G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955 Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No.
Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which provides that before
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents.
Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and Enrique M. Fernando for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon
for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075
and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners
of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due
process of law; B. They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for
civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited
power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power.
A printed memorandum explaining their position in extenso is attached to the record.
The Government's legal representative submitted a mimeographed memorandum contending
that, (1) the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of
deciding the constitutional questions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of
the said acts; and (3) the Acts are constitutionally valid.
Petitioners submitted a lengthy reply to the above arguments.
Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and recognition of
private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." Under its
provisions, the Department of Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated
all private schools in this country apparently without audible protest, nay, with the general
acquiescence of the general public and the parties concerned.
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider
petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert,
petitioners suffered no wrong—nor allege any—from the enforcement of the criticized statute.
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which
the judge, conscious of the fallability of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any
case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility. (Cooley Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 332.)
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become
dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. (C. J. S. 16, p.
204.)
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent
that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.)
In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and
operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous
governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to
censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorent to our system of law and government.
a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of
Education. The Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has
cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and
are actually operating by virtue of their permits.1 And they do not assert that the respondent
Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong
under the terms of law—and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a
general to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action
he must show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public. (Ex
parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 82 L. Ed. 493.)
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S. 405; Hendrick vs. Maryland,
235 U. S. 610; Coffmanvs. Breeze Corp., 323 U. S. 316-325.)
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant
require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a
hypothetical threat being insufficient. (United Public Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U .S. 75; 91 L. Ed.
754.)
Bona fide suit.—Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The
authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where
conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the
Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. (Tañada and Fernando,
Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138.)
Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of
one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. (Cf. Com. ex
rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks (Ky.) 197 S. W. 2d. 771.)
And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief.
(Salonga vs.Warner Barnes, L-2245, January, 1951.) Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem
may be. This is specially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there
comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless
avoidance becomes evasion." (Rice vs. Sioux City, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep., May 23, 1995,
Law Ed., Vol. 99, p. 511.)
The above notwithstanding, in view of the several decisions of the United States Supreme Court
quoted by petitioners, apparently outlawing censorship of the kind objected to by them, we have
decided to look into the matter, lest they may allege we refuse to act even in the face of clear
violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property.
Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the
Secretary of Education. Such requirement was not originally included in Act No. 2706. It was
introduced by Commonwealth Act No. 180 approved in 1936. Why?
In March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 3162 creating a Board of Educational
Survey to make a study and survey of education in the Philippines and of all educational
1
institutions, facilities and agencies thereof. A Board chairmaned by Dr. Paul Munroe, Columbia
University, assisted by a staff of carefully selected technical members performed the task, made
a five-month thorough and impartial examination of the local educational system, and submitted
a report with recommendations, printed as a book of 671 pages. The following paragraphs are
taken from such report:
PRIVATE-ADVENTURE SCHOOLS
There is no law or regulation in the Philippine Islands today to prevent a person, however
disqualified by ignorance, greed, or even immoral character, from opening a school to teach the
young. It it true that in order to post over the door "Recognized by the Government," a private
adventure school must first be inspected by the proper Government official, but a refusal to
grant such recognition does not by any means result in such a school ceasing to exist. As a
matter of fact, there are more such unrecognized private schools than of the recognized variety.
How many, no one knows, as the Division of Private Schools keeps records only of the
recognized type.
Conclusion.—An unprejudiced consideration of the fact presented under the caption Private
Adventure Schools leads but to one conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them from primary
grade to university are money-making devices for the profit of those who organize and
administer them. The people whose children and youth attend them are not getting what they
pay for. It is obvious that the system constitutes a great evil. That it should be permitted to exist
with almost no supervision is indefensible. The suggestion has been made with the reference
to the private institutions of university grade that some board of control be organized under
legislative control to supervise their administration. The Commission believes that the
recommendations it offers at the end of this chapter are more likely to bring about the needed
reforms.
Recommendations.—The Commission recommends that legislation be enacted to prohibit the
opening of any school by an individual or organization without the permission of the Secretary
of Public Instruction. That before granting such permission the Secretary assure himself that
such school measures up to proper standards in the following respects, and that the continued
existence of the school be dependent upon its continuing to conform to these conditions:
(1) The location and construction of the buildings, the lighting and ventilation of the rooms, the
nature of the lavatories, closets, water supply, school furniture and apparatus, and methods of
cleaning shall be such as to insure hygienic conditions for both pupils and teachers.
(2) The library and laboratory facilities shall be adequate to the needs of instruction in the
subjects taught.
(3) The classes shall not show an excessive number of pupils per teacher. The Commission
recommends 40 as a maximum.
(4) The teachers shall meet qualifications equal to those of teachers in the public schools of the
same grade.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of these findings and recommendations, can there be any doubt that the Government
in the exercise of its police power to correct "a great evil" could validly establish the "previous
permit" system objected to by petitioners? This is what differentiates our law from the other
statutes declared invalid in other jurisdictions. And if any doubt still exists, recourse may now
be had to the provision of our Constitution that "All educational institutions shall be under the
supervision and subject to regulation by the State." (Art. XIV, sec. 5.) The power to regulate
establishments or business occupations implies the power to require a permit or license. (53 C.
J. S. 4.)
What goes for the "previous permit" naturally goes for the power to revoke such permit on
account of violation of rules or regulations of the Department.
II. This brings us to the petitioners' third proposition that the questioned statutes "conferring on
the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards
constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power."
This attack is specifically aimed at section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as amended, provides:
It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of
efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish
adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given
in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have
authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the
efficiency of instruction given in the same,
"Nowhere in this Act" petitioners argue "can one find any description, either general or specific,
of what constitutes a 'general standard of efficiency.' Nowhere in this Act is there any indication
of any basis or condition to ascertain what is 'adequate instruction to the public.' Nowhere in
this Act is there any statement of conditions, acts, or factors, which the Secretary of Education
must take into account to determine the 'efficiency of instruction.'"
The attack on this score is also extended to section 6 which provides:
The Department of Education shall from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the
minimum standards required of primary, intermediate, and high schools, and colleges granting
the degrees of Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science, or any other academic degree. It shall
also from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required
of law, medical, dental, pharmaceutical, engineering, agricultural and other medical or
vocational schools or colleges giving instruction of a technical, vocational or professional
character.
Petitioners reason out, "this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the
Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix
the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the
exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standard. . . .."
It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the Secretary of Education to prescribe
rules fixing minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction to be observed by all such
private schools and colleges as may be permitted to operate. The petitioners contend that as
the legislature has not fixed the standards, "the provision is extremely vague, indefinite and
uncertain"—and for that reason constitutionality objectionable. The best answer is that despite
such alleged vagueness the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate
and efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school
calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of students etc.; and
the system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years.
Which only shows that the Legislature did and could, validly rely upon the educational
experience and training of those in charge of the Department of Education to ascertain and
2
formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of government
recognition of any private school.
At any rate, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered
with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail the validity of the power nor
the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education.
True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules and regulations "whimsical and
capricious" and that such discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who "bully
heads and teachers of private schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those
regulations specifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in proper administrative or
judicial proceedings—not to invalidate the law. For it needs no argument, to show that abuse
by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per se demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of such statute.
Anyway, we find the defendants' position to be sufficiently sustained by the decision in Alegra
vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394 upon holding the statute that authorized the Director of
Agriculture to "designate standards for the commercial grades of abaca, maguey and sisal"
against vigorous attacks on the ground of invalid delegation of legislative power.
Indeed "adequate and efficient instruction" should be considered sufficient, in the same way as
"public welfare" "necessary in the interest of law and order" "public interest" and "justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case" have been held sufficient as legislative standards
justifying delegation of authority to regulate. (See Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines, p. 793, citing Philippine cases.)
On this phase of the litigation we conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative
power.
In this connection, and to support their position that the law and the Secretary of Education have
transcended the governmental power of supervision and regulation, the petitioners appended a
list of circulars and memoranda issued by the said Department. However they failed to indicate
which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being "capricious," or
pain "nuisance"; and it is one of our decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is
specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it.
(Santiago vs. Far Eastern, 73 Phil., 408.)
We are told that such list will give an idea of how the statute has placed in the hands of the
Secretary of Education complete control of the various activities of private schools, and why the
statute should be struck down as unconstitutional. It is clear in our opinion that the statute does
not in express terms give the Secretary completecontrol. It gives him powers to inspect private
schools, to regulate their activities, to give them official permits to operate under certain
conditions, and to revoke such permits for cause. This does not amount to completecontrol. If
any of such Department circulars or memoranda issued by the Secretary go beyond the bounds
of regulation and seeks to establish complete control, it would surely be invalid. Conceivably
some of them are of this nature, but besides not having before us the text of such circulars, the
petitioners have omitted to specify. In any event with the recent approval of Republic Act No.
1124 creating the National Board of Education, opportunity for administrative correction of the
supposed anomalies or encroachments is amply afforded herein petitioners. A more expeditious
and perhaps more technically competent forum exists, wherein to discuss the necessity,
convenience or relevancy of the measures criticized by them. (See also Republic Act No. 176.)
If however the statutes in question actually give the Secretary control over private schools, the
question arises whether the power of supervision and regulation granted to the State by section
5 Article XIV was meant to include control of private educational institutions. It is enough to point
out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control of Education by
the State. (See Tolentino, Government of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II, p. 615; Benitez,
Philippine Social Life and Progress, p. 335.)
The Constitution (it) "provides for state control of all educational institutions" even as it
enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral
character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the
duties of citizenship. (Malcolm & Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1936.)
The Solicitor General cities many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power
to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State
control of private education was intended by the organic law. It is significant to note that the
Constitution grants power to supervise and to regulate. Which may mean greater power than
mere regulation.
III. Another grievance of petitioners—probably the most significant—is the assessment of 1 per
cent levied on gross receipts of all private schools for additional Government expenses in
connection with their supervision and regulation. The statute is section 11-A of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Republic Act No. 74 which reads as follows:
SEC. 11-A. The total annual expense of the Office of Private Education shall be met by the
regular amount appropriated in the annual Appropriation Act: Provided, however, That for
additional expenses in the supervision and regulation of private schools, colleges and
universities and in the purchase of textbook to be sold to student of said schools, colleges and
universities and President of the Philippines may authorize the Secretary of Instruction to levy
an equitable assessment from each private educational institution equivalent to one percent of
the total amount accruing from tuition and other fees: . . . and non-payment of the assessment
herein provided by any private school, college or university shall be sufficient cause for the
cancellation by the Secretary of Instruction of the permit for recognition granted to it.
Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional right—the right to open
a school, the liberty to teach etc. They claim this is unconstitutional, in the same way that taxes
on the privilege of selling religious literature or of publishing a newspaper—both constitutional
privileges—have been held, in the United States, to be invalid as taxes on the exercise of a
constitutional right.
The Solicitor General on the other hand argues that insofar as petitioners' action attempts to
restrain the further collection of the assessment, courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the
collection of taxes by injunction, and in so far as they seek to recover fees already paid the suit,
it is one against the State without its consent. Anyway he concludes, the action involving "the
legality of any tax impost or assessment" falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance.
There are good grounds in support of Government's position. If this levy of 1 per cent is truly a
mere fee—and not a tax—to finance the cost of the Department's duty and power to regulate
and supervise private schools, the exaction may be upheld; but such point involves investigation
and examination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the lower courts. If on the
3
other hand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would still be within the original jurisdiction of the Courts remedies are exhausted, the courts will not shrink from their duty to delimit constitutional
of First Instance. boundaries and protect individual liberties.
The last grievance of petitioners relates to the validity of Republic Act No. 139 which in its IV. For all the foregoing considerations, reserving to the petitioners the right to institute in the
section 1 provides: proper court, and at the proper time, such actions as may call for decision of the issue herein
The textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government presented by them, this petition for prohibition will be denied. So ordered.
shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Jugo, JJ., concur.
use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and
honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the
general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.
This power of the Board, petitioners aver, is censorship in "its baldest form". They cite two U.
S. cases (Miss. and Minnesota) outlawing statutes that impose previous restraints upon
publication of newspapers, or curtail the right of individuals to disseminate teachings critical of
government institutions or policies.
Herein lies another important issue submitted in the cause. The question is really whether the
law may be enacted in the exercise of the State's constitutional power (Art. XIV, sec. 5) to
supervise and regulate private schools. If that power amounts to control of private schools, as
some think it is, maybe the law is valid. In this connection we do not share the belief that section
5 has added new power to what the State inherently possesses by virtue of the police power.
An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For instance, if
there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power to control private
education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the former—conflict of two
express powers. But if the power to control education is merely implied from the police power,
it is feasible to uphold the express individual right, as was probably the situation in the two
decisions brought to our attention, of Mississippi and Minnesota, states where constitutional
control of private schools is not expressly produced.
However, as herein previously noted, no justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We
are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the
petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing
substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.
The average lawyer who reads the above quoted section of Republic Act 139 will fail to perceive
anything objectionable. Why should not the State prohibit the use of textbooks that are illegal,
or offensive to the Filipinos or adverse to governmental policies or educationally improper?
What's the power of regulation and supervision for? But those trained to the investigation of
constitutional issues are likely to apprehend the danger to civil liberties, of possible educational
dictatorship or thought control, as petitioners' counsel foresee with obvious alarm. Much
depends, however, upon the execution and implementation of the statute. Not that
constitutionality depends necessarily upon the law's effects. But if the Board on Textbooks in
its actuations strictly adheres to the letter of the section and wisely steers a middle course
between the Scylla of "dictatorship" and the Charybdis of "thought control", no cause for
complaint will arise and no occasion for judicial review will develop. Anyway, and again,
petitioners now have a more expeditious remedy thru an administrative appeal to the National
Board of Education created by Republic Act 1124.
Of course it is necessary to assure herein petitioners, that when and if, the dangers they
apprehend materialize and judicial intervention is suitably invoked, after all administrative

4
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by
petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of
Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya,
who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming
elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a
member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the
laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a
resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of
the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the
Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of
age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and
that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore,
class legislation."
For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory
provisions:
Sec 7. Terms of Office — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials
hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on
the first Monday of March 1980.
.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.
Sec. 4. ...
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate
for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:
provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact and
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.
... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).
Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials — ... The election shall be held on January 30,
1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)
Section 6. Election and Campaign Period — The election period shall be fixed by the
Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The period
of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the
accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution,
which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of
harassment and discrimination. "The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case
but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue has been
squarely raised,
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and
void for being violative of the Constitution.
I . The procedural Aspect
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities,
hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties
and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan
Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint,
nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. The respectively contest completely different statutory
provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The
action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although
petitioners plead nine constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required
only a modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners lgot and
Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial
review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties
have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and
controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed
by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said
provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No
petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no
5
ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on
Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition
for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual
record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion
of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent
COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of
which reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:
1) xxx
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:
Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition,
that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one
has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being
candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been
adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional
Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the
absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress.
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and
that the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The
Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:
... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a
direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that
"the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer.
In the same vein, it has been held:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack
the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected,
but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised
by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et
als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and
sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While,
concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation
of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine
Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution
Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per
se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677
[1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to
whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of
an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e.,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not
an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They
are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of
constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts
not being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural
standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina(26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481
[1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and
Gonzalez cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have
impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections which
will be held only a few days hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him
personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates
for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the
COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's
contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees.
Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages
are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should
not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might
or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a
6
good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political
elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also
be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees
from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify
retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65,
who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which
he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes
relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for
the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume
again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit
of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly
treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification.
What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional
guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions,
where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging
to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA
606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336
[1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to
allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible
to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The
Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the
questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.
Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid
unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs.
COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on
Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the compentence of the legislature to
prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are
reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section
4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided
in two parts. The first provides:
a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of
such fact ...
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set
aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra).
We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public
office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of
proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against
whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public
office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed
against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime
with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right
to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may
be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary
proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts
rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of
findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will
thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not
be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph
of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby
declared valid. Said paragraph reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the
Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired
elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits
to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to
run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing
that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby
declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused. SO ORDERED.
7
G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME
CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO
SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G.
FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN.
FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, and REP. JOKER P. ARROYO,petitioners,
vs.
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the
President; RENATO CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Executive Secretary and
Chairman of the Presidential review Committee on the Lotto, Office of the President;
PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; and PHILIPPINE GAMING
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Jovito R. Salonga, Fernando Santiago, Emilio C. Capulong, Jr. and Felipe L. Gozon for
petitioners.
Renato L. Cayetano and Eleazar B. Reyes for PGMC.
Gamaliel G. Bongco, Oscar Karaan and Jedideoh Sincero for intervenors.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain the
implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with
the on- line lottery system, also known as "lotto."
Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock domestic
corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are
committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The rest of the petitioners, except
Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing
in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and
concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Tañada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their
capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines.
The pleadings of the parties disclose the factual antecedents which triggered off the filing of this
petition.
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42)
which grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other
similar activities," the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993,
after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya
Group Berhad, "a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in
Malaysia," long "engaged in, among others, successful lottery operations in Asia, running both
Lotto and Digit games, thru its subsidiary, Sports Toto Malaysia," with its "affiliate, the
International Totalizator Systems, Inc., . . . an American public company engaged in the
international sale or provision of computer systems, softwares, terminals, training and other
technical services to the gaming industry," "became interested to offer its services and
resources to PCSO." As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees)
organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which "was intended to be the medium
through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered
and delivered to PCSO." 1
Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease
Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. 2 Relevant provisions of the RFP are the
following:
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
xxx xxx xxx
1.2. PCSO is seeking a suitable contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities
('Facilities') needed to operate and maintain a nationwide on-line lottery system. PCSO shall
lease the Facilities for a fixed percentage ofquarterly gross receipts. All receipts from ticket
sales shall be turned over directly to PCSO. All capital, operating expenses and expansion
expenses and risks shall be for the exclusive account of the Lessor.
xxx xxx xxx
1.4. The lease shall be for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years.
1.5. The Lessor is expected to submit a comprehensive nationwide lottery development plan
("Development Plan") which will include the game, the marketing of the games, and the logistics
to introduce the games to all the cities and municipalities of the country within five (5) years.
xxx xxx xxx
1.7. The Lessor shall be selected based on its technical expertise, hardware and software
capability, maintenance support, and financial resources. The Development Plan shall have a
substantial bearing on the choice of the Lessor. The Lessor shall be a domestic corporation,
with at least sixty percent (60%) of its shares owned by Filipino shareholders.
xxx xxx xxx
The Office of the President, the National Disaster Control Coordinating Council, the Philippine
National Police, and the National Bureau of Investigation shall be authorized to use the
nationwide telecommunications system of the Facilities Free of Charge.
1.8. Upon expiration of the lease, the Facilities shall be owned by PCSO without any additional
consideration. 3
xxx xxx xxx
2.2. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of PCSO in leasing the Facilities from a private entity are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2.2.2. Enable PCSO to operate a nationwide on-line Lottery system at no expense or risk to the
government.
xxx xxx xxx
2.4. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LESSOR
xxx xxx xxx
2.4.2. THE LESSOR
The Proponent is expected to furnish and maintain the Facilities, including the personnel
needed to operate the computers, the communications network and sales offices under a build-
lease basis. The printing of tickets shall be undertaken under the supervision and control of
PCSO. The Facilities shall enable PCSO to computerize the entire gaming system.
8
The Proponent is expected to formulate and design consumer-oriented Master Games Plan
suited to the marketplace, especially geared to Filipino gaming habits and preferences. In
addition, the Master Games Plan is expected to include a Product Plan for each game and
explain how each will be introduced into the market. This will be an integral part of the
Development Plan which PCSO will require from the Proponent.
xxx xxx xxx
The Proponent is expected to provide upgrades to modernize the entire gaming system over
the life ofthe lease contract.
The Proponent is expected to provide technology transfer to PCSO technical personnel. 4
7. GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PROPONENTS
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, the Proponent must be able to stand the acid test of proving that it is an entity able to
take on the role of responsible maintainer of the on-line lottery system, and able to achieve
PSCO's goal of formalizing an on-line lottery system to achieve its mandated objective. 5
xxx xxx xxx
16. DEFINITION OF TERMS
Facilities: All capital equipment, computers, terminals, software, nationwide telecommunication
network, ticket sales offices, furnishings, and fixtures; printing costs; cost of salaries and wages;
advertising and promotion expenses; maintenance costs; expansion and replacement costs;
security and insurance, and all other related expenses needed to operate nationwide on-line
lottery system. 6
Considering the above citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that the Berjaya Group
"undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%," by selling 35% out of the original 75%
foreign stockholdings to local investors.
On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. 7
The bids were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (SPBAC)
for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the
President. 8 The submission was preceded by complaints by the Committee's Chairperson, Dr.
Mita Pardo de Tavera. 9
On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent
PGMC the go-signal to operate the country's on-line lottery system and that the corresponding
implementing contract would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 "for final clearance
and approval by the Chief Executive." 10 This announcement was published in the Manila
Standard, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the Manila Times on 29 October 1993.11
On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly
opposing the setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical
considerations. 12
At the meeting of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the Senate on 12 November
1993, KILOSBAYAN reiterated its vigorous opposition to the on-line lottery on account of its
immorality and illegality. 13
On 19 November 1993, the media reported that despite the opposition, "Malacañang will push
through with the operation of an on-line lottery system nationwide" and that it is actually the
respondent PCSO which will operate the lottery while the winning corporate bidders are merely
"lessors." 14
On 1 December 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all documents pertaining to the lottery
award from Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr. In his answer of 17 December 1993,
the Executive Secretary informed KILOSBAYAN that the requested documents would be duly
transmitted before the end of the month. 15. However, on that same date, an agreement
denominated as "Contract of Lease" was finally executed by respondent PCSO and respondent
PGMC. 16 The President, per the press statement issued by the Office of the President,
approved it on 20 December 1993. 17
In view of their materiality and relevance, we quote the following salient provisions of the
Contract of Lease:
1. DEFINITIONS
The following words and terms shall have the following respective meanings:
1.1 Rental Fee — Amount to be paid by PCSO to the LESSOR as compensation for the
fulfillment of the obligations of the LESSOR under this Contract, including, but not limited to the
lease of the Facilities.
xxx xxx xxx
1.3 Facilities — All capital equipment, computers, terminals, software (including source codes
for the On-Line Lottery application software for the terminals, telecommunications and central
systems), technology, intellectual property rights, telecommunications network, and furnishings
and fixtures.
1.4 Maintenance and Other Costs — All costs and expenses relating to printing, manpower,
salaries and wages, advertising and promotion, maintenance, expansion and replacement,
security and insurance, and all other related expenses needed to operate an On-Line Lottery
System, which shall be for the account of the LESSOR. All expenses relating to the setting-up,
operation and maintenance of ticket sales offices of dealers and retailers shall be borne by
PCSO's dealers and retailers.
1.5 Development Plan — The detailed plan of all games, the marketing thereof, number of
players, value of winnings and the logistics required to introduce the games, including the
Master Games Plan as approved by PCSO, attached hereto as Annex "A", modified as
necessary by the provisions of this Contract.
xxx xxx xxx
1.8 Escrow Deposit — The proposal deposit in the sum of Three Hundred Million Pesos
(P300,000,000.00) submitted by the LESSOR to PCSO pursuant to the requirements of the
Request for Proposals.
2. SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LEASE
The LESSOR shall build, furnish and maintain at its own expense and risk the Facilities for the
On-Line Lottery System of PCSO in the Territory on an exclusive basis. The LESSOR shall bear
all Maintenance and Other Costs as defined herein.
xxx xxx xxx
3. RENTAL FEE
For and in consideration of the performance by the LESSOR of its obligations herein, PCSO
shall pay LESSOR a fixed Rental Fee equal to four point nine percent (4.9%) of gross receipts
from ticket sales, payable net of taxes required by law to be withheld, on a semi-monthly basis.
Goodwill, franchise and similar fees shall belong to PCSO.
4. LEASE PERIOD
9
The period of the lease shall commence ninety (90) days from the date of effectivity of this
Contract and shall run for a period of eight (8) years thereafter, unless sooner terminated in
accordance with this Contract.
5. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF PCSO AS OPERATOR OF THE ON-LINE LOTTERY
SYSTEM
PCSO shall be the sole and individual operator of the On-Line Lottery System. Consequently:
5.1 PCSO shall have sole responsibility to decide whether to implement, fully or partially, the
Master Games Plan of the LESSOR. PCSO shall have the sole responsibility to determine the
time for introducing new games to the market. The Master Games Plan included in Annex "A"
hereof is hereby approved by PCSO.
5.2 PCSO shall have control over revenues and receipts of whatever nature from the On-Line
Lottery System. After paying the Rental Fee to the LESSOR, PCSO shall have exclusive
responsibility to determine the Revenue Allocation Plan; Provided, that the same shall be
consistent with the requirement of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, which fixes a prize fund of fifty
five percent (55%) on the average.
5.3 PCSO shall have exclusive control over the printing of tickets, including but not limited to
the design, text, and contents thereof.
5.4 PCSO shall have sole responsibility over the appointment of dealers or retailers throughout
the country. PCSO shall appoint the dealers and retailers in a timely manner with due regard to
the implementation timetable of the On-Line Lottery System. Nothing herein shall preclude the
LESSOR from recommending dealers or retailers for appointment by PCSO, which shall act on
said recommendation within forty-eight (48) hours.
5.5 PCSO shall designate the necessary personnel to monitor and audit the daily performance
of the On-Line Lottery System. For this purpose, PCSO designees shall be given, free of charge,
suitable and adequate space, furniture and fixtures, in all offices of the LESSOR, including but
not limited to its headquarters, alternate site, regional and area offices.
5.6 PCSO shall have the responsibility to resolve, and exclusive jurisdiction over, all matters
involving the operation of the On-Line Lottery System not otherwise provided in this Contract.
5.7 PCSO shall promulgate procedural and coordinating rules governing all activities relating to
the On-Line Lottery System.
5.8 PCSO will be responsible for the payment of prize monies, commissions to agents and
dealers, and taxes and levies (if any) chargeable to the operator of the On-Line Lottery System.
The LESSOR will bear all other Maintenance and Other Costs, except as provided in Section
1.4.
5.9 PCSO shall assist the LESSOR in the following:
5.9.1 Work permits for the LESSOR's staff;
5.9.2 Approvals for importation of the Facilities;
5.9.3 Approvals and consents for the On-Line Lottery System; and
5.9.4 Business and premises licenses for all offices of the LESSOR and licenses for the
telecommunications network.
5.10 In the event that PCSO shall pre-terminate this Contract or suspend the operation of the
On-Line Lottery System, in breach of this Contract and through no fault of the LESSOR, PCSO
shall promptly, and in any event not later than sixty (60) days, reimburse the LESSOR the
amount of its total investment cost associated with the On-Line Lottery System, including but
not limited to the cost of the Facilities, and further compensate the LESSOR for loss of expected
net profit after tax, computed over the unexpired term of the lease.
6. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LESSOR
The LESSOR is one of not more than three (3) lessors of similar facilities for the nationwide On-
Line Lottery System of PCSO. It is understood that the rights of the LESSOR are primarily those
of a lessor of the Facilities, and consequently, all rights involving the business aspects of the
use of the Facilities are within the jurisdiction of PCSO. During the term of the lease, the
LESSOR shall.
6.1 Maintain and preserve its corporate existence, rights and privileges, and conduct its
business in an orderly, efficient, and customary manner.
6.2 Maintain insurance coverage with insurers acceptable to PCSO on all Facilities.
6.3 Comply with all laws, statues, rules and regulations, orders and directives, obligations and
duties by which it is legally bound.
6.4 Duly pay and discharge all taxes, assessments and government charges now and hereafter
imposed of whatever nature that may be legally levied upon it.
6.5 Keep all the Facilities in fail safe condition and, if necessary, upgrade, replace and improve
the Facilities from time to time as new technology develops, in order to make the On-Line Lottery
System more cost-effective and/or competitive, and as may be required by PCSO shall not
impose such requirements unreasonably nor arbitrarily.
6.6 Provide PCSO with management terminals which will allow real-time monitoring of the On-
Line Lottery System.
6.7 Upon effectivity of this Contract, commence the training of PCSO and other local personnel
and the transfer of technology and expertise, such that at the end of the term of this Contract,
PCSO will be able to effectively take-over the Facilities and efficiently operate the On-Line
Lottery System.
6.8 Undertake a positive advertising and promotions campaign for both institutional and product
lines without engaging in negative advertising against other lessors.
6.9 Bear all expenses and risks relating to the Facilities including, but not limited to,
Maintenance and Other Costs and:
xxx xxx xxx
6.10 Bear all risks if the revenues from ticket sales, on an annualized basis, are insufficient to
pay the entire prize money.
6.11 Be, and is hereby, authorized to collect and retain for its own account, a security deposit
from dealers and retailers, in an amount determined with the approval of PCSO, in respect of
equipment supplied by the LESSOR. PCSO's approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.
xxx xxx xxx
6.12 Comply with procedural and coordinating rules issued by PCSO.
7. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
The LESSOR represents and warrants that:
7.1 The LESSOR is corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines, at least sixty percent (60%) of the outstanding capital stock of which is owned
by Filipino shareholders. The minimum required Filipino equity participation shall not be
impaired through voluntary or involuntary transfer, disposition, or sale of shares of stock by the
present stockholders.
10
7.2 The LESSOR and its Affiliates have the full corporate and legal power and authority to own
and operate their properties and to carry on their business in the place where such properties
are now or may be conducted. . . .
7.3 The LESSOR has or has access to all the financing and funding requirements to promptly
and effectively carry out the terms of this Contract. . . .
7.4 The LESSOR has or has access to all the managerial and technical expertise to promptly
and effectively carry out the terms of this Contract. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
10. TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
The LESSOR shall establish a telecommunications network that will connect all municipalities
and cities in the Territory in accordance with, at the LESSOR's option, either of the LESSOR's
proposals (or a combinations of both such proposals) attached hereto as Annex "B," and under
the following PCSO schedule:
xxx xxx xxx
PCSO may, at its option, require the LESSOR to establish the telecommunications network in
accordance with the above Timetable in provinces where the LESSOR has not yet installed
terminals. Provided, that such provinces have existing nodes. Once a municipality or city is
serviced by land lines of a licensed public telephone company, and such lines are connected to
Metro Manila, then the obligation of the LESSOR to connect such municipality or city through a
telecommunications network shall cease with respect to such municipality or city. The voice
facility will cover the four offices of the Office of the President, National Disaster Control
Coordinating Council, Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation, and
each city and municipality in the Territory except Metro Manila, and those cities and
municipalities which have easy telephone access from these four offices. Voice calls from the
four offices shall be transmitted via radio or VSAT to the remote municipalities which will be
connected to this voice facility through wired network or by radio. The facility shall be designed
to handle four private conversations at any one time.
xxx xxx xxx
13. STOCK DISPERSAL PLAN
Within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Contract, the LESSOR shall cause itself to be
listed in the local stock exchange and offer at least twenty five percent (25%) of its equity to the
public.
14. NON-COMPETITION
The LESSOR shall not, directly or indirectly, undertake any activity or business in competition
with or adverse to the On-Line Lottery System of PCSO unless it obtains the latter's prior written
consent thereto.
15. HOLD HARMLESS CLAUSE
15.1 The LESSOR shall at all times protect and defend, at its cost and expense, PCSO from
and against any and all liabilities and claims for damages and/or suits for or by reason of any
deaths of, or any injury or injuries to any person or persons, or damages to property of any kind
whatsoever, caused by the LESSOR, its subcontractors, its authorized agents or employees,
from any cause or causes whatsoever.
15.2 The LESSOR hereby covenants and agrees to indemnify and hold PCSO harmless from
all liabilities, charges, expenses (including reasonable counsel fees) and costs on account of or
by reason of any such death or deaths, injury or injuries, liabilities, claims, suits or losses caused
by the LESSOR's fault or negligence.
15.3 The LESSOR shall at all times protect and defend, at its own cost and expense, its title to
the facilities and PCSO's interest therein from and against any and all claims for the duration of
the Contract until transfer to PCSO of ownership of the serviceable Facilities.
16. SECURITY
16.1 To ensure faithful compliance by the LESSOR with the terms of the Contract, the LESSOR
shall secure a Performance Bond from a reputable insurance company or companies
acceptable to PCSO.
16.2 The Performance Bond shall be in the initial amount of Three Hundred Million Pesos
(P300,000,000.00), to its U.S. dollar equivalent, and shall be renewed to cover the duration of
the Contract. However, the Performance Bond shall be reduced proportionately to the
percentage of unencumbered terminals installed; Provided, that the Performance Bond shall in
no case be less than One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (P150,000,000.00).
16.3 The LESSOR may at its option maintain its Escrow Deposit as the Performance Bond. . .
.
17. PENALTIES
17.1 Except as may be provided in Section 17.2, should the LESSOR fail to take remedial
measures within seven (7) days, and rectify the breach within thirty (30) days, from written notice
by PCSO of any wilfull or grossly negligent violation of the material terms and conditions of this
Contract, all unencumbered Facilities shall automatically become the property of PCSO without
consideration and without need for further notice or demand by PCSO. The Performance Bond
shall likewise be forfeited in favor of PCSO.
17.2 Should the LESSOR fail to comply with the terms of the Timetables provided in Section 9
and 10, it shall be subject to an initial Penalty of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), per city
or municipality per every month of delay; Provided, that the Penalty shall increase, every ninety
(90) days, by the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) per city or municipality per
month, whilst shall failure to comply persists. The penalty shall be deducted by PCSO from the
rental fee.
xxx xxx xxx
20. OWNERSHIP OF THE FACILITIES
After expiration of the term of the lease as provided in Section 4, the Facilities directly required
for the On-Line Lottery System mentioned in Section 1.3 shall automatically belong in full
ownership to PCSO without any further consideration other than the Rental Fees already paid
during the effectivity of the lease.
21. TERMINATION OF THE LEASE
PCSO may terminate this Contract for any breach of the material provisions of this Contract,
including the following:
21.1 The LESSOR is insolvent or bankrupt or unable to pay its debts, stops or suspends or
threatens to stop or suspend payment of all or a material part of its debts, or proposes or makes
a general assignment or an arrangement or compositions with or for the benefit of its creditors;
or
11
21.2 An order is made or an effective resolution passed for the winding up or dissolution of the
LESSOR or when it ceases or threatens to cease to carry on all or a material part of its
operations or business; or
21.3 Any material statement, representation or warranty made or furnished by the LESSOR
proved to be materially false or misleading;
said termination to take effect upon receipt of written notice of termination by the LESSOR and
failure to take remedial action within seven (7) days and cure or remedy the same within thirty
(30) days from notice.
Any suspension, cancellation or termination of this Contract shall not relieve the LESSOR of
any liability that may have already accrued hereunder.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant
Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can stop Malacañang," and the
imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-
petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.
In support of the petition, the petitioners claim that:
. . . X X THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH RESPONDENTS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND/OR ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS, AND THE PCSO GRAVELY ABUSE[D] THEIR DISCRETION AND/OR FUNCTIONS
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION AND/OR AUTHORITY IN RESPECTIVELY: (A)
APPROVING THE AWARD OF THE CONTRACT TO, AND (B) ENTERING INTO THE SO-
CALLED "CONTRACT OF LEASE" WITH, RESPONDENT PGMC FOR THE INSTALLATION,
ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF THE ON-LINE LOTTERY AND
TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS REQUIRED AND/OR AUTHORIZED UNDER THE SAID
CONTRACT, CONSIDERING THAT:
a) Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO, the PCSO is prohibited from holding and
conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity";
b) Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional franchise is required
before any person may be allowed to establish and operate said telecommunications system;
c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60% Filipino-owned and/or
controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is disqualified from operating a public service, like the
said telecommunications system; and
d) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the Foreign Investment Act
(R.A. No. 7042) to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications
systems. 18
Petitioners submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with
the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line
lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of
R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and
conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or
domestic." Even granting arguendo that a lease of facilities is not within the contemplation of
"collaboration" or "association," an analysis, however, of the Contract of Lease clearly shows
that there is a "collaboration, association, or joint venture between respondents PCSO and
PGMC in the holding of the On-Line Lottery System," and that there are terms and conditions
of the Contract "showing that respondent PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not respondent
PCSO." 19
The petitioners also point out that paragraph 10 of the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes
PGMC to establish a telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and
cities in the territory. However, PGMC cannot do that because it has no franchise from Congress
to construct, install, establish, or operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as
amended. Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot,
therefore, be granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Furthermore, since "the subscribed foreign capital" of the PGMC "comes to about
75%, as shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation," it cannot lawfully enter into
the contract in question because all forms of gambling — and lottery is one of them — are
included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the Foreign Investments Act
(R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital is allowed. 20
Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it to
establish and operate an on-line lottery and telecommunications systems. 21
Accordingly, the petitioners pray that we issue a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction commanding the respondents or any person acting in their places or upon
their instructions to cease and desist from implementing the challenged Contract of Lease and,
after hearing the merits of the petition, that we render judgment declaring the Contract of Lease
void and without effect and making the injunction permanent. 22
We required the respondents to comment on the petition.
In its Comment filed on 1 March 1994, private respondent PGMC asserts that "(1) [it] is merely
an independent contractor for a piece of work, (i.e., the building and maintenance of a lottery
system to be used by PCSO in the operation of its lottery franchise); and (2) as such
independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is
PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration, association or joint venture' with PGMC — as such
statutory limitation is viewed from the context, intent, and spirit of Republic Act 1169, as
amended by Batas Pambansa 42." It further claims that as an independent contractor for a
piece of work, it is neither engaged in "gambling" nor in "public service" relative to the
telecommunications network, which the petitioners even consider as an "indispensable
requirement" of an on-line lottery system. Finally, it states that the execution and implementation
of the contract does not violate the Constitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of
the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal, which should be
ventilated in another forum; and that the "petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing
or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought." 23
In their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, public respondents Executive
Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona, and the PCSO
maintain that the contract of lease in question does not violate Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and that the petitioner's interpretation of the phrase "in collaboration,
association or joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow, strained and utterly devoid of
logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is vested with the basic and
essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or contracts as may be necessary for
12
the attainment of its purposes and objectives." What the PCSO charter "seeks to prohibit is that
arrangement akin to a "joint venture" or partnership where there is "community of interest in the
business, sharing of profits and losses, and a mutual right of control," a characteristic which
does not obtain in a contract of lease." With respect to the challenged Contract of Lease, the
"role of PGMC is limited to that of a lessor of the facilities" for the on-line lottery system; in "strict
technical and legal sense," said contract "can be categorized as a contract for a piece of work
as defined in Articles 1467, 1713 and 1644 of the Civil Code."
They further claim that the establishment of the telecommunications system stipulated in the
Contract of Lease does not require a congressional franchise because PGMC will not operate
a public utility; moreover, PGMC's "establishment of a telecommunications system is not
intended to establish a telecommunications business," and it has been held that where the
facilities are operated "not for business purposes but for its own use," a legislative franchise is
not required before a certificate of public convenience can be granted. 24 Even
granting arguendo that PGMC is a public utility, pursuant to Albano S.
Reyes, 25 "it can establish a telecommunications system even without a legislative franchise
because not every public utility is required to secure a legislative franchise before it could
establish, maintain, and operate the service"; and, in any case, "PGMC's establishment of the
telecommunications system stipulated in its contract of lease with PCSO falls within the
exceptions under Section 1 of Act No. 3846 where a legislative franchise is not necessary for
the establishment of radio stations."
They also argue that the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the
Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize it to enter into the Contract of Lease; and that the
issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the
ambit of judicial review."
Finally, the public respondents allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the
instant suit, citing our resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. 26
Several parties filed motions to intervene as petitioners in this case, 27 but only the motion of
Senators Alberto Romulo, Arturo Tolentino, Francisco Tatad, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Vicente
Sotto III, John Osmeña, Ramon Revilla, and Jose Lina 28 was granted, and the respondents
were required to comment on their petition in intervention, which the public respondents and
PGMC did.
