Republic of the Philippines lacerated the right frontal lobe of his brain and at the On the other hand,
rain and at the On the other hand, the LTB's principal contention in
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11037 December 29, 1960
EDGARDO CARIAGA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, defendant-
appellant.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo for defendant and
appellant.
E.A. Fernandez and L.H. Fernandez for plaintiffs and
appellants.
Gov't. Corp. Counsel A. Padilla and Atty. F.A. Umali
for appellee.
DIZON, J.:
At about 1:00 p.m. on June 18, 1952, Bus No. 133 of
the Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co. — hereinafter referred to as the LTB — driven by
Alfredo Moncada, left its station at Azcarraga St.,
Manila, for Lilio, Laguna, with Edgardo Cariaga, a
fourth-year medical student of the University of Santo
Tomas, as one of its passengers. At about 3:00 p.m.,
as the bus reached that part of the poblacion of Bay,
Laguna, where the national highway crossed a
railroad track, it bumped against the engine of a train
then passing by with such terrific force that the first six
wheels of the latter were derailed, the engine and the
front part of the body of the bus was wrecked, the
driver of the bus died instantly, while many of its
passengers, Edgardo among them, were severely
injured. Edgardo was first confined at the San Pablo
City Hospital from 5:00 p.m., June 18, 1952, to 8:25
a.m., June 20 of the same year when he was taken to
the De los Santos Clinic, Quezon City. He left that
clinic on October 14 to be transferred to the University
of Santo Tomas Hospital where he stayed up to
November 15. On this last date he was taken back to
the De los Santos Clinic where he stayed until
January 15, 1953. He was unconscious during the
first 35 days after the accident; at the De los Santos
Clinic Dr. Gustilo removed the fractured bones which
University of Santo Tomas Hospital Dr. Gustilo
performed another operation to cover a big hole on
the right frontal part of the head with a tantalum plate.
The LTB paid the sum of P16,964.45 for all the
hospital, medical and miscellaneous expenses
incurred from June 18, 1952 to April, 1953. From
January 15, 1953 up to April of the same year
Edgardo stayed in a private house in Quezon, City,
the LTB having agreed to give him a subsistence
allowance of P10.00 daily during his convalescence,
having spent in this connection the total sum of
P775.30 in addition to the amount already referred to.
On April 24, 1953 the present action was filed to
recover for Edgardo Cariaga, from the LTB and the
MRR Co., and total sum of P312,000.00 as actual,
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and
for his parents, the sum of P18,00.00 in the same
concepts. The LTB disclaimed liability claiming that
the accident was due to the negligence of its co-
defendant, the Manila Railroad Company, for not
providing a crossing bar at the point where the
national highway crossed the railway track, and for
this reason filed the corresponding cross-claim
against the latter company to recover the total sum of
P18,194.75 representing the expenses paid to
Edgardo Cariaga. The Manila Railroad Company, in
turn, denied liability upon the complaint and cross-
claim alleging that it was the reckless negligence of
the bus driver that caused the accident.
The lower court held that it was the negligence of the
bus driver that caused the accident and, as a result,
rendered judgment sentencing the LTB to pay
Edgardo Cariaga the sum of P10,490.00 as
compensatory damages, with interest at the legal rate
from the filing of the complaint, and dismissing the
cross-claim against the Manila Railroad Company.
From this decision the Cariagas and the LTB
appealed.
The Cariagas claim that the trial court erred: in
awarding only P10,490.00 as compensatory damages
to Edgardo; in not awarding them actual and moral
damages, and in not sentencing appellant LTB to pay
attorney's fees.
this appeal is that the trial court should have held that
the collision was due to the fault of both the
locomotive driver and the bus driver and erred, as a
consequence, in not holding the Manila Railroad
Company liable upon the cross-claim filed against it.
We shall first dispose of the appeal of the bus
company. Its first contention is that the driver of the
train locomotive, like the bus driver, violated the law,
first, in sounding the whistle only when the collision
was about to take place instead of at a distance at
least 300 meters from the crossing, and second, in
not ringing the locomotive bell at all. Both contentions
are without merits.
After considering the evidence presented by both
parties the lower court expressly found:
. . . While the train was approximately 300 meters
from the crossing, the engineer sounded two long and
two short whistles and upon reaching a point about
100 meters from the highway, he sounded a long
whistle which lasted up to the time the train was about
to cross it. The bus proceeded on its way without
slackening its speed and it bumped against the train
engine, causing the first six wheels of the latter to be
derailed.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . that the train whistle had been sounded several
times before it reached the crossing. All witnesses for
the plaintiffs and the defendants are uniform in stating
that they heard the train whistle sometime before the
impact and considering that some of them were in the
bus at the time, the driver thereof must have heard it
because he was seated on the left front part of the
bus and it was his duty and concern to observe such
fact in connection with the safe operation of the
vehicle. The other L.T.B. bus which arrived ahead at
the crossing, heeded the warning by stopping and
allowing the train to pass and so nothing happened to
said vehicle. On the other hand, the driver of the bus
No. 133 totally ignored the whistle and noise
produced by the approaching train and instead he
tried to make the bus pass the crossing before the
train by not stopping a few meters from the railway
track and in proceeding ahead.
1
The above findings of the lower court are predicated
mainly upon the testimony of Gregorio Ilusondo, a
witness for the Manila Railroad Company.
Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the LTB to
assail his credibility, we do not find in the record any
fact or circumstance sufficient to discredit his
testimony. We have, therefore, no other alternative
but to accept the findings of the trial court to the
effect, firstly, that the whistle of locomotive was
sounded four times — two long and two short — "as
the train was approximately 300 meters from the
crossing"; secondly, that another LTB bus which
arrived at the crossing ahead of the one where
Edgardo Cariaga was a passenger, paid heed to the
warning and stopped before the "crossing", while —
as the LTB itself now admits (Brief p. 5) — the driver
of the bus in question totally disregarded the warning.
But to charge the MRR Co. with contributory
negligence, the LTB claims that the engineer of the
locomotive failed to ring the bell altogether, in
violation of the section 91 of Article 1459,
incorporated in the charter of the said MRR Co. This
contention — as is obvious — is the very foundation
of the cross-claim interposed by the LTB against its
co-defendant. The former, therefore, had the burden
of proving it affirmatively because a violation of law is
never presumed. The record discloses that this
burden has not been satisfactorily discharged.
The Cariagas, as appellants, claim that the award of
P10,000.00 compensatory damages to Eduardo is
inadequate considering the nature and the after
effects of the physical injuries suffered by him. After a
careful consideration of the evidence on this point we
find their contentions to be well-founded.
From the deposition of Dr. Romeo Gustilo, a
neurosurgeon, it appears that, as a result of the
injuries suffered by Edgardo, his right forehead was
fractured necessitating the removal of practically all of
the right frontal lobe of his brain. From the testimony
of Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, a psychiatrist, it may be
gathered that, because of the physical injuries
suffered by Edgardo, his mentality has been so
reduced that he can no longer finish his studies as a
medical student; that he has become completely
misfit for any kind of work; that he can hardly walk
around without someone helping him, and has to use
a brace on his left leg and feet.
Upon the whole evidence on the matter, the lower
court found that the removal of the right frontal lobe of
the brain of Edgardo reduced his intelligence by about
50%; that due to the replacement of the right frontal
bone of his head with a tantalum plate Edgardo has to
lead a quite and retired life because "if the tantalum
plate is pressed in or dented it would cause his
death."
The impression one gathers from this evidence is
that, as a result of the physical injuries suffered by
Edgardo Cariaga, he is now in a helpless condition,
virtually an invalid, both physically and mentally.
Appellant LTB admits that under Art. 2201 of the Civil
Code the damages for which the obligor, guilty of a
breach of contract but who acted in good faith, is
liable shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach and which the parties
had forseen or could have reasonably forseen at the
time the obligation was constituted, provided such
damages, according to Art. 2199 of the same Code,
have been duly proved. Upon this premise it claims
that only the actual damages suffered by Edgardo
Cariaga consisting of medical, hospital and other
expenses in the total sum of P17,719.75 are within
this category. We are of the opinion, however, that the
income which Edgardo Cariaga could earn if he
should finish the medical course and pass the
corresponding board examinations must be deemed
to be within the same category because they could
have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the
time he boarded the bus No. 133 owned and operated
by the LTB. At that time he was already a fourth-year
student in medicine in a reputable university. While
his scholastic may not be first rate (Exhibits 4, 4-A to
4-C), it is, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the
assumption that he could have passed the board test
in due time. As regards the income that he could
possibly earn as a medical practitioner, it appears
that, according to Dr. Amado Doria, a witness for the
LTB, the amount of P300.00 could easily be expected
as the minimum monthly income of Edgardo had he
finished his studies.
Upon consideration of all the facts mentioned
heretofore this Court is of the opinion, and so holds,
that the compensatory damages awarded to Edgardo
Cariaga should be increased to P25,000.00.
Edgardo Cariaga's claim for moral damages and
attorney's fees was denied by the trial court, the
pertinent portion of its decision reading as follows:
Plaintiffs' claim for moral damages cannot also be
granted. Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerates
the instances when moral damages may be covered
and the case under consideration does not fall under
any one of them. The present action cannot come
under paragraph 2 of said article because it is not one
of the quasi-delict and cannot be considered as such
because of the pre-existing contractual relation
between the Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and
Edgardo Cariaga. Neither could defendant Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company be held liable to pay moral
damages to Edgardo Cariaga under Article 2220 of
the Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of
carriage because said defendant did not act
fraudulently or in bad faith in connection therewith.
Defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company had
exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees like the drivers of its
buses in connection with the discharge of their duties
and so it must be considered an obligor in good faith.
The plaintiff Edgardo Cariaga is also not entitled to
recover for attorney's fees, because this case does
not fall under any of the instances enumerated in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
We agree with the trial court and, to the reason given
above, we add those given by this Court in Cachero
vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc.(101 Phil., 523,
530, 533):
A mere perusal of plaintiff's complaint will show that
this action against the defendant is predicated on an
alleged breach of contract of carriage, i.e., the failure
of the defendants to bring him "safely and without
mishaps" to his destination, and it is to be noted that
the chauffeur of defendant's taxicab that plaintiff used
when he received the injuries involved herein,
Gregorio Mira, has not even made a party defendant
to this case.
Considering, therefore, the nature of plaintiff's action
in this case, is he entitled to compensation for moral
damages? Article 2219 of the Civil Code says the
following:
2

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of
defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
xxx xxx xxx
Of course enumerated in the just quoted Article 2219
only the first two may have any bearing on the case at
bar. We find, however, with regard to the first that the
defendant herein has not committed in connection
with this case any "criminal offense resulting in
physical injuries". The one that committed the offense
against the plaintiff is Gregorio Mira, and that is why
he has been already prosecuted and punished
therefor. Altho (a) owners and managers of an
establishment and enterprise are responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of
the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions; (b) employers are
likewise liable for damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned task (Article 218 of the Civil
Code); and (c) employers and corporations engaged
in any kind of industry are subsidiary civilly liable for
felonies committed by their employees in the
discharge of their duties (Art. 103, Revised Penal
Code), plaintiff herein does not maintain this action
under the provisions of any of the articles of the codes
just mentioned and against all the persons who might
be liable for the damages caused, but as a result of
an admitted breach of contract of carriage and against
the defendant employer alone. We, therefore, hold
that the case at bar does not come within the
exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.
The present complaint is not based either on a "quasi-
delict causing physical injuries" (Art. 2219, par. 2 of
the Civil Code). From the report of the Code
Commission on the new Civil Code. We copy the
following:
A question of nomenclature confronted the
Commission. After a careful deliberation, it was
agreed to use the term "quasi-delict" for those
obligations which do not arise from law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, or criminal offenses. They are known
in Spanish legal treaties as "culpa aquiliana", "culpa-
extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delitos". The phrase
"culpa-extra-contractual" or its translation "extra-
contractual-fault" was eliminated because it did not
exclude quasi-contractual or penal obligations.
"Aquilian fault" might have been selected, but it was
thought inadvisable to refer to so ancient a law as the
"Lex Aquilia". So "quasi-delict" was chosen, which
more nearly corresponds to the Roman Law
classification of the obligations and is in harmony with
the nature of this kind of liability.
The Commission also thought of the possibility of
adopting the word "tort" from Anglo-American law. But
"tort" under that system is much broader than the
Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising from
non-contractual negligence. "Tort" in Anglo-American
jurisprudence includes not only negligence, but also
intentional criminal act, such as assault and battery,
false imprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of
the Philippine legal system, intentional and malicious
acts are governed by the Penal Code, although
certain exceptions are made in the Project. (Report of
the Code Commission, pp. 161-162).
In the case of Cangco, vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil.
768, We established the distinction between
obligation derived from negligence and obligation as a
result of a breach of contract. Thus, we said:
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal
liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage,
and that the obligation to respond for the damage
which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the
breach of that contract by reason of the failure of
defendant to exercise due care in its performance.
That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate,
differing essentially in the legal viewpoint from the
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its
servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the Civil Code
(Art. 2180 of the new), which can be rebutted by proof
of the exercise of due care in their selection of
supervision. Article 1903 is not applicable to
obligations arising EX CONTRACTU, but only to
extra-contractual obligations — or to use the technical
form of expression, that article relates only to CULPA
AQUILIANA' and not to CULPA
CONTRACTUAL.lawphil.net
The decisions in the cases of Castro vs. Acro Taxicab
Co., (82 Phil., 359; 46 Off. Gaz., No. 5, p. 2023);
Lilius, et al. vs. Manila Railroad, 59 Phil., 758) and
others, wherein moral damages were awarded to the
plaintiffs, are not applicable to the case at bar
because said decision were rendered before the
effectivity of the new Civil Code (August 30, 1950)
and for the further reason that the complaints filed
therein were based on different causes of action.
In view of the foregoing the sum of P2,000 was
awarded as moral damages by the trial court has to
be eliminated, for under the law it is not a
compensation awardable in a case like the one at bar.
What has been said heretofore relative to the moral
damages claimed by Edgardo Cariaga obviously
applies with greater force to a similar claim (4th
assignment of error) made by his parents.
The claim made by said spouses for actual and
compensatory damages is likewise without merits. As
held by the trial court, in so far as the LTB is
concerned, the present action is based upon a breach
of contract of carriage to which said spouses were not
a party, and neither can they premise their claim upon
the negligence or quasi-delict of the LTB for the
simple reason that they were not themselves injured
as a result of the collision between the LTB bus and
train owned by the Manila Railroad Company.
3

Wherefore, modified as above indicated, the appealed
judgement is hereby affirmed in all other respects,
with costs against appellant LTB.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Paredes,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25499 February 18, 1970
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD A. QUINTOS,
PRIMA A. QUINTOS, AND JULITA A. QUINTOS,
respondents.
Laurea and Pison for petitioner.
Bonifacio M. Abad, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., seeks the review by
certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan. The basic facts are set forth in said
decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We
quote:
At about 1:30 in the morning of March 17, 1960, an
Izuzu First Class passenger bus owned and operated
by the defendant, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-
Bulacan and driven by Laureano Casim, left
Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Manila. Among its paying
passengers was the deceased, Policronio Quintos, Jr.
who sat on the first seat, second row, right side of the
bus. At about 4:55 o'clock a.m. when the vehicle was
nearing the northern approach of the Sadsaran Bridge
on the national highway in barrio Sto. Domingo,
municipality of Minalin, Pampanga, it frontally hit the
rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. As a result the
end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload
and tied to the cart to hold it in place, hit the right side
of the windshield of the bus. The protruding end of the
bamboo pole, about 8 feet long from the rear of the
bullcart, penetrated through the glass windshield and
landed on the face of Policronio Quintos, Jr. who,
because of the impact, fell from his seat and was
sprawled on the floor. The pole landed on his left eye
and the bone of the left side of his face was fractured.
He suffered other multiple wounds and was rendered
unconscious due, among other causes to severe
cerebral concussion. A La Mallorca passenger bus
going in the opposite direction towards San Fernando,
Pampanga, reached the scene of the mishap and it
was stopped by Patrolman Felino Bacani of the
municipal police force of Minalin who, in the
meantime, had gone to the scene to investigate.
Patrolman Bacani placed Policronio Quintos, Jr. and
three other injured men who rode on the bullcart
aboard the La Mallorca bus and brought them to the
provincial hospital of Pampanga at San Fernando for
medical assistance. Notwithstanding such assistance,
Policronio Quintos, Jr. died at 3:15 p.m. on the same
day, March 17, 1960, due to traumatic shock due to
cerebral injuries.
The private respondents, Trinidad, Prima and Julita,
all surnamed Quintos, are the sisters and only
surviving heirs of Policronio Quintos Jr., who died
single, leaving no descendants nor ascendants. Said
respondents herein brought this action against herein
petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., as owner and
operator of said passenger bus, bearing Plate No.
TPU-14871-Bulacan, for breach of the contract of
carriage between said petitioner and the deceased
Policronio Quintos, Jr., to recover the aggregate sum
of P63,750.00 as damages, including attorney's fees.
Said petitioner — defendant in the court of first
instance — contended that the mishap was due to a
fortuitous event, but this pretense was rejected by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, both of which
found that the accident and the death of Policronio
had been due to the negligence of the bus driver, for
whom petitioner was liable under its contract of
carriage with the deceased. In the language of His
Honor, the trial Judge:
The mishap was not the result of any unforeseeable
fortuitous event or emergency but was the direct
result of the negligence of the driver of the defendant.
The defendant must, therefore, respond for damages
resulting from its breach of contract for carriage. As
the complaint alleged a total damage of only
P63,750.00 although as elsewhere shown in this
decision the damages for wake and burial expenses,
loss of income, death of the victim, and attorneys fee
reach the aggregate of P79,615.95, this Court finds it
just that said damages be assessed at total of only
P63,750.00 as prayed for in plaintiffs' amended
complaint.
The despositive part of the decision of the trial Court
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of
P63,750.00 as damages for breach of contract of
carriage resulting from the death of Policronio
Quintos, Jr.
which, as above indicated, was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari, filed by Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
The only issue raised in this appeal is the amount of
damages recoverable by private respondents herein.
The determination of such amount depends, mainly
upon two (2) factors, namely: (1) the number of years
on the basis of which the damages shall be computed
and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by said
respondents should be fixed.
The first factor was based by the trial court — the
view of which was concurred in by the Court of
Appeals — upon the life expectancy of Policronio
Quintos, Jr., which was placed at 33-1/3 years — he
being over 29 years of age (or around 30 years for
purposes of computation) at the time of his demise —
by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-301 = life
expectancy) adopted in the American Expectancy
Table of Mortality or the actuarial of Combined
Experience Table of Mortality. Upon the other hand,
petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in
adopting said formula and in not acting in accordance
with Alcantara v. Surro1 in which the damages were
computed on a four (4) year basis, despite the fact
4
that the victim therein was 39 years old, at the time of
his death, and had a life expectancy of 28.90 years.
The case cited is not, however, controlling in the one
at bar. In the Alcantara case, none of the parties had
questioned the propriety of the four-year basis
adopted by the trial court in making its award of
damages. Both parties appealed, but only as regards
the amount thereof. The plaintiffs assailed the non-
inclusion, in its computation, of the bonus that the
corporation, which was the victim's employer, had
awarded to deserving officers and employees, based
upon the profits earned less than two (2) months
before the accident that resulted in his death. The
defendants, in turn, objected to the sum awarded for
the fourth year, which was treble that of the previous
years, based upon the increases given, in that fourth
year, to other employees of the same corporation.
Neither this objection nor said claim for inclusion of
the bonus was sustained by this Court. Accordingly,
the same had not thereby laid down any rule on the
length of time to be used in the computation of
damages. On the contrary, it declared:
The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to
the heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed
basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court
considering the moral and material damages involved,
and so it has been said that "(t)here can be no exact
or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human
life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at
by precise mathematical calculation, but the amount
recoverable depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of
the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is
shorter, is an important factor.' (25 C.J.S. 1241.)
Other factors that are usually considered are: (1)
pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary (25 C.J.S.
1243-1250) ; (2) loss of support (25 C.J.S., 1250-
1251); (3) loss of service (25 C.J.S. 1251-1254); (4)
loss of society (25 C.J.S. 1254-1255); (5) mental
suffering of beneficiaries (25 C.J.S., 1258-1259) ; and
(6) medical and funeral expenses (26 C.J.S., 1254-
1260)."2
Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also,
an important element in fixing the amount recoverable
by private respondents herein. Although it is not the
sole element determinative of said amount, no cogent
reason has been given to warrant its disregard and
the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary
standard, such as a four-year rule. In short, the Court
of Appeals has not erred in basing the computation of
petitioner's liability upon the life expectancy of
Policronio Quintos, Jr.
With respect to the rate at which the damages shall
be computed, petitioner impugns the decision
appealed from upon the ground that the damages
awarded therein will have to be paid now, whereas
most of those sought to be indemnified will be
suffered years later. This argument is basically true,
and this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why the
Alcantara case points out the absence of a "fixed
basis" for the ascertainment of the damages
recoverable in litigations like the one at bar. Just the
same, the force of the said argument of petitioner
herein is offset by the fact that, although payment of
the award in the case at bar will have to take place
upon the finality of the decision therein, the liability of
petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of
P2,184.00 a year, which is the annual salary of
Policronio Quintos, Jr. at the time of his death, as a
young "training assistant" in the Bacnotan Cement
Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the Alcantara
case, on which petitioner relies, the lower courts did
not consider, in the present case, Policronio's
potentiality and capacity to increase his future
income. Indeed, upon the conclusion of his training
period, he was supposed to have a better job and be
promoted from time to time, and, hence, to earn more,
if not — considering the growing importance of trade,
commerce and industry and the concomitant rise in
the income level of officers and employees
therein — much more.
At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that We are
mainly concerned with the determination of the losses
or damages sustained by the private respondents, as
dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased, and
that said damages consist, not of the full amount of
his earnings, but of the support, they received or
would have received from him had he not died in
consequence of the negligence of petitioner's agent.
In fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon
with the "necessary expenses of his own living", which
should be deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has
been consistently held that earning capacity, as an
element of damages to one's estate for his death by
wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or
his capacity to acquire money, "less the necessary
expense for his own living.3 Stated otherwise, the
amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earning,
but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings
which the beneficiary would have received.4 In other
words, only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be
considered5 that is, the total of the earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings
or income6 and less living and other incidental
expenses.7
All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is
fair and reasonable to fix the deductible living and
other expenses of the deceased at the sum of
P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month, and
that, consequently, the loss sustained by his sisters
may be roughly estimated at P1,000.00 a year or
P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life expectancy.
To this sum of P33,333.33, the following should be
added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107
of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 2206
of our Civil Code, as construed and applied by this
Court;8 (b) P1,727.95, actually spent by private
respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c)
attorney's fee, which was fixed by the trial court, at
P500.00, but which, in view of the appeal taken by
petitioner herein, first to the Court of Appeals and
later to this Supreme Court, should be increased to
P2,500.00. In other words, the amount adjudged in
the decision appealed from should be reduced to the
aggregate sum of P49,561.28, with interest thereon,
at the legal rate, from December 29, 1961, date of the
promulgation of the decision of the trial court.
Thus modified, said decision and that of the Court of
Appeals are hereby affirmed, in all other respects,
with costs against petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc. It
is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 93 Phil. 472.
2 Emphasis supplied.
5

