Expert
Panel
Discussion
'The
strategic
and
other
implications
of


Australia's
involvement
in
Afghanistan'

20
November
2010,
Australian
Defence
College,
RUSI
Presentation


Panel
Members
(alphabetical):
Mr
Neil
James,
ADA;
MAJGEN
Jim
Molan
(Retd);

Professor
Hugh
White
SDSC;
Moderator:
MAJGEN
Peter
Abigail,
Director
ASPI

(Retd)1


MAJGEN
Jim
Molan


He
expressed
broad
agreement
with
the
positions
of
the
Prime
Minister
and

leader
of
the
Oppositions
as
expressed
in
their
speeches
delivered
to
Parliament

on
Tuesday,
19
October
2010.


He
then
outlined
a
number
of
concepts
that,
in
his
opinion,
derailed
discussions

on
AFG.
These
concepts
included:


1. AFG
is
the
‘graveyard
of
empires’:
Molan
listed
a
number
of
historical

expeditions
into
AFG
that
allegedly
‘disproved’
this
reputation.2

2. We
are
imposing
‘Western
values’
on
AFG:
Molan
rejects
both
the
idea

that
we
are
imposing
and
can
impose
Western
values.
He
cites
the
case
of

King
Amanullah
as
an
example
where
the
imposition
of
Western
values
in

AFG
had
failed.

3. Metrics

4. Pakistan
was
too
hard:
Molan
cited
Admiral
Mike
Mullen
(US
Chairman
of

Joint
Chiefs
of
Staff)
statements
that
Pakistan’s
Army
had
committed
to

going
after
the
TB
in
North
Waziristan3
as
evidence
that
the
situation
(and

perhaps
our
opinion)
of
Pakistan
may
change.

Molan
said
this
could
be
a
chance
for
strategic
change,
akin
to
the
Sunni

Awakening
in
Iraq.


























































1
http://www.rusi.org.au/states/act/whats_on.php,
accessed
23
October
2010.


2
This
argument
is
neither
here
nor
there.

3
Admiral
Mike
Mullen’s
statements
can
be
found
here:


http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010‐10‐13/pakistan‐army‐planning‐
assault‐on‐al‐qaeda‐terror‐epicenter‐mullen‐says.html,
accessed
23
October

2010.

 5. There
is
no
military
solution
in
AFG

6. It’s
been
nine
years,
why
haven’t
we
won?


Molan
responded
to
this
by
saying
that
we
hadn’t
given
sufficient
time
for

the
current
COIN
concept
to
work.

7. AUS
won’t
support
greater
involvement
in
AFG:
Molan
rebuffed
this
by

pointing
to
the
simplistic
nature
of
polls
and
surveys
of
Australian

popular
opinion.


Overall,
Molan’s
speech
advocated
for
pressing
on
with
the
current

campaign
in
order
to
give
the
Afghan
government
the
“space
to
breathe”
in

order
to
build
up
legitimacy
and
take
over
security
functions.
In
his

opinion,
that
is
what
success
would
look
like.



He
affirms
this
position
three
days
later
in
this
opinion
piece
in
The
Australian:

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national‐affairs/defence/it‐is‐not‐too‐late‐to‐
be‐successful‐in‐afghanistan/story‐e6frg8yo‐1225940217222


Professor
Hugh
White


White
began
by
stating
that
we
required
a
higher
level
of
confidence
in
the

justification
of
spending
lives
and
money
in
the
pursuit
of
strategic
interests.
In

this
sense,
our
government
needed
to
exercise
“due
diligence”
in
answering
the

following
questions:


1. What
are
our
aims
in
AFG?

2. How
much
will
it
cost
to
have
a
reasonable
prospect
of
success?

3. Is
it
worth
it?


He
argued
that,
if
we
are
to
accept
the
current
strategy
in
AFG,
we
need
a

fundamental
change
in
the
country.
That
is,
we
must
change
the
quality
of
the

political
culture
in
AFG
in
order
to
make
our
efforts
in
training
the
ANSF

worthwhile.
A
poor
government
would
merely
undermine
the
ANSF.
If
this
is
the

case,
how
hard
will
this
be?

White
also
questioned
whether
achieving
our
mission
in
Uruzgan
would
have

made
a
difference
to
the
overall
campaign.
He
pointed
out
that
the
quality
of
AFG

troops
is
beyond
our
control,
and
the
timeframe
of
2‐4
years
was
limiting.



White
then
posed
a
different
question:
assuming
we
can
make
a
difference
to

change
the
government
in
AFG,
do
we
(including
as
part
of
a
coalition)
have
the

capacity
to
make
a
deeper
transformation
in
AFG?
He
was
sceptical
as,
in
his

opinion,
trying
to
build
an
effective
government
as
an
interventionist
force
is

hard.


According
to
White,
there
is
a
weak
link
between
training
the
4th
Brigade
in

Uruzgan
and
our
strategic
objectives.


If
AUS
wants
an
enduring
solution,
how
much
more
resources
are
we
willing
to

invest?
In
White’s
opinion,
the
allies
will
not
do
more
in
AFG,
and
AUS
will
not
do

more.



He
closed
with
his
recommendations:
in
order
to
minimise
costs
(including

casualties),
it
was
in
AUS’
best
interests
to
stay
until
the
US
starts
to
leave,

then
we
should
get
out
asap.


Mr
Neil
James


In
James’
opinion,
it
is
not
enough
that
our
presence
in
AFG
is
due
to
alliance

management
reasons.
He
stated
that
we
should
not
be
in
a
war
if
we
do
not

intend
to
win
it.


He
cited
Anthony
Cordeman’s
latest
paper
(October
2010)
on
grand
strategies
in

the
AFG,
Pakistan
and
Iraq
wars.4


James
situated
his
position
as
halfway
between
Molan’s
and
White’s

respective
positions.
He
questioned
whether
he
had
blown
our
chances
in

the
alliance
by
not
taking
the
lead
in
Uruzgan
province
from
the
Dutch.



























































4
This
paper
is
available
for
download
here:
http://csis.org/publication/grand‐

strategy‐afghan‐pakistan‐and‐iraq‐wars,
accessed
23
October
2010.

James
also
argued
that
if
we
were
to
leave,
we
would
risk
energising
the

enemy,
and
that
we
had
a
moral
burden
to
finish
the
job
in
AFG.