In the meantime, the petitioners filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 29
March 1994 a petition against PGMC for the nullification of the latter's General Information
Sheets. That case, however, has no bearing in this petition.
On 11 April 1994, we heard the parties in oral arguments. Thereafter, we resolved to consider
the matter submitted for resolution and pending resolution of the major issues in this case, to
issue a temporary restraining order commanding the respondents or any person acting in their
place or upon their instructions to cease and desist from implementing the challenged Contract
of Lease.
In the deliberation on this case on 26 April 1994, we resolved to consider only these issues: (a)
the locus standi of the petitioners, and (b) the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in
the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO
from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign." On the first issue, seven
Justices voted to sustain the locus standi of the petitioners, while six voted not to. On the second
issue, the seven Justices were of the opinion that the Contract of Lease violates the exception
to Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid and
contrary to law. The six Justices stated that they wished to express no opinion thereon in view
of their stand on the first issue. The Chief Justice took no part because one of the Directors of
the PCSO is his brother-in-law.
This case was then assigned to this ponente for the writing of the opinion of the Court.
The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their
favor. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, 29 this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R.
No. L-2821)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not
devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained," 30 or that it "enjoys an open
discretion to entertain the same or not." 31 In De La Llana vs. Alba, 32 this Court declared:
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de
la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion
in People vs. Vera [65 Phil. 56 (1937)]. Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement [Ibid, 89]. The
other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid
of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from
a separate opinion inAquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections [L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62
SCRA 275]: "Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what
they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the
specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials
staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe; "The protection of private
rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state
there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in a
substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order." Moreover,
petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue
has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed
in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People v.
Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we are
prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hard back to the American Supreme
Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham, with their claim that what petitioners possess "is an
interest which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and
indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it." That
is to speak in the language of a bygone era, even in the United States. For as Chief Justice
Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not
breached has definitely been lowered.
In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan, 33 reiterated
in Basco vs. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 34 this Court stated:
13
Objections to taxpayers' suits for lack of sufficient personality standing or interest are, however,
in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar,
and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not
the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, this Court has brushed
aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.
and in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 35 it declared:
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we
hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of. [Ex Parte Levitt, 303 US 633]. And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered
by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and
so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions
raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question
the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were
invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court
dismissed the objective that they were not proper parties and ruled that the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied this
exception in many other cases. (Emphasis supplied)
In Daza vs. Singson, 36 this Court once more said:
. . . For another, we have early as in the Emergency Powers Cases that where serious
constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure." The same policy has since then been consistently followed by the
Court, as in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections [21 SCRA 774] . . .
The Federal Supreme Court of the United States of America has also expressed its
discretionary power to liberalize the rule on locus standi. In United States vs. Federal Power
Commission and Virginia Rea Association vs. Federal Power Commission, 37 it held:
We hold that petitioners have standing. Differences of view, however, preclude a single opinion
of the Court as to both petitioners. It would not further clarification of this complicated specialty
of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or less determined
by the specific circumstances of individual situations, to set out the divergent grounds in support
of standing in these cases.
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of
Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to
initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of
laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
Among such cases were those assailing the constitutionality of (a) R.A. No. 3836 insofar as it
allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives and to elective officials of both Houses of Congress; 38 (b) Executive Order No.
284, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987, which allowed members of the
cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or
positions; 39 (c) the automatic appropriation for debt service in the General Appropriations
Act; 40 (d) R.A. No. 7056 on the holding of desynchronized elections; 41 (d) R.A. No. 1869 (the
charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation) on the ground that it is contrary
to morals, public policy, and order; 42 and (f) R.A. No. 6975, establishing the Philippine National
Police. 43
Other cases where we have followed a liberal policy regarding locus standi include those
attacking the validity or legality of (a) an order allowing the importation of rice in the light of the
prohibition imposed by R.A. No. 3452; 44(b) P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed
amendments to the Constitution and P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it directed the COMELEC to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976; 45 (c) the
bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo,
Japan; 46 (d) the approval without hearing by the Board of Investments of the amended
application of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the site of its plant from Bataan
to Batangas and the validity of such transfer and the shift of feedstock from naphtha only to
naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas; 47 (e) the decisions, orders, rulings, and resolutions of
the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Commissioner of Customs, and the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting the National
Power Corporation from indirect tax and duties; 48 (f) the orders of the Energy Regulatory Board
of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional
increase in oil prices did not allow the petitioner substantial cross-examination; 49 (g) Executive
Order No. 478 which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported
crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products; 50 (h) resolutions of the Commission on
Elections concerning the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members
of Sanggunians;51 and (i) memorandum orders issued by a Mayor affecting the Chief of Police
of Pasay City. 52
In the 1975 case of Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 53 this Court, despite its unequivocal
ruling that the petitioners therein had no personality to file the petition, resolved nevertheless to
pass upon the issues raised because of the far-reaching implications of the petition. We did no
less in De Guia vs. COMELEC 54 where, although we declared that De Guia "does not appear
to have locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial interest," we brushed aside the
procedural infirmity "considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the
political exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse
of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent."
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised
are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of
the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country
and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system
are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the
petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby
brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
And now on the substantive issue.
14
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and
conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity, whether domestic or foreign." Section 1 provides:
Sec. 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. — The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising
and providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and services and charities of
national character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of
Act Numbered One thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, in such
frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as
shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.
B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health and
welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit-oriented, by
itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or
entity, whether domestic or foreign, except for the activities mentioned in the preceding
paragraph (A), for the purpose of providing for permanent and continuing sources of funds for
health programs, including the expansion of existing ones, medical assistance and services,
and/or charitable grants: Provided, That such investment will not compete with the private sector
in areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority. (emphasis supplied)
The language of the section is indisputably clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege
"to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the
PCSO cannot exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party.
This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase "except for the activities mentioned
in the preceding paragraph (A)," namely, "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities."
B.P. Blg. 42 originated from Parliamentary Bill No. 622, which was covered by Committee
Report No. 103 as reported out by the Committee on Socio-Economic Planning and
Development of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. The original text of paragraph B, Section 1 of
Parliamentary Bill No. 622 reads as follows:
To engage in any and all investments and related profit-oriented projects or programs and
activities by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, for the main purpose of raising funds for health
and medical assistance and services and charitable grants. 55
During the period of committee amendments, the Committee on Socio-Economic Planning and
Development, through Assemblyman Ronaldo B. Zamora, introduced an amendment by
substitution to the said paragraph B such that, as amended, it should read as follows:
Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health-oriented
investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit- oriented, by itself or in
collaboration, association, or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity,
whether domestic or foreign, for the purpose of providing for permanent and continuing sources
of funds for health programs, including the expansion of existing ones, medical assistance and
services and/or charitable grants. 56
Before the motion of Assemblyman Zamora for the approval of the amendment could be acted
upon, Assemblyman Davide introduced an amendment to the amendment:
MR. DAVIDE.
Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER.
The gentleman from Cebu is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE.
May I introduce an amendment to the committee amendment? The amendment would be to
insert after "foreign" in the amendment just read the following: EXCEPT FOR THE ACTIVITY
IN LETTER (A) ABOVE.
When it is joint venture or in collaboration with any entity such collaboration or joint venture
must not include activity activity letter (a) which is the holding and conducting of sweepstakes
races, lotteries and other similar acts.
MR. ZAMORA.
We accept the amendment, Mr. Speaker.
MR. DAVIDE.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER.
Is there any objection to the amendment? (Silence) The amendment, as amended, is
approved. 57
Further amendments to paragraph B were introduced and approved. When Assemblyman
Zamora read the final text of paragraph B as further amended, the earlier approved amendment
of Assemblyman Davide became "EXCEPT FOR THE ACTIVITIES MENTIONED IN
PARAGRAPH (A)"; and by virtue of the amendment introduced by Assemblyman Emmanuel
Pelaez, the word PRECEDING was inserted before PARAGRAPH. Assemblyman Pelaez
introduced other amendments. Thereafter, the new paragraph B was approved. 58
This is now paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.
No interpretation of the said provision to relax or circumvent the prohibition can be allowed since
the privilege to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other similar activities is
a franchise granted by the legislature to the PCSO. It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the
government to individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to
be taken most strongly against the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in
derogation of the common rights of the public must prove his title thereto by a grant which is
clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or
by probable inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld. Nothing passes by
mere implication." 59
In short then, by the exception explicitly made in paragraph B, Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO
cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture.
Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. It has been said that "the rights and
privileges conferred under a franchise may, without doubt, be assigned or transferred when the
grant is to the grantee and assigns, or is authorized by statute. On the other hand, the right of
transfer or assignment may be restricted by statute or the constitution, or be made subject to
the approval of the grantor or a governmental agency, such as a public utilities commission,
exception that an existing right of assignment cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation." 60
15
It may also be pointed out that the franchise granted to the PCSO to hold and conduct lotteries
allows it to hold and conduct a species of gambling. It is settled that "a statute which authorizes
the carrying on of a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed and every
reasonable doubt so resolved as to limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority." 61
Does the challenged Contract of Lease violate or contravene the exception in Section 1 of R.A.
No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with" another?
We agree with the petitioners that it does, notwithstanding its denomination or designation as a
(Contract of Lease). We are neither convinced nor moved or fazed by the insistence and forceful
arguments of the PGMC that it does not because in reality it is only an independent contractor
for a piece of work, i.e., the building and maintenance of a lottery system to be used by the
PCSO in the operation of its lottery franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease
or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis
of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered
from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the
party is the soul of the instrument. In order to give life or effect to an instrument, it is essential
to look to the intention of the individual who executed it. 62 And, pursuant to Article 1371 of the
Civil Code, "to determine the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered." To put it more bluntly, no one should be
deceived by the title or designation of a contract.
A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a consideration of the
contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is not in
reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a
piece of work, but one where the statutorily proscribedcollaboration or association, in the least,
or joint venture, at the most, exists between the contracting parties.Collaboration is defined as
the acts of working together in a joint project. 63 Association means the act of a number of
persons in uniting together for some special purpose or business. 64 Joint venture is defined as
an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise;
generally all contribute assets and share risks. It requires a community of interest in the
performance of the subject matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in connection therewith,
and duty, which may be altered by agreement to share both in profit and
losses. 65
The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC reveal that the PCSO had neither funds
of its own nor the expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery system, and that although
it wished to have the system, it would have it "at no expense or risks to the government."
Because of these serious constraints and unwillingness to bear expenses and assume risks,
the PCSO was candid enough to state in its RFP that it is seeking for "a suitable contractor
which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities needed to operate and maintain" the
system; exclusively bear "all capital, operating expenses and expansion expenses and risks";
and submit "a comprehensive nationwide lottery development plan . . . which will include the
game, the marketing of the games, and the logistics to introduce the game to all the cities and
municipalities of the country within five (5) years"; and that the operation of the on-line lottery
system should be "at no expense or risk to the government" — meaningitself, since it is a
government-owned and controlled agency. The facilities referred to means "all capital
equipment, computers, terminals, software, nationwide telecommunications network, ticket
sales offices, furnishings and fixtures, printing costs, costs of salaries and wages, advertising
and promotions expenses, maintenance costs, expansion and replacement costs, security and
insurance, and all other related expenses needed to operate a nationwide on-line lottery
system."
In short, the only contribution the PCSO would have is its franchise or authority to operate the
on-line lottery system; with the rest, including the risks of the business, being borne by the
proponent or bidder. It could be for this reason that it warned that "the proponent must be able
to stand to the acid test of proving that it is an entity able to take on the role of responsible
maintainer of the on-line lottery system." The PCSO, however, makes it clear in its RFP that the
proponent can propose a period of the contract which shall not exceed fifteen years, during
which time it is assured of a "rental" which shall not exceed 12% of gross receipts. As admitted
by the PGMC, upon learning of the PCSO's decision, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its
affiliates, wanted to offer itsservices and resources to the PCSO. Forthwith, it organized the
PGMC as "a medium through which the technical and management services required for the
project would be offered and delivered to PCSO." 66
Undoubtedly, then, the Berjaya Group Berhad knew all along that in connection with an on-line
lottery system, the PCSO had nothing but its franchise, which it solemnly guaranteed it had in
the General Information of the RFP. 67Howsoever viewed then, from the very inception, the
PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that any arrangement between them would
necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, and management aspects of the on-
line lottery system while the PCSO would, primarily, provide the franchise. The
words Gaming and Management in the corporate name of respondent Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation could not have been conceived just for euphemistic purposes. Of
course, the RFP cannot substitute for the Contract of Lease which was subsequently executed
by the PCSO and the PGMC. Nevertheless, the Contract of Lease incorporates their intention
and understanding.
The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Its denomination as
such is a crafty device, carefully conceived, to provide a built-in defense in the event that the
agreement is questioned as violative of the exception in Section 1 (B) of the PCSO's charter.
The acuity or skill of its draftsmen to accomplish that purpose easily manifests itself in the
Contract of Lease. It is outstanding for its careful and meticulous drafting designed to give an
immediate impression that it is a contract of lease. Yet, woven therein are provisions which
negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint venture for
a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system.
Consistent with the above observations on the RFP, the PCSO has only its franchise to offer,
while the PGMC represents and warrants that it has access to all managerial and technical
expertise to promptly and effectively carry out the terms of the contract. And, for a period of
eight years, the PGMC is under obligation to keep all theFacilities in safe condition and if
necessary, upgrade, replace, and improve them from time to time as new technology develops
to make the on-line lottery system more cost-effective and competitive; exclusively bear all costs
and expenses relating to the printing, manpower, salaries and wages, advertising and
promotion, maintenance, expansion and replacement, security and insurance, and all other
related expenses needed to operate the on-line lottery system; undertake a positive advertising
16
and promotions campaign for both institutional and product lines without engaging in negative
advertising against other lessors; bear the salaries and related costs of skilled and qualified
personnel for administrative and technical operations; comply with procedural and coordinating
rules issued by the PCSO; and to train PCSO and other local personnel and to effect the transfer
of technology and other expertise, such that at the end of the term of the contract, the PCSO
will be able to effectively take over the Facilities and efficiently operate the on-line lottery
system. The latter simply means that, indeed, the managers, technicians or employees who
shall operate the on-line lottery system are not managers, technicians or employees of the
PCSO, but of the PGMC and that it is only after the expiration of the contract that the PCSO will
operate the system. After eight years, the PCSO would automatically become the owner of the
Facilities without any other further consideration.
For these reasons, too, the PGMC has the initial prerogative to prepare the detailed plan of all
games and the marketing thereof, and determine the number of players, value of winnings, and
the logistics required to introduce the games, including the Master Games Plan. Of course, the
PCSO has the reserved authority to disapprove them. 68 And, while the PCSO has the sole
responsibility over the appointment of dealers and retailers throughout the country, the PGMC
may, nevertheless, recommend for appointment dealers and retailers which shall be acted upon
by the PCSO within forty-eight hours and collect and retain, for its own account, a security
deposit from dealers and retailers in respect of equipment supplied by it.
This joint venture is further established by the following:
(a) Rent is defined in the lease contract as the amount to be paid to the PGMC as compensation
for the fulfillment of its obligations under the contract, including, but not limited to the lease of
the Facilities. However, this rent is not actually a fixed amount. Although it is stated to be 4.9%
of gross receipts from ticket sales, payable net of taxes required by law to be withheld, it may
be drastically reduced or, in extreme cases, nothing may be due or demandable at all because
the PGMC binds itself to "bear all risks if the revenue from the ticket sales, on an annualized
basis, are insufficient to pay the entire prize money." This risk-bearing provision is unusual in a
lessor-lessee relationship, but inherent in a joint venture.
(b) In the event of pre-termination of the contract by the PCSO, or its suspension of operation
of the on-line lottery system in breach of the contract and through no fault of the PGMC, the
PCSO binds itself "to promptly, and in any event not later than sixty (60) days, reimburse the
Lessor the amount of its total investment cost associated with the On-Line Lottery System,
including but not limited to the cost of the Facilities, and further compensate the LESSOR for
loss of expected net profit after tax, computed over the unexpired term of the lease." If the
contract were indeed one of lease, the payment of the expected profits or rentals for the
unexpired portion of the term of the contract would be enough.
(c) The PGMC cannot "directly or indirectly undertake any activity or business in competition
with or adverse to the On-Line Lottery System of PCSO unless it obtains the latter's prior written
consent." If the PGMC is engaged in the business of leasing equipment and technology for an
on-line lottery system, we fail to see any acceptable reason why it should allow a restriction on
the pursuit of such business.
(d) The PGMC shall provide the PCSO the audited Annual Report sent to its stockholders, and
within two years from the effectivity of the contract, cause itself to be listed in the local stock
exchange and offer at least 25% of its equity to the public. If the PGMC is merely a lessor, this
imposition is unreasonable and whimsical, and could only be tied up to the fact that the PGMC
will actually operate and manage the system; hence, increasing public participation in the
corporation would enhance public interest.
(e) The PGMC shall put up an Escrow Deposit of P300,000,000.00 pursuant to the requirements
of the RFP, which it may, at its option, maintain as its initial performance bond required to ensure
its faithful compliance with the terms of the contract.
(f) The PCSO shall designate the necessary personnel to monitor and audit the daily
performance of the on-line lottery system; and promulgate procedural and coordinating
rules governing all activities relating to the on-line lottery system. The first further confirms that
it is the PGMC which will operate the system and the PCSO may, for the protection of its interest,
monitor and audit the daily performance of the system. The second admits
thecoordinating and cooperative powers and functions of the parties.
(g) The PCSO may validly terminate the contract if the PGMC becomes insolvent or bankrupt
or is unable to pay its debts, or if it stops or suspends or threatens to stop or suspend payment
of all or a material part of its debts.
All of the foregoing unmistakably confirm the indispensable role of the PGMC in the pursuit,
operation, conduct, and management of the On-Line Lottery System. They exhibit and
demonstrate the parties' indivisible community of interest in the conception, birth and growth of
the on-line lottery, and, above all, in its profits, with each having a right in the formulation and
implementation of policies related to the business and sharing, as well, in the losses — with the
PGMC bearing the greatest burden because of its assumption of expenses and risks, and the
PCSO the least, because of its confessed unwillingness to bear expenses and risks. In a
manner of speaking, each is wed to the other for better or for worse. In the final analysis,
however, in the light of the PCSO's RFP and the above highlighted provisions, as well as the
"Hold Harmless Clause" of the Contract of Lease, it is even safe to conclude that the
actual lessor in this case is the PCSO and the subject matter thereof is its franchise to hold and
conduct lotteries since it is, in reality, the PGMC which operates and manages the on-line lottery
system for a period of eight years.
We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in
paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid
for being contrary to law. This conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion on the other
issues raised by the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged Contract of Lease
executed on 17 December 1993 by respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
and respondent Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) is hereby DECLARED
contrary to law and invalid.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 11 April 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
17
G.R. No. 114222 April 6, 1995
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, JOHN H. OSMENA and RODOLFO G. BIAZON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, and EDSA LRT CORPORATION, LTD., respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to prohibit respondents from
further implementing and enforcing the "Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and
Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" dated April 22, 1992, and the "Supplemental
Agreement to the 22 April 1992 Revised and Restated Agreement To Build, Lease and Transfer
a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" dated May 6, 1993.
Petitioners Francisco S. Tatad, John H. Osmena and Rodolfo G. Biazon are members of the
Philippine Senate and are suing in their capacities as Senators and as taxpayers. Respondent
Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. is the incumbent Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), while private respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. is a private
corporation organized under the laws of Hongkong.
I declaring that of the five applicants, only the EDSA LRT Consortium "met the requirements of
In 1989, DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA, a major thoroughfare
in Metropolitan Manila, which shall traverse the cities of Pasay, Quezon, Mandaluyong and
Makati. The plan, referred to as EDSA Light Rail Transit III (EDSA LRT III), was intended to
provide a mass transit system along EDSA and alleviate the congestion and growing
transportation problem in the metropolis.
On March 3, 1990, a letter of intent was sent by the Eli Levin Enterprises, Inc., represented by
Elijahu Levin to DOTC Secretary Oscar Orbos, proposing to construct the EDSA LRT III on a
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis.
On March 15, 1990, Secretary Orbos invited Levin to send a technical team to discuss the
project with DOTC.
On July 9, 1990, Republic Act No. 6957 entitled "An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction,
Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and For Other
Purposes," was signed by President Corazon C. Aquino. Referred to as the Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) Law, it took effect on October 9, 1990.
Republic Act No. 6957 provides for two schemes for the financing, construction and operation
of government projects through private initiative and investment: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
or Build-Transfer (BT).
In accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6957 and to set the EDSA LRT III project
underway, DOTC, on January 22, 1991 and March 14, 1991, issued Department Orders Nos.
91-494 and 91-496, respectively creating the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC) and the Technical Committee.
After its constitution, the PBAC issued guidelines for the prequalification of contractors for the
financing and implementation of the project The notice, advertising the prequalification of
bidders, was published in three newspapers of general circulation once a week for three
consecutive weeks starting February 21, 1991.
The deadline set for submission of prequalification documents was March 21, 1991, later
extended to April 1, 1991. Five groups responded to the invitation namely, ABB Trazione of
Italy, Hopewell Holdings Ltd. of Hongkong, Mansteel International of Mandaue, Cebu, Mitsui &
Co., Ltd. of Japan, and EDSA LRT Consortium, composed of ten foreign and domestic
corporations: namely, Kaiser Engineers International, Inc., ACER Consultants (Far East) Ltd.
and Freeman Fox, Tradeinvest/CKD Tatra of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics, TCGI
Engineering All Asia Capital and Leasing Corporation, The Salim Group of Jakarta, E. L.
Enterprises, Inc., A.M. Oreta & Co. Capitol Industrial Construction Group, Inc, and F. F. Cruz &
co., Inc.
On the last day for submission of prequalification documents, the prequalification criteria
proposed by the Technical Committee were adopted by the PBAC. The criteria totalling 100
percent, are as follows: (a) Legal aspects — 10 percent; (b) Management/Organizational
capability — 30 percent; and (c) Financial capability — 30 percent; and (d) Technical capability
— 30 percent (Rollo, p. 122).
On April 3, 1991, the Committee, charged under the BOT Law with the formulation of the
Implementation Rules and Regulations thereof, approved the same.
After evaluating the prequalification, bids, the PBAC issued a Resolution on May 9, 1991
garnering at least 21 points per criteria [sic], except for Legal Aspects, and obtaining an over-
all passing mark of at least 82 points" (Rollo, p. 146). The Legal Aspects referred to provided
that the BOT/BT contractor-applicant meet the requirements specified in the Constitution and
other pertinent laws (Rollo, p. 114).
Subsequently, Secretary Orbos was appointed Executive Secretary to the President of the
Philippines and was replaced by Secretary Pete Nicomedes Prado. The latter sent to President
Aquino two letters dated May 31, 1991 and June 14, 1991, respectively recommending the
award of the EDSA LRT III project to the sole complying bidder, the EDSA LRT Consortium,
and requesting for authority to negotiate with the said firm for the contract pursuant to paragraph
14(b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the BOT Law (Rollo, pp. 298-302).
In July 1991, Executive Secretary Orbos, acting on instructions of the President, issued a
directive to the DOTC to proceed with the negotiations. On July 16, 1991, the EDSA LRT
Consortium submitted its bid proposal to DOTC.
Finding this proposal to be in compliance with the bid requirements, DOTC and respondent
EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., in substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium, entered into an
"Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" under the terms
of the BOT Law (Rollo, pp. 147-177).
Secretary Prado, thereafter, requested presidential approval of the contract.
In a letter dated March 13, 1992, Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon, who replaced Executive
Secretary Orbos, informed Secretary Prado that the President could not grant the requested
approval for the following reasons: (1) that DOTC failed to conduct actual public bidding in
compliance with Section 5 of the BOT Law; (2) that the law authorized public bidding as the only
mode to award BOT projects, and the prequalification proceedings was not the public bidding
contemplated under the law; (3) that Item 14 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
BOT Law which authorized negotiated award of contract in addition to public bidding was of
doubtful legality; and (4) that congressional approval of the list of priority projects under the BOT
18
or BT Scheme provided in the law had not yet been granted at the time the contract was
awarded (Rollo, pp. 178-179).
In view of the comments of Executive Secretary Drilon, the DOTC and private respondents re-
negotiated the agreement. On April 22, 1992, the parties entered into a "Revised and Restated
Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" (Rollo, pp. 47-
78) inasmuch as "the parties [are] cognizant of the fact the DOTC has full authority to sign the
Agreement without need of approval by the President pursuant to the provisions of Executive
Order No. 380 and that certain events [had] supervened since November 7, 1991 which
necessitate[d] the revision of the Agreement" (Rollo, p. 51). On May 6, 1992, DOTC,
represented by Secretary Jesus Garcia vice Secretary Prado, and private respondent entered
into a "Supplemental Agreement to the 22 April 1992 Revised and Restated Agreement to Build,
Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" so as to "clarify their respective rights
and responsibilities" and to submit [the] Supplemental Agreement to the President, of the
Philippines for his approval" (Rollo, pp. 79-80).
Secretary Garcia submitted the two Agreements to President Fidel V. Ramos for his
consideration and approval. In a Memorandum to Secretary Garcia on May 6, 1993, approved
the said Agreements, (Rollo, p. 194).
According to the agreements, the EDSA LRT III will use light rail vehicles from the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republics and will have a maximum carrying capacity of 450,000 passengers a
day, or 150 million a year to be achieved-through 54 such vehicles operating simultaneously.
The EDSA LRT III will run at grade, or street level, on the mid-section of EDSA for a distance
of 17.8 kilometers from F.B. Harrison, Pasay City to North Avenue, Quezon City. The system
will have its own power facility (Revised and Restated Agreement, Sec. 2.3 (ii); Rollo p. 55). It
will also have thirteen (13) passenger stations and one depot in 16-hectare government property
at North Avenue (Supplemental Agreement, Sec. 11; Rollo, pp. 91-92).
Private respondents shall undertake and finance the entire project required for a complete
operational light rail transit system (Revised and Restated Agreement, Sec. 4.1; Rollo, p. 58).
Target completion date is 1,080 days or approximately three years from the implementation
date of the contract inclusive of mobilization, site works, initial and final testing of the system
(Supplemental Agreement, Sec. 5; Rollo, p. 83). Upon full or partial completion and viability
thereof, private respondent shall deliver the use and possession of the completed portion to
DOTC which shall operate the same (Supplemental Agreement, Sec. 5; Revised and Restated
Agreement, Sec. 5.1; Rollo, pp. 61-62, 84). DOTC shall pay private respondent rentals on a
monthly basis through an Irrevocable Letter of Credit. The rentals shall be determined by an
independent and internationally accredited inspection firm to be appointed by the parties
(Supplemental Agreement, Sec. 6; Rollo, pp. 85-86) As agreed upon, private respondent's
capital shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come
from the earnings of the EDSA LRT III (Revised and Restated Agreement, Sec. 1, p. 5; Rollo,
p. 54). After 25 years and DOTC shall have completed payment of the rentals, ownership of the
project shall be transferred to the latter for a consideration of only U.S. $1.00 (Revised and
Restated Agreement, Sec. 11.1; Rollo, p. 67).
On May 5, 1994, R.A. No. 7718, an "Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 6957,
Entitled "An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of
Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and for Other Purposes" was signed into law by
the President. The law was published in two newspapers of general circulation on May 12, 1994,
and took effect 15 days thereafter or on May 28, 1994. The law expressly recognizes BLT
scheme and allows direct negotiation of BLT contracts.
II
In their petition, petitioners argued that:
(1) THE AGREEMENT OF APRIL 22, 1992, AS AMENDED BY THE SUPPLEMENTAL
AGREEMENT OF MAY 6, 1993, INSOFAR AS IT GRANTS EDSA LRT CORPORATION, LTD.,
A FOREIGN CORPORATION, THE OWNERSHIP OF EDSA LRT III, A PUBLIC UTILITY,
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION AND, HENCE, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
(2) THE BUILD-LEASE-TRANSFER SCHEME PROVIDED IN THE AGREEMENTS IS NOT
DEFINED NOR RECOGNIZED IN R.A. NO. 6957 OR ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS AND, HENCE, IS ILLEGAL;
(3) THE AWARD OF THE CONTRACT ON A NEGOTIATED BASIS VIOLATES R; A. NO. 6957
AND, HENCE, IS UNLAWFUL;
(4) THE AWARD OF THE CONTRACT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT EDSA LRT
CORPORATION, LTD. VIOLATES THE REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED IN THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BOT LAW AND, HENCE, IS ILLEGAL;
(5) THE AGREEMENTS VIOLATE EXECUTIVE ORDER NO 380 FOR THEIR FAILURE TO
BEAR PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND, HENCE, ARE ILLEGAL AND INEFFECTIVE; AND
(6) THE AGREEMENTS ARE GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT
(Rollo, pp. 15-16).
Secretary Garcia and private respondent filed their comments separately and claimed that:
(1) Petitioners are not the real parties-in-interest and have no legal standing to institute the
present petition;
(2) The writ of prohibition is not the proper remedy and the petition requires ascertainment of
facts;
(3) The scheme adopted in the Agreements is actually a build-transfer scheme allowed by the
BOT Law;
(4) The nationality requirement for public utilities mandated by the Constitution does not apply
to private respondent;
(5) The Agreements executed by and between respondents have been approved by President
Ramos and are not disadvantageous to the government;
(6) The award of the contract to private respondent through negotiation and not public bidding
is allowed by the BOT Law; and
(7) Granting that the BOT Law requires public bidding, this has been amended by R.A No. 7718
passed by the Legislature On May 12, 1994, which provides for direct negotiation as a mode of
award of infrastructure projects.
III
Respondents claimed that petitioners had no legal standing to initiate the instant action.
Petitioners, however, countered that the action was filed by them in their capacity as Senators
and as taxpayers.
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered
into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in
contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994]) and to disallow
19
the same when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and Development
Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA. 240 [1989]).
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but
to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present
action.
IV
In the main, petitioners asserted that the Revised and Restated Agreement of April 22, 1992
and the Supplemental Agreement of May 6, 1993 are unconstitutional and invalid for the
following reasons:
(1) the EDSA LRT III is a public utility, and the ownership and operation thereof is limited by the
Constitution to Filipino citizens and domestic corporations, not foreign corporations like private
respondent;
(2) the Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT) scheme provided in the agreements is not the BOT or BT
Scheme under the law;
(3) the contract to construct the EDSA LRT III was awarded to private respondent not through
public bidding which is the only mode of awarding infrastructure projects under the BOT law;
and
(4) the agreements are grossly disadvantageous to the government.
1. Private respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. to whom the contract to construct the EDSA
LRT III was awarded by public respondent, is admittedly a foreign corporation "duly incorporated
and existing under the laws of Hongkong" (Rollo, pp. 50, 79). There is also no dispute that once
the EDSA LRT III is constructed, private respondent, as lessor, will turn it over to DOTC, as
lessee, for the latter to operate the system and pay rentals for said use.
The question posed by petitioners is:
Can respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation own EDSA LRT III; a public
utility? (Rollo, p. 17).
The phrasing of the question is erroneous; it is loaded. What private respondent owns are the
rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power plant, not a
public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do
not by themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their
ownership but their use to serve the public (Iloilo Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Public Service Board,
44 Phil. 551, 557 558 [1923]).
The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility.
However, it does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a
public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public.
Section 11 of Article XII of the Constitution provides:
No franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive character or
for a longer period than fifty years . . . (Emphasis supplied).
In law, there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the ownership
of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public.
Ownership is defined as a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the
rights of another (Tolentino, II Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines 45 [1992]).
The exercise of the rights encompassed in ownership is limited by law so that a property cannot
be operated and used to serve the public as a public utility unless the operator has a franchise.
The operation of a rail system as a public utility includes the transportation of passengers from
one point to another point, their loading and unloading at designated places and the movement
of the trains at pre-scheduled times (cf. Arizona Eastern R.R. Co. v. J.A.. Matthews, 20 Ariz
282, 180 P.159, 7 A.L.R. 1149 [1919] ;United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Northern P.R. Co., 30 Wash
2d. 722, 193 P. 2d 868, 2 A.L.R. 2d 1065 [1948]).
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership
of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or
conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public.
The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in
control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.
This dichotomy between the operation of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities used
to serve the public can be very well appreciated when we consider the transportation industry.
Enfranchised airline and shipping companies may lease their aircraft and vessels instead of
owning them themselves.
While private respondent is the owner of the facilities necessary to operate the EDSA. LRT III,
it admits that it is not enfranchised to operate a public utility (Revised and Restated Agreement,
Sec. 3.2; Rollo, p. 57). In view of this incapacity, private respondent and DOTC agreed that on
completion date, private respondent will immediately deliver possession of the LRT system by
way of lease for 25 years, during which period DOTC shall operate the same as a common
carrier and private respondent shall provide technical maintenance and repair services to DOTC
(Revised and Restated Agreement, Secs. 3.2, 5.1 and 5.2; Rollo, pp. 57-58, 61-62). Technical
maintenance consists of providing (1) repair and maintenance facilities for the depot and rail
lines, services for routine clearing and security; and (2) producing and distributing maintenance
manuals and drawings for the entire system (Revised and Restated Agreement, Annex F).
Private respondent shall also train DOTC personnel for familiarization with the operation, use,
maintenance and repair of the rolling stock, power plant, substations, electrical, signaling,
communications and all other equipment as supplied in the agreement (Revised and Restated
Agreement, Sec. 10; Rollo, pp. 66-67). Training consists of theoretical and live training of DOTC
operational personnel which includes actual driving of light rail vehicles under simulated
operating conditions, control of operations, dealing with emergencies, collection, counting and
securing cash from the fare collection system (Revised and Restated Agreement, Annex E,
Secs. 2-3). Personnel of DOTC will work under the direction and control of private respondent
only during training (Revised and Restated Agreement, Annex E, Sec. 3.1). The training
objectives, however, shall be such that upon completion of the EDSA LRT III and upon opening
of normal revenue operation, DOTC shall have in their employ personnel capable of undertaking
training of all new and replacement personnel (Revised and Restated Agreement, Annex E Sec.
5.1). In other words, by the end of the three-year construction period and upon commencement
20
of normal revenue operation, DOTC shall be able to operate the EDSA LRT III on its own and
train all new personnel by itself.
Fees for private respondent' s services shall be included in the rent, which likewise includes the
project cost, cost of replacement of plant equipment and spare parts, investment and financing
cost, plus a reasonable rate of return thereon (Revised and Restated Agreement, Sec. 1; Rollo,
p. 54).
Since DOTC shall operate the EDSA LRT III, it shall assume all the obligations and liabilities of
a common carrier. For this purpose, DOTC shall indemnify and hold harmless private
respondent from any losses, damages, injuries or death which may be claimed in the operation
or implementation of the system, except losses, damages, injury or death due to defects in the
EDSA LRT III on account of the defective condition of equipment or facilities or the defective
maintenance of such equipment facilities (Revised and Restated Agreement, Secs. 12.1 and
12.2; Rollo, p. 68).
In sum, private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles and collect fees from the riding
public. It will have no dealings with the public and the public will have no right to demand any
services from it.
It is well to point out that the role of private respondent as lessor during the lease period must
be distinguished from the role of the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in
the case of Kilosbayan Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994). Therein, the Contract of Lease
between PGMC and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) was actually a
collaboration or joint venture agreement prescribed under the charter of the PCSO. In the
Contract of Lease; PGMC, the lessor obligated itself to build, at its own expense, all the facilities
necessary to operate and maintain a nationwide on-line lottery system from whom PCSO was
to lease the facilities and operate the same. Upon due examination of the contract, the Court
found that PGMC's participation was not confined to the construction and setting up of the on-
line lottery system. It spilled over to the actual operation thereof, becoming indispensable to the
pursuit, conduct, administration and control of the highly technical and sophisticated lottery
system. In effect, the PCSO leased out its franchise to PGMC which actually operated and
managed the same.
Indeed, a mere owner and lessor of the facilities used by a public utility is not a public utility
(Providence and W.R. Co. v. United States, 46 F. 2d 149, 152 [1930]; Chippewa Power Co. v.
Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 205 N.W. 900, 903, 188 Wis. 246 [1925]; Ellis v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, Ill 35 S. Ct. 645, 646, 237 U.S. 434, 59 L. Ed. 1036 [1914]). Neither
are owners of tank, refrigerator, wine, poultry and beer cars who supply cars under contract to
railroad companies considered as public utilities (Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Commission,
174 p. 2d 984, 987 [1946]).
Even the mere formation of a public utility corporation does not ipso facto characterize the
corporation as one operating a public utility. The moment for determining the requisite Filipino
nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization
for that purpose (People v. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333 [1953]).
2. Petitioners further assert that the BLT scheme under the Agreements in question is not
recognized in the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Section 2 of the BOT Law defines the BOT and BT schemes as follows:
(a) Build-operate-and-transfer scheme — A contractual arrangement whereby the contractor
undertakes the construction including financing, of a given infrastructure facility, and the
operation and maintenance thereof. The contractor operates the facility over a fixed term during
which it is allowed to charge facility users appropriate tolls, fees, rentals and charges sufficient
to enable the contractor to recover its operating and maintenance expenses and its investment
in the project plus a reasonable rate of return thereon. The contractor transfers the facility to the
government agency or local government unit concerned at the end of the fixed term which shall
not exceed fifty (50) years. For the construction stage, the contractor may obtain financing from
foreign and/or domestic sources and/or engage the services of a foreign and/or Filipino
constructor [sic]: Provided, That the ownership structure of the contractor of an infrastructure
facility whose operation requires a public utility franchise must be in accordance with the
Constitution: Provided, however, That in the case of corporate investors in the build-operate-
and-transfer corporation, the citizenship of each stockholder in the corporate investors shall be
the basis for the computation of Filipino equity in the said corporation: Provided, further, That,
in the case of foreign constructors [sic], Filipino labor shall be employed or hired in the different
phases of the construction where Filipino skills are available: Provided, furthermore, that the
financing of a foreign or foreign-controlled contractor from Philippine government financing
institutions shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the total cost of the infrastructure facility
or project: Provided, finally, That financing from foreign sources shall not require a guarantee
by the Government or by government-owned or controlled corporations. The build-operate-and-
transfer scheme shall include a supply-and-operate situation which is a contractual agreement
whereby the supplier of equipment and machinery for a given infrastructure facility, if the interest
of the Government so requires, operates the facility providing in the process technology transfer
and training to Filipino nationals.
(b) Build-and-transfer scheme — "A contractual arrangement whereby the contractor
undertakes the construction including financing, of a given infrastructure facility, and its turnover
after completion to the government agency or local government unit concerned which shall pay
the contractor its total investment expended on the project, plus a reasonable rate of return
thereon. This arrangement may be employed in the construction of any infrastructure project
including critical facilities which for security or strategic reasons, must be operated directly by
the government (Emphasis supplied).
The BOT scheme is expressly defined as one where the contractor undertakes the construction
and financing in infrastructure facility, and operates and maintains the same. The contractor
operates the facility for a fixed period during which it may recover its expenses and investment
in the project plus a reasonable rate of return thereon. After the expiration of the agreed term,
the contractor transfers the ownership and operation of the project to the government.
In the BT scheme, the contractor undertakes the construction and financing of the facility, but
after completion, the ownership and operation thereof are turned over to the government. The
government, in turn, shall pay the contractor its total investment on the project in addition to a
reasonable rate of return. If payment is to be effected through amortization payments by the
government infrastructure agency or local government unit concerned, this shall be made in
accordance with a scheme proposed in the bid and incorporated in the contract (R.A. No. 6957,
Sec. 6).
21
Emphasis must be made that under the BOT scheme, the owner of the infrastructure facility
must comply with the citizenship requirement of the Constitution on the operation of a public
utility. No such a requirement is imposed in the BT scheme.
