G.R. No.

207264 October 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which stated
that: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division is upheld."

In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:

"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make a
determination as regards her qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm
the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set
aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to due process and for
unconstitutionally adding a qualification not otherwise required by the constitution."1 (as
originally underscored)

The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:

"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque."2

Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus:

petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the
House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently
stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May
2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a
precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.

We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:

"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally
disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution
dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any
pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives. x x x As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to
argue on the basis of her due proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to
highlight the undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18
May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS.

1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc has already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to
reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First Division that CANCELLED petitioner's
certificate of candidacy.

2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of

petitioner's certificate o candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her
proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been removed, there was not even any
attempt to remove it.

3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation
may be removed. Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides:

"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En
Bane shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court."

Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a
restraining order that will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the Supreme Court may remove the
barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen. Petitioner
did not move to have it happen.

It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being
proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of
candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there was a
final finding against her by the COMELEC.3 She needed a restraining order from the
Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse
to her became executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more
imperative. She would have to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a
restraining order, which would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on
irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was
not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit her
proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law into her hands" and secure a
 proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane decision that was final on
14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.

4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule 18
in the provision that the COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL AND
EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme
Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision, unrestrained, moves from
promulgation into becoming final and executory. This is so because in Section 5 of Rule
18 it is stated:

Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the Commission or a

division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance
upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram.

5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very date
of its promulgation on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before us that she
in fact received a copy of the decision on 16 May 20 13.4 On that date, she had absolutely
no reason why she would disregard the available legal way to remove the restraint on her
proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a proclamation two days thereafter.
The utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane decision and of the Rule stating that
her proclamation at that point MUST be on permission by the Supreme Court is even
indicative of bad faith on the part of the petitioner.

6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted proclamation
as the very reason to support her argument that she could no longer be reached by the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it is the HRET that has exclusive jurisdiction
over the issue of her qualifications for office.

7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which she
directs, as well as in her objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with her
procured proclamation that petitioner nullifies the COMELEC's decision, by Division and
then En Banc and pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the COMELEC decision. In
other words, petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all administrative and judicial
actions thereon, past and present. And by her proclamation, she claims as acquired the
congressional seat that she sought to be a candidate for. As already shown, the reasons
that lead to the impermissibility of the objective are clear. She cannot sit as Member of
the House of Representatives by virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with
knowledge of the existing legal impediment.

8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which
has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a written
constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a
Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the
rightful winner in the election for such membership.5 Indeed, the action for cancellation
 of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable
determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the
COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally
decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the
COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the
COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of
Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained
when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five
days from 14 May 2013.

9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the
COMELEC First Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision, her
baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become
valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the Supreme Court regarding the decision
of the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was indispensably needed, not
to legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013 but to authorize a proclamation with the
Supreme Court decision as basis.

10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil action
for a writ of Certiorari through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed by set
rules and principles.

a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard
summarily. The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC
Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the Commission
may designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear
the case and to receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section
3 that when the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral
testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit their position
paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence;
x x x and that this provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing and
reception of evidence are delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of
its officials x x x.

b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner because of passion or hostility.6

It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the exercise of
the COMELEC summary jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the limits of the
Supreme Court's authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling that is brought before it, that
defines the way petitioner's submission before the Court should be adjudicated. Thus further
explained, the disposition of 25 June 2013 is here repeated for affirmation:

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted
in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there
was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to
question and present controverting evidence.

Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules
of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission. In
view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition
was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a
period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the
opportunity given her.

Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given
the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for
reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the
COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:

"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office
the law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements.
Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her
American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner's burden to present a case. She, however,
specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the
USA.

Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February

7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which
she continues to use until June 30 2012 petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The
burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the
respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely
misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can
establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-
American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship,
she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any
elective public office in the Philippines." (Emphasis in the original.)

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's
COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a
holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of
proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any
proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.

Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner admitted
that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American
citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said
motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012.
Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve
the people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to
petitioner's explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules,
then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she
executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were
promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012.1âwphi1
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her
oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-
acquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper
proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is
already part of the records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the
records evidence on matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent
COMELEC. This statement raises a lot of questions -Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance
for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at the
earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her
natural-born Filipino status?

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as
Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a
natural-born Filipino citizen.

This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this
Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot
be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met
as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules
Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-
002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of
Immigration. Thus, petitioner s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered
as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.

These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner s
citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.7

11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the
HRET insofar as the petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The
COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s certificate of candidacy, and its due course
or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally
proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the
proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before
the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for
grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Bane decision, there is no
longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In that sense, the
HRET s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who
becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable
step towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds
de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been
terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will
determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the
risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the
 House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are
had till termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the
terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is
not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between
the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet
no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.

12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste can be
attributed, as the dissent does so, to the resolution of this petition promulgated on 25 June
2013. It was not done to prevent the exercise by the HRET of its constitutional duty.
Quite the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition was done to pave the way for the
unimpeded performance by the HRET of its constitutional role. The petitioner can very
well invoke the authority of the HRET, but not as a sitting member of the House of
Representatives.8

The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the motion was
contained in a letter to the members of the Court on the understanding that the matter was
internal to the Court. The ponente now seeks the Courts approval to have the explanation
published as it is now appended to this Resolution.

The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well
be in order to remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of
the parties, but continues until the case is terminated.9 When petitioner filed her Petition for
Certiorari jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court exercised such jurisdiction when
it acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of the
petition by petitioner.

More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly
has legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition,
negative and nullify the Court's Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we counsel
petitioner against trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests.
Obviously, she cannot, as she designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the
law.

WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is
affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 See Separate Concurring Opinion
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Dissenting Opinion (NO PART)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE See: Dissent.

CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part No part
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave) See Concurring opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join J. Carpio in his Dissent No part

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See dissenting opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
* On official leave.
1
Rollo, p. 325.
2
Id. at 9.
3
"The concept of 'final' judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or
'executory' as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A 'final' judgment or
order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court
in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the
Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities
of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to
await the parties' next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to
cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes 'final' or, to use the established and
more distinctive term, 'final and executory. ' See Investments Inc v Court o Appeals 231
Phil. 302, 307 (1987).

Thus, when the COMELEC En Bane rendered its Resolution dated 14 May 2013,
such was a final judgment the issue of petitioner's eligibility was already
definitively disposed of and there was no longer any pending case on petitioner's
qualifications to run for office, and the COMELEC's task of ruling on the
propriety of the cancellation of petitioner's COC has ended. This final judgment,
by operation of Sec. 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, became
final and executory on 19 May 2013, or five days from its promulgation, as it was
not RJ restrained by the Supreme Court. See rollo pp. 163-165.
4
Rollo p. 5.

Parenthetically, the surrounding facts of the case show that the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBOC), as well as the parties, already had notice of the COMELEC En Bane
Resolution dated 14 May 2013 before petitioner was proclaimed. As alleged in the
Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration, and which was not disputed by petitioner,
the COMELEC En Bane found that On May 15 2013, the Villa PBOC was already in
receipt of the May 14 2013 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner thereby affirming the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the First Division that
cancelled petitioner's COC. The receipt was acknowledged by Rossini M. Ocsadin of the
PBOC on May 15,2013. On May 16,2013, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, petitioner's counsel of
record, received a copy of the same resolution. On May 18 2013, the PBOC under ARED
Ignacio is already aware of the May 14,2013 Resolution of the Commission En Bane
which is already on file with the PBOC. Furthermore, PBOC members Provincial
Prosecutor Bimbo Mercado and Magdalena Lim knew of the 14 May 2013 Resolution
since they are the original members of the Villa PBOC. However, while counsel for
petitioner, Atty. Aureus, already received a copy of said resolution on May 16, 2013, the
counsel for petitioner, Atty. Ferdinand Rivera (who is an UNA lawyer), who appeared
before the Ignacio PBOC on May 18,2013, misrepresented to said PBOC that [petitioner]
has not received a copy of the said May 14 2013 Resolution of this Commission. This has
mislead the Ignacio PBOC in deciding to proclaim petitioner believing that petitioner is
not yet bound by the said resolution. See rollo pp. 392-393.
5
In the case at bar, as the PBOC and the parties all had notice of the COMELEC En Bane
Resolution dated 14 May 2013, the PBOC should have, at the very least, suspended
petitioner's proclamation. Although COMELEC Resolution No. 9648 or the General
Instructions for the Board of Canvassers on the Consolidation/Canvass and Transmission
of Votes in Connection with the 3 May 2013 National and Local Elections authorizes the
PBOC to proclaim a winning candidate if there is a pending disqualification or petition to
cancel COC and no order of suspension was issued by the COMELEC, the cancellation
of petitioner's COC, as ordered in the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 14 May
2013, is of greater significance and import than an order of suspension of proclamation.
The PBOC should have taken the COMELEC En Bane s cue. To now countenance this
precipitate act of the PBOC is to allow it to render nugatory a decision of its superior.
Besides, on 18 May 2013, there was no longer any pending case as the COMELEC En
Bane Resolution dated 14 May 2013 is already a final judgment.
6
Beluso v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456.

In De Ia Cruz v COMELEC and Pacete the Court ruled that the COMELEC being
a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country,
its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling
within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. (G.R. No.
192221, 13 November 2012, 685 SCRA 347, 359).

In Mastura v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the rule that factual findings of
administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when
there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such
findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as
the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC -created and
explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself -on a level higher than
statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain
the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that
end, it is not strictly bound by the rut of evidence. (G R. No. 124 521, 29 January
1998, 285 SCRA 493, 499).
7
Rollo, pp. 181-184.
8
Petitioner before the HRET, can manifest what she desires in this Motion for
Reconsideration concerning the existence of Identification Certificate No. 05-05424
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 13 October 2005, ostensibly recognizing her
 as a citizen of the Philippines as per (pursuant) to the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. 9225) in relation to Administrative Order No. 91, S. of 24
and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2004-01 per order of this no. CRR No. 05-10/03-
5455 AFF No. 05-4961 signed by Commissioner ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ dated
October 6 2005. Petitioner belatedly submitted this manifestation in her Motion for
Reconsideration for the stated reason that her records with the Bureau of Immigration has
been missing. Fortunately, her Index Card on file at the Fingerprint Section was found
and it became the basis, together with Petitioner's copy of the certificate which she just
unearthed lately, for the issuance of a certified true copy of her Identification Certificate
No. 05-05424." See rollo, pp. 364 and 311.
9
Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez G.R. No. 172700,23 July 2010, 625 SCRA 299,
307.

_____________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 211140

LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL
MARILYN1 B. BARUA-YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In the same manner that this Court is cautioned to be circumspect because one party is the son of
a sitting Justice of this Court, so too must we avoid abjuring what ought to be done as dictated by
law and justice solely for that reason.

Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr.
(Speaker Belmonte, Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives, Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Sec.
Gen. Barua-Yap ), Secretary General, House of Representatives, and Hon. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes (Reyes), Representative, Lone District of the Province of Marinduque .

Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013
elections in accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and [this] Honorable Court;"2 thus, he seeks the following reliefs:

a. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO

BELMONTE, JR. be issued ordering said respondent to administer the proper OATH in
favor of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco for the position of Representative for the
Lone District of Marinduque; -and allow petitioner to assume the position of
 representative for Marinduque and exercise the powers and prerogatives of said position
of Marinduque representative;

b. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL [MARILYN]

BARUA-YAP be issued ordering said respondent to REMOVE the name of Regina 0.
Reyes in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives and to REGISTER the
name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, herein petitioner, in her stead; and

c. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN, PREVENT

and PROHIBIT respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES from usurping the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque and from
further exercising the prerogatives of said position and performing the duties pertaining
thereto, and DIRECTING her to IMMEDIATELY VACATE said position.3

The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the present petition are:

On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a
petition4 to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes as candidate
for the position of Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. In his
petition, Tan alleged that Reyes made several material misrepresentations in her COC, i.e.,
"(i) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque; (ii) that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen; (iii) that she is not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign
country; (iv) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964; (v) that her civil status is single; and finally
(vi) that she is eligible for the office she seeks to be elected to."5 The case was docketed as SPA
No. 13-053 (DC), entitled "Joseph Socorro B. Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence, Reyes's
COC was accordingly cancelled. The dispositive part of said resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby
CANCELLED.6

Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto.

But while said motion was pending resolution, the synchronized local and national elections
were held on May 13, 2013.

The day after, or on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. The March 27, 2013 Resolution of the Commission (First Division) is hereby
AFFIRMED.7
A copy of the foregoing resolution was received by the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Marinduque, through Executive Assistant Rossini M. Oscadin, on May 15, 2013.

Likewise, Reyes's counsel, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same on May 16, 2013.

On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution, the
Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the May
13, 2013 elections for the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No. 13-028, entitled "Lord
Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed against Reyes in
the HRET docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027, entitled "Christopher P Matienzo v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes."

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality8 in SPA No. 13-053
(DC), which provides:

NOW, THEREFORE, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have lapsed since the
date of the promulgation with no Order issued by the Supreme Court restraining its execution,
the Resolution of the Commission en banc promulgated on May 14, 2013 is hereby declared
FINAL and EXECUTORY.9

On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.

On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed as GR. No.
207264, entitled "Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro Tan,"
assailing (i) the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which denied her motion
for reconsideration of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division
cancelling her . Certificate of Candidacy (for material misrepresentations made therein); and (ii)
the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality.

In the meantime, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before the COMELEC
docketed as SPC No. 13-010, entitled "Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco vs. New Members/Old
Members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of the Lone District of Marinduque and
Regina Ongsiako Reyes," assailing the proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of
Reyes as null and void.

On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition in SPC No. 13-
010.

On June 25, 2013, in G.R. No. 207264, this Court promulgated a Resolution dismissing Reyes's
petition, viz.:
IN VIEW OF THE· FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division is upheld.10

Significantly, this Court held that Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction
over her since she is not yet considered a Member of the House of Representatives. This Court
explained that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (i) a valid proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii)
assumption of office.11

On June 28, 2013, Tan filed a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc) in SPA
No. 13-053 (DC), wherein he prayed that:

[A]n Order be issued granting the instant motion; and cause the immediate EXECUTION of this
Honorable Commission's Resolutions dated March 27, 2013 and May 14, 2013; CAUSE the
PROCLAMATION of LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the
House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque, during the May 2013 National
and Local Elections.12

At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started discharging the
functions of a Member of the House of Representatives.

On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of Velasco, the
COMELEC En Banc reversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's petition and declared null
and void and without legal effect the proclamation of Reyes. The dispositive part reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution of the First Division is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
is declared NULL and VOID and without any legal force and effect. Petitioner LORD ALLAN
JAY Q. VELASCO is hereby proclaimed the winning candidate for the position of
representative in the House of Representatives for the province of Marinduque.13 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Significantly, the aforequoted Resolution has not been challenged in this Court.

On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc, issued an Order (i)
granting Tan's motion for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution); and (ii) directing the
reconstitution of a new PBOC of Marinduque, as well as the proclamation by said new Board of
Velasco as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. The fallo of
which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby GRANTS the instant Motion.
Accordingly, a new composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque is hereby
constituted to be composed of the following:

1. Atty. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz - Chairman

2. Atty. Abigail Justine Cuaresma-Lilagan - Vice Chairman

3. Dir. Ester Villaflor-Roxas - Member

4. Three (3) Support Staffs

For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the parties, the convening of
the New Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque on July 16, 2013 (Tuesday) at 2:00 p.m.,
at the COMELEC Session Hall. gth Floor. PDG Intramuros, Manila and to PROCLAIM LORD
ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections.

Further, Director Ester Villaflor-Roxas is directed to submit before the New Provincial Board of
Canvassers (NPBOC) a certified true copy of the votes of congressional candidate Lord Allan
Jay Q. Velasco in the 2013 National and Local Elections.

Finally, the NPBOC of the Province of Marinduque is likewise directed to furnish copy of the
Certificate of Proclamation to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the
House of Representatives.14

On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein petitioner
Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of
Marinduque with 48,396 votes obtained from 245 clustered precincts.15

On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally convened in a
joint session. On the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected Representative for the Lone
District of Marinduque, along with the rest of the Members of the House of Representatives,
took their oaths in open session before Speaker Belmonte, Jr.

On July 23, 2013, Reyes filed a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of Petition "without
waiver of her arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as will be articulated in the HRET
which is now the proper forum."16

On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration17 (of this Court's June 25, 2013
Resolution in GR. No. 207264) filed on July 15, 2013, was denied by this Court, viz.:

WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is
affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.18
On November 27, 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 207264.

On December 3, 2013, said motion was treated as a second motion for reconsideration and was
denied by this Court.

On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters to Reyes
essentially demanding that she vacate the office of Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor.

On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting, among
others, that he be allowed to assume the position of Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque.

On December 11, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting .on the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Execution filed by Velasco on November 29, 2013, praying that:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of execution be ISSUED to implement and

enforce the May 14, 2013 Resolution in SPA No. 13-053, the July 9, 2013 Resolution in SPC
No. 13-010 and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of Proclamation of Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco as Representative of Marinduque. It is further prayed that a certified true copy of the
writ of execution be personally served and delivered by the Commission's bailiff to Speaker
Feliciano Belmonte for the latter's implementation and enforcement of the aforementioned May
14, 2013 Resolution and July 9, 2013 Resolution and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of
Proclamation issued by the Special Board of Canvassers of the Honorable Commission.19

the COMELEC issued an Order20 dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia, that all copies
of its Resolutions in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-010, the Certificate of Finality dated
June 5, 2013, the Order dated July 10, 2013, and the Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16,
2013 be forwarded and furnished to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter's information and
guidance.

On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. reiterating the
above-mentioned request but to no avail.

On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap reiterating his earlier
requests (July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes from the Roll of Members and
register his name in her place as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque.

However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all the letters and
requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to recognize him as the
duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of
numerous written demands for Reyes to vacate the position and office of the Representative of
the Lone District of Marinduque, she continues to discharge the duties of said position.
Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injunction anchored on the following issues:

A. Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and

ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to administer the oath in favor of petitioner as duly
elected Marinduque Representative and allow him to assume said position and exercise
the prerogatives of said office.

B. Whether or not respondent SG Barna-Yap can be COMPELLED, DIRECTED and

ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to delete the name of respondent Reyes from the
Roll of Members of the House and include the name of the Petitioner in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives.

C. Whether or not a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and a Writ of

PERMANENT. INJUNCTION can be issued to prevent, restrain and prohibit respondent
Reyes from exercising the prerogatives and performing the functions as Marinduque
Representative, and to order her to VACATE the said office.21

As to the first and second issues, Velasco contends that he "has a well-defined and clear legal
right and basis to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus."22 He insists that the final and
executory decisions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), and this Court in G.R. No.
207264, as well as the nullification of respondent Reyes's proclamation and his subsequent
proclamation as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, collectively
give him the legal right to claim the congressional seat.

Thus, he contends that it is the ministerial duty of (i) respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. "to
administer the oath to [him] and to allow him to assume and exercise the prerogatives of the
congressional seat for Marinduque representative;"23 and (ii) respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
"to register [his] name xx x as the duly elected member of the House and delete the name of
respondent Reyes from the Roll ofM embers." 24 Velasco anchors his position on Codilla, Sr. v.
De Venecia,25 citing a statement of this Court to the effect that the Speaker of the House of
Representatives has the ministerial duty to recognize the petitioner therein (Codilla) as the duly
elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap are unlawfully neglecting the performance of their alleged ministerial duties; thus,
illegally excluding him (Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.26

With respect to the third issue, Velasco posits that the "continued usurpation and unlawful
holding of such position by respondent Reyes has worked injustice and serious prejudice to
[him] in that she has already received the salaries, allowances, bonuses and emoluments that
pertain to the position of Marinduque Representative since June 30, 2013 up to the present in the
amount of around several hundreds of thousands of pesos." Therefore, he prays for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and a writ of permanent injunction against respondent Reyes to
"restrain, prevent and prohibit [her] from usurping the position."27
In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and not
mandamus given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office; and the
installation of Velasco in her place by Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath
of office and enters his name in the Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack
on a title to public office, the petition must be dismissed as enunciated by the Court in several
cases.28

As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo
Warranto cases involving Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the
Petition for Mandamus be treated as one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of
jurisdiction and absence of a clear legal right on the part of [Velasco]. "29 She argues that
numerous jurisprudence have already ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. Moreover, she insists
that there is also an abundance of case law that categorically states that the COMELEC is
divested of jurisdiction upon her proclamation as the winning candidate, as, in fact, the HRET
had already assumed jurisdiction over quo warranto cases30 filed against Reyes by several
individuals.

Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is "devoid of original jurisdiction to annul
[her] proclamation. "31 But she hastens to point out that (i) "[e]ven granting for the sake of
argument that the proclamation was validly nullified, [Velasco] as second placer cannot be
declared the winner x x x" as he was not the choice of the people of the Province of Marinduque;
and (ii) Velasco is estopped from asserting the jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes)
election because he (Velasco) filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the HRET on May 31,
2014.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), arguing for Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap, opposed Velasco's petition on the following grounds:

I.

UPON RESPONDENT REYES' PROCLAMATION ON MAY 18, 2013, EXCLUSIVE

JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING RESPONDENT
REYES, INCLUDING THE VALIDITY OF HER PROCLAMATION AND HER
ELIGIBILITY FOR OFFICE, VESTED IN THE HRET.

Hence, until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election protest filed
against respondent Reyes, and such HRET resolution or resolutions become final and executory,
respondent Reyes may not be restrained from exercising the prerogatives of Marinduque
Representative, and respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by mandamus to
remove respondent Reyes :S name from the Roll of Members of the House.

II.
CODILLA v. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, GIVEN THAT
PETITIONER, BEING MERELY THE SECOND PLACER IN THE MAY 13, 2013
ELECTIONS, CANNOT VALIDLY ASSUME THE POST OF MARINDUQUE
REPRESENTATIVE.

Hence, respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by
mandamus to, respectively, administer the proper oath to petitioner and register the latter's
name in the Roll of Members of the House.

III.

PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.32

The OSG presents the foregoing arguments on the premise that there is a need for this Court to
revisit its twin Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 both in GR. No. 207264,
given that (i) this Court was "divided" when it issued the same; and (ii) there were strong
dissents to the majority opinion. It argues that this Court has in the past revisited decisions
already final and executory; there is no hindrance for this Court to do the same in G.R. No.
207264.

Moreover, the OSG contends that:

Despite the finality of the June 25, 2013 Resolution and the October 22, 2013 Resolution,
upholding the cancellation of respondent Reyes's CoC, there has been no compelling reason for
the House to withdraw its recognition of respondent Reyes as Marinduque Representative, in the
absence· of any specific order or directive to the House. To be sure, there was nothing in the
Honorable Court's disposition in Reyes v. COMELEC that required any action from the House.
Again, it bears emphasis that neither petitioner nor respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen.
Barna-Yap were parties in Reyes v. COMELEC.

