G.R. No.

199199 August 27, 2013

MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG

MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, PETITIONER
vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REYNULFO A.
JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU, DENR, HON.
RAUL R. LEE, GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR.,
VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN M. AGUILAR, ANTONES
ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR
ORE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Order2 dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution3 dated October 18, 2011 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Branch 53. The assailed issuances dismissed
Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for Continuing Mandamus, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection Order.

Antecedent Facts

On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish
priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa
Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorney’s
fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.4 The petition
contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron
ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines
Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located
in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon
and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the
municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the
environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground
subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining
operators did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee
and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which
they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential
Management Staff and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of
Matnog;5 and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and
the Local Government Code.6 Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance
of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the
Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection order or
TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the
mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.7

The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being
the designated environmental court.8 In the Order9 dated September 16, 2011, the case
was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the
Resolution10 dated October 18, 2011. Aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case for
lack of jurisdiction, the RTC11 further ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree, order
or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the
issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the
petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed
to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or
appropriate agency, as required by the rules.12

Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.

Issues

The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil
Case No. 2011-8338. The other issue is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds
that: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly
failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the
complaint to the government or appropriate agency.

Ruling of the Court

Jurisdiction and Venue

In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16,
2011, apparently relied on SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial
areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin.
Circular) No. 23-2008,13 designating the environmental courts "to try and decide violations
of environmental laws x x x committed within their respective territorial
jurisdictions."14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial jurisdiction was limited within the
boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla,
Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide
[the] case, as such authority rests before another co-equal court."15

Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and
Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining
whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.

None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of
the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law.16 It may either be over the
nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the
issues framed in the pleadings.17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof
provides that the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction –

in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis
ours)

A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P.
Blg. 129, which gave the Court authority to define the territory over which a branch of the
RTC shall exercise its authority. These administrative orders and circulars issued by the
Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have
the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is
lodged solely in Congress.18 It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the
Government.19 Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states that the territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions. It was also clarified in Office of
the Court Administrator v. Judge Matas20 that –

Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
in the National Capital Judicial Region] and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did
not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts or its branches, such that
non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely
defines the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may
exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.21

The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the
geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not
equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties,
as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the
courts.22Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently incorrect.

At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon
was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically states that a special civil action for continuing
mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the
actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x."23 In this case, it appears that the alleged
actionable neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the
petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin.24 But even then, it does not warrant
the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived.25 Moreover, the
action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element
of jurisdiction.26 In Gomez-Castillo v. Commission on Elections,27 the Court even
expressed that what the RTC should have done under the circumstances was to transfer
the case (an election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it would serve the higher
interest of justice28 if the Court orders the transfer of Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC
of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution, with the RTC applying the Rules in its
disposition of the case.

At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No.
23-2008 constituting the different "green courts" in the country and setting the
administrative guidelines in the raffle and disposition of environmental cases. While the
designation and guidelines were made in 2008, the same should operate in conjunction
with the Rules.

A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the RTC further ruled that the petition was
dismissible on the following grounds: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision
yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach judicial
affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate
agency.29 The respondents, and even the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of the
public respondents, all concur with the view of the RTC.

The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila

Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.30 Now cast in stone under
Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that
of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are
covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8
of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance
before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition
outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to
the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a
reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in
mind of seeing to it that justice is served.31

Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8,
Section 1:

When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully

neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting
evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation,
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series
of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law,
rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping. 1âwphi1

On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as
well as a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner
must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand,
necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting
an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis
for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its
officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from
the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results
from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.32

The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel
the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law."33 The petition should mainly
involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The
RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently
based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the
Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing
any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or
series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully
satisfied. (Emphasis ours)

The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually
pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an
environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall
subsequently become final.

Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8,
Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction
over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as
mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full
satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be
made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the
satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket.34 A writ of continuing
mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it
"permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful
implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision."35

The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed
a case with the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes
under R.A. No. 7942.

Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining
disputes.36 But the petition filed below does not involve a mining dispute. What was being
protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining
operation being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
Corporation and TR Ore in the Municipality of Matnog; the authority of the Governor of
Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor of these entities; and the perceived indifference
of the DENR and local government officials over the issue. Resolution of these matters
does not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the members of the Panel but
requires an exercise of judicial function. Thus, in Olympic Mines and Development Corp. v.
Platinum Group Metals Corporation,37 the Court stated –

Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement
between the parties as to some provisions of the contract between them, which needs the
interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by
members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or
validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case.
The validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of
fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and require the application and
interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial
function.38(Emphasis supplied in the former and ours in the latter)

Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.

The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to
attach judicial affidavits. As previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be
verified, contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial
affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of
testimony of witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of
witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint.39

Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such
that the case should be dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners to
furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents. It should be remembered that "courts are
not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with
procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile
both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to an opportunity to
be heard."40

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 16, 2011 and
Resolution dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Branch 53, dismissing Civil Case No. 2011-8338 are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon is DIRECTED to transfer the
case to the Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch.
Petitioner Maricris D. Dolot is also ORDERED to furnish the respondents with a copy of
the petition and its annexes within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision and to
submit its Compliance with the RTC of Irosin.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 211010

VICTORIA SEGOVIA, RUEL LAGO, CLARIESSE JAMI CHAN, REPRESENTING THE

CARLESS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; GABRIEL ANASTACIO, REPRESENTED
BY HIS MOTHER GRACE ANASTACIO, DENNIS ORLANDOSANGALANG,
REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER MAY ALILI SANGALANG, MARIA PAULINA
CASTANEDA, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHERATRICIAANN CASTANEDA,
REPRESENTING THE CHILDREN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CHILDREN OF THE
FUTURE; AND RENATO PINEDA, JR., ARON KERR MENGUITO, MAY ALILI
SANGALANG, AND GLYNDA BATHAN BATERINA, REPRESENTING CAROWNERS
WHO WOULD RATHER NOT HA VE CARS IF GOOD PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
WERE SAFE, CONVENIENT, ACCESSIBLE AND RELIABLE, Petitioners
vs
THE CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HIS
EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, AND ITS COMMISSIONERS MARY ANN
LUCILLE SERING, HEHERSON ALVAREZANDNADAREV SANO; DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC) REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY, HONORABLE JOSEPH ABAYA; DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) AND THE ROAD BOARD, REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY, HONORABLE ROGELIO SINGSON; DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE
MANUEL ROXAS; DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE RAMON PAJE;
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM), REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY, HONORABLE FLORENCIO ABAD; METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA), REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN,
FRANCIS TOLENTINO; DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DA), REPRESENTED BY
ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE PROCESO ALCALA; AND JOHN DOES,
REPRESENTING AS YET UNNAMED LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE, JURIDICAL ENTITIES, AND NATURAL
PERSONS WHO FAIL OR REFUSE TO IMPLEMENT THE LAW OR COOPERATE IN
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW, Respondents

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus to
compel the implementation of the following environmental laws and executive issuances -
Republic Act No. (RA) 9729 (Climate Change Act), and RA 8749 (Clean Air Act);
1 2

Executive Order No. 774 (BO 774); AO 254, s. 2009 (AO 254); and Administrative Order
3 4

No. 171, s. 2007 (AO 171).

5

Accordingly, the Petitioners seek to compel: (a) the public respondents to: (1) implement
the Road Sharing Principle in all roads; (2) divide all roads lengthwise, one-half (½) for
all-weather sidewalk and bicycling, the other half for Filipino-made transport
vehicles; (3) submit a time-bound action plan to implement the Road Sharing Principle
throughout the country; (b) the Office of the President, Cabinet officials and public
employees of Cabinet members to reduce their fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%)
and to take public transportation fifty percent (50%) of the time; (c) Public respondent
DPWH to demarcate and delineate the road right-of-way in all roads and sidewalks;
and (d) Public respondent DBM to instantly release funds for Road Users' Tax. 6

The Facts

To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on
Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. This body was reorganized through BO
774, which designated the President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as members
of the Task Force. EO 774 expressed what is now referred to by the petitioners as the
"Road Sharing Principle." Its Section 9(a) reads:

Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of

fossil fuels, the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) shall lead a Task Group to reform the transportation sector. The
new paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple
principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For
this purpose, the system shall favor nonmotorized locomotion and
collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered
mini-train).