3 Pitman v. Merriman, 117 A. 18, 19, 80 N.H.
295.
4 Lynch v. Lynch, 195 A. 799; Lockerman v.
Hurlock, 126 A. 482, 2 W.W. Harr. 479; Lemmon v.
Broadwater, 108 A. 273, 7 Boyce 472; Louisville &
N.R.R. Co. v. Reverman's Adm'x, 15 S.W. 2d 300;
Heppner v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 297 S.W. 2d
497; Darnell v. Panhandle Co-op. Ass'n 120 N. W. 2d
278 175 Neb. 40.
5 Meehan Y. Central R. Co, of New Jersey,
D.C.N.Y. 181, F. Supp. 594.
6 Frasier v. Public Service Interstate Transp.
Co., C.A.N.Y., 244 F. 2d. 668.
7 Hanks v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 52
S.E. 2d 717, 230 N.C. 179; Gardner v. National Bulk
Carriers, Inc., D.C. Va. 221 F. Supp. 243, affirmed,
C.A., 333 F. 2d 676; Meehan v. Central R. Co. of New
Jersey, D.C. N.Y., 181 F. Supp. 594; Frazier v. Ewell
Engineering & Contracting Co., 62 So. 2d 51. See,
also, 2 Cooley on Torts, 168-169.
8 People v. Pantoja L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968;
People v. Sangaran, L-21757, Nov. 26, 1968; People
v. Gutierrez, L-25372, Nov. 29, 1968; People v.
Buenbrazo, L-27852, Nov. 29, 1968; People v.
Bakang, L-20908, Jan. 31, 1969; People v. Labutin L-
23513, Jan. 31, 1969; People v. Acabado L-26104,
Jan. 31, 1969; People v. Vacal, L-20913, Feb. 27,
1969, People v. Gonzales, L-23303-04, May 20,
1969; People v. Tapac, L-26491, May 20, 1969;
People v. Aranas, L-27851, Oct. 28, 1969.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 114061 August 3, 1994
KOREAN AIRLINES CO., LTD., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JUANITO C. LAPUZ,
respondents.
G.R. No. 113842 August 3, 1994
JUANITO C. LAPUZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES CO.,
LTD., respondents.
M.A. Aguinaldo and Associates for Korean Airlines
Co., Ltd.
Camacho and Associates for Juanito Lapuz.
CRUZ, J.:
Sometime in 1980, Juanito C. Lapuz, an automotive
electrician, was contracted for employment in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, for a period of one year through Pan
Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services, Inc. Lapuz was
supposed to leave on November 8, 1980, via Korean
Airlines. Initially, he was "wait-listed," which meant
that he could only be accommodated if any of the
confirmed passengers failed to show up at the airport
before departure. When two of such passengers did
not appear, Lapuz and another person by the name of
Perico were given the two unclaimed seats.
According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in with
one suitcase and one shoulder bag at the check-in
counter of KAL. He passed through the customs and
immigration sections for routine check-up and was
cleared for departure as Passenger No. 157 of KAL
Flight No. KE 903. Together with the other
passengers, he rode in the shuttle bus and proceeded
to the ramp of the KAL aircraft for boarding. However,
when he was at the third or fourth rung of the stairs, a
KAL officer pointed to him and shouted "Down!
Down!" He was thus barred from taking the flight.
When he later asked for another booking, his ticket
was canceled by KAL. Consequently, he was unable
to report for his work in Saudi Arabia within the
stipulated 2-week period and so lost his employment.
KAL, on the other hand, alleged that on November 8,
1980, Pan Pacific Recruiting Services Inc.
coordinated with KAL for the departure of 30 contract
workers, of whom only 21 were confirmed and 9 were
wait-listed passengers. The agent of Pan Pacific,
Jimmie Joseph, after being informed that there was a
possibility of having one or two seats becoming
available, gave priority to Perico, who was one of the
supervisors of the hiring company in Saudi Arabia.
The other seat was won through lottery by Lapuz.
However, only one seat became available and so,
pursuant to the earlier agreement that Perico was to
be given priority, he alone was allowed to board.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
30, 1 adjudged KAL liable for damages, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration,
judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the
defendant Korean Air Lines to pay plaintiff Juanito C.
Lapuz the following:
1. The amount of TWO HUNDRED
SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SIXTY (P272,160.00) PESOS as
actual/compensatory damages, with legal interest
thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint
until fully paid.
2. The sum of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
(P25,000.00) PESOS as and for attorney's fees; and
3. The costs of suit.
The case is hereby dismissed with respect to
defendant Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services,
Inc.
The counterclaims and cross-claim of defendant
Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. are likewise dismissed.
On appeal, this decision was modified by the Court of
Appeals 2 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following modifications: the amount of actual
damages and compensatory damages is reduced to
P60,000.00 and defendant-appellant is hereby
ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) by way of
moral and exemplary damages, at 6% interest per
6
annum from the date of the filing of the Complaint
until fully paid.
KAL and Lapuz filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, which were both denied for lack of
merit. Hence, the present petitions for review which
have been consolidated because of the identity of the
parties and the similarity of the issues.
In G. R. No. 114061, KAL assails the decision of the
appellate court on the following grounds:
1. That the Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that petitioner committed a breach of
contract of carriage notwithstanding lack of proper,
competent and sufficient evidence of the existence of
such contract.
2. That the Court of Appeals erred in not
according the proper evidentiary weight to some
evidence presented and the fact that private
respondent did not have any boarding pass to prove
that he was allowed to board and to prove that his
airline ticket was confirmed.
3. That the Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that the standby passenger status of
private respondent Lapuz was changed to a
confirmed status when his name was entered into the
passenger manifest.
4. That the Court of Appeals abused its
discretion in awarding moral and exemplary damages
in the amount of P100,000.00 in favor of private
respondent notwithstanding its lack of basis and
private respondent did not state such amount in his
complaint nor had private respondent proven the said
damages.
5. That the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the counterclaims.
6. That the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the counterclaim of petitioner against Pan
Pacific.
7. That the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the 6% per annum legal interest on the judgment
shall be computed from the filing of the complaint.
In G. R. No. 113842, Lapuz seeks: (a) the setting
aside of the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar
as it modifies the award of damages; b) actual and
compensatory damages in the sum equivalent to 5
years' loss of earnings based on the petitioner's
monthly salary of 1,600 Saudi rials at the current
conversion rate plus the cost of baggage and
personal belongings worth P2,000 and the service fee
of P3,000 paid to the recruiting agency, all with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
c) moral damages of not less than P1 million and
exemplary damages of not less than P500,000.00,
both with interest at 6% per annum from the filing of
the complaint; and d) attorney's fees in the sum
equivalent to 30% of the award of damages.
It is evident that the issues raised in these petitions
relate mainly to the correctness of the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals and the award of damages.
The Court has consistently affirmed that the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals and the other lower
courts are as a rule binding upon it, subject to certain
exceptions. As nothing in the record indicates any of
such exceptions, the factual conclusions of the
appellate court must be affirmed.
The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was
changed to that of a confirmed passenger when his
name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL
for its Flight No. KE 903. His clearance through
immigration and customs clearly shows that he had
indeed been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that
flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the contract of
carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz
to his destination.
This Court has held that a contract to transport
passengers is different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. 3 The business of the
carrier is mainly with the traveling public. It invites
people to avail themselves of the comforts and
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage
generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Passengers have the right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy
and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. 4 So it is that any discourteous conduct
on the part of these employees toward a passenger
gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier.
The breach of contract was aggravated in this case
when, instead of courteously informing Lapuz of his
being a "wait-listed" passenger, a KAL officer rudely
shouted "Down! Down!" while pointing at him, thus
causing him embarrassment and public humiliation.
KAL argues that "the evidence of confirmation of a
chance passenger status is not through the entry of
the name of a chance passenger in the passenger
manifest nor the clearance from the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, because they are
merely means of facilitating the boarding of a chance
passenger in case his status is confirmed." We are
not persuaded.
The evidence presented by Lapuz shows that he had
indeed checked in at the departure counter, passed
through customs and immigration, boarded the shuttle
bus and proceeded to the ramp of KAL's aircraft. In
fact, his baggage had already been loaded in KAL's
aircraft, to be flown with him to Jeddah. The contract
of carriage between him and KAL had already been
perfected when he was summarily and insolently
prevented from boarding the aircraft.
KAL's allegation that the respondent court abused its
discretion in awarding moral and exemplary damages
is also not tenable.
The Court of Appeals granted moral and exemplary
damages because:
The findings of the court a quo that the defendant-
appellant has committed breach of contract of
carriage in bad faith and in wanton, disregard of
plaintiff-appellant's rights as passenger laid the basis
and justification of an award for moral damages.
xxxx
In the instant case, we find that defendant-appellant
Korean Air Lines acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner when it
"bumped off" plaintiff-appellant on November 8, 1980,
and in addition treated him rudely and arrogantly as a
"patay gutom na contract worker fighting Korean Air
7
Lines," which clearly shows malice and bad faith, thus
entitling plaintiff-appellant to moral damages.
xxxx
Considering that the plaintiff-appellant's entitlement to
moral damages has been fully established by oral and
documentary evidence, exemplary damages may be
awarded. In fact, exemplary damages may be
awarded, even though not so expressly pleaded in the
complaint (Kapoe vs. Masa, 134 SCRA 231). By the
same token, to provide an example for the public
good, an award of exemplary damages is also proper
(Armovit vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
On the other hand, Lapuz's claim that the award of
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is
inadequate is not acceptable either. His prayer for
moral damages of not less than P1 million and
exemplary damages of not less than P500,000.00 is
overblown.
The well-entrenched principle is that moral damages
depend upon the discretion of the court based on the
circumstances of each case. 5 This discretion is
limited by the principle that the "amount awarded
should not be palpably and scandalously excessive"
as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or
corruption on the part of the trial court. 6 Damages
are not intended to enrich the complainant at the
expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to
alleviate the moral suffering that the injured party had
undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable
action. 7 There is no hard-and-fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral
damages since each case must be governed by its
own peculiar facts.
A review of the record of this case shows that the
injury suffered by Lapuz is not so serious or extensive
as to warrant an award of P1.5 million. The
assessment of P100,000 as moral and exemplary
damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and
realistic.
Lapuz likewise claims that the respondent court could
not rule upon the propriety of the award of actual
damages because it had not been assigned as an
error by KAL. Not so. The rule is that only errors
specifically assigned and properly argued in the brief
will be considered except errors affecting jurisdiction
over the subject matter and plain as well as clerical
errors. 8 But this is not without qualification for, as the
Court held in Vda. de Javellana vs. Court of Appeals:
9 lost earnings, the current rate of the Saudi Rial to the
. . . [T]he Court is clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even if they are not assigned as
errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration
is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case.
A similar pronouncement was made in Baquiran vs.
Court of Appeals 10 in this wise:
Issues, though not specifically raised in the pleading
in the appellate court, may, in the interest of justice,
be properly considered by said court in deciding a
case, if they are questions raised in the trial court and
are matters of record having some bearing on the
issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or the
lower court ignored.
The Court of Appeals was therefore justified in
decreasing the award of actual damages even if the
issue was not assigned as an error by KAL.
Consideration of this question was necessary for the
just and complete resolution of the present case.
Furthermore, there was enough evidence to warrant
the reduction of the original award, as the challenged
decision correctly observed:
A perusal of the plaintiff-appellant's contract of
employment shows that the effectivity of the contract
is for only one year, renewable every year for five
years. Although plaintiff-appellant intends to renew his
contract, such renewal will still be subject to his
foreign employer. Plaintiff-appellant had not yet
started working with his foreign employer, hence,
there can be no basis as to whether his contract will
be renewed by his foreign employer or not. Thus, the
damages representing the loss of earnings of plaintiff-
appellant in the renewal of the contract of
employment is at most speculative. Damages may not
be awarded on the basis of speculation or conjecture
(Gachalian vs. Delim, 203 SCRA 126). Hence,
defendant-appellant's liability is limited to the one year
contract only. Plaintiff-appellant is, therefore, entitled
only to his lost earnings for one year, i.e., P60,000.00,
which is 1/5 of P300,000.00, the total amount of
actual damages, representing lost earnings for five
years prayed for in the Complaint.
Plaintiff-appellant's contention that in computing his
Philippine Peso at the time of payment should be
used, is untenable, considering that in his Complaint,
plaintiff-appellant has quantified in Philippine Peso his
lost earnings for five years.
We disagree with the respondent court, however, on
the date when the legal interest should commence to
run. The rule is that the legal interest of six percent
(6%) on the amounts adjudged in favor of Lapuz
should resume from the time of the rendition of the
trial court's decision instead of November 28, 1980,
the date of the filing of the complaint.
On this matter, the Court has held:
If suit were for payment of a definite sum of money,
the contention might be tenable. However, if it is for
damages, unliquidated and not known until definitely
ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts
after proof, interest should be from the date of the
decision. 11
xxxx
The obligation to pay interest on a sum filed in a
judgment exists from the date of the sentence, when
so declared; for until the net amount of the debtor's
liability has been determined, he cannot he
considered delinquent in the fulfillment of his
obligation to pay the debt with interest thereon. 12
Finally, we find that the respondent court did not err in
sustaining the trial court's dismissal of KAL's
counterclaim against Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting
Services Inc., whose responsibility ended with the
confirmation by KAL of Lapuz as its passenger in its
Flight No. 903.
This is still another case of the maltreatment of our
overseas contract workers, this time by the airline
supposed to bring the passenger to his foreign
assignment. Our OCW's sacrifice much in seeking
employment abroad, where they are deprived of the
company of their loved ones, the direct protection of
our laws, and the comfort of our own native culture
8
and way of life. This Court shall exert every effort to
vindicate their rights when they are abused and shall
accord them the commensurate reparation of their
injuries consistent with their dignity and worth as
members of the working class.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED,
but with the modification that the legal interest on the
damages awarded to private respondent should
commence from the date of the decision of the trial
court on November 14, 1990. The parties shall bear
their own costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on official leave.
#Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Jesus O. Ibay; Rollo, pp.
32-46 (G. R. No. 114061).
2 Ynares-Santiago, J., ponente with Herrera
and Ibay-Somera, JJ., concurring.
3 Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways
Inc., 43 SCRA 397; Pan American orld Airways vs.
IAC, 153 SCRA 521; Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18
SCRA 155.
4 Air France vs. Carrascoso, supra.
5 Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport System,
148 SCRA 440; Pleno vs. CA, 161 SCRA 208; Mayo
vs. People, 204 SCRA 642.
6 Siguenza vs. CA, 137 SCRA 570;
Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport System, supra;
Gellada vs. Warner Barnes & Co., 57 O. G. [4], 7358.
7 R & B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC,
129 SCRA 736; Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs.
Espino, Jr., 94 SCRA 953.
8 Sec. 7, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court;
Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 SCRA 196.
9 123 SCRA 799.
10 2 SCRA 873.
11 Rivera vs. Matute, 98 Phil. 516.
12 Montilla vs. Augustinian Corp., 25 Phil. 447.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE,
petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME
TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA
KOH TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO
KOH and ELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME
TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV
Nos. 69040-41, promulgated on 3 April 1984, which
set aside its previous Decision dated 29 November
1983 reversing the Decision of the trial court which
dismissed petitioners' complaints in Civil Case No.
4477 and Civil Case No. 4478 of the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pampanga entitled "Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh,
Julieta Koh Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and
Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda
Manalo," and "George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee
vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," respectively,
and granted the private respondents' counterclaim for
moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.
The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-
delict were filed as a result of a vehicular accident
which led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee
and Loida Bondoc and caused physical injuries to
George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and
petitioner Araceli Koh McKee.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors
George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the
deceased Kim Koh McKee, were the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 4478, while petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh
and her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who are the
wife and children, respectively, of the late Jose Koh,
were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477. Upon the
other hand, private respondents are the owners of the
cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain
Ruben Galang was the driver of the truck at the time
of the accident.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8
January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur
Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando,
Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between
an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No.
RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by private
respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a
Ford Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga
'76 driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the
deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida
Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee,
Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all
passengers of the Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh
McKee, the mother of minors George, Christopher
and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other
hand, was the baby sitter of one and a half year old
Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on
the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front
passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her two
(2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
9
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck,
which was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of
rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling
southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford
Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles
City from San Fernando. When the northbound car
was about (10) meters away from the southern
approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted
from the right side of the road and into the lane of the
car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of
whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn
back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to
the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then
switched on the headlights of the car, applied the
brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane.
Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck.
The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which
was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
The incident was immediately reported to the police
station in Angeles City; consequently, a team of police
officers was forthwith dispatched to conduct an on the
spot investigation. In the sketch 1 prepared by the
investigating officers, the bridge is described to be
sixty (60) "footsteps" long and fourteen (14)
"footsteps" wide — seven (7) "footsteps" from the
center line to the inner edge of the side walk on both
sides. 2 Pulong Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry brook,
is made of concrete with soft shoulders and concrete
railings on both sides about three (3) feet high.
The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that
the right rear portion of the cargo truck was two (2)
"footsteps" from the edge of the right sidewalk, while
its left front portion was touching the center line of the
bridge, with the smashed front side of the car resting
on its front bumper. The truck was about sixteen (16)
"footsteps" away from the northern end of the bridge
while the car was about thirty-six (36) "footsteps" from
the opposite end. Skid marks produced by the right
front tire of the truck measured nine (9) "footsteps",
while skid marks produced by the left front tire
measured five (5) "footsteps." The two (2) rear tires of
the truck, however, produced no skid marks.
In his statement to the investigating police officers
immediately after the accident, Galang admitted that
he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 kilometers)
per hour.
As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil
Case No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31
January 1977 before the then Court of First Instance
of Pampanga and were raffled to Branch III and
Branch V of the said court, respectively. In the first,
herein petitioners in G.R. No. 68103 prayed for the
award of P12,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
Jose Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages,
P60,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for
litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for burial expenses,
P3,650.00 for the burial lot and P9,500.00 for the
tomb, plus attorney's fees. 3 In the second case,
petitioners in G.R. No. 68102 prayed for the following:
(a) in connection with the death of Kim McKee, the
sum of P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for
funeral services, P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot,
P3,000.00 for the tomb, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P2,000.00 as miscellaneous damages; (b) in the case
of Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with the serious
physical injuries suffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P12,000.00 for loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for the
hospitalization expenses up to the date of the filing of
the complaint; and (c) with respect to George McKee,
Jr., in connection with the serious physical injuries
suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the following
medical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical
Center, P3,500.00 payable to the St. Francis Medical
Center, P5,175.00 payable to the Clark Air Base
Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses amounting to
P5,000.00. They also sought an award of attorney's
fees amounting to 25% of the total award plus
traveling and hotel expenses, with costs. 4
On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben
Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the
trial court. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751
and was raffled to Branch V of the court, the same
Branch where Civil Case No. 4478 was assigned. 5
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No.
4477, private respondents asserted that it was the
Ford Escort car which "invaded and bumped (sic) the
lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as
counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as
attorney's fees, P20,000.00 as actual and liquidated
damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as business losses. 6 In Civil Case No.
4478, private respondents first filed a motion to
dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action
(Civil Case No. 4477) and failure to implead an
indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver;
they also filed a motion to consolidate the case with
Civil Case No. 4477 pending before Branch III of the
same court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs. 7
Both motions were denied by Branch V, then presided
over by Judge Ignacio Capulong. Thereupon, private
respondents filed their Answer with Counter-claim 8
wherein they alleged that Jose Koh was the person
"at fault having approached the lane of the truck
driven by Ruben Galang, . . . which was on the right
lane going towards Manila and at a moderate speed
observing all traffic rules and regulations applicable
under the circumstances then prevailing;" in their
counterclaim, they prayed for an award of damages
as may be determined by the court after due hearing,
and the sums of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and
P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in
both cases.
To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 4478 filed on 27 March 1978 a motion to
adopt the testimonies of witnesses taken during the
hearing of Criminal Case No. 3751, which private
respondents opposed and which the court denied. 9
Petitioners subsequently moved to reconsider the
order denying the motion for consolidation, 10 which
Judge Capulong granted in the Order of 5 September
1978; he then directed that Civil Case No. 4478 be
consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III of
the court then presided over by Judge Mario
Castañeda, Jr.
Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal
Case No. 3751.
In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses
Araceli Koh McKee, Fernando Nuñag, Col. Robert
Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel, Eugenio Tanhueco,
Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh, 11 and offered several
documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private
respondents presented as witnesses Ruben Galang,
Zenaida Soliman, Jaime Tayag and Roman Dayrit. 12
10

In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as
witnesses Mrs. Araceli McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc.
Fernando Nuñag, Dr. Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert
Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr. Hector, Ulanday,
Pfc. Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel,
Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan and Eugenio
Tanhueco, and offered several documentary exhibits.
13 Upon the other hand, the defense presented the
accused Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan, Zenaida
Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offered documentary
exhibits. 14
On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a
decision against the accused Ruben Galang in the
aforesaid criminal case. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered finding the accused Ruben Galang
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
in the information and after applying the provisions of
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and
indeterminate sentence law, this Court, imposes upon
said accused Ruben Galang the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as maximum; the accused is further
sentenced to pay and indemnify the heirs of Loida
Bondoc the amount of P12,000.00 as indemnity for
her death; to reimburse the heirs of Loida Bondoc the
amount of P2,000.00 representing the funeral
expenses; to pay the heirs of Loida Bondoc the
amount of P20,000.00 representing her loss of
income; to indemnify and pay the heirs of the
deceased Jose Koh the value of the car in the amount
of P53,910.95, and to pay the costs. 15
The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17
November 1980; on the same day, counsel for
petitioners filed with Branch III of the court — where
the two (2) civil cases were pending — a
manifestation to that effect and attached thereto a
copy of the decision. 16
Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr.
dismissed the two (2) civil cases on 12 November
1980 and awarded the private respondents moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
17 The dispositive portion of the said decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of
evidence to be in favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiffs, these cases are hereby ordered
DISMISSED with costs against the plaintiffs. The
defendants had proven their counter-claim, thru
evidences (sic) presented and unrebutted. Hence,
they are hereby awarded moral and exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus
attorney's fee of P15,000.00 and litigation expenses
for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual damages claimed for
(sic) by the defendants is (sic) hereby dismissing for
lack of proof to that effect (sic). 18
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to
the petitioners on 28 November 1980 and was
received on 2 December 1980. 19
Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of
conviction to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was
docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR and was
assigned to the court's Third Division. Plaintiffs in Civil
Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise separately
appealed the 12 November 1980 decision to the
appellate court. The appeals were docketed as C.A.-
G.R. No. 69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R,
respectively, and were assigned to the Fourth Civil
Cases Division.
On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court
promulgated its decision 20 in C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-
CR affirming the conviction of Galang. 21 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong
paghahabol ay Aming pinagtitibay sa kanyang
kabuuan. Ang naghahabol pa rin ang pinagbabayad
ng gugol ng paghahabol.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was
denied by the respondent Court in its Kapasiyahan
promulgated on 25 November 1982. 22 A petition for
its review 23 was filed with this Court; said petition
was subsequently denied. A motion for its
reconsideration was denied with finality in the
Resolution of 20 April 1983. 24
On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then
known as the Intermediate Appellate Court,
promulgated its consolidated decision in A.C.-G.R.
CV Nos. 69040 and 69041, 25 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby
reversed and set aside and another one is rendered,
ordering defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-
appellants as follows:
For the death of Jose Koh:
P 50,000.00 as moral damages
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 16,000.00 for the lot and tomb (Exhs. U and
U-1)
P 4,000.00 expenses for holding a wake (p. 9,
tsn April 19, 1979)
P 950.00 for the casket (Exh. M)
P 375.00 for the vault services (Exhs. V and
V-1)
For the death of Kim Koh McKee:
P 50,000.00 as moral damages
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 1,000.00 for the purchase of the burial lot
(Exh. M)
P 950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1)
P 375.00 for vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh
McKee:
P 25,000.00 as moral damages
P 672.00 for Clark Field Hospital (Exh. E)
P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic
(Exhs. D, D-1 and
D-2)
P 1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center
(Exhs. B and B-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh
McKee:
P 25,000.00 as moral damages
P 1,055.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center
(Exhs. G and
G-1)
11
P 75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center
(Exhs. G-2 and G-3)
P 428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital (Exh.
F)
P 114.20 to Muñoz Clinic (Exh. MM)
For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh
McKee:
P 10,000.00 as moral damages
P 1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Center
(Exhs. L and L-1)
P 321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and
D-1)
In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic)
fees in Civil Case No. 4477 and another P10,000.00;
as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4478.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 26
The decision is anchored principally on the
respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben
Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence
which caused the accident. The appellate court
further said that the law presumes negligence on the
part of the defendants (private respondents), as
employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision
of the latter; it was further asserted that these
defendants did not allege in their Answers the
defense of having exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
employee.27 This conclusion of reckless imprudence
is based on the following findings of fact:
In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial
positions, the determinative issue in this appeal is
posited in the fourth assigned error as follows:
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE
(sic) DRIVER OF THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS
TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN SWITCHED ON HIS
HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE TO THE
RIGHT.
Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness
Araceli Koh McKee testified thus:
Q What happened after that, as you
approached the bridge?
A When we were approaching the bridge, two
(2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side
of the highway going to San Fernando. My father,
who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two
(2) boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and
swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys.
We noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to
warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right
of way to come back to our right lane.
Q Did the truck slow down?
A No, sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its
way.
Q What happened after that?
A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried
to go back to the right lane since the truck is (sic)
coming, my father stepped on the brakes and all what
(sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. (tsn, pp.
5-6, July 22, 1977); or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil
Cases).
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven
by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce
its speed before the actual impact of collision (sic) as
you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know
(sic)?
A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he
reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to
our right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn.
pp. 33-34 July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil
Cases) (pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief).
Plaintiffs' version was successfully corroborated to
Our satisfaction by the following facts and
circumstances:
1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap,
Eugenio Tanhueco, declared that the truck stopped
only when it had already collided with the car:
xxx xxx xxx
Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the
hearing in the criminal case:
xxx xxx xxx
Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an
accommodation witness because he was one of the
first to arrive at the scene of the accident. As a matter
of fact, he brought one of the injured passengers to
the hospital.
We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to
defendants' witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger
of the truck, and Roman Dayrit, who supposedly lived
across the street.
Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the
ordinary course of events people usually take the side
of the person with whom they are associated at the
time of the accident, because, as a general rule, they
do not wish to be identified with the person who was
at fault. Thus an imaginary bond is unconsciously
created among the several persons within the same
group (People vs. Vivencio, CA-G.R. No. 00310-CR,
Jan. 31, 1962).
With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting
(sic) that he is an accommodation witness. He did not
go to the succor of the injured persons. He said he
wanted to call the police authorities about the mishap,
but his phone had no dial tone. Be this (sic) as it may,
the trial court in the criminal case acted correctly in
refusing to believe Dayrit.
2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not
include the claim that Galang stopped his truck at a
safe distance from the car, according to plaintiffs (p.
25, Appellants' Brief). This contention of appellants
was completely passed sub-silencio or was not
refuted by appellees in their brief. Exhibit 2 is one of
the exhibits not included in the record. According to
the Table of Contents submitted by the court below,
said Exhibit 2 was not submitted by defendants-
appellees. In this light, it is not far-fetched to surmise
12
that Galang's claim that he stopped was an eleventh-
hour desperate attempt to exculpate himself from
imprisonment and damages.
3. Galang divulged that he stopped after
seeing the car about 10 meters away:
ATTY. SOTTO:
Q Do I understand from your testimony that
inspite of the fact that you admitted that the road is
straight and you may be able to (sic) see 500-1000
meters away from you any vehicle, you first saw that
car only about ten (10) meters away from you for the
first time?
xxx xxx xxx
A I noticed it, sir, that it was about ten (10)
meters away.
ATTY. SOTTO:
Q So, for clarification, you clarify and state
under your oath that you have (sic) not noticed it
before that ten (10) meters? (Tsn. 3 to 5, Sept. 18,
1979). (p. 16, Appellants' Brief)
Galang's testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco's
statement that Galang stopped only because of the
impact. At ten (10) meters away, with the truck
running at 30 miles per hour, as revealed in Galang's
affidavit (Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants' brief), it is well-nigh
impossible to avoid a collision on a bridge.
5. Galang's truck stopped because of the
collision, and not because he waited for Jose Koh to
return to his proper lane. The police investigator, Pfc.
Fernando L. Nuñag, stated that he found skid marks
under the truck but there were not (sic) skid marks
behind the truck (pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1978). The
presence of skid marks show (sic) that the truck was
speeding. Since the skid marks were found under the
truck and none were found at the rear of the truck, the
reasonable conclusion is that the skid marks under
the truck were caused by the truck's front wheels
when the trucks (sic) suddenly stopped seconds
before the mishap in an endeavor to avoid the same.
But, as aforesaid, Galang saw the car at barely 10
meters away, a very short distance to avoid a
collision, and in his futile endeavor to avoid the
collision he abruptly stepped on his brakes but the
smashup happened just the same.
For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of
Galang, the law presumes negligence on the part of
the defendants in the selection of their driver or in the
supervision over him. Appellees did not allege such
defense of having exercised the duties of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of
their employees in their answers. They did not even
adduce evidence that they did in fact have methods of
selection and programs of supervision. The
inattentiveness or negligence of Galang was the
proximate cause of the mishap. If Galang's attention
was on the highway, he would have sighted the car
earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters.
He proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop
when a collision was already inevitable, because at
the time that he entered the bridge his attention was
not riveted to the road in front of him.
On the question of damages, the claims of appellants
were amply proven, but the items must be reduced.
28
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper
appreciation of the facts was subsequently filed by
private respondents on the basis of which the
respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3 April 1984, 29
reconsidered and set aside its 29 November 1983
decision and affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment
of 12 November 1980. A motion to reconsider this
Resolution was denied by the respondent Court on 4
July 1984.30
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners allege that respondent Court:
I
. . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE
ERROR WHEN IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS
DECISION BY MERELY BASING IT FROM (sic) A
MERE "PRESUMPTION," TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
DRIVER'S ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS,
WHO EXCLUSIVELY COMMITTED THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (sic),
FURTHER, IT ALSO DISREGARDED THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE
RECORDS; THEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S
RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES A and B, PETITION)
ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, PURELY BASED ON
SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND WITHOUT
SURE FOUNDATION IN THE EVIDENCE.
II
. . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
ERRED WHEN IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A
DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, "IT
CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE FINDINGS
OF GUILT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE
DRIVER OF THE TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE
ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED.
III
. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND MADE A MISLEADING
PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT HELD: "IT IS THUS
INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS (APPELLEES WRONGLY
MENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) TO PROVE
THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE
NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
DRIVER.
IV
. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic)
ERROR; COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND CITED ANOTHER CASE WHICH
IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THESE CASES.
V
. . . COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE
RECORDS, SPECIALLY THEY (sic) ARE
CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
13