There is no mention in the BOT Law that the BOT and BT schemes bar any other arrangement
for the payment by the government of the project cost. The law must not be read in such a way
as to rule out or unduly restrict any variation within the context of the two schemes. Indeed, no
statute can be enacted to anticipate and provide all the fine points and details for the multifarious
and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law (Director of Forestry v.
Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 [1957]; United States v.
Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119 [1914]).
The BLT scheme in the challenged agreements is but a variation of the BT scheme under the
law.
As a matter of fact, the burden on the government in raising funds to pay for the project is made
lighter by allowing it to amortize payments out of the income from the operation of the LRT
System.
In form and substance, the challenged agreements provide that rentals are to be paid on a
monthly basis according to a schedule of rates through and under the terms of a confirmed
Irrevocable Revolving Letter of Credit (Supplemental Agreement, Sec. 6; Rollo, p. 85). At the
end of 25 years and when full payment shall have been made to and received by private
respondent, it shall transfer to DOTC, free from any lien or encumbrances, all its title to, rights
and interest in, the project for only U.S. $1.00 (Revised and Restated Agreement, Sec. 11.1;
Supplemental Agreement, Sec; 7; Rollo, pp. 67, .87).
A lease is a contract where one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or
use of a thing for a certain price and for a period which may be definite or indefinite but not
longer than 99 years (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1643). There is no transfer of ownership
at the end of the lease period. But if the parties stipulate that title to the leased premises shall
be transferred to the lessee at the end of the lease period upon the payment of an agreed sum,
the lease becomes a lease-purchase agreement.
Furthermore, it is of no significance that the rents shall be paid in United States currency, not
Philippine pesos. The EDSA LRT III Project is a high priority project certified by Congress and
the National Economic and Development Authority as falling under the Investment Priorities
Plan of Government (Rollo, pp. 310-311). It is, therefore, outside the application of the Uniform
Currency Act (R.A. No. 529), which reads as follows:
Sec. 1. — Every provision contained in, or made with respect to, any domestic obligation to wit,
any obligation contracted in the Philippines which provisions purports to give the obligee the
right to require payment in gold or in a particular kind of coin or currency other than Philippine
currency or in an amount of money of the Philippines measured thereby, be as it is hereby
declared against public policy, and null, void, and of no effect, and no such provision shall be
contained in, or made with respect to, any obligation hereafter incurred. The above prohibition
shall not apply to (a) . . .; (b) transactions affecting high-priority economic projects for
agricultural, industrial and power development as may be determined by
the National Economic Council which are financed by or through foreign funds; . . . .
3. The fact that the contract for the construction of the EDSA LRT III was awarded through
negotiation and before congressional approval on January 22 and 23, 1992 of the List of
National Projects to be undertaken by the private sector pursuant to the BOT Law (Rollo, pp.
309-312) does not suffice to invalidate the award.
Subsequent congressional approval of the list including "rail-based projects packaged with
commercial development opportunities" (Rollo, p. 310) under which the EDSA LRT III projects
falls, amounts to a ratification of the prior award of the EDSA LRT III contract under the BOT
Law.
Petitioners insist that the prequalifications process which led to the negotiated award of the
contract appears to have been rigged from the very beginning to do away with the usual open
international public bidding where qualified internationally known applicants could fairly
participate.
The records show that only one applicant passed the prequalification process. Since only one
was left, to conduct a public bidding in accordance with Section 5 of the BOT Law for that lone
participant will be an absurb and pointless exercise (cf. Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, 217 SCRA
49, 61 [1993]).
Contrary to the comments of the Executive Secretary Drilon, Section 5 of the BOT Law in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 1594 allows the negotiated award of government
infrastructure projects.
Presidential Decree No. 1594, "Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for
Government Infrastructure Contracts," allows the negotiated award of government projects in
exceptional cases. Sections 4 of the said law reads as follows:
Bidding. — Construction projects shall generally be undertaken by contract after competitive
public bidding. Projects may be undertaken by administration or force account or by negotiated
contract only in exceptional cases where time is of the essence, or where there is lack of
qualified bidders or contractors, or where there is conclusive evidence that greater economy
and efficiency would be achieved through this arrangement, and in accordance with provision
of laws and acts on the matter, subject to the approval of the Minister of Public Works and
Transportation and Communications, the Minister of Public Highways, or the Minister of Energy,
as the case may be, if the project cost is less than P1 Million, and the President of the
Philippines, upon recommendation of the Minister, if the project cost is P1 Million or more
(Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, where there is a lack of qualified bidders or contractors, the award of government
infrastructure contracts may he made by negotiation. Presidential Decree No. 1594 is the
general law on government infrastructure contracts while the BOT Law governs particular
arrangements or schemes aimed at encouraging private sector participation in government
infrastructure projects. The two laws are not inconsistent with each other but are inpari
materia and should be read together accordingly.
In the instant case, if the prequalification process was actually tainted by foul play, one wonders
why none of the competing firms ever brought the matter before the PBAC, or intervened in this
case before us (cf. Malayan Integrated Industries Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 640
[1992]; Bureau Veritas v. Office of the President, 205 SCRA 705 [1992]).
The challenged agreements have been approved by President Ramos himself. Although then
Executive Secretary Drilon may have disapproved the "Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer
a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA," there is nothing in our laws that prohibits parties to a
22
contract from renegotiating and modifying in good faith the terms and conditions thereof so as
to meet legal, statutory and constitutional requirements. Under the circumstances, to require
the parties to go back to step one of the prequalification process would just be an idle ceremony.
Useless bureaucratic "red tape" should be eschewed because it discourages private sector
participation, the "main engine" for national growth and development (R.A. No. 6957, Sec. 1),
and renders the BOT Law nugatory.
Republic Act No. 7718 recognizes and defines a BLT scheme in Section 2 thereof as:
(e) Build-lease-and-transfer — A contractual arrangement whereby a project proponent is
authorized to finance and construct an infrastructure or development facility and upon its
completion turns it over to the government agency or local government unit concerned on a
lease arrangement for a fixed period after which ownership of the facility is automatically
transferred to the government unit concerned.
Section 5-A of the law, which expressly allows direct negotiation of contracts, provides:
Direct Negotiation of Contracts. — Direct negotiation shall be resorted to when there is only one
complying bidder left as defined hereunder.
(a) If, after advertisement, only one contractor applies for prequalification and it meets the
prequalification requirements, after which it is required to submit a bid proposal which is
subsequently found by the agency/local government unit (LGU) to be complying.
(b) If, after advertisement, more than one contractor applied for prequalification but only one
meets the prequalification requirements, after which it submits bid/proposal which is found by
the agency/local government unit (LGU) to be complying.
(c) If, after prequalification of more than one contractor only one submits a bid which is found
by the agency/LGU to be complying.
(d) If, after prequalification, more than one contractor submit bids but only one is found by the
agency/LGU to be complying. Provided, That, any of the disqualified prospective bidder [sic]
may appeal the decision of the implementing agency, agency/LGUs prequalification bids and
awards committee within fifteen (15) working days to the head of the agency, in case of national
projects or to the Department of the Interior and Local Government, in case of local projects
from the date the disqualification was made known to the disqualified bidder: Provided,
furthermore, That the implementing agency/LGUs concerned should act on the appeal within
forty-five (45) working days from receipt thereof.
Petitioners' claim that the BLT scheme and direct negotiation of contracts are not contemplated
by the BOT Law has now been rendered moot and academic by R.A. No. 7718. Section 3 of
this law authorizes all government infrastructure agencies, government-owned and controlled
corporations and local government units to enter into contract with any duly prequalified
proponent for the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any financially viable
infrastructure or development facility through a BOT, BT, BLT, BOO (Build-own-and-operate),
CAO (Contract-add-operate), DOT (Develop-operate-and-transfer), ROT (Rehabilitate-operate-
and-transfer), and ROO (Rehabilitate-own-operate) (R.A. No. 7718, Sec. 2 [b-j]).
From the law itself, once and applicant has prequalified, it can enter into any of the schemes
enumerated in Section 2 thereof, including a BLT arrangement, enumerated and defined therein
(Sec. 3).
Republic Act No. 7718 is a curative statute. It is intended to provide financial incentives and "a
climate of minimum government regulations and procedures and specific government
undertakings in support of the private sector" (Sec. 1). A curative statute makes valid that which
before enactment of the statute was invalid. Thus, whatever doubts and alleged procedural
lapses private respondent and DOTC may have engendered and committed in entering into the
questioned contracts, these have now been cured by R.A. No. 7718 (cf. Development Bank of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980]; Santos V. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041
[1965]; Adong V. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 [1922].
4. Lastly, petitioners claim that the agreements are grossly disadvantageous to the government
because the rental rates are excessive and private respondent's development rights over the
13 stations and the depot will rob DOTC of the best terms during the most productive years of
the project.
It must be noted that as part of the EDSA LRT III project, private respondent has been granted,
for a period of 25 years, exclusive rights over the depot and the air space above the stations for
development into commercial premises for lease, sublease, transfer, or advertising
(Supplemental Agreement, Sec. 11; Rollo, pp. 91-92). For and in consideration of these
development rights, private respondent shall pay DOTC in Philippine currency guaranteed
revenues generated therefrom in the amounts set forth in the Supplemental Agreement (Sec.
11;Rollo, p. 93). In the event that DOTC shall be unable to collect the guaranteed revenues,
DOTC shall be allowed to deduct any shortfalls from the monthly rent due private respondent
for the construction of the EDSA LRT III (Supplemental Agreement, Sec. 11; Rollo, pp. 93-94).
All rights, titles, interests and income over all contracts on the commercial spaces shall revert
to DOTC upon expiration of the 25-year period. (Supplemental Agreement, Sec. 11; Rollo, pp.
91-92).
The terms of the agreements were arrived at after a painstaking study by DOTC. The
determination by the proper administrative agencies and officials who have acquired expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge in the performance of their functions should be accorded
respect absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion (Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co. v. Deputy
Executive Secretary, 190 SCRA 673 [1990]; Board of Medical Education v. Alfonso, 176 SCRA
304 [1989]). Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and
strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption. Petitioners have not presented evidence on the
reasonable rentals to be paid by the parties to each other. The matter of valuation is an esoteric field which
is better left to the experts and which this Court is not eager to undertake.
That the grantee of a government contract will profit therefrom and to that extent the government is
deprived of the profits if it engages in the business itself, is not worthy of being raised as an issue. In all
cases where a party enters into a contract with the government, he does so, not out of charity and not to
lose money, but to gain pecuniarily.
5. Definitely, the agreements in question have been entered into by DOTC in the exercise of its
governmental function. DOTC is the primary policy, planning, programming, regulating and administrative
entity of the Executive branch of government in the promotion, development and regulation of dependable
and coordinated networks of transportation and communications systems as well as in the fast, safe,
efficient and reliable postal, transportation and communications services (Administrative Code of 1987,
Book IV, Title XV, Sec. 2). It is the Executive department, DOTC in particular that has the power, authority
and technical expertise determine whether or not a specific transportation or communication project is
necessary, viable and beneficial to the people. The discretion to award a contract is vested in the
government agencies entrusted with that function (Bureau Veritas v. Office of the President, 205 SCRA
705 [1992]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED
23
G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME
CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO
SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V.
VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN.
WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They insist that the decision in the
first case has already settled (1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and
(2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-
line lottery. Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can no longer be reopened.
Because two members of the Court did not consider themselves bound by the decision in the
first case, petitioners suggest that the two, in joining the dissenters in the first case in
reexamining the questions in the present case, acted otherwise than according to law. They cite
the following statement in the opinion of the Court:
The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7)
members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit.
The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent
litigation. In addition, there have been changes in the membership of the Court, with the
retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and
Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling
as to petitioners' standing.
Petitioners claim that this statement "conveys a none too subtle suggestion, perhaps a Freudian
slip, that the two new appointees, regardless of the merit of the Decision in the first Kilosbayan
case against the lotto (Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) must of necessity
align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters in the first case and
constitute the new majority in the second lotto case." And petitioners ask, "why should it be so?"
Petitioners ask a question to which they have made up an answer. Their attempt at
psychoanalysis, detecting a Freudian slip where none exists, may be more revealing of their
own unexpressed wish to find motives where there are none which they can impute to some
members of the Court.
For the truth is that the statement is no more than an effort to explain — rather than to justify —
the majority's decision to overrule the ruling in the previous case. It is simply meant to explain
that because the five members of the Court who dissented in the first case (Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ.) and the two new members (Mendoza and Francisco, JJ.)
thought the previous ruling to be erroneous and its reexamination not to be barred by stare
decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment, or law of the case, it was hardly tenable for
petitioners to insist on the first ruling.
Consequently to petitioners' question "What is the glue that holds them together," implying some
ulterior motives on the part of the new majority in reexamining the two questions, the answer is:
None, except a conviction on the part of the five, who had been members of the Court at the
time they dissented in the first case, and the two new members that the previous ruling was
erroneous. The eighth Justice (Padilla, J.) on the other hand agrees with the seven Justices
that the ELA is in a real sense a lease agreement and therefore does not violate R.A. No. 1169.
The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of the original
majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the first decision
in the first case was later reversed.
It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two questions is barred because the PCSO
and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation made a " formal commitment not to ask
for a reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case and instead submit a new agreement
that would be in conformity with the PCSO Charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) and with the
Decision of the Supreme Court in the first Kilosbayan case against on-line, hi-tech lotto."
To be sure, a new contract was entered into which the majority of the Court finds has been
purged of the features which made the first contract objectionable. Moreover, what the PCSO
said in its manifestation in the first case was the following:
1. They are no longer filing a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court
dated May 5, 1994, a copy of which was received on May 6, 1994.
2. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently negotiating a new lease agreement consistent
with the authority of PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) and
conformable with the pronouncements of this Honorable Court in its Decision of May 5, 1995.
The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as the PCSO.
There was thus no "formal commitment" — but only a manifestation — that the parties were not
filing a motion for reconsideration. Even if the parties made a "formal commitment," the six (6)
dissenting Justices certainly could not be bound thereby not to insist on their contrary view on
the question of standing. Much less were the two new members bound by any "formal
commitment" made by the parties. They believed that the ruling in the first case was erroneous.
Since in their view reexamination was not barred by the doctrine of stare decisis, res judicata or
conclusiveness of judgment or law of the case, they voted the way they did with the remaining
five (5) dissenters in the first case to form a new majority of eight.
Petitioners ask, "Why should this be so?" Because, as explained in the decision, the first
decision was erroneousand no legal doctrine stood in the way of its reexamination. It can,
therefore, be asked "with equal candor": "Why should this not be so?"
Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested, if not reversed, in a subsequent case
because of change in the membership of a court. In 1957, this Court, voting 6-5, held
in Feliciano v. Aquinas, G.R. No. L-10201, Sept. 23, 1957 that the phrase "at the time of the
election" in §2174 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 meant that a candidate for
municipal elective position must be at least 23 years of age on the date of the election. On the
other hand, the dissenters argued that it was enough if he attained that age on the day he
assumed office.
Less than three years later, the same question was before the Court again, as a candidate for
municipal councilor stated under oath in her certificate of candidacy that she was eligible for
that position although she attained the requisite age (23 years) only when she assumed office.
24
The question was whether she could be prosecuted for falsification. In People v. Yang, 107 Phi.
888 (1960), the Court ruled she could not. Justice, later Chief Justice, Benison, who dissented
in the first case, Feliciano v. Aquinas, supra, wrote the opinion of the Court, holding that while
the statement that the accused was eligible was "inexact or erroneous, according to the majority
in the Feliciano case," the accused could not be held liable for falsification, because
the question [whether the law really required candidates to have the required age on the day of
the election or whether it was sufficient that they attained it at the beginning of the term of
office] has not been discussed anew, despite the presence of new members; we
simply assume for the purpose of this decision that the doctrine stands.
Thus because in the meantime there had been a change in the membership of the Court with
the retirement of two members (Recess and Flex, JJ.) who had taken part in the decision in the
first case and their replacement by new members (Barrera and Gutierrez-David, JJ.) and the
fact that the vote in the first case was a narrow one (6 to 5), the Court allowed that the continuing
validity of its ruling in the first case might well be doubted. For this reason it gave the accused
the benefit of the doubt that she had acted in the good faith belief that it was sufficient that she
was 23 years of age when she assumed office.
In that case, the change in the membership of the Court and the possibility of change in the
ruling were noted without anyone — much less would-be psychoanalysts — finding in the
statement of the Court any Freudian slip. The possibility of change in the rule as a result of
change in membership was accepted as a sufficient reason for finding good faith and lack of
criminal intent on the part of the accused.
Indeed, a change in the composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an
erroneous decision. This was the lesson of Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (1871). The Legal Tender
Acts, which were passed during the Civil War, made U.S. notes (greenbacks) legal tender for
the payment of debts, public or private, with certain exceptions. The validity of the acts, as
applied to preexisting debts, was challenged in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1869). The
Court was then composed of only eight (8) Justices because of Congressional effort to limit the
appointing power of President Johnson. Voting 5-3, the Court declared the acts void. Chief
Justice Chase wrote the opinion of the Court in which four others, including Justice Grier,
concurred. Justices Miller, Swayne and Davis dissented. A private memorandum left by the
dissenting Justices described how an effort was made "to convince an aged and infirm member
of the court [Justice Grier] that he had not understood the question on which he voted," with the
result that what was originally a 4-4 vote was converted into a majority (5-3) for holding the acts
invalid.
On the day the decision was announced, President Grant nominated to the Court William Strong
and Joseph P. Bradley to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Justice Grier and to
restore the membership of the Court to nine. In 1871, Hepburn v. Griswold was overruled in the
Legal Tender Cases, as Knox v. Lee came to be known, in an opinion by Justice Strong, with a
dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Chase and the three other surviving members of the former
majority. There were allegations that the new Justices were appointed for their known views on
the validity of the Legal Tender Acts, just as there were others who defended the character and
independence of the new Justices. History has vindicated the overruling of the Hepburn case
by the new majority. The Legal Tender Cases proved to be the Court's means of salvation from
what Chief Justice Hughes later described as one of the Court's "self-inflicted wounds." 1
We now consider the specific grounds for petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of constitutionality in this case, the
rule concerning real party in interest, applicable to private litigation rather than the more liberal
rule on standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections are made against that ruling: (1) that the
constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for
affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official
actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing to
independent people's organizations "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, §16), grants them standing to sue on
constitutional grounds.
The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:
Art. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and property, and
thepromotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.
Id., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Id., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote
and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in
the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id., §17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and
sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human
liberation and development.
As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights
which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive
action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that
consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this
authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per
se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the
contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore,
does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being
privies to the agreement, cannot raise.
Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the requisite personality to
question the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall
respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and
protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations
through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at
all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§
15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those
with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court,
even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy"
25
requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is
what differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the political
departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.
Petitioners quote extensively from the speech of Commissioner Garcia before the Constitutional
Commission, explaining the provisions on independent people's organizations. There is nothing
in the speech, however, which supports their claim of standing. On the contrary, the speech
points the way to the legislative and executive branches of the government, rather than to the
courts, as the appropriate fora for the advocacy of petitioners' views. 2 Indeed, the provisions
on independent people's organizations may most usefully be read in connection with the
provision on initiative and referendum as a means whereby the people may propose or enact
laws or reject any of those passed by Congress. For the fact is that petitioners' opposition to the
contract in question is nothing more than an opposition to the government policy on lotteries.
It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and
concerned citizens in cases involving "paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens and legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases involving
constitutional issues and
(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing.
Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds. (Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phi. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. Comelec,
73 SCRA 333 (1976); Bugnay Const. & Dev. v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 (1989); City Council of
Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 [1972]) or where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional.
(VAT Cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630 [1994]) Voters are allowed to
question the validity of election laws because of their obvious interest in the validity of such
laws. (Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774 [1967]) Concerned citizens can bring suits if the
constitutional question they raise is of "transcendental importance" which must be settled early.
(Emergency Powers Cases [Araneta v. Dinglasan], 84 Phi. 368 (1949); Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano, 121 Phi. 358 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 122 Phi. 894 (1965);
CLU v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991]) Legislators are allowed to sue to question
the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives qualegislators.
(Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992); Gonzales
v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 (1971); Tatad v.
Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, April 16, 1995 (Mendoza, J., concurring))
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners
assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement for bringing
taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere
in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent
COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine
Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a
taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs.
Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is
vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. (Emphasis
added)
Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits.
Neither do the other cases cited by petitioners support their contention that taxpayers have
standing to question government contracts regardless of whether public funds are involved or
not. In Gonzales v. National Housing, Corp., 94 SCRA 786 (1979), petitioner filed a taxpayer's
suit seeking the annulment of a contract between the NHC and a foreign corporation. The case
was dismissed by the trial court. The dismissal was affirmed by this Court on the grounds of res
judicata and pendency of a prejudicial question, thus avoiding the question of petitioner's
standing.
On the other hand, in Gonzales v. Raquiza, 180 SCRA 254 (1989), petitioner sought the
annulment of a contract made by the government with a foreign corporation for the purchase of
road construction equipment. The question of standing was not discussed, but even if it was,
petitioner's standing could be sustained because he was a minority stockholder of the Philippine
National Bank, which was one of the defendants in the case.
In the other case cited by petitioners, City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 (1972),
members of the city council were allowed to sue to question the validity of a contract entered
into by the city government for the purchase of road construction equipment because their
contention was that the contract had been made without their authority. In addition, as taxpayers
they had an interest in seeing to it that public funds were spent pursuant to an appropriation
made by law.
But, in the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds are being misapplied or
misappropriated. The controlling doctrine is that of Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975)
where it was held that funds raised from contributions for the benefit of the Cultural Center of
the Philippines were not public funds and petitioner had no standing to bring a taxpayer's suit
to question their disbursement by the President of the Philippines.
Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can
they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners,
who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they
do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.
Finally, in Valmonte v. PCSO, G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987, we threw out a petition
questioning another form of lottery conducted by the PCSO on the ground that petitioner, who
claimed to be a "citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three minor children," had no direct and
personal interest in the lottery. We said: "He must be able to show, not only that the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute complained of." In the case at bar, petitioners have not shown
why, unlike petitioner in the Valmonte case, they should be accorded standing to bring this suit.
The case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is different. Citizens' standing to bring
a suit seeking the cancellation of timber licenses was sustained in that case because the Court
26
considered Art. II, §16 a right-conferring provision which can be enforced in the courts. That
provision states:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. (Emphasis)
In contrast, the policies and principles invoked by petitioners in this case do not permit of such
categorization.
Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to
lotteries which they regard to be immoral. This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter
for Congress to decide and Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.
Nevertheless, although we have concluded that petitioners do not have standing, we have not
stopped there and dismissed their case. For in the view we take, whether a party has a cause
of action and, therefore, is a real party in interest or one with standing to raise a constitutional
question must turn on whether he has a right which has been violated. For this reason the Court
has not ducked the substantive issues raised by petitioners.
II. R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P No . 42, states:
§1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. — The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,
hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and
providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and services and charities of
national character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of
Act Numbered One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-Nine, as amended, and shall have the
authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, in such
frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as
shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.
B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health and
welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit-oriented, by
itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or
entity, whether domestic or foreign, except for the activities mentioned in the preceding
paragraph (A), for the purpose of providing for permanent and continuing sources of funds for
health programs, including the expansion of existing ones, medical assistance and services,
and/or charitable grants: Provided, That such investments will not compete with the private
sector in areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National
Economic and Development Authority.
Petitioners insist on the ruling in the previous case that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct
charity sweepstakes, lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any other party because of the clause "except for the activities mentioned in the
preceding paragraph (A)" in paragraph (B) of §1. Petitioners contend that the ruling is the law
of this case because the parties are the same and the case involves the same issue, i.e., the
meaning of this statutory provision.
The "law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable, because this case is not a continuation of the first
one. Petitioners also say that inquiry into the same question as to the meaning of the statutory
provision is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The general rule on the "conclusiveness of
judgment," however, is subject to the exception that a question may be reopened if it is a legal
question and the two actions involve substantially different claims. This is generally accepted in
American law from which our Rules of Court was adopted. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
59 L.Ed.2d 147, 210 (1979); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 2d, ON JUDGMENTS, §28; P.
BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN AND D. SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n.2 [3rd Ed., 1988]) There is nothing in the record of this case to
suggest that this exception is inapplicable in this jurisdiction.
Indeed, the questions raised in this case are legal questions and the claims involved are
substantially different from those involved in the prior case between the parties. As already
stated, the ELA is substantially different from the Contract of Lease declared void in the first
case.
Borrowing from the dissenting opinion of Justice Feliciano, petitioners argue that the phrase "by
itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any other party" qualifies not only §1
(B) but also §1 (A), because the exception clause ("except for the activities mentioned in the
preceding paragraph [A]") "operates, as it were, as a renvoi clause which refers back to Section
1(A) and in this manner avoids the necessity of simultaneously amending the text of Section
1(A)."
This interpretation, however, fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in
paragraph (B), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking
authority, but also the phrase "by itself." In other words, under paragraph (B), the PCSO is
prohibited from "engag[ing] in . . . investments, programs, projects and activities" if these involve
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities not only "in collaboration, association
or joint venture" with any other party but also "by itself." Obviously, this prohibition cannot apply
when the PCSO conducts these activities itself. Otherwise, what paragraph (A) authorizes the
PCSO to do, paragraph (B) would prohibit.
The fact is that the phrase in question does not qualify the authority of the PCSO under
paragraph (A), but rather the authority granted to it by paragraph (B). The amendment of
paragraph (B) by B.P. Blg. 42 was intended to enable the PCSO to engage in certain
investments, programs, projects and activities for the purpose of raising funds for health
programs and charity. That is why the law provides that such investments by the PCSO should
"not compete with the private sector in areas where investments are adequate as may be
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority." Justice Davide, then an
Assemblyman, made a proposal which was accepted, reflecting the understanding that the bill
they were discussing concerned the authority of the PCSO to invest in the business of others.
The following excerpt from the Record of the Batasan Pambansa shows this to be the subject
of the discussion:
MR. DAVIDE. May I introduce an amendment after "adequate". The intention of the amendment
is not to leave the determination of whether it is adequate or not to anybody. And my amendment
is to add after "adequate" the words AS MAY BE DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. As a mater of fact, it will strengthen
the authority to invest in these areas, provided that the determination of whether the private
sector's activity is already adequate must be determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority.
Mr. ZAMORA. Mr. Speaker, the committee accepts the proposed amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
27
(2 RECORD OF THE BATASAN PAMBANSA, Sept. 6, 1979,
p. 1007)
Thus what the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so
whether "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with others or "by itself." This seems to
be the only possible interpretation of §1 (A) and (B) in light of its text and its legislative history.
That there is today no other entity engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and the like does
not detract from the validity of this interpretation.
III. The Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract, which were considered
to be features of a joint venture agreement, had been removed in the new contract. For instance,
§5 of the ELA provides that in the operation of the on-line lottery, the PCSO must employ "its
own competent and qualified personnel." Petitioners claim, however, that the
"contemporaneous interpretation" of PGMC officials of this provision is otherwise. They cite the
testimony of Glen Barroga of the PGMC before a Senate committee to the effect that under the
ELA the PGMC would be operating the lottery system "side by side" with PCSO personnel as
part of the transfer of technology.
Whether the transfer of technology would result in a violation of PCSO's franchise should be
determined by facts and not by what some officials of the PGMC state by way of opinion. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that §5 reflects the true intention of the
parties. Thus, Art. 1370 of the Civil Code says that "If the terms of a contract are clear and leave
no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control." The intention of the parties must be ascertained from their "contemporaneous and
subsequent acts." (Art. 1371; Atlantic Gulf Co. v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166 [1908]) It
cannot simply be judged from what one of them says. On the other hand, the claim of third
parties, like petitioners, that the clause on upgrading of equipment would enable the parties
after a while to change the contract and enter into something else in violation of the law is mere
speculation and cannot be a basis for judging the validity of the contract.
IV. It is contended that §1 of E.O. No. 301 covers all types of "contract[s] for public services
or for furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment to the government or to any of its
branches, agencies or instrumentalities" and not only contracts of purchase and sale.
Consequently, a lease of equipment, like the ELA, must be submitted to public bidding in order
to be valid. This contention is based on two premises: (1) that §1 of E.O. No. 301 applies to any
contract whereby the government acquires title to or the use of the equipment and (2) that the
words "supplies," "materials," and "equipment" are distinct from each other so that when an
exception in §1 speaks of "supplies," it cannot be construed to mean "equipment."
Petitioners' contention will not bear analysis. For example, the term "supplies" is used in
paragraph (a), which provides that a contract for the furnishing of "supplies" in order to meet an
emergency is exempt from public bidding. Unless "supplies" is construed to include
"equipment," however, the lease of heavy equipment needed for rescue operations in case of
a calamity will have to be submitted to public bidding before it can be entered into by the
government.
In dissent Justice Feliciano says that in such a situation the government can simply resort to
expropriation, paying compensation afterward. This is just like purchasing the equipment
through negotiation when the question is whether the purchase should be by public bidding, not
to mention the fact that the power to expropriate may not be exercised when the government
can very well negotiate with private owners.
Indeed, there are fundamental difficulties in simultaneously contending (1) that E.O. No. 301,
§1 covers both contracts of sale and lease agreements and (2) that the words "supplies,"
"materials" and "equipment" can not be interchanged. Thus, under paragraph (b) of §1, public
bidding is not required "whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or
activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service." Following
petitioners' theory, there should be a public bidding before the government can enter into a
contract for the lease of bulldozers and dredging equipment even if these are urgently needed
in areas ravaged by lahar because, first, lease contracts are covered by the general rule and,
second, the exception to public bidding in paragraph (b) covers only "supplies" but not
equipment.
To take still another example. Paragraph (d), which does away with the requirement of public
bidding "whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for
at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each
instance were exorbitant or nonconforming to specifications." Again, following the theory of the
petitioners, a contract for the lease of equipment cannot be entered into even if there are no
bids because, first, lease contracts are governed by the general rule on public bidding and,
second, the exception to public bidding in paragraph (d) applies only to contracts for the
furnishing of "supplies."
Other examples can be given to show the absurdity of interpreting §1 as applicable to any
contract for the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment and of considering the words
"supplies," "materials" and "equipment" to be not interchangeable. Our ruling that §1 of E.O.
No. 301 does not cover the lease of equipment avoids these fundamental difficulties and is
supported by the text of §1, which is entitled "Guidelines forNegotiated Contracts" and by the
fact that the only provisions of E.O. No. 301 on leases, namely, §§6 and 7, concern the lease
of buildings by or to the government. Thus the text of §1 reads:
§1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. — Any provision of law, decree, executive order or
other issuances to the contrary notwithstanding, no contract for public services or for furnishing
supplies, materials and equipment to the government or any of its branches, agencies or
instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without public bidding, except under any of
the following situations:
a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which may involve the
loss of, or danger to, life and/or property;
b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot
be delayed without causing detriment to the public service;
c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer who does not
have subdealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained
elsewhere at more advantageous terms to the government;
d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at
least two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance
were exhorbitant or non-conforming to specifications;
28
e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies through negotiated (3) Direct purchases from manufacturers or exclusive distributors;
purchase is most advantageous to the government to be determined by the Department Head (4) Thru the Bureau of Supply Coordination; and
concerned; and (5) Purchase from other government entities or foreign governments.
f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government. Sec. 3 broadly defines the term "supplies" as including —
Indeed, the purpose for promulgating E.O. No. 301 was merely to decentralize the system of everything except real estate, which may be needed in the transaction of public business, or in
reviewing negotiated contracts of purchase for the furnishing of supplies, materials and the pursuit of any undertaking, project, or activity, whether of the nature of equipment, furniture,
equipment as well as lease contracts of buildings. Theretofore, E.O. No. 298, promulgated on stationery, materials for construction, or personal property of any sort, including non-personal
August 12, 1940, required consultation with the Secretary of Justice and the Department Head or contractual services such as the repair and maintenance of equipment and furniture, as well
concerned and the approval of the President of the Philippines before contracts for the as trucking, hauling, janitorial, security, and related or analogous services.
furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment could be made on a negotiated basis, without Thus, the texts of both E.O. No. 301, §1 and of P.D. No. 526, §§1 and 12, make it clear that
public bidding. E.O. No. 301 changed this by providing as follows: only contracts for the purchase and sale of supplies, materials and equipment are contemplated
§2. Jurisdiction over Negotiated Contracts. — In line with the principles of decentralization and by the rule concerning public biddings.
accountability, negotiated contracts for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials or Finally, it is contended that equipment leases are attractive and commonly used in place of
equipment may be entered into by the department or agency head or the governing board of contracts of purchase and sale because of "multifarious credit and tax constraints" and therefore
the government-owned or controlled corporation concerned, without need of prior approval by could not have been left out from the requirement of public bidding. Obviously these credit and
higher authorities, subject to availability of funds, compliance with the standards or guidelines tax constraints can have no attraction to the government when considering the advantages of
prescribed in Section 1 hereof, and to the audit jurisdiction of the commission on Audit in sale over lease of equipment. The fact that lease contracts are in common use is not a reason
accordance with existing rules and regulations. for implying that the rule on public bidding applies not only to government purchases but also
Negotiated contracts involving P2,000,000 up to P10,000,000 shall be signed by the Secretary to lease contracts. For the fact also is that the government leases equipment, such as copying
and two other Undersecretaries. machines, personal computers and the like, without going through public bidding.
xxx xxx xxx FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED
§7. Jurisdiction Over Lease Contracts. — The heads of agency intending to rent privately-owned with finality.
buildings or spaces for their use, or to lease out government-owned buildings or spaces for SO ORDERED.
private use, shall have authority to determine the reasonableness of the terms of the lease and
the rental rates thereof, and to enter into such lease contracts without need of prior approval by
higher authorities, subject to compliance with the uniform standards or guidelines established
pursuant to Section 6 hereof by the DPWH and to the audit jurisdiction of COA or its duly
authorized representative in accordance with existing rules and regulations.
In sum, E.O. No. 301 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment, and it was merely to change the system of administrative review of emergency
purchases, as theretofore prescribed by E.O. No. 298, that E.O. No. 301 was issued on July
26, 1987. Part B of this Executive Order applies to leases of buildings, not of equipment, and
therefore does not govern the lease contract in this case. Even if it applies, it does not require
public bidding for entering into it.
Our holding that E.O. No. 301, §1 applies only to contracts of purchase and sale is conformable
to P.D. No. 526, promulgated on August 2, 1974, which is in pari materia. P.D. No. 526 requires
local governments to hold public bidding in the "procurement of supplies." By
specifying "procurement of supplies" and excepting from the general rule "purchases" when
made under certain circumstances, P.D. No. 526, §12 indicates quite clearly that it applies only
to contracts of purchase and sale. This provision reads:
§12. Procurement without public bidding. — Procurement of supplies may be made without the
benefit of public bidding in the following modes:
(1) Personal canvass of responsible merchants;
(2) Emergency purchases;

29
G.R. No. 118509 December 1, 1995
LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and NATIONAL BOOK
STORE, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The issue in the petition before us is whether or not there was a perfected contract between
petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. and respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
covering the sale of a parcel of land, approximately 3.3 hectares in area, and located in Barrio
Bagong Ilog, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
Branch 151 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig
ruled that there was a perfected contract of sale between petitioner and BPI. It stated that there
was mutual consent between the parties; the subject matter is definite; and the consideration
was determined. It concluded that all the elements of a consensual contract are attendant. It
ordered the cancellation of a sale effected by BPI to respondent National Book Store (NBS)
while the case was pending and the nullification of a title issued in favor of said respondent
NBS.
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, it was held that no contract of sale was
perfected because there was no concurrence of the three requisites enumerated in Article 1318
of the Civil Code. The decision of the trial court was reversed and the complaint dismissed.
Hence, the instant petition.
Shorn of the interpretations given to the acts of those who participated in the disputed sale, the
findings of facts of the trial court and the Court of Appeals narrate basically the same events
and occurrences. The records show that on May 14, 1976, Philippine Remnants Co., Inc.
constituted BPI as its trustee to manage, administer, and sell its real estate property. One such
piece of property placed under trust was the disputed lot, a 33,056-square meter lot at Barrio
Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 493122.
On June 23, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., a licensed real estate broker was given formal authority
by BPI to sell the lot for P1,000.00 per square meter. This arrangement was concurred in by the
owners of the Philippine Remnants.
Broker Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim of petitioner company who agreed to buy the land. On
July 8, 1988, petitioner's officials and Revilla were given permission by Rolando V. Aromin, BPI
Assistant Vice-President, to enter and view the property they were buying.
On July 9, 1988, Revilla formally informed BPI that he had procured a buyer, herein petitioner.
On July 11, 1988, petitioner's officials, Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai, went to BPI to confirm
the sale. They were entertained by Vice-President Merlin Albano and Asst. Vice-President
Aromin. Petitioner asked that the price of P1,000.00 per square meter be reduced to P900.00
while Albano stated the price to be P1,100.00. The parties finally agreed that the lot would be
sold at P1,000.00 per square meter to be paid in cash. Since the authority to sell was on a first
come, first served and non-exclusive basis, it may be mentioned at this juncture that there is no
dispute over petitioner's being the first comer and the buyer to be first served.
Notwithstanding the final agreement to pay P1,000.00 per square meter on a cash basis,
Alfonso Lim asked if it was possible to pay on terms. The bank officials stated that there was
no harm in trying to ask for payment on terms because in previous transactions, the same had
been allowed. It was the understanding, however, that should the term payment be disapproved,
then the price shall be paid in cash.
It was Albano who dictated the terms under which the installment payment may be approved,
and acting thereon, Alfonso Lim, on the same date, July 11, 1988, wrote BPI through Merlin
Albano embodying the payment initially of 10% and the remaining 90% within a period of 90
days.
Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay on terms had been frozen. Alfonso
Lim went to BPI on July 18, 1988 and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano.
The payment was refused because Albano stated that the authority to sell that particular piece
of property in Pasig had been withdrawn from his unit. The same check was tendered to BPI
Vice-President Nelson Bona who also refused to receive payment.
An action for specific performance with damages was thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by
petitioner against BPI. In the course of the trial, BPI informed the trial court that it had sold the
property under litigation to NBS on July 14, 1989. The complaint was thus amended to include
NBS.
On June 10, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment in the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants Bank
of the Philippine Islands and National Book Store, Inc.: —
1. Declaring the Deed of Sale of the property covered by T.C.T. No. 493122 in the name of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, situated in Barrio Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila, in favor of
National Book Store, Inc., null and void;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal to cancel the Transfer Certificate of
Title which may have been issued in favor of National Book Store, Inc. by virtue of the
aforementioned Deed of Sale dated July 14, 1989;
3. Ordering defendant BPI, upon receipt by it from plaintiff of the sum of P33,056,000.00, to
execute a Deed of Sale in favor of plaintiff of the aforementioned property at the price of
P1,000.00 per square meter; in default thereof, the Clerk of this Court is directed to execute the
said deed;
4. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasig, upon registration of the said deed, whether executed
by defendant BPI or the Clerk of Court and payment of the corresponding fees and charges, to
cancel said T.C.T. No. 493122 and to issue, in lieu thereof, another transfer certificate of title in
the name of plaintiff;
5. Ordering defendants BPI and National Book Store, Inc. to pay, jointly and severally, to the
plaintiff the sums of P10,000,000.00 as actual and consequential damages and P150,000.00
as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, both with interest at 12% per annum from date
hereof;
6. On the cross-claim of defendant bank against National Book Store, ordering the latter to
indemnify the former of whatever amounts BPI shall have paid to the plaintiff by reason hereof;
and
7. Dismissing the counterclaims of the defendants against the plaintiff and National Book Store's
cross-claim against defendant bank.
Costs against defendants.
(pp. 44-45, Rollo.)
30
As earlier intimated, upon the decision being appealed, the Court of Appeals (Buena [P], Rasul,
and Mabutas,JJ.), on August 12, 1994, reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed
petitioner's complaint for specific performance and damages.