In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as lead agency for the Task Group on
Fossil Fuels or TGFF) to formulate a national Environmentally Sustainable Transport
Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. The Road Sharing Principle is similarly mentioned,
thus:

SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF- In addition to the functions provided

in EO 774, the TGFF shall initiate and pursue the formulation of the
National EST Strategy for the Philippines.

Specifically, the TGFF shall perform the following

functions:
 (a) Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption
of fossil fuels. The new paradigm in the movement of men
and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who
have less in wheels must have more in road." For this
purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion
and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling,
and the manpowered mini-train).

xxxx

Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate
Change Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead
policy-making body of the government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and
evaluate the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate change. 7

Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road
Sharing Principle, demanding the reform of the road and transportation system in the
whole country within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said letter - foremost, through the
bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and government fuel consumption by fifty
percent (50%). Claiming to have not received a response, they filed this petition.
8

The Petition

Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who
in turn represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars
if good public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable".
They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the
alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by environmental
laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos. 9

These identified violations include: (a) The government's violation of "atmospheric trust"
10

as provided under Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, and thoughtless extravagance
in the midst of acute public want under Article 25 of the Civil Code for failure to reduce
personal and official consumption of fossil fuels by at least fifty percent (50%); (b) DOTC
and DPWH's failure to implement the Road Sharing Principle under EO 774; (c) DA's
failure to devote public open spaces along sidewalks, roads and parking lots to
sustainable urban farming as mandated by Section 12(b) f EO 774; (d) DILG's failure to
11

coordinate with local government units (LGUs) to guide them on the Road Sharing
Principle under Section 9(g) of EO 774; (e) DENR's failure to reduce air pollutant
12

emissions; and lastly, (f) DBM's failure to make available Road Users' Tax for purposes
stated in Section 9(e) of EO 774.
13

In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and
executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in
Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land,
14

water, and air" by the government without due process of law. They also decry the
15

"unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing scheme, claiming that ninety-eight percent
(98%) of Filipinos are discriminated against by the law when the car-owning two percent
(2%) is given almost all of the road space and while large budgets are allocated for
construction and maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for sidewalks, bike
lanes and non-motorized transportation systems. 16
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment seeking the
outright dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to adhere to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Moreover, respondents argue that petitioners are not entitled to the
17

reliefs prayed for.

Specifically, respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to a writ

of kalikasan because they failed to show that the public respondents are guilty of an
unlawful act or omission; state the environmental law/s violated; show environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants of two
or more cities; and prove that non- implementation of Road Sharing Principle will cause
environmental damage. Respondents likewise assert that petitioners are similarly not
entitled to a

Continuing Mandamus because: (a) there is no showing of a direct or personal injury or a

clear legal right to the thing demanded; (b) the writ will not compel a discretionary act or
anything not in a public officer's duty to do (i.e. the manner by which the Road Sharing
Principle will be applied; and to compel DA to exercise jurisdiction over roadside lands);
and (c) DBM cannot be compelled to make an instant release of funds as the same
requires an appropriation made by law (Article VI, Section 29[1] of the Constitution) and
the use of the Road Users' Tax (more appropriately, the Motor Vehicle Users' Charge)
requires prior approval of the Road Board. 18

In any event, respondents denied the specific violations alleged in the petition, stating that
they have taken and continue to take measures to improve the traffic situation in
Philippine roads and to improve the environment condition - through projects and
programs such as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and
mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is aimed to decongest major
thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike
Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs. These projects are individually and
jointly implemented by the public respondents to improve the traffic condition and mitigate
the effects of motorized vehicles on the environment. Contrary to petitioners' claims,
19

public respondents assert that they consider the impact of the transport sector on the
environment, as shown in the Philippine National Implementation Plan on Environment
Improvement in the Transport Sector which targets air pollution improvement actions,
greenhouse gases emission mitigation, and updating of noise pollution standards for the
transport sector.