Further, records with the HRET show that the following cases have been filed against respondent
Reyes:

(i) Case No. 13-036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme Mayores Tan & Jeasseca L.
Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;

(ii) Case No. 13-037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;

(iii) Case No. 13-027 (Quo Warranto ), entitled Christopher Matienzo v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes; and

(iv) Case No. 13-028 (Election Protest), entitled Lord Allan Jay Velasco v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes.33

And in view of the cases filed in the HRET, the OSG insists that:
If the jurisdiction of the COMELEC were to be retained until the assumption of office of the
winner, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the election, then there would
obviously be a clash of jurisdiction between the HRET and the COMELEC, given that the 2011
HRET Rules provide that the appropriate cases should be filed before it within 15 days from the
date of proclamation of the winner. If, as the June 25, 2013 Resolution provides, the HRET's
jurisdiction begins only after assumption of office, at noon of June 30 following the election,
then quo warranto petitions and election protests filed on or after said date would be dismissed
outright by the HRET under its own rules for having been filed out of time, where the winners
have already been proclaimed within the period after the May elections and up to June 14.34

In recent development, however, the HRET promulgated a Resolution on December 14, 2015
dismissing HRET Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037,35 the twin petitions for quo warranto filed
against Reyes, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of
Victor Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED. The September 11, 2014 Resolution of [the] Tribunal
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the present Petitions for Quo Warranto
are hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.36

In the said Resolution, the HR.ET held that "the final Supreme Court ruling in GR. No. 207264 is
the COGENT REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014 Resolution."37

To make clear, the September 11, 2014 Resolution of the HRET ordered the dismissal of a
Petition-In-Intervention filed by one Victor Vela Sioco (Sioco) in the twin petitions for quo
warranto, for "lack of merit." Further, the HRET directed "the hearing and reception of evidence
of the two Petitions for Quo Warranto against x x x Respondent [Reyes] to proceed. "38 Sioco,
however, moved for the reconsideration of the said September 11, 2014 HR.ET Resolution based
on the argument that the latter was contrary to law and jurisprudence given the Supreme Court
ruling in G.R. No. 207264.

Subsequently, the December 14, 2015 Resolution of the HRET held that-

The Tribunals Jurisdiction

It is necessary to clarify the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the present petitions for quo warranto,
considering the parties' divergent postures on how the Tribunal should resolve the same vis-a-vis
the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.

The petitioners believe that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over their petitions. They pray that
"after due proceedings," the Tribunal "declare Respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
DISQUALIFIED/INELIGIBLE to sit as Member of the House of Representatives, representing
the Province of Marinduque." In addition, the petitioner Eric Del Mundo Junio urges the
Tribunal to follow the Supreme Court pronouncement in G.R. No. 207264.

On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his Petition-In-Intervention, pleads for the outright
dismissal of the present petitions considering the Supreme Court final ruling in G.R. No. 207264.
For her part, respondent Regina Reyes prays too for the dismissal of the present petitions, albeit
after reception of evidence by the contending parties.

The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of [House] Members." Such power or authority of the
Tribunal is echoed in its 2011 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: "The
Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives."

xxxx

In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18, 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), had already
resolved that the COMELEC First Division correctly cancelled her COC on the ground that she
lacked the Filipino citizenship and residency requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nullified her
proclamation. When Regina Reyes challenged the COMELEC actions, the Supreme Court En
Banc, in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207246, upheld the same.

With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in the
nullification of her proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we would want to, cannot assume
jurisdiction over the present petitions. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives. And to be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office, so the
Supreme Court pronounced in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207264, thus:

x x x, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

xxxx

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is
not a member of the House of Representatives x x x.

xxxx

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?

In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the

Court ruled that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's
own jurisdiction begins.xx x
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office x x x.

Based on the above-quoted ruling of the Supreme Court, a valid proclamation is the first
essential element before a candidate can be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives over which the Tribunal could assume jurisdiction. Such element is obviously
absent in the present cases as Regina Reyes' proclamation was nullified by the COMELEC,
which nullification was upheld by the Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the Tribunal is
without power to assume jurisdiction over the present petitions since Regina Reyes "cannot be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives," as declared by the Supreme Court En
Banc in G.R. No. 207264. It further stresses:

"x x x there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner [Regina Reyes] on 18 May 2013.
Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a
precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office."

The Supreme Court has spoken. Its pronouncements must be respected. Being the ultimate
guardian of the Constitution, and by constitutional design, the Supreme Court is "supreme in its
task of adjudication; x x x. As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial
power ultimately go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is final." This Tribunal,
as all other courts, must take their bearings from the decisions and rulings of the Supreme
Court.39

Incidentally, it appears that an Information against Reyes for violation of Article 1 77

(Usurpation of Official Functions) of the Revised Penal Code, dated August 3, 2015, has been
filed in court,40 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes. "41

The Issue

The issue for this Court's resolution boils down to the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus to
compel Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform the specific acts sought by
Velasco in this petition.

The Ruling

The petition has merit.

At the outset, this Court observes that the respondents have taken advantage of this petition to re-
litigate what has been settled in G.R. No. 207264. Respondents are reminded to respect the Entry
of Judgment that has been issued therein on October 22, 2013.

After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent that this
special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case, contrary to the
asseverations of the respondents.
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or
exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not
well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a
private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise,
respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.42 In this case, given the
present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No.
207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC)
cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the
COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and
proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque - it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for
the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.

To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to
try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for
quo warranto.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a
verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is
shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the
part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof.43

The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.44

As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Y ap have no
discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's
name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is beyond cavil
that there is in existence final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264
affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC)
cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory resolution of
the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes, and
proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque.
The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled and
beyond dispute - Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative of the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.

Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul her
proclamation. Instead, it is the HRET that is constitutionally mandated to resolve any questions
regarding her election, the returns of such election, and her qualifications as a Member of the
House of Representatives especially so that she has already been proclaimed, taken her oath, and
started to discharge her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. But the confluence of the three acts in this case -
her proclamation, oath and assumption of office - has not altered the legal situation between
Velasco and Reyes.

The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013. The most crucial time is
when Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her non-eligibility to run as Representative of the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque - for without a valid COC, Reyes could not be treated
as a candidate in the election and much less as a duly proclaimed winner. That particular
decision of the COMELEC was promulgated even before Reyes' s proclamation, and which was
affirmed by this Court's final and executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22,
2013.

This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of the COMELEC,
the PBOC who, despite knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
cancelling Reyes' s COC, still proclaimed her as the winning candidate on May 18, 2013. Note
must also be made that as early as May 16, 2013, a couple of days before she was proclaimed,
Reyes had already received the said decision cancelling her COC. These points clearly show that
the much argued proclamation was made in clear defiance of the said COMELEC En Banc
Resolution.

That Velasco now has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the present
petition for mandamus is supported by the following undisputed facts that should be taken into
consideration:

First. At the time of Reyes's proclamation, her COC was already cancelled by the
COMELEC En Banc in its final finding in its resolution dated May 14, 2013, the
effectivity of which was not enjoined by this Court, as Reyes did not avail of the
prescribed remedy which is to seek a restraining order within a period of five (5) days as
required by Section 13(b), Rule 18 of COMELEC Rules. Since no restraining order was
forthcoming, the PBOC should have refrained from proclaiming Reyes.

Second. This Court upheld the COMELEC decision cancelling respondent Reyes's COC
in its Resolutions of June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013 and these Resolutions are
already final and executory.
 Third. As a consequence of the above events, the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010
cancelled respondent Reyes's proclamation and, in turn, proclaimed Velasco as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives in representation of the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque. The said proclamation has not been challenged or
questioned by Reyes in any proceeding.

Fourth. When Reyes took her oath of office before respondent Speaker Belmonte, Jr. in
open session, Reyes had NO valid COC NOR a valid proclamation.

Thus, to consider Reyes' s proclamation and treating it as a material fact in deciding this
case will paradoxically alter the well-established legal milieu between her and Velasco.

Fifth. In view of the foregoing, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to

serve as a Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province
of Marinduque, and therefore, she HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY to be recognized
as a party-respondent at a quo warranto proceeding before the HRET.

And this is precisely the basis for the HRET' s December. 14, 2015 Resolution acknowledging
and ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes.
Its finding was based on the existence of a final and executory ruling of this Court in G.R. No.
207264 that Reyes is not a bona fide member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid
proclamation. To reiterate this Court's pronouncement in its Resolution, entitled Reyes v.
Commission on Elections45-

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner [Reyes] could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013.
Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May
2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a
precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.

xxxx

"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy - that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally
disposed of the issue of petitioner's [Reyes] lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its
Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer
any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives. x x x."

As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner [Reyes] who continues to argue on the
basis of her "due proclamation," the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the
undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May
2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS." (Emphasis supplied.)
Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the HRET is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally available remedy to any party,
specially to Velasco, who should be the sitting Member of the House of Representatives if it
were not for the disregard by the leadership of the latter of the binding decisions of a
constitutional body, the COMELEC, and the Supreme Court

Though the earlier existence of the twin quo warranto petitions filed against Reyes before the
HRET had actually no bearing on the status of finality of the decision of the COMELEC in SPC
No. 13-010. Nonetheless, their dismissal pursuant to the HRET' s December 14, 2015 Resolution
sustained Velasco's well-defined, clear and certain right to the subject office.

The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel
respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the
final and executory Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC by
administering the oath of office to Velasco and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members
of the House of Representatives. In other words, the Court is called upon to determine whether or
not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the administration of the oath of office to Velasco; and (ii) the
inclusion of his name in the Roll of Members, are ministerial in character vis-a-vis the factual
and legal milieu of this case. As we have previously stated, the administration of oath and the
registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of discretion or judgment on
the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They are legally duty-bound to
recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone
District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this Court and the COMELEC'S
compliance with the said ruling, now both final and executory.

It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful Representative of a legislative
district and the Secretary-General to enter said Representative's name in the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives. In Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,46 the Court decreed:

Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified
petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law." For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the
subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on
the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and
certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no
longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and
beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got
53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered
the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc
set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The
Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent
Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has
been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the
matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land There is
no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the
duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-
General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately
executory. (Citations omitted.)

Similarly, in this case, by virtue of (i) COMELEC en bane Resolution dated May 14, 2013 in
SPA No. 13-053 (DC); (ii) Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC);
(iii) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated June 19, 2013 in SPC No. 13-010; (iv) COMELEC en
banc Resolution dated July 10, 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC); and (v) Velasco's Certificate of
Proclamation dated July 16, 2013, Velasco is the rightful Representative of the Lone District
of the Province of Marinduque; hence, entitled to a writ of Mandamus.

As to the view of Reyes and the OSG that since Velasco, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barna-Yap are not parties to G.R. No. 207264, Velasco can neither ask for the enforcement of
the Decision rendered therein nor argue that the doctrine of res judieata by conclusiveness of
judgment applies to him and the public respondents, this Court maintains that such contention is
incorrect. Velasco, along with public respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barna-
Yap, are all legally bound by this Court's judgment in G.R. No. 207264, i.e., essentially, that the
COMELEC correctly cancelled Reyes' s COC for Member of the House of Representatives for
the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque on the ground that the latter was ineligible for
the subject position due to her failure to prove her Filipino citizenship and the requisite one-year
residency in the Province of Marinduque. A contrary view would have our dockets unnecessarily
clogged with petitions to be filed in every direction by any and all registered voters not a party to
a case to question the final decision of this Court. Such restricted interpretation of res judieata is
intolerable for it will defeat this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 207264. To be sure, Velasco who was
duly proclaimed by COMELEC is a proper party to invoke the Court's final judgment that Reyes
was ineligible for the subject position.47

It is well past the time for everyone concerned to accept what has been adjudicated and take
judicial notice of the fact that Reyes's ineligibility to run for and be elected to the subject position
had already been long affirmed by this Court. Any ruling deviating from such established ruling
will be contrary to the Rule of Law and should not be countenanced.

In view of finality of the rulings in G.R. No. 207264, SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-
010, there is no longer any issue as to who is the rightful Representative of the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque; therefore, to borrow the pronouncement of this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,48 "[t]he rule of
law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the
rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion."

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent Hon. Feliciano
R. Belmonte, Jr., Speaker, House of Representatives, shall administer the oath of office of
petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as the duly-elected Representative of the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque. And public respondent Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap, Secretary
General, House of Representatives, shall register the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of
office. This Decision shall be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

I join the concurring opinion of J. Leonen NO PART

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See: Dissenting Opinion NO PART

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

NO PART
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 I concur and submit a concurring opinion
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

NO PART
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

NO PART See separate concurring opinion

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE* MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA*
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

CERTIFIED XEROX COPY

FELIPA B. ANAMA
CLERK OF COURT, EN BANC
SUPREME COURT

Footnotes

1 Originally cited as "Emilia."

* No part.

2 Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), pp. 3-4.

3 Id. at 25-26.

4 Docketed as SPA No. 13-053 (DC).

5 Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), pp. 31-32.

6 Id. at 42.

7 Id. at 47.

8 Id. at 65-67.

9 Id. at 67. Section 13, Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure in relation to
Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Resolution No. 9523, provides that a decision or resolution of
the COMELEC En Banc in special actions and special cases shall become final and
executory five (5) days after its promulgation unless a restraining order is issued by the
Supreme Court. Section 3, Rule 37, Part VII also provides that decisions in petitions to
deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance
candidate or to disqualify a candidate, shall become final and executory after the lapse of
five (5) days from promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

10 Id. at 82.

11 Id. at 74.

12 Id. at 106.

13 Id. at 267.

14 Id. at 107.

15 Id. at 109. Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for
the Position of Member of House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque.

16 Rollo (G.R. No. 207264), pp. 409-412.

17 Id. at 308-376.

18 Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), p. 122.

19 Id. at 269.

20 Id. at 269-272.

21 Id. at 12-13.

22 Id. at 14.

23 Id. at 16-17.

24 Id. at 20.
25 442 Phil. 135, 189-190 (2002).

26 Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), p. 21.

27 Id. at 24-25.

28 Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126 (1949); Pilar v. Secretary of the

Department of Public Works and Communications, 125 Phil. 766 (1967); Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 129 Phil. 7 (1967); Topacio v. Ong, 595 Phil. 491 (2008);
Seneres v. Commission on Elections, 603 Phil. 552 (2009).

29 Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), p. 314.

30 HRET Case Nos. 13-036 to 37, entitled "Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L.
Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes" and "Eric Del Mundo Junia v. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes," respectively.

31 Rollo (G.R. No. 201140), p. 344.

32 Id. at 385-386.

33 Id. at 398-399.

34 Id. at 397.

35 Petitioner Velasco's Manifestation dated January 6, 2016, with attachments.

36 Id., Annex "D," p. 5.

37 Id. at 2.

38 Id. at I.

39 Id. at 3-5.

40 Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 41, Quezon City.

41 Petitioner Velasco's Manifestation dated January 6, 2016, with attachments, Annex

"B."

42 Austria v. Amante, 79 Phil. 780, 783 (1948); Caraan-Medina v. Quizon, 124 Phil.
1171, 1178 (1966); Castro v. Del Rosario, 125 Phil. 611, 615-616 (1967).

43 Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, supra note 25 at 189.

 44 Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, 607 Phil. 768, 801 (2009), citing Codilla, Sr. v. De
Venecia, supra note 25 at 189.

45 G.R. No. 207264, October22, 2013, 708 SCRA 197, 219.

46 Supra note 25 at 188-190.

47 Canero v. University of the Philippines, 481 Phil. 249, 270 (2004).

48 Supra note 25 at 190.

_____________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 216572

FELICIANO P. LEGASPI, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALFREDO GERMAR, and ROGELIO P. SANTOS,
JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari1 assailing the Order2 dated 28 January 2015 of respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en bane in SPA No. 13-323 (DC).

The Parties

Respondents Alfredo Germar (Germar) and Rogelio P. Santos, Jr. (Santos), along with one
Roberto C. Esquivel (Esquivel), were among the candidates fielded by the Liberal Party (LP) to
vie for local elective posts in Norzagaray, Bulacan, during the 13 May 2013 elections. Germar
ran for the position of mayor, Santos ran for the position of councilor, and Esquivel ran for the
position of vice-mayor.

Petitioner Feliciano P. Legaspi, on the other hand, was the National Unity Party‘s (NUP‘s) bet
for mayor of Norzagaray during the 2013 polls.

The Election Results and the Petition for Disqualification

After the votes cast by the Norzagaray electorate were tallied, Germar emerged as the highest
vote getter in the mayoralty race. Santos, for his part, also appeared to have secured enough
votes to be the second councilor of the municipality. Esquivel, though, failed in his bid to
become vice-mayor of Norzagaray.
Upon learning about the results of the tally, petitioner immediately filed before the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Norzagaray a motion to suspend the proclamation of Germar and
Santos as winning candidates. Such motion, however, proved to be futile.

At exactly 7:45 a.m. on 14 May 2013, despite the petitioner‘s motion, the MBC proclaimed
Germar and Santos as duly elected mayor and councilor of the municipality of Norzagaray,
respectively.

A few hours3 after the said proclamation, petitioner filed before the COMELEC a Petition for
Disqualification against Germar, Santos, and Esquivel. In it, petitioner accused Germar, Santos,
and Esquivel of having engaged in rampant vote buying during the days leading to the elections.

The Petition for Disqualification was docketed as SPA No. 13-323 (DC) and was assigned to the
COMELEC First Division, then composed of Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle (Commissioner
Tagle), Christian Robert S. Lim (Commissioner Christian Lim) and Al A. Parreño
(Commissioner Parreño).

COMELEC First Division and Special First Division

In due course, the COMELEC First Division took a vote on SPA No. 13-323 (DC). The vote of
the division was an even 1-1 split, with Commissioner Tagle voting in favor of granting the
petition for disqualification, but with Commissioner Christian Lim voting against it. The third
member of the division, i.e., Commissioner Parreño, was not able to provide the potential tie-
breaking vote as he was then absent and attending to some other official business.

Due to the impasse created by the absence of one of its members, the COMELEC First Division
called for the constitution of a Special First Division through which COMELEC Chairman Sixto
S. Brillantes, Jr. sat in the First Division as acting member vice the absent Commissioner Parreño
for purposes of SPA No. 13-323 (DC).4

On 3 October 2013, the COMELEC Special First Division, by a 2 to 1 vote, rendered a

resolution: (1) disqualifying Germar and Santos for the positions of mayor and councilor,
respectively, of Norzagaray; and (2) referring the criminal aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) to the
COMELEC Law Department for preliminary investigation.5

Germar, Santos, and Esquivel filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc.

The COMELEC En Banc and the Dismissal of the Electoral Aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC)

On 10 July 2004, the COMELEC en banc took a vote on the motion for reconsideration. At that
time, the COMELEC en banc had six (6) incumbent members.6 Of the six (6), however, only
five (5) members actually participated in the deliberations and casted votes. Commissioner
Parreño opted to take no part and did not vote.

The following were the results of the voting:

 1. As to the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC), the vote was 3-2, i.e., 3 members
voted in favor of the disqualification of Germar and Santos, and 2 dissented.7 Hence, a
majority of at least four (4) votes was not reached with respect to the electoral aspect of
the case.

2. As to the criminal aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC), the vote was 4-1, i.e., 4 members
voted in favor of the referral of the criminal aspect of the disqualification case to the
COMELEC Law Department and 1 dissented.8 Hence, a majority was reached with
respect to the criminal aspect of the case.

In view of the foregoing, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution9 denying the motion for
reconsideration with respect to the criminal aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC), but ordering the
conduct of a rehearing insofar as the electoral aspect of the case was concerned.

After the rehearing, the COMELEC en banc took another vote but it still failed to muster a
majority consensus on the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC).10 The final vote of the
COMELEC en banc on the matter remained at the exact 3-2 split that it was before the
rehearing.11 Commissioner Parreño maintained his "no part" stance, while newly appointed
Commissioner Arthur D. Lim also opted to take no part and did not vote.

Thus, on 28 January 2015, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order12 directing the dismissal of
the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure13 (COMELEC Rules), to wit:

Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on
rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases gment or order appealed from shall stand
affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. (Emphasis ours.)

Unconvinced, petitioner filed the present petition14 before this Court.

The Present Petition

Petitioner claims that COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the
electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC). He protests that the dismissal was occasioned by a
"misapplication" by the COMELEC en banc of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.15

OUR RULING

We dismiss the present petition.

Let us start with the basics.

Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution obliges the COMELEC, like the other
constitutional commissions, to decide all cases or matters before it by a "majority vote of all its
[m]embers."16 When such majority vote cannot be mustered by the COMELEC en banc, Section
6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules provides the mechanism to avert a non-decision. Thus:

Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on
rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the jud pealed from shall stand affirmed; and
in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

Verily, under the cited provision, the COMELEC en banc is first required to rehear the case or
matter that it cannot decide or resolve by the necessary majority. When a majority still cannot be
had after the rehearing, however, there results a failure to decide on the part of the COMELEC
en banc. The provision then specifies the effects of the COMELEC en banc‘s failure to decide:

1. If the action or proceeding is originally commenced in the COMELEC, such action or

proceeding shall be dismissed;

2. In appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; or

3. In incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

As can be gleaned above, the effects of the COMELEC en banc‘s failure to decide vary
depending on the type of case or matter that is before the commission. Thus, under the provision,
the first effect (i.e., the dismissal of the action or proceeding) only applies when the type of case
before the COMELEC is an action or proceeding "originally commenced in the commission";
the second effect (i.e., the affirmance of a judgment or order) only applies when the type of case
before the COMELEC is an "appealed case"; and the third effect (i.e., the denial of the petition
or motion) only applies when the case or matter before the COMELEC is an "incidental matter."

Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, et al.17 gives us a key illustration of an application of the

first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.

Mendoza involved an electoral protest that was originally filed before the COMELEC and which
was raffled to one of its divisions. The COMELEC division to which the electoral protest was
assigned granted that protest, prompting the protestee to file a motion for reconsideration with
the COMELEC en banc. When the COMELEC en banc took a vote on the motion for
reconsideration, however, it failed to obtain the necessary majority vote. Consequently, the
COMELEC en banc reheard the matter and then took another vote. However, the second vote
also lacked the necessary majority. The final vote of the COMELEC en banc was 3-1 (i.e., 3 in
support of granting the protest and 1 dissent), with 3 members taking no part.18 On the basis of
the foregoing, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
(in effect sustaining the division‘s decision). The protestee challenged the foregoing resolution
on the strength of the argument that the failure of the COMELEC en banc to obtain the necessary
majority should have resulted in the dismissal of the election protest case itself pursuant to the
first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.

When that dispute reached this Court in Mendoza, we sustained the protestee. We held that the
first effect applied because the case before the COMELEC en banc was an electoral protest that
was "originally commenced" in the commission. We noted that while the electoral protest only
reached the COMELEC en banc through the motion for reconsideration of the decision of a
division, the same did not change the nature of the case before it; the motion for reconsideration
not being an appeal.19 Thus, we held that the failure of the COMELEC en banc to decide the
motion for reconsideration would result—not in the denial of the said motion or the affirmance
of the division‘s decision—but in the dismissal of the electoral protest itself, pursuant to the first
effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.20

Guided by the foregoing precepts, we shall now address the issues at hand.

II

The main thrust of petitioner‘s challenge is the supposed error of the COMELEC en banc in
applying the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules (by dismissing the
electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 [DC]) when it was unable to reach a majority vote after the
rehearing.21 According to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc erred in treating SPA No. 13-323
(DC) as an action that was "originally commenced in the commission" under the said
provision.22 As petitioner argues, an action can only be considered as having been "originally
commenced in the commission" under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules when that
action was originally filed before the COMELEC en banc itself and, as such, is the very matter
pending before it.23

Petitioner then points out that, in this case, what was before the COMELEC en banc was not the
main petition itself but only a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the division in SPA
No. 13-323 (DC). Hence, petitioner submits, the failure of the COMELEC en banc to reach a
majority vote in this case should result, not in the dismissal of the electoral aspect of SPA No.
13-323 (DC), but merely in the denial of the motion for reconsideration and the affirmance of the
division‘s decision.24

We do not agree.

