, u kojem navodno
boravi i Radovan Karadţić, do 15. lipnja 1998. godine, kada su uhapsio Milorada Krnojelca, zapeĉaćenom
optuţnicom zbog njegove uloge upravitelja zatoĉeniĉkog centra u KP domu. Za više detalja o KP Domu i
njegovoj ulozi, pogledajte dolje.

6. Tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata cetnici su se borili protiv okupacijskih sila i pozvali na obnovu srpske
monarhije i stvaranje Velike Srbije. Cetnici su se takoĊer borili protiv pro-nacistiĉkih ustaških snaga Hrvatske i
Titovih komunistiĉkih partizana i odgovorni su za široko rasprostranjene zloĉine nad Muslimanima i Hrvatima,
prvenstveno u Bosni i Hercegovini. Hrvati i muslimani, kako u Hrvatskoj tako iu Bosni, u srpskim vojnim i
paravojnim snagama u posljednjem ratu u Bosni nazivaju "cetnicima" u pogrdnom smislu. Iako neke vojne
institucije u Srbiji i Republici Srpskoj ţestoko odbacuju oznaku "Cetnik", tvrdeći da su samo branitelji svog
naroda i njihove zemlje i da nisu ekstremisti, drugi,

7. U daljnjem tekstu Povjerenstvo struĉnjaka UN-a.

8. Ujedinjeni narodi, Završno izvješće Komisije stručnjaka Ujedinjenih naroda, osnovano na temelju Rezolucije
780 Vijeća sigurnosti (New York: Ujedinjene nacije, 1992.), S / 1994/674 / Aneks III.A., 17. 746, 413 str. 136.

9. Ujedinjeni narodi, Završno izvješće Komisije stručnjaka Ujedinjenih naroda, Dodatak III. A., 17. 746, 413,
str. 169.

10. Za detalje o zloĉinima u kampu za silovanje u Sportskoj dvorani Partizan, pogledajte odjeljak o pritvorskim
centrima.

11. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 4. sijeĉnja 1998.

12. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 21. prosinca 1997.

13. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 22. prosinca 1997.

14. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 1997.

15. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Sarajevo, Bosna i Hercegovina, sijeĉanj 1998.

16. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s općinskom upravom u Foĉi, Ustikolina, Bosna i Hercegovina, 14. sijeĉnja
1998.

17. Posebno izvješće MKCK-a, "Pitanje nestalih osoba u Bosni i Hercegovini, Hrvatskoj i Saveznoj Republici
Jugoslaviji", 1. veljaĉe 1998. godine.

18. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 21. prosinca 1997.

19. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, sijeĉanj 1998.

20. Ibid.

21. Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova Sjedinjenih Ameriĉkih Drţava, "Sedmi izvještaj o ratnim zloĉinima u bivšoj
Jugoslaviji", Dopunski podaci SAD-a Vijeću sigurnosti Ujedinjenih naroda u skladu sa stavkom 5. Rezolucije
771 (1992.) i stavkom 1. Rezolucije 780 ( 1992), od 12. travnja 1993., (17.) travanj-kolovoz 1992.

22. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 22. prosinca 1997. U to vrijeme, Ustikolina, koja se
nalazi na putu izmeĊu Goraţda i Foĉe, bila je pod kontrolom bosanskih Srba. Nakon rata prebaĉen je u
bošnjaĉko-hrvatsku federaciju.

23. "Ustaše" je naziv za hrvatske snage koje su se pridruţile nacistima tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata. Rijeĉ je o
izrazu koji se danas koristi za opisivanje nacionalistiĉkih fašistiĉkih Hrvata, kako samih, tako i drugih. U ovom
sluĉaju, pojam je zamišljen jednostavno kao škripac.

24. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, 22. prosinca 1997.

25. Ujedinjeni narodi, Završno izvješće Povjerenstva stručnjaka Ujedinjenih naroda ..., Dodatak VIII, str. 139.

26. Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova Sjedinjenih Ameriĉkih Drţava, "Sedmo izvješće o ratnim zloĉinima u bivšoj
Jugoslaviji" (4) srpanj 1992.

27. Razgovori Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, prosinac 1997. i sijeĉanj 1998. godine.

28. Human Rights Watch nije mogao utvrditi toĉan broj osoba koje su "nestale" prije rujna 1993. MeĊutim,
opseţni razgovori s preţivjelima, bivšim duţnosnicima i novinarima koji rade u regiji tijekom rata pokazali su
razdoblje Krnojelĉeve uprave, 1992.-rujna 1993., u razdoblju u kojem je najveći broj ne-Srba bio zatoĉen u KP
domu, muĉen i zlostavljan, te "nestao".
29. Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 1997.