In response, petitioner filed their Reply, substantially reiterating the arguments they raised
in the Petition.

ISSUES

From the foregoing submissions, the main issues for resolution are:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition;

2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to

the doctrine of hierarchy of courts; and

3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should

issue.
 RULING

The petition must be dismissed.

Procedural Issues

Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), 20

respondents argue that the petitioners failed to show that they have the requisite standing
to file the petition, being representatives of a rather amorphous sector of society and
without a concrete interest or injury. Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as citizens,
21

taxpayers, and representatives; that the rules on standing had been relaxed following the
decision in Oposa v. Factoran; and that, in any event, legal standing is a procedural
22

technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion. 23

The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the requirements
on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations
under environmental laws. This has been confirmed by this Court's rulings in Arigo v.
24

Swift, and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-BioTech Applications, Inc. v.
25

Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines). However, it bears noting that there is a

26

difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient
that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage
subject of the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
27

continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the
unlawful act or omission. 28

Respondents also seek the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners
failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, reasoning that since a petition for
the issuance of a writ of kalikasan must be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the
stations of the Court of Appeals, then the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is
29

applicable. Petitioners, on the other hand, cite the same provision and argue that direct
30

recourse to this Court is available, and that the provision shows that the remedy to
environmental damage should not be limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the lower
courts. 31

The respondents' argument does not persuade. Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is
an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is
designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for
environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution
of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced
ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially
exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats. At the very least, the magnitude of
32

the ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the
exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed where it is
dictated by public welfare. Given that the RPEC allows direct resort to this Court, it is
1âwp hi1
33

ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly
before it.

Requisites for issuance of Writs of

Kalikasan and Continuing
Mandamus
We find that the petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs
prayed for.

For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a

balanced and healthful ecology;

2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or

omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and

3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an

environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. 34

It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. 35

In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a
balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the
petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission
that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

While there can be no disagreement with the general propositions put forth by the
petitioners on the correlation of air quality and public health, petitioners have not been
able to show that respondents are guilty of violation or neglect of environmental laws that
causes or contributes to bad air quality. Notably, apart from bare allegations, petitioners
were not able to show that respondents failed to execute any of the laws petitioners cited.
In fact, apart from adducing expert testimony on the adverse effects of air pollution on
public health, the petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation in establishing the
unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the public respondents that have a causal link or
reasonable connection to the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules, as
required of petitions of this nature.36

Moreover, the National Air Quality Status Report for 2005-2007 (NAQSR) submitted by
the petitioners belies their claim that the DENR failed to reduce air pollutant emissions - in
fact, the NAQSR shows that the National Ambient Total Suspended Particulates (TSP)
value used to determine air quality has steadily declined from 2004 to 2007, and while the
37

values still exceed the air quality guideline value, it has remained on this same downward
trend until as recently as 2011.38

On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not unlawfully
refuse to implement or neglect the laws, executive and administrative orders as claimed
by the petitioners. Projects and programs that seek to improve air quality were undertaken
by the respondents, jointly and in coordination with stakeholders, such as: priority tagging
of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport
System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke
Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and Urban
Re-Greening Programs.
In fact, the same NAQSR submitted by the petitioners show that the DENR was, and is,
taking concrete steps to improve national air quality, such as information campaigns, free
emission testing to complement the anti-smoke-belching program and other programs to
reduce emissions from industrial smokestacks and from open burning of waste. The 39

efforts of local governments and administrative regions in conjunction with

other · executive agencies and stakeholders are also outlined. 40

Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for
continuing mandamus as follows:

RULES
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS

SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.-When any agency or

instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or
violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto
supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until
the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the
respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also
contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable
to the respondents to be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had been
1âwphi1

liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a

petition for continuing mandamus. 41

Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. It

cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public
respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is applied or considered in
their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely
ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official can only be directed
42

by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined
in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the
recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the
corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or
the other.43

This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to compel the
respondents to act one way to implement the Road Sharing Principle - to bifurcate all
roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk and bicycling, and the other to
Filipino-made transport - when there is nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied issuances
that require that specific course of action in order to implement the same. Their good
intentions notwithstanding, the petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's
discretion with their own through this petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and
continuing mandamus.