The COMELEC en banc did not err when it dismissed the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323
(DC) when it was unable to reach a majority vote after the rehearing. Contrary to what petitioner
asserts, SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is most definitely an action that was filed originally before the
COMELEC within the contemplation of the said provision. While SPA No. 13-323 (DC) reached
the COMELEC en banc only through a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Special
First Division, its character as an original case filed before the commission remains the same.
Hence, the failure of COMELEC en banc to decide in this case properly results in the application
of the first effect of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.
SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is an Action
"Originally Commenced in the
Commission" Under Section 6, Rule
18 of the COMELEC Rules

Petitioner, to begin with, misconstrues Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.

The phrase "originally commenced in the commission" in Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules is worded in plain language and, therefore, must be construed in its ordinary and natural
sense.25 It simply means what it says. The phrase is meant to cover any action or proceeding that
is filed, at the first instance, before the COMELEC—whether sitting in division or en banc—as
contradistinguished from cases that are merely appealed to it. Petitioner‘s view that restricts such
phrase to include only those actions or proceedings that are originally filed with the COMELEC
en banc itself (e.g., petition to declare failure of elections) has no basis and only obscures the
otherwise clear import of the phrase‘s language.

In this case, the fact that SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is an action originally commenced in the
COMELEC cannot at all be doubted.1âwphi1 The records are crystal clear that the petition was
first filed with the COMELEC and was raffled to the First Division for decision. It is a fresh
petition—as it passed upon no other tribunal, body or entity prior to its filing with the
COMELEC. Hence, for all intents and purposes, SPA No. 13-323 (DC) must be considered as an
action "originally commenced in the commission" under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules.

Single Process of COMELEC in

Deciding Election Cases; COMELEC
En Banc Correctly Dismissed
Electoral Aspect of SPA No. 13-323
(DC)

Petitioner‘s insistence that the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules
ought not to be applied since what was before the COMELEC en banc was merely a motion for
reconsideration and not the petition for disqualification itself, likewise has no merit. It is
premised on the assumption that the proceedings in election cases before the COMELEC
division are separate from those before the en banc—an assumption that has already been
discredited by Mendoza.

In Mendoza, we held that the COMELEC acts on election cases under a single and integrated
process, to wit:

[H]owever the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is involved, xxx, the COMELEC will act on the
case in one whole and single process: to repeat, in division, and if impelled by a motion for
reconsideration, en banc.26

In his concurring opinion in Mendoza, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco (Justice Velasco) described
the act of filing a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc from a decision of a
division in an election case as but "part" of such single and integrated process and is "not an
appeal" from the latter to the former:

At best, the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc of a decision or
resolution of the division of the COMELEC should be viewed as part of one integrated process.
Such motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is a constitutionally guaranteed
remedial mechanism for parties aggrieved by a division decision or resolution. However, at the
risk of repetition, it is not an appeal from the COMELEC division to the en banc.27

Verily, when an election case originally filed with the COMELEC is first decided by a division,
the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration from that decision before the en banc does
not signify the initiation of a new action or case, but rather a mere continuation of an existing
process. The motion for reconsideration—not being an appeal from the decision of the division
to the en banc—only thus serves as a means of having the election case decided by the
COMELEC en banc. Under this view, therefore, the nature of the election case as it was before
the division remains the same even after it is forwarded to the en banc through a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the failure of the COMELEC en banc to decide a motion for
reconsideration from the decision of a division in an original election case would unquestionably
bring to the fore the application of the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules.

This is exactly what happened in this case. In this case, SPA No. 13- 323 (DC) was filed, at the
first instance, with the COMELEC. Being a petition for disqualification filed under Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code,28 SPA No. 13-323 (DC) was initially raffled to and decided by a
division of the commission. From that point, however, SPA No. 13-323 (DC) found its way to
the COMELEC en banc after a motion for reconsideration from the decision of the division was
filed. Hence, when the COMELEC en banc twice failed to reach the necessary majority to decide
the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC), it applied the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18
of the COMELEC Rules. We find absolutely nothing wrong with such application. It is, in fact,
reinforced by the very provisions of the COMELEC Rules and by Mendoza.

III

We next address the contra argument raised by Justice Velasco in his Dissenting Opinion.

Justice Velasco, in his dissent, shared petitioner‘s position that the failure of the COMELEC en
banc to reach a necessary majority in this case should have resulted merely in the denial of the
motion for reconsideration and not in the dismissal of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) itself. The learned
justice, however, justified the said position with an argument different from that advanced by
petitioner: Justice Velasco, in essence, concedes that the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules applies in this case, but contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in
how it applied the said provision.

Justice Velasco points out that the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules
speaks of the dismissal of either an "action" or a "proceeding" – which, the good justice submits,
supposedly pertains to different cases or matters that may be brought before the COMELEC en
banc. After identifying what those matters are, Justice Velasco concluded that the word "action"
as used under the subject provision has reference to the "cases originally filed before the
COMELEC division or en banc" whilst the word "proceeding" under the same rule has reference
to "motions for reconsideration challenging the rulings [of a division in election cases]."29

Thus, Justice Velasco opines, the failure of the COMELEC en banc to reach a majority vote on a
mere motion for reconsideration of a division decision in an original election case would – under
the first effect of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules – only lead to a dismissal of the
"proceeding" or of the motion for reconsideration; not the dismissal of the "action" or of the
election case itself.

Cognizant that the foregoing view is a betrayal of the principles laid down by the Court in
Mendoza, Justice Velasco now clamors for a "modification" or an abandonment of our ruling in
the said case insofar as how it applied the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules.30 Justice Velasco cautions the Court that pursuing Mendoza‘s interpretation of Section 6,
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules is bound to lead to absurd and illogical results – such as one
wherein a decision of a COMELEC division in an election case can simply be overturned by the
COMELEC en banc even though the latter is not able to reach a majority vote.31

The Court is not convinced.

Meaning of the Words "Action" and
"Proceeding" Determinable From Other
Provisions of the COMELEC Rules;
Justice Velasco’s Interpretation of the
Word "Proceeding" Contradicted By
COMELEC Rules, Taken As A Whole

The pin that holds Justice Velasco‘s argument is his interpretation of the terms "action" and
"proceeding" under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. While an isolated view of the
contested terms does lend some degree of reason to the respected justice‘s interpretation, a more
careful consideration of such terms in the context of the other parts of the COMELEC Rules,
however, will quickly reveal the interpretation‘s fault.

Verily, we are unable to accept it.

The words "action" and "proceeding" and even the entire phrase "action or proceeding" are not
exclusive to Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. Such words and phrase, in fact, appear
in other parts of the COMELEC Rules, most notably in Part V thereof. To our minds, an
examination of how the words "action" and "proceeding" and the phrase "actions or proceedings"
were used in Part V of the COMELEC Rules is telling of how the COMELEC Rules actually
intended such terms and phrase to be understood, which is, in the context of its other
provisions.32

Part V of the COMELEC Rules, which is aptly titled "Particular Actions or Proceedings," is one
of the nine major parts of the COMELEC Rules. It is composed of Rules 20 to 34 of the
COMELEC Rules, wherein each rule covers a specific "action or proceeding" that the
COMELEC can take cognizance of, thus:

COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE – PART V

PARTICULAR ACTIONS OR PROCEEDINGS

A. ORDINARY ACTIONS

 Rule 20 – Election Protests

 Rule 21 – Quo Warranto
 Rule 22 – Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest
 Cases

B. SPECIAL ACTIONS

 Rule 23 – Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel Certificates of

 Candidacy
 Rule 24 – Proceedings Against Nuisance Candidates
 Rule 25 – Disqualification of Candidates
 Rule 26 – Postponement of Suspension of Elections

C. SPECIAL CASES

 Rule 27 – Pre-proclamation Controversies

D. SPECIAL RELIEFS

 Rule 28 – Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

 Rule 29 – Contempt

E. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

 Rule 30 – Injunction

F. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

 Rule 31 – Annulment of Permanent List of Voters

 Rule 32 – Registration of Political Parties or Organization
 Rule 33 – Accreditation of Citizens‘ Arms of the Commission

G. ELECTION OFFENSES

 Rule 34 – Prosecution of Election Offenses

Evidently, what Part V actually discloses are the particular cases or matters that may be
considered as "actions or proceedings" for purposes of the COMELEC Rules. Notably, all the
actions or proceedings identified thereunder, save for the provisional remedy of injunction, are
all main cases cognizable by the COMELEC. Notable too is that a motion for reconsideration
from a decision of a division – which is but a part of a main case – is not among those included
in Part V.33

Accordingly, we find Justice Velasco‘s formulation linking the term "proceeding" under Section
6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules with "motions for reconsideration challenging the rulings [of
a division in election cases]"34 to be inconsistent with how such term was actually intended to
be understood by the COMELEC Rules. Such a formulation, rooted as it was in an isolated
analysis of the contested term, is out of touch with the rest of the provisions of the COMELEC
Rules.

Pursuing Mendoza Ruling Will Not

Lead to Absurdity

We likewise rebut Justice Velasco's submission that continuing with Mendoza's interpretation of
the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules is bound to lead to absurd
results.

To our minds, there is no "absurdity" in the fact that the decision of a division in an election case
ceases to be a COMELEC decision as a consequence of the failure of the COMELEC en bane to
reach a majority vote on reconsideration. That fact, far from being absurd, is nothing but the
natural and logical consequence of the application of the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules which, in tum, only complements our Constitution.

IV

All told, we found no indications that the COMELEC en bane had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC). On the contrary, what we
found is that such dismissal was perfectly in accord with the provisions of its own rules of
procedure and is consistent with established jurisprudence on the matter. Mendoza, to our minds,
remains good law. Certainly, the extraordinary writ of certiorari does not lie here.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J, VELASCO JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIEVENIDO L. REYES*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F.

ETELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.

1 Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; ro/lo, pp. 3-58.

2 Id. at 99-103.

3 At 12:45 p.m. on 14 May 2013.

4 Via an Order dated 1 October 2013. The substitution of Commissioner Parreño was
made pursuant to Section 6, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules, as amended by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9636 dated 13 February 2013. That provision reads:

Sec. 6. Substitution of members of a Division. –

(a) Temporary vacancy. Whenever a member of a Division is on leave, seriously

ill, temporarily disabled, is absent, inhibits himself, or is disqualified from sitting
in a case, the Chairman shall substitute him with another Commissioner, or the
Chairman shall sit in place of said member, and[,] in that event[,] he will preside.

(b) x x x.

Under either of the foregoing substitutions, the Division where the acting or
signing member is assigned shall be designated as "Special First Division" or
"Special Second Division," as the case may be, for purposes of the pertinent cases
therein pending. (Emphases ours.)

5 Rollo, pp. 59-73. The Resolution was penned by Presiding Commissioner Lucenito N.
Tagle, and concurred in by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. Commissioner Christian
Robert S. Lim registered the dissent. The electoral aspect of the disqualification case was
dismissed as to Esquivel since the latter had lost during the 2013 election.

6 There was a vacancy created in the membership of the COMELEC when the ad-interim
appointment of erstwhile commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo Padaca automatically lapsed
on 11 June 2014. Such vacancy would only be filled on 28 July 2014, when then newly
appointed Commissioner Arthur D. Lim assumed office.

7 Those who voted in favor of granting the disqualification of Germar and Santos were:
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R.
Yusoph. Commissioners Christian Robert S. Lim and Luie Tito F. Guia, on the other
hand, dissented.

8 Those who voted in favor of the referral to the COMELEC Law Department were
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph
and Luie Tito F. Guia. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim dissented.

9 Rollo, pp. 84-93. See also rollo, p. 100.

10 At this time, the COMELEC en banc already had seven (7) incumbent members.

11 See note 7.

12 Supra note 2.
13 COMELEC Rules Governing Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before It or Any of
Its Offices, dated 15 February 1993.

14 Supra note 1.

15 Id.

16 The provision reads in full:

SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling
of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

17 630 Phil. 432 (2010).

18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Supra note 1.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 See Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA, 327 Phil. 217, 235 (1996).

26 Supra note 17, at 460. (Emphasis ours.)

27 Id. at 484. (Emphasis ours.)

28 Batas Pambansa Bilang 881.

29 Dissenting Opinion of J. Velasco, p. 14.

30 Id. at 15-17.
 31 Id. at 17-19.

32 See the "Whole Act Rule" in statutory construction. The rule provides that when a
certain term or phrase is used multiple times in a statute, such term or phrase is assumed
to have the same meaning throughout the whole statute (A Guide To Reading,
Interpreting and Applying Statutes by Katharine Clark and Matthew Connolly [2006],
accessed through http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/legal-
writing-scholarship/writingcenter/ upload/statutoryinterpretation.pdf). The rule is a
necessary component of the principle that statutes ought to be interpreted holistically.

33 A motion for reconsideration, in the scheme of the COMELEC Rules, is included in

Part IV thereof under Rule 19. Part IV of the COMELEC Rules is titled "Dispositi

__________________________________________________

II:

G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015

KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED BY REPRESENTATIVE JAMES MARK

TERRY L. RIDON AND MARJOHARA S. TUCAY; SARAH JANE I. ELAGO,
PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES;
VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON OF THE ANAKBAYAN; MARC
LINO J. ABILA, NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF
THE PHILIPPINES; EINSTEIN Z. RECEDES, DEPUTY SECRETARY- GENERAL OF
ANAKBAYAN; CHARISSE BERNADINE I. BAÑEZ, CHAIRPERSON OF THE
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS; ARLENE CLARISSE Y. JULVE, MEMBER OF
ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA
MAMAMAYAN (AGHAM); AND SINING MARIA ROSA L. MARFORI, Petitioners, v.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, ON, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Rights beget responsibilities; progress begets change.

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 filed by herein petitioners Kabataan
Party-List, represented by Representative James Mark Terry L. Ridon and National President
Marjohara S. Tucay; Sarah Jane I. Elago, President of the National Union of Students of the
Philippines; Veneer Mari E. Crisostomo and Einstein Z. Recedes, Chairperson and Deputy
Secretary-General of Anakbayan, respectively; Marc Lino J. Abila, National President of the
College Editors Guild of the Philippines; Charisse Bernadine I. Bañez, Chairperson of the
League of Filipino Students; Arlene Clarisse Y. Julve, member of Alyansa ng mga Grupong
Haligi ngAgham at Teknolohiya para sa Mamamayan (AGHAM); and Sining Maria Rosa L.
Marfori (petitioners) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 10367, entitled
"An Act Providing for Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration,"2 as well as respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution Nos. 9721,3 9863,4 and 10013,5 all related
thereto.

The Facts

On February 15, 2013, President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367, which is a
consolidation of House Bill No. 3469 and Senate Bill No. 1030, passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate on December 11, 2012 and December 12, 2012,6 respectively.
Essentially, RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics
registration system for new voters7 in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and
updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.8 RA 10367 was duly
published on February 22, 2013,9 and took effect fifteen (15) days after.10

RA 10367 likewise directs that "[r]egistered voters whose biometrics have not been captured
shall submit themselves for validation."11 "Voters who fail to submit for validation on or
before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016
[E]lections shall be deactivated x x x."12 Nonetheless, voters may have their records reactivated
after the May 2016 Elections, provided that they comply with the procedure found in Section
2813 of RA 8189,14 also known as "The Voter's Registration Act of 1996."15

On June 26, 2013, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 972116 which serves as the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 10367, thus, prescribing the procedure for
validation,17 deactivation,18 and reactivation of voters' registration records (VRRs).19 Among
others, the said Resolution provides that: (a) "[t]he registration records of voters without
biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections shall be deactivated in the last [Election Registration Board (ERB)] hearing to be
conducted prior to said elections";20 (b) "[t]he following registered voters shall have their
biometrics data validated: [(1)] Those who do not have BIOMETRICS data appearing in the
Voter['s] Registration System (VRS); and [(2)] Those who have incomplete BIOMETRICS
data appearing in the VRS";21 (c) "[d]eactivated voters shall not be allowed to vote";22 and (d)
"[d]eactivation x x x shall comply with the requirements on posting, ERB hearing and
service of individual notices to the deactivated voters."23 Resolution No. 9721 further states
that, as of the last day of registration and validation for the 2013 Elections on October 31, 2012,
a total of 9,018,256 registered voters were without biometrics data.24 Accordingly, all Election
Officers (EOs) were directed to "conduct [an] information campaign on the conduct of
validation."25cralawred

On July 1, 2013, the COMELEC, pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, commenced the
mandatory biometric system of registration. To make biometric registration convenient and
accessible to the voting public, aside from the COMELEC offices in every local government
unit, it likewise established satellite registration offices in barangays and mails.26

On April 1, 2014, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 986327 which amended certain
portions28 of Resolution No. 985329 dated February 19, 2014, by stating that ERBs shall
deactivate the VRRs of those who "failed to submit for validation despite notice on or before
October 31, 2015," and that the "[d]eactivation for cases falling under this ground shall be made
during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing."30

A month later, or in May 2014, the COMELEC launched the NoBio-NoBoto public
information campaign which ran concurrently with the period of continuing registration.31

On November 3, 2015, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1001332 which provides for the
"procedures in the deactivation of [VRRs] who do not have biometrics data in the [VRS] after
the October 31, 2015 deadline of registration and validation."33 Among others, the said
Resolution directed the EOs to: (a) "[p]ost the lists of voters without biometrics data in the
bulletin boards of the City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer and in the barangay hall
along with the notice of ERB hearing;" and (b) "[s]end individual notices to the affected voters
included in the generated list of voters without biometrics data."34 It also provides that "[a]ny
opposition/objection to the deactivation of records shall be filed not later than November 9, 2015
in accordance with the period prescribed in Section 4,35 [Chapter I,] Resolution No. 9853."36
During the ERB hearing, which proceedings are summary in nature,37 "the ERBs shall, based dn
the list of voters without biometrics data, order the deactivation of registration records on the
ground of 'failure to validate.'"38 Thereafter, EOs were required to "[s]end individual notices to
the deactivated voters within five (5) days from the last day of ERB hearing."39 Moreover,
Resolution No. 10013 clarified that the "[Registration records of voters with incomplete
biometrics data and those corrupted data (biometrics) in the database shall not be
deactivated and be allowed to vote in the May 9, 2016 Synchronized National, Local and
[Autonomous Region on Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)] Regional Elections."40

On November 25, 2015, herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI)
assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367,
as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto. They contend
that: (a) biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where
there is penalty of deactivation;41 (b) biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification by law
contemplated by the 1987 Constitution;42 (c) biometrics validation gravely violates the
Constitution, considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling
reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage;43 (d)
voters to be deactivated are not afforded due process;44 and (e) poor experience with biometrics
should serve as warning against exacting adherence to the system.45 Albeit already subject of a
prior petition46 filed before this Court, petitioners also raise herein the argument that deactivation
by November 16, 2015 would result in the premature termination of the registration period
contrary to Section 847 of RA 8189.48 Ultimately, petitioners pray that this Court declare RA
10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, unconstitutional and that
the COMELEC be commanded to desist from deactivating registered voters without biometric
information, to reinstate voters who are compliant with the requisites of RA 8189 but have
already been delisted, and to extend the system of continuing registration and capture of
biometric information of voters until January 8, 2016.49

On December 1, 2015, the Court required the COMELEC to file its comment to the petition.
Meanwhile, it issued a TRO requiring the COMELEC to desist from deactivating the registration
records of voters without biometric information, pending resolution of the case at hand.50

On December 7, 2015, COMELEC Chairman Juan Andres D. Bautista, through a letter51

addressed to the Court En Banc, urgently appealed for the immediate lifting of the above-
mentioned TRO, stating that the COMELEC is set to finalize the Project of Precincts (POP) on
December 15, 2015, and that the TRO issued in this case has the effect of including the 2.4
Million deactivated voters in the list of voters, which, in turn, would require revisions to the POP
and consequently, adversely affect the timelines of all other interrelated preparatory activities to
the prejudice of the successful implementation of the Automated Election System (AES) for the
2016 Elections.52

On December 11, 2015, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
comment53 to the instant petition. On even date, petitioners filed a manifestation54 asking the
Court to continue the TRO against the deactivation of voters without biometric information.55

With no further pleadings required of the parties, the case was submitted for resolution.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue in this case is whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto, are unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is bereft of merit.

I.

At the outset, the Court passes upon the procedural objections raised in this case. In particular,
the COMELEC claims that petitioners: (a) failed to implead the Congress, the Office of the
President, and the ERB which it purports are indispensable parties to the case;56 (b) did not have
the legal standing to institute the instant petition;57 and (c) erroneously availed of certiorari and
prohibition as a mode of questioning the constitutionality of RA 10367 and the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions.58

The submissions do not hold.

Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an important constitutional issue pertaining to the right
of suffrage, the Court views the matter as one of transcendental public importance and of
compelling significance. Consequently, it deems it proper to brush aside the foregoing
procedural barriers and instead, resolve the case on its merits. As resonated in the case of Pabillo
v. COMELEC,59 citing Capalla v. COMELEC60 and Guingona, Jr. v. COMELEC:61
There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May 2010 [in this case, the May 2016] elections is a
matter of great public concern. On election day, the country's registered voters will come out to
exercise the sacred right of suffrage. Not only is it an exercise that ensures the preservation of
our democracy, the coming elections also embodies our people's last ounce of hope for a better
future. It is the final opportunity, patiently awaited by our people, for the peaceful transition of
power to the next chosen leaders of our country. If there is anything capable of directly
affecting the lives of ordinary Filipinos so as to come within the ambit of a public concern,
it is the coming elections, [x x x.]
Thus, in view of the compelling significance and transcending public importance of the issues
raised by petitioners, the technicalities raised by respondents should not be allowed to stand in
the way, if the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of
procedure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, the issue on whether or not the policy on biometrics validation, as provided under
RA 10367 and fleshed out in the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, should be upheld is one that
demands immediate adjudication in view of the critical preparatory activities that are currently
being undertaken by the COMELEC with regard to the impending May 2016 Elections. Thus, it
would best subserve the ends of justice to settle this controversy not only in order to enlighten
the citizenry, but also so as not to stymy the operations of a co-constitutional body. As
pronounced in Roque, Jr. v. COMELEC:62
[T]he bottom line is that the Court may except a particular case from the operations of its rules
when the demands of justice so require. Put a bit differently, rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Accordingly, technicalities and procedural
barriers should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of justice would not be subserved
by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure.63ChanRoblesV irtualawlibrary

That being said, the Court now proceeds to resolve the substantive issues in this case.

II.

Essentially, the present petition is a constitutional challenge against the biometrics validation
requirement imposed under RA 10367, including COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
10013. As non-compliance with the same results in the penalty of deactivation, petitioners posit
that it has risen to the level of an unconstitutional substantive requirement in the exercise of the
right of suffrage.64 They submit that the statutory requirement of biometric validation is no
different from the unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property because mere non-
validation already absolutely curtails the exercise of the right of suffrage through deactivation.65
Further, they advance the argument that deactivation is not the disqualification by law
contemplated as a valid limitation to the exercise of suffrage under the 1987 Constitution.66

The contestation is untenable.

As early as the 1936 case of The People of the Philippine Islands v. Corral,67 it has been
recognized that "[t]he right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is
a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it
for the public good. In the early stages of the evolution of the representative system of
government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the inhabitants.
But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has
come to embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons are excluded from the franchise."68

Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current parameters for the exercise of
suffrage:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified
by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for
at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall
be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the right
of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by law; and
third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein he
proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.