30. "Optuţene za ratne zloĉine", Drţavna komisija za prikupljanje ĉinjenica o ratnim zloĉinima, Bilten br.4,
Sarajevo, travanj 1993.

31. Vidjeti Dodatak II za pojedinosti o Krnojelacovoj optuţnici.

32. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 4. sijeĉnja 1998.

33. Intervju Human Rights Watcha, 22. prosinca 1997.

34. Ibid.

35. Intervju Human Rights Watcha, 20. prosinca 1997.

36. Popis osoba u podruĉju odgovornosti (AOR), promatraĉke misije Europske zajednice (ECMM), 16. lipnja
1997. i razgovor s ECMM / Foĉom, 13. sijeĉnja 1998. godine.

37. Razgovori Human Rights Watcha s preţivjelima u KP domu, naime ED, intervju 21. prosinca 1997., FE,
intervju 22. prosinca 1997. i IH, intervjui 1997. i 1998. godine.

38. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 21. prosinca 1997.

39. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s IPTF-om, Bosna i Hercegovina, 30. svibnja 1998.

40. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s ĉlanom osoblja meĊunarodne institucije koja djeluje u regiji Foĉe tijekom
cijelog rata iu postdejtonskom razdoblju, Bosna i Hercegovina, prosinac 1997.

41. Razgovori Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 21. prosinca 1997. i 22. prosinca 1997.

42. Razgovori Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, prosinac 1997. i svibanj 1998. godine.

43. Ovo je pseudonim za svjedokovog prijatelja, jer bi imenovanje prijatelja moglo omogućiti nekome da
identificira svjedoka, koji je ţelio ostati anoniman.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 22. prosinca 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 21. prosinca 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 22. prosinca 1997.

48. Razgovori Human Rights Watcha, 22. prosinca 1997.

49. Razgovori Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 1997. i 1998. godine.

50. Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 22. prosinca 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, prosinac 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 22. prosinca 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 21. prosinca 1997.

54. "Optuţene za ratne zloĉine", Drţavna komisija za prikupljanje ĉinjenica o ratnim zloĉinima u Republici
Bosni i Hercegovini, Bilten br. 4, Sarajevo, travanj 1993.

55. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s IPTF-om, Bosna i Hercegovina, 30. svibnja 1998. godine.

Roy Gutman, "Dnevni ritual seksualnog zlostavljanja", Newsday, 19. travnja 1993.

57. "Dani izbjeglica", Agencija Vreme News Digest, 29. oţujka 1993. godine.

58. Ujedinjeni narodi, Završno izvješće Komisije stručnjaka Ujedinjenih naroda, Prilog VIII, str. 146.

59. Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova Sjedinjenih Ameriĉkih Drţava, "Sedmo izvješće o ratnim zloĉinima u bivšoj
Jugoslaviji" (21.) srpanj-kolovoz 1992.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 22. prosinca 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 4. sijeĉnja 1998.

62. Za detalje o Milenku "Zeko" Vuković, vidi odjeljak o Miljevini ispod.

63. Ovaj svjedok je govorio o zloporabama koje su se dogodile u Partizanu, a koje su joj druge ţene ispriĉale
tijekom njenog kratkog boravka u njemu, a ne iskljuĉivo o vlastitim iskustvima u njoj, budući da je tamo bila
zatvorena samo jednu noć.

64. Roy Gutman, "Kampovi za silovanja: dokazi srpskih voĊa u bosanskom OKd-u napadaju", Newsday, 19.
travnja 1993.

65. Gutman, "Dnevni ritual ...", Newsday.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Victoria Clark, "Susret s silovanjem", Observer (London) , 21. veljaĉe 1993.

69. Roy Gutman, "Priznanje bosanskog logora nezapaţeno; Mitterand je upozorio rano na ubojstva, kaţu
svjedoci, ali su ostali pasivni," Newsday, 11. svibnja 1994., str. 6.

70. Clark, "Silovanje svoga susjeda", promatrač.

71. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, prosinac 1997.

72. U izvješću Struĉnog povjerenstva Ujedinjenih naroda navodi se da je Veleĉevo "srpske snage navodno
koristile ţenski zatvor Veleĉevo u Foĉi kao koncentracijski logor za muslimanske ţene. Ţene su navodno tamo
bile smještene tek u travnju 1993." Ujedinjeni narodi, Završno izvješće Komisije stručnjaka Ujedinjenih
naroda, Prilog VIII, str. 147.

Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, sijeĉanj 1998.

74. Ujedinjeni narodi, Završno izvješće Komisije stručnjaka Ujedinjenih naroda, Dodatak X, Masovne grobnice,
28. prosinca 1994.

Razgovori Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, prosinac 1997. i sijeĉanj 1998.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina.

77. "Optuţene za ratne zloĉine", Drţavna komisija za prikupljanje ĉinjenica o ratnim zloĉinima u Republici
Bosni i Hercegovini, Bilten br. 4, Sarajevo, travanj 1993.

78. Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Goraţde, Bosna i Hercegovina, 21. prosinca 1997.

79. Ime za vojnike lojalne srpskom radikalu Vojislavu Šešelju, nadaleko poznato kao jedan od najbrutalnijih
srpskih voĊa u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Šešelj je pobijedio na predsjedniĉkim izborima 1997. godine u Srbiji, ali su
rezultati poništeni zbog navodne izborne prijevare. (Kada su izbori ponovno prihvaćeni, kandidat SPS-a Milan
Milutinović je izabran za predsjednika uskom marginom.) U oţujku 1998., meĊutim, Šešelj je imenovan na
mjesto zamjenika premijera Srbije kao odraz znaĉajnog postotka mjesta koja je osvojio njegov Srpske radikalne
stranke na saveznim izborima 1998. godine.

80. Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova Sjedinjenih Ameriĉkih Drţava, "Sedmo izvješće o ratnim zloĉinima u bivšoj
Jugoslaviji" (20.) srpanj-kolovoz 1992.

81. Prema rijeĉima općinske vlade Foĉa u egzilu, Pero Elez je preminuo.

82. Razgovori Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 22. prosinca 1997. i 4. sijeĉnja 1998. (KJ i LK), i 5.
sijeĉnja 1998. godine.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 22. prosinca 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 4. sijeĉnja 1998.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 5. sijeĉnja 1998.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 4. sijeĉnja 1998.

87. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 5. sijeĉnja 1998.

88. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 4. sijeĉnja 1998

89. Ibid.

90. Ujedinjeni narodi, Završno izvješće Komisije stručnjaka Ujedinjenih naroda, S / 1994/674 / Prilog VIII, str.
147-8. Kuća Karaman nije jedini privatni smještaj koji je sluţio kao centar za zatoĉavanje i silovanje
ţena. Zapravo, intervjui Human Rights Watcha i Komisija struĉnjaka UN-a navode da su oba dokazala da su
mnoge kuće i stanovi koje su srpske snage zapljenile tijekom preuzimanja u Foĉi korištene kao privatni logori za
silovanje. Vidi izvješće Povjerenstva struĉnjaka UN-a, str. 144.

91. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s općinskom vladom u Foĉi u egzilu, Ustikolina, Bosna i Hercegovina, 14.
sijeĉnja 1998.

92. Ujedinjeni narodi, Završno izvješće Komisije struĉnjaka Ujedinjenih naroda , Prilog VIII, str. 144.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 4. sijeĉnja 1998.

94. Jedan svjedok koji je intervjuirao navodno Human Rights Watchu da je Milenko Vuković preminuo,
meĊutim, dobili smo kontradiktorne informacije u vezi s tim pitanjem i zato smo ga ukljuĉili na popis.

95. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 5. sijeĉnja 1998.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 4. sijeĉnja 1998.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 4. sijeĉnja 1998.

98. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 5. sijeĉnja 1998.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha sa Bošnjakom iz Miljevine, Bosna i Hercegovina, 14. sijeĉnja 1998.

100. Roy Gutman, Svjedok genocidu (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1993), str. 157.

101. Završno izvješće Povjerenstva stručnjaka utemeljeno na Rezoluciji 780 (1992) Vijeća sigurnosti , Aneks V:
"Prijedorsko izvješće" (New York: Ujedinjene nacije, 1995.) str.49-50.

102. Hannes Tretter, Stephan Muller, Roswitha Schwanke, Paul Angeli i Andreas Richter, Operacija etničkog
čišćenja u sjeveroistočnom bosanskom gradu Zvorniku od travnja do lipnja 1992. (Beĉ: Ludwig Boltzmann
Institut za ljudska prava, 1994).