The issues raised by the parties revolve around the following four questions:
(1) Was there a meeting of the minds between petitioner Limketkai and respondent BPI as to
the subject matter of the contract and the cause of the obligation?
(2) Were the bank officials involved in the transaction authorized by BPI to enter into the
questioned contract?
(3) Is there competent and admissible evidence to support the alleged meeting of the minds?
(4) Was the sale of the disputed land to the NBS during the pendency of trial effected in good
faith?
There is no dispute in regard to the following: (a) that BPI as trustee of the property of Philippine
Remnant Co. authorized a licensed broker, Pedro Revilla, to sell the lot for P1,000.00 per
square meter; (b) that Philippine Remnants confirmed the authority to sell of Revilla and the
price at which he may sell the lot; (c) that petitioner and Revilla agreed on the former buying the
property; (d) that BPI Assistant Vice-President Rolando V. Aromin allowed the broker and the
buyer to inspect the property; and (e) that BPI was formally informed about the broker having
procured a buyer.
The controversy revolves around the interpretation or the significance of the happenings or
events at this point.
Petitioner states that the contract to sell and to buy was perfected on July 11, 1988 when its top
officials and broker Revilla finalized the details with BPI Vice-Presidents Merlin Albano and
Rolando V. Aromin at the BPI offices.
Respondents, however, contend that what transpired on this date were part of continuing
negotiations to buy the land and not the perfection of the sale. The arguments of respondents
center on two propositions — (1) Vice-Presidents Aromin and Albano had no authority to bind
BPI on this particular transaction and (2) the subsequent attempts of petitioner to pay under
terms instead of full payment in cash constitutes a counter-offer which negates the existence of
a perfected contract.
The alleged lack of authority of the bank officials acting in behalf of BPI is not sustained by the
record.
At the start of the transactions, broker Revilla by himself already had full authority to sell the
disputed lot. Exhibit B dated June 23, 1988 states, "this will serve as your authority to sell on an
as is, where is basis the property located at Pasig Blvd., Bagong Ilog . . . ." We agree with
Revilla's testimony that the authority given to him was to sell and not merely to look for a buyer,
as contended by respondents.
Revilla testified that at the time he perfected the agreement to sell the litigated property, he was
acting for and in behalf of the BPI as if he were the Bank itself. This notwithstanding and to firm
up the sale of the land, Revilla saw it fit to bring BPI officials into the transaction. If BPI could
give the authority to sell to a licensed broker, we see no reason to doubt the authority to sell of
the two BPI Vice-Presidents whose precise job in the Bank was to manage and administer real
estate property.
Respondent BPI alleges that sales of trust property need the approval of a Trust Committee
made up of top bank officials. It appears from the record that this trust committee meets rather
infrequently and it does not have to pass on regular transactions.
Rolando Aromin was BPI Assistant Vice-President and Trust Officer. He directly supervised the
BPI Real Property Management Unit. He had been in the Real Estate Division since 1985 and
was the head supervising officer of real estate matters. Aromin had been with the BPI Trust
Department since 1968 and had been involved in the handling of properties of beneficial owners
since 1975 (tsn., December 3, 1990, p. 5).
Exhibit 10 of BPI, the February 15, 1989 letter from Senior Vice-President Edmundo Barcelon,
while purporting to inform Aromin of his poor performance, is an admission of BPI that Aromin
was in charge of Torrens titles, lease contracts, problems of tenants, insurance policies,
installment receivables, management fees, quitclaims, and other matters involving real estate
transactions. His immediate superior, Vice-President Merlin Albano had been with the Real
Estate Division for only one week but he was present and joined in the discussions with
petitioner.
There is nothing to show that Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai knew Aromin before the incident.
Revilla brought the brothers directly to Aromin upon entering the BPI premises. Aromin acted
in a perfectly natural manner on the transaction before him with not the slightest indication that
he was acting ultra vires. This shows that BPI held Aromin out to the public as the officer
routinely handling real estate transactions and, as Trust Officer, entering into contracts to sell
trust properties.
Respondents state and the record shows that the authority to buy and sell this particular trust
property was later withdrawn from Trust Officer Aromin and his entire unit. If Aromin did not
have any authority to act as alleged, there was no need to withdraw authority which he never
possessed.
Petitioner points to Areola vs. Court of Appeals (236 SCRA 643 [1994]) which cited Prudential
Bank vs. Court of Appeals (22 SCRA 350 [1993]), which in turn relied upon McIntosh vs. Dakota
Trust Co. (52 ND 752, 204 NW 818, 40 ALR 1021), to wit:
Accordingly a banking corporation is liable to innocent third persons where the representation
is made in the course of its business by an agent acting within the general scope of his authority
even though, in the particular case, the agent is secretly abusing his authority and attempting
to perpetrate a fraud upon his principal or some other person for his own ultimate benefit.
(at pp. 652-653.)
In the present case, the position and title of Aromin alone, not to mention the testimony and
documentary evidence about his work, leave no doubt that he had full authority to act for BPI in
the questioned transaction. There is no allegation of fraud, nor is there the least indication that
Aromin was acting for his own ultimate benefit. BPI later dismissed Aromin because it appeared
that a top official of the bank was personally interested in the sale of the Pasig property and did
not like Aromin's testimony. Aromin was charged with poor performance but his dismissal was
only sometime after he testified in court. More than two long years after the disputed transaction,
he was still Assistant Vice-President of BPI.
The records show that the letter of instruction dated June 14, 1988 from the owner of Philippine
Remnants Co. regarding the sale of the firm's property was addressed to Aromin. The
P1,000.00 figure on the first page of broker Revilla's authority to sell was changed to P1,100.00
31
by Aromin. The price was later brought down again to P1,000.00, also by Aromin. The
permission given to petitioner to view the lot was signed by Aromin and honored by the BPI
guards. The letter dated July 9, 1988 from broker Revilla informing BPI that he had a buyer was
addressed to Aromin. The conference on July 11, 1988 when the contract was perfected was
with Aromin and Vice-President Albano. Albano and Aromin were the ones who assured
petitioner Limketkai's officers that term payment was possible. It was Aromin who called up
Miguel Bicharra of Philippine Remnants to state that the BPI rejected payment on terms and it
was to Aromin that Philippine Remnants gave the go signal to proceed with the cash sale.
Everything in the record points to the full authority of Aromin to bind the bank, except for the
self-serving memoranda or letters later produced by BPI that Aromin was an inefficient and
undesirable officer and who, in fact, was dismissed after he testified in this case. But, of course,
Aromin's alleged inefficiency is not proof that he was not fully clothed with authority to bind BPI.
Respondents' second contention is that there was no perfected contract because petitioner's
request to pay on terms constituted a counter-offer and that negotiations were still in progress
at that point.
Asst. Vice-President Aromin was subpoenaed as a hostile witness for petitioner during trial.
Among his statements is one to the effect that —
. . . Mr. Lim offered to buy the property at P900.00 per square meter while Mr. Albano counter-
offered to sell the property at P1,100.00 per square meter but after the usual haggling, we finally
agreed to sell the property at the price of P1,000.00 per square meter . . .
(tsn, 12-3-90, p. 17; Emphasis supplied.)
Asked if there was a meeting of the minds between the buyer and the bank in respect to the
price of P1,000.00 per square meter, Aromin answered:
Yes, sir, as far as my evaluation there was a meeting of the minds as far as the price is
concerned, sir.
(ibid, p. 17.)
The requirements in the payment of the purchase price on terms instead of cash were
suggested by BPI Vice-President Albano. Since the authority given to broker Revilla specified
cash payment, the possibility of paying on terms was referred to the Trust Committee but with
the mutual agreement that "if the proposed payment on terms will not be approved by our Trust
Committee, Limketkai should pay in cash . . . the amount was no longer subject to the approval
or disapproval of the Committee, it is only on the terms." (ibid, p. 19). This is incontrovertibly
established in the following testimony of Aromin:
A. After you were able to agree on the price of P1,000.00/sq. m., since the letter or authority
says the payment must be in cash basis, what transpired later on?
B. After we have agreed on the price, the Lim brothers inquired on how to go about submitting
the covering proposal if they will be allowed to pay on terms. They requested us to give them a
guide on how to prepare the corresponding letter of proposal. I recall that, upon the request of
Mr. Albino Limketkai, we dictated a guide on how to word a written firm offer that was to be
submitted by Mr. Lim to the bank setting out the terms of payment but with the mutual agreement
that if his proposed payment on terms will not be approved by our trust committee, Limketkai
should pay the price in cash.
Q And did buyer Limketkai agree to pay in cash in case the offer of terms will be cash
(disapproved).
A Yes, sir.
Q At the start, did they show their willingness to pay in cash?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that the agreement on terms was to be submitted to the trust committee for
approval, are you telling the Court that what was to be approved by the trust committee was the
provision on the payment on terms?
A Yes, sir.
Q So the amount was no longer subject to the approval or disapproval of the committee, it is
only on the terms?
A Yes, sir.
(tsn, Dec. 3, 1990, pp. 18-19; Emphasis supplied.)
The record shows that if payment was in cash, either broker Revilla or Aromin had full authority.
But because petitioner took advantage of the suggestion of Vice-President Albano, the matter
was sent to higher officials. Immediately upon learning that payment on terms was frozen and/or
denied, Limketkai exercised his right within the period given to him and tendered payment in
full. The BPI rejected the payment.
In its Comment and Memorandum, respondent NBS cites Ang Yu Asuncion vs. Court of
Appeals (238 SCRA 602 [1994]) to bolster its case. Contrarywise, it would seem that the legal
principles found in said case strengthen and support petitioner's submission that the contract
was perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties.
The negotiation or preparation stage started with the authority given by Philippine Remnants to
BPI to sell the lot, followed by (a) the authority given by BPI and confirmed by Philippine
Remnants to broker Revilla to sell the property, (b) the offer to sell to Limketkai, (c) the
inspection of the property and finally (d) the negotiations with Aromin and Albano at the BPI
offices.
The perfection of the contract took place when Aromin and Albano, acting for BPI, agreed to
sell and Alfonso Lim with Albino Limketkai, acting for petitioner Limketkai, agreed to buy the
disputed lot at P1,000.00 per square meter. Aside from this there was the earlier agreement
between petitioner and the authorized broker. There was a concurrence of offer and
acceptance, on the object, and on the cause thereof.
The phases that a contract goes through may be summarized as follows:
a. preparation, conception or generation, which is the period of negotiation and bargaining,
ending at the moment of agreement of the parties;
b. perfection or birth of the contract, which is the moment when the parties come to agree on
the terms of the contract; and
c. consummation or death, which is the fulfillment or performance of the terms agreed upon in
the contract (Toyota Shaw, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116650, May 23, 1995).
But in more graphic prose, we turn to Ang Yu Asuncion, per Justice Vitug:
. . . A contract undergoes various stages that include its negotiation or preparation, its perfection
and, finally, its consummation. Negotiation covers the period from the time the prospective
contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time the contract is concluded
(perfected). Theperfection of the contract takes place upon the concurrence of the essential
elements thereof. A contract which is consensual as to perfection is so established upon a mere
meeting of minds, i.e., the concurrence of offer and acceptance, on the object and on the cause
32
thereof. A contract which requires, in addition to the above, the delivery of the object of the
agreement, as in a pledge orcommodatum, is commonly referred to as a real contract. In
a solemn contract, compliance with certain formalities prescribed by law, such as in a donation
of real property, is essential in order to make the act valid, the prescribed form being thereby
an essential element thereof. The stage of consummation begins when the parties perform their
respective undertakings under the contract culminating in the extinguishment thereof.
Until the contract is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a
binding juridical relation. In sales, particularly, to which the topic for discussion about the case
at bench belongs, the contract is perfected when a person, called the seller, obligates himself,
for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to another, called the
buyer, over which the latter agrees.
(238 SCRA 602; 611 [1994].)
In Villonco Realty Company vs. Bormaheco (65 SCRA 352 [1975]), bearing factual
antecendents similar to this case, the Court, through Justice Aquino (later to be Chief Justice),
quoting authorities, upheld the perfection of the contract of sale thusly:
The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which
is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally
demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts. (Art.
1475,Ibid.)
xxx xxx xxx
Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance
absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer (Art. 1319, Civil Code). "An
acceptance may be express or implied." (Art. 1320, Civil Code).
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that an acceptance may contain a request for certain changes in the terms of the offer
and yet be a binding acceptance. "So long as it is clear that the meaning of the acceptance is
positively and unequivocally to accept the offer, whether such request is granted or not, a
contract is formed." (Stuart vs. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 105 Fed. 2nd 965, citing Sec. 79, Williston
on Contracts).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the vendor's change in a phrase of the offer to purchase, which change does not essentially
change the terms of the offer, does not amount to a rejection of the offer and the tender or a
counter-offer. (Stuart vs. Franklin Life Ins. Co., supra.)
(at pp. 362-363; 365-366.)
In the case at bench, the allegation of NBS that there was no concurrence of the offer and
acceptance upon the cause of the contract is belied by the testimony of the very BPI official with
whom the contract was perfected. Aromin and Albano concluded the sale for BPI. The fact that
the deed of sale still had to be signed and notarized does not mean that no contract had already
been perfected. A sale of land is valid regardless of the form it may have been entered into
(Claudel vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 113, 119 [1991]). The requisite form under Article
1458 of the Civil Code is merely for greater efficacy or convenience and the failure to comply
therewith does not affect the validity and binding effect of the act between the parties (Vitug,
Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Revised Edition, p. 552). If the law requires
a document or other special form, as in the sale of real property, the contracting parties may
compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. Their right may
be exercised simultaneously with action upon the contract (Article 1359, Civil Code).
Regarding the admissibility and competence of the evidence adduced by petitioner, respondent
Court of Appeals ruled that because the sale involved real property, the statute of frauds is
applicable.
In any event, petitioner cites Abrenica vs. Gonda (34 Phil. 739 [1916]) wherein it was held that
contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds are ratified when the defense fails to object, or asks
questions on cross-examination. The succinct words of Justice Araullo still ring in judicial
cadence:
As no timely objection or protest was made to the admission of the testimony of the plaintiff with
respect to the contract; and as the motion to strike out said evidence came too late; and,
furthermore, as the defendants themselves, by the cross-questions put by their counsel to the
witnesses in respect to said contract, tacitly waived their right to have it stricken out, that
evidence, therefore, cannot be considered either inadmissible or illegal, and court, far from
having erred in taking it into consideration and basing his judgment thereon, notwithstanding
the fact that it was ordered to be stricken out during the trial, merely corrected the error he
committed in ordering it to be so stricken out and complied with the rules of procedure
hereinbefore cited.
(at p. 748.)
In the instant case, counsel for respondents cross-examined petitioner's witnesses at length on
the contract itself, the purchase price, the tender of cash payment, the authority of Aromin and
Revilla, and other details of the litigated contract. Under the Abrenica rule (reiterated in a
number of cases, among them Talosig vs. Vda. de Nieba 43 SCRA 472 [1972]), even assuming
that parol evidence was initially inadmissible, the same became competent and admissible
because of the cross-examination, which elicited evidence proving the evidence of a perfected
contract. The cross-examination on the contract is deemed a waiver of the defense of the
Statute of Frauds (Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Revised
Edition, supra, p. 563).
The reason for the rule is that as pointed out in Abrenica "if the answers of those witnesses
were stricken out, the cross-examination could have no object whatsoever, and if the questions
were put to the witnesses and answered by them, they could only be taken into account by
connecting them with the answers given by those witnesses on direct examination" (pp. 747-
748).
Moreover, under Article 1403 of the Civil Code, an exception to the unenforceability of contracts
pursuant to the Statute of Frauds is the existence of a written note or memorandum evidencing
the contract. The memorandum may be found in several writings, not necessarily in one
document. The memorandum or memoranda is/are written evidence that such a contract was
entered into.
We cite the findings of the trial court on this matter:
In accordance with the provisions of Art. 1403 of the Civil Code, the existence of a written
contract of the sale is not necessary so long as the agreement to sell real property is evidenced
by a written note or memorandum, embodying the essentials of the contract and signed by the
party charged or his agent. Thus, it has been held:
33
The Statute of Frauds, embodied in Article 1403 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,does not
require that the contract itself be written. The plain test of Article 1403, Paragraph (2) is clear
that a written note or memorandum, embodying the essentials of the contract and signed by the
party charged, or his agent suffices to make the verbal agreement enforceable, taking it out of
the operation of the statute. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the complaint in its paragraph 3 pleads that the deal had been closed by
letter and telegram (Record on Appeal, p. 2), and the letter referred to was evidently the one
copy of which was appended as Exhibit A to plaintiffs opposition to the motion to dismiss. The
letter, transcribed above in part, together with the one marked as Appendix B, constitute an
adequate memorandum of the transaction. They are signed by the defendant-appellant; refer
to the property sold as a Lot in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, covered by T.C.T. No. 62, give its
area as 1,825 square meters and the purchase price of four (P4.00) pesos per square meter
payable in cash. We have in them, therefore, all the essential terms of the contract and they
satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
(Footnote 26, Paredes vs. Espino, 22 SCRA 1000 [1968]).
While there is no written contract of sale of the Pasig property executed by BPI in favor of
plaintiff, there are abundant notes and memoranda extant in the records of this case evidencing
the elements of a perfected contract. There is Exhibit P, the letter of Kenneth Richard Awad
addressed to Roland Aromin, authorizing the sale of the subject property at the price of
P1,000.00 per square meter giving 2% commission to the broker and instructing that the sale
be on cash basis. Concomitantly, on the basis of the instruction of Mr. Awad, (Exh. P), an
authority to sell, (Exh. B) was issued by BPI to Pedro Revilla, Jr., representing Assetrade Co.,
authorizing the latter to sell the property at the initial quoted price of P1,000.00 per square meter
which was altered on an unaccepted offer by Technoland. After the letter authority was issued
to Mr. Revilla, a letter authority was signed by Mr. Aromin allowing the buyer to enter the
premises of the property to inspect the same (Exh. C). On July 9, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., acting
as agent of BPI, wrote a letter to BPI informing it that he had procured a buyer in the name of
Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. with offices at Limketkai Bldg., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila,
represented by its Exec. Vice-President, Alfonso Lim (Exh. D). On July 11, 1988, the plaintiff,
through Alfonso Lim, wrote a letter to the bank, through Merlin Albano, confirming their
transaction regarding the purchase of the subject property (Exh. E). On July 18, 1988, the
plaintiff tendered upon the officials of the bank a check for P33,056,000.00 covered by Check
No. CA510883, dated July 18, 1988. On July 1, 1988, Alfonso Zamora instructed Mr. Aromin in
a letter to resubmit new offers only if there is no transaction closed with Assetrade Co. (Exh. S).
Combining all these notes and memoranda, the Court is convinced of the existence of perfected
contract of sale. Aptly, the Supreme Court, citing American cases with approval, held:
No particular form of language or instrument is necessary to constitute a memorandum or note
in writing under the statute of frauds; any document or writing, formal or informal, written either
for the purpose of furnishing evidence of the contract or for another purpose, which satisfies all
the requirements of the statute as to contents and signature, as discussed
respectively infra secs. 178-200, and infra secs. 201-205, is a sufficient memorandum or note.
A memorandum may be written as well with lead pencil as with pen and ink. It may also be filled
in on a printed form. (37 C.J.S., 653-654).
The note or memorandum required by the statute of frauds need not be contained in a single
document, nor, when contained in two or more papers, need each paper be sufficient as to
contents and signature to satisfy the statute. Two or more writings properly connected may be
considered together, matters missing or uncertain in one may be supplied or rendered certain
by another, and their sufficiency will depend on whether, taken together, they meet the
requirements of the statute as to contents and the requirements of the statutes as to signature,
as considered respectively infra secs. 179-200 and secs. 201-215.
(pp. 460-463, Original RTC Record).
The credibility of witnesses is also decisive in this case. The trial court directly observed the
demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses while the Court of Appeals relied merely
on the transcript of stenographic notes.
In this regard, the court of origin had this to say:
Apart from weighing the merits of the evidence of the parties, the Court had occasion to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses they presented. This is one important factor that inclined the
Court to believe in the version given by the plaintiff because its witnesses, including hostile
witness Roland V. Aromin, an assistant vice-president of the bank, were straightforward, candid
and unhesitating in giving their respective testimonies. Upon the other hand, the witnesses of
BPI were evasive, less than candid and hesitant in giving their answers to cross examination
questions. Moreover, the witnesses for BPI and NBS contradicted each other. Fernando Sison
III insisted that the authority to sell issued to Mr. Revilla was merely an evidence by which a
broker may convince a prospective buyer that he had authority to offer the property mentioned
therein for sale and did not bind the bank. On the contrary, Alfonso Zamora, a Senior Vice-
President of the bank, admitted that the authority to sell issued to Mr. Pedro Revilla, Jr. was
valid, effective and binding upon the bank being signed by two class "A" signatories and that
the bank cannot back out from its commitment in the authority to sell to Mr. Revilla.
While Alfredo Ramos of NBS insisted that he did not know personally and was not acquainted
with Edmundo Barcelon, the latter categorically admitted that Alfredo Ramos was his friend and
that they have even discussed in one of the luncheon meetings the matter of the sale of the
Pasig property to NBS. George Feliciano emphatically said that he was not a consultant of Mr.
Ramos nor was he connected with him in any manner, but his calling card states that he was a
consultant to the chairman of the Pacific Rim Export and Holdings Corp. whose chairman is
Alfredo Ramos. This deliberate act of Mr. Feliciano of concealing his being a consultant to Mr.
Alfredo Ramos evidently was done by him to avoid possible implication that he committed some
underhanded maneuvers in manipulating to have the subject property sold to NBS, instead of
being sold to the plaintiff.
(pp. 454-455, Original RTC Record.)
On the matter of credibility of witnesses where the findings or conclusions of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other, the pronouncement of the Court
in Serrano vs. Court of Appeals (196 SCRA 107 [1991]) bears stressing:
It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial
court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which
may indicate their candor or lack thereof. While the Supreme Court ordinarily does not rule on
the issue of credibility of witnesses, that being a question of fact not properly raised in a petition
34
under Rule 45, the Court has undertaken to do so in exceptional situations where, for instance, We rule that the profits and the use of the land which were denied to petitioner because of the
as here, the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at divergent conclusions on questions non-compliance or interference with a solemn obligation by respondents is somehow made up
of fact and the credibility of witnesses. by the appreciation in land values in the meantime.
(at p. 110.) Prescinding from the above, we rule that there was a perfected contract between BPI and
On the fourth question of whether or not NBS is an innocent purchaser for value, the record petitioner Limketkai; that the BPI officials who transacted with petitioner had full authority to bind
shows that it is not. It acted in bad faith. the bank; that the evidence supporting the sale is competent and admissible; and that the sale
Respondent NBS ignored the notice of lis pendens annotated on the title when it bought the lot. of the lot to NBS during the trial of the case was characterized by bad faith.
It was the willingness and design of NBS to buy property already sold to another party which WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
led BPI to dishonor the contract with Limketkai. SET ASIDE. The June 10, 1991 judgment of Branch 151 of the Regional Trial Court of The
Petitioner cites several badges of fraud indicating that BPI and NBS conspired to prevent National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig, Metro Manila is REINSTATED except for
petitioner from paying the agreed price and getting possession of the property: the award of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) damages which is hereby DELETED.
1. The sale was supposed to be done through an authorized broker, but top officials of BPI SO ORDERED.
personally and directly took over this particular sale when a close friend became interested.
2. BPI Senior Vice President Edmundo Barcelon admitted that NBS's President, Alfredo Ramos,
was his friend; that they had lunch meetings before this incident and discussed NBS's purchase
of the lot. Barcelon's father was a business associate of Ramos.
3. George Feliciano, in behalf of NBS, offered P5 million and later P7 million if petitioner would
drop the case and give up the lot. Feliciano went to petitioner's office and haggled with Alfonso
Lim but failed to convince him inspite of various and increasing offers.
4. In a place where big and permanent buildings abound, NBS had constructed only a
warehouse marked by easy portability. The warehouse is bolted to its foundations and can
easily be dismantled.
It is the very nature of the deed of absolute sale between BPI and NBS which, however, clearly
negates any allegation of good faith on the part of the buyer. Instead of the vendee insisting
that the vendor guarantee its title to the land and recognize the right of the vendee to proceed
against the vendor if the title to the land turns out to be defective as when the land belongs to
another person, the reverse is found in the deed of sale between BPI and NBS. Any losses
which NBS may incur in the event the title turns out to be vested in another person are to be
borne by NBS alone. BPI is expressly freed under the contract from any recourse of NBS against
it should BPI's title be found defective.
NBS, in its reply memorandum, does not refute or explain the above circumstance squarely. It
simply cites the badges of fraud mentioned in Oria vs. McMicking (21 Phil. 243 [1912]) and
argues that the enumeration there is exclusive. The decision in said case plainly states "the
following are some of the circumstances attending sales which have been denominated by
courts (as) badges of fraud." There are innumerable situations where fraud is manifested. One
enumeration in a 1912 decision cannot possibly cover all indications of fraud from that time up
to the present and into the future.
The Court of Appeals did not discuss the issue of damages. Petitioner cites the fee for filing the
amended complaint to implead NBS, sheriffs fees, registration fees, plane fare and hotel
expenses of Cebu-based counsel. Petitioner also claimed, and the trial court awarded, damages
for the profits and opportunity losses caused to petitioner's business in the amount of
P10,000,000.00.

35
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948 entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of a fair trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Pampanga, Respondent. The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the
E. M. Banzali for petitioner. majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding
Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marcelo L. Mallari for the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify
respondent anew.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
TUASON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First petitioner.
Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin,
in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in
connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of
the accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First
Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary
investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and
asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then
his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses
could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal
and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was
sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right
to present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first
instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence,
and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped,
we are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in
abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for the purpose
set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently
promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over
the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary
investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's
order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of
the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting
the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated
to bring out the truth."chanrobles virtual law library
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and
his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before
the issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right
of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary
hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to
confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with

36
G.R. No. 110571 March 10, 1994
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra & Serapio for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary
injunction is the novel question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the
Board of Investments (BOI) should be filed. A thorough scrutiny of the conflicting provisions of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,"
Executive Order No. 226, also known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 and Supreme
Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus, called for.
Briefly, this question of law arose when BOI, in its decision dated December 10, 1992 in BOI
Case No. 92-005 granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI
certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles"
to "ceramic tiles." Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same
nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for
review with respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91.
Acting on the petition, respondent court required the BOI and petitioner to comment on
Mariwasa's petition and to show cause why no injunction should issue. On February 17, 1993,
respondent court temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. This temporary
restraining order lapsed by its own terms on March 9, 1993, twenty (20) days after its issuance,
without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.
On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order"
on the ground that respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-005,
the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
On May 25, 1993, respondent court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, private respondent's motion to dismiss the petition is hereby DENIED, for lack
of merit.
Private respondent is hereby given an inextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof
within which to file its comment to the petition. 1
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution on June 4, 1993, petitioner decided not to file
any motion for reconsideration as the question involved is essentially legal in nature and
immediately filed a petition for certiorariand prohibition before this Court.
Petitioner posits the view that respondent court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
issuing the questioned resolution of May 25, 1993, for the following reasons:
I. Respondent court has no jurisdiction to entertain Mariwasa's appeal from the BOI's decision
in BOI Case No. 92-005, which has become final.
II. The appellate jurisdiction conferred by statute upon this Honorable Court cannot be amended
or superseded by Circular No. 1-91. 2
Petitioner then concludes that:
III. Mariwasa has lost it right to appeal . . . in this case. 3
Petitioner argues that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129
and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a
Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be
the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down
therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or
orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with this Court, to wit:
Judicial relief. — All orders or decisions of the Board
(of Investments) in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be executory.
No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay
such an order or decision; Provided, that all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme
Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision.
On the other hand, Mariwasa maintains that whatever "obvious inconsistency" or "irreconcilable
repugnancy" there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question
of venue for appeal has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which
was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Circular 1-91, is herein quoted below:
1. Scope. — These rules shall apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of
Tax Appeals. They shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial
agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court. Among these agencies are the Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board,
National Telecommunications Commission, Secretary of Agrarian Reform and Special Agrarian
Courts under RA 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission and Philippine Atomic
Energy Commission.
2. Cases not covered. — These rules shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders of
the National Labor Relations Commission or the Secretary of Labor and Employment under the
Labor Code of the Philippines, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, and other quasi-
judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute.
3. Who may appeal and where to appeal. — The appeal of a party affected by a final order,
decision, or judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals or of a quasi-judicial agency shall be taken
to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal
involves questions of fact or of law or mixed questions of fact and law. From final judgments or
decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme
Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the Court of Appeals, to
wit:
37
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders,
awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in
cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor
Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Clearly evident in the aforequoted provision of B.P. 129 is the laudable objective of providing a
uniform procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the
bench and the bar. Equally laudable is the twin objective of B.P. 129 of unclogging the docket
of this Court to enable it to attend to more important tasks, which in the words of Dean Vicente
G. Sinco, as quoted in our decision in Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4is "less concerned
with the decisions of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of
particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies, momentous
economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority and its impact upon
fundamental rights.
In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 5 this Court noted that B.P. 129
did not deal only with "changes in the rules on procedures" and that not only was the Court of
Appeals reorganized, but its jurisdiction and powers were also broadened by Section 9 thereof.
Explaining the changes, this Court said:
. . . Its original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and habeas corpus,
which theretofore could be exercised only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, was expanded by
(1) extending it so as to include the writ of quo warranto, and also (2) empowering it to issue all
said extraordinary writs "whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." Its appellate
jurisdiction was also extended to cover not only final judgments of Regional Trial Courts, but
also "all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of . . . quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-
paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948," it being noteworthy in this connection that the text of the law is
broad and comprehensive, and the explicitly stated exceptions have no reference whatever to
the Court of Tax Appeals. Indeed, the intention to expand the original and appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals over quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions,
is further stressed by the last paragraph of Section 9 which excludes from its provisions, only
the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals." 6
However, it cannot be denied that the lawmaking system of the country is far from perfect.
During the transitional period after the country emerged from the Marcos regime, the lawmaking
power was lodged on the Executive Department. The obvious lack of deliberation in the drafting
of our laws could perhaps explain the deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform
procedure which B.P. 129 sought to promote.
In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 provides
that all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the order or decision.
Noteworthy is the fact that presently, the Supreme Court entertains ordinary appeals only from
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher. Judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court
only by petition for review on certiorari within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that
"(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed
by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." Thus, the right of appeal provided in E.O. 226 within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the order or decision is clearly not in consonance with the present
procedure before this Court. Only decisions, orders or rulings of a Constitutional Commission
(Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections or Commission on Audit), may be brought
to the Supreme Court on original petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 by the aggrieved party
within thirty (30) days form receipt of a copy thereof. 7
Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91
prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions
of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions
and confusing rules of procedure.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has,
however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. 8 In Inciong v. de
Guia, 9 a circular of this Court was treated as law. In adopting the recommendation of the
Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court
dated
September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20
dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the
Investigating Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning cases
instead of raffling is a common practice and holding that respondent could not go against the
circular of this Court until it is repealed or otherwise modified, as "(L)aws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
customs or practice to the contrary." 10
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because
the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified,
diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely
defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right
of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided
where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with
procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-
making powers.
38
The case of Bustos v. Lucero 11 distinguished between rights created by a substantive law and
those arising from procedural law:
Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights is a term which includes
those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations
(60 C.J., 980). Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights,
or which regulates rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action, as oppossed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress
for their invasion. 12
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be
brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal
granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI
under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the
venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a
different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the
substantive right to appeal.
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third
sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to appeals
from final orders or decision of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly
states that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial
agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words
"(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies
which are covered by the Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein. More
importantly, BOI does not fall within the purview of the exclusions listed in Section 2 of the
circular. Only the following final decisions and interlocutory orders are expressly excluded from
the circular, namely, those of: (1) the National Labor Relations Commission; (2) the Secretary
of Labor and Employment; (3) the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasi-
judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute. Since
in DBP v. CA 13 we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of
Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129,
on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should
be excluded from
Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of said law.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the
manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly
with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 19, 1993 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ. concur.
G.R. No. 107852 October 20, 1993
GREGORIO M. ARUELO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN,
BRANCH 17, MALOLOS BULACAN, and DANILO F. GATCHALIAN, respondents.
Pimentel, Apostol, Layosa & Sibayan Law Office for petitioner.
Venustiano S. Roxas & Associates for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, to set
aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 24, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No, 28621,
which ruled that the answer and counter-protest of respondent Danilo F. Gatchalian was filed
timely and ordered the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Malolos, Bulacan to continue with the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 343-M-92, the protest case filed by petitioner Gregorio N. Aruelo,
Jr.
Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the office of the
Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won over Aruelo
by a margin of four votes, such that on May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed him as the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan.
On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition
docketed as SPC No. 92-130, seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of
"fraudulent alteration and tampering" of votes in the tally sheets and the election returns.
On June 2, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Malolos, Bulacan, a
petition docketed as Civil Case No. 343-M-92 protesting the same election. Aruelo, however,
informed the trial court of the pendency of the pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC.
On June 10, 1992, Gatchalian was served an Amended Summons from the trial court, giving
him five days within which to answer the petition. Instead of submitting his answer, Gatchalian
filed on June 15, 1992 a Motion to Dismiss claiming that: (a) the petition was filed out of time;
(b) there was a pending protest case before the COMELEC; and (c) Aruelo failed to pay the
prescribed filing fees and cash deposit on the petition.
Meanwhile in SPC Case No. 92-130, the COMELEC on June 6, 1992 denied Aruelo's petition
for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166, which requires the submission of the
evidence and documents in support of the petition to annul Gatchalian's proclamation (Rollo, p.
42).
The trial court, on the other hand, issued an order dated July 10, 1992, denying Gatchalian's
Motion to Dismiss and ordering him to file his answer to the petition within five days from notice,
otherwise, "a general denial shall be deemed to have been entered" (Rollo, p. 45). The trial
court also directed Aruelo to pay the deficiency in his filing fee, which the latter complied with.
Gatchalian filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order but the trial court denied the same on
August 3, 1992.
On August 6, 1992, Gatchalian filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition
for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28621, which alleged grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court in denying his Motion to Dismiss and his Motion for Reconsideration.
39
Earlier, that is on July 23, 1992, Gatchalian filed before the trial court a Motion for Bill of
Particulars, which was opposed by Aruelo. The trial court denied Gatchalian's motion in an order
dated August 5, 1992, a copy of which was received by him on August 6, 1992.
On August 11, 1992, Gatchalian submitted before the trial court his Answer with Counter-Protest
and Counterclaim, alleging inter alia, that Aruelo was the one who committed the election fraud
and that were it not for the said fraud, Gatchalian's margin over Aruelo would have been greater.
Gatchalian prayed for the dismissal of the petition, the confirmation of his election and the award
of damages. On the day the answer was filed, the trial court issued an order admitting it, and
without Gatchalian's specific prayer, directed the revision of ballots in the precincts enumerated
in Gatchalian's Counter-Protest and Construction. For this purpose, the trial court ordered the
delivery of the contested ballot boxes to the Branch Clerk of Court.
On August 14, 1992, Aruelo filed with the trial court a Motion to Reconsider As Well As To Set
Aside "Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim" Filed Out of Time by Protestee. The trial
court, on September 2, 1992, denied Aruelo's motion and forthwith scheduled the constitution
of the revision committee.
On September 28, 1992, Aruelo prayed before the Court of Appeals for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial court from
implementing the Order of August 11, 1992, regarding the revision of ballots. The Court of
Appeals belatedly issued a temporary restraining order on November 9, 1992, after actual
revision of the contested ballots ended on October 28, 1992.
Meanwhile, Gatchalian filed with the Court of Appeals on September 21, 1992 another petition
for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 28977), again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court in issuing the Order dated August 5, 1992, which denied his Motion for Bill of
Particulars. The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated September 28, 1992, dismissed this
petition for lack of merit.
On November 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 28621,
denying Gatchalian's petition, but declared, at the same time, that Gatchalian's Answer With
Counter-Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed. The appellate court also lifted the temporary
restraining order and ordered the trial court to "proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below"
(Rollo, p. 212).
Hence, this petition.
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent
therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition
(Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his
answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is
prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing
of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new
five-day period to file his answer.
We do not agree.
Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No. -343-M-92) with the Regional Trial Court,
whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings
before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to
proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings
brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases
cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that
motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo
warranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain
pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice
and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
Private respondent received a copy of the order of the Regional Trial Court denying his motion
for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section 1 (b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his
motion for a bill of particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had until August 11, 1992 within
which to file his answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed by him on
August 11, 1992 was filed timely.
The instant case is different from a pre-proclamation controversy which the law expressly
mandates to be resolved in a summary proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX, Sec. 246; COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, Sec. 2; Dipatuan v. Commission on Elections, 185 SCRA
86 [1990]). Pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the
legislators' desire that the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidate
be done with dispatch and without unnecessary delay. Questions as those involving the
appreciation of the votes and the conduct of the balloting, which require more deliberate and
necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in the corresponding election protest
(Abella v. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 [1989]; Alonto v. Commission on Elections, 22 SCRA 878
[1968]).
An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an
office. Over and above the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to
determine the true choice of the people. For this reason, it is a well-established principle that
laws governing election protests must be liberally construed to the end that the popular will,
expressed in the election of public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated
(Unda v. Commission on Elections, 190 SCRA 827 [1990]; De Leon v. Guadiz, Jr., 104 SCRA
591 [1981]; Macasundig v. Macalangan, 13 SCRA 577 [1965]; Corocoro v. Bascara, 9 SCRA
519 [1963]).
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
40
G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992
EDWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LUIS T. SANTOS,
SECRETARY, respondents.
Reyes, Lozada and Sabado for petitioner.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage in
the practice of his profession while employed in the Government.
Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros
Occidental. On October 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed
Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of
Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in
relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2
of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and
abuse of authority.
Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City
Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has
continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose
from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58
of the same department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero
and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of
Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public
ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases in
the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 which provides:
MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-38
TO ALL: PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS, CITY AND MUNICIPALITY MAYORS, KLGCD
REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND ALL CONCERNED
SUBJECT: AMENDING MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-18 ON SANGGUNIAN
SESSIONS,PER DIEMS, ALLOWANCES, STAFFING AND OTHER RELATED
MATTERS
In view of the issuance or Circular No. 5-A by the Joint Commission on Local
Government Personnel Administration which affects certain provisions of MC 80-18,
there is a need to amend said Memorandum Circular to substantially conform to the
pertinent provisions of Circular No. 9-A.
xxx xxx xxx
C. Practice of Profession
The Secretary (now Minister) of Justice in an Opinion No. 46 Series of 1973 stated inter
alia that "members of local legislative bodies, other than the provincial governors or the
mayors, do not keep regular office hours." "They merely attend meetings or sessions
of the provincial board or the city or municipal council" and that provincial board
members are not even required "to have an office in the provincial building."
Consequently, they are not therefore to required to report daily as other regular
government employees do, except when they are delegated to perform certain
administrative functions in the interest of public service by the Governor or Mayor as
the case may be. For this reason, they may, therefore, be allowed to practice their
professions provided that in so doing an authority . . . first be secured from the Regional
Directors pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 74-58, provided, however, that no
government personnel, property, equipment or supplies shall be utilized in the practice
of their professions. While being authorized to practice their professions, they should
as much as possible attend regularly any and all sessions, which are not very often, of
their Sanggunians for which they were elected as members by their constituents except
in very extreme cases, e.g., doctors who are called upon to save a life. For this purpose
it is desired that they always keep a calendar of the dates of the sessions, regular or
special of their Sanggunians so that conflicts of attending court cases in the case of
lawyers and Sanggunian sessions can be avoided.
As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their profession shall
always be subject to the restrictions provided for in Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In
all cases, the practice of any profession should be favorably recommended by the
Sanggunian concerned as a body and by the provincial governors, city or municipal
mayors, as the case may be. (Emphasis ours, pp. 28-30,Rollo.)