The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of suffrage. The
State may therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the
restriction, however, that the same do not amount to, as per the second sentence of the provision,
a "literacy, property or other substantive requirement." Based on its genesis, it may be gleaned
that the limitation is geared towards the elimination of irrelevant standards that are purely based
on socio-economic considerations that have no bearing on the right of a citizen to intelligently
cast his vote and to further the public good.

To contextualize, the first Philippine Election Law, Act No. 1582, which took effect on January
15, 1907, mandated that only men who were at least twenty-three (23) years old and "comprised
within one of the following three classes" were allowed to vote: (a) those who prior to the 13th of
August, 1898, held the office of municipal captain, governadorcillo, alcalde, lieutenant, cabeza
de barangay, or member of any ayuntamiento; (b) those who own real property to the value of
P500.00, or who annually pay P30.00 or more of the established taxes; and (c) those, who speak,
read, and write English or Spanish.

When the 1935 Constitution was adopted, the minimum voting age was lowered to twenty-one
(21) and the foregoing class qualification and property requirements were removed.69 However,
the literacy requirement was retained and only men who were able to read and write were given
the right to vote.70 It also made women's right to vote dependent on a plebiscite held for such
purpose.71

During the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the delegates decided to remove the literacy and
property requirements to broaden the political base and discontinue the exclusion of millions of
citizens from the political systems:72
Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Manglapus

DELEGATE MANGLAPUS: Mr. President, the draft proposal, the subject matter of Report No.
11 contains amendments that are designed to improve Article V on suffrage and to broaden the
electoral base of our country. The three main points that are taken up in this draft which will be
developed in the sponsorship speeches that will follow might need explanatory remarks, x x x.
xxxx

(2) The present requirement, reading and writing, is eliminated and instead a provision is
introduced which says, "No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage;"
xxxx
The draft before us is in keeping with the trend towards the broadening of the electoral
base already begun with the lowering of the voting age to 18, and it is in keeping further
with the Committee's desire to discontinue the alienation and exclusion of millions of
citizens from the political system and from participation in the political life of the country.
The requirement of literacy for voting is eliminated for it is noted that there are very few
countries left in the world where literacy remains a condition for voting. There is no Southeast
Asian country that imposes this requirement. The United States Supreme Court only a few
months ago declared unconstitutional any state law that would continue to impose this
requirement for voting.

xxxx

It is to be noted that all those who testified before the Committee favoured the elimination of
the literacy requirement. It must be stressed that those witnesses represented all levels of
society x x x.

Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Ordoñez

x x x in the process, as we evolve, many and more of our people were left to the sidelines
because they could no longer participate in the process of government simply because their
ability to read and write had become inadequate. This, however, did not mean that they were no
longer responsive to the demands of the times, that they were unsensible to what was happening
among them. And so in the process as years went on, conscious efforts were made to liberate, to
free these persons who were formerly entitled in the course of election by means of whittling
away the requirements for the exercise of the right to vote. First of all, was the property
requirement. There were times in the English constitutional history that it was common to say
as an answer to a question, "Who are entitled to vote?" that the following cannot vote - -
criminals, paupers, members of the House of Lords. They were landed together at the same
figurative category.

Eventually, with the wisdom of the times, property requirement was eliminated but the last
remaining vestige which bound the members of the community to ignorance, which was the
persistence of this requirement of literacy remained. And this is again preserved in our
Constitution, in our Election Code, which provides that those who cannot prepare their ballots
themselves shall not be qualified to vote.

xxxx

Unless you remove this literacy test, the cultural minorities, the underprivileged, the urban
guerrillas will forever be outcasts of our society, irresponsive of what is happening. And if
this condition were to continue, my friends, we cannot fully claim that we have
representative democracy. Let us reverse the cycle. Let us eliminate the social imbalance by
granting to these persons who are very responsible the right to participate in the choice of the
persons who are to make their laws for them. (Emphases supplied)
As clarified on interpellation, the phrase "other substantive requirement" carries the same tack as
the other standards alienating particular classes based on socio-economic considerations
irrelevant to suffrage, such as the payment of taxes. Moreover, as particularly noted and as will
be later elaborated on, the phrase did not contemplate any restriction on procedural requirements,
such as that of registration:
DELEGATE DE LOS REYES: On page 2, Line 3, the following appears:
"For other substantive requirement, no literacy[,] property, or other substantive requirement shall
be imposed on the exercise of suffrage."
just what is contemplated in the phrase, "substantive requirement?"

DELEGATE OCCEÑA: I can answer that, but it belongs to the sphere of someone else in the
Committee. We use this term as distinguished from procedural requirements. For instance, the
law cannot come in and say that those who should be allowed to vote should have paid
certain taxes. That would be a substantial requirement in addition to what is provided for in the
Constitution. But the law can step in as far as certain procedural requirements are
concerned like requiring registration, and also step in as far as these classifications are
concerned.73 (Emphases supplied)
As it finally turned out, the imposition of literacy, property, or other substantive requirement was
proscribed and the following provision on suffrage was adopted74 in the 1973 Constitution:
Section 1. Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage. The Batasang Pambansa shall provide a system for the purpose of securing
the secrecy and sanctity of the vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After deliberating on and eventually, striking down a proposal to exclude literacy requirements
from the limitation,75 the exact provision prohibiting the imposition of "literacy, property, or
other substantive requirement[s]" in the 1973 Constitution was fully adopted in the 1987
Constitution.

Along the contours of this limitation then, Congress, pursuant to Section 118 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, among others, imposed the following legal
disqualifications:
Section 118. Disqualifications. - The following shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less
than one year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty:
Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically
reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five years after service of sentence.

(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or tribunal of
having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as
rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against
national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law:
Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five years after
service of sentence.
(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.
A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the possession of qualities, properties (such as fitness or
capacity) inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for a position or office, or to
perform a public duty or function."76

Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the discourse on suffrage is
concerned, should be distinguished from the concept of "registration", which is jurisprudentially
regarded as only the means by which a person's qualifications to vote is determined. In Yra v.
Abaño,77 citing Meffert v. Brown,78 it was stated that "[t]he act of registering is only one step
towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter [and]
one may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote."79 In said case, this Court
definitively characterized registration as a form of regulation and not as a qualification for the
right of suffrage:
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such
right.80 (Emphasis supplied)
As a form of regulation, compliance with the registration procedure is dutifully enjoined. Section
115 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Section 115. Necessity of Registration. - In order that a qualified elector may vote in any
election, plebiscite or referendum, he must be registered in the permanent list of voters for
the city or municipality in which he resides. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, although one is deemed to be a "qualified elector," he must nonetheless still comply with
the registration procedure in order to vote.

As the deliberations on the 1973 Constitution made clear, registration is a mere procedural
requirement which does not fall under the limitation that "[n]o literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage." This was echoed in
AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC81 (AKBAYAN-Youth), wherein the Court pronounced that the
process of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to vote. Albeit procedural, the
right of a citizen to vote nevertheless remains conditioned upon it:
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute
books and other repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution provides: chanRoblesvirtualLaw library

xxxx

As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of
registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in
addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to
register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
Voters Registration Act of 1996.82 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It defines "registration" as "the act of
accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the
election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book
of registered voters upon approval by the [ERB]."83 As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was
passed in order "to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters."

To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in modern technology, RA 10367, or the

assailed Biometrics Law, was signed into law in February 2013. It built on the policy
considerations behind RA 8189 as it institutionalized biometrics validation as part of the
registration process:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to establish a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.
"Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an
individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable
features."84

Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively require registered and new voters to submit
themselves for biometrics validation:
Section 3. Who Shall Submit for Validation. - Registered voters whose biometrics have not been
captured shall submit themselves for validation.

Section 10. Mandatory Biometrics Registration. - The Commission shall implement a mandatory
biometrics registration system for new voters.
Under Section 2 (d) of RA 10367, "validation" is defined as "the process of taking the biometrics
of registered voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured."

The consequence of non-compliance is "deactivation" which "refers to the removal of the

registration record of the registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters for
failure to comply with the validation process as required by [RA 10367]."85 Section 7 states:
Section 7. Deactivation. - Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of
filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated
pursuant to this Act. (Emphases supplied)
Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of validation, neutrally applies
to all voters. Thus, petitioners' argument that the law creates artificial class of voters86 is more
imagined than real. There is no favor accorded to an "obedient group." If anything, non-
compliance by the "disobedient" only rightfully results into prescribed consequences. Surely, this
is beyond the intended mantle of the equal protection of the laws, which only works "against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of inequality."87

It should also be pointed out that deactivation is not novel to RA 10367. RA 8189 already
provides for certain grounds for deactivation, of which not only the disqualifications under the
Constitution or the Omnibus Election are listed.
Section 27. Deactivation of Registration. The board shall deactivate the registration and remove
the registration records of the following persons from the corresponding precinct book of voters
and place the same, properly marked and dated in indelible ink, in the inactive file after entering
the cause or causes of deactivation:chanRoblesvir tualLawlibrary
a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than
one (1) year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided,
however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire
the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence as certified by the
clerks of courts of the Municipal/Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan;

b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of
having caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government
such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime
against national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with
law; Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five (5)
years after service of sentence;

c) Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent unless such

disqualification has been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such
person is no longer insane or incompetent;

d) Any person who did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections as shown
by their voting records. For this purpose, regular elections do not include the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) elections;

e) Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and

f) Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.

For this purpose, the clerks of court for the Municipal/Municipal ( Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional
Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan shall furnish the Election Officer of the city or municipality
concerned at the end of each month a certified list of persons who are disqualified under
paragraph (a) hereof, with their addresses. The Commission may request a certified list of
persons who have lost their Filipino Citizenship or declared as insane or incompetent with their
addresses from other government agencies.

The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a certified list of those persons
whose registration were deactivated and the reasons therefor, and furnish copies thereof to the
local heads of political parties, the national central file, provincial file, and the voter concerned.
With these considerations in mind, petitioners' claim that biometrics validation imposed under
RA 10367, and implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, must
perforce fail. To reiterate, this requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of
suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to
reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987
Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996.
Petitioners would do well to be reminded of this Court's pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth,
wherein it was held that:
[T]he act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration
is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus,
contrary to petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly
stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a
necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent
police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration
for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the
incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by
the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one which is not indifferent,
and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the
times.88 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or
other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution - that is, one
which propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person's
ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good - the same cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional, as in this case.

III.

For another, petitioners assert that biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution,
considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for
state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage.89 They cite the
case of White Light Corp. v. City of Manila90 (White Light), wherein the Court stated that the
scope of the strict scrutiny test covers the protection of the right of suffrage.91

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the regulation passes the strict scrutiny test.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation
of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its
earlier applications to equal protection.92 As pointed out by petitioners, the United States
Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as
suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel.93

Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest,94 and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.95

In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367
advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of
orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing - if not eliminating, the perennial problem
of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. According to the sponsorship
speech of Senator Aquilino L. Pimentel III, the objective of the law was to cleanse the national
voter registry so as to eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the results of the elections were
truly reflective of the genuine will of the people.96 The foregoing consideration is unquestionably
a compelling state interest.

Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-said
interest. Section 697 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation,
whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the
Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature,
and fingerprints recorded. It is, in effect, a manner of updating one's registration for those already
registered under RA 8189, or a first-time registration for new registrants. The re-registration
process is amply justified by the fact that the government is adopting a novel technology like
biometrics in order to address the bane of electoral fraud that has enduringly plagued the
electoral exercises in this country. While registrants may be inconvenienced by waiting in long
lines or by not being accommodated on certain days due to heavy volume of work, these are
typical burdens of voting that are remedied by bureaucratic improvements to be implemented by
the COMELEC as an administrative institution. By and large, the COMELEC has not turned a
blind eye to these realities. It has tried to account for the exigencies by holding continuous
registration as early as May 6, 2014 until October 31, 2015, or for over a period of 18 months.
To make the validation process as convenient as possible, the COMELEC even went to the
extent of setting up off-site and satellite biometrics registration in shopping malls and conducted
the same on Sundays.98 Moreover, it deserves mentioning that RA 10367 and Resolution No.
9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit themselves to validation every time there is an
election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo the validation process one (1) time, which
shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he remains an active voter. To add,
the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from exercising their right to vote in
the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they could still apply for reactivation99 following
the procedure laid down in Section 28100 of RA 8189.

That being said, the assailed regulation on the right to suffrage was sufficiently justified as it was
indeed narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of establishing a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters, and was demonstrably the least restrictive means
in promoting that interest.101

IV.

Petitioners further aver that RA 10367 and the COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
10013 violate the tenets of procedural due process because of the short periods of time between
hearings and notice, and the summary nature of the deactivation proceedings.102

Petitioners are mistaken.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that the COMELEC, through Resolution No. 10013, had
directed EOs to: (a) "[p]ost the lists of voters without biometrics data in the bulletin boards of the
City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer and in the barangay hall along with the notice
of ERB hearing;" and (b) [s]end individual notices to the affected voters included in the
generated list of voters without biometrics data.103 The same Resolution also accords concerned
individuals the opportunity to file their opposition/objection to the deactivation of VRRs not later
than November 9, 2015 in accordance with the period prescribed in Section 4,104 Chapter I,
Resolution No. 9853. Meanwhile, Resolution Nos. 9721 and 9863 respectively state that
"[d]eactivation x x x shall comply with the requirements on posting, ERB hearing and service of
individual notices to the deactivated voters,"105 and that the "Reactivation for cases falling under
this ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing."106 While the
proceedings are summary in nature, the urgency of finalizing the voters' list for the upcoming
May 2016 Elections calls for swift and immediate action on the deactivation of VRRs of voters
who fail to comply with the mandate of RA 10367. After all, in the preparation for the May 2016
National and Local Elections, time is of the essence. The summary nature of the proceedings
does not depart from the fact that petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard.

Relatedly, it deserves emphasis that the public has been sufficiently informed of the
implementation of RA 10367 and its deactivation feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early
as February 22, 2013,107 and took effect fifteen (15) days after.108 Accordingly, dating to the day
of its publications, all are bound to know the terms of its provisions, including the consequences
of non-compliance. As implemented, the process of biometrics validation commenced on July 1,
2013, or approximately two and a half (2 1/2) years before the October 31, 2015 deadline. To
add, the COMELEC conducted a massive public information campaign, i.e., NoBio-NoBoto,
from May 2014 until October 31, 2015, or a period of eighteen (18) months, whereby voters
were reminded to update and validate their registration records. On top of that, the COMELEC
exerted efforts to make the validation process more convenient for the public as it enlisted the
assistance of malls across Metro Manila to serve as satellite registration centers and declared
Sundays as working days for COMELEC offices within the National Capital Region and in
highly urbanized cities.109 Considering these steps, the Court finds that the public has been
sufficiently apprised of the implementation of RA 10367, and its penalty of deactivation in case
of failure to comply. Thus, there was no violation of procedural due process.

V.

Petitioners aver that the poor experience of other countries - i.e., Guatemala, Britain, Cote
d'lvoire, Uganda, and Kenya - in implementing biometrics registration should serve as warning
in adhering to the system. They highlighted the inherent difficulties in launching the same such
as environmental and geographical challenges, lack of training and skills, mechanical
breakdown, and the need for re-registration. They even adrnitted that while biometrics may
address electoral fraud caused by multiple registrants, it does not, however, solve other election-
related problems such as vote-buying and source-code manipulation.110

Aside from treading on mere speculation, the insinuations are improper. Clearly, petitioners'
submissions principally assail the wisdom of the legislature in adopting the biometrics
registration system in curbing electoral fraud. In this relation, it is significant to point out that
questions relating to the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are policy matters that
should not be addressed to the judiciary. As elucidated in the case of Fariñas v. The Executive
Secretary:111
[P]olicy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive
dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the
wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or
unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve
the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should
be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the
serious, conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance.112 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the exercise of its legislative power, Congress has a wide latitude of discretion to enact laws,
such as RA 10367, to combat electoral fraud which, in this case, was through the establishment
of an updated voter registry. In making such choices to achieve its desired result, Congress has
necessarily sifted through the policy's wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review,
much less reverse.113 Whether RA 10367 was wise or unwise, or was the best means in curtailing
electoral fraud is a question that does not present a justiciable issue cognizable by the courts.
Indeed, the reason behind the legislature's choice of adopting biometrics registration
notwithstanding the experience of foreign countries, the difficulties in its implementation, or its
concomitant failure to address equally pressing election problems, is essentially a policy question
and, hence, beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.

VI.

Finally, petitioners' proffer that Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on
October 31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189 which states:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special
election. (Emphasis added.)
The position is, once more, wrong.

Aside from committing forum shopping by raising this issue despite already being subject of a
prior petition filed before this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 220918,114 petitioners fail to consider that the
120- and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive period beyond which voter
registration may no longer be conducted. As already resolved in this Court's Resolution dated
December 8, 2015 in G.R. No. 220918, the subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to
conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period which may not be
reduced, but may be extended depending on the administrative necessities and other
exigencies.115 Verily, as the constitutional body tasked to enforce and implement election laws,
the COMELEC has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to fulfil its
mandate.116 Perforce, this power includes the determination of the periods to accomplish certain
pre-election acts,117 such as voter registration.

At this conclusory juncture, this Court reiterates that voter registration does not begin and end
with the filing of applications which, in reality, is just the initial phase that must be followed by
the approval of applications by the ERB.118 Thereafter, the process of filing petitions for
inclusion and exclusion follows. These steps are necessary for the generation of the1 final list of
voters which, in turn, is a pre-requisite for the preparation and completion of the Project of
Precincts (POP) that is vital for the actual elections. The POP contains the number of registered
voters in each precinct and clustered precinct, the names of the barangays, municipalities, cities,
provinces, legislative districts, and regions included in the precincts, and the names and locations
of polling centers where each precinct and clustered precinct are assigned.119 The POP is
necessary to determine the total number of boards of election inspectors to be constituted, the
allocation of forms and supplies to be procured for the election day, the number of vote counting
machines and other paraphernalia to be deployed, and the budget needed. More importantly, the
POP will be used as the basis for the fmalization of the Election Management System (EMS)
which generates the templates of the official ballots and determines the voting jurisdiction of
legislative districts, cities, municipalities, and provinces.120 The EMS determines the
configuration of the canvassing and consolidation system for each voting jurisdiction.
Accordingly, as the constitutional body specifically charged with the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall,121 the COMELEC should be given sufficient leeway in
accounting for the exigencies of the upcoming elections. In fine, its measures therefor should be
respected, unless it is clearly shown that the same are devoid of any reasonable justification.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED due to lack of merit. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on December 1, 2015 is consequently DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sereno, Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.

Endnotes:

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Sixteenth Congress

Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two thousand
fifteen.

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10742]

AN ACT ESTABLISHING REFORMS IN THE SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN CREATING

ENABLING MECHANISMS FOR MEANINGFUL YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN NATION-
BUILDING, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as the ―Sangguniang Kabataan Reform Act of
2015‖.

SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policies and Objectives. – The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building .and thus, promotes and protects their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being, inculcates in them patriotism, nationalism and other desirable
values, and encourages their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Towards this end, the State shall establish adequate, effective, responsive and enabling
mechanisms and support systems that will ensure the meaningful participation of the youth in
local governance and ^Ln nation-building.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act, the following terms are hereby defined:

(a) Commission shall refer to the National Youth Commission created under Republic Act No.
8044;

(b) Local Chief Executive shall refer to the provincial governor, city and municipal mayor;

(c) Local Government Operations Officer shall refer to the duly designated head of the office of
the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) stationed in the concerned local
government unit;

(d) Local Sanggunian shall refer to the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and
sangguniang bayan;

(e) Youth Affairs Provincial Officer shall refer to the person duly appointed or designated by the
Commission to serve as its agent in the province with the tasks provided for in this Act or as the
Commission may deem necessary;

(f) Youth shall refer to those persons whose ages range from fifteen (15) to thirty (30) years old
as defined in Republic Act No. 8044;

(g) Youth Organizations shall refer to those organizations whose membership/ composition are
the youth; and

(h) Youth-Serving Organizations shall refer to those registered organizations whose principal
programs, projects and activities are youth-oriented and youth-related.

CHAPTER II

THE KATIPUNAN NG KABATAAN AND THE SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN

SEC. 4. Katipunan ng Kabataan. – There shall be in every barangay a Katipunan ng Kabataan to

be composed of all citizens of the Philippines residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months,
who are at least fifteen (15) but not more than thirty (30) years of age, and who are duly
registered in the list of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and/or the records of the
Sangguniang Kabataan secretary.

SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. – The Katipunan ng Kabatan
shall:

(a) Elect the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson and members; and

(b) Serve as the highest policy-making body to decide on matters affecting the youth in the
barangay. As such, the Sangguniang Kabataan shall consult and secure the concurrence of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan in the formulation of all its, programs, plans and activities.

SEC. 6. Meetings of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. – The Katipunan ng Kabataan shall meet at
least once every six (6) months, or at the call of the chairperson of the Sangguniang Kabataan or
upon written petition of at least one-twentieth (1/20) of its members, to decide on important
issues affecting the youth of the barangay.

SEC. 7. Creation and Election of the Sangguniang Kabataan. – There shall be in every barangay
a Sangguniang Kabataan to be composed of a chairperson and seven (7) members who shall be
elected by the registered voters of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Sangguniang Kabataan
chairperson/shall, with the concurrence of the majority of the Sangguniang Kabataan members,
appoint from among the members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, a secretary and a treasurer.

SEC. 8. Powers and Functions of the Sangguniang Kabataan. – The Sangguniang Kabataan
shall:

(a) In consultation and with the concurrence of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, and within three (3)
months from assumption to office, formulate a three (3)-year rolling plan, which shall be known
as the Comprehensive Barangay Youth Development Plan, which shall serve as basis in the
preparation of the Annual Barangay Youth Investment Program. This plan shall be aligned with
the Philippine Youth Development Plan (PYDP) and o^her Local Youth Development Plans in
every level, municipal, city and provincial as is relevant;

(b) Approve the annual budget which is the annual slice of the Annual Barangay Youth
Investment Program before the start of the succeeding fiscal year and, if the Sangguniang
Kabataan funds allow, a supplemental budget. Any changes in the annual budget shall be in
accordance with existing applicable budget rules and procedures;

(c) Promulgate resolutions necessary to carry out the objectives of the youth in the barangay in
accordance with the Comprehensive Barangay Youth Development Plan and the applicable
provisions of this Act;

(d) Initiate and implement, in coordination with any national government agency and/or any
private or nongovernment institution, programs and projects designed to promote general
welfare, development and empowerment of the youth;
(e) Hold fund-raising activities which are in line with the Comprehensive Barangay Youth
Development Plan, the proceeds of which shall be tax-exempt and shall accrue to the general
fund of the Sangguniang Kabataan: Provided, however, That in the appropriation thereof, the
specific purpose for which such activity has been held shall be first satisfied: Provided, further,
That any appropriation thereof shall be in accordance with existing applicable budget,
accounting and auditing rules and regulations;

(f) Create regular and special committees and such other bodies whose chairpersons and
members of which shall come from among the members of the Sangguniang Kabataan or from
among the members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, as it may deem necessary to effectively carry
out its programs and activities;

(g) Submit the annual and end-of-term program accomplishments and financial reports to the
Sangguniang Barangay and present the same during the Katipunan ng Kabataan assembly, copy
furnished the Office of the Local Government Operations Officer and Local Youth Development
Council (LYDC), all in accordance with the prescribed form by the DILG and the Commission;

(h) Partner with the LYDC in planning and executing projects and programs of specific
advocacies like good governance, climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction and
resiliency, youth employment and livelihood, health and anti-drug abuse, gender sensitivity, and
sports development;

(i) Adopt and implement a policy on full public disclosure of all its transactions and documents
involving public interest; and

(j) Exercise such other powers and perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance, or delegated by the Sangguniang Barangay or the Commission.