VI
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED DAMAGES TO THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHEN SAID AWARD IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, IN THE
RECORDS, AND SAID AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED
BY LAW AND THE CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT.
VII
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS
DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES TO
PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD
OF DAMAGES. 31
In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required
private respondents to Comment on the petition. 32
After the said Comment 33 was filed, petitioners
submitted a Reply 34 thereto; this Court then gave
due course to the instant petitions and required
petitioners to file their Brief, 35 which they accordingly
complied with.
There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the
main task of dissecting the arguments and counter-
arguments, some observations on the procedural
vicissitudes of these cases are in order.
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the
recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict
under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, were filed ahead of Criminal Case No.
3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually
consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 for joint trial in
Branch III of the trial court. The records do not
indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it
may therefore be reasonably concluded that none
was made, to consolidate Criminal Case No. 3751
with the civil cases, or vice-versa. The parties may
have then believed, and understandably so, since by
then no specific provision of law or ruling of this Court
expressly allowed such a consolidation, that an
independent civil action, authorized under Article 33 in
relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code, such as the
civil cases in this case, cannot be consolidated with
the criminal case. Indeed, such consolidation could
have been farthest from their minds as Article 33 itself
expressly provides that the "civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." Be that as
it may, there was then no legal impediment against
such consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of
Court, which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits,
guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays,
clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the
trial court, or in short, attain justice with the least
expense to the parties litigants, 36 would have easily
sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing the
unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two (2)
judges appreciating, according to their respective
orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice,
the same facts differently, and thereafter rendering
conflicting decisions. Such was what happened in this
case. It should not, hopefully, happen anymore. In the
recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court or Appeals, 37
this Court held that the present provisions of Rule 111
of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of
an independent civil action for the recovery of civil
liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of
the Civil Code with the criminal action subject,
however, to the condition that no final judgment has
been rendered in that criminal case.
Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in
Criminal Case No. 3751 finding Galang guilty of
reckless imprudence, although already final by virtue
of the denial by no less than this Court of his last
attempt to set aside the respondent Court's
affirmance of the verdict of conviction, has no
relevance or importance to this case.
As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 38 the
responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a
quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. And, as more concretely stated in the
concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "in the
case of independent civil actions under the new Civil
Code, the result of the criminal case, whether
acquittal or conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to
the civil action." 39 In Salta vs. De Veyra and PNB vs.
Purisima, 40 this Court stated:
. . . It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the
civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the
same manner to be filed separately from the criminal
case, may proceed similarly regardless of the result of
the criminal case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related
to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to
proceed independently even during the pendency of
the latter case, the intention is patent to make the
court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect
whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be
so because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of
such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned,
that they may be made the subject of a separate civil
action because of the distinct separability of their
respective juridical cause or basis of action . . . .
What remains to be the most important consideration
as to why the decision in the criminal case should not
be considered in this appeal is the fact that private
respondents were not parties therein. It would have
been entirely different if the petitioners' cause of
action was for damages arising from a delict, in which
case private respondents' liability could only be
subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the
judgment of conviction in the criminal case against
Galang would have been conclusive in the civil cases
for the subsidiary liability of the private respondents.
41
And now to the merits of the petition.
It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the
principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not
respondent Court's findings in its challenged
resolution are supported by evidence or are based on
mere speculations, conjectures and presumptions.
The principle is well-established that this Court is not
a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised. The resolution of
factual issues is the function of the lower courts
whose findings on these matters are received with
respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. 42
14
The foregoing rule, however, is not without
exceptions. Findings of facts of the trial courts and the
Court of Appeals may be set aside when such
findings are not supported by the evidence or when
the trial court failed to consider the material facts
which would have led to a conclusion different from
what was stated in its judgment. 43 The same is true
where the appellate court's conclusions are grounded
entirely on conjectures, speculations and surmises 44
or where the conclusions of the lower courts are
based on a misapprehension of facts. 45
It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case
qualifies as one of the aforementioned exceptions as
the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the
respondent Court in its challenged resolution are not
supported by the evidence, are based on an
misapprehension of facts and the inferences made
therefrom are manifestly mistaken. The respondent
Court's decision of 29 November 1983 makes the
correct findings of fact.
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held
that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane
of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane
gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car,
Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this
presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately
concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was
the immediate and proximate cause of the collision.
This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for
the petitioners convincingly shows that the car
swerved into the truck's lane because as it
approached the southern end of the bridge, two (2)
boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk
into the lane of the car. As testified to by petitioner
Araceli Koh McKee:
Q What happened after that, as you
approached the bridge?
A When we were approaching the bridge, two
(2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side
of the highway going to San Fernando. My father,
who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two
(2) boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and
swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys.
We noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to
warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right
of way to come back to our right lane.
Q Did the truck slow down?
A No sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its
way.
Q What happened after that?
A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried
to go back to the right lane since the truck is (sic)
coming, my father stepped on the brakes and all what
(sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. 46
Her credibility and testimony remained intact even
during cross examination. Jose Koh's entry into the
lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what
was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril — death
or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly be
classified as negligent.
Negligence was defined and described by this Court
in Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 47 thus:
. . . Negligence is the omission to do something which
a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do (Black's Law
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley
defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury." (Cooley on Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)
In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more
than seventy years ago but still a sound rule, (W)e
held:
The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman
law. . . .
In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 48 We held:
. . . Negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of
ordinary care under the circumstances. (citing Ahern
v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894).
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of
negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is
manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose
Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would
have tried to avoid running over the two boys by
swerving the car away from where they were even if
this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding
such immediate peril would be the natural course to
take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite
lane would be several meters away and could very
well slow down, move to the side of the road and give
way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is
known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly
finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to
act without time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have
been a better method, unless the emergency in which
he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence." 49
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys
into the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh
adopted the best means possible in the given
situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above
test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of
negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is
negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was
the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause
has been defined as:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. And more
15
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom. 50
Applying the above definition, although it may be said
that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the
initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that
the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths
because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening
event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was
the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car
into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in
the collision had the latter heeded the emergency
signals given by the former to slow down and give the
car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane.
Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right
of the road, which was the proper precautionary
measure under the given circumstances, the truck
driver continued at full speed towards the car. The
truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in
view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide
while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck,
2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car
and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of
3.661 meters to spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge
has a level sidewalk which could have partially
accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding
himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid
the car instead of meeting it head-on.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the
records. He himself said that his truck was running at
30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge
while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge
52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185
of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give
credence to private respondents' claim that there was
an error in the translation by the investigating officer
of the truck driver's response in Pampango as to
whether the speed cited was in kilometers per hour or
miles per hour. The law presumes that official duty
has been regularly performed; 53 unless there is
proof to the contrary, this presumption holds. In the
instant case, private respondents' claim is based on
mere conjecture.
The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly
established through the earlier quoted testimony of
petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which was duly
corroborated by the testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco,
an impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven
by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce
its speed before the actual impact of collision as you
narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know?
A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he
reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to
our right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn,
pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit; "O" in these Civil
Cases) (pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief)54
while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:
Q When you saw the truck, how was it
moving?
A It was moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour,
sir.
Q Immediately after you saw this truck, do you
know what happened?
A I saw the truck and a car collided (sic), sir,
and I went to the place to help the victims. (tsn. 28,
April 19, 1979)
xxx xxx xxx
Q From the time you saw the truck to the time
of the impact, will you tell us if the said truck ever
stopped?
A I saw it stopped (sic) when it has (sic)
already collided with the car and it was already
motionless. (tsn. 31, April 19, 1979; Emphasis
Supplied). (p. 27, Appellants' Brief). 55
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent
negligence in failing to take the proper measures and
degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which
was the proximate cause of the resulting accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine
of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear
chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states
that the contributory negligence of the party injured
will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that
the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences
of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases,
the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof.56
In Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 57 We held:
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last
clear chance." The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of
last clear chance means that even though a person's
own acts may have placed him in a position of peril,
and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to
recovery (sic). As the doctrine is usually stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity
of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed
to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.
(Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent
defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even
to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing
himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or
according to some authorities, should have been
aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care,
16
had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff
to avoid an accident (57 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799).
In Pantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa, 58 We
ruled:
The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this
Court in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water
District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise:
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means
that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant where it
appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care
and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the
plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence
but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is
made liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff
[Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People's
Lumber and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al.,
G.R. No. 70493, May, 18, 1989]. The subsequent
negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise
ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the
immediate or proximate cause of the accident which
intervenes between the accident and the more remote
negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant
liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, supra].
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked
for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a
plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, although it may also be raised as a
defense to defeat claim (sic) for damages.
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to
rule, as We now rule, that it was the truck driver's
negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the
collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the
collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private
respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages.
The presumption that they are negligent flows from
the negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. 59 Costs against private respondents.
Their only possible defense is that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent SO ORDERED.
the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Romero, JJ., concur.
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, Bidin, J., took no part.
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. Footnotes
xxx xxx xxx 1 Exhibit "S".
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by 2 In the sketch plan prepared by Geodetic
their employees and household helpers acting within Engr. Benito J. Caraan [Exhibit "Y"], the bridge is
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the estimated to be 42.15 meters in length and 7.5 meters
former are not engaged in any business or industry. in width.
xxx xxx xxx 3 Record an Appeal, 220.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease 4 Id., 16-18.
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family 5 Record on Appeal, 121-124.
to prevent damage.
6 Id., 226-227.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the
diligence in the selection and supervision of 7 Id., 22-25; 26-28; 28-32; 34-36.
employees. 60 The answers of the private
respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did 8 Id., 39-43.
not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to
prove it. 9 Record on Appeal, 45-48; 49-52; 52-53.
The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision 10 Id., 53-57.
of 29 November 1983 in reversing the decision of the
trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 11 Id., 91, 92, 100, 101, 103, 104 and 105.
4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no
sufficient legal and factual moorings. 12 Record on Appeal, 107, 109, 111 and 112.
In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the 13 Id., 124, et seq.
indemnity for death must, however, be increased from
P12,000.00 to P50,000.00. 14 Id., 138, et seq.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 15 Id., 160-161.
assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April
1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 16 Record on Appeal, 120-121.
November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is
REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the 17 Id., 86-120.
indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim 18 Id., 119-120.
Koh McKee.
19 Id., 6.
17
 Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 56 Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104
20 Per Associate Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, 195 [1990]. Phil. 405 [1958]; Del Prado vs. Manila Electric Co., 52
concurred in Associate Justices Crisolito Pascual and Phil. 900) [1929]; Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 [1918].
Guillermo P. Villasor. 41 Martinez vs. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1 [1948];
Miranda vs. Malate Garage and Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 57 193 SCRA 603 [1991].
21 Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 69-77. 670 [1956]; Manalo vs. Robles Transportation Co.,
Inc., 99 Phil. 729 [1956]. 58 179 SCRA 384 [1989].
22 Annex "C-1," Id.; Id., 78.
42 FNCB Finance vs. Estavillo, 192 SCRA 514 59 Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Go., 19
23 G.R. No. 62713. [1990]; Rañeses vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, SCRA 289 [1967], citing Bahia vs. Litonjua, 30 Phil.
187 SCRA 397 [1990]; Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 624 [1915].
24 Annex "D," Petition, op. cit.; Rollo, op. cit., SCRA 138 [1988].
79. 60 Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., supra.
43 Capco vs. Macasaet, 189 SCRA 561
25 Per Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison, [1990]. 61 People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643 [1989];
concurred in by Associate Justices Abdulwahid A. People vs. Narit, 197 SCRA 334 [1991]; People vs.
Bidin, Marcelino R. Veloso and Desiderio P. Jurado. 44 Orcino vs. Civil Service Commission, 190 Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991]; People vs. Lubreo,
SCRA 815 [1990]; Tupue vs. Urgel, 161 SCRA 417 200 SCRA 11 [1991]; Dangwa Trans., Co., Inc. vs.
26 Rollo, 88-89. [1988], Tolentino vs. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167 [1974]. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 574 [1991].

27 Id., 88. 45 Pajunar vs. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA

464 [1989]; Sese vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Republic of the Philippines
28 Rollo, 83-88. 152 SCRA 585 [1987].
SUPREME COURT
Manila
29 Rollo, 61-65. 46 TSN, 22 July 1977, 5-6; Exhibit "O," Rollo,
83. EN BANC
30 Id., 67.
47 167 SCRA 363 [1988].
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
31 Rollo, 213-214.
48 27 SCRA 674 [1969]. BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
32 Rollo, 150.
vs.
49 Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378 FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
33 Id., 157-175. [1988], citing Siegl vs. Watson, 195 NW 867 and
others.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
34 Id., 185-198. Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
50 Vda. de Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181
35 Id., 199. [1957], citing 38 Am. Jur. 695-696.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
36 Caños vs. Peralta, 115 SCRA 843 [1982], 51 Rollo, 148. The facts that culminated in this case started with
citing 1 C.J.S. 1342-1343.
dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning
52 Section 53, Motor Vehicle Law. and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration
37 203 SCRA 619 [1991]. and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
53 Section 2 (m), Rule 131, Revised Rules of
38 102 Phil. 443 [1957]. Court. Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following
their mutual promise of love, decided to get married
39 At page 447. 54 Rollo, 83-84.
and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On
September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-
40 117 SCRA 212, 218-219 [1982]; see also 55 Id., 84. be:
Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 591 [1989];
Dear Bet —