103. TakoĊer se navodi u izvješću Ludwiga Boltzmanna i Završnom izvješću Komisije struĉnjaka kao "osoblje
za hitne sluĉajeve".

104. Završno izvješće Povjerenstva stručnjaka, Dodatak IV: "Politika etničkog čišćenja" ; Tretter i
drugi, "Operacije etničkog čišćenja" u Zvorniku u sjeveroistočnom bosanskom gradu od travnja do juna 1992.
godine.

105. Jedan od tih dokumenata bio je potvrda da je stanovnik muškarca "donirao" krv. Zatoĉenicima je uzimana
krv u nekim regionalnim logorima; Osim toga, neki svjedoci navode da su se smrtni sluĉajevi dogodili u bolnici
u Zvorniku zbog toga što su ljudi doslovno iskrvarili do smrti. Završno izvješće Povjerenstva stručnjaka, Prilog
IV . 324.

106. Završno izvješće Povjerenstva stručnjaka , Prilog IV.

107. Roy Gutman, " Kampovi za silovanja; dokazi srpskih voĊa u bosanskim napadima", Newsday , 19. travnja
1993.

108. Simo Mojevic je navodno bio clan Kriznog odbora Ustikoline. Više pojedinosti potraţite u nastavku.

109. Zelena je boja koja oznaĉava muslimanski utjecaj ili kontrolu. U ovom sluĉaju, Cancar se poziva na
uobiĉajeno propagandno sredstvo, u kojem se navodi da su bosanski muslimani bili umiješani u zavjeru za
povezivanje razliĉitih podruĉja bivše Jugoslavije u kojima postoji veliko muslimansko stanovništvo. Srpske
vlasti su ĉesto opisivale tu "zavjeru" kako bi ohrabrile stanovništvo bosanskih Srba da se "brani" od
"muslimanske ekspanzionistiĉke prijetnje".

110. Transkript razgovora s Petkom Cancarom, 1996. Novinar je dostavio transkript Human Rights Watchu pod
uvjetom da ostane anoniman. Do danas, intervju nije objavljen.

111. Charlotte Eagar, "Bosna: Kavalirski doktor parkirao je iz njegove loze", promatrač , 28. studenoga 1993.

112. "Bosna: vlasti šalju dokumente o ratnim zloĉinima u Haag", tiskovna agencija Hina , Zagreb na engleskom
jeziku, 1650 gmt, 26. travnja 1995.

113. Vidjeti odjeljak o nepoštivanju vlasti Foĉe u poslijeratnom razdoblju.

114. Radio Slobodna Europa, "Bosanski Srbi definiraju granice", br. 142, 28. srpnja 1992.

115. Ujedinjeni narodi, Završno izvješće Komisije stručnjaka Ujedinjenih naroda, Prilog III. A., 17. 746, 413,
str. 169.

116. Roy Gutman, " Kampovi za silovanje ...", Newsday.

117. Komisija za sigurnost i suradnju u Europi, saslušanje o genocidu u Bosni, Ĉetvrti kongres, prva sjednica,
CSCE 104-1-4, Washington, DC, utorak, 4. travnja 1995.

118. Roy Gutman, " Kampovi za silovanje ...", Newsday .

119. Radio Slobodna Europa, "bosanski Srbi polaţu pravo na tisuće ubijenih u hrvatsko-muslimanskim
logorima", 5. kolovoza 1992.

120. Roy Gutman, " Kampovi za silovanje ...", Newsday. Gutman je izvijestio da je potvrdio tu ĉinjenicu iz
izvora bosanskih Srba, koji je te informacije podijelio pod uvjetom anonimnosti.

121. Tracy Wilkinson, "Oštro svjetlo obasjava tamni bosanski kutak", Los Angeles Times , 27. rujna 1997.

122. Ibid.

123. Roy Gutman, " Kampovi za silovanje ...", Newsday.

124. Ibid.

125. Kada su sarajevska predgraĊa u oţujku 1996. prebaĉeni u Federacijsku kontrolu, većina etniĉkih Srba iz
ovih predgraĊa napustila je svoje domove kako bi se smjestila u privremeni smještaj u cijeloj Republici
Srpskoj. Vlasti Federacije nisu uspjele osigurati sigurnost onih bosanskih Srba koji su ţeljeli ostati u svojim
domovima u Sarajevu. Osim toga, vlasti bosanskih Srba odigrale su kljuĉnu ulogu u ohrabrivanju stanovništva
bosanskih Srba da napuste zemlju, ĉesto nudeći im poticaje za preseljenje u Republiku Srpsku, što je bila taktika
koja je bila dio napora bosanskih Srba da se stanovništvo preseli kako bi se uĉvrstila etniĉka podjela.