On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in which
the complainant, Engineer Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor Javellana,
presented their respective evidence.
Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to
continue his practice of law for the reasons stated in his letter-request. On the same
date, Secretary Santos replied as follows:
1st Indorsement
September 10, 1990
Respectfully returned to Councilor Erwin B. Javellana, Bago City, his within letter dated
September 10, 1990, requesting for a permit to continue his practice of law for reasons
therein stated, with this information that, as represented and consistent with law, we
interpose no objection thereto, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with his official functions.
LUIS T. SANTOS
Secretary.
41
(p. 60, Rollo.)
On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No.
90-81 setting forth guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective officials
as follows:
TO: All Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, Regional Directors and All
Concerned.
SUBJECT: Practice of Profession and Private Employment of Local Elective Officials
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees), states, in part, that "In addition to acts and omission of public
officials . . . now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public officials . . . and are hereby
declared to be unlawful: . . . (b) Public Officials. . . during their incumbency shall not:
(1) . . . accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent,
trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their
office unless expressly allowed by law; (2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions: . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Under Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Office of the President dated September 4,
1986, the authority to grant any permission, to accept private employment in any
capacity and to exercise profession, to any government official shall be granted by the
head of the Ministry (Department) or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides,in part, that:
No officer shall engage directly in any . . . vocation or profession . . . without a written
permission from the head of the Department: Provided, that this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers . . . whose duties and responsibilities require that
their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted
outside of office should be fixed by the Chief of the agency to the end that it will not
impair in anyway the efficiency of the officer or employee . . . subject to any additional
conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each particular case in the
interest of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service
Commission.
Conformably with the foregoing, the following guidelines are to be observed in the grant
of permission to the practice of profession and to the acceptance of private employment
of local elective officials, to wit:
1) The permission shall be granted by the Secretary of Local Government;
2) Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the government in conformity with
Sections 141, 171 and 203 of the Local Government Code (BP 337), are prohibited to
engage in the practice of their profession and to accept private employment during their
incumbency:
3) Other local elective officials may be allowed to practice their profession or engage
in private employment on a limited basis at the discretion of the Secretary of Local
Government, subject to existing laws and to the following conditions:
a) That the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the local chief
executive concerned to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the
officials concerned;
b) That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be utilized in the pursuit
of one's profession or private employment;
c) That no conflict of interests between the practice of profession or engagement in
private employment and the official duties of the concerned official shall arise thereby;
d) Such other conditions that the Secretary deems necessary to impose on each
particular case, in the interest of public service. (Emphasis supplied, pp. 31-32, Rollo.)
On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against
him on the ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are
unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to
regulate the practice of law.
In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana's motion to dismiss was denied by the public
respondents. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20, 1991.
Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA
7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members
who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work
only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive
monetary compensation therefrom. (Emphasis ours.)
42
Administrative Case No. C-10-90 was again set for hearing on November 26, 1991. engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent
Javellana thereupon filed this petition for certiorari praying that DLG Memorandum interests adverse to the government.
Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new Local Government Code Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG
(RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null void because: Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is
(1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local
xxx xxx xxx Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a law allows it.
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts andquasi-judicial bodies shall in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during
(2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and medical session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is
professions for only sanggunian members who are lawyers and doctors are restricted because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate
in the exercise of their profession while dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, to, or affect, the area of public service.
opticians, morticians and others are not so restricted (RA 7160, Sec. 90 [b-1]). WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
In due time, the Solicitor General filed his Comment on the petition and the petitioner SO ORDERED.
submitted a Reply. After deliberating on the pleadings of the parties, the Court resolved
to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions
of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers
but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws
and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction (Santiago vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary, 192 SCRA 199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166 SCRA 657). With respect to the
present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent,
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG
Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the
administrative charge against him.
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental
to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by
express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal
dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect
a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which
petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer
Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as
counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims
against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No.
74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from
43
G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court,
Antique, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA,
respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS
JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER
OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. — Petitioner also
contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's
ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the
Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees with the first part of petitioner's basic
argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses
committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate
of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and
inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the
State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL
DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE
BY SUPREME COURT; REASON. — However, We agree with petitioner that in the
absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN
REGARDING COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE;
PURPOSE. — Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's
certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates
reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary
records to make such a determination . . . In fine, where a criminal complaint against a
judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman
must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination
whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND
ITS PERSONNEL; REASON. — The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one
of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to
testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-
complaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted
by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in
his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less
resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a
criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the
Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to
the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial
Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to
refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22,
1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner
had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all
civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a
period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998,"
when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5)
civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent
Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the
months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months
beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an
extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case
despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged
arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and
supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman
constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of
supervision over all inferior courts.
44
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby
in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera
unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency SO ORDERED.
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action
taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power
of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue
of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to
it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific
mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all
courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service
to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of
his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a
determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on
this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively.
the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an
extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of
service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this
Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires
the resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and
refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee
had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

45
[G.R. No. 132177. July 19, 2001]
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN
and JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Petitioner Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 253 of the Regional Trial
Court of Las Pias City, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated August 22, 1997 denying the ex-parte motion to refer
to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated December 22, 1997
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255
of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
a Criminal Complaint[1]for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of
complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. Respondent alleged
therein that on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las
Pinas City, he requested petitioner to return the executive table he borrowed from
respondent; that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but
before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted Tarantado ito ah, and boxed him at his
right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown
away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable; and that respondent had the incident
blottered with the Las Pias Police Station. He prayed that criminal charges be filed
before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.
On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another Complaint[2] against petitioner,
this time and administrative case with the Supreme Court, docketed as Adm. Case No.
97-387-RTJ, praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of
grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. Said complaint is based on
the same facts as those in the complaint filed earlier with the office of the Ombudsman.
In the Order[3] dated June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner
to file a counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Instead of filing a
counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 and Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the
Honorable Supreme Court,[4] praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its
investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in abeyance, and refer the same to the
Supreme Court which, through the Office of the Court Administrator, is already
investigating what transpired on May 20, 1997. Petitioner contended that the Supreme
Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary
determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who,
both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.
On August 22, 197, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an Order[5] denying the motion
for referral to the Supreme Court. Invoking Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770,
the Office of the Ombudsman held that it is within its jurisdiction to investigate the
criminal charges of respondent Judge against petitioner.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[6] of the foregoing order, maintaining that the
Office of the Ombudsman should either refer Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 to the Supreme
Court for preliminary evaluation, or await the latters resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-
387-RTJ which involves the same parties and subject matter. Otherwise, petitioner
argues, the absurd situation may result wherein the Office of the Ombudsman files
criminal charges against petitioner who, on the other hand, is declared without fault by
the Supreme Court.
In the Order[7] dated December 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the
motion for reconsideration and required petitioner to submit a counter-affidavit within
an inextendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari, asking for the reversal of the assailed
Orders dated August 22, 1997 and December 22, 1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman
and the issuance of a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order, directing the
Office of the Ombudsman to refrain from taking further action in the implementation of
the challenged orders.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer
action on case No. OMB-0-97-0903 pending resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ.
The issue is not novel. In Maceda vs. Vasquez,[8] this Court resolved in the affirmative
the issue of whether or not the Ombudsman must defer action on a criminal complaint
against a judge, or a court employee where the same arises from their administrative
duties, and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court
employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
Invoking Section 15 of R.A. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman refuses to refrain from
taking cognizance of Case NO. OMB-0-97-0903 in favor of this Court on the ground
that, allegedly, the accusations therein against petitioner constitute simple criminal
charges falling within the parameters of its constitutional power and duty to investigate
and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee which appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 grants, among others, the following powers and duties to
the Office of the Ombudsman:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction,
it may takeover, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any
46
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse or it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of
impropriety in the performance of duties; the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on
employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by judicial independence.
law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative
and ensure compliance therewith, or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court
Section 21 of this Act... of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court
The foregoing provisions supply the legal basis for the Ombudsman in maintaining its that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take
jurisdiction over the charges of physical injuries, malicious mischief and assault upon the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
a person in authority filed by respondent Judge against petitioner. This conclusion other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
seems to be reinforced by Section 16 of R.A. 6770 which states that the powers of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Office of the Ombudsman apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is
nonfeasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure or office. hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino M.
The Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestations, in Lieu of Comment, correctly Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.
opined and we quote: SO ORDERED.
xxx the grant of the aforequoted powers to the Office of the Ombudsman is not
tantamount to giving it exclusive authority thereon. In fact, Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770,
which is relied upon by the Office of the Ombudsman in its assailed order, provides
that it has primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction over graft and corruption cases and
felonies committed by public officers in relation to their office. Moreover, it was held in
Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 [1993], that the Ombudsmans power under
Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.[9]
It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were
entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under Section
6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this
premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal
complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed
before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and
administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of
whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the
Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the
Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give
due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in
determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not
only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly
conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.[10]
47
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of
Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C.
ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR.,
VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman,
Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any
executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of
the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial
review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a
conceded legislative power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with
the time-honored principle of the independence of the judiciary 2as protected and
safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age
of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The
Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a
vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation
mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of
Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be
considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that
for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security
of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition
for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for
prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking
any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their
claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation
and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination
of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very
comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was
pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of
this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang
Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well
as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of
any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981,
followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the morning and
afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents were heard
through counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes
of the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was
deemed submitted for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of
all the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions,
the exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the
Court, it is our opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not
unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as
Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice
Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court
cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the
matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as
vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as
individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to
parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As
was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of
public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no
enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and
procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have
convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been
amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed
in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,foreshadowed by the very decision of People
v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not
think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the
American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their claim that what
petitioners possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is
comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that
the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the language of a bygone era
even in the United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later
48
case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been
lowered." 11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the
facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its
antecedents. They had laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard
for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization
was organized.12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-
A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The
Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be
submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President
sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all
lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and
Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On
October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial
Reorganization has the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset
its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what today
is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system.
There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt
necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no
step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's
faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a
greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of
modest means — much more so, the poorest and the humblest — can vindicate their
rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the
way the courts operate must be manifest to all members of the community and
particularly to those whose interests are affected by the exercise of their functions. It is
to that task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted
could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The
experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise
inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that
reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient
administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in
the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary
Act became effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt
that the last two decades of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even
greater complexity and delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in
the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically underprivileged, have
found legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately,
the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more
formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of justice. Moreover, they are
likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The
national leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search for solutions
that will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued
national progress." 15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on
development. That has been repeatedly stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are
geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as simply the
movement towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of sustained
increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP). 16 For the New
Society, its implication goes further than economic advance, extending to "the sharing,
or more appropriately, the democratization of social and economic opportunities, the
substantiation of the true meaning of social justice." 17 This process of modernization
and change compels the government to extend its field of activity and its scope of
operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor
elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social justice
and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively
implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical by
interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even
if the question does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation
and application. ... There could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of
success of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus
delay in the execution of the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably
expected. That is not conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in
such Report, equally of vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is
well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined efforts
exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice
Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time
supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards
more and more cases has continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated
economic development, the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and
other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies.
Thus confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the
Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even
worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it
ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in
the Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein
pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would
be the most thorough after four generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary
49
Act generations . enacted in June of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice
previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the Court of
Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges,
who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it
may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact business,
and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment
of independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was
passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of
Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts,
and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal
Courts. The membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously
increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a
Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special
courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next
came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by
the creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967,
Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same
qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First
Instance. 34
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the
basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background
as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's
instructions, this proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the
guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain objectives of the
reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a
reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper
meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the governmental
and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth in the
Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been
opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively
assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the
innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure,
the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights
and Good Government to which it was referred. Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225
was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa recommending the
approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C.
Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization.
Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization
submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines for
Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance
with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid
report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the
government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill
were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, to
which The bill was referred, following the public hearings on the bill held in December
of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of the
bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position
papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such
Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of
cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is
expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the
structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction
and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to
the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable
future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings
of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It is
quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as exhaustive study
before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a
background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation
that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and
undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the
affixing of the Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity.
The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38reiterated such a
doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or
separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the
abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-
known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never
to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the
merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid,
the abolition must be made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with
approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a
similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other branches of the
50
government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good
faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The
concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any
clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not
respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the
inauguration of the Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize
courts of original jurisdiction known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute,
petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim
appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the new legislation.
Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then National Assembly
disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the
validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This
Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of
estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result
reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to
preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the
security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No.
145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District,
and establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal
and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the
National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is
admitted that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the security
of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same
article of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of
a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes
in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)" 44 justice Laurel continued:
"I am not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power
and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of
tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller
and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the
other, to realize that the application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily
factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the
unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the
violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and
plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time to
make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to the
particular point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered
a great public need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145
was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular
judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the legislative
department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for
reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government than at the
time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature,
and although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision providing
for the vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth
Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor
of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice
Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of
the Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches
of the government, including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts
of First Instance were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice
Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally
categorical as to Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of
first instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the
mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and constitutional.
such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may
abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national capital
region, 51 and other metropolitan trial courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well
as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less reason
then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang
Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response
to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be
differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the
Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It
bears mentioning that in Brillo v. Eñage56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned
by the late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda question
que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si
efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho
de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente.Mc Culley vs. State, 46
51
LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o se
incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar
juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not
held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating a
city court in place of the former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de
autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre
con el cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that.
Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged statute was not within the
bounds of legislative authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise,
however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all-
embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts
of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the exception solely of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to
misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of the section
on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The
Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as
presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided
in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall
be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the
office." 60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to inquire
further into the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an
assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren
form of words. The amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-
established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted
in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro
M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept,
categorically spoke of providing "an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization
of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually
govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by
other departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that social group." 61 The above
excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil.62 Moreover, under
the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again the principle of separation
of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision but by actual
division." 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief
executive of the Republic of the Philippines." 65 Moreover, it is equally therein expressly
provided that all the powers he possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again
vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise." 66 Article VII of the
1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the
position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was a
provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government exercising the executive
power with the assistance of the Cabinet69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system
was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free
Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain
aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its
essentially presidential character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the
Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of which shall come from
the regional representatives of the Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an
Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than
fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang
Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of government that is now
operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and
legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains
its full authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national
policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then
why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need
"to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present,
where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the
legislative branches." 74
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior
courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges
under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935
Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to
supervise administratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary
Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to
be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be
no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In
case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of
inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
52
exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned,
this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear
need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that
this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such
were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by
either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a
case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who
shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains
in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure
therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power, Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that
in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of
removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded.
The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not
readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such
a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle
that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional
taint must be applied Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this
relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the Decree could have been so
worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called
for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice
Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct fate of invalidity, they
must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers
vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be committed.
It commends itself for approval." 80 Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The
Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts,
specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree
through implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no
such provision in this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the
Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile
or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is
expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to
abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of
their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly
distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested
in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency
is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is
why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that
this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice
Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the
Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government, the
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other
begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic utterance from the same jurist, even more
emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights
for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of government powers,
whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu
or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of
government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in
independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case
of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white but also because 'even
the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from
one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with
force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable
under the fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The constitutional structure
is a complicated system, and overlappings of governmental functions are recognized,
unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the same
way that the academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus
right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this attempt at
harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of power against power.
That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would
characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of
authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the
statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate
Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial
Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such
compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the
53
guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a standard
is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it
is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter
and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and
provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The
standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection
is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could
be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole." 89 The
undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative departments under the
amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is
accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision:
"There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive
agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid
legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor
Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern
government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a
deterrent factor to much-needed legislation."91 Further on this point from the same
opinion" "The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party
caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another objection based on the
absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is
equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The
Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of
the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act
which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the President in
accordance with the immediately succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the next
section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the
President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is
insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning
as before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared
by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically
abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no
ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to
hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service,
quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, 97 in legal
contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is equally
reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service,
private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in
certain cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain
incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather,
it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation by
the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even
acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in
a law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute
that could be done, "there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws
as saying what they obviously mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners
sought to have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named was the chairman and the other
two, members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion
was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the
Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
They were not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the
product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work was limited, as set forth in
the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in
the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could be no possible
objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative
supervision over interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way
judicial business is conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973
Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then
Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the
Philippines 101consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting
the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975
Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United States
has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been
responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has been the
creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus
the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at
54
the federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of
as well." 103 Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in
are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise be of
through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent
Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly
does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and
is more than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the
official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed
responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice
provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision
justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian
untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department or the
by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that basic
assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains committed.
As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been
d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded in the national
consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence in thought and
action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief
Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of
judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to
the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good
behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one
administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the
independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our
judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the
power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised — to reorganize
inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at the
cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but
"will do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case
stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 Theponencia of
Justice Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles
of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform
the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and
self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two
departments of government." 108 There is no reason to assume that the failure of this
suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious
consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in
55
G.R. No. 116049 July 13, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto
Princesa City, ARNE STROM and GRACE REYES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal Case
No. 11529 of the court a quo, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00
for gross ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a
motion for reconsideration dated April 1, 1995, and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration dated April 26, 1995.
For reasons of his own but the purposes of which can easily be deduced, separate
copies of the basic motion were furnished the Chief Justice, Judicial and Bar Council,
Solicitor General, Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Court Administrator
and his deputies, Secretary of Justice, and Ombudsman. Copies of the supplemental
motion were also furnished by him to the same officials or entities and, additionally, to
the individual members of this Court.
In the judgment now sought to be reconsidered, the Second Division of the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, specified that the only issue to be
resolved in this case was whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in granting the motion to quash the aforementioned criminal case. We quote
the pertinent portions of his ponencia not only for easy reference but to serve as a basis
for determining whether the sanctions imposed were commensurate to the
administrative offense, to wit:
The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the
light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish
the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the
aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite
P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI
No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No.
2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited LOI;
otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged the validity of the argument advanced
by the prosecution. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential
Decrees, such as P.D. No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial
law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held
by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by
the former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal,
binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2
is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial
law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has
been expressly or impliedly revoked or repealed, both continue to have the force and
effect of law (Rollo, pp. 7-8).
xxx xxx xxx
But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to check the
citations of the prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court on
the applicable law to a particular case devolves solely upon the prosecution or whoever
may be the advocate before the court. Respondent judge should be reminded that
courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws of the land (Sec. 1, Rule
129, Rules of Court). Being the trier of facts, judges are presumed to be well-informed
of the existing laws, recent enactments and jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn
duty as members of the bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance
of his duties is subject to censure. But where, as in the present case, the error could
have been entirely avoided were it not for the public respondent's irresponsibility in the
performance of his duties, it is but proper that respondent judge be reprimanded and
his order of dismissal set aside for grave ignorance of the law. For, respondent judge's
error is not a simple error in judgment but one amounting to gross ignorance of the law
which could easily undermine the public's perception of the court's competence.
We could stop here, since the rehashed arguments raised by respondent judge in his
aforesaid original and supplemental motions are completely refuted by the foregoing
discussion demonstrative not only of his adjudicatory error but also of judicial
incompetence. In fact, just to cite a few representative cases, it may be worthwhile for
respondent judge to ponder upon the Court's observations
in Aducayan vs. Flores, etc., et al., 1Ajeno vs. Inserto, 2 Libarios
vs. Dabalos, 3 and Estoya, et al. vs. Singson, etc., 4 which would put his asseverations
at rest.
Respondent judge, however, would want this Court to pass upon his other
supplications, arguments, and even his insinuations for that matter, which although
born more of fecundity in formulation and less of bases in law, we have decided to
anatomize even with some expense of prolixity.
Respondent judge prefaces his remedial approach with the assurance that "(t)he only
purpose of (h)is motion is to plead with bended knees and with all humility for the kind
reconsideration" of the decision in this case, specifically the findings that he is "grossly
56
ignorant of the law and as such, (he) was reprimanded and fined in the amount of
P10,000.00; and that the aforesaid decision is to be spread on (his) personal records." 5
He adverts to his good conduct as a person and as a judge, reiterates that the error
primarily stemmed from the shortcomings of the public prosecutor and, on a personal
note, he expresses this concern: ". . . I am again begging with humility that the
spreading of the aforesaid Decision on my personal records be reconsidered because
doing so will foreclose any chance for me to aspire for promotion in the judiciary in the
future. This is very painful. I will agonize up to my last day and my last breath in life." 6
The Court assures respondent judge that it has taken all the aforesaid matters into
consideration and is not insensitive thereto, including his argumentum ad
misericordiam. It feels, however, that there is more than ample substantiation for the
findings of the ponente in the main case, and compelling legal warrant for the
administrative penalties imposed which are even milder than those meted by it under
similar and comparable situations.
The spreading of the decision on the personal record of a respondent is an official
procedure and requirement which, incredibly, respondent judge would want this very
Court to violate and forego, in suppression of facts which must appear in official
documents. His further argument that —
The spreading of such decision on my personal records will not only open criticisms on
my private qualifications as a minister in the temple of justice but will open more
comments on my official acts, competence and credibility as a judge that might
undermine the people's faith in the judicial system in the Province of Palawan, in Puerto
Princesa City and in the entire country because it is always difficult to disassociate my
private credential from that of my public qualifications. 7
is, to put it mildly, a mite too exaggerated and a tad too melodramatic. The Court regrets
that respondent judge appears unaware that he is actually the recipient of uncommon
sympathetic consideration in this case.
Administrative penalties do not play the final strains of the valkyrian chant to a public
career, judicial or otherwise. It is for respondent judge, by subsequently demonstrating
his true worth through observance of judicial standards, to vindicate himself from a
misjudgment which is the heritage of the heedless and to rise to higher levels which is
the destiny of the deserving. Besides, it is a curious fact that assuming as valid his
meticulosity on the confidential nature of disciplinary cases, he nevertheless sent
copies of his motions to all the persons enumerated at the start of this resolution. It is
elementary that copies of such motions are merely filed with the court and furnished
only to the adverse party. Here, he wants us to keep sub rosa what he himself
publicizes.
From his initial exhibition of humility and penitential pose, respondent judge then goes
into a critical second gear by rhetorically wondering aloud in this fashion:
On July 27, 1994, the Third Division of the Honorable Supreme Court required me to
comment on the above-entitled petition. On August 23, 1994 I filed my comment thereto
and on October 24, 1994, in a Resolution the Third Division of the Supreme Court
resolved to note my Comment. When the Third Division of the Honorable Court
required me to comment in G.R. No. 116049, the supposition is that a valid raffle of
said case to that Division had already been made. That was my thinking and impression
for, why would the case go to that Division except thru a valid raffle. I am now in
quandary, however, as to why all of a sudden, G.R. No. 116049 was transferred to the
Second Division of the Supreme Court without us or any party being informed by the
Honorable Supreme Court about it. In our level at the Regional Trial Court in Palawan,
we observe the raffle of cases with solemnity and abide by the result of the raffle
faithfully. And the said Second Division meted me out excessive penalties when it was
the Third Division that required me to comment. Why did this happen? (Emphasis
supplied.) 8
Since this was obviously spoken with the ascriptive courage of the uninformed, we
assure His Honor that the Supreme Court also conducts "a valid raffle," observes such
raffle of its cases "with solemnity," and abides by the result thereof "faithfully." This
case was validly and solemnly raffled to Mr. Justice Bidin who was then with the Third
Division of the Court. On January 23, 1995, he was transferred to the Second Division
where he served as working chairman until his retirement on April 7, 1995. In
accordance with the internal rules of the Court, this case remained with him as the
original ponente and he accordingly penned the decision therein for and as a member
of the Second Division. There is no rule in the Court that the parties be informed that a
case has been transferred to another division, as respondent judge would want or
expect. To do so would easily be revelatory of the identity of the ponente which is
precisely what some litigants used to, and still, watch for and speculate upon.
In anticipation of a similar insinuendo, respondent judge is further informed that
because of the retirement of Mr. Justice Bidin and the uncertainty of the date when his
replacement could act upon his unfinished cases and the subsequent proceedings
therein, after its summer session and working recess the Court en banc, after due
deliberation on respondent judge's successive motions, decided to assign the
preparation of this resolution to the present writer thereof, he having been and still is
with the Second Division. Respondent judge, with his claim of extensive magisterial
experience, should have verified all the foregoing facts from the records of this Court,
instead of proceeding upon speculations.
Finally, shifting to what he obviously fancies to be high gear on a constitutional basis,
respondent judge questions the competence of the Second Division of this Court to
administratively discipline him. Exordially, a mere allegatio nudus does not create a
constitutional issue as to require the referral of this case, or at least the disciplinary
aspect thereof, to the Court en banc. The disposition of that matter merely involves a
57
clarification of the misconception of respondent judge thereon, presumably because of his
unfamiliarity with circulars adopted and followed by this Court, some of them being on internal
procedure. Be that as it may, since all the members of this Court are aware of the submissions
of respondent judge on this point through the copies of the motions which he furnished them,
and he insistently harps on constitutional grounds therein, the Court en banc resolved to accept
this aspect of the case from the Second Division.
His Honor relies on the second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII of the present Constitution
which reads: "The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon." This provision is an expansion
of and was taken from the second sentence of Section 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution
which provided: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal."
Stress is apparently laid by respondent judge on the inclusion of the adverbial phrase "en banc"
in referring to this Court in the quoted provision of the 1987 Constitution and, from this, he
argues that it is only the full Court, not a division thereof, that can administratively punish him.
Fortuitously, the writer of this resolution, as a member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, had the opportunity to take up that precise matter with the
committee chairman, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, by pointing out the equivalent
provision in the 1973 Constitution, hereinbefore quoted, which merely referred to the "Court,"
without qualification. It was accordingly explained and agreed that insofar as the power to
discipline is concerned, the qualification was not intended to make a difference, as a reference
to the Court by itself necessarily means the Court en banc. It was only decided to state "en
banc" there because all internal procedural and administrative matters, as well as ceremonial
functions, are always decided by or conducted in the Court en banc. On the other hand, where
the reference is to the Court acting through its divisions, it would necessarily be so specified.
For lack of transcription of the proceedings of the committees of said Commission, the writer
has perforce to rely on his recollection and notes, but he assures this Court of the foregoing
facts as they transpired.
At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are
actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme
Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the
grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof
by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases
should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will
hereafter be explained.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en
banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the
administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc,
on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. —
In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of Various Supreme Court Rules and
Resolutions," and providing inter alia:
For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more
than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
xxx xxx xxx
This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted
provision was maintained.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters
or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket
and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters,
since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.
This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to
expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the
lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of
three, five, or seven members. 10
Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts
are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a
thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only
when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of
P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decidedin division.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular
No. 2-89 which clarifies that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its
members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon,
and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or
resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).
That guideline or rule in the referral to the Court en banc of cases assigned to a division thereof
rests on the same rationale and applies with equal force to confute the antithetical theory of
respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos thereto, it would indeed be desirable for
said respondent to hereafter deal with situations like the one subject of this resolution with more
perspicacity and circumspection.
WHEREFORE, the basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the judgment in the
case at bar are hereby DENIED. This resolution is immediately final and executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
58
. G.R. No. 88709 February 11, 1992
NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, JUAN COQUINCO and CARLOS
COQUINCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORINO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Ex-
Officio Sheriff of Bulacan, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, MANUEL L. CO,
GOLDEN STAR INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN, respondents.
Manuel T. Ubarra for petitioners.
Encanto, Mabugat & Associates for UCPB.
Mangalindan and Bermas Law Offices for private respondent.
Federico Reyes for Manuel L. Co.
CRUZ, J.:
We are asked once again to interpret the constitutional provision that no decision shall
be rendered by any court without stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based, 1 this time in connection with an order of the trial court
sustaining demurrer to the evidence. 2 The order has been affirmed by the respondent
Court of Appeals, 3 and the appellant has come to this Court in this petition for review
on certiorari, invoking the said provision and alleging several reversible errors.
In the complaint filed by the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, it
was alleged that on January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan
of P2,000,000.00 from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to secure
payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at
Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the
loan, and the sheriff's sale was held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the
required notices after the original date for the auction was changed without the
knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. UCPB was the highest and lone bidder and
the mortgaged lands were sold to it for P3,558,547.64. On August 29, 1983, UCPB
sold all its rights to the properties to private respondent Manuel Co, who on the same
day transferred them to Golden Star Industrial Corporation, another private respondent,
upon whose petition a writ of possession was issued to it on November 4, 1983. On
September 6, 1984, NICOS and the other petitioners, as chairman of its board of
directors and its executive vice-president, respectively, filed their action for "annulment
of sheriff's sale, recovery of possession, and damages, with prayer for the issuance of
a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction."
Golden Star and Victorino P. Evangelista, as ex officio sheriff of Bulacan, moved to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prescription, estoppel, and
regularity of the sheriff's sale. Co denied the allegations of the plaintiffs and, like the
other defendants, counterclaimed for damages. In its answer with counterclaim, UCPB
defended the foreclosure of the mortgage for failure of NICOS to pay the loan in
accordance with its promissory note and insisted that the sheriff's sale had been
conducted in accordance with the statutory requirements.
The plaintiffs presented two witnesses, including petitioner Carlos Coquinco, who
testified at three separate hearings. They also submitted 21 exhibits. On April 30, 1986,
Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page demurrer to the evidence where they
argued that the action was a derivative suit that came under the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission; that the mortgage had been validly foreclosed;
that the sheriff's sale had been held in accordance with Act 3135; that the notices had
been duly published in a newspaper of general circulation; and that the opposition to
the writ of possession had not been filed on time. No opposition to the demurrer having
been submitted despite notice thereof to the parties, Judge Nestor F. Dantes
considered it submitted for resolution and on June 6, 1986, issued the
following —
ORDER
Acting on the "Demurrer to Evidence" dated April 30, 1986 filed by defendants Victorino
P. Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial Corporation to which plaintiff and other
defendants did not file their comment/opposition and it appearing from the very
evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the Sheriff's Auction Sale conducted on July 11,
1983 was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135 under which
the auction sale was appropriately held and conducted and it appearing from the
allegations in paragraph 13 of the plaintiff's pleading and likewise from plaintiff Carlos
Coquinco's own testimony that his cause is actually-against the other officers and
stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos Industrial Corporation ". . . for the purpose of
protecting the corporation and its stockholders, as well as their own rights and interests
in the corporation, and the corporate assets, against the fraudulent ants and devices
of the responsible officials of the corporation, in breach of the trust reposed upon them
by the stockholders . . ." a subject matter not within the competent jurisdiction of the
Court, the court finds the same to be impressed with merit.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed. The Defendants' respective
counterclaims are likewise dismissed.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction heretofore issued is dissolved and set aside.
It is this order that is now assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it
violates the aforementioned constitutional requirement. The petitioners claim that it is
not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached
by the trial court. They also stress that the sheriff's sale was irregular because the
notices thereof were published in a newspaper that did not have general circulation
and that the original date of the sheriff's sale had been changed without its consent,
the same having been allegedly given by a person not authorized to represent NICOS.
It is also contended that the original P2 million loan had already been paid and that if
59
there was indeed a second P2 million loan also secured by the real estate mortgage,
it was for UCPB to prove this, as well as its allegation that NICOS had defaulted in the
payment of the first quarterly installment on the first loan.
The petitioners complain that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of
their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement that the
sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. There was
therefore no adequate factual or legal basis for the decision that could justify its review
and affirmance by the Court of Appeals.
Rejecting this contention, the respondent court held:
In their first assignment of error, appellants faults the court for its failure to state clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which the order of dismissal is based, as required
by Section 1, Rule 36, of the Rules of Court and the Constitution.
An order granting a demurrer to the evidence is in fact an adjudication on the merits
and consequently the requirements of Section 1, Rule 36, is applicable. We are not
however prepared to hold that there is a reversible omission of the requirements of the
rule in the Order appealed from, it appearing from a reading thereof that there is
substantial reference to the facts and the law on which it is based.
The Order which adverts to the Demurrer to the Evidence expressly referred to the
evidence adduced by the plaintiff as showing that the Sheriff's auction sale conducted
on July 11, 1983, was in complete accord with the requisites of Section 3, Act 3135
under which the auction sale was apparently held and conducted. It likewise makes
reference to the allegations in paragraph 13 of plaintiff's pleadings and plaintiff Carlos
Coquinco's own testimony that the case is actually against the other officers and
stockholders of plaintiff NICOS Industrial Corporation and concludes, rightly or wrongly,
that the subject matter thereof is not within the competent jurisdiction of the Court.
We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo while leaving much
to be desired, substantially complies with the rules.
This Court does not agree. The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues,
and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it
was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor
of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its
action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher
court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision
that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to
the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by
a higher tribunal.
It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision does not apply to
interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for postponement or quashing a
subpoena, because it "refers only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of the
trial court resolving incidental matters." 4 As for the minute resolutions of this Court, we
have already observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals 5 that —
The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees
them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues
raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by
substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws,
where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely to forestall the
early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution
denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is
given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
The order in the case at bar does not come under either of the above exceptions. As it
is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the
merits, 6 it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating
therein the facts and the law on which it is based.
It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a
judgment on the merits and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. There is no
quarrel with this established principle. However, the rule would be applicable only if the
case is dismissed on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and not when some other
additional ground is invoked.
A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed
not only for lack of jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence to
prove the invalidity of the sheriff's sale. Regarding this second ground, all the trial court
did was summarily conclude "from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff" that the
sheriff's sale "was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135." It
did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it believed that the
legal requirements had been observed. Its conclusion was remarkably threadbare.
Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for
substance. As the ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the
merits, the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.
Significantly, the respondent court found that the trial court did have jurisdiction over
the case after all. This made even more necessary the factual and legal explanation
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff's evidence was
insufficient.
60
In People v. Escober, 7 the trial court in a decision that covered only one and a half pages,
single spaced found the defendant guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. Holding that
the decision violated the constitutional requirement, the Court observed through then Associate
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan:
The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily from
the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the
facts from which such conclusions are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material
allegations of the Amended Information were the facts without specifying which of the
testimonies or the exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-
appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing out what
these contradictions consist of or what "vital details" Escober could have recalled as a credible
witness. He also found the crime to be attended by the aggravating circumstances of cruelty,
nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among others" but did not particularly state the
factual basis for such findings.
While it is true that the case before us does not involve the life or liberty of the defendant, as in
Escober, there is still no reason for the constitutional short-cut taken by the trial judge. The
properties being litigated are not of inconsequential value; they were sold for three and a half
million pesos in 1983 and doubtless have considerably appreciated since then, after more than
eight years. These facts alone justified a more careful and thorough drafting of the order, to fully
inform the parties and the courts that might later be called upon to review it of the reasons why
the demurrer to the evidence was sustained and the complaint dismissed.
In Romero v. Court of Appeals, 8 the Court, somewhat reluctantly, approved a memorandum
decision of the Court of Appeals consisting of 4 pages, single-spaced, which adopted by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Agrarian Relations. While
holding that the decision could be considered substantial compliance with PD 946, Section
18, 9 and BP 129, Section 40, 10 Justice Jose Y. Feria nevertheless expressed the misgiving
that "the tendency would be to follow the line of least resistance by just adopting the findings
and conclusions of the lower court without thoroughly studying the appealed case."
Obviously, the order now being challenged cannot qualify as a memorandum decision because
it was not issued by an appellate court reviewing the findings and conclusions of a lower court.
We note that, contrary to the impression of the respondent court, there is not even an
incorporation by reference of the evidence and arguments of the parties, assuming this is
permitted. No less importantly, again assuming arguendo that such reference is allowed and
has been made, there is no immediate accessibility to the incorporated matters so as to insure
their convenient examination by the reviewing court. In Francisco v. Permskul, 11 which is the
latest decision of the Court on the issue now before us, we categorically required:
. . . Although only incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of the regional trial
court, Judge Balita's decision was nevertheless available to the Court of Appeals. It is this
circumstance, or even happenstance, if you will, that has validated the memorandum decision
challenged in this case and spared it from constitutional infirmity.
That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following requirement, as a
condition for the proper application of Section 40 of BP Blg. 129. The memorandum decision,
to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court
only byremote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and
immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation
by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being
adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words,
the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of BP Blg. 129 should actually embody
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made
an indispensable part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the
decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper
examination of the facts and the law on which it was based. The proximity at least of the
annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of
course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with
Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
In Escober, the Court observed that the flawed decision "should have been remanded to the
court a quo for the rendition of a new judgment" but decided nevertheless to decide the case
directly, the records being already before it and in deference to the right of the accused to a
speedy trial as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. However, we are not so disposed in the case
now before us.
It is not the normal function of this Court to rule on a demurrer to the evidence in the first
instance; our task comes later, to review the ruling of the trial court after it is examined by the
Court of Appeals and, when proper, its decision is elevated to us. In the present case, we find
that the respondent court did not have an adequate basis for such examination because of the
insufficiency of the challenged order. It must also be noted that we deal here only with property
rights and, although we do not mean to minimize them, they do not require the same urgent
action we took in Escober, which involved the very life of the accused. All things considered,
we feel that the proper step is to remand this case to the court a quo for a revision of the
challenged order in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution.
Review by the Court of the other issues raised, most of which are factual, e.g., the allegation of
default in the payment of the loan, the existence of a second loan, the nature of the newspapers
where the notices of the sale were published, the authority of the person consenting to the
postponement of the sale, etc., is impractical and unnecessary at this time. These matters
should be discussed in detail in the revised order to be made by the trial court so that the higher
courts will know what they are reviewing when the case is appealed.
In one case, 12 this Court, exasperated over the inordinate length of a decision rife with irrelevant
details, castigated the trial judge for his "extraordinary verbiage." Kilometric decisions without
much substance must be avoided, to be sure, but the other extreme, where substance is also
lost in the wish to be brief, is no less unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with
welcome economy of words, arrives at the factual findings, reaches the legal conclusions,
renders its ruling and, having done so, ends.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis.
This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10, for revision, within
30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986, conformably to the requirements of Article
VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the appeal thereof, if desired, in accordance with
law. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
61
KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, SANTIAGO LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and MAXIMO CONTRERAS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
Before the Court is pleading filed on March 4, 1998 in behalf of petitioner and
denominated as a Motion for Leave to file Incorporated Second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of September 10, 1997. This resolution does not in
the least depart from or enervate the specific prohibition against second motions for
reconsideration[1] Which are applicable thereto. Considering however, the increasing
practice by defeated parties of conjuring scenarios which they blame for their debacle
instead of admitting the lack of merit in their cases, the Court is constrained to once
again express its displeasure against such unethical disregard of the canons for
responsible advocacy, with the warning that this insidious pattern of professional
misconduct shall not hereafter be allowed to pass with impunity.
Indeed, petitioner has gone to the extent of attributing supposed errors and
irregularities in the disposition of this case to both the Court of Appeals and this Court,
with particular allusions amounting to misconduct on the part of counsel for respondent
private corporation and with specific imputations against retired Justice Teodoro Padilla
in connection therewith.These will hereafter be discussed in light of the records of this
Court and the vigorous disclaimer of counsel for said private respondent.
Petitioner's unbridled remonstrations are directed at the fact that its petition for review
on certiorari of the adverse decision of respondent Court of Appeals[2] was denied by
this Court for failure to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any
reversible error in its questioned judgment.[3] This was arrived at after due
consideration by the Second Division of this Court of the merits of the challenged
decision and the extended resolution of respondent court denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration thereof, the arguments of petitioner in his present petition for review
on certiorari, the joint comment of respondents, the reply of petitioner, and the joint
rejoinder of respondents, as well as the respective annexes of said pleadings.Indeed,
the parties had all the opportunity to expound on and dissect the issues in this case,
and in some instances even the non-issues, through the liberal admission by this Court
of such pleadings.
