DEL SOCORRO V WILSEM GR 193707

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed
with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her
son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst
never gave support to Roderigo.Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the
Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against
Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree
with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he
is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This
does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position
that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst
to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents
the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-
compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would
be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.

2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here
in the Philippines and committed the offense here
Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852

Subject Matter: Applicability of the doctrine of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code to R.A. 9262
(Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004)

Facts:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this union, two female
children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Protective
Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological, and
economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic
Act No. 9262.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be included
in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.

Held:

Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262 provides that the
offender be ralted or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In Section
47 of RA 9262, it has expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal principles
developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under
special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
G.R. No. 179267 GARCIA v. DRILON 699 SCRA 352
GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
699 SCRA 352
FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded.
Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle,
she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold
office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA
9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute
prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is
justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the
equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences
between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims
of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human
rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special
remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact
essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or
middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal
protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
 Republic vs Daisy Yahon
G.R. No. 201043
Facts:

Sgt Yahon was married to respondent. A TPO has been issued against Sgt Yahon to protect
the respondent from further abuses. In the TPO, Sgt Yahon was ordered to provide
reasonable financial spousal support to the respondent. In his failure to appear before the
court with a counsel and with an answer to the charges against him, the court has granted
PPO for the respondent against Sgt Yahon. It was also reiterated that Sgt Yahon should
provide for the financial spousal support to his wife from his retirement benefits. However, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center contended that half of the retirement benefits
of Sgt Yahon cannot be given to the respondent as it is from a military institution. The
petitioner contended that money due to government employees is not liable to the creditors
of the said employees in the process of garnishment.
Issue:
Whether or not the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon be subject to the ruling of the court to
provide for the financial spousal support of respondent.
Held:
Retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon are subject to the financial spousal support of respondent.
As a rule in statutory construction, when the law does not distinguish, the court should not
distinguish. As section 8 (g) of RA No. 9262 used the general term 'employer', it includes in
its coverage the military institution, which is the employer of Sgt Yahon.
G.R. No. 193960
April 05, 2018
Dabalos vs. RTC Branch 59 of Angeles City, Pampanga
G.R. No. 193960

Facts:

Dabalos had willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously used personal violence against the
complainant whom he had a dating relationship with. The said violence constituted the pulling
of hair, punching the complainant's back, shoulder, and left eye which have demeaning and
degrading effects on the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in
violation of Section 5 (a) of the Republic Act 9262. In Dabalos' defense, he averred that the
relationship had already ceased at the time of the alleged incident.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9262 be construed when the dating relationship was not the proximate
cause of the violence?
Held:
Yes. The law provides that any act can be considered as a crime of violence against women
through physical harm when it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is
the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or
with whom he has a common child, and when it results in or is likely to result in physical harm
or suffering.
Applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither
should the courts, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom
the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. It did not distinguish that the act of
violence should be a consequence of such relationship.
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

G.R. No. 182835; April 20, 2010

Facts:

After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with her face superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said accused for
violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.

The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that
Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in
Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.

The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s appeal
to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied
Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present
for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case?

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time
before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission
of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.

Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.
 DOLINA V. VALLECERA

GR No. 182367- [December 15, 2010]

DOCTRINE:

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the
filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of obligation.

FACTS:

In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a temporary
protection order against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse
under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint cherryl added a prayer for support for their
supposed child. She based such prayer on the latter’s certificate of live birth
which listed Vallecera ‘s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as
the RTC may deem appropriate.

Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one
for financial supportrather than for protection against woman and child abuses, that he
was not the child’s father and that the signature in the birth certificate was not here. He
also added that the petition is a harassment suit intended to for him to acknowledge the
child as his and therefore give financial support.

RTC dismissed petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection and
denied her application for temporary support for her child?

HELD:

Yes.

RATIO:

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A.
9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children
who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order against
the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child,
this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. In this case
neither her or her child lived with Vallecera.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the
filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand
for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child,
the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina
shall have proved his relation to him. The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a
judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children
are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for
compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support.
Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory
recognition may be integrated and resolved.
RICKY DINAMLING v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 19952 June 22, 2015

Facts:
Petitioner Ricky Dinamling was charged in two criminal information for violation of R.A. No.
9262. It is alleged in the information that he feloniously inflicts psychological violence upon a
woman with whom he has two children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and public
humiliation by repeated verbal and emotional abuse consisting of several bad and insulting
utterance directed against the victim. Dinamling pleaded not guilty to both charges.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of RA No. 9262.