18

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes
it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason
why — That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the
following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED
RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA
PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard
from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer
and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced
evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner,
and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual
damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief
from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion
for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to
strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered
the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on
August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable
settlement." It added that should any of them fail to
appear "the petition for relief and the opposition
thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before
court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a
motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on
defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that
he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro
City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an
amicable element. The court granted two weeks
counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two
weeks given by the court had expired on September
8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed
to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by
the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties
and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This
time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court
that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying
defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has
appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955
in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable
negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by
default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed
no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement
was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be
duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts
constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules
of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to
his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a
good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of
action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled
having been due to fortuitous event and/or
circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of
merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions
instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim,
L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand
Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit
of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere
surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set
aside was null and void, it having been based on
evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In
Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October
30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of
designating the clerk of court as commissioner to
receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule
33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's
consent to said procedure, the same did not have to
be obtained for he was declared in default and thus
had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil.
787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557,
October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and
reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment
is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is
no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action
for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30,
1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733,
Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to
marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out
that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of
the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it
so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to
which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated
with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said
Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff
and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A,
A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.
Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The
bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased
(Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the
flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with
accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given
and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but
two days before the wedding, defendant, who was
then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother
opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest
assured returning soon." But he never returned and
was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to
marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is
not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
19
good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the
damages awarded were excessive. No question is
raised as to the award of actual damages. What
defendant would really assert hereunder is that the
award of moral and exemplary damages, in the
amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New
Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to
exemplary damages, defendant contends that the
same could not be adjudged against him because
under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition
precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under
the above-narrated circumstances of this case
defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless
[and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion,
however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable
award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated
modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby
affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8721 May 23, 1957
TRANQUILINO CACHERO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB CO., INC., defendant-
appellant.
Bernardino Guerrero and J. G. Madarang for plaintiff-
appellant.
Castaño and Ampil for the defendant-appellant.
FELIX, J.:
There is no dispute as to the following facts: on
December 13, 1952, Atty. Tranquilino F. Cachero
boarded a Yellow Taxicab, with plate No. 2159-52
driven by Gregorio Mira Abinion and owned by the
Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. On passing Oroquieta
between Doroteo Jose and Lope de Vega streets,
Gregorio Mira Abinion bumped said taxicab against a
Meralco post, No. 1-4/387, with the result that the cab
was badly smashed and the plaintiff fell out of the
vehicle to the ground, suffering thereby physical
injuries, slight in nature.
The chauffeur was subsequently prosecuted by the
City Fiscal and on February 26, 1963, upon his plea
of guilty the Municipal Court of Manila sentenced him
to suffer 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor, and to
pay the costs. On December 17, 1952, Tranquilino F.
Cachero addressed a letter to the Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co., Inc., which was followed by another of
January 6, 1953, which reads as follows:
MANILA, January 6, 1953
The MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB CO., INC.
1338 Arlegui, Manila
Dear Sirs:
As you have been already advised by the letter dated
December 17, 1952, on December 13, 1952, while I
was a passenger of your taxicab bearing plate No.
2159 and driven by your chauffeur Gregorio Mira and
through his negligence and the bad condition of the
said car, he bumped the same against the pavement
on the street (Oroquieta — between Doroteo Jose
and Lope de Vega streets, Manila) and hit the
Meralco post on said street, resulting in the smashing
of the said taxicab, and as a result thereof I was
gravely injured and suffered and is still suffering
physical, mental and moral damages and not being
able to resume my daily calling.
For the said damages, I hereby make a demand for
the payment of the sum of P79,245.65, covering
expenses for transportation to the hospital for medical
treatment, medicines, doctors bills, actual monetary
loss, moral, compensatory and exemplary damages,
etc., within 5 days from date of receipt hereof.
I trust to hear from you on the matter within the period
of 5 days above specified.
Truly yours,
(Sgd.) TRANQUILINO F. CACHERO
2256 Int. B, Misericordia St.,
Sta. Cruz, Manila
(Exhibit K)
The Taxicab Co. to avoid expenses and time of
litigation offered to settle the case amicably with
plaintiff but the latter only agreed to reduce his
demand to the sum of P72,050.20 as his only basis
for settlement which, of course, was not accepted by
said company. So plaintiff instituted this action on
February 2, 1953, in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, praying in the complaint that the defendant be
condemned to pay him:
(a) The sum of P72,050.20, the total sum of the
itemized losses and/or damages under paragraph 7 of
the complaint, with legal interest thereon from the
date of the filing of the complaint;
(b) The sum of P5,000 as attorney's fee; and the
costs of the suit; and
Plaintiff further respectfully prays for such other and
further reliefs as the facts and the law pertaining to
the case may warrant.
The defendant answered the complaint setting forth
affirmative defenses and a counterclaim for P930 as
damages and praying for the dismissal of plaintiff's
action. After hearing the Court rendered decision only
July 20, 1954, the dispositive part of which is as
follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant, sentencing the latter to pay the former
the following: (1) For medicine, doctor's fees for
services rendered and transportation, P700; (2)
20
professional fee as attorney for the defendant in
Criminal Case No. 364, "People vs. Manolo Maddela
et al." of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya,
P3,000; (3) professional fees as attorney for the
defendant in Civil Case No. 23891 of the Municipal
Court of Manila, "Virginia Tangulan vs. Leonel da
Silva," and for the taking of the deposition of Gabina
Angrepan in a case against the Philippine National
Bank, P200; and(4) moral damages in the amount of
P2,000.
Defendant's counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
Defendant shall also pay the costs."
From this decision both parties appealed to Us,
plaintiff limiting his appeal to the part of the decision
which refers to the moral damages awarded to him
which he considered inadequate, and to the failure of
said judgment to grant the attorney's fees asked for in
the prayer of his complaint. Defendant in turn alleges
that the trial Court erred in awarding to the plaintiff the
following:
(1) P700 — for medicine, doctor's fees and
transportation expenses;
(2) P3,000 — as supposedly unearned full
professional fees as attorney for the defendant in
Criminal Case No. 364, "People vs. Manolo Maddela
et al.";
(3) P200 — as supposedly unearned professional
fees as attorney for the defendant in Civil Case No.
23891 of the Manila Municipal Court, "Virginia
Tangulan vs. Leonel de Silva", and for failure to take
the deposition of a certain Gabina Angrepan in an
unnamed case; and
(4) P2,000 — as moral damages, amounting to the
grand total of P5,900, these amounts being very
much greater than what plaintiff deserves.
In connection with his appeal, plaintiff calls attention
to the testimonies of Dr. Modesto S. Purisima and of
Dr. Francisco Aguilar, a member of the staff of the
National Orthopedic Hospital, which he considers
necessary as a basis for ascertaining not only the
physical sufferings undergone by him, but also for
determining the adequate compensation for moral
damages that he should be awarded by reason of
said accident.
The exact nature of plaintiff's injuries, their degree of
seriousness and the period of his involuntary disability
can be determined by the medical certificate (Exhibit
D) issued by the National Orthopedic Hospital on
December 16, 1952, and the testimonies of Dr.
Francisco Aguilar, physician in said hospital, and of
Dr. Modesto Purisima, a private practitioner. The
medical certificate (Exhibit D) lists: (a) a subluxation
of the right shoulder joint; (b) a contusion on the right
chest; and (c) a "suspicious fracture" of the upper end
of the right humerus. Dr. Aguilar who issued the
medical certificate admitted, however, with regard to
the "suspicious fracture", that in his opinion with (the
aid of) the x-ray there was no fracture. According to
this doctor plaintiff went to the National 0rthopedic
Hospital at least six times during the period from
December 16, 1952, to April 7, 1953; that he strapped
plaintiffs body (see Exhibit E), which strap was not
removed until after a period of six weeks had elapsed
Dr. Modesto Purisima, a private practitioner, testified
that he advised and treated plaintiff from, December
14, 1952, to the end of March (1953). Plaintiff was
never hospitalized for treatment of the injuries he
received in said accident.
Counsel for the defendant delves quite extensively on
these injuries. He says in his brief the following:
Just what is a subluxation? Luxation is another term
for dislocation (Dorland, W.A.N., The American
Illustrated Medical Dictionary (13th ed.), p. 652), and
hence, a sublaxation is an incomplete or partial
dislocation (Ibid., p. 1115). While a dislocation is the
displacement of a bone or bones from its or their
normal setting (and, therefore, applicable and occurs
only to joints and not to rigid or non-movable parts of
the skeletal system) (Ibid., p. 358; Christopher, F., A
Textbook of Surgery (5th ed.), p. 342), it should be
distinguished from a fracture which is a break or
rupture in a bone or cartilage, usually due to external
violence (Christopher, F., A Textbook of Surgery (5th
Ed.) p. 194; Dorland, W.A.N., The American
Illustrated Medical Dictionary (13th ed.), P.459).
Because, unlike fracture which may be partial (a crack
in the bone) or total (a complete break in the bone),
there can be no half-way situations with regard to
dislocations of the shoulder joint (the head or ball of
the humerus — the humerus is the bone from the
elbow to the shoulder) must be either inside the
socket of the scapula or shoulder blade (in which
case there is no dislocation) or out of the latter (in
which event there is a dislocation), to denote a
condition where due to external violence, the muscles
and ligaments connecting the humerus to the scapula
have subjected to strain intense enough to produce
temporary distention or lessening of their tautness
and consequently resulting in the loosening or
wrenching of the ball of the humerus from its snug fit
in the socket of the scapula, by using the terms
subluxation or partial dislocation(as used in the
medical certificate), is to fall into a misnomer — a
term often used by "chiropractors" and by those who
would want to sound impressive, but generally
unfavored by the medical profession. To describe the
above condition more aptly, the medical profession
usually employs the expression luxatio imperfecta, or,
in simple language, a sprain (Dorland, W.A.N., The
American Illustrated Medical Dictionary (13th ed.), p.
652). The condition we have described is a
paraphrase of the definition of a sprain. Plaintiff
suffered this very injury (a sprained or wrenched
shoulder joint) and a cursory scrutiny of his x-ray
plates (Exhibits A and B) by a qualified orthopedic
surgeon or by a layman with a picture or x-ray plate of
a normal shoulder joint (found in any standard
textbook on human anatomy; the one we used was
Schemer, J.P., Morris' Human Anatomy (10 ed., p.
194) for comparison will bear out our claim.
Treatment for a sprain is by the use of adhesive or
elastic bandage, elevation of the joint, heat, effleurage
and later massage (Christopher, F., A Textbook of
Surgery (5th ed., p. 116). The treatment given to the
plaintiff was just exactly that Dr. Aguilar bandaged
(strapped) plaintiff's right shoulder and chest (t.s.n., p.
31) in an elevated position (with the forearm
horizontal to the chest (see photograph, Exhibit E),
and certain vitamins were prescribed for him (t.s.n., p.
131). He also underwent massage for some time by
Drs. Aguilar and Purisima. The medicines and
appurtenances to treatment purchased by plaintiff
from the Orthopedic Hospital, Botica Boie and Metro
Drug Store were, by his own admission, adhesive
plaster, bandage, gauze, oil and "tintura arnica"
(t.s.n., p. 3 — continuation of transcript ), and Dr.
Purisima also prescribed "Numotizin", a beat
generating ointment (t.s.n., p. 23), all of which are
21
indicated for a sprain, and by their nature, can cure
nothing more serious than a sprain anyway. Fractures
and true dislocations cannot be cured by the kind of
treatment and medicines which plaintiff received. A
true dislocation, for instance, is treated by means of
reduction through traction of the arm until the humeral
head returns to the proper position in the scapular
socket (pulling the arm at a 60 degree angle and
guiding the ball of the humerus into proper position, in
its socket) while the patient is under deep
anaesthesia, and then, completely immobilizing the
part until the injured capsule has healed (Christopher,
F., A Textbook of Surgery, pp. 343 and 344). No
evidence was submitted that plaintiff ever received
the latter kind of treatment. Dr. Purisima even
declared that after the plaintiff's first visit to the
Orthopedic Hospital the latter informed him that there
was no fracture or dislocation (t.s.n., p. 26). Dr.
Purisima's statement is the truth of the matter as we
have already explained — joints of the shoulder being
only subject to total dislocation (due to their
anatomical design), not to partial ones, and any injury
approximating dislocation but not completely, it being
classified as mere sprains, slight or bad.
The second and last injury plaintiff sustained was a
contusion. What is a contusion? It is just a high flown
expression for a bruise or the act of bruising (Dorland,
W.A.N., The American Illustrated Medical Dictionary
(13th ed. p. 290). No further discussion need be made
on this particular injury since the nature of a bruise is
of common knowledge (it's a bit uncomfortable but not
disabling unless it occurs on movable parts like the
fingers or elbow which is not the case, herein having
occurred in the right chest) and the kind of medical
treatment or help it is also well known. (pp. 10-14,
defendant-appellant's brief).
The trial Judge undoubtedly did not give much value
to the testimonies of the doctors when in the
statement of facts made in his decision he referred to
the physical injuries received by the plaintiff as slight
in nature and the latter is estopped from discussing
the same in order to make them appear as serious,
because in the statement of facts made in his brief as
appellant, he says the following:
The facts of the case as found by the lower court in its
decision, with the permission of this Honorable Court,
we respectfully quote them hereunder as our
STATEMENT OF FACTS for the purpose of this
appeal.
Before entering into a discussion of the merits of
plaintiff's appeal, We will say a few words as to the
nature of the action on which his demand for
damages is predicated.
The nature of an action as in contract or in tort is
determined from the essential elements of the
complaint, taken as a whole, in the case of doubt a
construction to sustain the action being given to it.
While the prayer for relief or measure of damages
sought does not necessarily determine the character
of the action, it may be material in the determination
of the question and therefore entitled to consideration
and in case of doubt will open determine character of
the action and indeed there are actions whose
character is necessarily determined thereby. (1 C.J.S.
1100)
A mere perusal of plaintiff complaint will show that his
action against the defendant is predicated on an
alleged breach of contract of carriage, i.e., the failure
of the defendant to bring him "safely and without
mishaps" to his destination, and it is to be noted that
the chauffeur of defendant's taxicab that plaintiff used
when he received the injuries involved herein,
Gregorio Mira, has not even been made a party
defendant to this case.
Considering, therefore, the nature of plaintiff's action
in this case, is he entitled to compensation for moral
damages? Article 2219 of the Civil Code says the
following:
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious
acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
xxx xxx xxx
Of the cases enumerated in the just quoted Article
2219 only the first two may have any bearing on the
case at bar. We find, however, with regard to the first
that the defendant herein has not committed in
connection with this case any "criminal offense
resulting in physical injuries". The one that committed
the offense against the plaintiff is Gregorio Mira, and
that is why he has been already prosecuted and
punished therefor. Although (a) owners and managers
of an establishment or enterprise are responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of
the branches in which the latter are employed or on
the occasion of their functions; (b) employers are
likewise liable for damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned task (Article 2180 of the Civil
Code); and (c) employers and corporations engaged
in any kind of industry are subsidiarily civilly liable for
felonies committed by their employees in the
discharge of their duties (Art. 103, Revised Penal
Code), plaintiff herein does not maintain this action
under the provisions of any of the articles of the codes
just mentioned and against all the persons who might
be liable for the damages caused, but as a result of
an admitted breach of contract of carriage and against
the defendant employer alone. We, therefore, hold
that the case at bar does not come within the
exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.
The present complaint is not based either on a "quasi
delict causing physical injuries" (Art. 2219 par. 2, of
the Civil Code). From the report of the Code
Commission on the new Civil Code We copy the
following:
22
A question of nomenclature confronted the
Commission. After a careful deliberation, it was
agreed to use the term "quasi-delict" for those
obligations which do not arise from law, contracts
quasi-contracts or criminal offenses. They are known
in Spanish legal treatises as "culpa aquiliana", "culpa-
extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delitos". The phrase
"culpa-extra-contractual" or its translation "extra-
contractual fault" was eliminated because it did not
exclude quasi-contractual or penal obligations.
"Aquilian fault" might have been selected, but it was
thought inadvisable to refer to so ancient a law as the
"Lex Aquilia". So "quasi-delicts" was chosen, which
more nearly corresponds to the Roman Law
classification of obligations, and is in harmony with
the nature of this kind of liability.
The Commission also thought of the possibility of
adopting the word "tort" from Anglo-American Law.
But "tort" under that system is much broader than the
Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising from
non-contractual negligence." "Tort" in Anglo-American
jurisprudence includes not only negligence, but also
intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery,
false imprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of
the Philippine legal system, intentional and malicious
are governed by the Penal Code, although certain
exceptions are made in the Project. (Report of the
Code Commission, pp. 161-162).
In the case of Cangco vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil.
768, We established the distinction between
obligation derived from negligence and obligation as a
result of a breach of a contract. Thus, We said:
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal
liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage,
and that the obligation to respond for the damage
which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the
breach of that contract by reason of the failure of
defendant to exercise due care in its performance.
That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate,
differing essentially in the legal view point from that
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its
servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the Civil Code
(Art. 2180 of the new), which can be rebutted by proof
of the exercise of due care in their selection or
supervision. Article 1903 is not applicable to
obligation arising EX CONTRACTU, but only to extra-
contractual obligations or — to use the technical form
of expression, that article, relates only to CULPA
AQUILIANA and not to CULPA CONTRACTUAL.
The decisions in the cases of Castro vs. Acro Taxicab
(82 Phil., 359, 46 Off. Gaz., Na. 5, p. 2023); Lilius et
al. vs. Manila Railroad, (59 Phil. 758) and others,
wherein moral damages, are awarded to the plaintiffs,
are not applicable to the case at bar because said
decisions were rendered before the effectivity of the
new Civil Code (August 30, 1950) and for the further
reason that the complaints filed therein were based
on different causes of action.
In view of the foregoing the sum of P2,000 awarded
as moral damages by the trial Court has to be
eliminated, for under the law it is not a compensation
awardable in a case like the one at bar.
As to plaintiff's demand for P5,000 as attorney's fees,
the Civil Code provides the following:
ART, 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or
to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against
the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident
had faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly
valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household
helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) in actions for indemnity under workmen's
compensation and employers liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability
arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just
and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation must be reasonable.
The present case does not come under any of
exceptions enumerated in the preceding article,
specially of paragraph 2 thereof, because defendant's
failure to meet its responsibility was not the plaintiff to
litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interests.
The present action was instituted because plaintiff an
exorbitant amount for damages (P60,000) and
naturally the defendant did not and could not yield to
such demand. This is neither a case that comes
under paragraph 11 of Article 2208 because the
Lower Court did not deem it just and equitable to
award any amount for attorney's fees. As We agree
with the trial Judge on this point, We cannot declare
that he erred for not awarding to plaintiff any such
fees in this case.
Coming now to the appeal of the defendant, the
Court, after due consideration of the evidence
appearing on record:
(1) Approves the award of P700 for medicine, doctors'
fees and transportation expenses;
(2) Reduces the award of P3,000 as attorney's fees to
the sum of P2,000, as Manolo Maddela, defendant in
Criminal Case No. 364 of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Vizcaya testified that he has already paid to
plaintiff part of the latter's fees of P3,000, the amount
of which was not disclosed, though it was incumbent
upon the plaintiff to establish how much he had been
paid of said fees;
(3) Approves the award of P200 as unearned
professional fees as attorney for the defendant in Civil
Case No. 238191 of the Municipal Court of Manila
whom plaintiff was unable to represent, and for the
latter's failure to take the deposition of one Agripina
23
Angrepan due to the automobile accident referred to
in this case.
Before closing this decision We deem it convenient to
quote the following passage of defendant's brief as
appellant:
Realizing its obligation under its contract of carriage
with the plaintiff, and because the facts of the case,
as have been shown, mark it as more proper for the
Municipal Court only, the defendant, to avoid the
expense and time of litigation, offered to settle the
case amicably with plaintiff, but the latter refused and
insisted on his demand for P72,050.20 (Exhibit K) as
the only basis for settlement, thus adding a clearly
petty case to the already overflowing desk of the
Honorable Members of this Court.
We admire and respect at all times a man for standing
up and fighting for his rights, and when said right
consists in injuries sustained due to a breach of a
contract of carriage with us, sympathy and
understanding are added thereto. But when a person
starts demanding P72,050.20 for a solitary bruise and
sprain, injuries for which the trial court, even at its
generous although erroneous best, could only grant
P5,900, then respect and sympathy give way to
something else. It is time to fight, for, in our humble
opinion, there is nothing more loathsome nor truly
worthy of condemnation than one who uses his
injuries for other purposes than just rectification. If
plaintiff's claim is granted, it would be a blessing, not
a misfortune, to be injured. (p. 34-35)
This case was instituted by a lawyer who, as an
officer of the courts, should be the first in helping Us
in the administration of justice, and after going over
the record of this case, we do not hesitate to say that
the demand of P72,050.20 for a subluxation of the
right humerus bone and an insignificant contusion in
the chest, has not even the semblance of
reasonableness. As a matter of fact, Dr. Aguilar
himself said that the x-ray plates (Exhibits A, Band C)
" did not show anything significant except that it
shows a slight subluxation of the right shoulder, and
that there is a suspicious fracture", which ultimately
he admitted not to exist. The plaintiff himself must
have felt embarrassed by his own attitude when after
receiving defendant's brief as appellant, he makes in
his brief as appellee the categorical statement that he
DOES NOT NOW INSIST NOR PRETEND IN THE
LEAST to Collect from the defendant all the damages
he had claimed in his complaint, but instead he is
submitting his case to the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court for the award of a reasonable and
equitable damages allowable by law, to compensate
the plaintiff of the suffering and losses he had
undergone and incurred of the accident oftentimes
mentioned in this brief in which plaintiff was injured"
(p. 17-18).This acknowledgment comes too late, for
plaintiff has already deprived the Court of Appeals of
the occasion to exercise its appellate jurisdiction over
this case which he recklessly dumped to this Court.
We certainly cannot look with at favor at his attitude of
plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
modified by reducing the amount awarded as
professional fees from P3,000 to P2,000 and by
eliminating the moral damages of P2,000 awarded by
the Lower Court to the plaintiff. Said decision is in all
other respects affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and
Endencia, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12163 March 4, 1959
PAZ FORES, petitioner,
vs.
IRENEO MIRANDA, respondent.
Alberto O. Villaraza for petitioner.
Almazan and Ereneta for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Defendant-petitioner Paz Fores brings this petition for
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (C.A.
Case No. 1437-R) awarding to the plaintiff-respondent
Ireneo Miranda the sums of P5,000 by way of actual
damages and counsel fees, and P10,000 as moral
damages, with costs.
Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney
driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was
descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate
of speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to
swerve and to his the bridge wall. The accident
occurred on the morning of March 22, 1953. Five of
the passengers were injured, including the
respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right
humerus. He was taken to the National Orthopedic
Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected to a
series of operations; the first on May 23, 1953, when
wire loops were wound around the broken bones and
screwed into place; a second, effected to insert a
metal splint, and a third one to remove such splint. At
the time of the trial, it appears that respondent had
not yet recovered the use of his right arm.
The driver was charged with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a
plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly.
The contention that the evidence did not sufficiently
establish the identity of the vehicle as the belonging to
the petitioner was rejected by the appellate court
which found, among other things, that is carried plate
No. TPU-1163, SERIES OF 1952, Quezon City,
registered in the name of Paz Fores, (appellant
herein) and that the vehicle even had the name of
"Doña Paz" painted below its wind shield. No
evidence to the contrary was introduced by the
petitioner, who relied on an attack upon the credibility
of the two policemen who went to the scene of the
incident.
A point to be further remarked is petitioner's
contention that on March 21, 1953, or one day before
the accident happened, she allegedly sold the
passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain
Carmen Sackerman.
The initial problem raised by the petitioner in this
appeal may be formulated thus — "Is the approval of
the Public Service Commission necessary for the sale
of a public service vehicle even without conveying
therewith the authority to operate the same?"
Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the court of
24
Appeals answered the query in the affirmative. The
ruling should be upheld.
Section 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth
Act No. 146) provides:
Sec. 20. Subject to established limitations and
exceptions and saving provisions to the contrary, it
shall be unlawful for any public service or for the
owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the
previous approval and authority of the Commission
previously had —
xxx xxx xxx
(g) To sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its
property, franchises, certificates, privileges, or rights,
or any part thereof; or merge or consolidate its
property, franchises, privileges or rights, or any part
thereof, with those of any other public service. The
approval herein required shall be given, after notice to
the public and after hearing the persons interested at
a public hearing, if it be shown that there are just and
reasonable grounds for making the mortgage or
encumbrance, for liabilities of more than one year
maturity, or the sale, alienation, lease, merger, or
consolidation to be approved and that the same are
not detrimental to the public interest, and in case of a
sale, the date on which the same is to be
consummated shall be fixed in the order of approval:
Provided, however, That nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent the transaction from
being negotiated or completed before its approval or
to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public
service of any of its property in the ordinary course of
its business.
Interpreting the effects of this particular provision of
law, we have held in the recent cases of Montoya vs.
Ignacio, * 50 Off. Gaz. No. 1, p. 108; Timbol vs.
Osias, et al., G. R. No. L-7547, April 30, 1955, and
Medina vs. Cresencia, 99 Phil., 506; 52 Off. Gaz. No.
10, p. 4606, that a transfer contemplated by the law, if
made without the requisite approval of the Public
Service Commission, is not effective and binding in so
far as the responsibility of the grantee under the
franchise in relation to the public is concerned.
Petitioner assails, however, the applicability of these
rulings to the instant case, contending that in those
cases, the operator did not convey, by lease or by
sale, the vehicle independently of his rights under the
franchise. This line of reasoning does not find support
in the law. The provisions of the statute are clear and
prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of
the property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights,
or any part thereof of the owner or operator of the
public service Commission. The law was designed
primarily for the protection of the public interest; and
until the approval of the public Service Commission is
obtained the vehicle is, in contemplation of law, still
under the service of the owner or operator standing in
the records of the Commission which the public has a
right to rely upon.
The proviso contained in the aforequoted law, to the
effect that nothing therein shall be construed "to
prevent the transaction from being negotiated or
complete before its approval", means only that the
sale without the required approval is still valid and
binding between the parties (Montoya vs. Ignacio,
supra). The phrase "in the ordinary course of its
business" found in the other proviso" or to prevent the
sale, alienation, or lease by any public service of any
of its property". As correctly observed by the lower
court, could not have been intended to include the
sale of the vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to
such property that may be conceivably disposed or by
the carrier in the ordinary course of its business, like
junked equipment or spare parts.
The case of Indalecio de Torres vs. Vicente Ona (63
Phil., 594, 597) is enlightening; and there, it was held:
Under the law, the Public Service Commission has
not only general supervision and regulation of, but
also full jurisdiction and control over all public utilities
including the property, equipment and facilities used,
and the property rights and franchise enjoyed by
every individual and company engaged i the
performance of a public service in the sense this
phrase is used in the Public Service Act or Act No.
3108). By virtue of the provisions of said Act, motor
vehicles used in the performance of a service, as the
transportation of freight from one point to another,
have to this date been considered — and they cannot
but be so considered-public service property; and, by
reason of its own nature, a TH truck, which means
that the operator thereof places it at the disposal of
anybody who is willing to pay a rental of its use, when
he desires to transfer or carry his effects,
merchandise or any other cargo from one place to
another, is necessarily a public service property.
(Emphasis supplied)
Of course, this court has held in the case of Bachrach
Motor co. vs. Zamboanga Transportation Co., 52
Phil., 244, that there may be a nunc pro tunc
authorization which has the effect of having the
approval retroact to the date of the transfer; but such
outcome cannot prejudice rights intervening in the
meantime. It appears that no such approval was given
by the Commission before the accident occurred.
The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court
of First Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court
of Appeals to only P2,000, on the ground that a
review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient
basis for the trial court's appraisal, since the only
evidence presented on this point consisted of
respondent's bare statement that his expenses and
loss of income amounted to P20,000. On the other
hand, "it cannot be denied," the lower court said, "that
appellee (respondent) did incur expenses"' It is well to
note further that respondent was a painter by
profession and a professor of Fine Arts, so that the
amount of P2,000 awarded cannot be said to be
excessive (see Arts. 2224 and 2225, Civil Code of the
Philippines). The attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000
also awarded to the respondent are assailed on the
ground that the Court of First Instance did not
provided for the same, and since no appeal was
interposed by said respondent, it was allegedly error
for the Court of Appeals to award them motu proprio.
Petitioner fails to note that attorney's fees are
included in the concept of actual damages under the
Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court
deems it is just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code of
the Philippines). We see no reason to alter these
awards.
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the
respondent, the same must be discarded. We have
repeatedly ruled (Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab
Co. Inc., 101 Phil., 523; 54 Off. Gaz., [26], 6599;
Necesito, et al vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz.,
[23] 4023, that moral damages are not recoverable in
damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract
of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of
the new Civil Code, which provide as follows:
25
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under circumstances, such damages
are justify due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.
By contrasting the provisions of these two article it
immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of
transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e.,
wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential
to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered
included in the descriptive term "analogous cases"
used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220
specifically provides for the damages that are caused
by contractual breach, but because the definition of
quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly
excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting
contractual relation between the parties."
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage dome. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now
under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death
of a passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the
common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art.
2206, that entitles the deceased passenger to
"demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased" (Necesito vs.
Paras, 104 Phil., 84, Resolution on motion to
reconsider, September 11, 1958). But the exceptional
rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that
where the injured passenger does not die, moral
damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that
the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it
is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's
driver does not per se constitute of justify an inference
of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in
the case at bar there is no other evidence of such
malice to support the award of moral damages by the
Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for
breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad
faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as
required by Art. 220, would be to violate the clear
provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted
judicial legislation.
The Court of Appeals has invoked our rulings in
Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Co., G.R. No. 49155,
December 14, 1948 and Layda vs. Court of Appeals,
90 Phil., 724; but these doctrines were predicated
upon our former law of damages, before judicial
discretion in fixing them became limited by the
express provisions of the new Civil Code (previously
quoted). Hence, the aforesaid rulings are now
inapplicable.
Upon the other hand, the advantageous position of a
party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of
transportations explains, to some extent, the
limitations imposed by the new Code on the amount
of the recovery. The action for breach of contract
imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of
liability upon mere proof of injury to the passenger;
that latter is relieved from the duty to established the
fault of the carrier, or of his employees, and the
burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was
due to an unforseen event or to force majeure
(Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768, 777).
Moreover, the carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict,
may not escape liability by proving that it has
exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees (Art. 1759, new civil
code; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., supra; Prado
vs. Manila Electric Co., 51 Phil., 900).
The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as
well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially
extra contractual negligence, compel us to
differentiate between action ex contractu, and actions
quasi ex delicto, and prevent us from viewing the
action for breach of contract as simultaneously
embodying an action on tort. Neither can this action
be taken as one to enforce on employee's liability
under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, since the
responsibility is not alleged to be subsidiary, nor is
there on record any averment or proof that the driver
of appellant was insolvent. In fact, he is not even
made a party to the suit.
It is also suggested that a carrier's violation of its
engagement to safety transport the passenger
involves a breach of the passenger's confidence, and
therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract
in bad faith, justifying recovery of moral damages
under Art. 2220. This theory is untenable, for under it
the carrier would always be deemed in bad faith, in
every case its obligation to the passenger is infringed,
and it would be never accountable for simple
negligence; while under the law (Art. 1756). the
presumption is that common carriers acted negligently
(and not maliciously), and Art. 1762 speaks of
negligence of the common carrier.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in article 1733 and 1755.
ART. 1762. The contributory negligence of the
passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his
death or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the
negligence of the common carrier, but the amount of
damages shall be equitably reduced.
The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in
the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and
negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental
in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their
consequences being clearly differentiated by the
Code.
ART. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith
is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.
26
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude,
the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance
of the obligation.
It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory
provision to the contrary, that this difference was in
the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they
limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of
contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be
occasionally so gross as to amount to malice; but that
fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad
faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding
that the contract was breached through negligence of
the carrier's employees.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the
award of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages. (Court
of Appeals Resolution of May 5, 1957). In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed. No costs in this
instance. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes,
A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Endencia, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 135802 March 3, 2000
PRISCILLA L. TAN, petitioner,
vs.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., respondent.
PARDO, J.:
Petitioner Priscilla L. Tan appeals via certiorari from
the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming with
modification 2 the decision of the trial court, 3
ordering respondent to pay petitioner the following
amounts: (1) P15,000.00, as actual damages; (2)
P100,000.00, as moral damages; (3) P50,000.00, as
exemplary damages; (4) P30,000.00, as and for
attorney's fees; and (6) costs.
The case before the Court traces its roots from an
action for damages for breach of contract of air
carriage for failure to deliver petitioner's baggages on
the date of her arrival filed on June 29, 1994 with the
Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 150 against
respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc., a foreign
corporation engaged in the business of air
transportation.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1994, Priscilla L. Tan and Connie Tan
boarded Northwest Airlines Flight 29 in Chicago, U. S.
A. bound for the Philippines, with a stop-over at
Detroit, U. S. A. They arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) on June 1, 1994 at about
10:40 in the evening.
Upon their arrival, petitioner and her companion
Connie Tan found that their baggages were missing.
They returned to the airport in the evening of the
following day and they were informed that their
baggages might still be in another plane in Tokyo,
Japan.
On June 3, 1994, they recovered their baggages and
discovered that some of its contents were destroyed
and soiled.
Claiming that they "suffered mental anguish,
sleepless nights and great damage" because of
Northwest's failure to inform them in advance that
their baggages would not be loaded on the same
flight they boarded and because of their delayed
arrival, they demanded from Northwest Airlines
compensation for the damages they suffered. On
June 15, 1994 and June 22, 1994, petitioner sent
demand letters to Northwest Airlines, but the latter did
not respond. Hence, the filing of the case with the
regional trial court.
In its answer to the complaint, respondent Northwest
Airlines did not deny that the baggages of petitioners
were not loaded on Northwest Flight 29. Petitioner's
baggages could not be carried on the same flight
because of "weight and balance restrictions."
However, the baggages were loaded in another
Northwest Airlines flight, which arrived in the evening
of June 2, 1994.
When petitioner received her baggages in damaged
condition, Northwest offered to either (1) reimburse
the cost or repair of the bags; or (2) reimburse the
cost for the purchase of new bags, upon submission
of receipts.
After due trial, on June 10, 1996, the trial court
rendered decision finding respondent Northwest
Airlines, Inc. liable for damages, as follows:
WHEREFORE judgment is rendered ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the following amounts:
1. P15,000.00, as actual damages;
2. P100,000.00, as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
4. P30,000.00, as and for attorney's fees and
5. Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Given this 10th day of June, 1996 at Makati City.
ERNA FALLORAN ALIPOSA
Judge4
Respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc. appealed from
the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals
contending that the court a quo erred in finding it
guilty of breach of contract of carriage and of willful
misconduct and awarded damages which had no
basis in fact or were otherwise excessive.
On September 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision partially granting the appeal
by deleting the award of moral and exemplary
damages and reducing the attorney's fees, specifically
providing that:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
appeal is hereby GRANTED partially. The Decision of
the lower court dated June 10, 1996 is AFFIRMED
with the modification that the award of moral and
exemplary damages is deleted and the amount of
attorney's fees is reduced to ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00).
No pronouncement as to costs.
27