Petitioner then filed a 24-page motion for reconsideration, and this Court required
respondents to comment thereon, after which petitioners reply filed without leave was
nonetheless admitted, and to which, on leave sought and granted, respondents filed a
joint rejoinder. All these pleadings, just like those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, were so extensive, to the point of even incorporating new and modified
issues, as to cover all possible aspects of the case to subserve the partisan views of
the parties. Since no additional and substantial arguments were adduced to warrant
the reconsideration sought, the Court resolved to deny the motion on January 26,
1998.[4]
It defies explanation, therefore, why petitioner would still insist that the parties should
further have been allowed to file memoranda, an obvious ploy to justify a resolution
giving due course to its petition, while simultaneously insinuating that its pleadings were
not read. Indeed, petitioner would even dictate how this Court should have acted on its
petition, with the improbable theory that because the case had progressed to the
rejoinder stage, the petition must be given due course and a decision be rendered
thereafter in its favor. This it tries to buttress by the palpably erroneous submission that
since respondent court reversed the decision of the court a quo, this Court is duty
bound to determine the facts involved. Firstly, this is a deliberate misstatement of our
jurisprudence which merely holds that, in such a case, this Court may at its option
review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals instead of being bound
thereby. Secondly, and worse for petitioner, there is no conflict in the factual findings
of the two lower courts as the Court of Appeals actually adopted the findings of fact of
the trial court.
In its second motion for reconsideration, petitioner now tries a different tack by lecturing
this Court on its theory that the minute resolutions it assails are supposedly in violation
of Section 14, Article VIII of the present Constitution. In characteristic fashion, it
insinuates that such procedure adopted by this Court is a culpable constitutional
violation and can be subject of impeachment proceedings. Petitioner is, of course, free
to believe and act as it pleases just as this Court may likewise be minded to take the
appropriate sanctions, for which purpose it would do well for all and sundry to now
imbibe the consistent doctrines laid down by this Court.
As early as Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al,[5] it has been stressed that these
resolutions are not decisions within the above constitutional requirements; they merely
hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers
have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no
need to fully explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the Court of Appeals decision.
This was reiterated in Que vs. People, et al.,[6] and further clarified in Munal vs.
Commission on Audit, et al.[7] that the constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases
submitted for decision, i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda
and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course, with the
resolution therefore stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Court, after
deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the
petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error
in the respondent courts decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.[8]
62
For, as expounded more in detail in Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, et al.:[9]
The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of
its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a
case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the
decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the
facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the
petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-
compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition
always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta (148 SCRA
382, 417 [1987]), [T]he Court is not duty bound to render signed Decisions all the
time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute
Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case
(Italics supplied). This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and,
accordingly discharge its constitutional functions. x x x.
xxx
In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al. (May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision
must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based as referring
only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional
provision which states that, No petition for review x x x shall be refused due course x x
x without stating the legal basis therefor (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When
the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings,
manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and
states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent
court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is
a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
The course of action adopted by the Court in disposing of this case through its two
resolutions, after a thorough review of the issues and arguments of the parties in the
plethora of pleadings they have filed, is not only in accord with but is justified by this
firm and realistic doctrinal rule:
x x x The Supreme Court is not compelled to adopt a definite and stringent rule on how
its judgment shall be framed. It has long been settled that this Court has discretion to
decide whether a minute resolution should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in
any particular case and that a minute Resolution of dismissal of a Petition for Review
on Certiorari constitutes an adjudication on the merits of the controversy or subject
matter of the Petition. It has been stressed by the Court that the grant of due course to
a Petition for Review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so
there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial. For one thing, the facts and law are
already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion. A minute Resolution denying a
Petition for Review of a Decision of the Court of Appeals can only mean that the
Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals, in other words that the decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is
correct.[10]
That this Court was fully justified in handing down its minute resolution because it
agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals since the
decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct, is best demonstrated and
appreciated by reproducing the salient pronouncements of respondent court on the real
issues actually involved in this case. The material holdings in its decision[11] of June 28,
1996 are as follows:
The facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:
Sometime in 1975, NIDC granted KIPI a direct loan of Eight Million Pesos
(P8,000,000.00) and a Two Million ((P2,000,000.00) guarantee to secure PNB. (Exh.
M of petitioner and Exh. 22 of respondent PNB and intervenor SLDC, T.S.N. October
14, 1992 pp. 19-28). As security thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated April
24, 1975 was executed by Petitioner KIPI in favor of NIDC, covering, among others, a
parcel of land with all its improvements embraced in and covered by TCT NO. 469737
of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal (now Makati, Metro Manila).At the
instance of Respondent PNB and with the conformity of its subsidiary, NIDC, in order
to secure the obligation of Petitioner KIPI under Respondent PNBs deferred letter of
credit for US$1,564,826.00 in favor of Toyota Tsusho Kaisha Ltd., Japan, Petitioner
KIPI executed an Amendment of Mortgage Deed dated June 21, 1978 covering the
same parcel of land and its improvements under TCT No. 469737 on a pari passu basis
in favor of Respondent PNB and NIDC. (Exhibit H, H-1 to H-9). Upon full payment of
Petitioner KIPIs account with NIDC and the P2.0 M Credit Line with Respondent PNB,
NIDC executed a Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage[12] dated January 7,
1981 releasing the mortgage on TCT No. 469737 (Exhibit 1 to 1-4 of Petitioner and
Exhibits 7 to 7-D of Respondent PNB and Intervenor SLDC). In this Deed of Release
and Cancellation of Mortgage, it is provided among the whereases that Whereas, the
credit accomodations had been fully paid by the Borrower to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) and NIDC. (Exh. 1-5). By virtue of this full payment and the execution of
the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, NIDC returned the owners copy of
the TCT No. 469737 of the petitioner and accordingly the Deed of Release and
Cancellation of Mortgage was registered with the Registry of Deed on January 28,
1981. (Exhibits E to E-5) (sic) that there were some accounts chargeable to Petitioner
KIPI on deferred letters of credit opened and established in 1974 and 1975 settled by
Respondent PNB with the foreign suppliers in 1978 and 1979 but came to the
knowledge of Respondent PNB only in 1981 and 1982 (Exhibits 21-1 to 21-L. T.S.N.
May 20, 1992 pp. 16-30).
In a letter to Petitioner KIPI dated March 31, 1992, Respondent PNB requested for the
return of the owners copy of TCT No. 469737 (Exh. 22). On July 7, 1982 in a letter
63
addressed to Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio, then President of Petitioner KIPI, Respondent
PNB reiterated for the return of the aforesaid TCT NO. 469737 (Exh. 22-A) and the
said title was returned to Respondent PNB.
On May 7, 1982, Respondent PNB filed a Petition for Correction of Entry and Adverse
Claim with the office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila and was able to
have the same annotated at the back of TCT No. 469737 (Exh. 9 joint exhibit of
Respondent PNB and Intervenor SLDC).
On November 2, 1983, Respondent PNB filed with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Makati,
Metro Manila a Petition of Sale Under ACT 1508, as amended by P.D. 385 to extra-
judicially foreclose various properties belonging to Petitioner by virtue of a Chattel
Mortgage with Power of Attorney dated June 21, 1978 (Exhibits J to J-4).
On November 25, 1983, Petitioner KIPI received an undated Notice of Sheriffs Sale to
the effect that the land covered by TCT No. 469737 would be foreclosed extra-judicially
on December 19, 1983 at 9:00 a.m. (Exh. K to K-2).
xxx
Simplifying and summing up all the assigned errors of both appellants Philippine
National Bank and Santiago Land Development Corporation, there are actually three
main issues to be resolved in this appeal, to wit: (1) Whether the Deed of Release
dated January 7, 1981 executed by the National Investment and Development
Corporation in favor of appellee Komatsu Industries (Phil.) Inc. [Exhibit I, p. 76 Record
Vol. I; Exhibit 7, p. 1494 Record Vol. IV], had the effect of releasing the real estate
mortgage in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank, as embodied in the
Amendment of Mortgage Deed dated June 21, 1978 [Exhibit H, p. 64 Record Vol I;
Exhibit 6, p. 1482 Record - Vol. IV]; (2) Whether the foreclosure of appellees property
conducted on May 17, 1984 is valid; (3) Whether there is legal and/or factual basis for
the awards of damages in favor of the appellee.
Anent the first issue, We rule that the Deed of Release dated January 7, 1981 executed
solely by the National Investment and Development Corporation in favor of the appellee
Komatsu Industries (Phil.) Inc., did not operate to release the real estate mortgage
executed in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank as embodied in the Amendment
of Mortgage Deed dated June 21, 1978. Said Deed of Release is not binding upon the
appellant Philippine National Bank which was not a signatory to it and has not ratified
the same.
It is axiomatic under Our law on obligations and contracts that contracts take effect only
between the parties, their assigns and heirs (Art. 1311, New Civil Code). The
characteristic of relativity of contracts renders it binding only upon the parties and their
successors. [Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Paras, Vol. IV 1994 ed., pp. 550-
552]. A contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is
not a party to it [Civil Code of the Philippines, Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995 ed., p. 428 citing
Lopez vs. Enriquez, 16 Phil. 336, Ibaez vs. Rodriguez, 47 Phil. 554, etc.] even if he is
aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof [Civil Code of the
Philippines, Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995, p. 428 citing Manila Port Service et al. vs. Court of
Appeals et al. 20 SCRA 1214]. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the act,
declaration, or omission of another, and proceedings against one cannot affect
another, except as expressly provided by law or the Rules of Court [Civil Code of the
Philippines, Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995 ed., p. 428 / Rule 123 sec. 10 Rules of Court].
We accordingly find no legal basis for the courts ruling that the Deed of Release dated
January 7, 1981, had the effect of releasing the mortgage in favor of appellant bank
despite the fact that it was executed solely by the National Investment and
Development Corporation without any conformity or authority whatsoever of its joint
mortgagee, the appellant Philippine National Bank. It is not disputed that PNB is a
corporation with a separate and distinct personality from that of NIDC. The court a
quo erred in holding that PNB recognized the release of the mortgage as shown by its
Exhibit 22 wherein Vice President Ramirez stated in his memo to the Litigation and
Collection Division of the PNB that upon discovery of the aforecited release of the
mortgage, we immediately wrote NIDC informing them that KIPI effected the release of
PNBs mortgage using NIDCs Deed of Release. The same memo stated that PNB
requested KIPI to return the title for the reannotation of PNBs mortgage which was
erroneously cancelled (p. 1712, Record). Accordingly, the same exhibit indubitably
showed that PNB promptly objected to the erroneous cancellation of the mortgage in
its favor. Moreover, as above pointed out, an agreement cannot bind one who is not a
party even if he had knowledge of the agreement and had acted on the basis thereof.
Moreover, a reading of the Amendment of Mortgage Deeds executed by Komatsu, PNB
and NIDC, will show that it covered not only the credit accommodations obtained by
Komatsu with NIDC as described in the first whereas clause, but also another obligation
arising from the establishment of a deferred letter of credit for US$1,564,826.00, and
other credit accommodations. We quote from the said Amendment:
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Deed of
Mortgage in favor of NIDC referred to in the first Whereas clause hereof shall be as it
is hereby amended in the sense that the mortgage shall be in favor of PNB and NIDC,
their successors and assigns on a pari-passu basis to secure the respective obligations
of the Mortgagor to PNB and NIDC as follows:
NIDC : a) Direct loan of P8,000,000.00
: b) Guarantee in the amount of P2,000,000.00 issued in favor of PNB to secure the
Credit Line of the MORTGAGOR with PNB
PNB : US $1,564,826.00 or equivalent in Philippine Currency by way of deferred Letter
of Credit issued by PNB in favor of Toyoda Tsusho Kaisha Ltd., Japan, thru Republic
National Bank of New York, N.Y.
plus interest and charges as well as all other obligations, whether direct or indirect,
primary or secondary, as appearing in the respective Books of Account of NIDC and
64
PNB and other reasonable expenses and charges arising thereunder, whether such
obligations have been contracted before, during or after date hereof. Subject to
condition No. 4 hereinbelow, in case the MORTGAGOR execute subsequent
promissory note or notes either as renewal of the former note, an extension thereof, as
new loan, or is given any kind of accommodations such as overdraft, letters of credit,
acceptance and bills of exchange, release of import shipments, on trust receipts etc.,
this mortgage shall also stand as security for the payment of said promissory notes or
notes and/or accommodations without necessity of executing new contract and this
mortgage shall have the same force and effect as if the said promissory notes or notes
and/or accommodations were existing on the date hereof. However, if the
MORTGAGOR shall pay to the MORTGAGEES, their successors or assigns the
obligations secured by this mortgage, together with interest, costs and other expenses
on or before the date they are due and shall keep and perform all the covenants and
agreements herein contained for the MORTGAGOR then this mortgage shall be null
and void, otherwise, it shall remain in full force and effect. (pp. 65-66, Record).
It is clear that the reference to the credit accommodations consisting of P8,000,000.00
direct loan and P2,000,000.00 guarantee mentioned in the third whereas clause of the
Deed of Release as having been fully paid by the borrower was to these two obligations
obtained from NIDC, and not to the other obligation described in the Amended
Mortgage as pertaining to PNB directly, arising from the issuance of the deferred letter
of credit in the amount of US $1,564,826.00, the express inclusion of which obligation
in the Amended Mortgage cannot be ignored. It is equally clear that NIDC was in no
position to state that Komatsus direct obligation to PNB has been fully paid. And on the
basic proposition above-stated that the deed of release executed by NIDC cannot bind
its joint mortgagee, which is an entirely different entity, We find that the court a quo
erroneously invoked the 3rd whereas clause stating that the credit accommodations had
been fully paid by the Borrower to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and NIDC.
We are thus unable to accept the trial courts reasoning that the release executed by
NIDC will necessarily include the mortgage to PNB. The hypothesis that NIDC being a
wholly owned subsidiary of its joint mortgagee could not have executed the Deed of
Release and Cancellation of Mortgage without the knowledge and consent of
respondent PNB, its mother company, has no support in law and jurisprudence.Neither
does the evidence of record show that any confirmation or ratification of the release of
mortgage was made by the PNB. Nothing short of an actual payment of the debt or an
express release will operate to discharge a mortgage (55 Am. Jur. 394).
Defendants-appellants also question the trial courts ruling that even granting that PNBs
claim is correct that insofar as it is concerned, the mortgage was not released it being
separate entity and the mortgage being on a pari passu basis, the extrajudicial
foreclosure should be to the extent only of its proportionate credit.
We do not agree that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole Pasong
Tamo property is null and void. A mortgage is indivisible in nature, so that payment of
a part of the secured debt does not extinguish the entire mortgage (See Paras, Civil
Code Anno., 1995 ed., Vol. V, p. 1044; Art. 2089, Civil Code). There is also no
language in the mortgage instrument to indicate otherwise, i.e. that the mortgage of the
Pasong Tamo property is divisible, so that in case of the payment of the obligation to
one mortgagee the mortgage would subsist only to the extent of the remaining lien of
the other mortgagee. The mortgage instrument contemplated not only obligations
existing on the date thereof, but also future obligations or accommodations appearing
in the respective Books of Account of NIDC and PNB, thus rendering it unlikely and
impractical for the parties to have intended a division of the mortgaged property in
accordance with the proportionate credits of the two joint mortgagors.
The case of Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 46) cited
by the court a quo is not in point. It refers to a mortgage of one parcel of land in favor
of one mortgagee, where there was a failure of consideration, i.e., the entire amount of
the loan was not released to the mortgagor and the mortgage was thus held to be
enforceable only to the extent of the amount of the loan that was released. The factual
situation in this case is obviously different. The mortgage here is not being enforced for
more than the actual sum due.
With respect to the courts pronouncement that the Petition for Correction of Entry or
Adverse Claim cannot be made as basis of any foreclosure proceeding, suffice it to
point out that the records bear out defendants-appellants claim that the PNB filed a
verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135 pursuant to the
provisions of the Amendment of Mortgage Deed (Records, pp. 1482 to 1493).The
Petition for Sale under Act No. 3135, as amended, dated October 8, 1983, was made
the basis for the issuance of the Notice of Sheriffs sale (Exhs. 9 to 9-d, 9-e to 9-bbb, 9-
ccc Komatsu; Exhs. 10, 14 to 14-b, 15, 17 PNB,/SLDC). The plaintiff-appellee has not
controverted the veracity of these documents either in the court below or in its
Appellees brief. Accordingly, We rule that since the mortgage in favor of PNB is still
subsisting, the sheriffs sale on the basis of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure is
valid.
Finally, consistently with Our above ruling relative to the validity of the foreclosure
proceedings and the non-binding effect of the Deed of Release executed by the
National Investment and Development Corporation in so far as the mortgage in favor
of the appellant Philippine National Bank is concerned. We rule that the appellee
Komatsu Industries (Phil.) Inc. is not entitled to any award of damages pursuant to the
principle of damnum absque injuria, i.e. there might have been a loss (on the part of
the appellee-mortgagor) arising from the foreclosure but said loss does not create a
ground of legal redress. A loss or damage which does not constitute the violation of a
65
legal right or amount to a legal wrong is damnum absque injuria [Huyong Hian vs. Court
of Appeals, 59 SCRA 134; Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 548].(Italics supplied)
Consequently, respondent court reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial court
in Civil Case NO. 5957 and declared legal and valid the First Notice of Sheriffs Sale
dated November 12, 1983, the Second Notice of Sheriffs Sale dated April 6, 1984, the
Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceedings held and conducted thereunder, the Certificate
of Sale dated May 17, 1984 and the registration thereof, the Final Deed of Sale, its
registration and the Transfer Certificate of Title issued to respondent Philippine
National Bank as the highest and lone bidder, the Deed of Sale in favor of and the
Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the intervenor Santiago Land Development
Corporation.
Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court in
its resolution[13] of January 14, 1997, from which we quote the following pertinent
excerpts:
The motion for reconsideration has no merit.
We reiterate our ruling that the Deed of Release executed solely by National
Investment and Development Corporation did not operate to release the real estate
mortgage executed in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank as embodied in the
Amendment of Mortgage Deed. This issue was fully discussed in our decision and We
find no substantial argument in the motion for reconsideration, the petitioner-appellees
memorandum or at the hearing, that would warrant a reversal of our previous findings.
It is evident that the Deed of Release pertains only to the mortgage executed in favor
of the National Investment and Development Corporation whose credit has been fully
paid. Insofar as the mortgage executed in favor of PNB is concerned, the same
subsists as the credit in the amount of $1,564,826.00 remained unpaid. Contrary to
appellees submission, the Deed of Release executed by the National Investment and
Development Corporation is not an exercise in futility for said document actually
released the indebtedness due to the National Investment and Development
Corporation consisting of an P8,000,000.00 direct loan and P2,000,000.00 guarantee
loan.
Petitioner-appellee submits that in the light of Article 2089 of the Civil Code, the
Amendment of Mortgage Deed is null and void, and there was no valid mortgage in
favor of PNB. Hence when the Deed of Release cancelled the only valid mortgage in
favor of National Investment Development Corporation, there was no more mortgage
left to be foreclosed by Philippine National Bank.
We do not agree.
At the outset, We note that the legality and validity of the Amendment of Mortgage
Deed was never put in issue before the trial court nor was it raised in the appeal
proper. If well recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first time
on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or disregarded
when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate
court [Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 303].
At any rate, We are not inclined to uphold appellees contention that the Amendment of
Mortgage Deed (which is the basis of the mortgage in favor of the PNB) is null and void
on the argument that Article 2089 of the Civil Code prohibits a situation where two or
more creditors, with separate and distinct credits secured a mortgage over a single
property.
There is nothing in Article 2089 of the Civil Code that prohibits the mortgagor from
mortgaging the same property for a separate and distinct debt in favor of another
creditor. In this jurisdiction, the mortgagor is allowed to obtain subsequent loans by
means of subsequent and successive mortgages on the same property. We further
agree with appellant that if an owner-mortgagor can enter into second and further
mortgages, there is no law that prohibits the mortgagor and the mortgagee from
agreeing that the mortgages would be pari-passu. What is proscribed by Article 2089
is for a debtor who has mortgaged his property to secure a debt, to demand that the
mortgage be released in proportion to the amount of the debt he has paid. Under the
said article, the mortgagor has to pay the debt in full before he can ask for the release
of the mortgage. This is compatible with the principle that a mortgage is indivisible.
Our ruling that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole Pasong Tamo
property is valid since the mortgage is indivisible in nature is not inconsistent with our
statement that the Deed of Released executed solely by National Investment and
Development Corporation did not operate to release the real estate mortgage executed
in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank. The fact that the Deed of Release
executed by the National Investment and Development Corporation did not operate to
release the real estate mortgage in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank, does
not render the mortgage divisible. Indeed, foreclosure of the property in its entirety by
Philippine National Bank is necessary because of the indivisible nature of a
mortgage. The fact that there are two obligations secured by the same mortgaged
property does not render the mortgage divisible. The indivisibility of the mortgage or
pledge does not affect the divisibility of the principal obligation. When the same thing
is pledged or mortgaged to several creditors, the indivisibility of the pledge or mortgage
entitled each and every creditor to the same action against the thing which is liable in
its entirety for the individual share of each creditor. [Civil Code of the Philippines, by
Tolentino, Vol. V, pp. 538-539, 1992 Ed.].
The rest of the arguments of the appellee in its motion for reconsideration are mere
rehash of what have been raised in its brief and were already fully considered and
discussed in our decision. (Emphasis ours)
In the same manner, we readily found that, despite the lengthy and repetitious
submissions of petitioner in its pleadings filed with this Court as earlier enumerated, all
the arguments therein are also mere rehashed versions of what it posited before
66
respondent court. We have patiently given petitioners postulates the corresponding
thorough and objective review but, on the real and proper issues so completely and
competently discussed and resolved by respondent court, petitioners obvious
convolutions of the same arguments are evidently unavailing. It must be noted that its
recourse to respondent court was by appeal on writ of error, hence the preceding
quotation in extenso of said courts decision readily shows how the real issues were
correctly particularized and summarized to meet petitioners assignment of errors, and
then ably adjudicated on both evidential and legal grounds.
Petitioner has come to this Court this time on appeal by certiorari and it must be aware
of the elementary rule that, as emphasized in the decisions previously cited, a review
thereunder is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons therefor.[14] Here, there is no novel
question of substance nor has respondent court decided the case contrary to law or
our applicable decisions. On the contrary, it acted with commendable fealty to the
same, and that is the other reason why we extensively reproduced the pertinent
discussions in its challenged decision.
All these notwithstanding, petitioner still comes up with another supposed issue, this
time faulting respondent court for allegedly not resolving the question of whether or not
petitioner is entitled to redeem its foreclosed property from respondent Philippine
National Bank in the event the foreclosure thereof is held to be valid. We agree with
respondents observation that this matter is not proper at this stage of the case since it
was never raised in the complaint or admitted as an issue at the pre-trial, but was raised
only in petitioners memorandum before the trial court.[15] Also, respondents point out
that the period of redemption had long lapsed since the sheriffs certificate of sale was
registered on May 17, 1984 and, citing applicable authorities, the one-year redemption
period is not suspended by an action for nullification of the auction sale.
What is more telling against petitioners new proposition, however, is the documented
fact that as early as April 17, 1985, it executed a Deed of Assignment of Right of
Redemption over the property in question in favor of Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing.[16] In
fact, the exercise of such right of redemption by the assignee is involved in Civil Case
No. 105 of the Regional Trial court of Makati, and the side issue of the right of
respondent Santiago Land Development Corporation to intervene therein was decided
by this Court in G.R. NO. 106194. On both substantive and procedural considerations,
therefore, petitioners presentation of that so-called issue in the present appellate stage
is an undue imposition on the time of this Court.
We have stated, at the outset, that petitioners second motion for reconsideration could
have been correctly rejected outright. But, as further noted, petitioner has distressingly
adopted the lamentable technique contrived by losing litigants of resorting to
ascriptions of supposed irregularities in the courts of justice as the cause for their
defeat. Here, petitioner speaks of pressure having been employed by respondents
against the trial court. It then proceeds to insinuate anomalous haste on the part of
respondent court in reversing the trial court, pointing to the supposed short period of
time it took the former to come out with its decision. It never even bothered to mention
that the issues are actually very simple, that the evidence is basically documentary,
and that the questions raised are easily answered by applying settled doctrines of this
Court.
On top of that, it now veers towards this Court, spinning the yarn that retired Justice
Teodoro Padilla first approached the ponente to whom its petition had been raffled, and
asked for a disposition in favor of respondents as a birthday and parting gift; that
said ponente declined and unloaded the case such that it was again raffled to a good
friend of Justice Padilla. The records, however, show that this case was directly raffled
to the Second Division on January 28, 1997 and there was no prior ponente to whom
it was assigned who then supposedly unloaded it; and under the internal rules of this
Court, when a case is unloaded, there is no need for holding a second raffle.
Petitioner could have rendered a signal service to the judiciary if it had only verified and
proved the facts it purveyed but which are now belied even just by the internal rules of
this Court, of which petitioner appears to be ignorant hence the valor of his
denunciation. The members of the Second Division of this Court vehemently deny and
denounce the animadversion on their allegedly having been approached by Justice
Padilla regarding this case. The Padilla Law Office, counsel for respondent private
corporation, has submitted its response to the imputations against it, thus calling for
petitioner to prove its charges. The same burden is also imposed upon petitioner to
prove its charges. The same burden is also imposed upon petitioner for the aspersions
it has cast upon respondent Court of Appeals. We, therefore, leave it to the aforesaid
law firm, Justice Teodoro Padilla and the Court of Appeals, on the one hand, and to
herein petitioner, on the other, to decide for themselves whether to further pursue this
incident in the proper proceedings.
On such contingency, this Court will content itself for the nonce with a stern admonition
that petitioner refrain from conduct tending to create mistrust in our judicial system
through innuendos on which no evidence is offered or indicated to be
proffered. Responsible litigants need not be told that only pleadings formulated with
intellectual honesty on facts duly ascertained can subserve the ends of justice and
dignify the cause of the pleader.
WHEREFORE, petitioners second motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit and EXPUNGED as an unauthorized pleading. This resolution is
immediately final and executory, and no further pleadings or motions will be
entertained.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
67
G.R. No. 114323 July 23, 1998
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC., respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil
Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS
COMMISSION and against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED.
The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India
while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines. The present conflict between the petitioner and the private
respondent has its roots in a contract entered into by and between both parties on
February 26, 1983 whereby the private respondent undertook to supply the petitioner
FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement. In
consideration therefor, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private respondent the
amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
U.S. DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by opening an irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed
letter of credit in favor of the latter. The oil well cement was loaded on board the ship
MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery at Bombay
and Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute between the shipowner and the private
respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point destination.
Notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent had already received payment and
despite several demands made by the petitioner, the private respondent failed to
deliver the oil well cement. Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and
they agreed that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil
well cement with Class "G" cement cost free at the petitioner's designated port.
However, upon inspection, the Class "G" cement did not conform to the petitioner's
specifications. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring
its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates:
Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all questions and
disputes, relating to the meaning of the specification designs, drawings and instructions
herein before mentioned and as to quality of workmanship of the items ordered or as
to any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or
relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these
conditions or otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute
the same during stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment
thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the persons appointed by Member of
the Commission at the time of dispute. It will be no objection to any such appointment
that the arbitrator so appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he had to deal with
the matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of his duties
as Commission's employee he had expressed views on all or any of the matter in
dispute or difference.
The arbitrator to whom the matter is originally referred being transferred or vacating his
office or being unable to act for any reason the Member of the Commission shall
appoint another person to act as arbitrator in accordance with the terms of the
contract/supply order. Such person shall be entitled to proceed with reference from the
stage at which it was left by his predecessor. Subject as aforesaid the provisions of the
Arbitration Act, 1940, or any Statutory modification or re-enactment there of and the
rules made there under and for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration
proceedings under this clause.
The arbitrator may with the consent of parties enlarge the time, from time to time, to
make and publish the award.
The venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun. 1*
On July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute
in petitioner's favor setting forth the arbitral award as follows:
NOW THEREFORE after considering all facts of the case, the evidence, oral and
documentarys adduced by the claimant and carefully examining the various written
statements, submissions, letters, telexes, etc. sent by the respondent, and the oral
arguments addressed by the counsel for the claimants, I, N.N. Malhotra, Sole
Arbitrator, appointed under clause 16 of the supply order dated 26.2.1983, according
to which the parties, i.e. M/S Oil and Natural Gas Commission and the Pacific Cement
Co., Inc. can refer the dispute to the sole arbitration under the provision of the
Arbitration Act. 1940, do hereby award and direct as follows: —
The Respondent will pay the following to the claimant: —
1. Amount received by the Respondent
against the letter of credit No. 11/19
dated 28.2.1983 US $ 477,300.00
2. Re-imbursement of expenditure incurred
by the claimant on the inspection team's
visit to Philippines in August 1985 US $ 3,881.00
3. L.C. Establishment charges incurred
by the claimant US $ 1,252.82
4. Loss of interest suffered by claimant
from 21.6.83 to 23.7.88 US $ 417,169.95
Total amount of award US $ 899,603.77
In addition to the above, the respondent would also be liable to pay to the claimant the
interest at the rate of 6% on the above amount, with effect from 24.7.1988 up to the
68
actual date of payment by the Respondent in full settlement of the claim as awarded or
the date of the decree, whichever is earlier.
I determine the cost at Rs. 70,000/- equivalent to US $5,000 towards the expenses on
Arbitration, legal expenses, stamps duly incurred by the claimant. The cost will be
shared by the parties in equal proportion.
Pronounced at Dehra Dun to-day, the 23rd of July 1988. 2
To enable the petitioner to execute the above award in its favor, it filed a Petition before
the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India (hereinafter referred to as the foreign
court for brevity), praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court"
in India. The foreign court issued notices to the private respondent for filing objections
to the petition. The private respondent complied and sent its objections dated January
16, 1989. Subsequently, the said court directed the private respondent to pay the filing
fees in order that the latter's objections could be given consideration. Instead of paying
the required filing fees, the private respondent sent the following communication
addressed to the Civil judge of Dehra Dun:
The Civil Judge
Dehra Dun (U.P.) India
Re: Misc. Case No. 5 of 1989
M/S Pacific Cement Co.,
Inc. vs. ONGC Case
Sir:
1. We received your letter dated 28 April 1989 only last 18 May 1989.
2. Please inform us how much is the court fee to be paid. Your letter did not mention
the amount to be paid.
3. Kindly give us 15 days from receipt of your letter advising us how much to pay to
comply with the same.
Thank you for your kind consideration.
Pacific Cement Co., Inc.
By:
Jose Cortes, Jr.
President 3
Without responding to the above communication, the foreign court refused to admit the
private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing fees, and thereafter
issued an Order on February 7, 1990, to wit:
ORDER
Since objections filed by defendant have been rejected through Misc. Suit No. 5 on
7.2.90, therefore, award should be made Rule of the Court.
ORDER
Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On the basis of
conditions of award decree is passed. Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the
decree. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from defendant (US$ 899,603.77 (US$
Eight Lakhs ninety nine thousand six hundred and three point seventy seven only)
along with 9% interest per annum till the last date of realisation.4
Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several
demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to
pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner. Accordingly,
the petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court.
The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1)
plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue; (2) lack of cause of action; and (3) plaintiffs claim
or demand has been waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. The petitioner
filed its opposition to the said motion to dismiss, and the private respondent, its
rejoinder thereto. On January 3, 1992, the RTC issued an order upholding the
petitioner's legal capacity to sue, albeit dismissing the complaint for lack of a valid
cause of action. The RTC held that the rule prohibiting foreign corporations transacting
business in the Philippines without a license from maintaining a suit in Philippine courts
admits of an exception, that is, when the foreign corporation is suing on an isolated
transaction as in this case. 5 Anent the issue of the sufficiency of the petitioner's cause
of action, however, the RTC found the referral of the dispute between the parties to the
arbitrator under Clause 16 of their contract erroneous. According to the RTC,
[a] perusal of the shove-quoted clause (Clause 16) readily shows that the matter
covered by its terms is limited to "ALL QUESTIONS AND DISPUTES, RELATING TO
THE MEANING OF THE SPECIFICATION, DESIGNS, DRAWINGS AND
INSTRUCTIONS HEREIN BEFORE MENTIONED and as to the QUALITY OF
WORKMANSHIP OF THE ITEMS ORDERED or as to any other questions, claim, right
or thing whatsoever, but qualified to "IN ANY WAY ARISING OR RELATING TO THE
SUPPLY ORDER/CONTRACT, DESIGN, DRAWING, SPECIFICATION, etc.,"
repeating the enumeration in the opening sentence of the clause.
The court is inclined to go along with the observation of the defendant that the breach,
consisting of the non-delivery of the purchased materials, should have been properly
litigated before a court of law, pursuant to Clause No. 15 of the Contract/Supply Order,
herein quoted, to wit:
"JURISDICTION
All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this
supply order, shall be subject to the EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT,
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and the place from which this supply order
is situated." 6
The RTC characterized the erroneous submission of the dispute to the arbitrator as a
"mistake of law or fact amounting to want of jurisdiction". Consequently, the
69
proceedings had before the arbitrator were null and void and the foreign court had
therefore, adopted no legal award which could be the source of an enforceable right. 7
The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's
ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties,
thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. In addition, the
appellate court observed that the full text of the judgment of the foreign court contains
the dispositive portion only and indicates no findings of fact and law as basis for the
award. Hence, the said judgment cannot be enforced by any Philippine court as it would
violate the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. 8 The appellate court ruled further that the dismissal of the private respondent's
objections for non-payment of the required legal fees, without the foreign court first
replying to the private respondent's query as to the amount of legal fees to be paid,
constituted want of notice or violation of due process. Lastly, it pointed out that the
arbitration proceeding was defective because the arbitrator was appointed solely by
the petitioner, and the fact that the arbitrator was a former employee of the latter gives
rise to a presumed bias on his part in favor of the petitioner. 9
A subsequent motion for reconsideration by the petitioner of the appellate court's
decision was denied, thus, this petition for review on certiorari citing the following as
grounds in support thereof:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
LOWER COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL SINCE:
A. THE NON-DELIVERY OF THE CARGO WAS A MATTER PROPERLY
COGNIZABLE BY THE PROVISIONS OF CLAUSE 16 OF THE CONTRACT;
B. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIVIL COURT OF DEHRADUN, INDIA WAS AN
AFFIRMATION OF THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS OF THE ARBITRATOR
AND THEREFORE ENFORCEABLE IN THIS JURISDICTION;
C. EVIDENCE MUST BE RECEIVED TO REPEL THE EFFECT OF A PRESUMPTIVE
RIGHT UNDER A FOREIGN JUDGMENT. 10
The threshold issue is whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract. To
reiterate, Clause 16 provides as follows:
Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all questions and
disputes, relating to the meaning of the specification designs, drawings and instructions
herein before mentioned and as to quality of workmanship of the items ordered or as
to any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or
relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these
conditions or otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute
the same during stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment
thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the persons appointed by Member of
the Commission at the time of dispute. It will be no objection to any such appointment
that the arbitrator so appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he had to deal with
the matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of his duties
as Commission's employee he had expressed views on all or any of the matter in
dispute or difference. 11
The dispute between the parties had its origin in the non-delivery of the 4,300 metric
tons of oil well cement to the petitioner. The primary question that may be posed,
therefore, is whether or not the non-delivery of the said cargo is a proper subject for
arbitration under the above-quoted Clause 16. The petitioner contends that the same
was a matter within the purview of Clause 16, particularly the phrase, ". . . or as to any
other questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising or relating to the
supply order/contract, design, drawing, specification, instruction . . .". 12 It is argued that
the foregoing phrase allows considerable latitude so as to include non-delivery of the
cargo which was a "claim, right or thing relating to the supply order/contract". The
contention is bereft of merit. First of all, the petitioner has misquoted the said phrase,
shrewdly inserting a comma between the words "supply order/contract" and "design"
where none actually exists. An accurate reproduction of the phrase reads, ". . . or as to
any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating
to the supply order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these
conditions . . .". The absence of a comma between the words "supply order/contract"
and "design" indicates that the former cannot be taken separately but should be viewed
in conjunction with the words "design, drawing, specification, instruction or these
conditions". It is thus clear that to fall within the purview of this phrase, the "claim, right
or thing whatsoever" must arise out of or relate to the design, drawing, specification, or
instruction of the supply order/contract. The petitioner also insists that the non-delivery
of the cargo is not only covered by the foregoing phrase but also by the phrase, ". . . or
otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the
same during the stipulated/extended period or after completion/abandonment thereof .
. .".
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, although a rule in the construction of statutes, is
equally applicable in the ascertainment of the meaning and scope of vague contractual
stipulations, such as the aforementioned phrase. According to the maxim noscitur a
sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible
of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of the words in which it is found or with which it is associated,
or stated differently, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associated
words. 13 A close examination of Clause 16 reveals that it covers three matters which
may be submitted to arbitration namely,
70
(1) all questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the specification designs,
drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and as to quality of workmanship
of the items ordered; or
(2) any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or
relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these
conditions; or
(3) otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same
during stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment thereof.
The first and second categories unmistakably refer to questions and disputes relating
to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the
supply/order contract. In the third category, the clause, "execution or failure to execute
the same", may be read as "execution or failure to execute the supply order/contract".
But in accordance with the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, this reference to the supply
order/contract must be construed in the light of the preceding words with which it is
associated, meaning to say, as being limited only to the design, drawing, instructions,
specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract. The non-delivery
of the oil well cement is definitely not in the nature of a dispute arising from the failure
to execute the supply order/contract design, drawing, instructions, specifications or
quality of the materials. That Clause 16 should pertain only to matters involving the
technical aspects of the contract is but a logical inference considering that the
underlying purpose of a referral to arbitration is for such technical matters to be
deliberated upon by a person possessed with the required skill and expertise which
may be otherwise absent in the regular courts.
This Court agrees with the appellate court in its ruling that the non-delivery of the oil
well cement is a matter properly cognizable by the regular courts as stipulated by the
parties in Clause 15 of their contract:
All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this
supply order, shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court, within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction and the place from which this supply order is situated. 14
The following fundamental principles in the interpretation of contracts and other
instruments served as our guide in arriving at the foregoing conclusion:
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall
be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual. 15
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing
the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. 16
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction
of an instrument, where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction
is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. 17
Thus, this Court has held that as in statutes, the provisions of a contract should not be
read in isolation from the rest of the instrument but, on the contrary, interpreted in the
light of the other related provisions. 18 The whole and every part of a contract must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its harmonious whole. Equally applicable is
the canon of construction that in interpreting a statute (or a contract as in this case),
care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions.
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be
avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. 19
The petitioner's interpretation that Clause 16 is of such latitude as to contemplate even
the non-delivery of the oil well cement would in effect render Clause 15 a mere
superfluity. A perusal of Clause 16 shows that the parties did not intend arbitration to
be the sole means of settling disputes. This is manifest from Clause 16 itself which is
prefixed with the proviso, "Except where otherwise provided in the supply
order/contract . . .", thus indicating that the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is not all
encompassing, and admits of exceptions as may be provided elsewhere in the supply
order/contract. We believe that the correct interpretation to give effect to both
stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all claims or disputes
arising from or relating to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of
the materials of the supply order/contract, and for Clause 15 to cover all other claims
or disputes.
The petitioner then asseverates that granting, for the sake of argument, that the non-
delivery of the oil well cement is not a proper subject for arbitration, the failure of the
replacement cement to conform to the specifications of the contract is a matter clearly
falling within the ambit of Clause 16. In this contention, we find merit. When the 4,300
metric tons of oil well cement were not delivered to the petitioner, an agreement was
forged between the latter and the private respondent that Class "G" cement would be
delivered to the petitioner as replacement. Upon inspection, however, the replacement
cement was rejected as it did not conform to the specifications of the contract. Only
after this latter circumstance was the matter brought before the arbitrator. Undoubtedly,
what was referred to arbitration was no longer the mere non-delivery of the cargo at
the first instance but also the failure of the replacement cargo to conform to the
specifications of the contract, a matter clearly within the coverage of Clause 16.