126. Drţavna komisija za prikupljanje ĉinjenica o ratnim zloĉinima u Republici Bosni i Hercegovini, Bilten broj
4, travanj 1993., str. 28.

127. "Bosna: vladajuća stranka koja je navodno dotjerala nasljednika predsjednika Plavšića," Gradjanin ,
Beograd, u srpskohrvatskom, 1218 gmt, 11. kolovoza 1997. godine.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, veljaĉa 1998.

129. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, prosinac 1997.

Faik Tafro, "Krvavi bajram", Dani , 8. prosinca 1997

Telefonski intervju Human Rights Watcha, travanj 1998.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, sijeĉanj 1998.

133. Svjedoĉenje vojnika bosanskih Srba iz Foĉe, koje je podnijela Human Rights Watchu pod uvjetom
anonimnosti, SD, meĊunarodni novinar.

134. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, lipanj 1998.

135. Telefonski intervju Human Rights Watcha, travanj 1998.

136. Bosanska imena ĉesto se pišu u zadnjem imenu.

137. Transkript razgovora s Petkom Cancar, na bosanskom jeziku, 1996. godine. Novinar je dostavio transkript
Human Rights Watchu pod uvjetom da ostane anoniman.

138. Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova Sjedinjenih Ameriĉkih Drţava, "Sedmo izvješće o ratnim zloĉinima u bivšoj
Jugoslaviji" (47) 92. travnja.
139. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, travanj 1998.

140. "Optuţeni za ratne zloĉine", Drţavna komisija za prikupljanje ĉinjenica o ratnim zloĉinima u Republici
Bosni i Hercegovini, Bilten br. 4, Sarajevo, travanj 1993.

Faik Tafro, "Kravni Bajram", Dani .

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, sijeĉanj 1998.

144. Popis osoba AOR-a, promatraĉke misije Europske zajednice (ECMM), 16. lipnja 1997. godine.

Faik Tafro, "Spavaona Broj 15", Dani, 19. sijeĉnja 1998.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, sijeĉanj 1998.

147. Ibid.

148. Razgovori Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, sijeĉanj 1998.

149. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Sarajevo, Bosna i Hercegovina, prosinac 1998.

150. Ibid.

151. Hugh Pain, "Bosna: muslimanska kultura uništena u bosanskom gradu". Reuters News Service . 25. rujna
1992.

152. Janjo Janjić optuţen je 26. lipnja 1996. zbog uloge u napadu na Foĉu, uhićenja i pritvaranja civila te
silovanja ţena u pritvoru i na ispitivanju.

153. Zoran Vuković je 26. lipnja 1996. godine optuţen za svoju ulogu u napadu na Foĉu, uhićenju i zatvaranju
civila i silovanju ţena u pritvoru.

Telefonski intervju Human Rights Watcha, travanj 1998.

155. Telefonski intervju Human Rights Watcha, lipanj 1998.

156. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, prosinac 1997.

157. Optuţnica protiv Dragana Gagovića, MeĊunarodnog kaznenog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju, 26. lipnja 1996.

158. Telefonski intervju Human Rights Watcha, lipanj 1998.

159. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, veljaĉa 1998.

160. Ibid.

161. Ibid.

Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s IPTF-om, Bosna i Hercegovina, svibanj 1998.

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid.
165. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s IPTF-om, Bosna i Hercegovina, 30. svibnja 1998.

166. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, lipanj 1998.

167. Pisani intervju Human Rights Watcha, studeni 1997.

168. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha, sijeĉanj 1998.

169. "Javne reakcije u općini Foĉa o politiĉkim borbama u RS", IPTF Goraţde, 2. srpnja 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 16. svibnja 1998.

171. "Zapisnik o meĊuagencijskom sastanku odrţanom u Foĉi / Srbinju 17.4.1997.", UNHCR / Goraţde, Bosna i
Hercegovina, travanj 1997.

Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s osobljem UNHCR-a, Bosna i Hercegovina, 5. i 14. sijeĉnja 1998. godine.

Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s osobljem UNHCR-a, Bosna i Hercegovina, 13. sijeĉnja 1998. godine.

174. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha sa osobljem UNHCR-a, Bosna i Hercegovina, 5. i 14. sijeĉnja 1998.
godine.