SO ORDERED. 5
Hence, this appeal. 6
The issue is whether respondent is liable for moral
and exemplary damages for willful misconduct and
breach of the contract of air carriage.
The petition is without merit.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent
was not guilty of willful misconduct. "For willful
misconduct to exist there must be a showing that the
acts complained of were impelled by an intention to
violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of
one's rights. It must be evidenced by a flagrantly or
shamefully wrong or improper conduct." 7
Contrary to petitioner's contention, there was nothing
in the conduct of respondent which showed that they
were motivated by malice or bad faith in loading her
baggages on another plane. Due to weight and
balance restrictions, as a safety measure, respondent
airline had to transport the baggages on a different
flight, but with the same expected date and time of
arrival in the Philippines. As aptly explained by
respondent:
To ensure the safety of each flight, Northwest's
personnel determine every flight's compliance with
"weight and balance restrictions." They check the
factors like weight of the aircraft used for the flight gas
input, passenger and crew load, baggage weight, all
in relation to the wind factor anticipated on the flight. If
there is an overload, i.e., a perceived safety risk, the
aircraft's load will be reduced by off-loading cargo,
which will then be placed on the next available flight.
8 and exemplary damages and reduced the attorney's
It is admitted that respondent failed to deliver
petitioner's luggages on time. However, there was no
showing of malice in such failure. By its concern for
safety, respondent had to ship the baggages in
another flight with the same date of arrival.
Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly held that
respondent did not act in bad faith. 9
"Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of known duty through some motive or interest
or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud." 10
"Where in breaching the contract of carriage the
defendant airline is not shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is
limited to the natural and probable consequences of
the breach of obligation which the parties had
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In that
case, such liability does not include moral and
exemplary damages." 11
Consequently, we have no reason to reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for lack
of merit. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
Court of Appeals deleting, however, the award of
attorney's fees.1âwphi1.nêt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 In CA-G. R. CV No. 54438, decision promulgated
on September 30, 1998, Justice Martin, Jr., ponente,
and Justices Callejo, Sr. and Umali, concurring.
2 The Court of Appeals deleted the award of moral
fees to P10,000.00.
3 In Civil Case No. 94-2042, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 150, Makati City, Judge Erna Falloran
Aliposa, presiding.
4 Trial Court's Decision, Rollo, p. 41.
5 Court of Appeal's Decision, Rollo. p. 34.
6 Filed on October 21, 1996, Rollo, pp. 5-20.
7 Luna vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 107, 113
[1992].
8 Respondent's Comment, Rollo, pp. 60-78, at p. 64.
9 Sarkies Tours Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
280 SCRA 58 [1997].
10 Ford Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267
SCRA 320 [1997]; Llorente, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
287 SCRA 382 [1998].
11 Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals,
219 SCRA 520, 526 [1993].
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 71929 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 9
ALITALIA, Petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and FELIPA E. PABLO,
Respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
Dr. Felipa Pablo — an associate professor in the
University of the Philippines, 1 and a research
grantee of the Philippine Atomic Energy Agency —
was invited to take part at a meeting of the
Department of Research and Isotopes of the Joint
FAO-IAEA Division of Atomic Energy in Food and
Agriculture of the United Nations in Ispra, Italy. 2 She
was invited in view of her specialized knowledge in
"foreign substances in food and the agriculture
environment." She accepted the invitation, and was
then scheduled by the organizers, to read a paper on
"The Fate of Radioactive Fusion Products
Contaminating Vegetable Crops." 3 The program
28
announced that she would be the second speaker on
the first day of the meeting. 4 To fulfill this
engagement, Dr. Pablo booked passage on petitioner
airline, ALITALIA.
She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting in
accordance with the itinerary and time table set for
her by ALITALIA. She was however told by the
ALITALIA personnel there at Milan that her luggage
was "delayed inasmuch as the same . . . (was) in one
of the succeeding flights from Rome to Milan." 5 Her
luggage consisted of two (2) suitcases: one contained
her clothing and other personal items; the other, her
scientific papers, slides and other research material.
But the other flights arriving from Rome did not have
her baggage on board.
By then feeling desperate, she went to Rome to try to
locate her bags herself. There, she inquired about her
suitcases in the domestic and international airports,
and filled out the forms prescribed by ALITALIA for
people in her predicament. However, her baggage
could not be found. Completely distraught and
discouraged, she returned to Manila without attending
the meeting in Ispra, Italy. : nad
Once back in Manila she demanded that ALITALIA
make reparation for the damages thus suffered by
her. ALITALIA offered her "free airline tickets to
compensate her for any alleged damages. . . ." She
rejected the offer, and forthwith commenced the
action 6 which has given rise to the present appellate
proceedings.
As it turned out, Prof. Pablo's suitcases were in fact
located and forwarded to Ispra, 7 Italy, but only on the
day after her scheduled appearance and participation
at the U.N. meeting there. 8 Of course Dr. Pablo was
no longer there to accept delivery; she was already on
her way home to Manila. And for some reason or
other, the suitcases were not actually restored to Prof.
Pablo by ALITALIA until eleven (11) months later, and
four (4) months after institution of her action. 9
After appropriate proceedings and trial, the Court of
First Instance rendered judgment in Dr. Pablo's favor:
10
"(1) Ordering the defendant (ALITALIA) to pay . . .
(her) the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, by way of nominal
damages;
(2) Ordering the defendant to pay . . . (her) the sum of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), Philippine
Currency, as and for attorney's fees; (and)
(3) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of the
suit."
ALITALIA appealed to the Intermediate Appellate
Court but failed to obtain a reversal of the judgment.
11 Indeed, the Appellate Court not only affirmed the
Trial Court's decision but also increased the award of
nominal damages payable by ALITALIA to
P40,000.00. 12 That increase it justified as follows: 13
"Considering the circumstances, as found by the Trial
Court and the negligence committed by defendant,
the amount of P20,000.00 under present inflationary
conditions as awarded . . . to the plaintiff as nominal
damages, is too little to make up for the plaintiff's
frustration and disappointment in not being able to
appear at said conference; and for the
embarrassment and humiliation she suffered from the
academic community for failure to carry out an official
mission for which she was singled out by the faculty
to represent her institution and the country. After
weighing carefully all the considerations, the amount
awarded to the plaintiff for nominal damages and
attorney's fees should be increased to the cost of her
round trip air fare or at the present rate of peso to the
dollar at P40,000,00."
ALITALIA has appealed to this Court on Certiorari.
Here, it seeks to make basically the same points it
tried to make before the Trial Court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court, i.e.:
1) that the Warsaw Convention should have been
applied to limit ALITALIA'S liability; and
2) that there is no warrant in fact or in law for the
award to Dr. Pablo of nominal damages and
attorney's fees. 14
In addition, ALITALIA postulates that it was error for
the Intermediate Appellate Court to have refused to
pass on all the assigned errors and in not stating the
facts and the law on which its decision is based. 15
Under the Warsaw Convention, 16 an air carrier is
made liable for damages for:
1) the death, wounding or other bodily injury of a
passenger if the accident causing it took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of its operations of
embarking or disembarking; 17
2) the destruction or loss of, or damage to, any
registered luggage or goods, if the occurrence
causing it took place during the carriage by air;" 18
and
3) delay in the transportation by air of passengers,
luggage or goods. 19
In these cases, it is provided in the Convention that
the "action for damages, however, founded, can only
be brought subject to conditions and limits set out"
therein. 20
The Convention also purports to limit the liability of
the carriers in the following manner: 21
1. In the carriage of passengers the liability of the
carrier for each passenger is limited to the sum of
250,000 francs . . . Nevertheless, by special contract,
the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher
limit of liability.: nad
2. a) In the carriage of registered baggage and of
cargo, the liability of the carrier is limited to a sum of
250 francs per kilogramme, unless the passenger or
consignor has made, at the time when the package
was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration
of interest in delivery at destination and has paid a
supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that
case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not
exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that
sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor
at delivery.
b) In the case of loss, damage or delay of part of
registered baggage or cargo, or of any object
contained therein, the weight to be taken into
consideration in determining the amount to which the
carrier's liability is limited shall be only the total weight
of the package or packages concerned. Nevertheless,
when the loss, damage or delay of a part of the
29
registered baggage or cargo, or of an object
contained therein, affects the value of other packages
covered by the same baggage check or the same air
way bill, the total weight of such package or packages
shall also be taken into consideration in determining
the limit of liability.
3. As regards objects of which the passenger takes
charge himself the liability of the carrier is limited to
5000 francs per passenger.
4. The limits prescribed . . shall not prevent the court
from awarding, in accordance with its own law, in
addition, the whole or part of the court costs and of
the other expenses of litigation incurred by the
plaintiff. The foregoing provision shall not apply if the
amount of the damages awarded, excluding court
costs and other expenses of the litigation, does not
exceed the sum which the carrier has offered in
writing to the plaintiff within a period of six months
from the date of the occurrence causing the damage,
or before the commencement of the action, if that is
later.
The Warsaw Convention however denies to the
carrier availment "of the provisions which exclude or
limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful
misconduct or by such default on his part as, in
accordance with the law of the court seized of the
case, is considered to be equivalent to wilful
misconduct," or "if the damage is (similarly) caused . .
by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of
his employment." 22 The Hague Protocol amended
the Warsaw Convention by removing the provision
that if the airline took all necessary steps to avoid the
damage, it could exculpate itself completely, 23 and
declaring the stated limits of liability not applicable "if
it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or
omission of the carrier, its servants or agents, done
with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result." The
same deletion was effected by the Montreal
Agreement of 1966, with the result that a passenger
could recover unlimited damages upon proof of wilful
misconduct. 24
The Convention does not thus operate as an
exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline's
liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that
liability. Such a proposition is not borne out by the
language of the Convention, as this Court has now,
and at an earlier time, pointed out. 25 Moreover,
slight reflection readily leads to the conclusion that it
should be deemed a limit of liability only in those
cases where the cause of the death or injury to
person, or destruction, loss or damage to property or
delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended
by any wilful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or
otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official
or employee for which the carrier is responsible, and
there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form of
resulting injury. The Convention's provisions, in short,
do not "regulate or exclude liability for other breaches
of contract by the carrier" 26 or misconduct of its
officers and employees, or for some particular or
exceptional type of damage. Otherwise, "an air carrier
would be exempt from any liability for damages in the
event of its absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply
with a contract of carriage, which is absurd." 27 Nor
may it for a moment be supposed that if a member of
the aircraft complement should inflict some physical
injury on a passenger, or maliciously destroy or
damage the latter's property, the Convention might
successfully be pleaded as the sole gauge to
determine the carrier's liability to the passenger.
Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the
disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage
resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery
therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. It is
in this sense that the Convention has been applied, or
ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by
each case.:-cralaw
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. I.A.C., 28 for
example, the Warsaw Convention was applied as
regards the limitation on the carrier's liability, there
being a simple loss of baggage without any otherwise
improper conduct on the part of the officials or
employees of the airline or other special injury
sustained by the passenger.
On the other hand, the Warsaw Convention has
invariably been held inapplicable, or as not restrictive
of the carrier's liability, where there was satisfactory
evidence of malice or bad faith attributable to its
officers and employees. 29 Thus, an air carrier was
sentenced to pay not only compensatory but also
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees,
for instance, where its employees rudely put a
passenger holding a first-class ticket in the tourist or
economy section, 30 or ousted a brown Asiatic from
the plane to give his seat to a white man, 31 or gave
the seat of a passenger with a confirmed reservation
to another, 32 or subjected a passenger to extremely
rude, even barbaric treatment, as by calling him a
"monkey." 33
In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper
conduct may be ascribed to the employees of
petitioner airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage was
eventually returned to her, belatedly, it is true, but
without appreciable damage. The fact is,
nevertheless, that some special species of injury was
caused to Dr. Pablo because petitioner ALITALIA
misplaced her baggage and failed to deliver it to her
at the time appointed — a breach of its contract of
carriage, to be sure — with the result that she was
unable to read the paper and make the scientific
presentation (consisting of slides, autoradiograms or
films, tables and tabulations) that she had
painstakingly labored over, at the prestigious
international conference, to attend which she had
traveled hundreds of miles, to her chagrin and
embarrassment and the disappointment and
annoyance of the organizers. She felt, not
unreasonably, that the invitation for her to participate
at the conference, extended by the Joint FAO/IAEA
Division of Atomic Energy in Food and Agriculture of
the United Nations, was a singular honor not only to
herself, but to the University of the Philippines and the
country as well, an opportunity to make some sort of
impression among her colleagues in that field of
scientific activity. The opportunity to claim this honor
or distinction was irretrievably lost to her because of
Alitalia's breach of its contract.
Apart from this, there can be no doubt that Dr. Pablo
underwent profound distress and anxiety, which
gradually turned to panic and finally despair, from the
time she learned that her suitcases were missing up
to the time when, having gone to Rome, she finally
realized that she would no longer be able to take part
in the conference. As she herself put it, she "was
really shocked and distraught and confused."
Certainly, the compensation for the injury suffered by
Dr. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be
restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw
Convention for delay in the transport of baggage.
30
She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for
loss or damage to her luggage. As already
mentioned, her baggage was ultimately delivered to
her in Manila, tardily but safely. She is however
entitled to nominal damages — which, as the law
says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered — and this Court agrees that the respondent
Court of Appeals correctly set the amount thereof at
P40,000.00. As to the purely technical argument that
the award to her of such nominal damages is
precluded by her omission to include a specific claim
therefor in her complaint, it suffices to draw attention
to her general prayer, following her plea for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees, "for such
other and further just and equitable relief in the
premises," which certainly is broad enough to
comprehend an application as well for nominal
damages. Besides, petitioner should have realized
that the explicit assertion, and proof, that Dr. Pablo's
right had been violated or invaded by it — absent any
claim for actual or compensatory damages, the prayer
thereof having been voluntarily deleted by Dr. Pablo
upon the return to her of her baggage — necessarily
raised the issue of nominal damages.: rd
This Court also agrees that respondent Court of
Appeals correctly awarded attorney's fees to Dr.
Pablo, and the amount of P5,000.00 set by it is
reasonable in the premises. The law authorizes
recovery of attorney's fees inter alia where, as here,
"the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest," 34 or "where the
court deems it just and equitable." 35
WHEREFORE, no error being perceived in the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals, it
appearing on the contrary to be entirely in accord with
the facts and the law, said decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Endnotes
1. Teaching such natural science subjects as
Botany, Biology and Plant Physiology.
2. Rollo, p. 36.
3. Ibid, reference being made to Exhs. "A-2-a" and
"A-2-b".
4. This was on November 6, 1972.
5. Rollo, p. 88.
6. On June 7, 1973 (Rollo, p. 90).
7. Specifically to the Hotel Europa, as indicated by
Prof. Pablo (Rollo, pp. 88-89).
8. Rollo, p. 89. The baggage arrived on Nov. 7,
1972; but by that time, Prof Pablo had already left
Rome for Hongkong.
9. Delivery appears to have been effected on
October 17, 1973 (Rollo, p. 136).
10. Rollo, p. 43: Record on Appeal, pp. 61-62. The
decision was written by Judge Ricardo D. Galano and
is dated February 2, 1975.
11. Its appeal was docketed as AC-G.R. CV No.
59501.
12. Rollo, pp. 35-39. The decision was written for the
Second Civil Cases Division by Campos, Jr, J., with
whom concurred Pascual, Camilon and Jurado, JJ.
13. Id., pp. 38-39.
14. Id., pp. 91-92.
15. Id., p. 91.
16. Full title: "Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed
at Warsaw, October 12, 1929" (League of Nations —
Treaty Series), coming into force on Feb. 13, 1933,
adhered to by the Republic of the Philippines on Nov.
9, 1950 with reservation; the Philippines deposited the
Instrument of Adherence with the Polish Government
on Nov. 9, 1950; and the Convention entered into
force for the Philippines on Feb. 7, 1951 (Philippine
Treaties Index [1946-1982] citing 137 League of
Nations Treaties Series 11). The Warsaw Convention
was amended by (1) the Hague Protocol on
September 28, 1955 (Id., and United Nations, Treaty
Series, Vol. 261, p. 423 and Vol. 266, p. 444),
entering into force for the Philippines on February 28,
1967; (2) the Montreal Agreement in 1966, of which
the Philippine Airlines and Alitalia are signatories; (3)
the Guatemala Protocol in 1971 (apparently not
adhered to by IATA members); and (4) the Montreal
Protocols (Numbered 3 and 4) (1975) (also apparently
not effective among IATA members).
17. ART. 17.
18. ART. 18 (par. 1), "transportation by air" being
defined as "the period during which the baggage or
goods are in charge of the carrier whether in an
airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a
landing outside an airport, in any place whatever," but
not where said baggage or goods are transported by
land, sea or river outside an airport unless it be in "the
performance of a contract for transportation by air for
the purpose of loading, delivery or transshipment
(pars. 2 and 3, ART. 18).
19. ART. 19.
20. ART. 24, which also states that with regard to
Article 17, the application of the rule is "without
prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons
who have the right to bring suit and what are their
respective rights."
21. ART. 22, as amended by the Hague Protocol,
supra; the Montreal Agreement of 1966 set the
limitation of damages at $75,000 per passenger; the
Guatemala Protocol, 1971, boosted the limit to
$100,000 per passenger, liability for baggage was
increased to $1,000, and the right to bring suit was
expanded.
22. ART. 25.
23. ART. 20 (1). "The carrier is not liable if he proves
that he and his agents have taken all necessary
31
measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for him or them to take such measures."
24. Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F 2d 508
[2nd Cir. 1966] aff'd 390 US 455 [1968], rehearing
denied 397 US 939 [1968] and Egan v. Kallsman
Instrument Corp., 21 NY 2d 160, 287 NYS 2d 14
[1967]; CERT. DENIED 390 US 1039 [1968].
25. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Cuenca, 14 SCRA 1065
(1965) which inter alia states that the Convention
"merely declares the carrier liable for damages in the
enumerated cases, if the conditions therein specified
are present.".
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 164 SCRA 268, citing Ong Yiu v. C.A. 91 SCRA
223; SEE Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (DC
NM), 368 F. Supp. 1152 holding that the airline was
not responsible to its passengers for mere mental
anguish sustained as a result of the hijacking, in the
absence of physical injuries.
29. SEE KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Tuller, 119 App.
DC 282, 292 F 2d 775, cert den 368 US 921, 7 L Ed
2d 136, 82 S Ct 243; American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen,
87 App DC 307, 186 F 2d 529; Goepp v. American
Overseas Airlines, Inc., 281 App Div 105, 117 NYS 2d
276, affd. 305 NY 830, 114 NE 2d 37, cert den 346
US 874, 98 L Ed 382, 74 S Ct 124.
30. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Cuenca, 14 SCRA
1063; Lopez v. Pan Am, 16 SCRA 43.
31. Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155. In
Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 64 SCRA
610 (1975), plaintiff's seat in the first-class section
was given to a Belgian, and consequently plaintiff,
who held a first-class ticket, confirmed and validated,
was relegated to a tourist or economy-class seat.
32. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. C.A., 154 SCRA 211;
see also, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. C.A., 65 SCRA
237.
33. Zulueta v. Pan Am, 43 SCRA 397.
34. Civil Code, ART. 2208, par. (2); see Rivera v.
Litum & Co., Inc., 4 SCRA 1072 (1962); Filipino Pipe
& Foundry Corporation v. Central Bank, 23 SCRA
1044 (1968); Ganaban v. Bayle, 30 SCRA 365
(1969); Valenzuela v. CA., G.R. No. 56168, Dec. 22,
1988.
35. Id., id., par (11); see Civil Aeronautics
Administration v. C.A., G.R. No. 51806, Nov. 8, 1988.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 95536 March 23, 1992
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., MARIA SALVACION
SALUDO, LEOPOLDO G. SALUDO and
SATURNINO G. SALUDO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TRANS WORLD
AIRLINES, INC., and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the
decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 20951 of respondent
Court of Appeals1 which affirmed the decision of the
trial court2 dismissing for lack of evidence herein
petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No R-2101 of the
then Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch
I.
The facts, as recounted by the court a quo and
adopted by respondent court after "considering the
evidence on record," are as follows:
After the death of plaintiffs' mother, Crispina Galdo
Saludo, in Chicago Illinois, (on) October 23, 1976
(Exh. A), Pomierski and Son Funeral Home of
Chicago, made the necessary preparations and
arrangements for the shipment, of the remains from
Chicago to the Philippines. The funeral home had the
remains embalmed (Exb. D) and secured a permit for
the disposition of dead human body on October 25,
1976 (Exh. C), Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago,
Illinois, Bienvenido M. Llaneta, at 3:00 p.m. on
October 26, 1976 at the Pomierski & Son Funeral
Home, sealed the shipping case containing a
hermetically sealed casket that is airtight and
waterproof wherein was contained the remains of
Crispina Saludo Galdo (sic) (Exb. B). On the same
date, October 26, 1976, Pomierski brought the
remains to C.M.A.S. (Continental Mortuary Air
Services) at the airport (Chicago) which made the
necessary arrangements such as flights, transfers,
etc.; C.M.A.S. is a national service used by
undertakers to throughout the nation (U.S.A.), they
furnish the air pouch which the casket is enclosed in,
and they see that the remains are taken to the proper
air freight terminal (Exh. 6-TWA). C.M.A.S. booked
the shipment with PAL thru the carrier's agent Air
Care International, with Pomierski F.H. as the shipper
and Mario (Maria) Saludo as the consignee. PAL
Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 Ordinary was issued
wherein the requested routing was from Chicago to
San Francisco on board TWA Flight 131 of October
27, 1976 and from San Francisco to Manila on board
PAL Flight No. 107 of the same date, and from Manila
to Cebu on board PAL Flight 149 of October 29, 1976
(See Exh. E., Also Exh. 1-PAL).
In the meantime, plaintiffs Maria Salvacion Saludo
and Saturnino Saludo, thru a travel agent, were
booked with United Airlines from Chicago to
California, and with PAL from California to Manila.
She then went to the funeral director of Pomierski
Funeral Home who had her mother's remains and she
told the director that they were booked with United
Airlines. But the director told her that the remains
were booked with TWA flight to California. This upset
her, and she and her brother had to change
reservations from UA to the TWA flight after she
confirmed by phone that her mother's remains should
be on that TWA flight. They went to the airport and
watched from the look-out area. She saw no body
being brought. So, she went to the TWA counter
again, and she was told there was no body on that
flight. Reluctantly, they took the TWA flight upon
assurance of her cousin, Ani Bantug, that he would
look into the matter and inform her about it on the
plane or have it radioed to her. But no confirmation
32
from her cousin reached her that her mother was on
the West Coast.
Upon arrival at San Francisco at about 5:00 p.m., she
went to the TWA counter there to inquire about her
mother's remains. She was told they did not know
anything about it.
She then called Pomierski that her mother's remains
were not at the West Coast terminal, and Pomierski
immediately called C.M.A.S., which in a matter of 10
minutes informed him that the remains were on a
plane to Mexico City, that there were two bodies at
the terminal, and somehow they were switched; he
relayed this information to Miss Saludo in California;
later C.M.A.S. called and told him they were sending
the remains back to California via Texas (see Exh. 6-
TWA).
It-turned out that TWA had carried a shipment under
PAL Airway Bill No. 079-ORD-01180454 on TWA
Flight 603 of October 27, 1976, a flight earlier than
TWA Flight 131 of the same date. TWA delivered or
transferred the said shipment said to contain human
remains to PAL at 1400H or 2:00 p.m. of the same
date, October 27, 1976 (Bee Exh. 1- TWA). "Due to a
switch(ing) in Chicago", this shipment was withdrawn
from PAL by CMAS at 1805H (or 6:05 p.m.) of the
same date, October 27 (Exh. 3-PAL, see Exh. 3-a-
PAL).
What transpired at the Chicago (A)irport is explained
in a memo or incident report by Pomierski (Exh. 6-
TWA) to Pomierski's lawyers who in turn referred to
said' memo and enclosed it in their (Pomierski's
lawyers) answer dated July 18, 1981 to herein
plaintiff's counsel (See Exh. 5-TWA). In that memo or
incident report (Exh. 6-TWA), it is stated that the
remains (of Crispina Saludo) were taken to CMAS at
the airport; that there were two bodies at the (Chicago
Airport) terminal, and somehow they were switched,
that the remains (of Crispina Saludo) were on a plane
to Mexico City; that CMAS is a national service used
by undertakers throughout the nation (U.S.A.), makes
all the necessary arrangements, such as flights,
transfers, etc., and see(s) to it that the remains are
taken to the proper air freight terminal.
The following day October 28, 1976, the shipment or
remains of Crispina Saludo arrived (in) San Francisco
from Mexico on board American Airlines. This
shipment was transferred to or received by PAL at
1945H or 7:45 p.m. (Exh. 2-PAL, Exh. 2-a-PAL). This
casket bearing the remains of Crispina Saludo, which
was mistakenly sent to Mexico and was opened
(there), was resealed by Crispin F. Patagas for
shipment to the Philippines (See Exh. B-1). The
shipment was immediately loaded on PAL flight for
Manila that same evening and arrived (in) Manila on
October 30, 1976, a day after its expected arrival on
October 29, 1976.3
In a letter dated December 15, 1976,4 petitioners'
counsel informed private respondent Trans World
Airlines (TWA) of the misshipment and eventual delay
in the delivery of the cargo containing the remains of
the late Crispin Saludo, and of the discourtesy of its
employees to petitioners Maria Salvacion Saludo and
Saturnino Saludo. In a separate letter on June 10,
1977 addressed to co-respondent Philippine Airlines
(PAL),5 petitioners stated that they were holding PAL
liable for said delay in delivery and would commence
judicial action should no favorable explanation be
given.
Both private respondents denied liability. Thus, a
damage suit6 was filed by petitioners before the then
Court of First Instance, Branch III, Leyte, praying for
the award of actual damages of P50,000.00, moral
damages of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and costs of suit.
As earlier stated, the court below absolved the two
respondent airlines companies of liability. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court in
toto, and in a subsequent resolution,7 denied herein
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
In predictable disagreement and dissatisfaction with
the conclusions reached by respondent appellate
court, petitioners now urge this Court to review the
appealed decision and to resolve whether or not (1)
the delay in the delivery of the casketed remains of
petitioners' mother was due to the fault of respondent
airline companies, (2) the one-day delay in the
delivery of the same constitutes contractual breach as
would entitle petitioners to damages, (3) damages are
recoverable by petitioners for the humiliating, arrogant
and indifferent acts of the employees of TWA and
PAL, and (4) private respondents should be held
liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages, aside
from attorney's fees and litigation expenses.8
At the outset and in view of the spirited exchanges of
the parties on this aspect, it is to be stressed that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition filed in
this Court to review on certiorari the decision of the
Court of Appeals.9 This being so, the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The rule,
however, admits of established exceptions, to wit: (a)
where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the
finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
or conjectures;(c) when the inference made is
manifestly-mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when
the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual
findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; 10 (g) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; 11
and (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are
mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence,
or where the facts of set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record. 12
To distinguish, a question of law is one which involves
a doubt or controversy on what the law is on a certain
state of facts; and, a question of fact, contrarily, is one
in which there is a doubt or difference as to the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts. 13 One test, it has
been held, is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question
of law, otherwise it will be a question of fact.14
Respondent airline companies object to the present
recourse of petitioners on the ground that this petition
raises only factual questions. 15 Petitioners maintain
otherwise or, alternatively, they are of the position
that, assuming that the petition raises factual
questions, the same are within the recognized
33
exceptions to the general rule as would render the
petition cognizable and worthy of review by the Court.
16
Since it is precisely the soundness of the inferences
or conclusions that may be drawn from the factual
issues which are here being assayed, we find that the
issues raised in the instant petition indeed warrant a
second look if this litigation is to come to a reasonable
denouement. A discussion seriatim of said issues will
further reveal that the sequence of the events
involved is in effect disputed. Likewise to be settled is
whether or not the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals subject of this review indeed find evidentiary
and legal support.
I. Petitioners fault respondent court for "not
finding that private respondents failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence required by law which resulted
in the switching and/or misdelivery of the remains of
Crispina Saludo to Mexico causing gross delay in its
shipment to the Philippines, and consequently,
damages to petitioners." 17
Petitioner allege that private respondents received the
casketed remains of petitioners' mother on October
26, 1976, as evidenced by the issuance of PAL Air
Waybill No. 079-01180454 18 by Air Care
International as carrier's agent; and from said date,
private respondents were charged with the
responsibility to exercise extraordinary diligence so
much so that for the alleged switching of the caskets
on October 27, 1976, or one day after private
respondents received the cargo, the latter must
necessarily be liable.
To support their assertion, petitioners rely on the
jurisprudential dictum, both under American and
Philippine law, that "(t)he issuance of a bill of lading
carries the presumption that the goods were delivered
to the carrier issuing the bill, for immediate shipment,
and it is nowhere questioned that a bill of lading is
prima facie evidence of the receipt of the goods by
the carrier. . . . In the absence of convincing testimony
establishing mistake, recitals in the bill of lading
showing that the carrier received the goods for
shipment on a specified date control (13 C.J.S. 235)."
19
A bill of lading is a written acknowledgment of the
receipt of the goods and an agreement to transport
and deliver them at a specified place to a person
named or on his order. Such instrument may be
called a shipping receipt, forwarder's receipt and
receipt for transportation. 20 The designation,
however, is immaterial. It has been hold that freight
tickets for bus companies as well as receipts for cargo
transported by all forms of transportation, whether by
sea or land, fall within the definition. Under the Tariff
and Customs Code, a bill of lading includes airway
bills of lading. 21 The two-fold character of a bill of
lading is all too familiar; it is a receipt as to the
quantity and description of the goods shipped and a
contract to transport the goods to the consignee or
other person therein designated, on the terms
specified in such instrument. 22
Logically, since a bill of lading acknowledges receipt
of goods to be transported, delivery of the goods to
the carrier normally precedes the issuance of the bill;
or, to some extent, delivery of the goods and issuance
of the bill are regarded in commercial practice as
simultaneous acts. 23 However, except as may be
prohibited by law, there is nothing to prevent an
inverse order of events, that is, the execution of the
bill of lading even prior to actual possession and
control by the carrier of the cargo to be transported.
There is no law which requires that the delivery of the
goods for carriage and the issuance of the covering
bill of lading must coincide in point of time or, for that
matter, that the former should precede the latter.
Ordinarily, a receipt is not essential to a complete
delivery of goods to the carrier for transportation but,
when issued, is competent and prima facie, but not
conclusive, evidence of delivery to the carrier. A bill of
lading, when properly executed and delivered to a
shipper, is evidence that the carrier has received the
goods described therein for shipment. Except as
modified by statute, it is a general rule as to the
parties to a contract of carriage of goods in
connection with which a bill of lading is issued reciting
that goods have been received for transportation, that
the recital being in essence a receipt alone, is not
conclusive, but may be explained, varied or
contradicted by parol or other evidence. 24
While we agree with petitioners' statement that "an
airway bill estops the carrier from denying receipt of
goods of the quantity and quality described in the bill,"
a further reading and a more faithful quotation of the
authority cited would reveal that "(a) bill of lading may
contain constituent elements of estoppel and thus
become something more than a contract between the
shipper and the carrier. . . . (However), as between
the shipper and the carrier, when no goods have been
delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop
the carrier from showing the true facts . . . Between
the consignor of goods and receiving carrier, recitals
in a bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a
rebuttable presumption that such goods were
delivered for shipment. As between the consignor and
a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital."
25 (Emphasis supplied)
For this reason, we must perforce allow explanation
by private respondents why, despite the issuance of
the airway bill and the date thereof, they deny having
received the remains of Crispina Saludo on October
26, 1976 as alleged by petitioners.
The findings of the trial court, as favorably adopted by
the Court of Appeals and which we have earner
quoted, provide us with the explanation that
sufficiently over comes the presumption relied on by
petitioners in insisting that the remains of their mother
were delivered to and received by private
respondents on October 26, 1976. Thus —
. . . Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago, Illinois,
Bienvenido M. Llaneta, at 3:00 p.m. on October 26,
1976 at the Pomierski & Son Funeral Home, sealed
the shipping case containing a hermetically sealed
casket that is airtight and waterproof wherein was
contained the remains of Crispina Saludo Galdo (sic)
(Exh. B). On the same date October 26, 1976,
Pomierski brought the remains to C.M.A.S.
(Continental Mortuary Air Services) at the airport
(Chicago) which made the necessary arrangements
such as flights, transfers, etc; C.M.A.S. is a national
service used by undertakers throughout the nation
(U.S.A.), they furnish the air pouch which the casket
is enclosed in, and they see that the remains are
taken to the proper air freight terminal (Exh. G-TWA).
C.M.A.S. booked the shipment with PAL thru the
carrier's agent Air Care International, with Pomierski
F.H. as the shipper and Mario (Maria) Saludo as the
consignee. PAL Airway Bill No. 079- 01180454
Ordinary was issued wherein the requested routing
34
was from Chicago to San Francisco on board TWA
Flight-131 of October 27;1976, and from San
Francisco to Manila on board PAL Flight No. 107 of
the same date, and from Manila to Cebu on board
PAL Flight 149 of October 29, 1976 (See Exh. E, also
Exh. 1-PAL).26 (Emphasis ours.)
Moreover, we are persuaded to believe private
respondent PAL's account as to what transpired
October 26, 1976:
. . . Pursuant thereto, on 26 October 1976, CMAS
acting upon the instruction of Pomierski, F.H., the
shipper requested booking of the casketed remains of
Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo on board PAL's San
Francisco-Manila Flight No. PR 107 on October 27,
1976.
2. To signify acceptance and confirmation of
said booking, PAL issued to said Pomierski F.H., PAL
Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 dated October 27, 1976
(sic, "10/26/76"). PAL confirmed the booking and
transporting of the shipment on board of its Flight PR
107 on October 27, 1976 on the basis of the
representation of the shipper and/or CMAS that the
said cargo would arrive in San Francisco from
Chicago on board United Airlines Flight US 121 on 27
October 1976.27
In other words, on October 26, 1976 the cargo
containing the casketed remains of Crispina Saludo
was booked for PAL Flight Number PR-107 leaving
San Francisco for Manila on October 27, 1976, PAL
Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 was issued, not as
evidence of receipt of delivery of the cargo on
October 26, 1976, but merely as a confirmation of the
booking thus made for the San Francisco-Manila flight
scheduled on October 27, 1976. Actually, it was not
until October 28, 1976 that PAL received physical
delivery of the body at San Francisco, as duly
evidenced by the Interline Freight Transfer Manifest of
the American Airline Freight System and signed for by
Virgilio Rosales at 1945H, or 7:45 P.M. on said
date.28
Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code
that the extraordinary responsibility of the common
carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered
to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full force
and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded
or stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner
exercises the right of stoppage in transitu, 29 and
terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time
for the acceptance, of the goods by the consignee or
such other person entitled to receive them. 30 And,
there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are
ready for and have been placed in the exclusive
possession, custody and control of the carrier for the
purpose of their immediate transportation and the
carrier has accepted them. 31 Where such a delivery
has thus been accepted by the carrier, the liability of
the common carrier commences eo instanti. 32
Hence, while we agree with petitioners that the
extraordinary diligence statutorily required to be
observed by the carrier instantaneously commences
upon delivery of the goods thereto, for such duty to
commence there must in fact have been delivery of
the cargo subject of the contract of carriage. Only
when such fact of delivery has been unequivocally
established can the liability for loss, destruction or
deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier,
absent the excepting causes under Article 1734,
attach and the presumption of fault of the carrier
under Article 1735 be invoked.
As already demonstrated, the facts in the case at bar
belie the averment that there was delivery of the
cargo to the carrier on October 26, 1976. Rather, as
earlier explained, the body intended to be shipped as
agreed upon was really placed in the possession and
control of PAL on October 28, 1976 and it was from
that date that private respondents became
responsible for the agreed cargo under their
undertakings in PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454.
Consequently, for the switching of caskets prior
thereto which was not caused by them, and
subsequent events caused thereby, private
respondents cannot be held liable.
Petitioners, proceeding on the premise that there was
delivery of the cargo to private respondents on
October 26,1976 and that the latter's extraordinary
responsibility had by then become operative, insist on
foisting the blame on private respondents for the
switching of the two caskets which occurred on
October 27, 1976. It is argued that since there is no
clear evidence establishing the fault Continental
Mortuary Air Services (CMAS) for the mix-up, private
respondents are presumably negligent pursuant to
Article 1735 of the Civil Code and, for failure to rebut
such presumption, they must necessarily be held
liable; or, assuming that CMAS was at fault, the same
does not absolve private respondents of liability
because whoever brought the cargo to the airport or
loaded it on the plane did so as agent of private
respondents.
This contention is without merit. As pithily explained
by the Court of Appeals:
The airway bill expressly provides that "Carrier
certifies goods described below were received for
carriage", and said cargo was "casketed human
remains of Crispina Saludo," with "Maria Saludo as
Consignee; Pomierski F.H. as Shipper; Air Care
International as carrier's agent." On the face of the
said airway bill, the specific flight numbers, specific
routes of shipment and dates of departure and arrival
were typewritten, to wit: Chicago TWA Flight 131/27
to San Francisco and from San Francisco by PAL 107
on, October 27, 1976 to Philippines and to Cebu via
PAL Flight 149 on October 29, 1976. The airway bill
also contains the following typewritten words, as
follows: all documents have been examined (sic).
Human remains of Crispina Saludo. Please return
back (sic) first available flight to SFO.
But, as it turned out and was discovered later the
casketed human remains which was issued PAL
Airway Bill #079-1180454 was not the remains of
Crispina Saludo, the casket containing her remains
having been shipped to Mexico City.
However, it should be noted that, Pomierski F.H., the
shipper of Mrs. Saludo's remains, hired Continental
Mortuary Services (hereafter referred to as C.M.A.S.),
which is engaged in the business of transporting and
forwarding human remains. Thus, C.M.A.S. made all
the necessary arrangements such as flights,
transfers, etc. — for shipment of the remains of
Crispina Saludo.
The remains were taken on October 26th, 1976, to
C.M.A.S. at the airport. These people made all the
necessary arrangements, such as flights, transfers,
etc. This is a national service used by undertakers
throughout the nation. They furnished the air pouch
which the casket is enclosed in, and they see that the
remains are taken to the proper air frieght terminal. I
35
was very surprised when Miss Saludo called me to
say that the remains were not at the west coast
terminal. I immediately called C.M.A.S. They called
me back in a matter of ten minutes to inform me that
the remains were on a plane to Mexico City. The man
said that there were two bodies at the terminal, and
somehow they were switched. . . . (Exb. 6 — "TWA",
which is the memo or incident report enclosed in the
stationery of Walter Pomierski & Sons Ltd.)
correct shipment containing the body of Crispina For purposes of clarity, Exhibit I is designated as
Saludo was received by PAL only on October 28, Exhibit I-TWA.
1976, at 1945H, or 7:45 P.M., per American Airlines
Interline Freight Transfer Manifest No. AA204312.36 xxx xxx xxx
Witness the deposition of TWA's ramp serviceman, ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
Michael Giosso, on this matter:
This Exhibit I-TWA, could you tell what it is, what it
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.: shows?