The private respondent posits that it was under no legal obligation to make replacement
and that it undertook the latter only "in the spirit of liberality and to foster good business
relationship". 20 Hence, the undertaking to deliver the replacement cement and its
subsequent failure to conform to specifications are not anymore subject of the supply
order/contract or any of the provisions thereof. We disagree.
As per Clause 7 of the supply order/contract, the private respondent undertook to
deliver the 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement at "BOMBAY (INDIA) 2181 MT and
CALCUTTA 2119 MT". 21 The failure of the private respondent to deliver the cargo to
71
the designated places remains undisputed. Likewise, the fact that the petitioner had
already paid for the cost of the cement is not contested by the private respondent. The
private respondent claims, however, that it never benefited from the transaction as it
was not able to recover the cargo that was unloaded at the port of Bangkok. 22 First of
all, whether or not the private respondent was able to recover the cargo is immaterial
to its subsisting duty to make good its promise to deliver the cargo at the stipulated
place of delivery. Secondly, we find it difficult to believe this representation. In its
Memorandum filed before this Court, the private respondent asserted that the Civil
Court of Bangkok had already ruled that the non-delivery of the cargo was due solely
to the fault of the carrier. 23 It is, therefore, but logical to assume that the necessary
consequence of this finding is the eventual recovery by the private respondent of the
cargo or the value thereof. What inspires credulity is not that the replacement was done
in the spirit of liberality but that it was undertaken precisely because of the private
respondent's recognition of its duty to do so under the supply order/contract, Clause
16 of which remains in force and effect until the full execution thereof.
We now go to the issue of whether or not the judgment of the foreign court is
enforceable in this jurisdiction in view of the private respondent's allegation that it is
bereft of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner
was based. The pertinent portion of the judgment of the foreign court reads:
ORDER
Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On the basis of
conditions of award decree is passed. Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the
decree. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from defendant (US$ 899,603.77 (US$
Eight Lakhs ninety nine thousand six hundred and three point seventy seven only)
along with 9% interest per annum till the last date of realisation.24
As specified in the order of the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, "Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall
be a part of the decree". This is a categorical declaration that the foreign court adopted
the findings of facts and law of the arbitrator as contained in the latter's Award Paper.
Award Paper No. 3/B-1, contains an exhaustive discussion of the respective claims
and defenses of the parties, and the arbitrator's evaluation of the same. Inasmuch as
the foregoing is deemed to have been incorporated into the foreign court's judgment
the appellate court was in error when it described the latter to be a "simplistic decision
containing literally, only the dispositive portion". 25
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does
not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
In Francisco v. Permskul, 26 this Court held that the following memorandum decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not transgress the requirements of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court
hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds
that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. 27 (Emphasis
supplied.)
This Court had occasion to make a similar pronouncement in the earlier case
of Romero v. Court of Appeals, 28 where the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
adopted the findings and disposition of the Court of Agrarian Relations in this wise:
We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-assessment of the
same, and We are persuaded, nay compelled, to affirm the correctness of the trial
court's factual findings and the soundness of its conclusion. For judicial convenience
and expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt by way of reference, the findings of facts
and conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our
decision. 29 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid
the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof,
in the decision of the higher court. 30This is particularly true when the decision sought
to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions
arrived at, as in this case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of eighteen (18)
single spaced pages.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily
affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such
judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the
judgment is relied on. 31 This Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. 32 Thus, if under the procedural
rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by
adopting the arbitrator's findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same
vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes
final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in
this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules
provide otherwise.
The private respondent claims that its right to due process had been blatantly violated,
first by reason of the fact that the foreign court never answered its queries as to the
amount of docket fees to be paid then refused to admit its objections for failure to pay
the same, and second, because of the presumed bias on the part of the arbitrator who
was a former employee of the petitioner.
Time and again this Court has held that the essence of due process is to be found in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
72
support of one's defense 33 or stated otherwise, what is repugnant to due process is enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has
the denial of opportunity to be heard. 34 Thus, there is no violation of due process even regularly performed its official duty. 39
if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his side Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment, the private respondent herein,
of the controversy and he waived his right to do so. 35 had the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity which it failed to do in the
In the instant case, the private respondent does not deny the fact that it was notified by instant case.
the foreign court to file its objections to the petition, and subsequently, to pay legal fees The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done than to order its
in order for its objections to be given consideration. Instead of paying the legal fees, enforcement, despite the fact that the petitioner merely prays for the remand of the
however, the private respondent sent a communication to the foreign court inquiring case to the RTC for further proceedings. As this Court has ruled on the validity and
about the correct amount of fees to be paid. On the pretext that it was yet awaiting the enforceability of the said foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further proceedings in the
foreign court's reply, almost a year passed without the private respondent paying the RTC for the reception of evidence to prove otherwise are no longer necessary.
legal fees. Thus, on February 2, 1990, the foreign court rejected the objections of the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court
private respondent and proceeded to adjudicate upon the petitioner's claims. We of Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS
cannot subscribe to the private respondent's claim that the foreign court violated its COMMISSION's complaint in Civil Case No. 4006 before Branch 30 of the RTC of
right to due process when it failed to reply to its queries nor when the latter rejected its Surigao City is REVERSED, and another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING
objections for a clearly meritorious ground. The private respondent was afforded private respondent PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC. to pay to petitioner the
sufficient opportunity to be heard. It was not incumbent upon the foreign court to reply amounts adjudged in the foreign judgment subject of said case.
to the private respondent's written communication. On the contrary, a genuine concern SO ORDERED.
for its cause should have prompted the private respondent to ascertain with all due
diligence the correct amount of legal fees to be paid. The private respondent did not
act with prudence and diligence thus its plea that they were not accorded the right to
procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy from this Court. 36
The private respondent bewails the presumed bias on the part of the arbitrator who
was a former employee of the petitioner. This point deserves scant consideration in
view of the following stipulation in the contract:
. . . . It will be no objection any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a
Commission employer (sic) that he had to deal with the matter to which the supply or
contract relates and that in the course of his duties as Commission's employee he had
expressed views on all or any of the matter in dispute or difference. 37 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Finally, we reiterate hereunder our pronouncement in the case of Northwest Orient
Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 38 that:
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam
of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest
by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere,
73
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-
ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-
intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
JR., petitioner, G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT
OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO,
JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS,
DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA
SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE
CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA
CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO,
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO
PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO,
JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO,
CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN
PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL
DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI
AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT,
ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH
SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA,
JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO,
CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR.,
JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO
ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON,
REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY
ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA,
NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.
SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
74
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner- in-intervention,
in-intervention, vs.
vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE
HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,respondents, AL., respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, x---------------------------------------------------------x
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
x---------------------------------------------------------x PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003 vs.
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
GONZALES, petitioners, REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner- ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
in-intervention, x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
vs. ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N.
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS vs.
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003 G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, vs.
EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE x---------------------------------------------------------x
ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO vs.
LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners, PRESIDENT, respondents.
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner- x---------------------------------------------------------x
75
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA,
DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V.
DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS,
ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G.
AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER
CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON,
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO,
BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN
80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,
MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE
COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION
OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
[CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ,
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY
THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
[CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST
PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT,respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate
and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the
independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their
respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means
and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times
turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is
confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has
76
drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to
vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether
the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps
even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address
all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces,
at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving
it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the
public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among
the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes
for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power
assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three
branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended
as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the
people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these
branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater
interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-
third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the
party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th
Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November
28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th
Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE II RULE V
77
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. – Impeachment shall be
initiated only by a verified complaint for
impeachment filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof or by a verified complaint
or resolution of impeachment filed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of
the House.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No period of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated impeachment proceedings are deemed
against the same official more than once initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, Members
within the period of one (1) year.
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF can be initiated against the same officia
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS (Italics in the original; emphasis an
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL underscoring supplied)
Section 16. – ImpeachmentOn July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by
Proceedings Deemed Initiated.– Representative
In Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice
cases where a Member of the House files "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
a verified complaint of impeachment orexpenditures
a by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
citizen files a verified complaint that Fund
is (JDF)."3
endorsed by a Member of the House On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
through a resolution of endorsement complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
against an impeachable officer, and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
impeachment proceedings against such betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by
official are deemed initiated on the dayRepresentatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
the Committee on Justice finds that the Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
verified complaint and/or resolution 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
against such official, as the case may be,
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
is sufficient in substance, or on the date
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
the House votes to overturn or affirm the
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
finding of the said Committee that the days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
verified complaint and/or resolution, asCommittee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
the case may be, is not sufficient report
in to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
substance. corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
In cases where a verified complaint orHouse
a within ten session days from receipt thereof.
resolution of impeachment is filed The or House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
endorsed, as the case may be, by at least
complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003
one-third (1/3) of the Members of the for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has
House, impeachment proceedings are not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of
deemed initiated at the time of the Article XI of the Constitution.
filing of such verified complaint or Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or
resolution of impeachment with the on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it,
Secretary General. the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the
House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Impeachment Proceedings. – Within Davide,
a Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the
of the House of Representatives.13
no impeachment proceedings, as such, Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of
which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
78
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a
duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal
remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that
he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits
that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections
5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with
Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second
impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives,
and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray,
in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against
the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles
of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted
the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as
citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use
of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases
of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment
complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and
members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving
and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents
De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy
Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared
null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right
to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that
they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the
integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is
instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second
impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null
and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking
cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and
issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist
from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are
citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and
a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what
its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount
public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and
the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member
of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is
mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays
in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and
Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
79
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their
petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of
all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding
generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House
of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second
impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second
impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in
interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging
that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental
significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct
and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its
officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or
giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition
for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the
second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as
they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged
abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña,
alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of
their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which
they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of
Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus
standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of
whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law
and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and
Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues
raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of
transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null
and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from
accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by
the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2)
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting
any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have
accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first
three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second
impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No.
160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House
Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were
filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket
number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a
legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the
constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a
motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted
to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned
for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have
yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno
and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice
Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of
October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent
House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment
on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for
oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished
legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and
80
respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for
and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through
Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special
appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to
hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an
independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the
performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On
even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to
Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the
Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the
one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to
the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a)
consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file
their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for
oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin
M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are
plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the
filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its
constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon
its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues
raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in
G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning
the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that
it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and
praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for
judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed
in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein
Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On
November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also
filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and
Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and
Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory
issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can
invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this
Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article
XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the
instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and
against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to
be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial
review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the
essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be
discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial
review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
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Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice
Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present
Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on
what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and
function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject
to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations
are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided
for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government
mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of
this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more
than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided
for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments
of the government.24(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper
allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course
of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly
conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure,
it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review
was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the
supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of
the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the
constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms
and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts,
as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935
Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and
former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial
review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
82
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral
component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the
people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x
x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of
powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing
operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion
by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter
law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and
rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech
of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience
during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the
role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release
of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial
law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon
it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of
the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the
rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during
the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of
constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus,
in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We
do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
83
sought to be attained. They are to be given theirordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are
the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court
apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision
and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect
that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through
Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task
in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran
declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated
a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2,
they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent
of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision
of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone,
but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought
into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory.45(Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids
is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this
Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of
the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing
the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but
they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force
of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and
jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De
Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the
Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that
impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any
question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is
beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to
try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it;
84
and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions
relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are
outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the
majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs
counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try
impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under
which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a
lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to
deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of
review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American
Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition
that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for
under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total
exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it
necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine
constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are
of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and
have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned.
As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes,
[this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly
applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the
United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful
words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and
that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines
their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus,
they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed
legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride." 56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave
the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for
certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents
in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial
review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of
mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not
concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial
review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled
that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate
or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to
nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution,
it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v.
Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the
House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
85
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although
under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this
does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the
National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election
is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and
enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial
review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial
review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution
but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that
petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will
sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since
this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental
importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion
given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is
of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule
exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking
the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot
himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule
on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has
constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it
behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what
is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted
by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional
and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an
action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are
brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or
by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue
in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails
of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
86
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before
us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they
invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of
Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the
legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts
of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or
any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that
he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners,
given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when
it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital
interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member
of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too
general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the
petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention
of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It,
therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues
presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons
intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all
concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the
suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is,
under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not
they were before the court.89Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be
sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitionersadditionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their
petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is
mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the
issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of
a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance
to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the
public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party
should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very
least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take
judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case.
He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be
87
permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements
of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek
to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional
issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part
of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated,
granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et.
al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens
to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority
members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War
II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with
Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the
grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a
legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby
granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate
President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate
President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the
House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions
are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the
matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated,
allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for,
while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement
for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public
moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is
"being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against
abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of
petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being
deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the
Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case
to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when
the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is
questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the
2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that
the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit,
as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are
premature. Amicus curiaeformer Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there
may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final
arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies
in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who
suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage
signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and
opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to
raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are
presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that
even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can
raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of
their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their
constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the
questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit
of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners
would continue to suffer their injuries.
88
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both
Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously
discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the
power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning
impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the
judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot
be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined
the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme
or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which
involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the
political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. 100 In
other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues
involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark
1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the
1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question
doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a
political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to
take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice
Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's
power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual
comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the
service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary
has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of
reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the
most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's
indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the
Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority
to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar
with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not
lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973
on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law
was announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September
21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when
martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything
about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers
were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs
were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971
Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had
not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the
Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates
to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them
was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the
89
Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they
finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to
the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree
calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial
law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain
matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on
the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January
1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the
interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with
such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President
suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would
consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the
questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its
scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on
Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays."
Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were
released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a
plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the
votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court
praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being
heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a
proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force
because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the
Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to
the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the
parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been
ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and
void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political
question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the
vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme
Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum
in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged
referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the
members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference
between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the
defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the
case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was
set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was
clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the
following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable.
There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary
party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform
her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are
and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to
discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by
law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly
derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another
important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided
into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one
is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.
90
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an
initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion
further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power
is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may
be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but
where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had
abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction,
that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme
Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political
question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away
with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial
power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the
reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the
political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political
questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot
be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was
not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions"
and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not
truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law,
this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are
not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes,
held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens
the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this
Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform
under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question
doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the
principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two
species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard.
The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
91
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or thepotentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and
distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens
the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial
review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they
should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable
political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then
our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this
standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section
3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated
fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by
the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article
XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article
XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which
this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would
require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.
Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the
sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust,
elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to
approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear
cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to
decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of
a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto
v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised,if the record also presents some other
ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted
and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises
in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657
for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a
judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the
decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the
second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon
which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining
whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon,
this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not
form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which
it is applied."119
92
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other
reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a
Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and
legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an
open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the
independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied
opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and
resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second
impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's
opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and
distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is
required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened
by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition
which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has
already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted
provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's
self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while
joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new
argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does
not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for
the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of
the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the
signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a
"Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution
of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the
abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in
order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of
Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the
Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement,
they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared
and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the
Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for
Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint
as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House
of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by
the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least
one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
93
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does
indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment,
more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of
the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for
invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground
as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for
naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts
presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the
latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly
prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are,
constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16
of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution;
and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes
the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a
moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment
because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is
very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with
penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to
them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this
Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified.
Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy
may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under
Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this
Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words
of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty
which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a
dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government
cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the
authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to
the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the
discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a
member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass
upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be
fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest
or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been
settled in the case ofAbbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners
filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or
Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET
Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as
respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its
three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide
the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the
same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn
of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of
which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by
no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections
when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet
the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for
the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of
vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices
and Senators, singly and collectively.
94
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before
said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What
we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and
that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them,
is nothing short ofpro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power.
And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction
of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their
judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It
affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership
of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises
its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven
pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court
Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-
adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only
in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly
suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question
of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals
from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an
independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails
to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule,
none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a
personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v.
TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated
into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of
the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the
statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the
exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint
the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing
95
conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the
appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario
that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home
and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an
impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure
of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution
of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the
Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a
reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action
may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not
regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of
the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political
consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to
grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes.
Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for
the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end
there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's
claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for
the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate
branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty
under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no
reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate
manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging
disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine
in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority.
Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect
and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section
3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does
not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives,
as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as
Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways,
to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as
the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices
had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body,
has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate."
Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner
Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed
on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which
he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on
the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of
"initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt
that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin,
to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action,"
which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated
during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts
consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles
of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments
leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation
is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
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Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives
Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the
Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a
contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is
recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to
postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the
intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be
pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the
substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals
and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on
impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this
body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment
resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action,
calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial
and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the
approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make
of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that
the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on
the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment
is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it
appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples
in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the
Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the
resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been
bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The
Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me.
I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless,
I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of
Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in
keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that
on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to
initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the
word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now
read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee
or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the
verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles
of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are
mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third
of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my
amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you,
Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted
by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the
complaint. In his amicus curiaebrief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the
obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as
contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts
with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution
of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already
initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2),
Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father
Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word
"initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that
the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
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During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word
"initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate."
The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second
sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala
sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An
impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-
quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members,
can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power"
to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from
the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive
noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in
the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint
either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed
by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it;
(3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the
resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms
a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of
one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the
complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at
this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an
impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully
charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when
the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House
proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been
done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the
initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus
when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary… toinitiate impeachment proceedings," this
was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does
not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus
the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year,"
it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on
the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He
reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated,
as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary
words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a
misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula
singulisby equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two
former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate"
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial
action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by
the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2)
once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing
or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
98
House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give
the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI,
citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions
(referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter
at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing
from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said
case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional
Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent
spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are
at present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide
has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has
not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional
Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings
thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI,
it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its
rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that
Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is
misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of
the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover,
Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make
rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to
either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee,
or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-
third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by
necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution
without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House
of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted
"disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando,
speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v.
Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons
other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature.
InArroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice
Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be
a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that
all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same
case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine
setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of
Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of
power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to
view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first
defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It
held:
99
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the
rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had,
prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the
presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is
as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own
motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters
for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other
way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity
of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The
power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined
by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method
had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule
XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the
principle of separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to
categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will
cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This
power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It
was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution.
The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive
and the Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere
power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch
or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other
branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and
the legislators being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court
from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as
nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court
is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it
should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by
not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters
of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our
trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this
100
new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity
to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel
provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should
provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here,
the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for
arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of
the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution
simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole
power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme
Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold
with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since
our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how
that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which
state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient
in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in
substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the
House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article
XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon
that takes the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people
with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not
to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many
of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to
articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues
involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the
impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans
and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the
business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith – offered
suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the
governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon
areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been
constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action
of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives
of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the
present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same
clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of
jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court
from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of
the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found
the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally
vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called
for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land.
What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court
can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut
allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter
or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action
can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
101
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else.
impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
basis in fact and in law. The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what
the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to
is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon
great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to each other.
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on
the rule of law. November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003
said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
from the truth. SO ORDERED.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held
and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless
of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice
over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom,
unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it
rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted
to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate
who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him
but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the
Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary
from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution
now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality
when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system
which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral
authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands.
Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous
in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has
discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases
especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is
not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he

102

[G.R. No. 146486. March 4, 2005]
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND FORMER DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS ARTURO C.
MOJICA, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1,
Rule 65 of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals of 18 December 2000 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 58460 entitled, Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas v.
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio, Jr.
and the Committee of Peers composed of Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero,
Deputy Ombudsman Rolando Casimiro and Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo.
The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and
employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its
two directors, filed a formal complaint[2] with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting
an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following:
1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona;
2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco;
and
3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of
OMB-Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for release.
The complainants further requested that an officer-in-charge from the OMB-Manila be
appointed to manage their office to prevent the Deputy Ombudsman from harassing
witnesses and wielding his influence over them. To underscore the seriousness of their
intentions, they threatened to go on a mass leave of absence, and in fact took their
cause to the media.[3]
The subsequent events, as stated by the Ombudsman and adopted by the Court of
Appeals,[4] are as follows:
The Ombudsman immediately proceeded to the OMB-Visayas office in Cebu City to
personally deal with the office rebellion. Reaching Cebu, the Ombudsman was
informed by Petitioner that Petitioner wanted to proceed to Manila, apparently because
of his alienation and the fear for reprisal from his alleged lady victims husbands.
Petitioner in fact already had a ticket for the plane leaving two hours later that day. The
Ombudsman assented to the quick movement to Manila for Petitioners safety and the
interest of the Offices operations. Subsequently, the Ombudsman installed Assistant
Ombudsman Nicanor J. Cruz as the Officer-in-Charge of OMB-Visayas.
Acting on the formal complaint against petitioner, the Ombudsman directed his Fact-
Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to conduct a verification and fact-finding
investigation on the matter. The FFIB, later in its Report, found the evidence against
Petitioner strong on the charges of acts of extortion, sexual harassment and
oppression. The FFIB report was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted
Committee of Peers composed of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, The Special
Prosecutor and the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.
The Committee of Peers initially recommended that the investigation be converted into
one solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied
by the Ombudsman after careful study, and following the established stand of the Office
of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not
removable through impeachment. As succintly (sic) stated by the Ombudsman in his
Memorandum dated March 27, 2000 (in reiteration of the March 13, 2000 Order of
Overall Deputy Ombudsman) -
Acting on your query as to whether or not the Ombudsman confirms or affirms the
disapproval by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., of your
recommendation to conduct instead an investigation of the complaint against Deputy
Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica solely for the purpose of impeachment, I hereby confirm
the action of disapproval.
xxx
Moreover, as demonstrated in many previous cases against Deputy Ombudsman
Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman Manuel B. Casaclang, Deputy Ombudsman
Jesus F. Guerrero, Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo and former Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa, the official position of the Office is that the Constitution,
R.A. 6770 and the Supreme Court in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, 19 May
1988, exclude the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor from the list of
impeachable officials and the Jarque caseinvolves Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto as
respondent, hence, the mention therein of the Deputy Ombudsmen is merely an obiter
dictum. Two of your present members in fact participated in the investigation of the
previous Mojica cases and thereafter recommended the dismissal thereof for lack of
merit.
In the same Memorandum, the Ombudsman directed the Committee of Peers to
evaluate the merits of the case and if warranted by evidence, to conduct administrative
and criminal investigation(s) immediately thereafter. Upon evaluation, the Committee
recommended the docketing of the complaint as criminal and administrative cases. The
Committee of Peers Evaluation dated 30 March 2000, stated as follows:
On the basis of the foregoing facts, duly supported with sworn-statements executed by
all concerned parties, the undersigned members of the COP find sufficient cause to
warrant the conduct of preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication against
103
Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica for the following criminal and administrative
offenses, namely:
I. CRIMINAL
Violation of Section 3, paragraph[s] (b) and (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act);
Violation of R.A. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995),
II. ADMINISTRATIVE
a. Dishonesty
b. Grave Misconduct
c. Oppression
d. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service
e. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of his Office; (Section 22, paragraphs (A), (C), (N),
(T) and (U), Rule XIV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987.)
Accordingly, let the instant case be docketed separately, one for the criminal case and
another for the administrative case covering all the offenses specified above and,
thereafter, a formal investigation be simultaneously and jointly conducted by the
Committee of Peers, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7.
Accordingly, on 6 April 2000, the Committee of Peers (COP) directed the herein private
respondent Mojica in OMB-0-00-0615 entitled, Padua-Varona v. Mojica, for violation of
Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) and Sec. 3, par. (b) and
(c) of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) to submit his
controverting evidence.
On 10 April 2000, the complainants in OMB-0-00-0615 filed a Motion to Place
Respondent Under Preventive Suspension,[5] claiming that the offenses for which
private respondent Mojica was charged warranted removal from office, the evidence
against him was strong, and that Mojicas continued stay in office would prejudice the
case, as he was harassing some witnesses and complainants to recant or otherwise
desist from pursuing the case.
On the same date, the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum[6] to the COP, directing
them to conduct administrative proceedings in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 entitled, OMB
Visayas Employees v. Mojica (for dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression, conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and directly or indirectly having
financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of his office),
and submit a recommendation on the propriety of putting Mojica under preventive
suspension.
Subsequently, the COP issued an Order[7] in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 finding prima
facie evidence against Mojica and requiring him to submit an answer to the above-
mentioned offenses within ten days, as well as his counter-affidavit and supporting
evidence.[8]
Aggrieved, the private respondent filed a petition[9] for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals praying that a resolution be issued:
1. . . . issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) upon the filing of the petition to
enjoin and restrain the respondents, (the Ombudsman, the Over-all Deputy
Ombudsman, the Committee of Peers, and the Special Prosecutor) their agents and
representatives, from suspending the petitioner (herein private respondent Mojica);
2. thereafter, converting said TRO into a Writ of Preliminary Injunction;
3. after hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the following acts of the Ombudsman
null and void ab initio:
a. detailing and assigning indefinitely the petitioner to OMB-Manila in a [special]
capacity, thus effectively demoting/suspending petitioner, and preventing him from
preparing his defense;
b. authorizing or directing the docketing of the complaints against the petitioner, which
is equivalent to authorizing the filing of the administrative and/or criminal cases against
the petitioner, who is an impeachable official;
c. denying the request of petitioner for leave of absence, which acts were done without
lawful authority, in a malevolent and oppressive manner and without jurisdiction.
On 04 May 2000, the Court of Appeals resolved to grant the prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and required the Ombudsman to comment and show cause why no
writ of preliminary injunction should be issued, which reads in part:
Meanwhile, to maintain the status quo and in order to forestall the petition at bench
from becoming moot and academic, and considering that upon examination of the
records we believe that there is an urgent need for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to prevent great and irreparable injury that would result to herein
petitioner before the matter could be heard on notice, the herein respondents, their
agents and representatives acting for and in their behalf or under their authority, are
hereby enjoined and restrained from proceeding with the hearing of the Motion to Place
Respondent Under Preventive Suspension dated April 10, 2000, which hearing is set
on May 9, 2000 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon and/or from conducting any further
proceedings relative to the suspension from (o)ffice of the herein petitioner until further
order and/or notice from this Court.[10]
Nevertheless, on 6 June 2000, the COP issued an Order[11] in both OMB-0-00-0615
and OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 to the effect that having failed to submit the required
counter-affidavits despite the lapse of seventeen days from the expiration of the
extended reglementary period for filing the same, respondent Mojica was deemed to
have waived his right to present his evidence. The COP thus deemed both criminal and
administrative cases submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
104
Thus, on 13 June 2000, the private respondent thus filed an urgent motion[12] before
the Court of Appeals to enjoin the Ombudsman from taking any action whatsoever in
the criminal and administrative cases aforementioned. The following day, the private
respondent filed another urgent motion, this time praying that the Court of Appeals
issue an order requiring the Ombudsman to show cause why it should not be cited for
contempt for failing to conform with the 4 May 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed[13] the Ombudsman to comment on the
above pleadings, and to comply with the formers Temporary Restraining Order of 4
May 2000.
The parties subsequently exchanged various pleadings that culminated in a
Resolution[14] by the Court of Appeals on 5 July 2000 that, among other things, directed
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining all therein respondents from
taking any action whatsoever in cases No. OMB-0-00-0615 (criminal) and No. OMB-
ADM-0-00-0316 (administrative) against Mojica, and deemed the instant petition
submitted for resolution on the merits upon the submission of the comment or
explanation on the appellate courts show cause Resolution of 20 June 2000.
Meanwhile, on 19 June 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
directed the private respondent Mojica ostensibly to answer a different set of charges
for violation of Art. 266 and Sec. 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 (OMB-00-0-1050) and for
grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service[15] (OMB-ADM-0-00-0506). Feeling that this was merely an attempt at
circumventing the directives of the Court of Appeals, Mojica filed an urgent motion
before the Court of Appeals for respondents to show cause again why they should not
be cited for contempt.
By way of opposition, the Ombudsman pointed out that the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the appellate court was against any action taken in cases No. OMB-0-00-
0615 and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, and not against any new cases filed against the
private respondent thereafter. The Ombudsman further pointed out that since Mojicas
term of office had already expired as of 6 July 2000, the private respondent could no
longer invoke his alleged immunity from suit.
On 14 August 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military issued an
order deeming that cases No. OMB-0-00-1050 and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 had
been deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence at hand. On 17
August 2000, the private respondent filed an urgent motion for the immediate issuance
of an order enjoining the Ombudsman from taking any further action whatsoever in
OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 and OMB-0-00-1050.[16]
On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojicas term of
office, the Court of Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision[17] on the
grounds of public interest.
In essence, the appellate court held that although the 1987 Constitution, the
deliberations thereon, and the commentaries of noted jurists, all indicate that a Deputy
Ombudsman is not an impeachable official, it was nevertheless constrained to hold
otherwise on the basis of this Courts past rulings. Thus, the dispositive portion thereof
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the order of the Committee of Peers in its
Evaluation dated March 30, 2000 directing the docketing separately of the criminal
case as well as the administrative case against the petitioner is hereby SET
ASIDE and DECLARED NULL AND VOID. Accordingly, the complaints in Criminal
Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316,
respectively, filed against the petitioner are hereby DISMISSED. All acts or orders of
the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman and the Committee of Peers,
subjecting the petitioner [herein private respondent] to criminal and administrative
investigations, or pursuant to such investigations, are likewise hereby DECLARED
INVALID.[18]
Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of
the same rules, of the above decision, on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ERRONEOUSLY RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AS THEN DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, IS AN IMPEACHABLE OFFICIAL,
CONSIDERING THAT THE PLAIN TEXT OF SEC. 2, ART. XI OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS THEREOF,
EXCLUDES A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FROM THE LIST OF IMPEACHABLE
OFFICIALS.
II
THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE MAY NOT BE
INVOKED TO PERPETUATE AN ERRONEOUS OBITER DICTUM.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE
DISMISSAL OF A CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST A RETIRED DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN,
WHICH IS STILL PENDING PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BEFORE PETITIONER
OMBUDSMAN.[19]
At the outset, it bears noting that instead of assailing the Court of Appeals Decision
solely by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioner lodged the present petition alternatively as an original special civil
action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules.
105
It is settled that the appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition
for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 45 is clear that the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding
involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be
but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Under Rule 45, the
reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or denial of
motion for reconsideration.[20]
The records show that following the petitioners receipt on 5 January 2001 of a copy the
Court of Appeals Decision, it filed the present petition on 16 January 2001, well within
the reglementary period so indicated.
We go now into the substantive aspect of this case, where we are presented an attack
upon a prior interpretation of Article XI, Sec. 2 in relation to Article XI, Sec. 8 of our
Constitution.
The interpretation in question first appears in Cuenco v. Fernan,[21] a disbarment case
against then Associate Justice Marcelo Fernan filed by Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former
member of the House of Representatives, where we held in part:
There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed.
Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7)(1) of the Constitution, be
members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment
(Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the
Court during the Members incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to
run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed
from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article
XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of
the Ombudsman and his deputies(Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), a
majority of the members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation
to Article XI [2], id.), and the members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified
public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally required
to be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis supplied.)
Barely two months later, we issued another Resolution in In Re: Raul M.
Gonzales,[22] concerning the same charges for disbarment brought against Justice
Fernan, wherein we cited the above ruling to underscore the principle involved in the
case, that [a] public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a member of
the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed
from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the
incumbency of such public officer.[23]
In 1995, we subsequently anchored our Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto,[24] a
disbarment case against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, on the above ruling,
adding that:
. . . [T]he court is not here saying that the Ombudsman and other constitutional officers
who are required by the Constitution to be members of the Philippine Bar and are
remova[ble] only by impeachment, are immunized from liability possibly for criminal
acts or for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or other claimed
misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is here a fundamental procedural
requirement which must be observed before such liability may be determined and
enforced. The Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from office via the
constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Should the tenure of the Ombudsman be thus terminated by
impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively e.g.,
in disbarment proceedings for any wrong or misbehavior which may be proven against
him in appropriate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, in Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator
Labella,[25] the Court, citing its Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto,[26] dismissed, in a
minute resolution, the complaint for disbarment against the herein private respondent
Mojica in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, stating that:
Anent the complaint for disbarment against respondent Arturo C. Mojica in his capacity
as Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, suffice it to state that a public officer whose
membership in the Philippine Bar is a qualification for the office held by him and
removable only by impeachment cannot be charged with disbarment during his
membership (In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771, 774 [1988]; Cuenco vs.
Fernan, 158 SCRA 29, 40 [1988]). And we have held in the case of Jarque vs.
Desierto (A.C. No. 4509, En Banc Resolution December 5, 1995), that the
Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from office via impeachment before
they may be held to answer for any wrong or misbehavior which may be proven against
them in disbarment proceedings.
The above Resolution was subsequently made the basis of the appellate courts
assailed Decision of 18 December 2000. Thus, in holding that a Deputy Ombudsman
is an impeachable officer, the appellate court stated that it had to defer to the loftier
principle of adherence to judicial precedents, otherwise known as the doctrine of Stare
Decisis.... necessary for the uniformity and continuity of the law and also to give stability
to society.[27]
Nevertheless, the court a quo took pains to point out that the 1987 Constitution, the
deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the
Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer.
Is the Deputy Ombudsman, then, an impeachable officer? Section 2, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, states that:
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the
members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
106
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
To determine whether or not the Ombudsman therein mentioned refers to a person or
to an office, reference was made by the appellate court to the Records of the
Constitutional Commission, as well as to the opinions of leading commentators in
constitutional law. Thus:
. . . It appears that the members of the Constitutional Commission have made reference
only to the Ombudsman as impeachable, excluding his deputies. The pertinent portions
of the record read, to wit:
...
MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you.
On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has been concern aired by
Commissioner Rodrigo about who will see to it that the Ombudsman will perform his
duties because he is something like a guardian of the government. This recalls the
statement of Juvenal that while the Ombudsman is the guardian of the people, Quis
custodiet ipsos custodies, who will guard the guardians? I understand here that the
Ombudsman who has the rank of a chairman of a constitutional commission is also
removable only by impeachment.
MR. ROMULO. That is the intention, Madam President.
MR. REGALADO. Only the Ombudsman?
MR. MONSOD. Only the Ombudsman.
MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase have
the rank of. We know, for instance, that the City Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a
justice of the Intermediate Appellate Court, and yet he is not a part of the judiciary. So
I think we should clarify that also and read our discussions into the Record for purposes
of the Commission and the Committee.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. If I may just comment: the Ombudsman in this provision is a rank
in itself really. That is how we look at it. But for purposes of government classification
and salary, we thought we have to give him a recognizable or an existing rank as a
point of reference more than anything else.
MR. REGALADO. Yes, but my concern is whether or not he is removable only by
impeachment, because Section 2 enumerates the impeachable officials, and it does
not mention public officers with the rank of constitutional commissioners.
MR. ROMULO. But we do mention them as the Ombudsman is mentioned in that
enumeration. We used the word Ombudsman because we would like it to be his title;
we do not want him called Chairman or Justice. We want him called Ombudsman.
...
(Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 26, 1986, pp. 273-274)
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist.
On lines 13 and 14, I move for the deletion of the words and the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman
should not be placed on the level of the President and the Vice-President, the members of the
judiciary and the members of the Constitutional Commissions in the matter of removal from
office.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
MR. MONSOD. We regret we cannot accept the amendment because we feel that the
Ombudsman is at least on the same level as the Constitutional Commissioners and this is one
way of insulating it from politics.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, to make the members of the Ombudsman removable only by
impeachment would be to enshrine and install an officer whose functions are not as delicate as
the others whom we wanted to protect from immediate removal by way of an impeachment.
MR. MONSOD. We feel that an officer in the Ombudsman, if he does his work well, could be
stepping on a lot of toes. We would really prefer to keep him there but we would like the body
to vote on it, although I would like to ask if we still have a quorum, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Do we have a quorum? There are members who are in the lounge.
The Secretary-General and the pages conduct an actual count of the Commissioners present.
THE PRESIDENT. We have a quorum.
MR. MONSOD. May we restate the proposed amendment for the benefit of those who were not
here a few minutes ago.
MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. I thought that amendment was
already covered in the amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo. One of those amendments
proposed by Commissioner Rodrigo was to delete the word Ombudsman and, therefore, we
have already voted on it.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, may I comment on that.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, the Gentleman may proceed.
MR. DAVIDE. The proposed amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo was the total deletion of the
Office of the Ombudsman and all sections relating to it. It was rejected by the body and,
therefore, we can have individual amendments now on the particular sections.
THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to
include the Ombudsman among those officials who have to be removed from office only on
impeachment. Is that right?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man?
MR. DAVIDE. Only one man.
MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies.
MR. MONSOD. No.
...
(Ibid., p. 305, emphasis supplied)
Moreover, this Court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal
luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is
107
impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section
2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his
deputies, is impeachable. Foremost among them is the erudite Justice Isagani A. Cruz (ret.),
who opined:
The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members
of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.
(see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative
enactment. The power to impeach is essentially a non-legislative prerogative and can be
exercised by the Congress only within the limits of the authority conferred upon it by the
Constitution. This authority may not be expanded by the grantee itself even if motivated by the
desire to strengthen the security of tenure of other officials of the government.
It is now provided by decree (see P.D. No. 1606) that justices of the Sandiganbayan may be
removed only through process of impeachment, the purpose evidently being to withdraw them
from the removal power of the Supreme Court. This prohibition is of dubious constitutionality. In
the first place, the list of impeachable officers is covered by the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Secondly, Article VIII, Section 11, of the Constitution states that all judges of
inferior courts and this would include the Sandiganbayan are under the disciplinary power of
the Supreme Court and may be removed by it. This view is bolstered by the last sentence of
Article XI, Section 2, which runs in full as follows:
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment for and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Cruz,
Isagani A., Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., pp. 333-334)
Equally worth noting is the opinion of no less than Rev. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., himself
who was a member of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution, (who)
asserted:
Q. Is the list of officers subject to impeachment found in Section 2 exclusive?
A. As presently worded, yes.
(Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Philippine Constitution, A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p.
401)
Last but certainly not the least is the equally erudite Representative Antonio B. Nachura himself,
who, as a professor of law, commented that the enumeration of impeachable officers in Section
2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, is exclusive. (Nachura, Antonio B., Outline/Reviewer in
Political Law, 1998 ed., p. 192)[28]
From the foregoing, it is immediately apparent that, as enumerated in Sec. 2 of Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, only the following are impeachable officers: the President, the Vice
President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman.[29]
How then to explain our earlier pronouncement in Cuenco v. Fernan, as later cited in In Re:
Raul M. Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Dep. Ombudsman Mojica
and Graft Investigator Labella? By way of reiteration, said Resolution reads in part:
. . . To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Members
incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional
mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and
conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI [2] of the Constitution. Precisely the same
situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article
XI [2]), . . . all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine
Bar.[30](Emphasis supplied)
In cross-referencing Sec. 2, which is an enumeration of impeachable officers, with Sec. 8, which
lists the qualifications of the Ombudsman and his deputies, the intention was to indicate, by way
of obiter dictum, that as with members of this Court, the officers so enumerated were also
constitutionally required to be members of the bar.
