The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relive

persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
(Villavicencio vs, Lukban, 39 Phil., 778,788.) It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of
his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held
under lawful authority. (Quintos vs. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil., 304, 306.)

The important question is whether or not, after a person covered by the Proclamation has been
formally indicted in court by the filing against him of an information charging rebellion with multiple
murder, arson and robberies, he may be entitled to bail.

Under paragraph 16, Section 1, Areticle II of the Constitution,all persons shall before conviction be
bailable by sufficientsureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong. The crime of rebellion or insurrection is certainly not a capital offense, because it is penalized
only by prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 20,000pesos. The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate and co-equal. If the
intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus carries or implies the suspension of the right to bail, they would have very easily
provided that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong and except when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. As stated in the case of Ex parte Miligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 Law Ed.
297, the Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right, leaving the rest to remain forever
inviolable.

It is essential to the safety of every government that, in a great crisis, like the one we have just
passed through, there should be a power somewhere of suspending the writ of habeas corpus. In
every war, there are men of previously good character, wicked enough to counsel their fellow
citizens to resist the measures deemed necessary by a good government to sustain its just authority
and overthrow its enemies; and their influence may lead to dangerous combinations. In the
emergency of the times, an immediate public investigation according to law may not be possible; and
yet, the peril to the country may be too imminent to suffer such persons to go at large.
Unquestionably, there is then an exigency which demands that the government, if it should see fit, in
the exercise of a proper discretion, to make arrests, should not be required to produce the person
arrested in answer to a writ of habeas corpus. The constitution goes no further. It does not say after
a writ of habeas corpus is denied a citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise than by the course of
common law. If it had intended this result, it was easy by the use of direct words to have
accomplished it. The illustrious men who framed that instrument were guarding the foundations of
civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited power; they were full of wisdom, and the lessons of
history informed them that a trial by an established court, asisted by an impartial jury, was the only
sure way of protecting the citizen against oppression and wrong. Knowing this, they limited the
suspension of one great right, and left the rest to remain forever inviolable.

The purpose of the proclamation has already been accomplished inrespect of those who are now
facing charges in court, to be dealtwith necessarily in accordance with the constitution and the
law.The court, in passing upon petitions to bail and granting thesame in proper cases, does not
inquire into the cause of their detention which is plainly under and by virtue of commitmentsissued by
the court upon the filing of the information forrebellion with multiple murder, arson and robberies. The
court,therefore, cannot be said to be interfering in an act of theExecutive, for it cannot be seriously
contended that, after thefiling of the information, the accused continues to be underdetention as a
result of an executive commitment and stillcovered by the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. otherwise, the suspension will operate as a judgment of conviction, in violation of
the constitutional mandate that no person shall be held to answer for criminal offense without due
process of law (Article III, section 1, Paragraph 15). "The laws which protect the liberties of the whole
people must not be violated or set aside in order to inflict, even upon the guilty, unauthorized though
merited justice." Ex parte Milligan, supra.

The right to bail, along with the right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17, of the Constitution), tends to aid the
accused to prove his innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be
provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori imply the suspension of all his other rights (even the rights to
be tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence, absolute freedom. The latter
result is not insisted upon for being patently untenable. it is not correct to say that, if a person
covered by Proclamation No. 210 is not entitled to be released before he is indicted in court, there is
more reason to hold that he should not be released after an information is filed against him, because
it is then logical to assume that the Government holds sufficient evidence. If he cannot secure his
release before the filing of the information, it is because, in view of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the court cannot look into the legality of his detention under an executive
act, and not because he is assumed to be guilty. As already stated, after the filing of the information,
in granting to bail in proper cases, the court does not determine the legality of his prior detention
which has already been superseded by a detention underjudicial process, but merely proceeds with
and carries into effect its jurisdiction over the criminal case and grants a right guaranteed by the
Constitution. Besides, it is significant that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed
to be innocent (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17).

We are not insensitive to the proposition that the very nature of the crime of rebellion suggests the
likehood that a person accused thereof will jump his bail. The remedy, however, is unfortunately not
in the hands of the court. The lawmakers or the framers of the Constitution should have made the
offense capital or even unbailable.

In the cases now before us, the accused have been charged with rebellion so complexed with other
offenses as to make them capital. Their right to bail is accordingly not absolute and may be denied
when evidence of guilt is strong. The filing of the information implies that the prosecution holds
sufficient evidence for conviction, and it is fair to suppose that the court will duly exercise its
judgment when called upon to pass on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
At any rate, on admission to bail, the accused is delivered to the custody of his sureties as a
continuance of the original detention. (U.S. vs. Sunico and Ng Chiong, 40 Phil. 826).

And it should be borne in mind that if the worse comes to the worst — to the extent that the security
of the State is in factimperiled and the regular constitutional processes can no longerbe observed
with general safety to the people, — the President isauthorized by the Constitution (Article VIII,
Section 10,Paragraph 2) to "place the Philippines or any part thereof undermartial law." Even then,
the primordial objective should be a"regime of justice" as contemplated in the Preamble of the
Constitution. The stubborn fact, however, is that the meresuspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is anadmission that the courts can function and are functioningnormal; otherwise,
there is no need for the suspension as therewill be no court to grant the writ.

USE IMMUNITY

Prohibits the use of the witness’ compelled testimony and its fruits in
any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness
The witness can still be prosecuted but his compelled testimony may not be used against
him

TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY
Immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony
relates

The witness cannot be prosecuted at all

The difference between transactional and use immunity is that transactional immunity protects the
witness from prosecution for the offense or offenses involved, whereas use immunity only protects
the witness against the government's use of his or her immunized testimony in a prosecution of the
witness -- except in a subsequent prosecution for perjury or giving a false statement.