Consequently, when the cargo was received from On that date, do (sic) you have occasion to handle or MICHAEL GIOSSO:
C.M.A.S. at the Chicago airport terminal for shipment, deal with the transfer of cargo from TWA Flight No.
which was supposed to contain the remains of 603 to PAL San Francisco? It shows transfer of manifest on 10-27-76 to PAL at
Crispina Saludo, Air Care International and/or TWA, 1400 and verified with two signatures as it completed
had no way of determining its actual contents, since MICHAEL GIOSSO: the transfer.
the casket was hermetically sealed by the Philippine
Vice-Consul in Chicago and in an air pouch of Yes, I did. ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
C.M.A.S., to the effect that Air Care International
and/or TWA had to rely on the information furnished ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.: Very good,. Who was the PAL employee who
by the shipper regarding the cargo's content. Neither received the cargo?
could Air Care International and/or TWA open the What was your participation with the transfer of the
casket for further verification, since they were not only cargo? MICHAEL GIOSSO:
without authority to do so, but even prohibited.
MICHAEL GIOSSO: The name is Garry Marcial." 37
Thus, under said circumstances, no fault and/or
negligence can be attributed to PAL (even if Air Care I manifested the freight on a transfer manifest and The deposition of Alberto A. Lim, PAL's cargo
International should be considered as an agent of physically moved it to PAL and concluded the transfer supervisor at San Francisco, as deponent-witness for
PAL) and/or TWA, the entire fault or negligence being by signing it off. PAL, makes this further clarification:
exclusively with C.M.A.S.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.: ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
It can correctly and logically be concluded, therefore,
that the switching occurred or, more accurately, was You brought it there yourself? You mentioned Airway Bill, Mr. Lim. I am showing to
discovered on October 27, 1976; and based on the you a PAL Airway Bill Number 01180454 which for
above findings of the Court of appeals, it happened MICHAEL GIOSSO: purposes of evidence, I would like to request that the
while the cargo was still with CMAS, well before the same be marked as evidence Exhibit I for PAL.
same was place in the custody of private Yes sir.
respondents. xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. JUAN COLIAS, JR.:
Thus, while the Air Cargo Transfer Manifest of TWA In what circumstances did you encounter Exhibit I-
of October 27, 197634 was signed by Garry Marcial of Do you have anything to show that PAL received the PAL?
PAL at 1400H, or 2:00 P.M., on the same date, cargo from TWA on October 27, 1976?
thereby indicating acknowledgment by PAL of the ALBERTO A. LIM:
transfer to them by TWA of what was in truth the MICHAEL GIOSSO:
erroneous cargo, said misshipped cargo was in fact If I recall correctly, I was queried by Manila, our
withdrawn by CMAS from PAL as shown by the Yes, I do. Manila office with regard to a certain complaint that a
notation on another copy of said manifest35 stating consignee filed that this shipment did not arrive on the
"Received by CMAS — Due to switch in Chicago (Witness presenting a document) day that the consignee expects the shipment to arrive.
10/27-1805H," the authenticity of which was never
challenged. This shows that said misshipped cargo ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.: ATTY CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
was in fact withdrawn by CMAS from PAL and the

36
Okay. Now, upon receipt of that query from your Do you have any proof with you to back the
Manila office, did you conduct any investigation to statement?
pinpoint the possible causes of mishandling?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
ALBERTO A. LIM:
Yes. We have on our records a Transfer Manifest
Yes. from American Airlines Number 204312 showing that
we received a human remains shipment belong to
xxx xxx xxx Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo or the human remains of
Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo.
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
ATTY. CESAR P. MAIALAYSAY:
What is the result of your investigation?
At this juncture, may I request that the Transfer
ALBERTO A. LIM: Manifest referred to by the witness be marked as an
evidence as Exhibit II-PAL.
In the course of my investigation, I found that we
received the body on October 28, 1976, from xxx xxx xxx
American Airlines.
Mr. Lim, yesterday your co-defendant TWA presented
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY: as their Exhibit I evidence tending to show that on
October 27, 1976 at about 2:00 in the, afternoon they
What body are you referring to? delivered to you a cargo bearing human remains.
Could you go over this Exhibit I and please give us
xxx xxx xxx your comments as to that exhibit?
ALBERTO A. LIM: ATTY. ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:
The remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo. That is a vague question. I would rather request that
counsel propound specific questions rather than
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY: asking for comments on Exhibit I-TWA.
Is that the same body mentioned in this Airway Bill? ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
ALBERTO A. LIM: In that case, I will reform my question. Could you tell
us whether TWA in fact delivered to you the human
Yes. remains as indicated in that Transfer Manifest?
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY: ALBERTO A. LIM:
What time did you receive said body on October 28, Yes, they did.
1976?
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
ALBERTO A. LIM:
I noticed that the Transfer Manifest of TWA marked
If I recall correctly, approximately 7:45 of October 28, as Exhibit I-TWA bears the same numbers or the
1976. same entries as the Airway Bill marked as Exhibit I-A
PAL tending to show that this is the human remains of
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY: Mrs Cristina (sic) Saludo. Could you tell us whether
this is true?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
It is true that we received human remains shipment
from TWA as indicated on this Transfer Manifest. But
in the course of investigation, it was found out that the
human remains transferred to us is not the remains of
Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo this is the reason why we
did not board it on our flight. 38
Petitioners consider TWA's statement that "it had to
rely on the information furnished by the shipper" a
lame excuse and that its failure to prove that its
personnel verified and identified the contents of the
casket before loading the same constituted
negligence on the part of TWA.39
We upbold the favorable consideration by the Court of
Appeals of the following findings of the trial court:
It was not (to) TWA, but to C.M.A.S. that the
Pomierski & Son Funeral Home delivered the casket
containing the remains of Crispina Saludo. TWA
would have no knowledge therefore that the remains
of Crispina Saludo were not the ones inside the
casket that was being presented to it for shipment.
TWA would have to rely on there presentations of
C.M.A.S. The casket was hermetically sealed and
also sealed by the Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago.
TWA or any airline for that matter would not have
opened such a sealed casket just for the purpose of
ascertaining whose body was inside and to make sure
that the remains inside were those of the particular
person indicated to be by C.M.A.S. TWA had to
accept whatever information was being furnished by
the shipper or by the one presenting the casket for
shipment. And so as a matter of fact, TWA carried to
San Francisco and transferred to defendant PAL a
shipment covered by or under PAL Airway Bill No.
079-ORD-01180454, the airway bill for the shipment
of the casketed remains of Crispina Saludo. Only, it
turned out later, while the casket was already with
PAL, that what was inside the casket was not the
body of Crispina Saludo so much so that it had to be
withdrawn by C.M.A.S. from PAL. The body of
Crispina Saludo had been shipped to Mexico. The
casket containing the remains of Crispina Saludo was
transshipped from Mexico and arrived in San
Francisco the following day on board American
37
Airlines. It was immediately loaded by PAL on its flight
for Manila.
The foregoing points at C.M.A.S., not defendant TWA
much less defendant PAL, as the ONE responsible for
the switching or mix-up of the two bodies at the
Chicago Airport terminal, and started a chain reaction
of the misshipment of the body of Crispina Saludo
and a one-day delay in the delivery thereof to its
destination.40
Verily, no amount of inspection by respondent airline
companies could have guarded against the switching
that had already taken place. Or, granting that they
could have opened the casket to inspect its contents,
private respondents had no means of ascertaining
whether the body therein contained was indeed that
of Crispina Saludo except, possibly, if the body was
that of a male person and such fact was visually
apparent upon opening the casket. However, to
repeat, private respondents had no authority to unseal
and open the same nor did they have any reason or
justification to resort thereto.
It is the right of the carrier to require good faith on the
part of those persons who deliver goods to be carried,
or enter into contracts with it, and inasmuch as the
freight may depend on the value of the article to be
carried, the carrier ordinarily has the right to inquire as
to its value. Ordinarily, too, it is the duty of the carrier
to make inquiry as to the general nature of the articles
shipped and of their value before it consents to carry
them; and its failure to do so cannot defeat the
shipper's right to recovery of the full value of the
package if lost, in the absence of showing of fraud or
deceit on the part of the shipper. In the absence of
more definite information, the carrier has a the right to
accept shipper's marks as to the contents of the
package offered for transportation and is not bound to
inquire particularly about them in order to take
advantage of a false classification and where a
shipper expressly represents the contents of a
package to be of a designated character, it is not the
duty of the carrier to ask for a repetition of the
statement nor disbelieve it and open the box and see
for itself. 41 However, where a common carrier has
reasonable ground to suspect that the offered goods
are of a dangerous or illegal character, the carrier has
the right to know the character of such goods and to
insist on an inspection, if reasonable and practical
under the circumstances, as a condition of receiving
and transporting such goods.42
It can safely be said then that a common carrier is
entitled to fair representation of the nature and value
of the goods to be carried, with the concomitant right
to rely thereon, and further noting at this juncture that
a carrier has no obligation to inquire into the
correctness or sufficiency of such information. 43 The
consequent duty to conduct an inspection thereof
arises in the event that there should be reason to
doubt the veracity of such representations. Therefore,
to be subjected to unusual search, other than the
routinary inspection procedure customarily
undertaken, there must exist proof that would justify
cause for apprehension that the baggage is
dangerous as to warrant exhaustive inspection, or
even refusal to accept carriage of the same; and it is
the failure of the carrier to act accordingly in the face
of such proof that constitutes the basis of the common
carrier's liability. 44
In the case at bar, private respondents had no reason
whatsoever to doubt the truth of the shipper's
representations. The airway bill expressly providing
that "carrier certifies goods received below were
received for carriage," and that the cargo contained
"casketed human remains of Crispina Saludo," was
issued on the basis of such representations. The
reliance thereon by private respondents was
reasonable and, for so doing, they cannot be said to
have acted negligently. Likewise, no evidence was
adduced to suggest even an iota of suspicion that the
cargo presented for transportation was anything other
than what it was declared to be, as would require
more than routine inspection or call for the carrier to
insist that the same be opened for scrutiny of its
contents per declaration.
Neither can private respondents be held accountable
on the basis of petitioners' preposterous proposition
that whoever brought the cargo to the airport or
loaded it on the airplane did so as agent of private
respondents, so that even if CMAS whose services
were engaged for the transit arrangements for the
remains was indeed at fault, the liability therefor
would supposedly still be attributable to private
respondents.
While we agree that the actual participation of CMAS
has been sufficiently and correctly established, to hold
that it acted as agent for private respondents would
be both an inaccurate appraisal and an unwarranted
categorization of the legal position it held in the entire
transaction.
It bears repeating that CMAS was hired to handle all
the necessary shipping arrangements for the
transportation of the human remains of Crispina
Saludo to Manila. Hence, it was to CMAS that the
Pomierski & Son Funeral Home, as shipper, brought
the remains of petitioners' mother for shipment, with
Maria Saludo as consignee. Thereafter, CMAS
booked the shipment with PAL through the carrier's
agent, Air Care International. 45 With its aforestated
functions, CMAS may accordingly be classified as a
forwarder which, by accepted commercial practice, is
regarded as an agent of the shipper and not of the
carrier. As such, it merely contracts for the
transportation of goods by carriers, and has no
interest in the freight but receives compensation from
the shipper as his agent. 46
At this point, it can be categorically stated that, as
culled from the findings of both the trial court and
appellate courts, the entire chain of events which
culminated in the present controversy was not due to
the fault or negligence of private respondents. Rather,
the facts of the case would point to CMAS as the
culprit. Equally telling of the more likely possibility of
CMAS' liability is petitioners' letter to and demanding
an explanation from CMAS regarding the statement of
private respondents laying the blame on CMAS for
the incident, portions of which, reading as follows:
. . . we were informed that the unfortunate a mix-up
occurred due to your negligence. . . .
Likewise, the two airlines pinpoint the responsibility
upon your agents. Evidence were presented to prove
that allegation.
On the face of this overwhelming evidence we could
and should have filed a case against you. . . . 47
clearly allude to CMAS as the party at fault. This is
tantamount to an admission by petitioners that they
consider private respondents without fault, or is at the
very least indicative of the fact that petitioners
38
entertained serious doubts as to whether herein
private respondents were responsible for the
unfortunate turn of events.
Undeniably, petitioners' grief over the death of their
mother was aggravated by the unnecessary
inconvenience and anxiety that attended their efforts
to bring her body home for a decent burial. This is
unfortunate and calls for sincere commiseration with
petitioners. But, much as we would like to give them
consolation for their undeserved distress, we are
barred by the inequity of allowing recovery of the
damages prayed for by them at the expense of private
respondents whose fault or negligence in the very
acts imputed to them has not been convincingly and
legally demonstrated.
Neither are we prepared to delve into, much less
definitively rule on, the possible liability of CMAS as
the evaluation and adjudication of the same is not
what is presently at issue here and is best deferred to
another time and addressed to another forum.
II. Petitioners further fault the Court of Appeals
for ruling that there was no contractual breach on the
part of private respondents as would entitle petitioners
to damages.
Petitioners hold that respondent TWA, by agreeing to
transport the remains of petitioners' mother on its
Flight 131 from Chicago to San Francisco on October
27, 1976, made itself a party to the contract of
carriage and, therefore, was bound by the terms of
the issued airway bill. When TWA undertook to ship
the remains on its Flight 603, ten hours earlier than
scheduled, it supposedly violated the express
agreement embodied in the airway bill. It was
allegedly this breach of obligation which compounded,
if not directly caused, the switching of the caskets.
In addition, petitioners maintain that since there is no
evidence as to who placed the body on board Flight
603, or that CMAS actually put the cargo on that
flight, or that the two caskets at the Chicago airport
were to be transported by the same airline, or that
they came from the same funeral home, or that both
caskets were received by CMAS, then the employees
or agents of TWA presumably caused the mix-up by
loading the wrong casket on the plane. For said error,
they contend, TWA must necessarily be presumed
negligent and this presumption of negligence stands
undisturbed unless rebutting evidence is presented to
show that the switching or misdelivery was due to
circumstances that would exempt the carrier from
liability.
Private respondent TWA professes otherwise. Having
duly delivered or transferred the cargo to its co-
respondent PAL on October 27, 1976 at 2:00 P.M., as
supported by the TWA Transfer Manifest, TWA
faithfully complied with its obligation under the airway
bill. Said faithful compliance was not affected by the
fact that the remains were shipped on an earlier flight
as there was no fixed time for completion of carriage
stipulated on. Moreover, the carrier did not undertake
to carry the cargo aboard any specified aircraft, in
view of the condition on the back of the airway bill
which provides:
CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT
xxx xxx xxx
It is agreed that no time is fixed for the completion of
carriage hereunder and that Carrier may without
notice substitute alternate carriers or aircraft. Carrier
assumes no obligation to carry the goods by any
specified aircraft or over any particular route or routes
or to make connection at any point according to any
particular schedule, and Carrier is hereby authorized
to select, or deviate from the route or routes of
shipment, notwithstanding that the same may be
stated on the face hereof. The shipper guarantees
payment of all charges and advances.48
Hence, when respondent TWA shipped the body on
earlier flight and on a different aircraft, it was acting
well within its rights. We find this argument tenable.
The contention that there was contractual breach on
the part of private respondents is founded on the
postulation that there was ambiguity in the terms of
the airway bill, hence petitioners' insistence on the
application of the rules on interpretation of contracts
and documents. We find no such ambiguity. The
terms are clear enough as to preclude the necessity
to probe beyond the apparent intendment of the
contractual provisions.
The hornbook rule on interpretation of contracts
consecrates the primacy of the intention of the
parties, the same having the force of law between
them. When the terms of the agreement are clear and
explicit, that they do not justify an attempt to read into
any alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to
be understood literally just as they appear on the face
of the contract.49 The various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together50 and such a
construction is to be adopted as will give effect to all
provisions thereof.51 A contract cannot be construed
by parts, but its clauses should be interpreted in
relation to one another. The whole contract must be
interpreted or read together in order to arrive at its
true meaning. Certain stipulations cannot be
segregated and then made to control; neither do
particular words or phrases necessarily determine the
character of a contract. The legal effect of the contract
is not to be determined alone by any particular
provision disconnected from all others, but in the
ruling intention of the parties as gathered from all the
language they have used and from their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts. 52
Turning to the terms of the contract at hand, as
presented by PAL Air Waybill No. 079-01180454,
respondent court approvingly quoted the trial court's
disquisition on the aforequoted condition appearing
on the reverse side of the airway bill and its
disposition of this particular assigned error:
The foregoing stipulation fully answers plaintiffs'
objections to the one-day delay and the shipping of
the remains in TWA Flight 603 instead of TWA Flight
131. Under the stipulation, parties agreed that no time
was fixed to complete the contract of carriage and
that the carrier may, without notice, substitute
alternate carriers or aircraft. The carrier did not
assume the obligation to carry the shipment on any
specified aircraft.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, contrary to the claim of plaintiffs-
appellants, the conditions of the Air Waybill are big
enough to be read and noticed. Also, the mere fact
that the cargo in question was shipped in TWA Flight
603, a flight earlier on the same day than TWA Flight
131, did not in any way cause or add to the one-day
39
delay complained of and/or the switching or mix-up of
the bodies.53
Indubitably, that private respondent can use substitute
aircraft even without notice and without the
assumption of any obligation whatsoever to carry the
goods on any specified aircraft is clearly sanctioned
by the contract of carriage as specifically provided for
under the conditions thereof.
Petitioners' invocation of the interpretative rule in the
Rules of Court that written words control printed
words in documents, 54 to bolster their assertion that
the typewritten provisions regarding the routing and
flight schedule prevail over the printed conditions, is
tenuous. Said rule may be considered only when
there is inconsistency between the written and printed
words of the contract.
As previously stated, we find no ambiguity in the
contract subject of this case that would call for the
application of said rule. In any event, the contract has
provided for such a situation by explicitly stating that
the above condition remains effective
"notwithstanding that the same (fixed time for
completion of carriage, specified aircraft, or any
particular route or schedule) may be stated on the
face hereof." While petitioners hinge private
respondents' culpability on the fact that the carrier
"certifies goods described below were received for
carriage," they may have overlooked that the
statement on the face of the airway bill properly and
completely reads —
Carrier certifies goods described below were received
for carriage subject to the Conditions on the reverse
hereof the goods then being in apparent good order
and condition except as noted hereon. 55 (Emphasis
ours.)
Private respondents further aptly observe that the
carrier's certification regarding receipt of the goods for
carriage "was of a smaller print than the condition of
the Air Waybill, including Condition No. 5 — and thus
if plaintiffs-appellants had recognized the former, then
with more reason they were aware of the latter. 56
In the same vein, it would also be incorrect to accede
to the suggestion of petitioners that the typewritten
specifications of the flight, routes and dates of
departures and arrivals on the face of the airway bill
constitute a special contract which modifies the
printed conditions at the back thereof. We reiterate
that typewritten provisions of the contract are to be
read and understood subject to and in view of the
printed conditions, fully reconciling and giving effect to
the manifest intention of the parties to the agreement.
The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier's liability for
delay is that in the absence of a special contract, a
carrier is not an insurer against delay in transportation
of goods. When a common carrier undertakes to
convey goods, the law implies a contract that they
shall be delivered at destination within a reasonable
time, in the absence, of any agreement as to the time
of delivery. 57 But where a carrier has made an
express contract to transport and deliver property
within a specified time, it is bound to fulfill its contract
and is liable for any delay, no matter from what cause
it may have arisen. 58 This result logically follows
from the well-settled rule that where the law creates a
duty or charge, and the party is disabled from
performing it without any default in himself, and has
no remedy over, then the law will excuse him, but
where the party by his own contract creates a duty or
charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good
notwithstanding any accident or delay by inevitable
necessity because he might have provided against it
by contract. Whether or not there has been such an
undertaking on the part of the carrier to be determined
from the circumstances surrounding the case and by
application of the ordinary rules for the interpretation
of contracts.59
Echoing the findings of the trial court, the respondent
court correctly declared that —
In a similar case of delayed delivery of air cargo under
a very similar stipulation contained in the airway bill
which reads: "The carrier does not obligate itself to
carry the goods by any specified aircraft or on a
specified time. Said carrier being hereby authorized to
deviate from the route of the shipment without any
liability therefor", our Supreme Court ruled that
common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and
to deliver merchandise, and persons are not vested
with the right to prompt delivery, unless such common
carriers previously assume the obligation. Said rights
and obligations are created by a specific contract
entered into by the parties (Mendoza vs. PAL, 90 Phil.
836).
There is no showing by plaintiffs that such a special or
specific contract had been entered into between them
and the defendant airline companies.
And this special contract for prompt delivery should
call the attention of the carrier to the circumstances
surrounding the case and the approximate amount of
damages to be suffered in case of delay (See
Mendoza vs. PAL, supra). There was no such
contract entered into in the instant case.60
Also, the theory of petitioners that the specification of
the flights and dates of departure and arrivals
constitute a special contract that could prevail over
the printed stipulations at the back of the airway bill is
vacuous. To countenance such a postulate would
unduly burden the common carrier for that would have
the effect of unilaterally transforming every single bill
of lading or trip ticket into a special contract by the
simple expedient of filling it up with the particulars of
the flight, trip or voyage, and thereby imposing upon
the carrier duties and/or obligations which it may not
have been ready or willing to assume had it been
timely, advised thereof.
Neither does the fact that the challenged condition
No. 5 was printed at the back of the airway bill militate
against its binding effect on petitioners as parties to
the contract, for there were sufficient indications on
the face of said bill that would alert them to the
presence of such additional condition to put them on
their guard. Ordinary prudence on the part of any
person entering or contemplating to enter into a
contract would prompt even a cursory examination of
any such conditions, terms and/or stipulations.
There is a holding in most jurisdictions that the
acceptance of a bill of lading without dissent raises a
presumption that all terms therein were brought to the
knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him, and
in the absence of fraud or mistake, he is estopped
from thereafter denying that he assented to such
terms. This rule applies with particular force where a
shipper accepts a bill of lading with full knowledge of
its contents, and acceptance under such
circumstances makes it a binding contract. In order
that any presumption of assent to a stipulation in a bill
40
of lading limiting the liability of a carrier may arise, it
must appear that the clause containing this exemption
from liability plainly formed a part of the contract
contained in the bill of lading. A stipulation printed on
the back of a receipt or bill of lading or on papers
attached to such receipt will be quite as effective as if
printed on its face, if it is shown that the consignor
knew of its terms. Thus, where a shipper accepts a
receipt which states that its conditions are to be found
on the back, such receipt comes within the general
rule, and the shipper is held to have accepted and to
be bound by the conditions there to be found. 61
Granting arguendo that Condition No. 5 partakes of
the nature of a contract of adhesion and as such must
be construed strictly against the party who drafted the
same or gave rise to any ambiguity therein, it should
be borne in mind that a contract of adhesion may be
struck down as void and unenforceable, for being
subversive of public policy, only when the weaker
party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant
bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of
taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the
opportunity to bargain on equal footing. 62 However,
Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al 63 instructs us
that contracts of adhesion are not entirely prohibited.
The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free
to reject it entirely; if he adheres, be gives his
consent. Accordingly, petitioners, far from being the
weaker party in this situation, duly signified their
presumed assent to all terms of the contract through
their acceptance of the airway bill and are
consequently bound thereby. It cannot be gainsaid
that petitioners' were not without several choices as to
carriers in Chicago with its numerous airways and
airliner servicing the same.
We wish to allay petitioners' apprehension that
Condition No. 5 of the airway bill is productive of
mischief as it would validate delay in delivery,
sanction violations of contractual obligations with
impunity or put a premium on breaches of contract.
Just because we have said that condition No. 5 of the
airway bill is binding upon the parties to and fully
operative in this transaction, it does not mean, and let
this serve as fair warning to respondent carriers, that
they can at all times whimsically seek refuge from
liability in the exculpatory sanctuary of said Condition
No. 5 or arbitrarily vary routes, flights and schedules
to the prejudice of their customers. This condition only
serves to insulate the carrier from liability in those
instances when changes in routes, flights and
schedules are clearly justified by the peculiar
circumstances of a particular case, or by general
transportation practices, customs and usages, or by
contingencies or emergencies in aviation such as
weather turbulence, mechanical failure, requirements
of national security and the like. And even as it is
conceded that specific routing and other navigational
arrangements for a trip, flight or voyage, or variations
therein, generally lie within the discretion of the carrier
in the absence of specific routing instructions or
directions by the shipper, it is plainly incumbent upon
the carrier to exercise its rights with due deference to
the rights, interests and convenience of its customers.
A common carrier undertaking to transport property
has the implicit duty to carry and deliver it within
reasonable time, absent any particular stipulation
regarding time of delivery, and to guard against delay.
In case of any unreasonable delay, the carrier shall
be liable for damages immediately and proximately
resulting from such neglect of duty. 64 As found by
the trial court, the delay in the delivery of the remains
of Crispina Saludo, undeniable and regrettable as it
was, cannot be attributed to the fault, negligence or
malice of private respondents,65 a conclusion
concurred in by respondent court and which we are
not inclined to disturb.
We are further convinced that when TWA opted to
ship the remains of Crispina Saludo on an earlier
flight, it did so in the exercise of sound discretion and
with reasonable prudence, as shown by the
explanation of its counsel in his letter of February 19,
1977 in response to petitioners' demand letter:
Investigation of TWA's handling of this matter reveals
that although the shipment was scheduled on TWA
Flight 131 of October 27, 1976, it was actually
boarded on TWA Flight 603 of the same day,
approximately 10 hours earlier, in order to assure that
the shipment would be received in San Francisco in
sufficient time for transfer to PAL. This transfer was
effected in San Francisco at 2:00 P.M. on October 27,
1976. 66
Precisely, private respondent TWA knew of the
urgency of the shipment by reason of this notation on
the lower portion of the airway bill: "All documents
have been certified. Human remains of Cristina (sic)
Saludo. Please return bag first available flight to
SFO." Accordingly, TWA took it upon itself to carry the
remains of Crispina Saludo on an earlier flight, which
we emphasize it could do under the terms of the
airway bill, to make sure that there would be enough
time for loading said remains on the transfer flight on
board PAL.
III. Petitioners challenge the validity of
respondent court's finding that private respondents
are not liable for tort on account of the humiliating,
arrogant and indifferent acts of their officers and
personnel. They posit that since their mother's
remains were transported ten hours earlier than
originally scheduled, there was no reason for private
respondents' personnel to disclaim knowledge of the
arrival or whereabouts of the same other than their
sheer arrogance, indifference and extreme
insensitivity to the feelings of petitioners. Moreover,
being passengers and not merely consignors of
goods, petitioners had the right to be treated with
courtesy, respect, kindness and due consideration.
In riposte, TWA claims that its employees have
always dealt politely with all clients, customers and
the public in general. PAL, on the other hand,
declares that in the performance of its obligation to
the riding public, other customers and clients, it has
always acted with justice, honesty, courtesy and good
faith.
Respondent appellate court found merit in and
reproduced the trial court's refutation of this assigned
error:
About the only evidence of plaintiffs that may have
reference to the manner with which the personnel of
defendants treated the two plaintiffs at the San
Francisco Airport are the following pertinent portions
of Maria Saludo's testimony:
Q When you arrived there, what did you do, if
any?
A I immediately went to the TWA counter and
I inquired about whether my mother was there or if'
they knew anything about it.
41
Q What was the answer?
A They said they do not know. So, we waited.
Q About what time was that when you
reached San Francisco from Chicago?
A I think 5 o'clock. Somewhere around that in
the afternoon.
Q You made inquiry it was immediately
thereafter?
A Right after we got off the plane.
Q Up to what time did you stay in the airport
to wait until the TWA people could tell you the
whereabouts?
A Sorry, Sir, but the TWA did not tell us
anything. We stayed there until about 9 o'clock. They
have not heard anything about it. They did not say
anything.
Q Do you want to convey to the Court that
from 5 up to 9 o'clock in the evening you yourself
went back to the TWA and they could not tell you
where the remains of your mother were?
A Yes sir.
Q And after nine o'clock, what did you do?
A I told my brother my Mom was supposed to
be on the Philippine Airlines flight. "Why don't" we
check with PAL instead to see if she was there?" We
tried to comfort each other. I told him anyway that was
a shortest flight from Chicago to California. We will be
with our mother on this longer flight. So, we checked
with the PAL.
Q What did you find?
A We learned, Yes, my Mom would be on the
flight.
Q Who was that brother?
A Saturnino Saludo.
Q And did you find what was your flight from
San Francisco to the Philippines?
A I do not know the number. It was the
evening flight of the Philippine Airline(s) from San
Francisco to Manila.
Q You took that flight with your mother?
A We were scheduled to, Sir.
Q Now, you could not locate the remains of
your mother in San Francisco could you tell us what
did you feel?
A After we were told that my mother was not
there?
Q After you learned that your mother could
not fly with you from Chicago to California?
A Well, I was very upset. Of course, I wanted
the confirmation that my mother was in the West
Coast. The fliqht was about 5 hours from Chicago to
California. We waited anxiously all that time on the
plane. I wanted to be assured about my mother's
remains. But there was nothing and we could not get
any assurance from anyone about it.
Q Your feeling when you reached San
Francisco and you could not find out from the TWA
the whereabouts of the remains, what did you feel?
A Something nobody would be able to
describe unless he experiences it himself. It is a kind
of panic. I think it's a feeling you are about to go
crazy. It is something I do not want to live through
again. (Inting, t.s.n., Aug. 9, 1983, pp. 14-18).
The foregoing does not show any humiliating or
arrogant manner with which the personnel of both
defendants treated the two plaintiffs. Even their
alleged indifference is not clearly established. The
initial answer of the TWA personnel at the counter
that they did not know anything about the remains,
and later, their answer that they have not heard
anything about the remains, and the inability of the
TWA counter personnel to inform the two plaintiffs of
the whereabouts of the remains, cannot be said to be
total or complete indifference to the said plaintiffs. At
any rate, it is any rude or discourteous conduct,
malfeasance or neglect, the use of abusive or
insulting language calculated to humiliate and shame
passenger or had faith by or on the part of the
employees of the carrier that gives the passenger an
action for damages against the carrier (Zulueta vs.
Pan American World Airways, 43 SCRA 397; Air
France vs. Carrascoso, et al., 18 SCRA 155; Lopez,
et al. vs. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431;
Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Cuenca, 14 SCRA 1063),
and none of the above is obtaining in the instant case.
67
We stand by respondent court's findings on this point,
but only to the extent where it holds that the manner
in which private respondent TWA's employees dealt
with petitioners was not grossly humiliating, arrogant
or indifferent as would assume the proportions of
malice or bad faith and lay the basis for an award of
the damages claimed. It must however, be pointed
out that the lamentable actuations of respondent
TWA's employees leave much to be desired,
particularly so in the face of petitioners' grief over the
death of their mother, exacerbated by the tension and
anxiety wrought by the impasse and confusion over
the failure to ascertain over an appreciable period of
time what happened to her remains.
Airline companies are hereby sternly admonished that
it is their duty not only to cursorily instruct but to
strictly require their personnel to be more
accommodating towards customers, passengers and
the general public. After all, common carriers such as
airline companies are in the business of rendering
public service, which is the primary reason for their
enfranchisement and recognition in our law. Because
the passengers in a contract of carriage do not
contract merely for transportation, they have a right to
be treated with kindness, respect, courtesy and
consideration. 68 A contract to transport passengers
is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation, and generates a relation attended
with public duty. The operation of a common carrier is
a business affected with public interest and must be
directed to serve the comfort and convenience of
passengers. 69 Passengers are human beings with
human feelings and emotions; they should not be
treated as mere numbers or statistics for revenue.
42
The records reveal that petitioners, particularly Maria
and Saturnino Saludo, agonized for nearly five hours,
over the possibility of losing their mother's mortal
remains, unattended to and without any assurance
from the employees of TWA that they were doing
anything about the situation. This is not to say that
petitioners were to be regaled with extra special
attention. They were, however, entitled to the
understanding and humane consideration called for
by and commensurate with the extraordinary diligence
required of common carriers, and not the cold
insensitivity to their predicament. It is hard to believe
that the airline's counter personnel were totally
helpless about the situation. Common sense would
and should have dictated that they exert a little extra
effort in making a more extensive inquiry, by
themselves or through their superiors, rather than just
shrug off the problem with a callous and uncaring
remark that they had no knowledge about it. With all
the modern communications equipment readily
available to them, which could have easily facilitated
said inquiry and which are used as a matter of course
by airline companies in their daily operations, their
apathetic stance while not legally reprehensible is
morally deplorable.
Losing a loved one, especially one's, parent, is a
painful experience. Our culture accords the tenderest
human feelings toward and in reverence to the dead.
That the remains of the deceased were subsequently
delivered, albeit belatedly, and eventually laid in her
final resting place is of little consolation. The
imperviousness displayed by the airline's personnel,
even for just that fraction of time, was especially
condemnable particularly in the hour of bereavement
of the family of Crispina Saludo, intensified by
anguish due to the uncertainty of the whereabouts of
their mother's remains. Hence, it is quite apparent that
private respondents' personnel were remiss in the
observance of that genuine human concern and
professional attentiveness required and expected of
them.
The foregoing observations, however, do not appear
to be applicable or imputable to respondent PAL or its
employees. No attribution of discourtesy or
indifference has been made against PAL by
petitioners and, in fact, petitioner Maria Saludo
testified that it was to PAL that they repaired after
failing to receive proper attention from TWA. It was
from PAL that they received confirmation that their
mother's remains would be on the same flight to
Manila with them.
We find the following substantiation on this particular
episode from the deposition of Alberto A. Lim, PAL's
cargo supervisor earlier adverted to, regarding their
investigation of and the action taken on learning of
petitioner's problem:
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:
Yes.
Mr. Lim, what exactly was your procedure adopted in
your so called investigation?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
I called the lead agent on duty at that time and
requested for a copy of airway bill, transfer manifest
and other documents concerning the shipment.
ATTY ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:
Then, what?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
They proceeded to analyze exactly where PAL failed,
if any, in forwarding the human remains of Mrs.
Cristina (sic) Saludo. And I found out that there was
not (sic) delay in shipping the remains of Mrs. Saludo
to Manila. Since we received the body from American
Airlines on 28 October at 7:45 and we expedited the
shipment so that it could have been loaded on our
flight leaving at 9:00 in the evening or just barely one
hour and 15 minutes prior to the departure of the
aircraft. That is so (sic) being the case, I reported to
Manila these circumstances. 70
IV. Finally, petitioners insist, as a consequence
of the delay in the shipment of their mother's remains
allegedly caused by wilful contractual breach, on their
entitlement to actual, moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
legal interest.
The uniform decisional tenet in our jurisdiction bolds
that moral damages may be awarded for wilful or
fraudulent breach of contract 71 or when such breach
is attended by malice or bad faith. 72 However, in the
absence of strong and positive evidence of fraud,
malice or bad faith, said damages cannot be
awarded.73 Neither can there be an award of
exemplary damages 74 nor of attorney's fees 75 as
an item of damages in the absence of proof that
defendant acted with malice, fraud or bad faith.
The censurable conduct of TWA's employees cannot,
however, be said to have approximated the
dimensions of fraud, malice or bad faith. It can be said
to be more of a lethargic reaction produced and
engrained in some people by the mechanically routine
nature of their work and a racial or societal culture
which stultifies what would have been their
accustomed human response to a human need under
a former and different ambience.
Nonetheless, the facts show that petitioners' right to
be treated with due courtesy in accordance with the
degree of diligence required by law to be exercised by
every common carrier was violated by TWA and this
entitles them, at least, to nominal damages from TWA
alone. Articles 2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code make
it clear that nominal damages are not intended for
indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication
or recognition of a right violated of invaded. They are
recoverable where some injury has been done but the
amount of which the evidence fails to show, the
assessment of damages being left to the discretion of
the court according to the circumstances of the
case.76 In the exercise of our discretion, we find an
award of P40,000.00 as nominal damages in favor of,
petitioners to be a reasonable amount under the
circumstances of this case.
WHEREFORE, with the modification that an award of
P40,000.00 as and by way of nominal damages is
hereby granted in favor of petitioners to be paid by
respondent Trans World Airlines, the appealed
decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ.,
concur.
43
Footnotes 16 Consolidated Reply, ibid., 229.
40 Ibid., 166-167.
1 Justice Jorge S. Imperial, ponente, with 17 Rollo, 17-26.
Justices Filemon D. Mendoza and Artemon D. Luna, 41 13 C.J.S., Carriers 148.
concurring; Petition, Annet C; Rollo, 154. 18 Exhibit E, Bill of Exhibits, 5; Exhibit 1-PAL,
Bill of Exhibits, 32. 42 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 751.
2 Penned by Judge Lucio F. Saavedra;
Petition, Annex A; Rollo, 51. 19 Rollo, 20. 43 Manuel ,A. Barcelona, Liabilities of Carriers:
Airline Practices and Procedures, in CURRENT
3 Rollo, 159-163. 20 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 771. ISSUES AFFECTING AIRLINES IN THE
PHILIPPINES, 103 (1989).
4 Exhibit G, Bill of Exhibits, 7. 21 4 Alcantara, Commercial Laws of the
Philippines, 118 (1987). 44 Nocum vs. Lagupa Tayabas Bus Co., 30
5 Exhibit H, ibid., 9. SCRA 69 (1969).
22 13 C.J.S., Carriers, 233.
6 Original Record, 1. 45 Rollo, 160.
23 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 775.
7 Petition, Annex E; Rollo, 200. 46 13 C.J.S., Carriers 41; 13 Am. Jur. 2d,
24 13 C.J.S., Carriers 232. Carriers 572.
8 Rollo, 16-17.
25 Op. cit., 240-243. 47 Annex 2, Opposition to Joint Motion to
9 Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court. Dismiss, 1-2, Original Record, 253-254; Memorandum
26 Rollo, 160. of Private Respondent TWA, 250.
10 Ramos, et al. vs. Pepsi Cola bottling Co. of
the P.I., et al., 19 SCRA 289 (1967); Malaysian Airline 27 Memorandum for Private Respondent PAL, 48 Exhibit 2-A-TWA, Bill of Exhibits, 26.
System Bernad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 156 1-2.
SCRA 321 (1987). 49 Article 1370, Civil Code; Philippine Airlines
28 Exhibits 2 and 2-A-PAL; Bill of Exhibits, 31. vs. Philippine Airlines Employees Association, 70
11 Abellana, et al. vs. Dosdos, etc., et al., 13 SCRA 180(1976); Government Service Insurance
SCRA 244 (1965); Uytiepo, et al. vs. Aggabao, et al., 29 Article 1737, Civil Code. System vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 311
35 SCRA 186 (1970); Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. (1986); Honrado, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198
CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734 30 Article 1738, id. SCRA 326 (1991).
(1980).
31 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 763-764. 50 Article 1374, Civil Code.
12 Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 33
SCRA 622 (1970); Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 142 32 Op. cit., 762-763. 51 See Section 9, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
SCRA 593 (1986); Manlapaz vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 147 SCRA 236 (1987). 33 Rollo, 163-165. 52 Ruiz, et al. vs. Sheriff, et al., 34 SCRA 83
(1970); National Union Fire Insurance Company of
13 Pilar Development Corporation vs. 34 Exhibit 1-TWA, Bill of Exhibits, 33. Pittsburg, et al. vs. Stolt-Nielsen Philippines, Inc., et
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 146 SCRA 215 al., 184 SCRA 682 (1990).
(1986). 35 Exhibit 3-PAL, ibid., 30.
53 Rollo, 168-169.
14 Vda. de Arroyo vs. El Beaterio del 36 Exhibit 2-PAL, ibid., 101.
Santissimo Rosario de Molo, et al, 23 SCRA 525 54 Section 13, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
(1968). 37 Exhibit 5-PAL, ibid., 39-41.
55 Exhibit E, Bill of Exhibits, 5.
15 Comment of Respondent TWA, 5; Rollo, 38 Exhibit 5-PAL, ibid., 58-63, 71-73.
206; Comment of Respondent PAL, 10-11; Rollo, 213. 56 Comment of Private Respondent PAL, 9;
39 Rollo, 229-230. Rollo, 221.