SEC. 9. Meetings of the Sangguniang Kabataan. – (a) The Sangguniang Kabataan shall meet
regularly once a month on the date, time and place to be fixed by the said sanggunian. Special
meetings may be called by the chairperson or any four (4) of its members by giving written
notice of the date, time, place and agenda of the meeting, which can be sent either through
personal delivery, registered mail, fax or email, to all members, and must be received at least one
(1) day in advance. The Sangguniang Barangay and the Municipal or City Youth Development
Council shall be furnished with notices of regular and special meetings and the minutes of the
meetings thereafter.

(b) A majority of the members including the chairperson shall constitute a quorum.

SEC. 10. Qualifications. – An official of the Sangguniang Kabataan, either elective or appointee,
must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, a resident of
the barangay for not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, at
least eighteen (18) years but not more than twenty-four (24) years of age on the day of the
elections, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, must not be related within
the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to any incumbent elected national official or
to any incumbent elected regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official, in the locality
where he or she seeks to be elected, and must not have been convicted by final judgment of any
crime involving moral turpitude.

SEC. 11. Term of Office. – (a) The chairperson and members of the Sangguniang Kabataan shall
hold office for a fixed term of three (3) years unless sooner removed for cause, permanently
incapacitated, have died or resigned from office.

(b) The Sangguniang Kabataan secretary and treasurer shall be coterminus with the appointing
authority unless sooner removed for cause, found to have failed from the discharge of his or her
duties, or has committed abuse of authority as stipulated in existing laws pertaining to the
conduct of public officials, through a majority vote of all the members of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan in a regular or special assembly called for the purpose.

(c) A Sangguniang Kabataan official who, during his or her term of office, shall have passed the
age of twenty-four (24) years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of the term for
which he or she was elected.

SEC. 12. Sangguniang Kabataan Chairperson. – The chairperson of the Sangguniang Kabataan
shall automatically serve as an ex officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay upon assumption
to office. As such, he or she shall exercise the same powers, discharge the same duties and
functions, and enjoy the same privileges as the regular Sangguniang Barangay members; and
shall be the chairperson of the Committee on Youth and Sports Development. He or she shall be
entitled to a pro-rata honoraria for every session of the Sangguniang Barangay he or she has
attended.

SEC. 13. Powers and Functions of the Sangguniang Kabataan Chairperson. – The Sangguniang
Kabataan chairperson shall exercise such powers and discharge such duties as follows:

(a) Call and preside over all meetings of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and vote in case of a tie, and
assemblies of the Katipunan ng Kabataan except when one. (1) of the agenda to be discussed in
such assembly involves the disciplinary action against the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson, in
which case, the highest ranking Sangguniang Kabataan member shall preside;

(b) Take the lead in the formulation of the Comprehensive Barangay Youth Development Plan
and in the preparation and implementation of the Annual Barangay Youth Investment Program;

(c) Ensure the implementation of policies, programs and projects as contained in the Annual
Barangay Youth Investment Programs, in coordination with the Sangguniang Barangay and the
Municipal or City Youth Development Council;

(d) Sign all required documents and warrants drawn from the Sangguniang Kabataan funds for
all expenditures in the implementation of the Comprehensive Barangay Youth Development Plan
and Annual Barangay Youth Investment Program;

(e) Exercise general supervision over the affairs and activities of the Sangguniang Kabataan and
the Katipunan ng Kabataan as well as the official conduct of its members;
(f) With the concurrence of the Sangguniang Kabataan, appoint from among the members of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan a secretary and a treasurer;

(g) Coordinate with the Sangguniang Barangay and other youth organizations within his or her
barangay on youth-related programs and projects that they wish to initiate and implement; and

(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed
by law or ordinance.

SEC. 14. Sangguniang Kabataan Secretary. – The Sangguniang Kabataan secretary shall:

(a) Keep all the records of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, including the list of its qualified
members, youth policies, studies, research and registry of youth and youth-serving organizations
in the barangay, if any;

(b) Prepare and keep all the minutes of all assemblies of the Katipunan ng Kabataan and of all
the meetings of the Sangguniang Kabataan;

(c) Cause the posting, in the barangay bulletin board and in at least three (3) conspicuous places
within the jurisdiction of the barangay, and if possible including the use of traditional and
nontraditional media, and make available for any person with legal purpose, all resolutions
approved by the Sangguniang Kabataan, the annual and end-of-term reports of the programs and
projects implemented by the Sangguniang Kabataan, the Comprehensive Barangay Youth
Development Plan and Annual Barangay Youth Investment Program and the dissemination of
the same to concerned offices, institutions and individuals; and

(d) Perform such other duties and discharge such other functions as the Sangguniang Kabataan
chairperson may prescribe or direct.

SEC. 15. Sangguniang Kabataan Treasurer. – The Sangguniang Kabataan treasurer shall:

(a) Take custody of all Sangguniang Kabataan property and funds;

(b) Collect and receive contributions, monies, materials, and all other resources intended for the
Sangguniang Kabataan and the Katipunan ng Kabataan;

(c) Serve as cosignatory in all withdrawals from the Sangguniang Kabataan funds and disburse
funds in accordance with the approved annual budget and supplemental budget, as the case may
be, of the Sangguniang Kabataan,

(d) Certify to the availability of the Sangguniang Kabataan funds whenever necessary;

(e) Submit to the Sangguniang Kabataan and to the Sangguniang Barangay certified and detailed
statements of actual income and expenditures at the end of every quarter and the posting of the
same in the barangay bulletin board and in at least three (3) conspicuous places within the
jurisdiction of the barangay, and if possible including the use of traditional and nontraditional
media;

(f) Render report during the regular Katipunan ng Kabataan assembly on the financial status of
the Sangguniang Kabataan; and

(g) Perform such other duties and discharge such other functions as the Sangguniang Kabataan
chairperson may prescribe or direct.

SEC. 16. Privileges of Sangguniang Kabataan Officials. – (a) All Sangguniang Kabataan
officials in good standing, whether elected or appointed, shall, during their incumbency:

(1) Be exempt from payment of tuition and matriculation fees while enrolled in any public
tertiary school including state colleges and universities and those locally funded public
educational institutions within or nearest their area of jurisdiction. The National Government,
through the DILG, shall reimburse said college or university the amount of the tuition and
matriculation fees;

(2) Be exempt from taking the National Service Training Program-Civic Welfare Training
Service (NSTP-CWTS) subjects. In lieu thereof, concerned Sangguniang Kabataan officials shall
submit written reports, preferably with photographs, or other documentations of their
participation in the implementation of programs, projects and activities as outlined in the
Comprehensive Barangay Investment Program. Absence of such reports and documentations or a
finding to the contrary upon verification of submitted reports, will disqualify the concerned
Sangguniang Kabataan officials from this privilege. The Commission on Higher Education
(CHED) and the Commission shall jointly promulgate the guidelines for the implementation of
this provision;

(3) Be excused from attending their regular classes, if they are currently enrolled in any school,
while attending then- regular or special Sangguniang Kabataan meetings, and the Sangguniang
Barangay sessions, in case of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson. A certification of
attendance shall be issued by the Sangguniang Kabataan secretary, attested by the Sangguniang
Kabataan chairperson and duly noted by the Punong Barangay and shall be submitted to the
concerned faculty member and the dean of the educational institution as proof of attendance. In
the case of the Sangguniang Kabataan secretary, the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson shall
issue the certification duly noted by the Punong Barangay. In the case of the Sangguniang
Kabataan chairperson, the barangay secretary shall issue the certification of attendance duly
noted by the Punong Barangay. Any person who shall falsely certify as to the attendance of any
Sangguniang Kabataan official shall be criminally and administratively liable;

(4) Be provided by the National Government with Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(Philhealth) coverage; and

(5) Be entitled to receive actual travelling reimbursements as may be authorized by law, and
subject to the availability of funds: Provided, That, such travel is directly related to the
performance of their functions as Sangguniang Kabataan officials and is supported by duly
approved travel order by the Punong Barangay in the case of the Sangguniang Kabataan
chairperson, or by the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson in the case of the other Sangguniang
Kabataan officials.

(6) The Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson shall have the same privileges enjoyed by other
Sangguniang Barangay officials under this Act subject to such requirements and limitations
provided herein.

SEC. 17. Persons in Authority – For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the Sangguniang
Kabataan chairperson and members in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in
their jurisdictions.

SEC. 18. Suspension and Removal from Office. – Any elected official of the Sangguniang
Kabataan may, after due process, be suspended for not more than six (6) months or removed
from office by majority vote of all members of the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang
Panlungsod which has jurisdiction in the barangay of the concerned Sangguniang Kabataan
official which shall be final and executory, on any of the following grounds:

(a) Absence from the regular meeting of the Sangguniang Kabataan without valid cause for two
(2) consecutive times or accumulated absences of four (4) within a period of twelve (12) months;

(b) Failure to convene the regular assembly of the Katipunan ng Kabataan for two (2)
consecutive times;
(c) Failure to convene the regular Sangguniang Kabataan meetings for three (3) consecutive
months in the case of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson;

(d) Failure to formulate the Comprehensive Barangay Youth Development Plan and the Annual
Barangay Youth Investment Program, or approve the annual budget within the prescribed period
of time without justifiable reason;

(e) Failure to implement programs and projects outlined in the Annual Barangay Youth
Investment Program without justifiable reason;

(f) Four (4) consecutive absences during the regular Sangguniang Barangay sessions without
valid cause in the case of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson;

(g) Conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude; and violation of existing
laws against graft and corruption and other civil service laws, rules and regulations; and

(h) Failure in the discharge of his or her duty or has committed abuse of authority.

SEC. 19. Succession and Filling up of Vacancies. – (a) In case a Sangguniang Kabataan
chairperson refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently
incapacitated, is removed from office, the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the
highest number of votes in the election immediately preceding shall assume the office of the
chairperson for the unexpired portion of his or her term. In case said member refuses to assume
the position or fails to qualify, the Sangguniang Kabataan member obtaining the next highest
number of votes shall assume the position of the chairperson for the unexpired portion of the
term.

(b) After the vacancy shall have been filled, the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson shall, within
thirty (30) days, call for a special Katipunan ng Kabataan assembly to elect a Sangguniang
Kabataan member to complete the membership of said sanggunian: Provided, That, such special
assembly is coordinated with the Office of the Local Government Operations Officer and the
COMELEC of the municipality or city where the concerned barangay belongs Such Sangguniang
Kabataan member shall hold office for the unexpired portion of the term of the vacant seat. For
this purpose, any citizen of the Philippines residing in the said barangay for at least six (6)
months who attains the age of fifteen (15) years old at the time of the special election and who
registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan before the Sangguniang Kabataan secretary
shall be entitled to vote in the said special election.

(c) All other vacancies in the office of the Sangguniang Kabataan shall be filled in accordance
with the immediately preceding provision.

(d) In case of suspension of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson, the successor, as determined
in subsection (a) of this section, shall assume the position during the period of such suspension.

SEC. 20. Sangguniang Kabataan Funds. – The Sangguniang Kabataan funds shall be governed
by the following provisions:

(a) All the income of the barangay derived from whatever source shall accrue to its general fund
and shall, at the option of the barangay concerned, be kept as trust fund in the custody of the city
or municipal treasurer or be deposited in „ hank n refer ably government-owned, situated in or
nearest to its area of jurisdiction. Such funds shall be disbursed in accordance with the provisions
of this Act. Ten percent (10%) of the general fund of the barangay shall be set aside for the
Sangguniang Kabataap. The Sangguniang Barangay shall appropriate the Sangguniang Kabataan
funds in lump-sum which shall be disbursed solely for youth development and empowerment
purposes;

(b) The Sangguniang Kabataan shall have financial independence in its operations,
disbursements and encashment of their fund, income and expenditures. As such, the
Sangguniang Kabataan funds shall be deposited in the name of the Sangguniang Kabataan of the
concerned barangay in a government-owned bank situated in or nearest to its area of jurisdiction
with the Sangguniang Kabataan chairperson and the Sangguniang Kabataan treasurer as the
official signatories;

(c) All Sangguniang Kabataan funds shall be allocated in an annual budget, and if the funds
allow, in a supplemental budget in accordance with the adopted Annual Barangay Investment
Program. Both the Comprehensive Barangay Youth Development Plan and Annual Barangay
Investment Program shall give priority to programs, projects and activities that will promote and
ensure the equitable access to quality education, environmental protection, climate change
adaptation, disaster risk reduction and resiliency, youth employment and livelihood, health and
anti-drug abuse, gender sensitivity, sports development, and capability building which
emphasizes leadership training; and

(d) The Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panlungsod shall, within sixty (60) days upon
receipt hereof, review the annual budget and supplements1 budget of the Sangguniang Kabataan
on their compliance in the immediately preceding provision and other existing laws, rules and
regulations. Noncompliance shall render said budgets inoperative either in whole or in part.
Failure on the part of the sanggunian to complete the review within the prescribed period shall
render the said annual budget deemed approved.

All Sangguniang Kabataan funds derived from any source shall be stated in its financial records
which shall be kept by the Sangguniang Kabataan treasurer, copy furnished the sangguniang
barangay, in simplified manner as may be prescribed by the Commission on Audit (COA). All
Sangguniang Kabataan funds shall be subject to all existing accounting and auditing laws, rules
and regulations.

SEC. 21. Pederasyon ng Sangguniang Kabataan. – (a) There shall be an organization of the
Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan to be known as follows:

(1) In municipalities, Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan which shall be

composed of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairpersons of barangays in the municipality;

(2) In cities, the Panlungsod na Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan which shall be
composed of the Sangguniang Kabataan chairpersons of barangays in the city; and

(3) In provinces, Panlalawigang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan which shall be

composed of the convenors of the Pambayan and Panlungsod na Pederasyon ng mga
Sangguniang Kabataan.

(b) The Pederasyon ng njiga Sangguniang Kabataan shall, at all levels, elect from among
themselves a president, a vice president, a1 treasurer, a secretary and such other officers as they
may deem necessary. The concerned Local Government Operations Officer, in coordination with
the election officer, shall facilitate the conduct of the elections which shall be held within fifteen
(15) days from the Sangguniang Kabataan elections in case of the Pambayan and Panlungsod na
Pederasyon, and within thirty (30) days in case of the Panlalawigang Pederasyon.

(c) The manner of election, suspension and removal of the officers of the Pederasyon at all levels
and the term of office of the other officers of the Pederasyon shall be governed by the guidelines
to be jointly issued by the DILG, the COMELEC and the Commission within sixty (60) days
upon the effectivity of this Act.

SEC. 22. Membership in the Sanggunian and Local Special Bodies. – (a) The duly elected
president of the Pederasyon ng Sangguniang Kabataan, at all levels, shall serve as ex officio
member of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
respectively;
(b) He or she shall be the chairperson of the Committee on Youth and Sports Development in the
said Sanggunian, and a regular member of the Committees on Education, Environment,
Employment and Livelihood, Health and Anti-Drug Abuse, and Gender and Development,

(c) He or she shall serve as ex officio member of Local School Board, Local Council for the
Protection of Children Local Development Council, Local Health Board Local Tourism Council
and Local Peace and Order Council, and

(d) He or she shall convene the LYDC every three (3) months to conduct consultations with
youth organizations.

CHAPTER III

THE LOCAL YOUTH DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL (LYDC)

SEC. 23. Creation. – To ensure wide and multi-sectoral youth participation in local governance,
there shall be in every province, city and municipality a Local Youth Development Council
(LYDC) ―which shall be called, Provincial Youth Development Council, City Youth
Development Council and Municipal Youth Development Council, respectively. The LYDC
shall be composed of representatives of youth and youth-serving organizations in the provincial,
city, and municipal level. The LYDC shall assist the planning and execution of projects and
programs of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and the Pederasyons in all levels.

SEC. 24. Local Youth Development Council Funds. – The LYDC shall be funded by their
respective Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

CHAPTER IV

THE LOCAL YOUTH DEVELOPMENT OFFICE

SEC. 25. Creation. – There shall be in every province, city and municipality a Youth
Development Office which shall be headed by a youth development officer with the rank of at
least division chief. Such may be put under the Office of the Local Chief Executive, the Office of
the Planning and Development, the Office of the Social Welfare, or in any other office deemed
appropriate by the local government unit. If the funds of the local government unit are sufficient,
it can be a separate department with divisions and units for policy and planning, administration
and finance, and programs and operations. In the event when the local government unit has
exceeded the prescribed personal services limitations, the local chief executive may designate
existing personnel whom he or she deems fit to serve this purpose until such time that the local
government unit can already create this office.

SEC. 26. Funding. – The local government unit shall incorporate in its annual budget such
amount as may be necessary for the operation and effective functioning of the Local Youth
Development Office.

CHAPTER V
 CAPABILITY-BUILDING AND ORIENTATION TOWARDS NATION-BUILDING AND
EMPOWERMENT

SEC. 27. Mandatory and Continuing Training Programs. – For the purpose of emphasizing the
role of the youth in nation-building and molding them to become better citizens with the values
of patriotism, nationalism and honor as a Filipino, any Sangguniang Kabataan official, whether
elected or appointed, or any member of the LYDC must undergo the mandatory training
programs before he or she can assume office. During their incumbency, they must attend the
continuing training programs to be undertaken by the Commission in coordination with the
DILG. Deliberate failure to attend the said training programs shall constitute sufficient ground to
disqualify said Sangguniang Kabataan official or LYDC member or subject them to disciplinary
actions.

SEC. 28. Components of the Mandatory Training Programs. – The Commission and the DILG
with the assistance of the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP), the Local
Government Academy (LGA), the University of the‘ Philippines-National College of Public
Administration and Governance (UP-NCPAG), and in consultation with youth stakeholders shall
jointly design and implement the mandatory and continuing training programs. The mandatory
training programs1 must include among others, the following components: (a)(1) The Philippine
.cultural history, political systems ethics and ideologies; (2) The Filipino as a nation builder (3)
The Filipino youth and its role in nation-building; and (b) capability building on leadership,
program and project development and sustainability, financial management, and accountability
and transparency.

SEC. 29. Training Fund – A training fund with an initial amount of fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) is hereby established and appropriated from any available source to be
managed by the Commission. Thereafter, such amount needed for this purpose shall be included
in the Annual General Appropriations Act.

CHAPTER VI

LINGGO NG KABATAAN

SEC. 30. Observance of Linggo ng Kabataan. –

(a) Every barangay, municipality, city and province shall conduct an annual activity to be known
as the Linggo ng Kabataan on the week where the 12th of August falls to coincide with the
International Youth Day. The Sangguniang Kabataan, in the case of barangay, and the respective
LYDC in cooperation with the Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan, in the case of
municipality, city and province, shall take the lead in this observance.

(b) The observance of the Linggo ng Kabataan shall include the election of the counterparts of all
local elective and appointive officials, as well as heads of national offices or agencies stationed
or assigned in the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit, among in-school and
community youth residing in the local government concerned from ages thirteen (13) to
seventeen (17). During said week, they shall hold office as boy and girl officials and shall
perform such duties *and conduct such activities as may be provided in the ordinance enacted
pursuant to this Chapter.

CHAPTER VII

REGISTRATION, ELECTION AND ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE

SEC. 31. Registration. – For purposes of the next regular Sangguniang Kabataan election under
this Act, the COMELEC shall set a special registration of the Katipunan ng Kabataan which shall
in no case be less than one (1) month and shall include Saturdays and Sundays. Subsequent
registration of the Katipunan ng Kabataan shall be governed by Republic Act No. 8189 including
the system of continuing registration.

SEC. 32. Date of Election. – The Sangguniang Kabataan elections shall be synchronized with the
barangay elections and subsequently every three (3) years thereafter.

CHAPTER VIII

FINAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 33. Appropriations. – The amount necessary to implement the provisions of this Act shall
be included in the Annual General Appropriations Act.

SEC. 34. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). – The Commission, the DILG, the
COMELEC, the Department of Budget and Management, the CHED, the Department of
Education, and the COA, in consultation with the local government leagues, and various youth
organizations and youth-serving organizations shall be tasked to come up, within sixty (60) days
upon approval of this Act, with the IRR needed for the implementation of this Act.

SEC. 35. Separability Clause. – If, for any reason or reasons, any part or provision of this Act
shall be declared unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or provisions not affected thereby shall
continue to be in full force and effect.

SEC. 36. Repealing Clause. – Sections 329, 423-439 of Republic Act No. 7160, also known as
―The Local Government Code of 1991‖; Section 10(O) of Republic Act No. 8044, otherwise
known as ―Youth In Nation-Building Act‖; Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 9340, entitled
―An Act Amending Republic Act No. 9164, Resetting the Baranagay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections, and for Other Purposed‖; all other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders letters
of instruction, rules and regulations or portions thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 37. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after the completion of
its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,
______________________________________________
DECISION

BRION, J.:

This petition for certiorari filed by Nardo M. Velasco (Velasco) under Rule
64, in relation with Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Court seeks to set aside and
annul [1] the Resolution dated July 6, 2007 of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and [2] the Resolution dated October 15,
2007 of the COMELEC en banc, in SPA Case No. 07-148 entitled Mozart P.
Panlaqui v. Nardo M. Velasco. The assailed resolutions denied due course to the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) Velasco had filed for the position of Mayor of the
Municipality of Sasmuan, Pampanga.

THE ANTECEDENTS

Velasco was born in San Antonio, Sasmuan, Pampanga on June 22, 1952 to
Arsenio Velasco and Lucia Mangalindan. He married Evelyn D. Castillo on June
29, 1975 at the Roman Catholic Church of Sasmuan. In 1983, he moved to and
worked in the United States of America where he subsequently became a citizen.

Sometime in 2006, Velasco applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003. His application was approved on July 31, 2006. On the same day, he took his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco. He returned to the Philippines on September
14, 2006 and has not left since, except for a 3-day Hongkong trip from September
26, 2006 to September 29, 2009.

Soon thereafter or on October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for registration as a

voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga. The Election Registration Board (ERB) denied his
application. Thereupon, Velasco filed a petition for the inclusion of his name in the
list of voters with the Municipal Trial Court of Sasmuan (MTC). The MTC, finding
no evidence of Velascos change of domicile, granted Velascos petition on February
9, 2007; it reversed the ERBs decision and ordered Velascos inclusion in the List
of Voters of Sasmuan.

On March 1, 2007, Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,

Pampanga (RTC) reversed and set aside, on appeal, the MTC decision. The RTC
reasoned out that Velasco lost his domicile of origin [Sasmuan, Pampanga] when
he became a US citizen; under Philippine immigration laws, he could only stay in
the Philippines as a visitor or as a resident alien. Velasco, according to the RTC,
only regained or reacquired his Philippine residency on July 31, 2006 when he
reacquired his Filipino citizenship. The RTC based this conclusion on our ruling in
Caasi v. Court of Appeals1[1] that naturalization in a foreign country results in the
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Thus, the RTC found that Velasco
failed to comply with the residency requirement under the Constitution, making
him ineligible to vote in the May 14, 2007 elections.

Velasco appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; the appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 98259.