175. Gradonaĉelnike općina u Bosni izabrali su skupštine općina, ĉiji su ĉlanovi izabrani na općinskim izborima
u rujnu 1997. godine. S obzirom na ĉinjenicu da općinska skupština u Foĉi, u kojoj su Bošnjaci osvojili većinu,
nikada nije dobila mjesto u vladi u Foĉi, OESS još nije potvrdio rezultate općinskih izbora u Foĉi. Prema tome,
prema pravilima i propisima OESS-ovog Privremenog izbornog povjerenstva, Ljubo Veljović nije legitimni
gradonaĉelnik Foĉe.

Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s osobljem UNHCR-a, Bosna i Hercegovina, 6. veljaĉe 1998. godine.

Razgovor Human Rights Watcha sa osobljem OESS-a u Foĉi, travanj 1997. godine.

178. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s osobljem IRC-a u Goraţdu, travanj 1997. godine.

179. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s IRC-om, Bosna i Hercegovina, 5. veljaĉe 1998. godine.

180. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s ĉlanom osoblja IPTF-a, Bosna i Hercegovina, sijeĉanj 1998.

181. "Javne reakcije u općini Srbinje / Foĉa o politiĉkim borbama u RS", IPTF Goraţde, 2. srpnja 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, 21. prosinca 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha s UNHCR-om, Bosna i Hercegovina, 5. sijeĉnja 1998.

184. Centar za pravnu pomoć u Foĉi nalazi se u hotelu Zelengora, kao i postaja IPTF. Budući da je hotel
Zelengora zgrada u javnom vlasništvu, vlasti u Foĉi primaju stanarinu za te prostore. To je moţda jedan od
razloga zašto su vlasti dopustile otvaranje centara.

185. Razgovori Human Rights Watcha s tumaĉima, Bosna i Hercegovina, sijeĉanj i veljaĉa 1998.

Izvješće ECMM-a o općoj situaciji u AOR-u, 21. srpnja 1997. godine.

187. Ibid. Pogrdan izraz za muslimane.

188. Izvješće ECMM-a o općoj situaciji u AOR-u, 21. srpnja 1997. godine.
189. Miloš Lazović je od travnja do studenog 1997. bio gradonaĉelnik Foĉe. TakoĊer je kandidirao na općinskim
izborima u rujnu 1997. godine. Nekada je bio direktor glavne pošte u Sarajevu, a tijekom rata direktor pošte u
Foĉi. Lazović je zamijenio Cancar za gradonaĉelnika. Prema civilnim poslovima UN-a, Lazović je trenutno
predsjednik lokalnog vladinog odbora.

190. Dnevno izvješće ECMM-a, 29. srpnja 1997.

191. Takis Michas, "Privlaĉenje kriminalaca u Bosni", Wall Street Journal Europe , 24. rujna 1997.

Intervju Human Rights Watcha, Bosna i Hercegovina, sijeĉanj 1998.

193. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s UNHCR-om, Bosna i Hercegovina, 14. sijeĉnja 1998. godine.

194. Nije jasno je li to bila ista osoba.

195. Izvješće ECMM / Srbinje, 27. kolovoza 1997.

196. Akcijsko upozorenje - Savezna Republika Jugoslavija (Srbija), "Srbijanski novinar prijeti smrću", Odbor za
zaštitu novinara, 29. listopada 1997.

197. Takis Michas, "Privlaĉenje kriminalaca u Bosni", Wall Street Journal Europe , 24. rujna 1997.

Takis Michas, "Privlaĉenje kriminalaca u Bosni", Wall Street Journal Europe , 24. rujna 1997.

199. Razgovor Human Rights Watcha s osobljem Ureda za ljudska prava IPTF-a, Sarajevo, sijeĉanj 1998.

200. Ibid.

201. Telefonski intervju Human Rights Watcha, 25. lipnja 1998.

202. (203)

203.

204. Ibid.

205. Ibid.

206. Ibid.

207. Ibid.

Jacqueline Pietsch, "Bosna i Hercegovina: AFP daje pojedinosti o optuţnici protiv Krnojelca", Paris AFP
(Sjevernoeuropska služba) , 18. lipnja 1998.

209. "Odrţan skup o uhićenju bosanskih Srba zbog ratnih zloĉina", Pale SRNA , 15. lipnja 1998., 15:10 GMT.

Izvješće Mihajla Orlovića, Banja Luka Srpska Televizija , 17. lipnja 1998., 17:30 GMT.