44

57 13 C.J.S., Carriers 390, 392; Mason vs.
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 262 I11. App 580.
58 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 854; Chicago &
A.R. Co. vs. Kirby, 225 US 155, 56 Led 1033, 32 Sct
648; Harmony vs. Bingham, 12 NY 99.
59 13 C.J.S., Carriers 395; Frey vs. New York
Cent., etc., R. Co., 100 N.Y.S. 225, 114 App. Div.
747.
60 Rollo, 168-169.
61 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 778-779; See Ong
Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 91 SCRA 223 (1979)
and Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 164 SCRA 268
(1988).
62 Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union and Rock
Insurance Co., Ltd., etc., 98 Phil. 85 (1955);
Fieldman's Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Vda. de Songco,
25 SCRA 70 (1968); Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, 83
SCRA 361 (1978).
63 Supra, Fn. 61.
64 Chicago & A.R. Co. vs. Kirby, supra;
Warren vs. Portland. Terminal Co., 121 Me 157, 116
A 411, 26 ALR 304.
65 Petition, Annex A; Rollo, 79.
66 Exhibit F and Exhibit 4-TWA, Bill of
Exhibits, 6.
67 Petition, Annex C; Rollo, 169-172.
68 Alitalia Airways vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
187 SCRA 763 (1990); cf. Air France vs. Carrascoso,
et al., 18 SCRA 168 (1966).
69 See Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 188 SCRA 461 (1990).
70 Exhibit 5-PAL, 50-51; Bill of Exhibits, 83-84.
71 Article 2220, Civil Code; Tamayo vs.
Aquino, et al., 105 Phil. 949 (1959); China Airlines
Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 169 SCRA 226
(1989).
72 Perez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 13 SCRA
137 (1965); Sabena Belgian World Airlines vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., 171 SCRA 620 (1989).
73 Coscolluela vs. Valderrama, 2 SCRA 1095
(1961); Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 687
(1990).
74 Article 2232, Civil Code; Davila, et al. vs.
Philippine Airlines, 49 SCRA 497 (1973); Philippine
National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 159 SCRA
433 (1988); Esguerra vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 173
SCRA 1 (1989).
75 Article 2208, Civil Code; Federation of
United NAMARCO Distributors, Inc. et al. vs. National
Marketing Corporation, 4 SCRA 867 (1962);
Songcuan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
191 SCRA 28 (1990).
76 See Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Cuenca, et
al., 14 SCRA 1063 (1965); Robes-Francisco Realty &
Development Corporation vs. Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Branch XXXIV), et al., 84 SCRA 59 (1978);
Alitalia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 192
SCRA 9 (1990).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33836 March 16, 1987
DRA. SOFIA L. PRUDENCIADO, petitioner,
vs.
ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SYSTEM, INC. and JOSE
LEYSON, et al., respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 4,1971
in CA-G.R. No. 34832R entitled Dra. Sofia L.
Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc. and
Jose Leyson, which modified the decision 2 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, in Civil
Case No. Q-5235 reducing the amount of moral
damages from P25,000 to P2,000 and eliminating the
award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees but
granting actual damages of P2,451.27.
The decretal portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
modified, ordering appellants jointly and severally to
pay plaintiff the sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages
representing the cost of the repair of the car of
Plaintiff; (2) the sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
The antecedent facts of this case as found by the trial
court and by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
At about 2:05 p.m. of May 11, 1960, Dra. Sofia L.
Prudenciado was driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air
car along Arroceros Street with the intention of
crossing Taft Avenue in order to turn left, to go to the
Philippine Normal College Compound where she
would hold classes. She claimed that she was driving
her car at the rate of 10 kmph; that before crossing
Taft Ave. she stopped her car and looked to the right
and to the left and not noticing any on-coming vehicle
on either side she slowly proceeded on first gear to
cross the same, but when she was almost at the
center, near the island thereof, Jose Leyson who was
driving People's Taxicab owned and operated by
Alliance Transport System, Inc., suddenly bumped
and struck Dra. Prudenciado's car, thereby causing
physical injuries in different parts of her body,
suffering more particularly brain concussion which
subjected her to several physical examinations and to
an encephalograph test while her car was damaged
to the extent of P2,451.27. The damage to the taxicab
amounted to P190.00 (Decision in Civil Case No. Q-
5235, CFI, Rizal; Record on Appeal, pp. 63-64;
Decision, CA-G.R. No. 34832-R, Rollo, pp. 37-38).
Dra. Prudenciado filed a complaint for damages at the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City against
the Alliance Transport System and Jose Leyson
docketed as aforestated, Civil Case No. Q-5232
(Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
45

After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, found Jose Leyson guilty of negligence
in the performance of his duties as taxicab driver
which is the proximate cause of the accident in
question. On the other hand, defendant Alliance
Transport System, Inc. failed to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that it had exercised the
required diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection, supervision and control of its employees
including defendant Leyson. Consequently, both
defendants were held jointly and severally liable for
the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff Dra. Sofia
L. Prudenciado as well as for the damage to her car,
in addition to the other consequential damages
prayed for. The dispositive portion of said decision
reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS
judgment is rendered, one in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendants, by ordering the said
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages
representing the cost for the repair of the car of
plaintiff; P25,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and the further sum of
P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, with costs against the
defendants. (Record on Appeal, pp. 71-73).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision on May 14, 1971 and denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its resolution
dated July 20, 1971.
Hence, this petition.
The petition was given due course in the resolution of
this Court dated September 6, 1971 and petitioner
filed her brief on November 10, 1971 (Rollo, p. 69)
while respondents filed their brief on January 24,
1972 (Rollo, p. 86). Petitioner filed her Reply Brief on
March 1, 1972 (Rollo, p. 96); after which the case was
considered submitted for decision on the same date
(Rollo, p. 99).
In her brief, petitioner raised the following assignment
of errors:
I ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PETITIONERS
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN REDUCING THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES
TO THE PETITIONER FROM P25,000.00 AWARDED
BY THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL,
BRANCH V, QUEZON CITY, TO P2,000.00
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THERE
WAS NO FINDING THAT THE AWARD WAS
PALPABLY AND SCANDALOUSLY EXCESSIVE AS
TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS THE RESULT OF
PASSION OR CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF
THE TRIAL COURT;
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES OF P5,000.00 NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT THE FINDING OF THE SAID COURT
ON THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW APPLICABLE
JUSTIFIED THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AS HELD BY THE SAID TRIAL COURT;
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT HER DEMOTION IN RANK AS A
PROFESSOR IN THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT
SUBSTANTIATED AND IN MAKING THIS FINDING
A BASIS FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE AWARD
OF MORAL DAMAGES, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
IT IS ALREADY TOO FAR FETCHED AND IT
MERELY CONFIRMS THE TRUTH OF THE FACT
THAT THE ACCUSED SUFFERED LOSS OF HER
USUAL LIVELINESS; VIVACITY ACTIVITY SELF-
CONFIDENCE AND THAT SHE FEELS UNCERTAIN
AND INSECURE AND THAT SHE WAS SUBJECTED
TO EXTREME FRIGHT AND SERIOUS ANXIETY,
SERIOUS APPREHENSION OF LOSING HER LIFE
OR HER SENSES OR REASON AND OF HER
PHYSICAL MOBILITY ANYTIME AND THAT SHE
SUFFERED GREAT SHOCK AND SEVERE PAINS
ON HER BACK NEAR THE LEFT SIDE OF HER
SPINAL COLUMN OF THE LUMBAR REGION;
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO
ERRED IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID
AWARD IS LEGAL AND PROPER;
V
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN ELIMINATING THE COSTS TAXED AGAINST
THE RESPONDENTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT SAID COSTS ARE LEGAL AND
PROPER;
VI
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN FINDING THAT THE CLAIM OF DR. SOFIA L.
PRUDENCIADO OF HER LOSS OF HER USUAL
LIVELINESS, VIVACITY ACTIVITY AND HER
USUAL SELF CONFIDENCE, SUCH THAT SHE
NOW FEELS UNCERTAIN AND INSECURE...
EXTREME FRIGHT AND SERIOUS ANXIETY,
SERIOUS APPREHENSION OF LOSING HER LIFE
OR HER SENSES OR REASON; OF HER
PHYSICAL MOBILITY ANYTIME ... GREAT SHOCK
AND SEVERE PAINS ON HER BACK NEAR THE
LEFT SIDE OF HER SPINAL COLUMN IN THE
LUMBAR REGION IS UNCORROBORATED
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT OF THE
CERTIFICATE, EXHIBIT "G" OF DR. DOMINADOR
VERGARA, OF THE VETERANS MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL AND DR. CONRADO ARAMIL, BRAIN
SPECIALIST AND THE CORROBORATING
TESTIMONY OF THE LATTER AFTER
EXAMINATION AND TREATMENT OF PETITIONER;
VII
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN SO MODIFYING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT
HAD NO POWER TO DO SO UNDER THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AS FOUND
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS;
VIII
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN MODIFYING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE
DECISION OF SAID TRIAL COURT IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
46