In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to
perform any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the
executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation
of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were
able to show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that
seek to improve air quality.1âwp hi1

At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a
ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing
Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course of action (i.e. the bifurcation of
roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made transport
vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in law or
executive issuances for it to be considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the
necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the
implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of
discretion of the executive as to how the principle enunciated in an executive issuance
relating to the environment is best implemented. Clearly, the determination of the means
to be taken by the executive in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or
executive policy relating to the environment requires the use of discretion. Absent a
showing that the executive is guilty of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or
palpable excess of authority," the general rule applies that discretion cannot be checked
44

via this petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the continuing mandamus cannot
issue.1âwphi1

Road Users' Tax

Finally, petitioners seek to compel DBM to release the Road Users' Tax to fund the reform
of the road and transportation system and the implementation of the Road Sharing
Principle.

It bears clarifying that the Road Users' Tax mentioned in Section 9(e) of EO 774,
apparently reiterated in Section 5 of AO 254 is the Special Vehicle Pollution Control Fund
component of the Motor Vehicle Users' . Charge ("MVUC') imposed on owners of motor
vehicles in RA 8794, otherwise known as the Road Users' Tax Law. By the express
provisions of the aforementioned law, the amounts in the special trust accounts of the
MVUC are earmarked solely and used exclusively (1) for road maintenance and the
improvement of the road drainage, (2) for the installation of adequate and efficient traffic
lights and road safety devices, and (3) for the air pollution control, and their utilization are
subject to the management of the Road Board. Verily, the petitioners' demand for the
45

immediate and unilateral release of the Road Users' Tax by the DBM to support the
petitioners' operationalization of this Road Sharing Principle has no basis in law. The
executive issuances relied upon by the petitioner do not rise to the level of law that can
supplant the provisions of RA 8794 that require the approval of the Road Board for the
use of the monies in the trust fund. In other words, the provisions on the release of funds
by the DBM as provided in EO 774 and AO 254 are necessarily subject to the conditions
set forth in RA 8794. Notably, RA 9729, as amended by RA 10174, provides for the
establishment for the People's Survival Fund that may be tapped for adaptation activities,
46

which similarly require approval from the PSF Board. 47

That notwithstanding, the claim made by the petitioners that hardly any budget is allotted
to mitigating environmental pollution is belied by the priority given to programs aimed at
addressing and mitigating climate change that the DBM and the CCC had been tagging
and tracking as priority expenditures since 2013. With the coordination of the DILG, this
48

priority tagging and tracking is cascaded down to the local budget management of local
government units. 49

Other causes of action

As previously discussed, the petitioners' failure to show any violation on the part of the
respondents renders it unnecessary to rule on other allegations of violation that the
petitioners rely upon as causes of action against the public respondents.

In fine, the allegations and supporting evidence in the petition fall short in showing an
actual or threatened violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology arising from an unlawful act or omission by, or any unlawful neglect on
the part of, the respondents that would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.

SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of

the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters
of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of
routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6,
2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013
after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
 On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its
next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m.
while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of
South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan.
No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking
fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging

operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental
damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique,
Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del
Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused
by USS Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in
this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a
case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act
being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”
However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject
matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the

“public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other
civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors
in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal
standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as

commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the
USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions
and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio

took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship
entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to
the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained
that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from
suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates
an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to complywith the
rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage
through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio,

they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following
exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any
request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may
require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or
other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to
the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea
or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for
non-commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles

30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and
other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign
warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with
resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the
above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case,
the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the
UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by
customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as
codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS
was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed
mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly
owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’
acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that
non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the
rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and
territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility”
under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely
affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our
long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the
country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its
obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting
our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising
leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS
directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve
the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis,

directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and
elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic
regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present

controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds
the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States
while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be
required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the
laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel
operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to

criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from
Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged
with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or

non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel
who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would
be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine

whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein,
we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of
environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the
collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit
or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation
of an environmental law.