A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and
made without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under the
doctrine of stare decisis.[31]
The legal maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere" (follow past precedents and do not disturb
what has been settled) states that where the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[32]
The succeeding cases of In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Jarque v. Desierto do not tackle the
impeachability of a Deputy Ombudsman either. Nor, for that matter, does Lastimosa-
Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella, which, as previously
mentioned, is a minute resolution dismissing a complaint for disbarment against the herein
private respondent on the basis of the questioned obiter in Cuenco v. Fernan and the
succeeding cases without going into the merits.
Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon
by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the
question presented.[33]
As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be
held criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the
petitioner.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses
which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.[34]Hence, the
moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability,
there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts.[35]
Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private
respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the formers retirement benefits have
been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12[36] and 13[37] of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2000 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and
Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 are hereby REINSTATED and the Office of the
Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
108

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA,
NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act which
further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this
petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the
Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057
(for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary
proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of
the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been
involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of
the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers
from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task
Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M.
Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo
de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-
intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that
what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub
out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the
incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and
personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said
incident was a legitimate police operation. 1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified
modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple
murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and
intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the
withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as
principal in eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second
Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed
them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11)
amended informations 5before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged
only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other.
One of the accused 6 was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a
and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are
government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank
of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none
has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned
by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices
Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended
information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal
accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration,
insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by
petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the
issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1,
1996, House Bill No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C.
Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill
No. 844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,
defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills
sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the
109
word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c)
of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the
President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution 14 denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling
that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997
Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but
before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it
on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices
Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so
in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson,
and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases — in fact, no order of arrest has been
issued — this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court
admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1
neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the
cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including
Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in
any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues
that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in
bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were
in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right
to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further,
from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution
of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the
passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the
issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit
the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial
had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases
will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the
Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and
a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to
procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous"
provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject requirement
for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. 17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic
Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it
the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply
specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the
Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could
no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired
under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings
in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and
praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within
a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on
the question of whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos.
23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime
charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the
said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the
Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible
reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of
proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret
to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving
graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
110
employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation
to their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following
provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the
Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological
order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D.
No. 1860, 24 P.D. No. 1861, 25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest
amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos.
1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative
to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and
petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A,
issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
111
Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court
over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975
provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal accused are
afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding
to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the
final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding
enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in
the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word
"accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975,
was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are
at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors,
relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has
jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under
the amended information has the rank of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the other
hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to
represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, 29 contends
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on
bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration
cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public
official or employee 32 holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
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Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which
is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the
jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This
paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection
a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or
felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender — that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated
in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the
same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused
public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In
enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606
which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right
to equal protection of the law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to
deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to
warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest
officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification
made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must
present proof of arbitrariness. 34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection
of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four
elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification
between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has
not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial
had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that
makes real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective
proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of
Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it
can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily
affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a
transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4
and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them.
Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving"
certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases
pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does
not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just
happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law.
Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory
provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what
is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the
Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In
particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against
those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted
on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that
the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among
the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in
paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of
R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other
Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the
Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner
during the committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to
nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative
hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee
involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a
member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly
empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it
decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law 41 for they are
deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-
tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
113
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249.
In Calder v. Bull, 42 an ex post facto law is one —
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the
defendant. 43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation
of a person to his disadvantage. 44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes
a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of a amnesty. 45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not
penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal
laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations; 47 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor
their punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice. 49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which
they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is
incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several
times 50 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature
that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right
of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does
not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and,
therefore, does not come within the prohibition. 52 Moreover, the law did not alter the
rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled that adjective statutes may
be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. 54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme
Court to review questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts,
the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of
innocence has been convincing overcome. 56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision
of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that
it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand"
its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be
considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because
such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every
bill must only have one subject expressed in the title 57 is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and
should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general
subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D.
1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general
subject. 59 The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted
within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the
legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. 60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of
Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section
7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the
Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions
over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court
has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court
is determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations, 61 and not by the
evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls
under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged
must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This jurisdictional requirement is in
accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public
officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled
corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law." This
constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared
114
in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder
was committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions. 65 This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of
official duties "must be alleged in the informations." 66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the
actual recital of the facts." 67The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not
from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was
explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was — First; To furnish the accused with such a
descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and
second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should
be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not
conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be set
forth in the complaint with reasonable particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant) and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact andcircumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to
him as "he is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense." 70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended
informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific
factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense
charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby
accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.
DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF
SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO
A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES,
SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP.
CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2
NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL
RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4
ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R.
JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and
SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions
as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts
herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using
firearms with treachery evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior
strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP,
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR.,
SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL
L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office
as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as
accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among
others falsely representing that there where no arrest made during the read conducted
115
by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about
the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused
committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused
was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise,
the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and
intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague
on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-
above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made
during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque
Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the
"arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There
is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted
"at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately
preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the
principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid,
arrests and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling.
Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said
accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the
(PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged
and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element
in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed
in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation
in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public
officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion
between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close intimacy between
the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court
and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special
policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and then
established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision and
control where his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal complaints and
conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest
and detain person without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper
court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such,
and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag
who denied in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused
because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not
held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime
thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the
accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the
court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and
then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege
that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00
abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose
they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is
these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution
at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed
in relation to public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that
the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is
controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the
close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the
commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been
committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The
Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over
the said cases.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
116
[G.R. Nos. 140199-200. February 6, 2002]
FELICITO S. MACALINO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition for certiorari[1] assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and
the Sandiganbayan to take cognizance of two criminal cases[2] against petitioner and
his wife Liwayway S. Tan, contending that he is not a public officer within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.[3]
On September 16, 1992, the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, with the
approval of the Ombudsman, filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations against
petitioner and Liwayway S. Tan charging them with estafa through falsification of official
documents (Criminal Case No. 18022) and frustrated estafa through falsification of
mercantile documents (Criminal Case No. 19268), as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 18022
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1989 and for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, FELICITO S. MACALINO, being then
the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans
Administration & Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), a government-controlled corporation with offices at EDSA corner Reliance St.,
Mandaluyong, and hence, a public officer, while in the performance of his official
functions, taking advantage of his position, committing the offense in relation to his
office and conspiring and confederating with his spouse LIWAYWAY S. TAN, being
then the owner of Wacker Marketing, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and by means of deceit defraud the Philippine National Construction Corporation in the
following manner: in preparing the application with the Philippine National Bank,
Buendia Branch for the issuance of a demand draft in the amount of NINE HUNDRED
EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO & 11/100 PESOS
(P983,682.11), Philippine Currency, in favor of Bankers Trust Company, accused
FELICITO S. MACALINO superimposed the name Wacker Marketing as payee to
make it appear that the demand draft was payable to it, when in truth and in fact and
as the accused very well knew, it was the Bankers Trust Company which was the real
payee as indicated in Check Voucher No. 3-800-89 and PNB Check No. B236746
supporting said application for demand draft; subsequently accused FELICITO S.
MACALINO likewise inserted into the letter of PNCC to PNB Buendia Branch the words
payable to Wacker Marketing to make it appear that the demand drafts to be picked up
by the designated messenger were payable to Wacker Marketing when in truth and in
fact the real payee was Bankers Trust Company; and as a result of such acts of
falsification, PNB Buendia issued 19 demand drafts for P50,000.00 each and another
demand draft for P33,682.11, all, payable to Wacker Marketing, which were
subsequently delivered to accused Felicitor S. Macalino and which accused
LIWAYWAY S. TAN thereafter exchanged with PNB Balanga Branch for 19 checks
at P50,000.00 each and another for P33,682.11 and all of which she later deposited
into Account No. 0042-0282-6 of Wacker Marketing at Philtrust Cubao, thereby causing
pecuniary damage and prejudice to Philippine National Construction Corporation in the
amount of P983,682.11.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, August 24, 1992.[4]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 19268
That on or about the 4th day of April, 1990, and subsequently thereafter, in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, FELICITO S. MACALINO, being then the Assistant
Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration and
Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation, a government-
controlled corporation with offices at EDSA corner Reliance St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, and hence, a public officer, while in the performance of his official functions,
taking advantage of his position, committing the offense in relation to his office, and
conspiring and confederating with his spouse LIWAYWAY S. TAN, being then the
owner of Wacker Marketing, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and by
means of deceit defraud the Philippine National Construction Corporation in the
following manner: after receiving Check Voucher No. 04-422-90 covering the partial
payment by PNCC of the sinking fund to International Corporate Bank (Interbank) as
well as Check No. 552312 for TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P2,250,000.00), Philippine Currency, payable to Interbank for the purpose,
accused FELICITO S. MACALINO falsified PNB Check No. 552312 by altering the
payee indicated therein to make it appear that the aforesaid check was payable to
Wacker Marketing instead of Interbank and further falsified the schedule of check
disbursements sent to PNB Buendia by making it appear therein that the payee of
Check No. 552312 was Wacker Marketing when in truth and in fact and as the accused
very well knew, it was Interbank which was the real payee; accused LIWAYWAY S.
TAN thereafter deposited Check No. 552312 into Account No. 0042-0282-6 of Wacker
Marketing at Philtrust Cubao and Wacker Marketing subsequently issued Philtrust
Check No. 148039 for P100,000.00 in favor of accused FELICITO S. MACALINO;
which acts of falsification performed by the accused would have defrauded the
Philippine National Construction Corporation of P2,250,000.00 had not PNB Buendia
ordered the dishonor of Check No. 552312 after noting the alteration/erasures thereon,
thereby failing to produce the felony by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
117
Manila, Philippines, May 28, 1993.[5]
Upon arraignment on November 9, 1992, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Hence, trial proceeded.[6]
However, during the initial presentation of evidence for the defense, petitioner moved
for leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over him since he is not a public officer because the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter.[7] The People of the Philippines opposed the motion.[8]
On August 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying petitioners
motion to dismiss for lack of merit.[9]
Hence, this petition.[10]
The Issue
The sole issue raised is whether petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is a public officer
within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner contends that an employee of the PNCC is not a public officer as defined
under Republic Act No. 3019, as follows:
Sec. 2. (a) xxx xxx xxx.
(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent
or temporary, whether in the unclassified or classified or exempted service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding
paragraph.
We agree.
To resolve the issue, we resort to the 1987 Constitution. Article XI, on the Accountability
of Public Officers, provides:
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations x x x.
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient. x x x
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its instance, any public official or employee of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties. (underscoring supplied)
Further, Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters. (underscoring supplied)
Republic Act No. 6770 provides:
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties -The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties:
1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. x x x.
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties.
Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general
law on corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer within the
coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over him. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private
individual is when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or
accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the jurisdiction
of Sandiganbayan.[11]
The cases[12] cited by respondent People of the Philippines are inapplicable because
they were decided under the provisions of the 1973 Constitution which included as
public officers, officials and employees of corporations owned and controlled by the
government though organized and existing under the general corporation law. The
1987 Constitution excluded such corporations.
The crimes charged against petitioner were committed in 1989 and 1990.[13] The
criminal actions were instituted in 1992. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of a court
to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the institution of the action.[14]
The Fallo
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court SETS ASIDE the
order dated July 29, 1999 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18022 and
19268 and ORDERS the DISMISSAL of the two (2) cases against petitioner and his
wife.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 120681-83. October 1, 1999]
118
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and
the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,respondents.
[G.R. No. 128136. October 1, 1999]
MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. MABIOG,
REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE LA
ROSA, petitioners, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its
PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRAS-SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC
HENRY JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and GIDEON C. MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No.
1486 created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has under gone various changes,[1] the most recent
of which were effected through Republic Act Nos. 7975[2] and 8249.[3] Whether the
Sandiganbayan, under these laws, exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused of violations of Republic Act No.
3019[4] and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code[5] is the central issue in these
consolidated petitions.
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos.
21001, 21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of R.A.
No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22, 1996
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which
suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 23278 in deference to whatever ruling
this Court will lay down in the Binay cases.
The facts, as gathered from t he records, are as follows:
G.R. Nos. 120681-83
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan
three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code,[6] and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019.[7] The informations, which were subsequently amended on September 15, 1994,
all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during
petitioners incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contended that the six-year
delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 27,
1988 to the time the informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7,
1994 constituted a violation of his right to due process. Arraignment of the accused
was held in abeyance pending the resolution of this motion.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners
motion to quash. Petitioners motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the
prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before the petitioner could file a reply
to the prosecutions opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995,
granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety days from
receipt of the resolution. The court ruled that the requisites for suspension pendente
lite were present as petitioner was charged with one of the offenses under Section 13
of R.A. No. 3019[8] and the informations containing these charges had previously been
held valid in the resolution denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari,[9] to set aside the
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due
process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite before he
could file a reply to the prosecutions opposition to his motion for reconsideration of the
resolution denying the motion to quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court
directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other things, permit petitioner to file said reply.
After allowing and considering petitioners reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995,
issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the denial
of the motion to quash. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued another resolution
reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect
on May 16, 1995.[10]
On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases
to the proper court for further proceedings, alleging that when the two Resolutions, both
dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction
over the subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied
petitioners motion, holding thus:
There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade 27 under the
compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the time of the
commission of the offenses charged in he above-entitled cases, the accused Mayor
Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim capacity, the
Sandiganbayan, has, under Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases therein
filed against him. The allegation that Mayor Binay ought to have been classified with a
salary grade lower than Grade 27, because at the time of the commission of the
offenses charged he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower than Grade 27 does
not hold water. In 1986 when the herein offenses were committed by the accused, the
Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet in existence. From
119
the very definition of he very Act itself, it is evident that the Act was passed and had
been effective only in 1989. The Grade classification of a public officer, whether at the
time of the commission of the offense or thereafter, is determined by his classification
under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused
Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission of the
offenses and the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 classifies
Municipal Mayors as Grade 27, it is a conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over the accused herein.
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, Municipal Mayor Jejomar
C. Binay had begun receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is equivalent to
Grade 28 under the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the said Act. Under the
Index of Occupational Services, the position titles and salary grades of the
Compensation & Position classification system prepared by the Department of Budget
and Management pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the position of
Municipal Mayor had been classified as Grade 27.[11]
On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case Nos.
21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that the Court annul and set
aside: (1) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of
the same court also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the order suspending
petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4,
1995 denying the motion to refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court
issue a temporary restraining order preventing the suspension and arraignment of
petitioner. The Court on July 7, 1995, resolved, among others, to issue the temporary
restraining order prayed for.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an Addendum to Petition (To allow the introduction of
alternative reliefs), praying that, should this Court hold that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the
same on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary investigation before the
Ombudsman prior to the filing of the informations, deprived him of his right to due
process; and that, moreover, there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the
informations.
G.R. No. 128136
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual,
Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays co-
petitioners are officials of the same municipality.
In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San Pascual,
Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido
H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. The complaint charged the respondent municipal officials of overpaying
Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual
Central School. This was docketed in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-
1232.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla
recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis
John S. Asuncion concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended approval of the same. The resolution was
approved by then Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following marginal
note:
Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to cause the preparation of the
information and to approve the same for filing with the proper court.[12]
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed
against petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the June 14,
1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The information was signed by a
Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation Officer who recommended the filing of
the information with the Sandiganbayan.
In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San Pascual,
Batangas filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners, and Elpidia
Amada and Brigido Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. 3019. The complaint also
alleged, among others, the overpricing of the landscaping project of San Pascual
Central School. The case was docketed as OMB-0-94-0149.
In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos
recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with violation of Section
3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended with proper court. The resolution, which
was recommended for approval by Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and
conclusions in the resolution in OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was
overpriced.
On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the landscaping project,
this time before the Sandiganbayan. The information was subsequently amended on
May 17, 1996. Except for the date the alleged crime was committed, the information
charged essentially the same inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC. The
case was docketed in the Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378.
On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the
information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged with the same offense
in two informations; and that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose
120
petitioners to double jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds motion to
quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended
proceedings in the case until the Supreme Court resolved the question of the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction involved in the Binay petition.
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before the RTC
to refer the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan, arguing that
under R.A. No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the
case. On July 3, 1996, the RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of
the motion to refer the case since the issue of jurisdiction was pending before the
Sandiganbayan.
Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans Order dated June 21, 1996. On August 2,
1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of the same order. On October 22,
1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the
prosecution and set the case for arraignment. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration
of the October 22, 1996 Resolution ordering their arraignment, which motion was
denied on February 17, 1997.
On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.
On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order to
prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the
Sandiganbayan.
The petition raises the following issues:
I this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision
Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of municipal
mayor after the passage of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the filing earlier of an
information for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court having territorial
jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the offense?
II
Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped by laches or waiver
from filing and prosecuting the case before respondent Sandiganbayan after the filing
earlier of the information in the proper court, thereafter repudiating it, seeking another
court of the same category and finally to respondent court?
III
Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same offense violated the rule
on duplicity of information?
IV
Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall not be
dismissed, will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to double jeopardy?
V interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and the prosecutors guilty
of forum shopping?[13]
On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the
Magsaysay petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition).
In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first address the common
question of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
I
The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject
cases.
The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606,[14] as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1861,[15] the pertinent provisions of which state:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation
to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years,
or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by
the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx.
On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor Binay had not yet been
arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was already in
effect when the information against Mayor Magsaysay et al., was filed on August 11,
1995 in the RTC of Batangas City.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
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(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding
to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
xxx.
While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, congress enacted R.A.
No. 8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect,
per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days after its complete publication
on February 8, 1997 in the Journal and Malaya, two newspapers of general circulation.
As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now
reads:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at he time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the position of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of he Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to heir office.
d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
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municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan because:
(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal
mayors were not classified as Grade 27.
(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.
(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A classes of positions within one range of basic compensation.[22]
In support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27, Mayor Binay
argues:
xxx. The new laws consistent and repeated reference to salary grade show[s] an
intention to base the separation of jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and
the regular courts on pay scale.Grades are determined by compensation. The
essence of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay scales determine grades.[16]
Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification[17] from the City Personnel Officer of
Makati stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary of only P10,793.00
from March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount was supposedly equivalent to
Grade 22 under R.A. No. 6758.
Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification[18] from the Municipal
Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating:
x x x that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. Magsaysay, Municipal Mayor
of San Pascual, Batangas with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of November 3, 1993
equivalent only to Grade 25, Step 5 of RA 6758, the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
Section 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented due to budgetary
constraints. This certification is issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th day of
May 1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for whatever legal purpose and/or purposes it
may serve.
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify Grades.
The Constitution[19] states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of
government officials and employees, Congress shall take into account the nature of
the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions, thus:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government
officials, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualifications required for their positions.
Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758[20] provides in Section 2 thereof
that differences in pay are to be based upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In short, the nature of
an officials position should be the determining factor in the fixing of his or her
salary. This is not only mandated by law but dictated by logic as well.
Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme known as the grade
defined in Presidential Decree No. 985[21] as including
xxx all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject
matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities
and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such
The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of ones position -- the level of difficulty,
responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of another
position. It is the officials Grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way
around.
It is possible that a local government officials salary may be less than that prescribed
for his Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial capability of his
or her respective local government unit.[23] Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the
officials grade.
Thus, Section 8 of R.A. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice-President,
Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the Chairmen
and Members of the Constitutional Commissions. Section 8 also authorizes the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to determine the officials who are of
equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable and to assign such officials
the same Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section.
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the DBM to
prepare the Index of Occupational Services guided by the Benchmark Position
prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated therein.
To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index
of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level is not
determinative. An officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of law of which
the Court must take judicial notice.[24]
As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position
Titles and Salary Grades list the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner
mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
mayors are local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989, under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are
123
[o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A.
No. 7975.[25]
B of inclusio unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate.
Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in Section
4a(1). They invoke the rule in statutory construction expressio unius est expressio
alterius. As what is not included in those enumerated is deemed excluded, municipal
officials are excluded from the Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction.
Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law is clear and
unambiguous.[26] The law is clear in this case. As stated earlier, Section 4a(1) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of [o]fficials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade
27 and higher, of the compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the plain
meaning rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation.
The premise of petitioners argument is that the enumeration in Section 4a(1) is
exclusive. It is not. The phrase specifically including after [o]fficials of the executive
branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration.The principle
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances
indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive,[27] or where the
enumeration is by way of example only.[28] In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra, the Court held that the catchall in
Section 4a(5) was necessary for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress
to list down each position created or will be created pertaining to grades 27 and above.
The same rationale applies to the enumeration in Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did
not intend said enumeration to be an exhaustive list.
Should there be any doubts as to whether petitioner mayors are under the category of
Grade 27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the matter:
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to
Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the
implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
In the Courts Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999 denying the motion for
reconsideration, we treated the above provision as confirmatory of the Salary Grade
assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors.
C Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that
Petitioner Binay cites previous bills[29] in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. These bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal officials from the
Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve these officials ,especially
those from the provinces, of the financial burden brought about by trials in Manila.
The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the law in
this case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the resort to the rule
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but
it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases
of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it
says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate
as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127
SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation. It must
be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or
onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions
may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus,
where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor
add to the latter by implication (Samson v. CA., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).[30]
Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for reconsideration:
x x x that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
would be inconvenient since the witness in their case would come from Baguio City
and San Nicolas, Pangasinan.This, according to petitioners, would defeat one of the
purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the convenience of the accused.
The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others, that:
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to implement
its intent, and courts have no choice but to apply it. Congress has willed that positions
with Grade 27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
this Court is duty-bound to obey the congressional will.
Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating:
Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was established up to the present, the
Court has been confronted with the problem of those accused who are of limited means
who stand trial for petty crimes, the so-called small fry -- the barangay officials, the
municipal officials and employees, postal clerks and letter carriers and the like --
who are involved with nickel-and-dime cases and money-related cases such as
malversation, estafa and theft. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
only those occupying high positions in Government and the military fall under
the jurisdiction of the court.[31]
124
It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant that all municipal officials are
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts are not bound
by a legislators opinion in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a
particular legislation. It is deemed a mere personal opinion of the legislator.[32] Such
opinions do not necessarily reflect the view of the entire Congress.[33]
D 2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of the approval of R.A.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay cannot
be referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides:
Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the guidelines
in determining jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong:[34]
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over
a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not
affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is
construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its
enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive
effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the
statute.
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the rule. The
provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislatures intention to apply its
provisions on jurisdiction to criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan. To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.
Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions are found
in other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts.[35] There is no reason why
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any different.
The term proper courts, as used in Section 7, means courts of competent jurisdiction,
and such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975. The former should not be read in isolation but construed in conjunction with the
latter.
The term proper courts as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted
to regular courts, but includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent
of Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have not begun to the regular
courts, it should have employed the term proper regular courts or regular courts instead
of proper courts. Accordingly, the law in the third paragraph of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, uses the term regular courts, not proper
courts:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the
final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than salary grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the
preceding enumeration. [Underscoring supplied.]
Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows:
1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of the approval of
R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.
No. 7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies.
(a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7975, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it, then the case shall be
referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7975, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before it, the case shall be
referred to the regular courts.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date of the
approval of R.A. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains jurisdiction over the
said cases.
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of Section
7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court
over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislatures intent and in any event
should be applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A. No. 7975.
In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al.,[36] The Court explained the
purpose of the foregoing provision.
x x x it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of [Sandiganbayans] jurisdiction
would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in
the form of a transitory provision. x x x. The transitory provision does not only cover
cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. x x x. Moreover, those
cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under
Section 7 of the new law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the original.]
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
on pending cases was, therefore, not lost on the legislature. Congress has,
furthermore, deemed the commencement of the trial as the crucial point in determining
whether a court retains a case pending before it or lose the same on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction per the provisions of R.A. 8249. The law obviously does not want to waste
the time and effort already devoted to the presentation of evidence if trial had already
begun. On the other hand, not much disruption would be caused if the amendment
were made to apply to cases the trials of which have not yet to start.
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:
125
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the
approval of R.A. No. 8249, said law does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval of
R.A. No. 8249, then said law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it retains
jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the case
shall be referred to the regular courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular court,
the latter loses jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said court
retains jurisdiction.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction
over said cases.
II
Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that his right to speedy disposition
has been violated by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases by the
Ombudsman.
Article III of the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings.[37] Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.[38]
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, [39] is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.[40] Equally applicable is the balancing
test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial,
or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay,
the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay.[41] The concept of speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[42]
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be
sufficient.[43] In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.[44]
In Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court held that the length of delay and the simplicity
of the issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The
unexplained inaction[46] of the prosecutors called for the dismissal of the cases against
petitioner Tatad.
In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan,[47] the Court also ruled that there was no violation of the
right to speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e.,
the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural
reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by
executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the
functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court likewise considered the
failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay
to the accused.
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena,[48] the complexity of the issues and the failure of the
accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat
to her claim to the constitutional guarantee.
In Cadalin vs. POEAs Administrator,[49] the Court, considering also the complexity of
the cases (not run-of-the-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that
the right to speedy disposition was not violated therein.
In petitioner Binays case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the
disposition of the subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of the
Tanodbayan, and later with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately explains the
length of the delay:
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan an
affidavit-complaint charging, Jejomar Binay, Sergio Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin
Almeda, Nelson Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano Basam, Maria Chan, Romeo
Barrios, Azucena Diaz, Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo Marcelo, Armando San Miguel,
Salvador Pangilinan and John Does of the following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation
of Public Funds; (b) Multiple Falsification of Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official
Functions; (d) Violation of Election Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
1.1. Brillantes complaint was based on the initial findings and observations of the COA
on the examination of the cash and accounts covering transactions from April 1, 1987
to January 4, 1988 and Post-Audit of Selected Accounts for the last quarter of 1987 of
the Municipality of Makati contained in its Report dated January 11, 1988. The COA
furnished the Tanodbayan a copy of this report on August 1, 1988 upon request of the
latter.
1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a copy of the report, the Tanodbayan was
informed that this COA audit report of January 11, 1988 is not yet released since the
Mayor of Makati was given thirty days within which to explain/clarify the findings in the
126
report and is subject to change or modification depending upon the
explanation/clarification to be submitted by the Mayor of Makati. Because of this
information from the COA the preliminary investigation was held in abeyance until the
submission of the final report.
1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the Final Report on Audit of Makati was received
by the Office of the Ombudsman and was transmitted for purposes of the ensuring
preliminary investigation to the Tanodbayan which received the same on March 22,
1989.
1.4. This first part of the Final Report contained the fifteen (15) adverse findings, above
elsewhere stated as the basis of Bobby Brillantes complaint.
1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated in the documentation and analysis of its
findings and preparation of the final report.
1.6. The first part of the final report was followed by a Supplemental Report on Findings
No. 1 and 3. This Supplemental Report is dated July 3, 1989.
2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous documents supporting the COA
findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio, Chairman of the Panel of Prosecutors, issued the
corresponding subpoena directing the respondents to submit their respective counter-
affidavits.
2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted his counter-
affidavit on May 18, 1990, Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon, Nicanor Santiago, Jr. on
June 19, 1990, Renato Manrique on June 4, 1990, Alfredo Ignacio on June 6, 1990,
Roberto Chang on August 27, 1990. Feliciano Bascon submitted his Supplemental
Affidavit on November 22, 1990.
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations were conducted on September 27, 1990,
October 26, 1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990.
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted a copy of this Petition for
Certiorari in G.R. No. 92380 which he and the municipality of Makati filed with the
Supreme Court against COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the Commission on
Audit, with a manifestation that said petition is submitted to support Binays stand as
regard COA Finding No. 9 aforestated.
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed an affidavit containing allegations
incriminating Jejomar Binay;
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April 2, 1992 affidavit of Marissa Chan,
Jejomar Binay submitted his comment thereto on April 30, 1992.
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel submitted to the Deputy Special
Prosecutor its Resolution disposing the preliminary investigation of the case.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution was approved by the Special Prosecutor,
who forwarded the same and the entire records to the Office of the Ombudsman for
review and/or final action.
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel of the Ombudsman submitted to the latter its review
action for approval.
6.3. On August 19, 1994, the Ombudsman approved some of the recommendations of the
Review Panel and directed the preparation and filing of the informations.[50]
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA);
it must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable
cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct it s own review of the COA findings. Judging
from said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of
time for their resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 29, 1995
denying the Motion to Quash:
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the prosecution, unable to rely on the raw
findings of the Commission on Audit in 15 reports caused the investigation and examination of
thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents considering that no less than the
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team members
had to take part in the conduct of a final audit consisting of evaluation and analysis of the initial
findings in the 15 raw reports, the cases must have involved complicated legal and factual
issues which do warrant or justify a longer period of time for preliminary investigation.
xxx
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to three (3) years from
the time all the counter-affidavits were submitted to the Tanodbayan, notwithstanding the fact
that very few documentary and testimonial evidence were involved. In the above-entitled cases,
the preliminary investigation of all ten (10) cases was terminated in merely two (2) years and
four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay filed his last pleading, on April 30, 1992.[51]
Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his suspension pendente
lite is unwarranted since the informations charging him were not valid. This contention,
however, must fail in view of our pronouncement that there was no delay in the resolution of the
subject cases in violation of his right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the informations in
question are valid an petitioners suspension pendente lite must be upheld.
Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the subject cases is a
question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of such
discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise thereof.[52] Petitioner in this case has failed
to establish any such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.
III
Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will now dispose of the following issues
raised by them:
(1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an information alleging the
same facts with the Regional Trial Court.
(2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the Sandiganbayan considering
that they had already filed another information alleging the same facts before the Regional Trial
Court.
(3) The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy.
The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals with the questions of duplicity of
information and forum shopping.
127
Petitioners invoke the rule that the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of such character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.[53] They claim that the filing of the information in
the Sandiganbayan was a subsequent happening or event which cannot oust the RTC of its
jurisdiction.
This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the information was filed before the RTC,
R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to
the Sandiganbayan.
Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is determined by law, not by the
consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel.[54] As a consequence of this principle, the
Court held in Zamora vs. Court of Appeals[55] that:
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has no jurisdiction over it
does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later with the competent court. The
plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply because it made a mistake before in the choice of
the proper forum. In such a situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a contrary conclusion would allow a party
to divest the competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately, in
derogation of the law.
It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases[56] that estoppel prevents a party from
questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself invoked. Estoppel, however,
remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is vested by
law.[57] Even in those instances where the Court applied estoppel, the party estopped
consistently invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the proceedings,
impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. This is not the case
here. After discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in the RTC, respondents
promptly asked the trial court to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan, which motion was
followed by a motion to resolve the previous motion. There was no consistent invocation of the
RTCs jurisdiction. There were no further proceedings after the filing of the information save for
the motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the motion to
resolve the earlier motion. Finally, the trial court had not rendered any decision, much less one
adverse to petitioners.
Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not themselves party
to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the plaintiff, for the commission of a crime
is an offense against the State. Thus, the complaint or information filed in court is required to
be brought in the name of the People of the Philippines.[58] Even then, the doctrine of estoppel
does not apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions.[59] Violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder,[60] is a public offense. Social and public interest
demand the punishment of the offender; hence, criminal actions for public offenses can not be
waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of estoppel.[61]
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy
even though they had already pleaded not guilty to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The
first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent
jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that
had no jurisdiction.[62] The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the quashal of
the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy.[63] Their
remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.[64]
The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan violated the rule against
duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule presupposes that there is one
complaint or information charging not one offense, but two or more offenses. Thus, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except
only in those cases in which existing laws prescribed a single punishment for various offenses.
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information
under Rule 117:
Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
xxx
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
xxx
Here, petitioners are faced not with one information charging more than one offense but
with more than one information charging one offense.
The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-shopping. Broadly speaking, forum
shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions
or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition.[65]We discern no intent on the part of the State, in filing two
informations in two different courts, to gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.
Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set of officials, after investigating a
complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas charging petitioners of overpricing,
filed the information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the RTC. Another set of
officials investigated another complaint from the Concerned Citizens Group accusing petitioners
of, among others, overpricing the same project subject of the previous complaint. Finding
probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal action, charging the same
offense and alleging essentially the same facts as the first, this time in the Sandiganbayan. Later
learning of the procedural faux pas, respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to refer
the case to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED
128

G.R. No. L-35612-14 June 27, 1973
NORBERTO MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, GUMACA
BRANCH, PRESIDED OVER BY THE HONORABLE JUAN MONTECILLO, and THE
PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF QUEZON PROVINCE,respondents.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Feliciano Landicho for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. for respondents.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
Our resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing these petitions for habeas
corpus, certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit is sought to be reconsidered. It was
our ruling that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that his confinement
was marked by illegality or that the order cancelling the bail previously issued was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It is to credit of his able counsel, former Senator
Estanislao Fernandez, that his fight for provisional liberty is carried on with a further
manifestation of skilled scholarly effort, but such valiant attempt to secure his release
is doomed to fail. The law, as will hereafter be set forth, points to the contrary.
Deference to its command precludes a reconsideration. This resolution will likewise
briefly touch upon the question of why the issuance of a brief dismissal order does not
in any wise offend against the constitutional provision requiring that no decision "shall
be rendered by any court of record without on which it is based." 1
1. Habeas corpus could be invoked by petitioner if he were able to show the illegality
of his detention. There is aptness and accuracy in the characterization of the writ of
habeas corpus as the writ of liberty. Rightfully it is latitudinarian in scope. It is wide-
ranging and all embracing in its reach. It can dig deep into the facts to assure that there
be no toleration of illegal restraint. Detention must be for a cause recognized by law.
The writ imposes on the judiciary the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether a
deprivation of physical freedom is warranted. This it has to discharge without loss of
time. The party who is keeping a person in custody has to produce him in court as soon
as possible. What is more, he must justify the action taken. Only if it can be
demonstrated that there has been no violation of one's right to liberty will he be
absolved from responsibility. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must
thereby cease.
The above formulation of what is settled law finds no application to the present
situation. Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in accordance with a warrant of arrest
properly issued after a determination by the judge in compliance with the constitutional
provision requiring the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses produced. 2 No allegation to the contrary may be entertained. It cannot
be denied that petitioner's co-accused, Nelso Unal, Hermogenes Lumanglas and
Leopoldo Trinidad, had previously come to this court to challenge the filing of one
information where there were three victims. Accordingly, this Court, in Unal v.
People, 3 required three separate amended informations. There was no question,
however, as to the legality of the warrants of arrest previously issued, not only in the
case of the parties in such petition, but likewise of petitioner. Habeas corpus, under the
circumstances, would not therefore lie." 4
2. Even if it be granted that petitioner may not be released on a habeas corpus
proceeding, is he, however, entitled to bail? Precisely that is the remedy by which,
notwithstanding the absence of any flaw in one's confinement, provisional liberty may
still be had. Such a remedy, as a matter of fact, was granted him in accordance with
an order of the municipal court of Mulanay. Thereafter, however, the bail was revoked
by the Court of First Instance in the order now challenged. Such actuation he would
now condemn as a grave abuse of discretion. In the landmark decision of Chief Justice
Concepcion, People v. Hernandez, 5 the right to bail was rightfully stress as an aspect
of the protection accorded individual freedom which, in his eloquent language," is too
basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, ...." 6 To be more
matter of fact about it, there is this excerpt from de la Camara v. Enage 7 "Before
conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offense when the
evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter
he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not
beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime,
especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and
thus frustrate the hearing of his cage. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an
intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a mode short of confinement
which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused for the
subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right to one
charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is,
rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an
ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be
resisted." 8
The precise question however, is whether once the provisional liberty has been thus
obtained, it could be terminated by the cancellation of the bail. In the answer filed on
behalf of respondent Court, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza did stress the absence
of authority on the part of special counselor Antonio R. Robles who was not authorized
to intervene in this case on behalf of the state but did so, his failure to object being the
129
basis of the bail granted by the municipal court of Mulanay, Quezon. Such an allegation
was denied by petitioner. We are not called upon to rule definitely on this aspect as
independently thereof, there are two other basic objections. One was that petitioner,
when the bail was granted, was still at large. The municipal court, therefore, could not
have granted bail in accordance with our ruling in Feliciano v. Pasicolan. 9 Thus: "'The
constitutional mandate that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to the limitation
that the person applying for bail should be in custody of the law, or otherwise deprived
of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous
as to grant bail to one who is free.'" 10 Secondly, and what is worse, the prosecution
was never given a chance to present its evidence. The authoritative doctrine in People
v. San Diego 11 is thus squarely in point: "Whether the motion for bail of a defendant
who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in summary proceeding or in the
course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within
a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the Court
should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant
special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would
be a violation of procedural due process, and order of the Court granting bail should
be considered void." 12
Nor is the San Diego ruling novel. As far back as 1958, in People v. Raba, 13 it was
held: "Considering that Talantor did not serve notice of his motion to reduce bail on the
provincial fiscal at least three days before the hearing thereof and the court failed to
require that a reasonable notice thereof be given to said fiscal, it is evident that the
court acted improperly in reducing the bail without giving the fiscal an opportunity to be
heard" 14 Just after San Diego, this Court had occasion to stress anew such a principle
in People v. Bocar. 15 As set forth in the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes: "It cannot be
denied that, under our regime of laws, and concomitant with the legal presumption of
innocence before conviction, an accused is entitled to provisional liberty on bail, the
only exception being when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his
guilt is strong. But even in the latter instance, the high regard reserved by the law for
personal freedom is underscored by the provision placing upon the prosecution, not on
the defense, the burden of proving that the accused is not entitled to bail. This
protective attitude towards the sanctity of the liberty of a person notwithstanding, due
process also demands that in the matter of bail the prosecution should be afforded full
opportunity to present proof of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the
prosecution in this case was deprived of the right to present its evidence against the
bail petition, or that the order granting such petition was issued upon incomplete
evidence, then the issuance of the order would really constitute grave abuse of
discretion that would call for the remedy of certiorari." 16
The last sentence in the above excerpt finds application in the matter before us. No
grave abuse of discretion yo justify the grant of the writ certiorari prayed for has been
shown. That is why our resolution sought to be reconsidered should stand.
3. That brings us to the point raised in the motion for reconsideration objecting to our dismissing
the petition through a minute resolution. It is his contention that there should be an extended
decision. As noted at the outset, reliance is had on the constitutional provision requiring a
decision by a court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based." According to a recent decision, Jose v. Santos, 17 what is expected of the judiciary
"is that the decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law
to the facts as established. Nor is there any regid formula as to the language to be employed to
satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this
respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which
he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution
directs." 18 What must then be stressed is that under such a provision as held in the early case
of Soncuya v. National Investment Board, 19 the decision spoken of is the judgment rendered
after the previous presentation of the proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case upon a stipulation
of facts upon which its disposition is to be based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v.
Henares, 20 the above decision was cited with approval, with the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes
containing the following. "Plaintiff-appellant assigns as another error that the order appealed
from does not contain any statement of the facts and the law on which it is based. Obviously,
this is based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution. The contention is untenable, since these provisions have been held to refer only
to decisions of the merit and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters such as
the one at bar." 21
It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if the situation
is subjected, to searching analysis, it cannot be denied that what is really involved is just a mere
incident in the prosecution of petitioner Had he prevailed, he would have been entitled to
provisionary liberty. Under the circumstances, as the facts of the clearly demonstrate, with the
plea for habeas corpus be unavailing, we felt that a minute resolution which certainly would
require less time than a full-blown decision, was not inappropriate. Precisely, the leniency
shown the parties dwell at length on their respective contentions should disprove any suspicion
that the decision arrived at was reached without according the parties the fundamental fairness
to which they are entitled under the Constitution. Since, at the most, the relief sought by
petitioner will not, in any way, foreclose the ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way
or the other, we deemed that the constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call for
application. In that sense, a minimum resolution certainly cannot be stigmatized as in any wise
failing to abide by a constitutional command.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied, our resolution of January 26, 1973
dismissing the petitions for of merit reiterated and the temporary restraining order issue by us
on October 16, 1973 lifted so that the case against petitioner can be duly heard forthwith.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
130