The Court of Appeals and the trial court are in accord
in the finding that the accident was caused by the
negligence of the taxi driver. The bone of contention
is however in the award of damages, which
crystalizes the errors assigned into one issue, which
is whether or not the Court of Appeals is justified in
modifying or changing the grant of damages by the
trial court.
It is well settled that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court, but said
findings are subject to scrutiny if such are
diametrically opposed to those of the trial court
(Samson v. CA, et al. G.R. No. L-40071, January 29,
1986).
The Court of Appeals concedes that a concussion of
the brain was suffered by Dra. Prudenciado but as to
how serious was the concussion or how it had later
become, and the disastrous extent of the injuries
which she alleges to have sustained as a result of the
accident, are seriously doubted by said Appellate
Court.
Specifically, said Court finds that Dra. Prudenciado's
claim (which was sustained b the trial court) that
because of aforesaid concussion, she eventually lost
her usual liveliness, vivacity activity and her usual
self- confidence, to the extent that now she feels
uncertain and insecure, not to mention a sense of
extreme fright and serious anxiety, serious
apprehension of losing her life, or her senses or
reason or her physical mobility momentarily, plus
experiences of great shock and severe pains on her
back near the left side of her spinal column in the
lumbar region, was not supported by the deposition of
Dr. Conrado Aramil the list who attended to the
plaintiff from May 14 to May 26, 1960 (TSN, July 13,
1960, pp. 72-73). From said deposition, it was
gathered that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a mild
abnormality, compatible with mold concussion of the
brain (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp. 47-48); that the
symptoms of any brain concussion usually are
headache, dizziness, voting and lack of pep or
alertness; and that the possible after effects that may
be produced are persistent or irregular headaches,
fluctuating dizziness. Accordingly, Dra. Prudenciado
was advised "Just to watch herself if she would
develop any alarming symptoms such as headache,
dizziness or vomitings, to have her re-checked after
several months for her to be sure." (Ibid, pp. 51-52). It
might also produce intellectual deterioration or
lessening of intelligence, and even insanity.
Dra. Prudenciado sought to establish that she had
precisely suffered are those after effects except
insanity; but the Court of Appeals ruled that her proof
consisted merely in her own uncorroborated
testimony. In support of her allegation she could not
show any medical certificate tending to prove that she
was indeed medically treated abroad for her brain
ailment nor was there any showing in the documents
presented that she was demoted to the rank of
technical assistant because the San Francisco State
College does not believe in her mental capacity any
more.
Finally, her statements that she is almost completely
losing her voice, that she has a terrible headache
when her head is pressed, that she has lost her sense
of taste, that she is nervous and temperamental and
that she has lapses of memory, are belied by the
deposition of Dr. Aramil that the patient's EEG was
already normal on May 26, 1960; and on cross-
examination he declared that she was clinically
symtomless when she was discharged from the
hospital (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp. 75-76; 78-79).
There is no argument that moral damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of defendant's wrongful act or omission (People
v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 [1984]).
In the same manner, it is undisputed that the trial
courts are given discretion to determine the amount of
moral damages Alcantara v. Surro, 93 Phil. 472) and
that the Court of Appeals can only modify or change
the amount awarded when they are palpably and
scandalously excessive "so as to indicate that it was
the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the
part of the trial court (Gellada v. Warner Barnes &
Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bachrach
Motors Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 636 and Adone v.
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., 57 O.G. 656). But in more
recent cases where the awards of moral and
exemplary damages are far too excessive compared
to the, actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party,
this Court ruled that they should be reduced to more
reasonable amounts.
Thus, in the case of San Andres v. Court of Appeals
(116 SCRA 85 [1982]) the Supreme Court ruled that
while the amount of moral damages is a matter left
largely to the sound discretion of a court, the same
when found excessive should be reduced to more
reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts
and circumstances. Moral damages, though incapable
of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an
award designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer.
In a much later case (Siguenza v. Court of Appeals,
137 SCRA 578-579 [1985]), the Supreme court,
reiterating the above ruling, reduced the awards of
moral and exemplary damages which were far too
excessive compared to the actual losses sustained by
the aggrieved parties and where the records show
that the injury suffered was not serious or gross and,
therefore, out of proportion to the amount of damages
generously awarded by the trial court.
In any case the Court held that "moral damages are
emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at
the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to
enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, by reason of the
defendants' culpable action." The award of moral
damages must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted & B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 745 [1984]
citing Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr.,
94 SCRA 966).
Coming back to the case at bar, a careful review of
the records makes it readily apparent that the injuries
sustained by Dra. Prudenciado are not as serious or
extensive as they were claimed to be, to warrant the
damages awarded by the trial court. In fact, a closer
scrutiny of the exhibits showing a moderate damage
to the car can by no stretch of the imagination
produce a logical conclusion that such disastrous
effects of the accident sought to be established,
actually took place, not to mention the fact that such
47
were not supported by the medical findings
presented. Unquestionably, therefore, the damages
imposed' by the lower court should be reduced to
more reasonable levels.
On the other hand, it will be observed that the
reduction of the damages made by the Court of
Appeals is both too drastic and unrealistic, to pass the
test of reasonableness, which appears to be the
underlying basis to justify such reduction.
While the damages sought to be recovered were not
satisfactorily established to the extent desired by the
petitioner, it was nonetheless not disputed that an
accident occurred due to the fault and negligence of
the respondents; that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a
brain concussion which although mild can admittedly
produce the effects complained of by her and that
these symptoms can develop after several years and
can lead to some, serious handicaps or predispose
the patient to other sickness (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp.
52-54). Being a doctor by profession, her fears can be
more real and intense than an ordinary person.
Otherwise stated, she is undeniably a proper recipient
of moral damages which are proportionate to her
suffering.
As to exemplary damages, Article 2231 of the Civil
Code provides:
In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted
if the defendant acted with grave negligence.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective
damages is, as the name implies, to provide an
example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et
al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).
The findings of the trial court in the case at bar which
became the basis of the award of exemplary
damages are to the effect that it is more apparent
from the facts, conditions and circumstances
obtaining in the record of the case that respondent
driver was running at high speed after turning to the
right along Taft Ave. coming from Ayala Boulevard,
considering that the traffic was clear. Failing to notice
petitioner's car, he failed to apply his brakes and did
not even swerve to the right to avoid the collision
(Record on Appeal, pp. 69-70).
The Court of Appeals conforms with aforesaid
findings of the trial court but is not prepared to accept
that there was gross negligence on the part of the
driver to justify the imposition of exemplary damages.
However, a driver running at full speed on a rainy day,
on a slippery road in complete disregard of the
hazards to life and limb of other people cannot be
said to be acting in anything less than gross
negligence. The frequent incidence of accidents of
this nature caused by taxi drivers indeed demands
corrective measures.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED insofar as
the award of damages is concerned; and respondents
are ordered to jointly and severally pay the petitioner;
(1) the sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages
representing the cost of the repair of her car; (2) the
sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages; (3) the sum of
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) the sum of
P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla,
Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 PENNED by Justice Lourdes P. San Diego,
with Justices Salvador V. Esguerra and Edilberto
Soriano.
2 Written by Judge Nicasio Yatco
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22415 March 30, 1966
FERNANDO LOPEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, defendant-
appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for the defendant-
appellant.
Vicente J. Francisco for the plaintiffs-appellants.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Plaintiffs and defendant appeal from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. Since the value in
controversy exceeds P200,000 the appeals were
taken directly to this Court upon all questions involved
(Sec. 17, par. 3[5], Judiciary Act).
Stated briefly the facts not in dispute are as follows:
Reservations for first class accommodations in Flight
No. 2 of Pan American World Airways — hereinafter
otherwise called PAN-AM — from Tokyo to San
Francisco on May 24, 1960 were made with
PAN-AM on March 29, 1960, by "Your Travel Guide"
agency, specifically, by Delfin Faustino, for then
Senator Fernando Lopez, his wife Maria J. Lopez, his
son-in-law Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., and his daughter,
Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., (Milagros Lopez
Montelibano). PAN-AM's San Francisco head office
confirmed the reservations on March 31, 1960.
First class tickets for the abovementioned flight were
subsequently issued by
PAN-AM on May 21 and 23, 1960, in favor of Senator
Lopez and his party. The total fare of P9,444 for all of
them was fully paid before the tickets were issued.
As scheduled Senator Lopez and party left Manila by
Northwest Airlines on May 24, 1960, arriving in Tokyo
at 5:30 P.M. of that day. As soon as they arrived
Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego of the
Philippine Embassy to contact PAN-AM's Tokyo office
regarding their first class accommodations for that
evening's flight. For the given reason that the first
class seats therein were all booked up, however,
PAN-AM's Tokyo office informed Minister Busuego
that PAN-AM could not accommodate Senator Lopez
and party in that trip as first class passengers.
Senator Lopez thereupon gave their first class tickets
to Minister Busuego for him to show the same to
PAN-AM's Tokyo office, but the latter firmly reiterated
that there was no accommodation for them in the first
48
class, stating that they could not go in that flight
unless they took the tourist class therein.
Due to pressing engagements awaiting Senator
Lopez and his wife, in the United States — he had to
attend a business conference in San Francisco the
next day and she had to undergo a medical check-up
in Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota, on May 28,
1960 and needed three days rest before that in San
Francisco — Senator Lopez and party were
constrained to take PAN-AM's flight from Tokyo to
San Francisco as tourist passengers. Senator Lopez
however made it clear, as indicated in his letter to
PAN-AM's Tokyo office on that date (Exh. A), that
they did so "under protest" and without prejudice to
further action against the airline.1äwphï1.ñët
Suit for damages was thereafter filed by Senator
Lopez and party against PAN-AM on June 2, 1960 in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Alleging breach of
contracts in bad faith by defendant, plaintiffs asked for
P500,000 actual and moral damages, P100,000
exemplary damages, P25,000 attorney's fees plus
costs. PAN-AM filed its answer on June 22, 1960,
asserting that its failure to provide first class
accommodations to plaintiffs was due to honest error
of its employees. It also interposed a counterclaim for
attorney's fees of P25,000.
Subsequently, further pleadings were filed, thus:
plaintiffs' answer to the counterclaim, on July 25,
1960; plaintiffs' reply attached to motion for its
admittance, on December 2, 1961; defendant's
supplemental answer, on March 8, 1962; plaintiffs'
reply to supplemental answer, on March 10, 1962;
and defendant's amended supplemental answer, on
July 10, 1962.
After trial — which took twenty-two (22) days ranging
from November 25, 1960 to January 5, 1963 — the
Court of First Instance rendered its decision on
November 13, 1963, the dispositive portion stating:
In view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendant, which is accordingly ordered to pay the
plaintiffs the following: (a) P100,000.00 as moral
damages; (b) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c)
P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of this
action.
So ordered.
Plaintiffs, however, on November 21, 1963, moved for
reconsideration of said judgment, asking that moral
damages be increased to P400,000 and that six per
cent (6%) interest per annum on the amount of the
award be granted. And defendant opposed the same.
Acting thereon the trial court issued an order on
December 14, 1963, reconsidering the dispositive part
of its decision to read as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendant, which is accordingly ordered to pay the
plaintiffs the following: (a) P150,000.00 as moral
damages; (b) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
with legal interest on both from the date of the filing of
the complaint until paid; and (c) P25,000.00 as
attorney's fees; and the costs of this action.
So ordered.
It is from said judgment, as thus reconsidered, that
both parties have appealed.
Defendant, as stated, has from the start admitted that
it breached its contracts with plaintiffs to provide them
with first class accommodations in its Tokyo-San
Francisco flight of May 24, 1960. In its appeal,
however, it takes issue with the finding of the court a
quo that it acted in bad faith in the branch of said
contracts. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, raise
questions on the amount of damages awarded in their
favor, seeking that the same be increased to a total of
P650,000.
Anent the issue of bad faith the records show the
respective contentions of the parties as follows.
According to plaintiffs, defendant acted in bad faith
because it deliberately refused to comply with its
contract to provide first class accommodations to
plaintiffs, out of racial prejudice against Orientals. And
in support of its contention that what was done to
plaintiffs is an oftrepeated practice of defendant,
evidence was adduced relating to two previous
instances of alleged racial discrimination by defendant
against Filipinos in favor of "white" passengers. Said
previous occasions are what allegedly happened to
(1) Benito Jalbuena and (2) Cenon S. Cervantes and
his wife.
And from plaintiffs' evidence this is what allegedly
happened; Jalbuena bought a first class ticket from
PAN-AM on April 13, 1960; he confirmed it on April
15, 1960 as to the Tokyo-Hongkong flight of April 20,
1960; PAN-AM similarly confirmed it on April 20,
1960. At the airport he and another Oriental — Mr.
Tung — were asked to step aside while other
passengers - including "white" passengers —
boarded PAN-AM's plane. Then PAN-AM officials told
them that one of them had to stay behind. Since Mr.
Tung was going all the way to London, Jalbuena was
chosen to be left behind. PAN-AM's officials could
only explain by saying there was "some mistake".
Jalbuena thereafter wrote PAN-AM to protest the
incident (Exh. B).
As to Cenon S. Cervantes it would appear that in
Flight No. 6 of PAN-AM on September 29, 1958 from
Bangkok to Hongkong, he and his wife had to take
tourist class, although they had first class tickets,
which they had previously confirmed, because their
seats in first class were given to "passengers from
London."
Against the foregoing, however, defendant's evidence
would seek to establish its theory of honest mistake,
thus:
The first class reservations of Senator Lopez and
party were made on March 29, 1960 together with
those of four members of the Rufino family, for a total
of eight (8) seats, as shown in their joint reservation
card (Exh. 1). Subsequently on March 30, 1960, two
other Rufinos secured reservations and were given a
separate reservation card (Exh. 2). A new reservation
card consisting of two pages (Exhs. 3 and 4) was then
made for the original of eight passengers, namely,
Senator Lopez and party and four members of the
Rufino family, the first page (Exh. 3) referring to 2
Lopezes, 2 Montelibanos and 1 Rufino and the
second page (Exh. 4) referring to 3 Rufinos. On April
18, 1960 "Your Travel Guide" agency cancelled the
reservations of the Rufinos. A telex message was
thereupon sent on that date to PAN-AM's head office
at San Francisco by Mariano Herranz, PAN-AM's
reservations employee at its office in Escolta, Manila.
(Annex A-Acker's to Exh. 6.) In said message,
49
however, Herranz mistakenly cancelled all the seats
that had been reserved, that is, including those of
Senator Lopez and party.
The next day — April 1960 — Herranz discovered his
mistake, upon seeing the reservation card newly
prepared by his co-employee Pedro Asensi for Sen.
Lopez and party to the exclusion of the Rufinos (Exh.
5). It was then that Herranz sent another telex wire to
the San Francisco head office, stating his error and
asking for the reinstatement of the four (4) first class
seats reserved for Senator Lopez and party (Annex A-
Velasco's to Exh. 6). San Francisco head office
replied on April 22, 1960 that Senator Lopez and
party are waitlisted and that said office is unable to
reinstate them (Annex B-Velasco's to Exh. 6).
Since the flight involved was still more than a month
away and confident that reinstatement would be
made, Herranz forgot the matter and told no one
about it except his co-employee, either Armando
Davila or Pedro Asensi or both of them (Tsn., 123-
124, 127, Nov. 17, 1961).
Subsequently, on April 27, 1960, Armando Davila,
PAN-AM's reservations employee working in the
same Escolta office as Herranz, phoned PAN-AM's
ticket sellers at its other office in the Manila Hotel, and
confirmed the reservations of Senator Lopez and
party.
PAN-AM's reservations supervisor Alberto Jose,
discovered Herranz's mistake after "Your Travel
Guide" phone on May 18, 1960 to state that Senator
Lopez and party were going to depart as scheduled.
Accordingly, Jose sent a telex wire on that date to
PAN-AM's head office at San Francisco to report the
error and asked said office to continue holding the
reservations of Senator Lopez and party (Annex B-
Acker's to Exh. 6). Said message was reiterated by
Jose in his telex wire of May 19, 1960 (Annex C-
Acker's to Exh. 6). San Francisco head office replied
on May 19, 1960 that it regrets being unable to
confirm Senator Lopez and party for the reason that
the flight was solidly booked (Exh. 7). Jose sent a
third telex wire on May 20, 1960 addressed to PAN-
AM's offices at San Francisco, New York (Idlewild
Airport), Tokyo and Hongkong, asking all-out
assistance towards restoring the cancelled spaces
and for report of cancellations at their end (Annex D-
Acker's to Exh. 6). San Francisco head office
reiterated on May 20, 1960 that it could not reinstate
the spaces and referred Jose to the Tokyo and
Hongkong offices (Exh. 8). Also on May 20, the Tokyo
office of PAN-AM wired Jose stating it will do
everything possible (Exh. 9).
Expecting that some cancellations of bookings would
be made before the flight time, Jose decided to
withhold from Senator Lopez and party, or their agent,
the information that their reservations had been
cancelled.
Armando Davila having previously confirmed Senator
Lopez and party's first class reservations to PAN-
AM's ticket sellers at its Manila Hotel office, the latter
sold and issued in their favor the corresponding first
class tickets on the 21st and 23rd of May, 1960.
From the foregoing evidence of defendant it is in
effect admitted that defendant — through its agents
— first cancelled plaintiffs, reservations by mistake
and thereafter deliberately and intentionally withheld
from plaintiffs or their travel agent the fact of said
cancellation, letting them go on believing that their
first class reservations stood valid and confirmed. In
so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class
tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed
reservations for the same, when in fact they had
none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself
into the position of having to breach its a foresaid
contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute
cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as
it turned out in this case. Such actuation of defendant
may indeed have been prompted by nothing more
than the promotion of its self-interest in holding on to
Senator Lopez and party as passengers in its flight
and foreclosing on their chances to seek the services
of other airlines that may have been able to afford
them first class accommodations. All the time, in legal
contemplation such conduct already amounts to
action in bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a
known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will
(Spiegel vs. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2d 895,
907). As stated in Kamm v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 175
A. 62, 99 A.L.R. 1, 7: "Self-enrichment or fraternal
interest, and not personal ill-will, may well have been
the motive; but it is malice nevertheless."
As of May 18, 1960 defendant's reservations
supervisor, Alberto Jose knew that plaintiffs'
reservations had been cancelled. As of May 20 he
knew that the San Francisco head office stated with
finality that it could not reinstate plaintiffs' cancelled
reservations. And yet said reservations supervisor
made the "decision" — to use his own, word — to
withhold the information from the plaintiffs. Said
Alberto Jose in his testimony:
Q Why did you not notify them?
A Well, you see, sir, in my fifteen (15) years of service
with the air lines business my experience is that even
if the flights are solidly booked months in advance,
usually the flight departs with plenty of empty seats
both on the first class and tourist class. This is due to
late cancellation of passengers, or because
passengers do not show up in the airport, and it was
our hope others come in from another flight and,
therefore, are delayed and, therefore, missed their
connections. This experience of mine, coupled with
that wire from Tokyo that they would do everything
possible prompted me to withhold the information, but
unfortunately, instead of the first class seat that I was
hoping for and which I anticipated only the tourists
class was open on which Senator and Mrs. Lopez,
Mr. and Mrs. Montelibano were accommodated. Well,
I fully realize now the gravity of my decision in not
advising Senator and Mrs. Lopez, Mr. and Mrs.
Montelibano nor their agents about the erroneous
cancellation and for which I would like them to know
that I am very sorry.
xxx xxx xxx
Q So it was not your duty to notify Sen. Lopez and
parties that their reservations had been cancelled
since May 18, 1960?
A As I said before it was my duty. It was my duty but
as I said again with respect to that duty I have the
power to make a decision or use my discretion and
judgment whether I should go ahead and tell the
passenger about the cancellation. (Tsn., pp. 17-19,
28-29, March 15, 1962.)
At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant,
therefore, in breach of its known duty, made plaintiffs
believe that their reservation had not been cancelled.
50
An additional indication of this is the fact that upon the
face of the two tickets of record, namely, the ticket
issued to Alfredo Montelibano, Jr. on May 21, 1960
(Exh. 22) and that issued to Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano,
Jr., on May 23, 1960 (Exh. 23), the reservation status
is stated as "OK". Such willful-non-disclosure of the
cancellation or pretense that the reservations for
plaintiffs stood — and not simply the erroneous
cancellation itself — is the factor to which is
attributable the breach of the resulting contracts. And,
as above-stated, in this respect defendant clearly
acted in bad faith.
As if to further emphasize its bad faith on the matter,
defendant subsequently promoted the employee who
cancelled plaintiffs' reservations and told them nothing
about it. The record shows that said employee —
Mariano Herranz — was not subjected to investigation
and suspension by defendant but instead was given a
reward in the form of an increase of salary in June of
the following year (Tsn., 86-88, Nov. 20, 1961).
At any rate, granting all the mistakes advanced by the
defendant, there would at least be negligence so
gross and reckless as to amount to malice or bad faith
(Fores vs. Miranda, L-12163, March 4, 1959; Necesito
v. Paras, L-10605-06, June 30, 1958). Firstly,
notwithstanding the entries in the reservation cards
(Exhs. 1 & 3) that the reservations cancelled are
those of the Rufinos only, Herranz made the mistake,
after reading said entries, of sending a wire cancelling
all the reservations, including those of Senator Lopez
and party (Tsn., pp. 108-109, Nov. 17, 1961).
Secondly, after sending a wire to San Francisco head
office on April 19, 1960 stating his error and asking for
reinstatement, Herranz simply forgot about the matter.
Notwithstanding the reply of San Francisco head
Office on April 22, 1960 that it cannot reinstate
Senator Lopez and party (Annex B-Velasco's to Exh.
6), it was assumed and taken for granted that
reinstatement would be made. Thirdly, Armando
Davila confirmed plaintiff's reservations in a phone
call on April 27, 1960 to defendant's ticket sellers,
when at the time it appeared in plaintiffs' reservation
card (Exh. 5) that they were only waitlisted
passengers. Fourthly, defendant's ticket sellers issued
plaintiffs' tickets on May 21 and 23, 1960, without first
checking their reservations just before issuing said
tickets. And, finally, no one among defendant's agents
notified Senator Lopez and party that their
reservations had been cancelled, a precaution that
could have averted their entering with defendant into
contracts that the latter had already placed beyond its
power to perform.
Accordingly, there being a clear admission in
defendant's evidence of facts amounting to a bad faith
on its part in regard to the breach of its contracts with
plaintiffs, it becomes unnecessary to further discuss
the evidence adduced by plaintiffs to establish
defendant's bad faith. For what is admitted in the
course of the trial does not need to be proved (Sec. 2,
Rule 129, Rules of Court).
Addressing ourselves now to the question of
damages, it is well to state at the outset those rules
and principles. First, moral damages are recoverable
in breach of contracts where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220, New Civil
Code). Second, in addition to moral damages,
exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good, in
breach of contract where the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil
Code). And, third, a written contract for an attorney's
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate
result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its
contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social
humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and
mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with first
class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were
given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were
expected to be among the first-class passengers by
those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found
among the tourist passengers. It may not be
humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is
humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary
to what is rightfully to be expected from the
contractual undertaking.
Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro
Tempore. International carriers like defendant know
the prestige of such an office. For the Senate is not
only the Upper Chamber of the Philippine Congress,
but the nation's treaty-ratifying body. It may also be
mentioned that in his aforesaid office Senator Lopez
was in a position to preside in impeachment cases
should the Senate sit as Impeachment Tribunal. And
he was former Vice-President of the Philippines.
Senator Lopez was going to the United States to
attend a private business conference of the
Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company; but his aforesaid
rank and position were by no means left behind, and
in fact he had a second engagement awaiting him in
the United States: a banquet tendered by Filipino
friends in his honor as Senate President Pro Tempore
(Tsn., pp. 14-15, Nov. 25, 1960). For the moral
damages sustained by him, therefore, an award of
P100,000.00 is appropriate.
Mrs. Maria J. Lopez, as wife of Senator Lopez, shared
his prestige and therefore his humiliation. In addition
she suffered physical discomfort during the 13-hour
trip,(5 hours from Tokyo to Honolulu and 8 hours from
Honolulu to San Francisco). Although Senator Lopez
stated that "she was quite well" (Tsn., p. 22, Nov. 25,
1960) — he obviously meant relatively well, since the
rest of his statement is that two months before, she
was attackedby severe flu and lost 10 pounds of
weight and that she was advised by Dr. Sison to go to
the United States as soon as possible for medical
check-up and relaxation, (Ibid). In fact, Senator Lopez
stated, as shown a few pages after in the transcript of
his testimony, that Mrs. Lopez was sick when she left
the Philippines:
A. Well, my wife really felt very bad during the entire
trip from Tokyo to San Francisco. In the first place,
she was sick when we left the Philippines, and then
with that discomfort which she [experienced] or
suffered during that evening, it was her worst
experience. I myself, who was not sick, could not
sleep because of the discomfort. (Tsn., pp. 27-28,
Nov. 25, 1960).
It is not hard to see that in her condition then a
physical discomfort sustained for thirteen hours may
well be considered a physical suffering. And even
without regard to the noise and trepidation inside the
plane — which defendant contends, upon the strengh
of expert testimony, to be practically the same in first
class and tourist class — the fact that the seating
spaces in the tourist class are quite narrower than in
first class, there beingsix seats to a row in the former
as against four to a row in the latter, and that in tourist
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class there is very little space for reclining in view of
the closer distance between rows (Tsn., p. 24, Nov.
25, 1960), will suffice to show that the aforesaid
passenger indeed experienced physical suffering
during the trip. Added to this, of course, was the
painfull thought that she was deprived by defendant
— after having paid for and expected the same — of
the most suitable, place for her, the first class, where
evidently the best of everything would have been
given her, the best seat, service, food and treatment.
Such difference in comfort between first class and
tourist class is too obvious to be recounted, is in fact
the reason for the former's existence, and is
recognized by the airline in charging a higher fare for
it and by the passengers in paying said higher rate
Accordingly, considering the totality of her suffering
and humiliation, an award to Mrs. Maria J. Lopez of
P50,000.00 for moral damages will be reasonable.
Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling
as immediate members of the family of Senator
Lopez. They formed part of the Senator's party as
shown also by the reservation cards of PAN-AM. As
such they likewise shared his prestige and
humiliation. Although defendant contends that a few
weeks before the flight they had asked their
reservations to be charged from first class to tourist
class — which did not materialize due to alleged full
booking in the tourist class — the same does not
mean they suffered no shared in having to take tourist
class during the flight. For by that time they had
already been made to pay for first class seats and
therefore to expect first class accommodations. As
stated, it is one thing to take the tourist class by free
choice; a far different thing to be compelled to take it
notwithstanding having paid for first class seats.
Plaintiffs-appellants now ask P37,500.00 each for the
two but we note that in their motion for
reconsideration filed in the court a quo, they were
satisfied with P25,000.00 each for said persons.
(Record on Appeal, p. 102). For their social
humiliation, therefore, the award to them of
P25,000.00 each is reasonable.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective
damages is, as the name implies, to provide an
example or correction for public good. Defendant
having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court,
as stated earlier, may award exemplary damages in
addition to moral damages (Articles 2229, 2232, New rate of exchange and the terms at which the amount
Civil Code). of damages awarded would approximately be in U.S.
dollars, this Court is all the more of the view that said
In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an award is proper and reasonable.
amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar
breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby
airlines. In this light, we find it just to award modified so as to award in favor of plaintiffs and
P75,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages. against defendant, the following: (1) P200,000.00 as
moral damages, divided among plaintiffs, thus:
Now, as to attorney's fees, the record shows a written P100,000.00 for Senate President Pro Tempore
contract of services executed on June 1, 1960 (Exh. Fernando Lopez; P50,000.00 for his wife Maria J.
F) whereunder plaintiffs-appellants engaged the Lopez; P25,000.00 for his son-in-law Alfredo
services of their counsel — Atty. Vicente J. Francisco Montelibano, Jr.; and P25,000.00 for his daughter
— and agreedto pay the sum of P25,000.00 as Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr.; (2) P75,000.00 as
attorney's fees upon the termination of the case in the exemplary or corrective damages; (3) interest at the
Court of First Instance, and an additional sum of legal rate of 6% per annum on the moral and
P25,000.00 in the event the case is appealed to the exemplary damages aforestated, from December 14,
Supreme Court. As said earlier, a written contract for 1963, the date of the amended decision of the court a
attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid quo, until said damages are fully paid; (4) P50,000.00
therefor unless found by the court to be as attorney's fees; and (5) the costs. Counterclaim
unconscionable or unreasonable. A consideration of dismissed.So ordered.
the subject matter of the present controversy, of the
professional standing of the attorney for plaintiffs- Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
appellants, and of the extent of the service rendered J.B.L., Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and
by him, shows that said amount provided for in the Sanchez, JJ., concur.
written agreement is reasonable. Said lawyer — Dizon, J., is on leave.
whose prominence in the legal profession is well
known — studied the case, prepared and filed the
complaint, conferred with witnesses, analyzed
documentary evidence, personally appeared at the
trial of the case in twenty-two days, during a period of
three years, prepared four sets of cross-
interrogatories for deposition taking, prepared several
memoranda and the motion for reconsideration, filed
a joint record on appeal with defendant, filed a brief
for plaintiffs as appellants consisting of 45 printed
pages and a brief for plaintiffs as appellees consisting
of 265 printed pages. And we are further convinced of
its reasonableness because defendant's counsel
likewise valued at P50,000.00 the proper
compensation for his services rendered to defendant
in the trial court and on appeal.
In concluding, let it be stressed that the amount of
damages awarded in this appeal has been
determined by adequately considering the official,
political, social, and financial standing of the offended
parties on one hand, and the business and financial
position of the offender on the other (Domingding v.
Ng, 55 O.G. 10). And further considering the present
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