Ruling:
The elements of the crime are;

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a
common child. As for the woman’s child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or
living within or without the family abode.
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through the acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar acts or omissions.

In this case, the elements have been proven and duly established. It is undisputed that thevictim
is a woman who has then in a five-year ongoing relationship with Dinamling and had two
common children. The woman is often in fear of petitioner due to latter’s physical and verbal
abuse.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (RA No. 9262) just like the mental
or emotional anguish caused on the victim. It is the means employed by the perpetrator, while
mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. To establish psychological violence as the element of the crime, it is necessary to show
proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar acts. And to
establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present a testimony of the victim as such
experiences are personal to this party.

In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done
by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section
5(i) of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done,
petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping her pants and underwear,
although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence since it
was alleged and proven that they resulted in the victim’s public ridicule. Accused is alleged to
have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of physical violence
must be proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means of causing mental or
emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the physical violence
translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or emotional
well-being.
BARCENAS V NLRC

FACTS: The Buddhist Temple has hired petitioner who speaks the Chinese
language as secretary and interpreter. The head monk, Chua Se Su, had sexual
relations with petitioner, which resulted to the latter giving birth to a child. In
May, 1982, of five months before giving birth to the alleged son of Su on
October 12, 1982, petitioner was sent home to Bicol. Upon the death of Su in
July, 1983, complainant remained and continued in her job. In 1985,
respondent Manuel Chua (Chua, for short) was elected President and
Chairman of the Board of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the
Philippines, Inc. and Rev. Sim Dee for short) was elected Head Buddhist
Priest. Thereafter, Chua and Dee discontinued payment of her monthly
allowance and the additional P500.00 allowance effective 1983. Petitioner and
her son were evicted forcibly from their quarters in the temple by six police
officers. She was brought first to the Police precinct in Tondo and then
brought to Aloha Hotel where she was compelled to sign a written undertaking
not to return to the Buddhist temple in consideration of the sum of
P10,000.00. Petitioner refused and Chua shouted threats against her and her
son. Her personal belongings including assorted jewelries were never returned
by respondent Chua.
Chua alleges that she was never an employee of the temple, but only attended
to the personal needs of the former head monk, hence was co-terminus with
such.

LA ruled in favour of the petitioner. NLRC reversed.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is an employee of the temple

HELD:
Petitioner is an employee of the temple as secretary and interpreter.

Moreover, the work that petitioner performed in the temple could not be
categorized as mere domestic work. We find that petitioner, being proficient in
the Chinese language, attended to the visitors, mostly Chinese, who came to
pray or seek advice before Buddha for personal or business problems;
arranged meetings between these visitors and Su and supervised the
preparation of the food for the temple visitors; acted as tourist guide of foreign
visitors; acted as liaison with some goverment offices; and made the payment
for the temple’s Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these tasks may not
be deemed activities of a household helper. They were essential and important
to the operation and religious functions of the temple.

In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon her return
to Bicol in May, 1982 to await the birth of her love-child allegedly by Su. The
records do not show that petitioner filed any leave from work or that a leave
was granted her. Neither did she return to work after the birth of her child on
October 12, 1982, whom she named Robert Chua alias Chua Sim Tiong. The
NLRC found that it was only in July, 1983 after Su died that she went back to
the Manila Buddhist Temple. Petitioner’s pleadings failed to rebut this
finding. Clearly, her return could not be deemed as a resumption of her old
position which she had already abandoned.

Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but rather as Su’s
mistress who is bent on protecting the proprietary and hereditary rights of her
son and nephew. Finally, while petitioner contends that she continued to work
in the temple after Su died, there is, however, no proof that she was re-hired
by the new Head Monk.
Domingo vs. Rayala (596 SCRA 90)
Domingo vs. Rayala
546 Scra 90

Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for
sexual harassment against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled
her ears. Rayala argued that his acts does not constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist,
there must be a demand, request or requirement of sexual favor.

Issue:
Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment.

Rulings:
Yes.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-
related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-
related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,
teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or
moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or
otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
. (2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
. (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.

even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still
be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a “demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor.” But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from
the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her
neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for
school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual
overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual
favor.