It was against this factual backdrop that Velasco filed on March 28,
2007 his COC for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan. Velascos COC contains,
among others, the required information that he is a registered voter of Precinct No.
103-A of Sasmuan, Pampanga. He executed on even date an Affidavit renouncing,
abandoning, and relinquishing his American citizenship.

The next day, private respondent Mozart Panlaqui (Panlaqui), who also filed
his COC for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan, filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course To and/or To Cancel Velascos COC, claiming that: (1) contrary to
Velascos claim, he is not a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A, as his name is
not included in the list of voters; (2) the RTC has rendered a decision denying
Velascos petition for inclusion as voter; (3) Velasco does not possess the
constitutional requirement of legal residency (i.e., one year residency in the
Philippines immediately preceding the election as provided under Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution) to register as voter; he arrived in the Philippines only
last September 14, 2006; and (4) Velasco is not eligible to run for office since he is
not a qualified voter. Panlaqui asked for the annulment, revocation and
cancellation of, or denial of due course to, Velascos COC that allegedly contained
obvious and gross material misrepresentation. The case was docketed as SPA Case
No. 07-148.

In his Answer, Velasco denied the allegations of Panlaquis petition and

claimed in defense that: (1) he possesses all the qualifications of a voter of
Sasmuan, as he is a domiciliary and permanent resident of the Philippines and
Sasmuan since birth; that, when he took his oath of allegiance on July 31, 2006, he
is considered not to have lost his Philippine citizenship and therefore continues to
enjoy full civic and political rights under the Constitution and the statutes; (2) the
appeal or review of the RTC decision is pending resolution with the Court of
Appeals; (3) he did not act with malice, bad faith and gross misrepresentation
when he stated that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of Sasmuan in
his COC, as the MTC decision has not been reversed with finality; (4) he has
renounced his American citizenship on March 29, 2007 or prior to the filing of his
COC, making him eligible to seek elective public office pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9255; and (5) he possesses all the qualifications of a voter of Sasmuan and of a
candidate for Municipal Mayor, Sasmuan being his domicile of origin and
permanent residence. He claimed that he is qualified to vote and seek public office
until a final judgment is rendered saying otherwise; hence, he did not commit any
misrepresentation and Panlaquis petition should be dismissed.

Velasco garnered 7,822 votes [the most number] for the position of Mayor
of Sasmuan in the May 14, 2007 election. As the COMELEC failed to resolve
Panlaquis petition prior to the election, Velasco was proclaimed Mayor of
Sasmuan on May 16, 2007. He took his oath of office and assumed the powers and
functions of the office on June 30, 2007.

On July 6, 2007, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution

the first of the interrelated resolutions assailed in the present petition canceling
Velascos COC and declaring his proclamation as Mayor of Sasmuan null and void.
Citing Section 138 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)2[2] which declared the
decision of the RTC in the voters inclusion/exclusion proceedings final and
executory, the Second Division of the COMELEC found Velasco guilty of material
misrepresentation when he claimed in his COC filed on March 28, 2007 that he is a
registered voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga. This defect, according to the Second
Division, effectively voided Velascos COC.

Velasco moved to reconsider the Second Divisions Resolution, but the

COMELEC en banc in a Resolution dated October 15, 2007 (also assailed in this
petition) denied the motion. The COMELEC en banc essentially affirmed the
Second Divisions ruling. Additionally, the COMELEC pointed out that in the
absence of a writ or order issued by the CA (where the appeal from the RTC
decision in the inclusion/exclusion case was then pending) enjoining the
enforcement of the RTC decision, it had to apply Section 138 of the OEC. Velasco
responded to this development by filing the present petition with this Court.
 THE PETITION, COMMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

The petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:

1. Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it
decided the issue on petitioners right to vote despite its apparent lack of
jurisdiction on this issue and the pendency of such prejudicial issue
before the CA.

2. Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled

that the March 1, 2008 decision of the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga
reversing the earlier decision of the MTC of Sasmuan, Pampanga is
already final and executory.

3. Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it

annulled the proclamation of the petitioner without notice and hearing.

4. Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled

that petitioner committed material misrepresentation in his COC by
merely relying on private respondents baseless allegations in the petition
to deny due course to petitioners COC without taking into consideration
that petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualification of a voter.

In his comment, Panlaqui asserts that: (1) Velasco committed forum

shopping, as another case involving the same issues is on appeal and pending
resolution with the CA; and (2) in light of this appeal, not all the requisites for a
petition for certiorari are present; in the alternative and assuming certiorari to be
proper, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, as the RTC
decision is final, executory, and non-appealable.
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
COMELEC. The OSG argues that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. The COMELEC has jurisdiction under Section 78 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, as amended, or the OEC over petitions to deny due course and/or cancel
a COC (COC-denial/cancellation). There was likewise no denial of due process;
Velasco filed an Answer to Panlaquis petition and was fully heard before the
COMELEC denied due course to his COC. The OSG also argues that Velascos
immigration to the United States and subsequent acquisition of US citizenship
constituted an abandonment of his Philippine domicile and residence. Finally, the
OSG claims that Velasco committed misrepresentation in declaring his residence at
Sasmuan in his COC a ground for the cancellation of COC under Section 78 of the
OEC. The real issue, according to the OSG, is not Velascos right to vote, but the
misrepresentation he committed when he filed his COC.

On March 5, 2008, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution to implement

the assailed resolutions. The CA, on the other hand, rendered on March 13, 2008
its decision in CA-GR SP No. 98259 granting Velascos appeal, thereby reversing
and setting aside the RTC decision. The appellate court ruled that, contrary to the
RTCs finding, Velasco effectively reacquired his residence when he decided to
relocate in the Philippines for good in 2003; from 2003-2006, Velasco stayed in
the Philippines for a total of almost two (2) years for the last three (3) years
immediately preceding the May 14, 2007 election; from the totality of these acts,
Velasco revealed his intention to reacquire his rights as a Filipino citizen. Citing
Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,3[3] the CA considered Velasco a qualified
voter.

On Velascos motion, we issued a status quo ante order enjoining the

COMELEC from implementing the assailed resolutions.

In an interesting twist, the CA issued on August 19, 2008 an Amended

Decision in response to a motion for reconsideration of its earlier decision
dismissing Velascos Rule 42 petition for lack of jurisdiction. It reversed its earlier
ruling that it has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, explicitly stating that the
jurisprudence it cited to support its appellate jurisdiction in voters
inclusion/exclusion proceeding is no longer good law because of the amendments
to the election law on which its cited jurisprudence was based. It declared that
Section 138 of the OEC being explicit that the decision on appeal by the RTC in
inclusion and exclusion cases is immediately final and executory appears to be a
clear mandate for this Court (the CA) not to entertain instant petition for lack of
jurisdiction.

Based on these submissions, we are called upon to resolve the following

issues: (1) whether Velasco forum-shopped; and (2) whether the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in canceling Velascos COC.
 THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit.

Grave Abuse of Discretion.

The well-settled rule is that this Court will not interfere with a COMELEC
decision unless the COMELEC is shown to have committed grave abuse of
discretion.4[4] Correctly understood, grave abuse of discretion is such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an]
exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or
to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law.5[5]

Velasco imputes grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC for canceling

his COC on the sole ground that he committed false representation when he
claimed that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A. This imputation directly
poses to us the question: was the COMELEC ruling capriciously, whimsically,
and arbitrarily made?
 In answering this question, we recognize at the outset that together with the
cancellation of the COC that is directly before us, we have to consider the effect
and impact of the inclusion/exclusion proceedings that Velasco brought before the
MTC which, on appeal to the RTC, ultimately led to the denial of his listing as a
voter in Sasmuan. While this inclusion/exclusion case is not before us, it was the
ruling in this proceeding that the COMELEC cited as ground for the cancellation of
Velascos COC after Velasco claimed that he is a registered voter of Precinct No.
103-A of Sasmuan, Pampanga.

The COC Denial/Cancellation Proceedings.

Section 74, in relation with Section 78 of the OEC governs the cancellation
of, and grant or denial of due course to, COCs. The combined application of these
sections requires that the facts stated in the COC by the would-be candidate be
true, as any false representation of a material fact is a ground for the COCs
cancellation or the withholding of due course. To quote these provisions:

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of

candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the
office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party
to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation assumed by his oath
is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
 that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.

xxxx
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the election.

The false representation that these provisions mention must necessarily pertain to a
material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the
consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact
cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be
prosecuted for violation of the election laws. Obviously, these facts are those that
refer to a candidates qualification for
elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence.6[6] The candidates
status as a registered voter similarly falls under this classification as it is a
requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the
COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for
and represent the local government under which he is running.

Separately from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under

Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must
be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates
qualifications for public office.7[7]

The Voters Inclusion/Exclusion Proceedings.

The process of voters inclusion/exclusion, as part of the voters registration

process, is provided and defined under Sections 138, 139 and 143 of the OEC.
These sections provide:

Sec. 138. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases. The Municipal

and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters from the list in their respective cities
or municipalities. Decisions of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be
appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Courts within five (5) days
from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final and
executory. The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten (10) days
from the time it is received and the decision shall become final and executory. No
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained [As amended by Section 33 of
Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189)].

Sec. 139. Petition for inclusion of voters in the list. Any person whose
application for registration has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has
been stricken out from the list may file with the court a petition to include his
name in the permanent list of voters in his precinct at any time except one
hundred five (105) days prior to a regular election or seventy-five (75) days prior
to a special election. It shall be supported by a certificate of disapproval of his
application and proof of service of notice of his petition upon the Board. The
petition shall be decided within fifteen (15) days after its filing.

If the decision is for the inclusion of voters in the permanent list of voters,
the Board shall place the application for registration previously disapproved in the
corresponding book of voters and indicate in the application for registration the
date of the order of inclusion and the court which issued the same [As amended
by Section 34 of RA 8189].

Section 143. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter

of inclusion, exclusion and correction of names of voters.

(a) Petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of voters shall

be filed during office hours;

(b) Notice of the place, date and time of the hearing of the petition shall be
served upon the members of the Board and the challenged voter upon the filing of
the petition. Service of such notice may be made by sending a copy thereof by
personal delivery or by leaving it in the possession of a person of sufficient
discretion in the residence of the challenged voter, or by registered mail. Should
the foregoing procedures be not practicable, the notice shall be posted in the
bulletin board of the city or municipal hall and in two (2) other conspicuous
places within the city or municipality;

xxx

(c) A petition shall refer only one to one (1) precinct and implead the
Board as respondents;.

(d) No costs shall be assessed against any party in these proceedings.

However, if the court should find that the application has been filed solely to
harass the adverse party and cause him to incur expenses, it shall order the
culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses.

(e) Any voter, candidate or political party who may be affected by the
proceedings may intervene and present his evidence.
 (f) The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no case
rendered upon a stipulation of facts. x x x

(g) The petition shall be heard and decided within ten (10) days from the
date of its filing. Cases appealed to the Regional Trial Court shall be decided
within ten (10) days from receipt of the appeal. In all, cases, the court shall decide
these petitions not later than fifteen (15) days before the election and the decision
shall be immediately final and executory. [As amended by Section 32 of RA
8189]

Inclusion/exclusion proceedings essentially involve the simple issue of whether a

petitioner shall be included in or excluded from the list of voters based on the
qualifications required by law and the facts presented to show possession of these
qualifications.

The Proceedings Compared.

In terms of purpose, voters inclusion/exclusion and COC denial/cancellation

are different proceedings; one refers to the application to be registered as a voter to
be eligible to vote, while the other refers to the application to be a candidate.
Because of their differing purposes, they also involve different issues and entail
different reliefs although the facts on which they rest may have commonalities
where they may be said to converge or interface. One such commonality is on the
matter of residence. Section 9 of Republic Act 8189, otherwise known as the
Voters Registration Act (VRA), requires that voters shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote,
at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election. The OEC, on the other
hand, requires under its Section 74 that the would-be candidate state material facts
such as, among others, his residence. Under the combined application of Section
65 of the OEC and Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC), a local
official must among others have the same residency requirement as required under
the VRA. Another point of convergence is on the candidates status as a registered
voter; a candidate for a local government position must be a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, province, or city where he or she intends to run for office.

The remedies available in the two proceedings likewise differ. Velascos

remedy from the adverse decision in his petition for inclusion as voter is as
provided under Section 138 of the OEC quoted above. From the MTC, the recourse
is to the RTC whose decision is final and executory, correctible by the Court of
Appeals only by a writ of certiorari based on grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the approval of a certificate of candidacy
or its denial is a matter directly cognizable by the COMELEC, with the decision of
its Division reviewable by the COMELEC en banc whose decision is in turn
reviewable by this Court under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and Section 7, of
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion.

In the present case, the ERB denied Velascos registration as a voter, which
denial the RTC subsequently supported. As already mentioned, this denial by the
RTC is, by law, final and executory. Since Velascos knowledge of the RTC
decision at the time he filed his COC is not disputed, the COMELEC concluded
that he committed a material misrepresentation when he stated under oath in his
COC that he is a registered voter of Sasmuan.

Under these facts and legal situation, we cannot hold that the COMELECs
conclusion is legally erroneous, much less that it is tainted by grave abuse of
discretion. It is a matter of record, appearing in a final RTC judgment no less, that
Velasco was not a registered voter of Sasmuan at the time he filed his COC. His
claim in this regard was therefore false and was a material misrepresentation. Other
than his active misrepresentation, Velasco likewise was inexplicably silent about,
and thus knowingly omitted any mention of, the denial of his registration. As the
COMELEC did, we can only conclude that he deliberately concealed the existence
of the final and executory RTC ruling when he filed his COC. He could not
disclose this fact as the unavoidable consequence of disclosure was to render him
unqualified to be a candidate.8[8]

That the COMELEC relied on the RTC ruling in canceling the COC of
Velasco cannot likewise be a legal error as Section 138 of the OEC is clear and
categorical in its terms: Decisions of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts
may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Courts within five (5)
days from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final and
executory. The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten days from the
time the appeal was received and its decision shall be final and executory. We note
that when Velasco sought recourse with the Court of Appeals, he did so by way of
appeal under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court a recourse that was not available to him
because an RTC ruling in an inclusion/exclusion is final and executory. This led
the appellate court to recognize in its Amended Decision of August 19, 2008, albeit
on motion for reconsideration, that it had no jurisdiction to entertain Velascos
appeal.

The Right to Vote

The above discussions, particularly on the distinctions between

inclusion/exclusion proceedings and COC denial/cancellation proceedings, refute
and belie Velascos position that the COMELEC improperly ruled on his right to
vote when it cancelled his COC. The tribunals given authority by law and who
actually ruled on whether Velasco should have the right to vote in Sasmuan,
Pampanga were the ERB, the MTC, and subsequently, the RTC. The COMELEC
did not so rule; it merely recognized the RTCs final and executory ruling on the
matter.

This conclusion is not a hairsplitting sophistry, but one based on clear

distinctions drawn by the law. As above pointed out, inclusion/exclusion and COC
denial/cancellation proceedings, while they may ultimately have common factual
bases, are still proceedings poles apart in terms of the issues, reliefs, and remedies
involved. That at some point they may converge (as in this case, where the COC
denial/cancellation proceeding relied on and used the results of the voters
inclusion/exclusion proceeding) does not erase the distinctions between them. In
the context of this case, it does not mean that the COMELEC commonly with the
ERB, the MTC and the RTC ruled on Velascos right to vote because the
COMELEC relied on the latters ruling.

In Domino v. COMELEC9[9] where this Court faced the contention that the
decision of the first level court in an exclusion proceeding on the issue of residence
is final and conclusive on the COMELEC hearing a COC denial/cancellation
proceeding under Section 78 of the OED we ruled that the factual findings of the
trial court and its resultant conclusions in the inclusion/exclusion proceedings on
matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction
are not conclusive on and do not rise to the level of a res judicata ruling with
respect to the COMELEC.10[10] The reason is that inclusion/exclusion
proceedings, while judicial in character, are summary proceedings.11[11] We
further added that a decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding does not operate
as a bar to any future action in any other election that a party may take concerning
his right to be registered as a voter.12[12] Otherwise stated, a ruling on the right to
vote by the trial court for a specific election is binding on the COMELEC. By clear
implication, the COMELEC itself does not rule on the right to vote by recognizing
in a Sec. 78 COC denial/cancellation proceeding the final and executory ruling by
a court, as mandated by law, in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding.
Velascos Qualifications/Disqualifications as a Voter

Whether Velasco possesses all the qualifications and none of the

disqualifications to register as a voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga is a matter that is not
directly before us as his inclusion as a Sasmuan voter is not before us. As the
COMELEC did, we rely on the final and executory RTC ruling excluding Velasco
from the Sasmuan voters list. We observe, however, that at the time he filed his
application for registration with the COMELEC local office on October 13, 2006,
Velasco was a dual citizen. The records show that Velasco renounced his
American citizenship only on March 28, 2007,13[13] although he secured his dual
citizenship status as early as July 31, 2006 at the Philippine Consulate in San
Francisco, California.14[14] Under his dual citizenship status, he possessed the
right to vote in Philippine elections through the absentee voting scheme under
Republic Act No. 9189 (the Oversees Absentee Voting Law or the OAVL)15[15] as
we ruled in Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC.16[16] In Macalintal v.
COMELEC,17[17] we significantly said that absentee voters are exempted from
the constitutional residency requirement for regular Philippine voters. Thus, the
residency requirements we cited above under the VRA and the LGC do not apply
to Velasco, assuming he registered as a dual citizen/absentee voter.

By law, however, the right of dual citizens who vote as absentee voters
pertains only to the election of national officials, specifically: the president, the
vice-president, the senators, and party-list representatives.18[18] Thus, Velasco
was not eligible to vote as an absentee voter in the local election of 2007. In fact,
the records do not show that Velasco ever registered as an absentee voter for the
2007 election.19[19]

On the other hand, Velasco could not have registered as a regular voter
because he did not possess the residency requirement of one-year stay in the
Philippines and six-months stay in the municipality where he proposed to vote at
the time of the election. The records show that he arrived in the Philippines only on
September 14, 2006 and applied for registration on October 13 of that year20[20]
for the election to be held in May of the following year (2007). To hark back and
compare his case to a similar case, Coquilla v. COMELEC,21[21] Velasco, before
acquiring his dual citizenship status, was an American citizen who had lost his
residency and domiciliary status in the Philippines; whose sojourn in the
Philippines was via a visitors visa; and who never established permanent residence
in the Philippines. Like Coquilla before him, Velasco could not have therefore
validly registered as a regular voter eight months before the May 2007 local
elections.

The Due Process Issue.

Finally, we see no merit in Velascos argument that the COMELEC annulled

his proclamation as Mayor without due process. The nullification of his
proclamation as a winning candidate was an outcome - a necessary legal
consequence of the cancellation of his COC pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. A
COC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification
case.22[22] In the present case, Velasco filed an Answer to Panlaquis petition to
cancel or deny due course to his (Velascos) COC; hence, he was afforded the
opportunity to be heard in the cancellation of his COC.

Under the combined application of Sections 623[23] and 724[24] of

Republic Act No. 6646,25[25] candidates who are disqualified by final judgment
before the election shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be
counted. If the disqualification or COC cancellation/denial case is not resolved
before election day, the proceedings shall continue even after the election and the
proclamation of the winner.26[26] In the meanwhile, the candidate may be voted
for and be proclaimed if he or she wins, but the COMELECs jurisdiction to deny
due course and cancel his or her COC continues. This rule applies even if the
candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of
votes,27[27] and even if the candidate is proclaimed and has taken his oath of
office.28[28] The only exception to this rule is in the case of congressional or
senatorial candidates with unresolved disqualification or COC denial/cancellation
cases after the elections. Pursuant to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution,
the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction over these unfinished cases in favor of
the respective Senate or the House of Representatives electoral tribunals after the
candidates take their oath of office.29[29]

Under these circumstances, Velascos claim of denial of due process is

misplaced since he was given the opportunity to be heard in a proceeding that
would result in the annulment of his proclamation; due process was duly served
because its essence is the opportunity to be heard and this was fully given to
Velasco.30[30]

In sum, the COMELEC resolutions canceling Velascos COC are

procedurally and substantively correct, thus negating the grave abuse of discretion
that Velasco alleges.

As our final point, we are aware that Velasco won the May 14, 2007
mayoralty election in Sasmuan. We recognize, too, that we have ruled in the past
that a candidates victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule
in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves
defects in the candidates certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions
relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established
rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v.
COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC.31[31]

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-
tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and
unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous
significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively
negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic
information to make an informed choice about a candidates eligibility and fitness
for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is
Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government
officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC
that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be
emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false
COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC
qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their
COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements.

In the process, the rule of law suffers; the clear and unequivocal legal
command, framed by a Congress representing the national will, is rendered inutile
because the people of a given locality has decided to vote a candidate into office
despite his or her lack of the qualifications Congress has determined to be
necessary.

In the present case, Velasco is not only going around the law by his claim
that he is registered voter when he is not, as has been determined by a court in a
final judgment. Equally important is that he has made a material misrepresentation
under oath in his COC regarding his qualification. For these violations, he must
pay the ultimate price the nullification of his election victory. He may also have to
account in a criminal court for making a false statement under oath, but this is a
matter for the proper authorities to decide upon.

We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the
past by the clarification that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve
material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC
mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the
people shall have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement
involves more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material
COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and
criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the
Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material
qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in
any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the
electorate will. The balance must always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing
the law. To rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of law.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. The Status

Quo Order we issued is hereby ordered IMMEDIATELY LIFTED. We
DECLARE that there is no more legal impediment or obstacle to the
implementation of the assailed COMELEC resolutions. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
______________________________________________________

III.

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA

MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT
KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and
LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN,
AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE,
4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN,
ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT,
AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL
B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.

[G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000]

AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG

ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-
KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER
INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP,
ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-
LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000]

ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION

OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON
FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR
CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA,
OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG
LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU,
PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:*

Prologue

To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic
Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck
down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce
and administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does
it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.

Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws -
- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.

In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary
democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory
parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal
solutions convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested
jurisprudence.

The Case

Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution32[1] of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065;33[2] and (2) the January 7,
1999 Resolution34[3] of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed
Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to
complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided under
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.

The Facts and the Antecedents

Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government --
the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party
or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of
party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of
Representatives as regular members.35[4] In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House --
one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative.36[5]

Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the

Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.

Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection or election of party-list
representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy
declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances
to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
(italics ours.)

The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA
7941) in this wise:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,
prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through
the party-list system.

Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The
proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:37[6]

Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of Nominees

Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the
Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation,
Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent
to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S.
Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.38[7]

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government
Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to
Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It
alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the
House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed
that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared
winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations39[8] filed their respective Motions for Intervention,
seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise,
PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on
August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL,
MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care,
Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution
granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in
addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all
times, the total number of congressional40[9] seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent
district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52
seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA
7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly
determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the
marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives."
Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it
should encourage [the] multi-party system. (Boldface in the original.) Considering these
elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the
party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative. It thus
disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second
Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include
those similarly situated.

ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of
names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as
party-list representatives, to wit:

1. SENIOR CITIZENS

2. AKAP

3. AKSYON

4. PINATUBO

5. NUPA

6. PRP

7. AMIN

8. PAG-ASA

9. MAHARLIKA

10. OCW-UNIFIL

11. FCL

12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN

13. KAMPIL

14. BANTAY BAYAN

15. AFW

16. ANG LAKAS OCW

17. WOMENPOWER, INC.

18. FEJODAP

19. CUP

20. VETERANS CARE

21. 4L

22. AWATU

23. PMP

24. ATUCP

25. NCWP

26. ALU

27. BIGAS

28. COPRA

29. GREEN

30. ANAKBAYAN

31. ARBA

32. MINFA

33. AYOS

34. ALL COOP

35. PDP-LABAN

36. KATIPUNAN

37. ONEWAY PRINT

38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS

to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in

Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its
Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a
set of Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through
the Party-List System. Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for
every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex A. It apparently
relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and
one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said
unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three elements, the Group of 38 private
respondents.41[10]

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the
basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected
to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They
contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions
garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the
House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be
allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of
votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up, the Comelec en banc
resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In
other words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons
be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the
total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed
the two percent threshold?

The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two
percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two
political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x
x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the
Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives x x x. Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from
complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose
20% of the House of Representatives.

Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority --
with three commissioners concurring42[11] and two members43[12] dissenting -- affirmed the
Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st
party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of
manifest errors.

Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement
imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application,
holding that there were more important considerations than this statutory threshold.

Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the
issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this
Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system.44[13] In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec
were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as
likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners
sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and
organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-
list system.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec to CEASE and
DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any
other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions
enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999
Resolution, until further orders from this Court.

On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor
appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR
No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo
Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for
Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of
the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae.
Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.

Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda
in amplification of their verbal arguments.45[14]

The Issues

The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the
subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a
qualified party be determined?

The Courts Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed
Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.

First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory

The pertinent provision46[15] of the Constitution on the composition of the House of

Representatives reads as follows:

Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.

Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving
at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this
legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:

No. of district representatives

---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
 .80 representatives

This formulation47[16] means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may
be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list
seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during
the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:

208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all
the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No.

Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling

The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.

According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up

has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by
which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election
must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat
in the House of Representatives.

Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this
legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or
coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty
percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up
completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters
themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how
many should represent them.

On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that
the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote
requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it
mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.

We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the
equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down
only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-
list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,
Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of
party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it
necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at
least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-
list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have
more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b)
of the law provides:

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in
Congress.

On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
mathematical impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust
or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.48[17] Our task now, as should have been
the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of
clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable,
implement it within the context of the actual election process.

Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies,
is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared
unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute
remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is
the essence of the rule of law.

Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation

The Two Percent Threshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was
raised by, I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a
minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list
system.

They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5
percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate
political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for
them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through
the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."49[18]

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives,
as the following shows:

MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving
at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different
sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of
the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany.50[19]

Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the
specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner
Christian S. Monsod explained:

MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes.

Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are
about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean
500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in
the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The
average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that
there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have
memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What
we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is
our job to open up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We
think that people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within that
system.51[20]

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative
state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives
chosen by them.52[21] But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the
mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus,
even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"53[22] to ensure meaningful local
representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation
or circumvention.54[23]

The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a

multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the
implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or
triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way,
we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats
among the fifty. x x x.55[24]

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to
three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the
two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-
representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership,
would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously
challenged in these consolidated cases.

Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld
the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA
7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified
parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on
this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively
referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their
respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then
determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or
guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two
percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the
three-seat limit further imposed by the law.

One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment

One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the
votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat.56[25] Translated
in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three
seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two
percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease
of comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for
example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party
C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to
5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties
will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering
two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seats
as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be
contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court
discarded it.

The Niemeyer Formula

Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed
by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list
seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified
party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be
allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total
number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product
will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:

No. of remaining seats

to be allocated No. of additional
--------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of party
Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned
qualified parties (Integer.decimal)

The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending
order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the
distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:

Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total

Votes Seats Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52

However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those
obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of
facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total
of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of
"proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.

The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the
Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty
percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements --
two percent for us and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models,
however. As ably pointed out by private respondents,57[26] one half of the German Parliament is
filled up by party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German
law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned,
imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major
statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.

Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic
because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be
transplanted in toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines

It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands
an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the
number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters
of the Filipino party-list system.

As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional representation into a
mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned
parameters.

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents,
as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes
cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the first party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly
exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two
additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the
same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party.
Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats
has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first
one is entitled.

The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two
reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2)
the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a
fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty
percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not
necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting
percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.

The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales58[27] that a fractional membership
cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another
party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled
to x x x.

In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature.
Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme
Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis
given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to
one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second
party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore,
for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be
entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without
a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first
party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four
percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the
total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the
highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to
which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in
the House of Representatives.

Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to
one additional seat or a total of two seats.

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional
seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of
the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would
contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six
percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would
be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party
received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same
number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of
representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the
first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion
to those of the first party.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:

No. of votes of
concerned party
------------------
Total no. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
for concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
------------------
Total no. of votes
for party list system

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as
follows:

No. of votes of
Additional seats ABA No. of additional
for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)

Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

Additional seats 321,646

for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since
party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied

Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows:

Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional Total

Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1
NATCCO
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of
votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be
zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of
additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole
number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers
and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in
the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining
absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum
of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party
may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself
has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant
parameter.

The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with
the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the
twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their
nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology.

In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however,
that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation,
no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it less strict, then
the formula will also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.

Epilogue

In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38)
herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat,
because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and
proportional representation.

In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively
arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the
power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom
and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.59[28]

Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have
failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such
requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.60[29]

The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,61[30]
cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a
mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its
recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the
legislature.

Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by
the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as
unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution
prohibits, the statute permits.62[31]

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of
three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the proportional
representation mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.

The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a
total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not
be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated
the implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already
popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should
allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our
tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not
despair.

Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should
serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more
active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should
also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular
democracy.

With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are
confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience,
perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of
full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-
list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties -
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.

Puno, J., see separate concurring opinion.

Mendoza, J., dissents.

Kapunan, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. Mendoza.

____________________________________________

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National

Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and
mandamus,63[1] assails the Resolution64[2] promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The
COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal
Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the
COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and
Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of
Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
 Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for
Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition,65[3] assails NBC Resolution No. 07-6066[4] promulgated on 9 July
2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and
coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-
List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of
the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning
party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC67[5] (Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the

Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and
179295.

The Facts

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties
under the Party-List System.68[6]

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of

Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-
041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and
the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers
that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling,
that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.69[7]
There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandum on 19 July 2007.

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC

Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties
as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong
(BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas
Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC),
A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers
Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak
Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution
No. 07-60 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of

Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed,
in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand
six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in
connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National
Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any
higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one
(16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/
untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)
1,337,032
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100%
outcome) from areas not yet submitted for canvass
(Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and
Pagalungan, Maguindanao)
 102,430
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in
part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two

percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes,
the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four
thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus
COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a
formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the
required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list
ballots have been completely canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least
three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES

COALITION RECEIVED
1 BUHAY 1,163,218
 2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
3 CIBAC 760,260
4 GABRIELA 610,451
5 APEC 538,971
6 A TEACHER 476,036
7 AKBAYAN 470,872
8 ALAGAD 423,076
9 BUTIL 405,052
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029
11 BATAS 386,361
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
13 ARC 338,194
14 ABONO 337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan

(BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF
REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the
Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-
250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore
entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the

Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and
other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set
forth below, the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List
System:

1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
4 Gabriela Womens Party GABRIELA
5 Association of Philippine Electric APEC
 Cooperatives
6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment A TEACHER
Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms, Inc.
7 Akbayan! Citizens Action Party AKBAYAN
8 Alagad ALAGAD
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL
10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO
11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC
13 Abono ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions

which may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual
votes cast under the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be
determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion
of the canvass of the party-list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan

(BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the
proceedings therein moot and academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and

coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their
respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
 SO ORDERED.70[8] (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC,

promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats
allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs interpretation
of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the

National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and
coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the
projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1)
guaranteed party-list seat each;

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the
National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007,
based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes
received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is
16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-List Projected total number of votes

1 BUHAY 1,178,747
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
3 CIBAC 755,964
4 GABRIELA 621,718
5 APEC 622,489
6 A TEACHER 492,369
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
 8 ALAGAD 423,190
9 BUTIL 409,298
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
12 ARC 375,846
13 ABONO 340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the
highest number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions,
making it the first party in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC,
reiterated in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-
list system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an
additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the first party, the correct formula as
expressed in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party relative to total votes for

Total votes for party-list system party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it
to additional seats:

Proportion of votes received Additional seats

by the first party

 Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat
Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

1,178,747

- - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%

16,261,369

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in
CIBAC is, as follows:

No. of votes of

concerned party No. of additional

Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to

a concerned party No. of votes of first party

first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List Percentage Additional Seat

 BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1
CIBAC 1.28 1
GABRIELA 1.05 1
APEC 1.05 1
A TEACHER 0.83 0
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
ALAGAD 0.71 0
BUTIL 0.69 0
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
ARC 0.63 0
ABONO 0.57 0

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus

Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other
elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties,
organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:

Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2
BAYAN MUNA 1
CIBAC 1
GABRIELA 1
APEC 1

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions

which may later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes
cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate
percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.
 Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and
coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their
respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a
copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.71[9]

Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No.

07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of
Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon
[NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and

Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution
prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-
List representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the

2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in
that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative
seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied;

and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of

seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the
additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of
RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained
by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes
cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding
votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold
rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the
ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX A of
COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be
used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be
proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative
seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11

of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats
for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941
shall be followed.

RECOMMENDATION:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60

promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes
and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and
Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the
May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections resolved among others
that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization
or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of
the canvass of the party-list results.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as
it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig,
Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.

Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.72[10]

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in
NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of
NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC,
acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in
its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the
Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the
COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.73[11]

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007,

the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties
entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector
Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),74[12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),75[13]
and An Waray.76[14] Per the certification77[15] by COMELEC, the following
party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing

Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for
Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee
(with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the
COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.

Issues
 BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section

5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of
RA 7941 constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?78[16]

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following
issues in their petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers,

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:

A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

 1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in
allocating additional seats for the First Party violates the principle of
proportional representation under RA 7941.

2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional

seats, one for the First Party and another for the qualifying parties, violates
Section 11(b) of RA 7941.

3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule

are different from those required under RA 7941;

C. Violates the Four Inviolable Parameters of the Philippine party-list

system as provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v.
COMELEC.

II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party
Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely
in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the
instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature,
involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental
importance to our nation.79[17]

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties
in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral
arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for
one seat constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the
party-list elections?80[18]

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-

list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans.
For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent
of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
 Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two
additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled
to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.81[19]

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical

interpretation of the term proportional representation, this Court is compelled to
revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
 (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall

constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.

xxx

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of

Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be
composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The
Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the
House of Representatives.

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the
ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We
compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the
number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first
formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats available Number of seats available to

to legislative districts
x .20 = party-list representatives
 .80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available
for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since
the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55
seats available to party-list representatives.

220 x .20 = 55
.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the

total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating
the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the
legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold

and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats
reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the
guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total
party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of
R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System.
Veterans produced the First Party Rule,82[20] and Justice Vicente V. Mendozas
dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula83[21] as an alternative.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of

allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,84[22] the following procedure
shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The

COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide
basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
 In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three
formulas to allocate party-list representative seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b)

on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this
procedure as follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members
of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec
Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th
Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%)
of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than
three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups
under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes
corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-
list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in
accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.85[23]

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.
 The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote
requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list
representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the
COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;

(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes

obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast
for the party-list system.86[24]

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the
proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total
nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes of a party-list with
a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of
seats.87[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs
second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the
COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically
preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both
formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List
System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept
the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all
qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is
computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second
percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole
integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-
list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat
allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are
ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking
are allocated until all the seats are filled up.88[26]

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating
parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes garnered during the elections.89[27]

Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
2 BAYAN 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
9 COOP- 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835
26 SENIOR 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA 33,903
ILONGGO
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
31 ANG 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
KASANGGA
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA 29,130
PILIPINO
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271
34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
 37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
39 ABANSE! 130,356 86 APO 16,421
PINAY
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG 16,241
BUKID
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD 8,915
FILIPINA
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause
guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-
list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each
party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over
the total votes for the party-list.90[28]

Votes Garnered
Votes over Total Guaranteed
Rank Party
Garnered Votes for Party- Seat
List, in %
 1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS91[29] 385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
Total 17
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at

least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17
qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates
that are entitled to one seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat
allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes. This is where petitioners and
intervenors problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the
clause in proportion to their total number of votes to be in proportion to the votes
of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A.
No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued

operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.
This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible
to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50

million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that
has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let
us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties
get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.
Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for
every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.92[30]

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent

(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in

paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be

included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are
the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
 In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our
allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The
percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing
the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38,
which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-
List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer
of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds
to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list
seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Votes Additional Applying

Guaranteed (B) plus
Garnered the three
Seat (C), in
over Seats seat cap
whole
integers
Votes Total Votes
Rank Party for Party
Garnered
List, in %
 (A) (First Round) (Second
Round)
(E)

(B) (D)
(C)
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
2 BAYAN 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
993[31] COOP- 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
 26 SENIOR 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.
31 ANG 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
Total 17 55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above,

there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations.
All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the
parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a
total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed

all political parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the
party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society
through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very
much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on
the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated
under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to
political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats
and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they
be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives.
Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever
is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and
can also participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that
he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
 MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say
Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party
list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad
base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin
mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang reserve.
Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din
ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
 MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

xxxx

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and
mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the
UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass
organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the
participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be
true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that
they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong,
there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the
policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will create
conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come
together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives
of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent
system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example,
distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in
Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the
leadership of those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with
the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican
Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should
not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we
set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more
institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs
sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to
rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even
beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider
constitutional arena for major political parties.
 x x x 94[32] (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the
Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in
the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or

platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests
and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens

who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
 (f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party
from dominating the party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.95[33] In
defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or
a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties
will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in
party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the
law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form
coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There
should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-
list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral
youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with,
their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can
establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this
fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino
(KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
 The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A.
No. 7941:

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-
five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative
who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the
expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity96[34] as there
is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the
sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors,97[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he
or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or
she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House
of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow
the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent
the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The
three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall
thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in

Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major
political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is
unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE

the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as
well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare
unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list
seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in
accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political
parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

___________________________________

ECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1
filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012,2
20 November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19
February 2013.7

The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

G.R. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

No.
A. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic review of the COMELEC
Division’s resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 20128
1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not
(PLM) Sining (ASIN) considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.
Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129
2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and
(PLM) Savings and loan association cannot be
Loan considered marginalized and
Association, Inc. underrepresented; and
(Manila - The first and second
Teachers) nominees are not teachers by
profession.
3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its
(PLM) Local Athletics members belong to the
Entrepreneurs marginalized; and
and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to
Inc. (ALA-EH) qualify.
Resolution dated 27 November 201210
4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to
 (PLM) Advocating qualify: although registering
Autonomy Party as a regional political party,
(1AAAP) two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 27 November 201211
5 204367 12-104 Akbay - Failure of the group to show
(PL) Kalusugan that its nominees belong to
(AKIN), Inc. the urban poor sector.
Resolution dated 29 November 201212
6 204370 12-011 Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a
(PP) (AAB) marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 201213
7 204436 12-009 Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the
(PP), Party (AI) party represents a
12-165 marginalized and
(PLM) underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.
Resolution dated 4 December 201214
8 204485 12-175 Alliance of - Failure to establish that the
(PL) Organizations, group can represent 14
Networks and Associations sectors; - The sectors of
of homeowners‘
 the Philippines, associations, entrepreneurs
Inc. (ALONA) and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
B. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s review on motion for reconsideration
of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 201215
9 204139 12-127 Alab ng - Failure to prove track
(PL) Mamamahayag record as an organization;
(ALAM) - Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 201216
10 204402 12-061 Kalikasan Party-List - The group reflects an
(PP) (KALIKASAN) advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 14 November 201217
11 204394 12-145 Association of - Failure to prove
(PL) Guard, Utility membership base and track
Helper, Aider, record;
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities
 Domestic that sufficiently benefited its
Helper, intended constituency; and
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not belong
and to any of the sectors which
Nanny of the the group seeks to represent.
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
Resolution dated 5 December 201218
12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the
(PLM) Pinoy (PPP) group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
Second Division‘s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida‘s (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list
group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives
of the "marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA,
ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,21
and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13
May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23
(Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:

G.R. No. SPP Group Grounds for Denial

No.
Resolution dated 10 October 201224
1 203818- 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and
 19 (PLM) Political Party accreditation as a political
12-177 (AKB) party, but denied participation
(PLM) in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225
2 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.
3 203981 12-187 Association for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Righteousness accreditation
Advocacy on - Failure to comply, and for
Leadership violation of election laws;
(ARAL) - The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.
4 204002 12-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.
5 204318 12-220 United Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Movement accreditation
 Against Drugs - The sectors of drug
Foundation counsellors and lecturers,
(UNIMAD) veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.
Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226
6 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration
(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector
Brotherhood, it seeks to represent; and
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) - The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
7 204122 12-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military
Philippines, Inc. fraternity;
(1GANAP/ - The sector of community
GUARDIANS) volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.
8 20426 12-257 Blessed Cancelled registration
(PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven
Farmers and nominees do not belong to
Fishermen the sector of farmers and
International, fishermen, the sector sought
Inc. (A to be represented; and
BLESSED - None of the nominees are
Party-List) registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.
Resolution dated 16 October 201227
9 203960 12-260 1st Cancelled registration
(PLM) Consumers - The sector of rural energy
Alliance for consumers is not
 Rural Energy, marginalized and
Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
- The party‘s track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.
Resolution dated 16 October 201228
10 203922 12-201 Association of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Philippine accreditation
Electric - Failure to represent a
Cooperatives marginalized and
(APEC) underrepresented sector; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 23 October 201229
11 204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
( AT ) - The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230
12 203976 12-288 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Rural and accreditation
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant
Reconstruction, and urban poor sectors that
Inc. (ARARO) the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
 party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231
13 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration
(PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for
Magsasaka ng more than a year immediately
Pilipinas after the May 2010 elections;
Movement - The nominees do not belong
(AGRI) to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.
14 203936 12-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration
(PLM) Magsasaka-Partido - Failure to show that
Tinig ng majority of its members are
Masa (AKMA-PTM) marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.
15 204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent
Agilang and Certificate of Nomination
Pilipinong were not signed by an
Magsasaka appropriate officer of the
(KAP) party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
 activities for the sector.
16 204364 12-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration
(PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that
Ordinaryong nominees actually belong to
Tao Para sa the sector, or that they have
Lupa, Pabahay, undertaken meaningful
Hanapbuhay at activities for the sector.
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
17 204141 12-229 The True Cancelled registration
(PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that
(for God, majority of its members are
Country and marginalized and
People) underrepresented; and
Association of - Failure to prove that two of
the Philippines, its nominees actually belong
Inc. (BANTAY) to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
18 204408 12-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration
(PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from
Country – Urban urban poor youth to urban
Poor Youth poor) necessitates a new
Advancement application;
and Welfare - Failure to show track record
( PA C YAW ) for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.
19 204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers
Party (PASANG and operators, who may have
MASDA) conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.
20 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala, na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA) Inc. (KAKUSA)
 majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 30 October 201232
21 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 201233
22 204094 12-185 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
Democracy - Failure to represent an
(ANAD) identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
 2007 Elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234
23 204239 12-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) the Environment accreditation
Sons and - The party is an advocacy
Daughters of group and does not represent
Mother Earth the marginalized and
(GREENFORCE) underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.
24 204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
(FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.
25 204341 12-269 Action League Cancelled registration and
(PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the party‘s
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.
Resolution dated 7 November 201235
26 204358 12-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration
(PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group
 Advancement which may not be allowed
for National registration under the party-list system;
Progress and
(AAMA) - Failure to establish that the
nominees actually belong to
the sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 201236
27 204359 12-272 Social Cancelled registration
(PLM) Movement for - The nominees are
Active Reform disqualified from
and representing the sectors that
Transparency the party represents;
(SMART) - Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 201237
28 204238 12-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(ABP) - Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the
construction industry, the
sector it claims to represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 201238
29 204323 12-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and
(PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.
Resolution dated 7 November 201239
30 204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
(AANI) - Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
party‘s nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 201240
31 204125 12-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Indigenous accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five
Alliance, Inc. nominees are members of the
(A-IPRA) indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees
are bona fide
members.
Resolution dated 7 November 201241
32 204216 12-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with
Federation, Inc. private and government
(COCOFED) agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.
Resolution dated 7 November 201242
33 204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration
(PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track
(ABANG record of continuously
LINGKOD) representing the peasant
 farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.
Resolution dated 14 November 201243
34 204158 12-158 Action Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Brotherhood for Active accreditation - Failure to show that the
Dreamers, Inc. party is actually able to
(ABROAD) represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 28 November 201244
35 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and
(PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
Para sa mga - The party receives
Magsasaka assistance from the
(BINHI) government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 28 November 201245
36 204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The party‘s nominees
 neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.
Resolution dated 3 December 201246
37 204486 12-194 1st Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Kabalikat ng accreditation
Bayan - Declaration of untruthful
Ginhawang statements;
Sangkatauhan - Failure to exist for at least
(1st one year; and
KABAGIS) - None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 4 December 201247
38 204410 12-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation
(PLM) Transport - The party represents drivers
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The party‘s nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.
Resolution dated 4 December 201248
39 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration
204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election
12-191 in the laws because its nominees
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. had a term-sharing
(SENIOR agreement.
CITIZENS)

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,

1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI,
AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA,
AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI,
A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-
UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court,
directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the
official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only
the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:

G.R. No. SPP No. Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012
203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)
203981 12-187 Association for Righteousness Advocacy on
(PLM) Leadership (ARAL)
204002 12-188 Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
(PLM)
203922 12-201 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(PLM) (APEC)
203960 12-260 1st
(PLM) Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)
203936 12-248 Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa
(PLM) (AKMA-PTM)
203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,
(PLM) Inc. (KAKUSA)
203976 12-288 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
(PLM) Inc. (ARARO)
Resolution dated 20 November 2012
204094 12-185 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(PLM) (ANAD)
204125 12-292 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,
(PLM) Inc. (A-IPRA)
204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
(PLM) (1BRO-PGBI)
Resolution dated 27 November 2012
204141 12-229 The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country
(PLM) and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)
204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng
(PLM) Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
204216 12-202 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(PLM) (COCOFED)
204158 12-158 Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.
(PLM) (ABROAD)
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
204122 12-223 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
(PLM) (1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
(PLM)
204318 12-220 United Movement Against Drugs Foundation
(PLM) (UNIMAD)
204263 12-257 Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen
(PLM) International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)
204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
(PLM)
204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong
(PLM) Magsasaka (KAP)
204364 12-180 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa
(PLM) Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG
(PLM) LINGKOD)
204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)
(PLM)
204238 12-173 Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
(PLM)
204239 12-060 Green Force for the Environment Sons and
(PLM) Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)
204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
(PLM)
204323 12-210 Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
(PLM)
204341 12-269 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
(PLM)
204358 12-204 Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement
 (PLM) for National Progress (AAMA)
204359 12-272 Social Movement for Active Reform and
(PLM) Transparency (SMART)
204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
(PLM)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)
204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
204408 12-217 Pilipino Association for Country – Urban Poor
(PLM) Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)
204428 12-256 Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
(PLM)
204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
(PLM)
204379 12-099 Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
(PLM)
204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
204426 12-011 Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs
(PLM) and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)
204455 12-041 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,
(PLM) Inc. (Manila Teachers)
204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga
(PLM) Magsasaka (BINHI)
204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
204435 12-057 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party
(PLM) (1AAAP)
204486 12-194 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang
(PLM) Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)
204410 12-198 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
(PLM)
204421, 12-157 Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
204425 (PLM) Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
12-191
 (PLM)
204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
12-165
(PLM)
204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and
Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)
204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG
(PLM) MASDA)

The Issues

We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the
party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections.

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners,
we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

The Party-List System

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put,
the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that
cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for
his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.
The 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5, Article VI
 (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall
not be represented in the voters‘ registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law.

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the
party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The
constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following
discussion among its framers:

MR. MONSOD: x x x.

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is
not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to
avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making
the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by
Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral
representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that
they will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the
problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were
the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and
other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral
representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach
sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other
sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which
went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more
limiting the law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in
the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the
farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated
citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the
discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.

The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the
Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought
to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are
no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a
sectoral organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do the
mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no
discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one
vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to
be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or
coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list.
This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional
party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be
represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each
organization — one does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a
party — and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast
in favor of a party, organization or coalition.

When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be
for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum
that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list
of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet the
minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the
votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of
the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women‘s party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least
2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties
who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.

What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we
allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat.
There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special
interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say,
there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets
only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So,
they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band together,
form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly.
Those are the dynamics of a party list system.

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same
time making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will
get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have
the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat
on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially
the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.

BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of
party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather
than sectors and party list?

MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even
have to mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can
be sectoral parties within the party list system.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for
the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under
the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and
Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must
they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives.
Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever
is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and
can also participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela
Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list
election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of
citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party,
it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng
political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito
reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa
political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition
alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang
labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.

MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.

MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of
sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?

MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is
really organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political
party may submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists
are to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance
to present evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the
claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be
conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words,
COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not
only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner
Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as
they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution."53

In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties
in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to
sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang
Bagong Bayani:

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987
Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta,
advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list
representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view
that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their
development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to
further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral
contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more
established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern
when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list
elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The
advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise
— that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This
proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list
system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The
majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative
the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only
concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for
selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by
which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace
themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.54
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted.
Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three
consecutive terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only,
and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral
parties.

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to
win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same
number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list
system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-
traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system
both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas
after the words "national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral
parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at
the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did
not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively
sectoral.

What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any
clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties
belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt
that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system
is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second,
the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first
"three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three
groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not
for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-
list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in
the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology

or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates
and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over
the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the
region.
 (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens

who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or
concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral

parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party
or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c)
of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct
of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral
party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties
under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive
and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative
district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list
system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from
the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent
and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly

different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and
need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national
or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform,
or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily
"marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition
"marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However,
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political
constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special
interests and concerns of their respective sectors.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not
require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No.
7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for
the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice
and hearing.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for

religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the

"marginalized and underrepresented."

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in
Section 2 on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system,"
which will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become
members of the House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No.
7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,"
the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors,
organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even
interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented"
would lead to absurdities.

How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with
its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987
Constitution on the matter?

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section
5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These
sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the
members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track
record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It
is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the
economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as
classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to
a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and
ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as
"wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding
in SUVs.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections.
Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-
defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors.
Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that
do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional
parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies,"
giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of
parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed
by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with
the declared statutory policy of enabling ‗Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives.‘ "However, the
requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong
Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC‘s refusal to register sectoral wings officially
organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it
expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system, even
through their sectoral wings.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on
the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major political
parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly
limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate
in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political
parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of
the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list
elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared
towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a
voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields
candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list
system.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector
represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major
political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which
provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
(in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the
party-list system."

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-
five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.

Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.1âwphi1

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she
seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one
must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such
sector.

In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to
participate in the party-list system:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x
x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.

xxxx

Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.

xxxx

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for

religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

 (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered."

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.

xxxx

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:

"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-
five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of
his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.

Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further.
In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-
list elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987
Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the
party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the
major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of
the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law."61 The experimentations in socio-
political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such
experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now
come to an end.

We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in

disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have
committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized
under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in
the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then
prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here
that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in
accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-
list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from
decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to
the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or

lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal
 advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to
the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that
did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations
must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have
been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not
organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise,
nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any
sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed
to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above,
the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist
from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution
has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly
qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been
granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of
petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list
elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names
of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this
purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

__________________________________________

G.R. No. 180443

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA,
CINCHONA C. GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and
mandamus is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules
and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not
written in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law
that the COMELEC thereby implements.

Common Antecedents

The Citizens‘ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly
registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate
in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of
intent to participate,2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a
list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the
required number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the
certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2)
herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5)
Emil L. Galang. The nominees‘ certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of
nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of
general circulation, The Philippine Star News4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.5
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,6 whereby it
withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as
one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2)
Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.

Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of
the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang and the substitution of Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that
Lokin and Tugna were not among the nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its
proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to focus on his
family life.

On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc
sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its
second nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus
proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC
to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted
that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.

The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.

Notwithstanding Villanueva‘s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment

of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC
failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.9

On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved to set the
matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed
as E.M. No. 07-054.

In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 200711 to partially
proclaim the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List
System as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan
Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives,
Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party,
Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and Abono; and to
defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes until final resolution of their respective cases.

The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18,
2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan Muna,
CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an
additional seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective
cases.

With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos,
purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of
the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested
that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office.
Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because
COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.

On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 thuswise:

WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the
withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as
second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona
C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the
party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be:

1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva

2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales

3. Armi Jane R. Borje

SO ORDERED.

The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president
of CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was
charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate
activities, which included the act of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in
the May 14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications,
Villanueva as the president of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's
representative and that his actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of
withdrawal, although done without any written Board approval, was accomplished with the
Board‘s acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent of the party should be given
paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees.

As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of
CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office

as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.15

Precís of the Consolidated Cases

In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.

In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January
12, 2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving
CIBAC‘s withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC‘s second, third
and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their
stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No.
7804).17 He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941.18 the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.

In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse
in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that
office; that Lokin‘s proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter
being raised by Lokin.

For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for
mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have
him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.

Issues

The issues are the following:

(a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;

(b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;

(c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the
Party-List System Act; and

(d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and
allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or
law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in
nature.

Ruling

The petitions are granted.

A
The Court has jurisdiction over the case
The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been
done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the
HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the
question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto
in the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.

We do not agree.

An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and
irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal
votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed
a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.

A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible
person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the
action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because
the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.

The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto,
for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second
nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list
organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the
defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal
votes, Lokin‘s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby
wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for
quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of
Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek
the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7
of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by
Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of
the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a
petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a
limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Lokin‘s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.

B
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping

Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in
one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or
(b) if, after having filed a petition in the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the
Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one
case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy)
would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction from
a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court.19

What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by
the different fora upon the same issue.20

The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes
forum shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and as
abusing their processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the administration
of justice.21

Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily
constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances.22 The actions must also raise
identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.23 Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other.24

Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the
second nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing
CIBAC‘s entitlement to an additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down
the provision in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance
"all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with
pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective
cases." He has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his
being CIBAC‘s second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion
and to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-list organizations with pending
disputes.

On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14,
2007 resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna
and Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third
nominee); and to challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC‘s
basis for allowing CIBAC‘s withdrawal of Lokin‘s nomination.

Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the
action for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved
the same parties, because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they
sought were different.

C
Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804

The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance
with the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or
abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make
laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative
in character may be delegated.25

Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and
administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation
lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to
control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those
empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is
established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the
Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the
prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a
large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a law
and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.26

The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the
operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is
rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not,
however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be
legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of
administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to
this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It
is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere
administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27

To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be
valid:28

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;

2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;

3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and

4. It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall.29 In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is
also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or
other laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers.30

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31 Hence, the COMELEC met the first
requisite.

The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804
underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in the resolution itself.

Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of
whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin
against Section 13 succeeds.

As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the
resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority
conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress,32 for
administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The
administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the
law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements
not contemplated by the Legislature.33

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or

coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a
list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case
it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in
writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or
a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No
change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have
been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in
writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee
shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives
who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of
the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the
COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally
because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and
sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature
has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really
intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very
purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which
the courts must not depart.34 When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.35 Accordingly, an
administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its
meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.36

The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the nominees or
to alter the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations of the Congress,
viz:

MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do not
see any provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to change
the nominees or to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication
correct that at any time after submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered?

MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman
from Albay and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring
committee will gladly consider the same.

MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the
COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing.

MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee
has been submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee changed
his political party affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the
party list and the political party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee who
changed his political party affiliation.

MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the
exception rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies, then there
has to be a change but any change for that matter should always be at the last part of the list so
that the prioritization made by the party will not be adversely affected.37

The usage of "No" in Section 8 – "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases
where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in
which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list" – renders Section 8
a negative law, and is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory.
Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey
the command "thou shall not," and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act,38
subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case.
Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its nominees,
but merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its
nominees‘ names after submission of the list to the COMELEC.

The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of
lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list
reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with
whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will
only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements prescribed by the law and
whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation.
Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election,
not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any
particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in
newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make
intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its
nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after
the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters‘ demand for transparency. The
lawmakers‘ exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such
circumvention.

D
Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization
can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the
COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated.

The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling
under any of the three exceptions.

When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the
exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision
rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions,
none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter
by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always
proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it
accords with reason and justice.391avvphi1

The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the
general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general
words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute
shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction;
hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception.
Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the
exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted
construction.

E
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:

Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he
dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue
as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of
the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.

No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.

Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth
being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."

Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three
statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.

We agree with Lokin.

The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,40 has neither
the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement
thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to
be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs
should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.41

Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under

legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying the law‘s general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be
expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.42

The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8
of R.A. No. 7941,43 because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provision‘s
phraseology.

The explanation does not persuade.

To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase
anew or in a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is
not altered.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The
new ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination
already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done.
Neither was the grant of the unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who
precisely denied the right to withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations
of the House of Representatives has indicated). The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent
to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list organization once his name has
been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the
party-list organizations.

We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing
and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the system
could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by
seeing to the transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be
afforded the chance of making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.

The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs,
but must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the
IRRs are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to
be issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.45

F
Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804

An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46 In case of conflict between the law and the
IRR, the law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not adopted
pursuant to the law is no law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of law.47 The invalid
rule, regulation, or part thereof cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation, or power.

Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC – was invalid,
CIBAC‘s withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with
new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin
and the others could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941. Resultantly, the COMELEC‘s approval of CIBAC‘s petition of withdrawal of the
nominations and its recognition of CIBAC‘s substitution, both through its assailed September 14,
2007 resolution, should be struck down for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to
support its action.

WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.

We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it
authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has
submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.

Accordingly, we annul and set aside:

(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving
Citizens‘ Battle Against Corruption‘s withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin,
Jr., Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees,
respectively, and ordering their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second
nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and

(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as

a Party-List Representative representing Citizens‘ Battle Against Corruption in the House
of Representatives.

We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a
Party-List Representative representing Citizens‘ Battle Against Corruption in the House of
Representatives.

We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

__________________________________________________

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a
mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson

 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette98[1]

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that

others may make different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we
may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices
are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree
and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our
Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for,
diversity and difference in opinion.

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the
definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are
concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet
herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable
and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however,
that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better
than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse
viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated November 11, 200999[2] (the First Assailed Resolution) and
December 16, 2009100[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)
(collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal
to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.101[4]

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify

themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
Petition102[5] for registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a

marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-
point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections.103[6] Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform
of governance.104[7]

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC
(Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:

x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is

particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and

sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of
a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even
their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature:
And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned
in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is
unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error
which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

 For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are
indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained
down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of
those who indulged in sin and crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help
Thou me against people who do mischief (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October
2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as

indicated in the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007,
Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated
as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license,

relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to
be complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code

which defines nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The

contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of
the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are
inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions
and indecent shows as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and

exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine
ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines

openly contrary to public morals;
 2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their
knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other

place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being
understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by
virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone
crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence,
lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet
traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public
order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees
and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints,

engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating

immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules,
or regulations relating to the elections.

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our
youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman
Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that older
practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth. As an agency of the government, ours
too is the States avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect
our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.105[8]

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,106[9] three commissioners voted to

overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V.
Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang
Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N.
Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking
for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating
that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system.

Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it
cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation
as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-
list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations would
have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers
of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of
misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for
the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also
the nations only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation
because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to
justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial
to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will
remain just that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine

jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals
(LGBT) as a special class of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that
homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that nothing in
the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or
legal equality of homosexual relations, as in the case of race or religion or belief.
 xxxx

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is

elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females,
and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that
applies to all citizens alike.

xxxx

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim

religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious groups moral
rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are
generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the
Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian
upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped
[sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the
land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon
Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals. It penalizes immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent
shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its
Petitions paragraph 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians
who are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for
the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any
act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality x x x. These are all unlawful.107[10]

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul
the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory
injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin
printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file
its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11,
2010.108[11] Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for
Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.109[12]
Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners
application.110[13] Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate
its position, we required it to file its own comment.111[14] The COMELEC, through its
Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.112[15]

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary

restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing
the Assailed Resolutions.113[16]
 Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a
Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-
Intervention.114[17] The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral
grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to
intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to

Intervene115[18] which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.116[19]

The Parties Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
 The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC
erred in denying petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for
COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special
interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a
separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners
freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that
there had been no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector
is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to
actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the

Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
 The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground
that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may
be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,117[20] the enumeration of marginalized
and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition
when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate
organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was
shown that save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in
almost all provinces in the country.118[21]
 This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that
petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation
mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious,
considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to
the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is
irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and
a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal

of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the
Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was
estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members
around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.119[22] Ang
Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates
around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:

Abra Gay Association

Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
 Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro
Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City120[23]

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or
LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of
these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even
exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.
 Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the
records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as
a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in
Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or
lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept

Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious
matters.121[24] Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality.122[25] We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
 Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions
should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification
for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated,
government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.
As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:123[26]

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in
public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be
resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies
upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and
morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or
agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to
religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it
would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it
appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the
government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not
because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although
admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on
those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion
and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them;
the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in
a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be
religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an
articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the
religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating
influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses
prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to
uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.
Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could
 allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.124[27]

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang

Ladlads Petition for Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and

homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally
accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:

Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists
of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is
recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in
having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring
down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set
of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.125[28]

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not
difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about
the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly transplanted into the
realm of law.126[29]

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a finding by
the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral
acts.127[30] The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a

different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to
immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad
absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands
full of disqualification cases against both the straights and the gays. Certainly this is not
the intendment of the law.128[31]

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course,
do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning
morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and
should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we
cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate
morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the
rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all
value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our
scrutiny.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings.129[32] A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of
laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-
list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts
more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to
further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the
inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not
because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides
nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted
the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists
in the same treatment of similar persons.130[33] The equal protection clause guarantees
that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which
is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.131[34]

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental

right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a
rational relationship to some legitimate government end.132[35] In Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,133[36] we declared that [i]n
our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have
followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution.134[37]

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason
to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has
expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or
expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume
that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that
is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is
sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The
COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot
contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no
legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same
basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs
from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any
other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different
circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection
clause.135[38] We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class
meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to
this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has
merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly
situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification
not justified by the circumstances of the case.

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic
means.136[39] It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing
opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v.
Escritor:137[40]

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled

in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every
aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where people
deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including
opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to
the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from
determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public
deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and
decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when
public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will
largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median
groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the
limits it specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority,
however small not only for a majority, however large but for each of us" the majority
imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise
could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic

society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to
those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not
for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated,
the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
 This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is
not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality
and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are
protected as well.

Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even

overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does
not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.138[41] European and United Nations judicial
decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality
grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and
international texts.139[42] To the extent that there is much to learn from other
jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts,
may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled
that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In
order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions
must show that their actions were caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.140[43]
 With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in
Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law
or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the
changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has
emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is
advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression
through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or
unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population.141[44] A political
group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial
political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone
concerned.142[45] Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that
are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of
association guarantee.143[46]

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express
that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with
equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent
to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view.
However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious
or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of
other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay
rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the
discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex
moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most
liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither
attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this
Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent
punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their
right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of
expression or association. The OSG argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly

denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the
qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list
system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4,
Article III of the Constitution.

xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the
petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be
hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right
which cannot be limited.
 As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that
the denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not
outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public
life through engagement in the party list elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x144[47]

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to
participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection
offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore,
that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly
expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political
process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed,
been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its
attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups
struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human
rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic
legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of
conduct.
 Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect
and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-
discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR
and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as

follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general

application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio
for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has
opined that the reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual
orientation.145[48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements.146[49]

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly
or through freely chosen representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by

universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free
expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
 As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to
electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General
Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen
to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the
right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in
force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may
be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it
protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the
people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.

xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for
elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any
restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on
objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election
should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as
education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should
suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy.
States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any
group or category of persons from elective office.147[50]

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket
invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the
petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International
Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),148[51]
which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles
contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.149[52] Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these
alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of
society wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human
intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of
what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies
many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states
to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a
result of the notion that if wants are couched in rights language, then they are no longer
controversial.
 Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege ferenda
and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of
contemporary international law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony,
and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning
desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.150[53]

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this
case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and
religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own
view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it
can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy
is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the

Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No.
09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to
GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.

SO ORDERED.
 DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and
mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their
intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay

Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-
LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private
respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list
elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not
their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the Party-List System Act and belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the second, docketed as
G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3,
2007 effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names
of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups
mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous letter-request.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or

publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the
petitions,151[1] the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following additional
prayers: 1) that the 33 private respondents named therein be declare[d] as
unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as sectoral organizations,
parties or coalition for failure to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the
[Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec152[2]] and, 2) correspondingly, that the
Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the
May 2007 elections.

In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc
required the public and private respondents to file their respective comments on
the petitions within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice. Apart
from respondent Comelec, seven (7) private respondents153[3] in G.R. No.
177271 and one party-list group154[4] mentioned in G.R. No. 177314 submitted
their separate comments. In the main, the separate comments of the private
respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of the plea of
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list groups
and thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in the
May 14, 2007 party-list elections.

The facts:

On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing
rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate
and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of
representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto,
a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these
and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007
elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3)
AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8)
BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12)
BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR
presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.

Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an
Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of
certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of
the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list
of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent
petition has yet to be resolved.

Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals

behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually
represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No.
177314, addressed a letter155[5] dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig
of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees.
Another letter156[6] of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time
petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the
subject request.

Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to
petitioner Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin,
however, carried the front-page banner headline COMELEC WONT BARE PARTY-
LIST NOMINEES,157[7] with the following sub-heading: Abalos says party-list polls
not personality oriented.
 On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R.
Salonga, in their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a
letter158[8] to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on
Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list
nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to information,
Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner
headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the Comelec, collectively or
individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying the
banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx
Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec
en banc Resolution 07-0724159[9] under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the
nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic
disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:

RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of

party-list nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m.
on election day.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters
addressed to the Commission inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.)
 According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April
3, 2007 Resolution only on April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation
that the last part of the Order empowering the Law Department to implement this
resolution and reply to all letters inquiring on the party-list nominees is apparently
a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the
impression that the antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 is the final answer to the
two formal requests of Petitioners.160[10]

The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual
setting, albeit petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when
they filed their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution
07-0724.

To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the
respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec -

xxx committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed

accreditations even without simultaneously determining whether the nominees of
herein private respondents are qualified or not, or whether or not the nominees are
likewise belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to
represent in Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of the eight-point guidelines prescribed
by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani161[11] case which states that, not
only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. In the case of private
 respondents, public respondent Comelec granted accreditations without the required
simultaneous determination of the qualification of the nominees as part of the
accreditation process of the party-list organization itself. (Words in bracket added;
italization in the original)162[12]

The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course of action would entail
going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in question, particularly
whether or not they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would
require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial
review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called
upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on
record.163[13] The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the
evidence.164[14]

Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026 in which
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the nominees of the respondent
party-list groups named in their petition.

Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications
of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the
qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka),
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed
with the Comelec not later than ninety (90) days before the election whereas the succeeding Section
8 requires the submission not later than forty-five (45) days before the election of the list of names
whence party-list representatives shall be chosen.
 Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and captures the main issues tendered by
the petitioners in these consolidated cases and they may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees

of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free
access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and

2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to

the public the names of said nominees.

While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the

nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while commanding

the publication and the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list system participating

groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees

in said certified list. Thus:

SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later than
sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their
desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all
precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list. (Emphasis added.)

And doubtless part of Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees

away from the public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news report appearing in the

adverted April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin:

 The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision not to

release the names of nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions

accredited to participate in the party-list election which will be held simultaneously with

the May 14 mid-term polls.

COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. said he and [the other five

COMELEC] Commissioners --- believe that the party list elections must not be

personality oriented.

Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 , the people are to vote for sectoral parties,

organizations, or coalitions, not for their nominees.

He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the

names of nominees. xxx (Words in brackets and emphasis added)

Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.

Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is

the right to information enshrined in the self-executory165[15] Section 7, Article III of the

Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is

another constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and
transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution
reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest
are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people
recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who
govern to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in
a constitutional regime.166[16] Without a governments acceptance of the
limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties,
without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights
pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
 By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to
obstruct the exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by
mandamus.167[17] And since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship
possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are
ordinarily unavailing.168[18]

Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its
companion right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in
Legaspi, supra, the peoples right to know is limited to matters of public concern
and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the
policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving public interest and is
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of
preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade,
banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security.169[19]

The terms public concerns and public interest have eluded precise
definition. But both terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an
ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case
to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public.

If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain

persons employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service
eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should
be a matter of highest public concern and interest.

As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the

disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the
legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: [T]he names of the
party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is certainly not a
justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the
prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and
duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same
provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch
the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something
that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that
prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other
than the Certified List the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec
obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an
absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The
interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional
dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.

The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of

personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed
non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of
invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information.170[20]
While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the
end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would
eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the
purported reasons behind the Comelecs disinclination to release the
names of party-list nominees. It is to be stressed, however, that the Court
is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts and
applicable statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the
Court always assumes, at the first instance, the presumptive validity and
regularity of official acts of government officials and offices.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the
right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment.
Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a
bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of
blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the
Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo,171[21]
has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of
the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election.172[22] So it must be here for still
other reasons articulated earlier.

In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a

constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups named in the herein petitions.
 WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it
seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However,
insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in
the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314
are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors
or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections.
The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its compliance herewith
within five (5) days from notice hereof.

This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the

Comelec.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.